Peczenick, The Binding Force of Precedent, La Fuerza Vinculante Del Precedente

7/27/2019 Peczenick, The Binding Force of Precedent, La Fuerza Vinculante Del Precedente

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t r rerences and vanahons sketched above_refled the influpncee n tet t i ..60 upor . u . ways whict i cour ts maleeprecedents . Beyond these d i f fe rences , and notwi thstandingrpor tance, the ma ssive and intensive use of precedents i s aand growing trend in all the mo dem systems of justice.ce s'Taking Civil Codes Less Seriously ' , Modem Law Review, p.1 (1987).i c k , D.N. a nd Sum m e rs , R.S . ( e ds ) (1991) , Interpreting Statutes A Com-Study, Ald ersh o t : Dar tmo u th .'F r e nc h a nd Am e r ic a n Jud ic ia l Opin ions ' , Y ate Journal of International Law ,(1994).

1 4 The Binding Force ofPrecedentALEKSANDER PECZENIK, LUND*

1 Introductory RemarksAll s tudents of com parat ive law know that historical ly com m on law(in the UK , USA and so on) is to a great extent based on precedents ,whereas the Rom an Germ anic (cont inental , ' c ivil ') law has beenm ost ly based on s ta tutes . They also know that precedents are for-m ally binding in the comm on law countries on all courts below thehighes t cour ts . Tha t is , it i s lega l e r ror no t to fo l low upper c our tprecedent and such failure will ordinarily be reversed on appea l. Inthe highest cour ts , the precedents set by those cour ts also have s t rongnorm at ive force , even though there i s no poss ibi li ty of reversal onappeal. But in countries of the Europe an continent, precedent is notthus form al ly binding, yet i t i s a fact that p recedents are regular lyfollowed by the co urts. This fact also explains why som e jurists saythat precedents in the continental legal systems are binding de facto,but not de jure.Only very special kinds of precedents in a few continental systemsare binding de jure. Thus, in Germ any, precedents establ ished by theFederal Consti tutional Court are recognized as form ally binding onthe cour ts below. Ordinary precedents es tabl ished by the FederalCourt of Jus t ice are not form al ly binding but they have to be fol -lowed except where special reasons can be shown to the contrary. InPoland, the s i tuat ion is s imilar . The resolut ions of the Const i tut ionalTribunal, establishing generally binding interpretations of statutes,are the only cand idates for the role of form al ly ( legal ly) bindingprecedents for the courts below. Legal principies established by theP o l i s h Su p r e m e C o u r t d o n o t f o r m a l ly b in d th e c o u r t s b u t h a v enormat ive force. T h i s co n ce r n s p a r t i cu l a rl y t h o s e o f t h e S u p r em e

1 am grateful to Aulis Aarnio and Robert Alexy for al l the help and inspirat ion Ireceived during our discussions about the topics dealt with in the present chapter.46 1


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462 InterPreting Preced entshe B inding Force of Precedent 46 3C o u r t r e s o l u t i o n s w h i c h h a v e g a i n e d t h e s t a t u s o f l e g a l p r i n c i p i e s .Where a legal principie has been established, the Supreme Courtcannot depart from that principie simply by passing a judgmentcontradic tory to i t , but can only do so i f i t s ta te s an adequa te j us t i f i -c a t ion fo r a n a l te rna t ive v ie w of the la w. Thus o rd ina ry judgm e nts o ft h e P o l i sh Su p r e m e C o u r t a n d Su p r e m e A d m i n i st r a t iv e C o u r t a r epre c e de n ts in the se nse tha t the y ha ve fo rc e in la te e a na logous c a se s ,or p rov ide ' fu r ther supp or t ' in t he sense o f add i r tg weigh t t o o therl e g a l ly r e l e v a n t a r g u m e n t s f o r t h e d e c i s i o n h a n d e d d o w n . I n S p a i n ,too, precedents of the Constitutional Court can be considered asfo rm a l ly b ind ing fo r a l l o the r c our t s . The y m us t a l so be fo l lowe d bythe Constitutional Court itself except if it offers some sufficientreason for chang ing i t s own p r ior ru l ing (s) . P r ior j udgem ents of theSpa nish Supre m e Cour t on ly ha ve fo rc e o r p rov ide fu r the r suppor t .D e c i s i o n s o f t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s i n N e w Y o r k , b y c o n t r a s t , a r eformally binding - binding as a matter of law - on intermediatea ppe l la te c our t s a nd o n the t r ia l c our t s o f ge ne ra l ju r i sd ic t ion wi th inNe w York S ta te , a nd so a r e de c is ions o f the House o f Lords in r e la -tion to the Court of Appeal and the lower courts of the relevaraju r i sd ic t ions wi th in the Uni te d K ingdorn . Thus de c is ions to the c on-t r a ry by c our t s be low a re no t la wfu l , a nd wi l l be r e ve r se d on a ppe a l .These h ighes t - l eve l cour t s can , i ndeed , recons ider t he i r own p r io rd e c i s i o n s a n d d o o c c a s i o n a l ly d e p a r t f r o m o r o v e r r u l e t h e r n o n t h eground of carefully weighed and argued reasons, but, in the con-c e p ts a nd te m -dnology of th i s s tudy, the se a r e no t fo rma l ly b inc im gon the highest courts, for no appeal lies to a higher court. All thes a m e , t h e h i g h e s t c o u r t s t r e a t t h e ir o w n d e c i s i o n s a s h a v i n g s t r o n gnorma t ive fo rc e . So f a r a s c on c e rns c our t s lowe r in the h ie r a r c hy, thepre c e de n ts se t by the se lowe r t r ibuna ls p rov ide e xa m ple s o f 've r t ic a l'formally binding precedents. And in relation to their own earlierde c is ions , the y ha ve the powe r to de p a r t f rom or ove r ru le the i r ownprecedents on a re s t r ic ted range of g rounds , and for s t rong reasons ,but mus t o the rwise a c c e p t the m a s b ind ing in la w.2 The Normativity of Following P r e c e d e n tAs the in t roduc tory remarks indica te , th is chapte r ma inly addressesa number of d is t inc t ions concerning the na ture of the force tha t canbe asc r ibed to precedents . I t does so in the l ight of r e sponses in thec ount ry-by-c oun t ry c ha p te r s p rom pte d by que s t ion I I .1 subm i t te d toa u thor s a nd c o-a u tho r s o f the c oun t ry c ha p te r s ( se e Appe n dix ) . I t ismate r ia l to repea t the key concepts and te rminology of the quest ionin full here .

I I .1 W e m a y use fu l ly d i f f e r e n t ia te b ind ingne ss , f o r c e , f u r the r sup-port, and il lustra tiveness or other value of a precedent as follows:(1) Formal bindingness: a judgm e nt no t r e spe c t i r ig a p r e c e de n t 'sb ind ingne ss i s no t la wfu l a nd so i s sub je c t to r e ve r sa l on a pp e a l .Dis t ingu ishforma l b ind ingne ss no t sub je c t to ove r ru l ing: ( i ) 'S t r ic tlyb ind ing ' - mus t be app l i ed in every case; (u ) de fe a s ib lybinding - must be applied in every case unless excep-t ions a pp ly (e xc e p t ions ma y be w e l l de f ine d o r no t ) ;f o r m a l b i n d i n g n e s s ( w i t h o r w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n s ) t h a t i ssub je c t to ove r ru l ing o r m odi f ic a tion .(2) N ot form ally binding b ut having force: a judgm e nt no t r e spe c t -ing a p re c e de n t ' s f o r c e , though la wfu l , i s sub je c t to c r i t ic i sm onthis ground, and may be subject to reversal on this ground.Dis t ingu ishdefeas ib l e fo rce - shou ld be app l i ed un les s excep t ionsc o m e h i t o p l a y ( e x c ep t i o n s m a y o r m a y n o t b e w e l l d e -fined);o u t w e i g h a b l e f o r c e - s h o u l d b e a p p l i e d u n l e s s c o u n t e r -va i l ing r e a sons a pp ly .N ot form ally b inding and not having f orce (as d efined in 2) b utproviding further support: a j u d g m e n t l a c k i n g t h i s i s s t i ll l a w f u la nd m a y s t i l l be jus t i fie d , bu t no t a s we l l jus t i f ie d a s i t would beif the precedent were invoked, for example, to show that thede c is ion be ing r e a c he d ha rm onize s w i th the p re c e de n t .M ere illustratvenes s or other value.

A critic of the present project could legitimately ask whether thefo re go ing d ra ws d is t inc t ions tha t a r e too soph is t ic a te d . Would the sedis t inc t ions 'even be unders tood by the ve ry j udges whose prac t icethey a re supposed to h e lp us ana lyse? Are any of these d is t inc t ionsa c tua l ly e xpre sse d in so m a ny words by c our t s o r by sc ho la r s?Se t t i r tg a s ide the que s t ion o f the i r be ing unde r s tood , we c a n r e a d -ily concede that some of the terms and perhaps even some of thec onc e p ts se t f o r th a bo ye a r e no t use d in jud ic ia l o r sc ho la r ly d isc us-s i o n s o f p r e c e d e n t . N o t e v e n i n t h e U K , w h e r e p e r h a p s t h e r e i s t h erichest practice of analysis of precedent internally in the judicialproc e ss , a r e the se d is t inc t ions d ra wn e xp l ic i tly by the c our t s . The re -fore categorizing a decision in the stipulated terrns depends oni n t erp re t ing the p rac t i ce o f t he judges in the l igh t o f a concep tua lf r a rne work inde pe nde n t ly e s ta b l ishe d . In the U ni te d S ta te s (he re r e p-resented by New York) judicial language seem s to be even less explici tin th i s r e spe c There is se ldorn any explic it judic ia l discussion of thed is t inc t ion be twe e n fo rm a l b ind ingne ss a nd me re norm a t ive fo rc e o fa lower orde r . Moreo ver , to the ex tent the re is , the la t te r i s usua l ly


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464 Interpreting Preced entshe B inding Force of Precedent 46 5referred to merely as 'persuasive authority', rather than 'binding'au thor i ty . Nor i s t here much exp l i c i t d i scuss ion o f any d i s t inc t ionbe tween mere ' force ' and ' fur the r suppor t ' . By ana logy , the d is t inc -t i o n b e t w e e n ' d e f e a s ib l e ' a n d ' o u t w e i g h a b l e ' f o r c e i s n o t e x p l i c i tl ydisc usse d by the judge s e i the r .In o the r sys te ms , the c our t s a r e e ve n le ss e xp l ic it . Europe a n Com -m u n i t y l a w d o e s n o t c o n t a i n t h e s e s o r t s o f d i s t in c t i o n s c o n c e r n i n gthe case law. Not even schola r s d iscuss the E CJ 's dec is ions in thesete rms. In F rance and in Spa in such dis t inc t ions a re not made e i the r .T h e o n l y d i s c u s s i o n i n S p a i n , b y n o m e a n s a n e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s io n ,has been bas ica l ly theore t ica l , dea l ing with the t r adi t iona l quest ionof the c ha ra c te r o f jud ic ia l p r e c e de n t a s a sourc e o f la w. In I ta ly i t i su n c o m m o n f o r t h e d e g r e e o f f o r c e o r b i n d i n g n e ss o f a p r e c e d e n t ' t obe e xp l ic i t ly d isc usse d in jud ic ia l op in ions . The c ou r t s in c on t ine n ta lsystems do not differentiate clearly, as far as precedents are cdn-cerned, be tween (a ) having force , (b) providing fur the r suppor t and( c ) m e re ly i llus t r a tive va lue . In Ge rma n y, o the rwise we l l known fo r avery theoretical approach to the law, the situation is similar : differ ingde gre e s o f norm a t ive be a r ing o f p r e c e de n t a r e se ldom e xp l ic i t ly d is -c usse d in jud ic ia l de c is ions . Norm a l ly , judge s do no t e ve n m a ke a nyge ne ra l r e m a rks on th is . In Nord ic c oun t r ie s the a c tua l p r a c t ic e ge n-erally fi ts the definit ion s t ipulated for 'not forznally binding but havingf o r c e ' . I n P o l a n d n e i t h e r t h e l a w n o r d o c t r i n e u s e s t h e f i n e d i s t i n c -t ions be tween precedents 'having force ' , 'p roviding fur the r suppor t 'a nd be ing 'm e re ly i l lus t r a t ive ' . Not e ve n sc ho la r s use suc h la ngua ge .The c r i t ic 's ob je c t ion m us t be r e je c te d , howe ve r . Eve n thoug h thepresent distinctions are not explicitly or at all used by judges orschola r s , th is does not make them use less , though i t does require usto j us t i fy the wor th we ho ld them to h ave . Even thoug h they c lea r lyt ranscend judic ia l or o the r se l f -unders tanding in any s ing le sys tem,they are a valuable tool for rationally reconstructing practices ofde c is ion m a king. Th is i s e spe c ia l ly so in the c on te x t o f a n a t te mpt totease out and to understand differences as well as similarities be-t w e e n d i v e r s e s y s t e m s a n d t r a d i t i o n s o f l a w . I t m u s t b e s a i d c l e a r l ythat the comparisons we draw are not confined to, or mainly ad-d r e s s e d t o , c o m p a r i n g t h e j u d i c i a l u s e o f l a n g u a g e ( i n d e e d , o i l t h ev a r i o u s n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s i n u s e i n t h e s y s t e m s w e s t u d y ) . R a t h e r ,our concern is with practices of precedent. A useful language ofc ompa r ison ha s to be a k ind o f 'me ta la ngua ge ' , c on ta in ing te rms a ndd i s t inc t ions no t p resen t , o r no t a r t i cu la t ed , i n any o f t he par t i cu larobjec t languages of j udic ia l prac t ice and sc hola r ly doc tr ine in te rna lt o p a r t i c u l a r s y st e m s i n t h e i r o r d i n a r y f u n c t io n i n g . T h u s s o m e s u c hrational reconstruction of practices, in some such concepts, is anecessity.

3 Binding De Facto?The f a c t i s tha t the a u thor s o f the c oun t ry-by-c oun t ry c ha p te r s in ours t u d y h a v e g e n e r a l l y a t t e m p t e d t o use t h e s e d i s t i n c t io n s u n d e r a snearly as possible a common understanding of them. In order tounde r s ta nd the se c ha p te r s p rope r ly , some fu r the r c onc e p tua l c la r i fi -c a t ions ma y be he lp fu l .AH m a in va r ie t ie s o f norm a t ive be a r ing he re - f o rma l b ind ingne ss ,fo rc e a nd suppo r t - a r e norma t ive in the se nse tha t the y a r e ta ke n toind ic a te de gre e s o f jus t i f ic ato r ine ss o f the r e a sons ge ne ra te d by p re -cedent. The very expression 'non-normative force' seems to beproblematic, in some contexts even self-contradictory. This also posesprob le ms fo r wha t i s a qu ite c omm only use d e xpre ss ion in a num be rof c oun t r ie s , na m e ly 'b ind ing de f a c to ' a n e xpre ss ion tha t i s , in suc hcountr ies, a lso contrasted with 'formally binding', or binding de jure .The e xpre ss ion 'b ind ing de f a c to ' se e ms to im ply tha t the p re c e de n tsh av e n o n o rmat iv e fo rce , n o ju s t if i ca to r in es s , b u t h av e to b e fo l lo wedt o t h e e x t e n t a t l e a s t t h a t t h e y a r e i n f a c t u s u a l l y f o l l o w e d . S u c h av i e w m a y b e t h e o r e t ic a l ly n a i v e o r i t m a y b e a c c o m p a n i e d b y s o m esophis t ic a te d the or ie s . For e xa mple , a the or i s t m a y a dop t a n e x te rna lpoint of view with regard to legal practice. A theorist may thusin te rpre t the express ion 'de fac to b indingness ' a s r e fe r r ing to somesta t is t ica l regula r i ty , supposing i t to be es tabl ished em pir ica l ly tha tjudges regular ly follow cer ta in ( types of) precedents. A theorist maya l s o s t a t e t h a t t h e ' d e f a c t o f o r c e ' o f t h e p r e c e d e n t s m e a n s t h a t t h epre c e de n t i s ( a pa r t o f ) the mo t iva t iona l ba s i s o f the judge . Th is wa s ,fo r ins ta nc e , A lf Ross 's ide a , in h is the ory a bou t the norma t ive ide o l -ogy of the judge . Thus Ro ss ' s the ory wa s a n e x te rna ] de sc r ip t ion o fthe in te rna l point of v iew of the j udges . In th is pe r spec t ive , r e spec tfo r p reced en t h as o n ly a 'p sych o lo g ica l fo rce ' in th e d ec i s io n m ak in g .Howe ve r , a ny non-norm a t ive in te rp reta t ion o f 'b ind ing de f a c to ' i scontra ry to the lawyers ' in te rna! unders tanding of lega l prac t ice insom e c oun t r ie s . The re a r e a t l e a s t som e c on te x ts in whic h i t i s se l f -contradic to ry ; for most o th e rs i t i s theore t ica l ly uninte res t ing . I t i sc o n t r a r y t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e h i g h e s t c o u r ts i n s e v e r a l s y s t e m s m a yi s su e gu id e lin es wi th so me n o rm at iv e fo rce , reco mm en d in g th a t su b -se que n t c our t s fo l low a p re c e de n t o r c la ss o f p r e c e de n ts , pe rha ps onthe ba s is o f s ta tu to ry a u thor iza t ion . In suc h c a se s , norm a t ive fo rc e i sprospe c t ive . The cour t i s t ry ing to . a f fec t the fu ture prac t ice . Hereonly a norm a t ive c onc e p t ion o f b ind ingne ss , fo r c e o r suppor t i s pos-sible. There is no s tat is t ical or other regulari ty to be referrec l to .T o b e s u r e , t h e s i t u a t io n m a y b e t h e o t h e r w a y a r o u n d . A j u d g ede c id ing a subse que n t c a se looks ba c k , f in to the pa s t , a nd fo l lows apat t e rn es t ab l i shed in a p rev ious dec i s ion , regard les s o f t he i s suewhe the r o r no t the p r io r c our t i s sue d a ny c omm a nd or r e c omm e nda -


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466 lnterpreting Precedents T he B inding Force of Precedent 46 7t ion a ddre sse d to lowe r o r subse que n t c o ur t s . He re , f rom the po in t o fview of the later court, the precedent may either be conceived ash a v i n g n o r m a t i v e f o r c e o r m a y b e c o n c e i v e d m e r e l y a s a f a c tu a l l yavailable model of decision, in some way influential as suc h . Buteven i f the la t te r i s the case , the express ion 'b inding de fac to ' i s se l f -c on t r a d ic to ry , be c a use the ve ry word 'b ind ing ' ind ic a te s a norm a t ivef o r c e , w h i c h i s s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h e m e r e f a c t o f f o ll o w i n g t h eprecedent. Indeed, it indicates that what is going on is taken to bejust ificatory.Th e n o n -n o rm at iv e co n cep t io n o f b in d in gn ess d e fac to i s a l so th eo r-e t ica l ly uninte res t ing because i t leaves out the reaso ns for fo l lowingpre c e de n ts . I f a p r a c t ic e i s f o l lowe d fo r c e r ta in r e a sons , the se r e a sonsm u s t h a v e s o m e n o r m a t i v e c h a r a c t er . A n d s u r e l y c o u r t s t h a t f o ll o wprecedents must be presurned to have some reason for doing so.O t h e r w i s e , t h e p r a c t ic e o f f o l l o w i n g p r e c e d e n t s w o u l d a p p e a r t o b ei r ra t i o n a l a n d i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e . N o d o u b t , t h e j u d g e s o f t e n f o l l o wp r e c e d e n t s a n d f e e l m o t i v a t e d t o d o s o , b u t i t i s d i f f i c u lt t o b e l i e v etha t the y do no t a l so c ons ide r th i s m ot iva t ion , e xp l ic it ly o r impl ic i t ly ,to be r igh t on a c c ount o f som e s ta ta b le , e ve n i f no t s ta te d , norm a t ivegrounds. I f so , precedents have a k ind of normat ive force . A mere lye x p l a n a t o r y a p p r o a c h s u c h a s t h a t o f R o s s c a n n o t p r o v i d e a n y h i n ta s to the na tu re o f th i s fo r c e .

Any o f t he fo l lowing migh t be o f fered as a ju s t i fy ing reason fo rfo l lowing p re c e de n t : the p ra c t ic e o f the p re c e de n t -m a king c our t ; thepractice of the precedent-applying court; the common opinion oflega l schola r s ; the expec ta t ions of the pa r t ie s ; and of course aA theva r ious r a t iona les fo r fo l lowing p re c e de n t r e c i te d in the va r ious c oun-try chapters and discussed in detail in Chapter 15. So-called'bindingness de facto' may thus explicitly or implicitly derive itsn o r m a t i v e c h a r a c t e r f r o m v a r i o u s p r a c t i c e s a n d g e n e r a l r a t i o n a l e s ,none itself a formally established legal norm such as is in issuewhere const i tu t iona l or s ta tu tory provis ions provide tha t precedentsa re to be fo l lowe d in c e r ta in c ond i t ions .As a n e xa m ple o f impl ic i t ly norma t ive c ha ra c te r in the b ind ingne ssof p r e c e de n ts , one m a y r e f e r to the Swe dish s i tua t ion . Swe dish p re c -e de n ts a r e no t fo rm a l ly b ind ing ye t , a c c ord ing to the Code o f Jud ic ia lP r o c e d u r e , t h e Sw e d i s h Su p r e m e C o u r t m u s t g r a n t certiorari to e n-able appeals to be brought before it in cases where it is importanttha t a genera l ru l ing be g iven by way of precedent for j udic ia l prac -t i c e . T h is s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s io n w o u l d b e m e a n i n g l e s s i f s u c h g e n e r a lr u l i n g l a c k e d a n y l c in d o f n o r m a t i v i t y . T h u s o n e m a y c o n c l u d e t h a tthe Code impl ie s th i s norm a t iv i ty , w i thou t e xp l ic i t ly p rov id ing fo r i t .From all this it follows that the expression 'binding de facto' asused in var ious coun t r i es mus t no t be in t erp re t ed l i t e ra l ly . On anyreasonable in te rpre ta t ion, i t does no t indica te lack of norm at iv i ty . I t

only indica tes tha t the normat ive reasons for fo l lowing precedentsa r e d i f fe r e n t f r o m , a n d i n s o m e s e n s e s o m e w h a t w e a k e r t h a n , t h er e a sons fo r fo l lowing o r c omp lying wi th o the r le ga l p rov is ions suc ha s le gis la t ion , subord ina te le gis la t ion o r a r t ide s o f a c ons t i tu t ion , a l lo f w h i c h w e m a y s u p p o s e t o b e ' f o rm a l l y b i n d i n g ' in a n y c o n t e m -pora ry le ga l sys te m.4 N o n - f o r m a l L e g a l N o r r n a t iv i t yIn my view, one simple way to express the various kinds ofnormativity involved in formal 'bindingness', 'force' and 'furthersuppor t ' i s th is : preceden ts tha t a re forma l ly b inding , or b inding deju r e , mus t be r e ga rde d a s a u thor i ta t ive r e a sons fo r de c is ion in le ga la rgume nta t ion . Pre c e de n ts whic h a r e no t fo rma l ly b ind ing bu t whic hha ve fo rc e o r p rov ide fu r the r suppor t a r e r s t i l l one s whic h shou ld b euse d a s a u thor i ta t ive r e a sons in le ga l a rgume nta t ion . Re a sons whic hm e re ly ge ne ra te fo rc e , o r p rov ide fu r the r suppor t , a r e impor ta n t , bu tt hey are no t fo rmal ly b ind ing. That i s , fa i lu re to dec ide in accordwith such precede nt-based reasons w il l not usua l ly yie ld dec is ionstha t a re unlawful and which, i f appea led, wi l l be reversed. Indeed,m ost p r e c e de n ts in c on t ine n ta l sys te ms a r e o f th i s k ind . The sa me i st rue o f the a va i la b i l ity o f p r e c e de n ts f rom fore ign bu t c ogna te le ga lsys te ms , a s whe n a Da nish p re c e de n t migh t be ta ke n in to a c c oun t bya Swed ish co u r t , o r an Au s t ra l i an b y an En gl i sh .Thus p re c e de n ts whic h a r e b ind ing in a we a ke r se nse tha n fo rm a lor de jure should shit ' . be regarded as ha v ing the c ha ra c te r o f le ga l lyau thor i t a t ive reasons . They are reasons which shou ld be app l i ed ,a nd th is ' shou ld ' i s l e ga l in c ha ra c te r , a lbe i t no t in the s t r ic t se nse o fb ind ing de ju r e : tha t whic h in the p re se n t usa ge we c ha ra c te r ize a s ar e a s o n t h a t m u s t b e a p p l i e d a s a m a t t e r o f s t r ic t l e g a l r e qu i r e m e n tsuc h tha t de pa r tu re i s no t la wfu l a nd wi l l be r e ve r se d on a ppe a l . Thenorm a t ive fo rc e o f a ll p r e c e de n ts , e ve n those whic h a r e no t b ind ingd e j u r e , h a s t o b e d i s t in g u i s h e d f r o m t h a t o f s o - c a l l e d ' s u b s t a n t iv er e a sons ' , whose fo rc e i s de pe nde n t me re ly on the i r c on te n t , no t the i rform or or igin (or 'pedigree ') . On the contrary, i t is a legally authori-t a t iv e fo rce . B o th l ega l n o rms wh ich a re fo rm al ly b in d in g d e ju re an dthose whic h m e re ly ' shou ld ' be r e ga rde d a s a u thor i ta t ive r e a sons a r ea lso e xp la na to ry f a c to r s in the la w: one c a n , fo r e xa m ple , e xp la in thec on te n t o f a jud ic ia l de c is ion by the f a c t tha t i t ha s s ta tu to ry suppor t and one can explain i t by the fact that i t fo l lows a precedent.All this has interesting consequences for the structure of legalsys te ms in ge ne ra l . One m a y sa y tha t a le ga l sys te m m a y c ons is t o ftwo layers : norms which must be regarded as author i ta t ive reasonsin lega l a rgumenta t ion, tha t i s forma l ly b inding or b inding de j ure ,


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468 interpretzng erecedenrse ninding toree of Preceaent 46 9a n d n o r m s w h i c h m e r e l y should be r e ga rde d a s a u thor i ta t ive r e a sonsin lega l a rgumen ta t ion. Most types of precedents in cont inenta l sys-t e m s b e l o n g t o t h e l a t te r c a t e g o r y . I n c o m m o n l a w s y s t e m s , m u c hp r e c e d e n t i s f o rm a l l y b in d i n g ( d e j u r e ) a n d s o m e h a s l e s s e r n o r m a -t iv e fo rce .S t a t u t e s a n d c u s t o m h a d a s p e c i a l p o s i t io n i n t h e c l a s s i c a l c o n t i -ne n ta l doc t r ine o f the sourc e s o f la w in the n ine te e n th c e n tu ry . The yhad the power to create rights and duties of private persons; theya lso de te rm ined the l im i ts of lega l , tha t i s author i ta t ive , a rgumen ta -t io n ( c f . Mal t , 1 9 9 2 , p p .55 f f ) . Th e c las s ica l d o c t r in e a l so reco gn ized an u m b e r o f s e c o n d a r y s o u r c e s o f t h e l a w ( a r g u m e n t a t iv e a u x i l i a rytools) such as ' the nature of th ings ' , legal practice, travaux prparatoiresand foreign law (ibid. , p.52).Consequently, those legal sources which must be regarded asa u t h o r i t a t iv e r e a s o n s a r e m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h o s e w h i c h m e r e l yshould b e t h u s r e g a r d e d . T h e c o n c e p t ' m o r e i m p o r t a n t ' i m p l i e s t h efo l lowing.1 A m o r e i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e i s l e g a l ly a s t r o n g e r r e a s o n t h a n . a l e s simportant one. For example, statute is a stronger legal reasonthan a precedent in continental law. Sorne counter-argumentst h a t a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o o u t w e i g h a p r e c e d e n t a r e n o t s u f f i c i e n t t ooutweigh a s ta tu te .2 The hie ra rchy of lega l sources in th is sen se is mere ly protf is iona l ,p r ima fac ie . I f a co l l is io n o ccu rs b e tween a m o re imp o r tan t so u rcea nd a le ss imp or ta n t one , the fo rme r ha s p r io r i ty , i f no ou twe igh-ing reasons ex is t which reverse the pr ior i ty orden I f one ass ignspr ior i ty to a le ss impo r tant lega l source abo y e a m o r e i m p o r t a n to n e , o n e h a s t h e b u r d e n o f a r g u m e n t a t io n f o r t h i s p r i o r i ty . O u t -we igh ing r e a sons a r e thus r e qu i r e d to fo l low a p re c e de n t c on t r a ryto the p la in me a n ing o f a s ta tu te .3n s o m e l e g a l s y s t e m s , t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s o f w e i g h t h a v e i n s t it u -t ional consequences. In Sweden and Finland (but not, for example,i n D e n m a r k ) a j u d g e w h o i g n o r e s a b i n d i n g s t a tu t e c a n b e p r o s -ecuted (cf . Ch. 20 of Cr imina l Code ) . This is not t rue of a j udgewho ignore s a p r e c e de n t . (The se ins t i tu t iona l c onse que nc e s m a ybe perceived as intrinsic to the very sense of 'bindingness de

j u r e '. F r o m t h i s p o i n t o f v i e w , i t m a y b e a n a n o m a l y t o h a v e alegal system which recognizes formal bindingness, that , isbindingness de jure of a norm, and yet does not contain anys a n c t i o n f o r t h e b r e a c h o f s u c h a n o r m . I n t h i s p e r s p e c t iv a , t h eSwedish and F innish solu t ion appears na tura l , whi le the Danisho n e i s a k i n d o f lex imperfecta. But , on the o the r ha nd , th i s v ie w iscontroversial because criminal liability of a judge for havingneg lec ted a b inding norm is ex t remely na r row in lega l sys tems.

In the UK , whe re p re c e de r t t s a r e unque s t iona b ly b ind ing de ju r e ,the p re va i l ing c onc e p t ion o f jud ic ia l inde pe nde nc e p re c lude s a nyposs ib i li ty o f c iv i l o r c r imina l sa nc t ions be ing impo se d on a judgeon account of errors, however gross, committed in a judicialcapacity.)4 A prima facie more important legal source can, however, havel e ss we igh t tha n a numb e r o f le ss im por ta n t one s , in c umula t ion .I n s o m e s y s t e m s , a n u m b e r o f p r e c e d e n t s c a n t h u s j o i n t l y w e ig hmore than some s ta tu tes read according to the i r l i te ra l meaning .This point dese rv es fur the r e labora t ion. I t i s poss ib le to say tha tthe sound in te rpre ta t ion of the s ta tu te i s tha t which has a l readyt a ke n fu l ly in to a c c oun t the be a r ing o f p r e c e de n ts on i t . The s ta t -ute so interpreted then retains its priority over precedents.Howe ve r , th i s wa y of in te rp re t ing the s i tua t ion le a ds to a num be ro f p r o b l e m s w h i c h c a n n o t b e d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r . F o r e x -a mp le , one ha s to a r t swe r the on to logic a l que s t ion , ' In wha t se nsecan the in te rpre ted m eaning be regarded as ex is t ing pr ior to thejud ic ia l a c t o f in te rp re ta t ion? ' (Th is p r e -e x is te nc e would be poss-ible, if the act of interpretation were purely cognitive. On theother hand, i t would be im poss ib le , i f in te rpre ta t ive reasoning isc ons t i tu t ive , no t me re ly c ogn i t ive .)5 A counter-argtunent which 'wins' against a stronger source ofl a w m u s t b e s t ronge r tha n a c oun te r -a rgum e nt whic h i s su f f ic ie n tto w in a ga ins t a we a ke r one .

5 M o r e a b o u t t h e L e g a l C h a r a c t e r o f t h e N o r m a t i v e Be a r i n g o fPrecedent 'Having Force ' or P roviding 'Fur the r Suppor t 'The le ga l c ha ra c te r o f p r e c e de n t tha t i s no t fo rm a l ly b ind ing ye t ha sf o r c e o r p r o v i d e s f u r th e r s u p p o r t c a n b e s e e n i n a n u m b e r o f w a y s .F ir s t and foremost , such precedent-based reasons , s imply by vi r tueof jud ic ia l a nd o the r p r a c tic e s w i th in the sys te m, c om e to be ta ke n a sauthori tat ive reasons for decision: as having just ificatory s tatus withinthe sys te m. A se c ond wa y to gra sp the le ga l c ha ra c te r o f the norma -t iv e b ear in g o f p reced en t s ' h av in g fo rce ' o r p ro v id i r tg ' fu r th er su p p o r t 'is to consider how precedents share an important property of alllega l r easons , namely tha t they he lp to : exc lude some reasons f romthe un ive r se o f le ga l de te rmina t ive ne ss . I t i s obv ious tha t a fo rm a l lyb ind ing, a nd so undoub te d ly le ga l , p r e c e de n t e xc lude s a t l e a s t someconf l ic t ing reasons for dec is ion. Thus i t exc ludes contra ry substan-t ive r e a sons , f o r e xa mple . But e ve n non -forma l ly b ind ing p re c e de n t ,s u c h a s a p r e c e d e n t i n a c i v i l l a w c o u n t r y t h a t m e r e l y h a s f o r c e orp ro v id es fu r th er su p p o r t , a l so sh ares th e ch arac te r i s t ic o f l ega l reaso n sgenera l ly , namely tha t such precedent opera tes to exc lude contra ry


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470 Interpreting PrecedenteThe BndingForce of Precedent 7 1r e a sons f rom c o ns ide ra t ion by the de c is ion ma ke r . Th is w i l l now bet r ea ted in more de ta i l .All k inds o f p r a c t ic a l r e ason ing, le ga l a nd m ora l , invo lve we igh inga n d b a l a n c i n g o f s e v e r a l f a c t o r s a t t h e s a m e t i m e . Y e t t h e l a w i m -poses some restrictions on this process of weighing. One way toachieve th is r e sul t i s to enac t ru les . The ex is tente of a ru le p redudesrecourse to ce r ta in k inds of r e levant background reasons , inc luding(usually) the very reasons that led to the introduction of the rulei t se l f . A l e g a l r o le m a y t h u s w o r k a s a s e c o n d - o r d e r r e a s o n w h i c hmay justify in some cases not doing what ought to be done in thel ight of the to ta l i ty of a l l mora l r easons (c f . Peczenik , 1989, p .240 ,claiming that this view is a paraphrase of Joseph Raz's theory ofexc lu s io n ary reaso n s in th e l aw; see Raz 1 9 7 9 , p p .1 8 , 27 an d 3 3) .The same can be said about precedents. Precedents can be re-ga rde d a s p r ima f a c ie r e a sons fo r e xc lud ing m a ny o the r r e a sons f roml e g a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n . T h i s p o i n t m a y b e d i f f i c u lt t o g r a s p , b e c a u s et h e u s e o f p r e c e d e n t s n o t o n l y e x c l u d e s s o m e r e a s o n s f r o m t h e p r o -c e s s o f w e i g h i n g a n d b a l a n c i n g , b u t a ls o a d d s s o m e n e w r e a s o lns toi t , o r a t l e a s t sh i f ts the we igh t o f the r e a sons invo lve d . In the a pp l ic a -tion of a precedent, weighing and balancing implies an effort toachieve a ' r e f lec t ive equi l ibr ium ' be tween the precedent norm takenas the starting point for argumentation and the other admissiblereasons bear ing on one ' s dec i s ion . Th i s re f l ec t ive equ i l ib r ium i s akind o f c ohe re nc e . But the re i s no a lgor i th ru , no f in i te a nd una m bigu-ous se t o f ru le s de c id ing wha t i s m ore a nd wha t i s le ss c ohe re n t .Ju r i s t s usua l ly a im a t p r e se n t ing the la w a s a c ohe re n t sys te m , bu tthe concept of coherence is diff icult to def ine precisely. According toNe i l Ma c Cormic k ' s the ory o f norma t ive c ohe re nc e (198 4 , pp .235 f f ) ,legal principies support and explain a number of legal rules andmake them coherent. But such legal principies are often implicit,access ib le a s a r e sul t of we ighing and ba lanc ing of o the r pr inc ip iesand pa r t icula r j udgments . Moreover , d iscovery and j us t i f ica t ion ofan imp l ic i t precedent-based ru le i s an in te l lec tua l ac t iv i ty invoivingthe we igh ing a nd ba la nc ing o f se ve ra l c r i te r ia o f c ohe re nc e . Amo ngothe r th ings , a de e pe r a nd b roa de r suppor t ma ke s a the ory a bou t thecontent of the precedent ru le in quest ion more coherent . Ceteris pari-bus , the de gre e o f c ohe re nc e o f suc h a the ory de pe nds on the num be ro f s u p p o r t e d s t a t e m e n t s t h a t b e l o n g t o i t , t h e l e n g t h o f t h e c h l i n s o freasons tha t be long to i t , t he number o f t he connect ions tha t exi s tbe tween va r ious suppor t ive cha ins be long ing to the theory and howm a n y s t a t e m e n t s b e l o n g i n g t o t h e t h e o r y a r e r e l e v a n t i n t h e t y p e o freaso n in g th e th eo ry u ses ( c f . Alexy an d Peczen ik 1 9 9 1 , p p .1 30 f f ) .The ro l e o f weigh ing and ba lancing reasons i s par t i cu lar ly dearwhen one conside ra the fac t tha t the process of apply ing precedentsin v o lv es an e f fo r t to ach iev e d iach ro n ic co h eren ce ( c f . Peczen ik , 1 9 9 5 ,

pp .603 f f ) o f the la w. The la w c ha nge s c on t inua l ly . A ne w in te rp re t -a t i o n o f a p r e c e d e n t m u s t h a v e s u p p o r t o f t h e l e g a l t ra d i t io n , y e t i timplies a change of the tradition (cf. Krygier, 1986, pp.237 ff;Bankowski, 1991, p208). Ronald Dworkin 's theory of ' in tegri ty ' (1986,pp .225 f f ) i s a n e xa m ple o f a k ind o f c ohe re nc e in t im e , o f te n c a l le d'narrat ive' .(see, for example, Jackson, 1988, pp.155-6) . Ceteris paribus,the de gre e o f d ia c hron ic . c ohe re nc e a c h ie ve d th rough the p ra c t ic e o ffo l lowing p re c e de n t de pe nds on how ma ny of i t s a c tua l c om pone n ts( ru le s , p r inc ip ie s , pa r t ic u la r judgme nts , da ta , the or ie s a nd so on) a r ej u s t if i e d a n d e x p l a i n e d b y t h e l e g a l t r a d i t i o n , h o w l o n g a t i m e t h et r a d i t ion c ove r s a nd h ow m uc h th is jus t i f ic a t ion a pprox im a te s to theb es t b a lan ce o f th e c r i t e r ia o f syn ch ro n ic co h eren ce .Now the point i s tha t the precedent-apply ing j udge ass igns re la -t iv e ly m o re weigh t to th e reaso n s weigh ed an d b a lan ced in th e co n textof e s ta b l i sh ing the p re c e de n t -ba se d ru le tha n to non- le ga l r e a sons . Ajudge may thus follow precedents which derive from the highestc o u r t , e v e n w h e r e h e b e l i e v e s t h a t a d i f fe r e n t d e c i s io n w o u l d h a v eb een m o re su i t ab le o n th e b a lan ce o f a l l mo ra l an d o th er reaso n s , h adthe c our t no t de c ide d p re v ious c a se s in the w a y i t d id . Fo l lowing thep r e c e d e n t s i n v o l v e s w e i g h i n g a n d b a l a n c i n g , t o o , b u t i t is s i m p l e rthan weighing all the moral reasons would be. Only if there arep a r t i c u l a rl y s t r o n g r e a s o n s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e j u d g e o u g h t t o g i v ejudgm e nt in a wa y d i f f e r e n t f rom tha t ind ic a te d by the p re c e de n t ( s )doe s the que s t ion a r i se o f de v ia t ing f rom the p re c e de n t .T h e p h e n o m e n o n o f e x d u d i n g s o m e r e a s o n s w i t h in t h e l a w , e v e ni f the se r e a sons a r e good ou ts ide o f the la w , i s pa r t ic u la r ly c omple xdue to the fac t tha t i t occurs a t severa l leve ls , of ten confused withe a c h o the r . For e xa mple , no t on ly do p re c e de n ts the mse ive s e xc ludesome reasons f rom lega l d iscourse , the re a re a lso some recognizedru le s c onc e rn ing the use o f p r e c e de n ts , a nd the se ru les e xc lude som ere a sons f rom 'me ta - le ga l ' d isc our se a bou t the fo rc e o f p r e c e de n ts .W h e n e v e r a p r a c t i c e o f r e s p e c t i n g p r e c e d e n t s e x i s t s , t h e r e a l s oe v o l v e s o m e r u l e s f o r t h e u s e o f p r e c e d e n t s . I n p a r t ic u l a r , a l e g a lsys te m m a y thus r e ga rd p re c e de n ts a s fo rma l ly b ind ing. Th is me a ns ,a m ong o the r th ings , tha t de v ia t ion f rom a p re c e de n t i s r e gu la te d bya se t o f ru le s , r e qu i r ing som e spe c ia l k ind o f r e a son ing (a te c hn iqueof d is t ingu ish ing, fo r e xa m ple ; se e Cha p te r 17 ) . To be su re , a l l suc hr u l e s h a v e a s o m e w h a t u n c e r t a i n s c o p e ( ' o p e n t e x t u r e ' : see, fo r ex-ample, Hart , 1961, p .124) , yet they decrease the overall uncertainty ofthe application of precedents . A legal system may also assign a weakerk in d o f n o rmat iv e fo rce to a p reced en t . Ev en th i s fo rce can b e ch arac-t e r ize d by m e a ns o f a se t o f ru le s , r nos t ly im pl ic i t , ye t posse ss ing alegal character.The la w ma y thus impose ru le s , p r e c e de n ts a nd a ga in ru le s a bou tthe use o f p r e c e de n ts , a ll o f the m re s t r ic t ing the num be r o f f a c to r s to


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47z nuerprering r r e c e d b i r b r The Binding Force of Precedent 4 7 3be taken in to account in the just i f ica t ion of coherence judgmentsdetermin ing analogies between c ases. Such a rest r ic t ion decreasescoherence b etween the law and m orality. On the other hand , i t of tenincreases the internal coheren ce of the law itself . This is perhaps thepoint of al l law: a Hercules or archa ngel can m ake holist ic judgmentsof coherence of al l morally relevant factors, but a human being needsthe help o f socia l inst i tu tions; among o ther th ings, she or he needslegal rules and precedents, binding de jure or not.

In sum, m any precedr i t -based reasons , even though not orm al lybind ing, tha t i s no t b ind ing de ju re , a re s t i l l legal in chara er . Theyare accep ted in the law as hav ing force o r as p rov id ing fur er sup-por t , and thus as types o f au thor i ta t ive reasons fo r legal decisions.They also share a leading characterist ic of legal reasons, namely thatthey exclude other reasons.6 Not Forma l ly Bind ing bu t Having Force , o r Prov id ing Fur therS u p p o r t D e g r e es of Norm at ivi tyThe conceptual framework devised through common debate andconsensus fo r our s tudy, and re f lec ted in our va r ious quest ions , in-dudes question II (see Appendix) which provides that a formalbind ing p re c e de n t i s one tha t m us t in la te r s im i la r c a se s be r e spe c te d ,tha t i s , fo l lowed b y cour ts be low the preceden t-se t t ing cour t , so tha ta judgment not respecting a precedent's bindingness is not lawfuland so will be reversed on appeal. However, a precedent not for-m al ly b ind ing yet ' hav ing fo rce ' o r p rov id ing fu r ther sup por t i s , inour conceptual framework, one that courts below the precedent-se t t ing c our t in la te r s imi la r c a se s shou ld a l so r e spe c t , tha t i s , f o l low.The only d i f fe rences be tween the degrees of normat iv i ty or author i -tativeness of the two types of preceden t-based reasons a re tha t thefailure to follow precedent merely having force is subject to crff ic ismo n t h i s g r o u n d ( a s s o m e t h i n g t h a t s h o u l d h a v e b e e n d o n e ) a n d m aybe sub je c t to r e ve r sa l , whe re a s the f a i lu r e to fo l low form a l ly b ind ingprecedent 'is not lawful' and so 'is subject to reversal on appeal'.T h e s e , t h e n , r e p r e s e n t , i n o u r v i e w , a m a j o r d i f f e re n c e o f d e g r e e i nthe normat ive bea r ing tha t the two types of precedent-based reasonshave . Of course , our conceptua l f ramework a lso recognizes the pos-s ib i l it i e s tha t , in a g ive n sys te m , a fo rma l ly b ind ing p re c e de n t o r on ehaving force may be subject to overruling or modification by ana p p r o p r i a t e h i g h e r c o u r t .T h e c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k o f t h i s s t u d y r e c o g n i z e s a f u rt h e r a n dl e s s e r d e g r e e o f n o r m a t i v e b e a r i n g , t o o , o n e i n w h i c h a pre c e de n t i sn o t f o r m a l l y b i n d i n g a n d d o e s n o t h a v e f o r c e ( a s h e r e d e f i n e d ) , y e tw h i c h nevertheless provides ' further support ' . Here it is merely true

that the fai lure of the later court to invoke the precedent in a similarcase s ign if ies s imply that the dec ision of the cour t i s no t as wel ljustif ied as i t would be if the preceden t were invoked, for exam ple,to show tha t the dec is ion be ing reached harm onizes wi th the pre -cedent.These, then, represent three degrees of norm ative bearing that pre-cedent m ay have in a later case. I t is not claimed that these exh austall the possible degrees that may be identified in a given system, butthis is a suff icient variation in degrees to enable all systems in ours tudy to be plotted a t some point on a kind of com mo n cont inuum.Thus i t is dear that formal bindingness of preced ent is widely recog-nized in comm on law systems and also to a l im ited extent (rnairdy inthe constitutional courts) in civil law systems. It is also plain from thevar ious na t iona l s tudies here tha t one or both of the two foregoinglesser degrees of normative bearing of precedent are widely recog-nized in the civi l ian systems.With respect to precedents not formally binding but having force,the participants in this project deemed it important to differentiatebetween precedents having ' defeas ib le force ' and precedents having'outweighable force' . The concept of defeasibi l ity ut i l ized in the con-ceptua l f r amework of the s tudy appl ies to two types of s i tua t ions ,t h e f i r st f a r mo r e co m m o n th an th e s eco n d . In th e f i rs t typ e o fdefeasibili ty, the precedent should be applied to the similar subse-quent cases 'unless exceptions come into play. Here the exceptionsare exceptions to the rule or principie of law d erivable from the preced entcase, and i t i s a commonplace that such excep t ions exist to manyrules and pr inc ipies in precedent-based law in m odem systems ofthe kind in our study. Of course, such exceptions are usually createdover t ime rather than on the occasion the precedent i tself is created.Moreover , when such except ions a re c rea ted, the precedent-basedrule or principie typical ly i tself rem ains in the system , al though thereare instances when a se ries of exceptions ult imately swallows up theyule itself, so that it may be said no longer to exist.Secondly, i t is also true that some systems do recognize basic ex-ceptions to the g eneral doctrine of precedent itself, that is , the version ofthe doctr ine ( fo rmal ly b ind ing, fo rce , fu r ther suppor t , and so on)appl icable in the sys tem (as dis t inguished f rom except ions to som epart icular legal rule). One type of such exc eption recognized in somecommon law systems is that , when a precedent-sett ing court decidesa case 'per incuriam ' , that is in ignorance of relevant binding author-i ty, the case has no norm ative bearing as a precedent whatsoever. In asense, i t is eihninated from the system an d thus is defeasible in thismore drast ic sense.Of course, questions can a rise also as to exactly what i t is that hasnormat ive bear ing in a precede nt. Let us return to some dist inctions,


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474 Interpreting P recedents T he B inding Force of Precedent 47 5m a de in que s t ion I I o f the Appe ndix . As r e ga rds a p r e c e de n t , we m a yt hus d i s t ingu i sh (a ) defeas ib l e fo rce - shou ld be app l i ed un l Is s ex-c e p t ions c om e in to p la y (e xc e p t ions ma y or m a y no t be we l l de f ine d)and (b ) outwe igha b le fo rc e - shou ld be a p p l ie d un le ss c oun te rva i l ingr e a s o n s a p p l y . F i r s t o f a l l, w h a t i s i t t h a t h a s t h e d e f e a s i b l e a n d / o routwe igha b le b ind ing fo rc e ? Thre e poss ib i l i t ie s mu s t be c ons ide re d :the precedent case itself, a rule based on the case and, finally, apr inc ip ie ba se d on the c a se .

An im por ta n t po i r t t in th i s c on te x t i s tha t the fo rc e a nd r a t iona le o fa precedent is the force of analogy between the cases. Analogouscases should be dec ided in a s imi la r manner . This sounds p laus ib le ,but invokes very difficult theoretical problems. One can logicallyr e c ons t ruc t the p r inc ip ie o f a na logy be twe e n c a se s a s de m a nding thecreation of a precedent-based norm (a rule or a principie). If onea s s u m e s t h a t t h e c a s e i t s e lf h a s b i n d i n g f o r c e , o n e m u s t m e a n t h a tt h i s p r e c e d e n t - b a s e d n o r m i s n o t d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e ' l a w i t s e lf ' a n dthus must be created by the person who interprets the precedent.For , su re ly , one c a nno t m a ke se nse o f the ide a tha t ( a ) two c a se s ( thepre c e de n t c a se a nd the subse que n t c a se ) a r e a na logous to e a c h o the r ,a l t h o u g h ( b ) n o n o r m c a n b e d i s c o v e r e d , o r a t l e a s t c re a t e d , w h i c ht e l ls u s w h a t m a k e s t h e s e c a s e s a n a l o g o u s . A n a l o g y b e t w e e n c a s e sr e qu i r e s a l ink be twe e n the m , a nd th is l ink c a nno t be a nyth ing o the rt h a n a n o r m u n d e r w h i c h t h e c a s e s c a n b e s u b s u m e d . S u c h a n o r mc a n be e i the r p r e -e x is te n t o r c r e a te d by the in te rp re te r , bu t i t m us t beth inka b le .On the o the r ha nd , e ve n i f the p re -e x is te n t p r e c e de n t -ba sc ld normi s d isce rnible , the scope of suc h a norm is inevi tably uncer ta in ( see ,fo r example , Har t , 1961 , pp .121 f f ) . On ly re l evan t s imi l ar i t i es be-twe e n c a se s c ons t i tu te a su f f ic ie n t r e a son fo r c onc lus ion by a na logy.B u t wh at i s re lev an t? Ju d gm en ts o f re lev an ce a re ju s t i f iab le b y weigh -ing a nd ba la nc ing o f va r ious r e a sons , o f te n p r inc ip ie s .Re le va n t r e se mbla nc e c a n c onc e rn ma ny d i f f e r e n t th ings , suc h a spe r sons , th ings , doc um e nts , r igh ts , du t ie s , c i rc um sta nc e s c onc e rn ingspace and time, socia l effects of the application of the law to differentcases and, f ir ta lly, the place of the cases in respective 'stor ies ' ( 'narra-t ives ' - see , for exam ple , J ackson, 1988 , pp.155 -6 ) . In any case , oneneeds a 'key of relevance' (cf. Aarnio, 1987, pp.104 ff) , a conce ption bywhic h r a t iona l we igh ing a nd b a la nc ing i s poss ib le . Ye t the re a ppe a r sto be no a lgor i thm of we igh ing, no f i r t i te se t o f un a mbiguous c r i te ria .Seco n d ly , re lev an ce o f s im i la r it i es i s a m at te r o f d egree . Th e d egree o fr e le va nc e de c re a se s w i th the inc re a s ing 'd i s ta nc e ' f rom the p re c e de n tcase . (The log ica l s ide o f t h i s fac t i s t he fo l lowing: t he re l a t ion o fanalogy between cases is not transit ive; a case, C 1 , can be analogous tothe c a se C in que s t ion , a no the r c a se , C 2 ,a na logous to C 1 , wi thout C2necessari ly being analogous to C. (See Frndberg, 1973, pp.150 ff.)

Fol lowing p re c e de n ts i s se ldom a m e c ha n ic a l p roc e ss o f fo l lowingpre-existing rules. I t is ra ther l ike weighing and balancing of reasons,inter ala pre -e x is te n t p r e c e de n t ru le s (o r p r inc ip ie s) in o rde r to m a kenew rifles . A reason for decidir% the new case l ike the old one is to bec o n s i d e r e d . C o u n t e r -a r g u m e n t s c a n p r e v a i l in s o m e c a s e s , a n d i t i snot known in advance in which ones, albeit the result will almosta l w a y s b e n o t o n l y t o s o l v e t h e c a s e , b u t a ls o t o c o n f i r m o r m o d i f ythe p re c e de n t ru le .7 D e f e a s i b i e a n d O u t w e i g h a b l e F o r c e o f P r e c e d e n t - b a s e d R u l e sor Pr inc ip ies : Four P oss ib i l i t ie sT h e p a r t i c i p a n t e i n t h i s s t u d y a g r e e d o n t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n c e p t u a l -i za t ion o f p r e c e de n t no t fo rma l ly b ind ing bu t ha v ing fo rc e :

N ot form ally binding b ut having force: a j u d g m e n t n o t r e s p e c t i n g aprecedent's force, though lawful, is subject to criticism on thisgrour td , a nd m a y be sub je c t to r e ve r sa l on th i s ground . Dis t ingu ishd efeas ib le fo rce - sh o u ld b e ap p l i ed u n les s excep t io n s co mein to p la y (e xc e p t ions ma y or m a y no t be we l l de f ine d) ;outweighable force - should be applied unless counter-v ai l in g rea so n s ap p ly .I n a d d i t i o n , i n r e g a r d t o f o r m a l l y b i n d i n g p r e c e d e n t , t h e p a r t i c i-pants in th is s tudy recognized the poss ib i l i ty tha t forma l ly b indingp reced en t m igh t n o t o n ly b e d efeas ib le b u t m igh t s i so b e o u tweigh ab lew h e n t h e y r e c o g n i z e d ' f o r m a l b i n d i n g n e s s ( w i t h o r w i t h o u t e x c e p -t ions, that is subject to overruling or mo dification) ' , for such overrulingo r m o d i f i c a t io n o c c u r s i n t h e f a c e o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t o u t w e i g hthe p re c e de n t ove r ru le d o r modi f ie d .The r e la t ions be twe e n the c onc e p ts 'ou twe igha b le ' a nd 'de fe a s ib le 'c a n now be sum ma r ize d . The re a r e four logic a l poss ib i l it i e s .

1 A given precedent-based rule or principie may be bothoutweighab le and de feas ib le . Thus , we say i t is to be respec ted,that is, followed, in all future cases to which it is applicable,unless outweighed by countervail ing reasons. The precedent-basedru le o r p r inc ip ie ma y a lso be de fe a s ib le in the o rd ina ry se nse tha ti t s appl ica t ion is subj ec t to except ions a l ready recogn ized or ye tto b e reco gn ized . I t may a l so b e d efeas ib le in a m u ch m o re d ras t i cse nse , na m e ly tha t i t ma y be e l in t ina te d e n t i r e ly f rom the sys te mb y o p e r a t i o n o f s o m e g e n e r a l e xc e p t i o n t o t h e d o c t r i n e o f p r e -c e de n t i t se l f , a s in the c a se o f a per inc uriam de c is ion (a l though i tm igh t be be t te r to sa y tha t suc h a p re c e de n t ne ve r a c h ie ve s va l id -


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476 Intetpreting Precedents T he B inding Force of Precedent 47 7ity as a precedent in the first place). A new case which bringsabout an ordinary exception or restriction to an existing prec-eden t -based ru l e o r p r inc ip i e changes the l egal s i t ua t ion . Af t erjudicial legal weighing and deliberation about the matter ande ve n tua l de c is ion , the r e su l t o f the de pa r tu re f rom the p re c e de n t -based rule or principie will be the creation of a new rule orp r i n c i p ie w h i c h i n c l u d e s a n e x c e p t i o n t o t h e o l d o n e . I n t h e t e r -minology propose d by Dwork in a nd Ale xy, on ly p r inc ip ie s (he nc en o t c a s e s a n d n o t r u l e s ) h a v e t h e d i m e n s i o n o f w e i g h t . I n t h e i rt e r m i n o l o g y , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t w h i c h o u t w e i g h s a n d t h a t w h i c h i soutweighed is s t r ic t ly the pr inc ip ie behind, r e spec t ive ly , the de -fea t ing and the defea t ed ru l e . An ' ou tweigh ing reason has thusto be conceptua l ized as being like a pr incipie , not l ike a rule . There su l t o f ou twe igh ing i s , on the o the r ha nd , a lwa ys a ru le , tha t i s ,a n e xc e p t ion la id down in a ne w pre c e de n t -ba se d ru le tha t c le ro-g a t e s f r o m t h e s c o p e o f t h e o l d p r e c e d e n t - b a s e d r u le . T h u s t h ecrea t io n o f th e excep t io n i s th e sam e as th e c rea t io n o f a ru 1 4 .2 A p r e c e d e n t - b a s e d r u le o r p r i n c i p i e m a y b e d e f e a s i b l e a l th o u g hnot outweighable. This is the case when it may be eliminatedfrom the system by a process other than by being outweighed(and, say, overruled). According to a plausible theory, a t least onesuc h p roc e ss ( a nd a r e la t ive ly in f r e que n t one ) i s one tha t i s no t amatter of interpretation of the substantive content of the pre-ced en t b u t ra th er co n cern s th e way th e p reced en t h as b een c rea ted .For e xa m ple , de fe a s ib le (bu t no t ou twe igha b le ) p r e c e de n ts c a n befound in the Court of Appeal in England and Wales, which isf o r m a l l y b o u n d b y i t s o w n p r e c e d e n t s e x c e p t w h e r e t h e s e h a v eb een reach ed per incuriam. B y co n t ras t , th e d ec i s io n s o f th e Ho u seof Lords a r e fo rma l ly b ind ing on the Cour t o f Appe a ls a nd lowe rc our ts , bu t ou twe igha b le , tha t i s , sub je c t to ove r ru l ing o r m odi f i -c a t ion on the ba s is o f ou twe igh ing r e a sons a s d isc usse d a bo y e. Ofcourse , t h i s i s no t t o say tha t no p receden t o f t he Cour t o f Ap-peals could ever be both defeasible and outweighable. Fore xa m ple , on a ne w po in t no t the re to fore ru le d on by the House o fLords, the Court of Appeal might decide, after weighing ther e a sons on bo th s ide s , in f a vour o f a g ive n ru le . On ta te r a ppe a l tot h e H o u s e o f L o r d s , t h a t c o u r t m i g h t t h e n r e w e i g h t h e r e a s o n sand reverse. In other countries, such as Norway, lower courtstreat the previous decisions of the Supreme Court as binding,s t r ic tly o r a t l e a s t no n-ou twe igha b ly ( though de fe a s ib ly) .3 A p r e c e d e n t - b a s e d r u l e o r p r i n c ip i e m a y b e n e i t h e r o u t w e i g h a b l en o r d e f e a s i b l e . It i s n o t o u t w e i g h a b l e b e c a u s e i t c a n n o t b e o u t -weighed by cou r t te r -a rgumen ts . Ne i the r is i t de feas ib le , because t c a nno t be de fe a te d in pa r t o r in whole by a subse que n t p r a c t ic e .The only lawful way to depart from it is by new legislation.

Absolu te ly b ind ing p re c e de n ts in the se se nse s a r e no longe r to befound in any of the systems discussed in the present work. Ajudgm e nt o f a c ons t i tu t iona l c our t se t t ing a s ide a s ta tu te be c a useof contrast with a constitutional provision is neither outweighablenor de feas ib le . But i t i s nota precedent in a proper sense , i f th is' fo rmal ' e f fec t i s co n s id ered .4 A p r e c e d e n t -b a s e d r u l e o r p r i n c i p ie m a y b e o u t w e i g h a b l e b u t n o td efeas ib le in th e d ras t i c s en se o f e l im in a t io n f ro m th e sys tem. I t i soutweighable because it is a pr incipie , to be followed in a ll futurecases to which i t i s app l i cab le , un les s ou tweighed by coun ter -a r g u m e n t s . D e p e n d i n g o n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , e v e n i f i t h a s b e e no u t w e i g h e d i n a c a s e , i t m a y n o t b e e l i m i n a t e d f r o m t h e s y s t e mand, if so, should be followed in a still later case, unless out-weighed by counte r -a rguments which occur in tha t case . Such apr inc ip ie i s not de feas ib le in the sense tha t i t can be e l i rn ina tedf rom the sys te m by the c our t s , though i t ma y be de fe a s ib le in these nse tha t e xc e p t ions c a n be c r e a te d to i t . The on ly wa y to pu t i to u t o f th e sys tem i s b y l eg i s l a tio n .The on ly e xa m ple o f ou twe igh ing in a s ingle c a se on ly , whic h doe sn o t e s t a b l is h a n e x c e p t i o n f r o m t h e p r e c e d e n t - b a s e d r u l e o r p r i n -cipie, is outweighing by a lower instance. In some countries, fore xa m ple Ge rm a ny, I ta ly, Fra nc e a nd Spa in , lowe r c our t s e xe rc ise thef r e e d o m t o d e p a r t f r o m p r e c e d e n t s s e t b y h i g h e s t i n st a n c e o n t h eground of the i r be ing outweighed by re levant conside ra t ions in thegiven case. Even if the precedent had thus been outweighed in ap a r t i c u l a r c a s e , i t s t a y s in t h e s y s t e m , a n d s h o u l d b e f o l l o w e d i n as t i ll l a te r c a se , un le ss ou twe ighe d by c oun te r -a rgume nts whic h oc c urthe n . Only the h ighe r ins ta nc e , whic h ha d c r e a te d the p re c e de n t ru le ,ha s powe r to m a ke a de c is ion tha t de fe a ts i t . The lowe r ins ta nc e ma yonly ho ld i t ou twe ighe d in a pa r t ic u la r c a se .8 Degrees of BindingnessThe c onc e p tua l f r a me work o f our s tudy c on ta ins (que s t ion 11 . 3 , Ap-pe nd ix ) the fo l lowing l i s t o f f a c to r s whic h ma y be t r e a te d a s r e le va n tt o d e t e r m i n i n g t h e d e g r e e o f b i n d i n g n e s s ( n o r m a t i v e b e a r i n g ) o f aprecejient.a The hie ra rchica l r ank of the cour t .b Whe the r the de c is ion i s me re ly o f a pa ne l o r by a fu l l be nc h .c The reputa t ion of the cou r t or of the judge wr i t ing the opinion.d Cha nge s in the po l i t ic a l , e c onom ic o r soc ia l ba c kground s inc e theprior decision.


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478 Interpreting Preced ente T he B inding Force of Precedent 4 7 9ef S o u n d n e s s o f t h e s u p p o r t i n g a r g u m e n t s i n t h e o p i n i o n .The a ge o f the p re c e de n t .The p re se nc e o r a bse nc e o f d isse n t .T h e b r a n c h o f l a w i n v o l v e d ( f o r e x a m p l e , p r e c e d e n t b e in g m o r eweighty in proper ty law than in the law of tor t ) .Whether the precedent r epresents a t r end.How we l l the p re c e de n t i s a c c e p te d in a c a de mie wr i t ings .The e f f e c ts o f le ga l c ha nge in r e la te d a r e a s .In te rp re te d in a c e r ta in wa y, the e xpre ss ion ' the de gre e o f b ind ingne ss '(normat ive bea r ing) i s appl icable both to forma l b indingness j and tothe o the r , le sse r , degrees of normat ive bea r ing tha t a precedent mayhave : ' force ' , ' fur the r suppor t ' , ' i l lus t ra t ive va lu and so on.N o d o u b t , f o r m a l b i n d i n g n e s s m a y b e r e g a r d e d a s a n o n - g r a d e dconcept , l ike 'pregnant ' : a precedent i s forma l ly b inding or not , andi t c a n n o t b e b i n d i n g to a d e g r e e . H o w e v e r , in t h e c o m m o n c o n c e p -t ua l f ramework o f ou r s tudy , fo rmal b ind ingness i s t rea t ed , no t aso n e s i d e o f a d i c h o t o m y , b u t a s m e r e l y o n e t yp e o f b i n d i n g n e s s o n ac o n t i n u u m t h a t a l s o i n c l u d e s ' h a v i n g f o r c e ' , 'p r o v i d i n g f u r t h e r s u p -p o r t ' a n d s o o n .As e xp la ine d in Se c t ion 2 a bo ye , the a na lys is whic h de te rmine s thee x i s t en c e o f f o r m a l b i n d i n g n e s s i n t h e c o n c e p t u a l f ra m e w o r k o f o u rs tudy , and which d i f fe rent ia te s i t f rom the le sse r degreeS of norma-t ive bea r ing tha t precedent m ay have , i s tha t f a i lure of a subsequentcourt below to respect the precedent and so not follow it signifiest h a t t h e d e c i s i o n s o m a d e i s ' n o t l a w f u l a n d s o i s s u b j e c t t o r e v e r s a lon a ppe a l ' . Bu t i t doe s no t fo l low tha t the de te rmina t ion o f whe the r agive n p re c e de n t o f a h ighe s t c o ur t in , sa y , the UK or Ne w York i s tob e t r e a t e d a s f o r m a l l y b i n d i n g i n a s y s te m r e c o g n i z i n g s u c h f o r m a lb i n d i n g n e s s is a m e c h a n i c a l o n e w i t h o u t a n y s c o p e f o r e xe r c i s e o fa n y j u d g m e n t b y t h e c o u r t b e l o w ( e v e n a s s u m i n g t h a t th e m a t e r i a lfac ts of the h igher cour t precedent a re re levant ly s imi la r to thg casea t h a n d ) . F o r e x a m p l e , w h e r e t h e r e i s o n l y o n e p r e c e d e n t , i t c a n n o tbe de n ie d tha t , f o r ins ta n te , a de c is ion o f the h ighe s t c o ur t i s l ike ly tob e t a k e n s o m e w h a t m o r e s e r i o u s l y t h a n w o u l d b e a s i n g l e d e c i s io nof the intermediate appellate court; so, too, a decision by the fullbe nc h o f the up pe r c our t , r a the r tha n by m e re ly a pa ne l . The a ge o f aprecedent may be a factor too. And a decision per incuriam o f t h eh i g h e s t c o u r t m a y i n a g i v e n s y s t e m n o t b e t r e a t ed a s a p r e c e d e n t a ta l l . Bu t sys te m s d i f f e r p r e c ise ly in the r a nge o f suc h f a c to r s tha t m a yenter a determination of unlawfulness and thus the likelihood ofr e ve r sa l o f a de c is ion no t fo l lowing a n uppe r c our t p r e c e de n t .A s r e g a r d s v a r i o u s d e g r e e s o f n o n - f o r m a l n o r m a t i v e b e a r i n g , f o rexample having force or providing further support, it appears thata lmo s t a l l the va r ious f a c to r s se t f o r th a bo y e in f lue nc e i t , one wa y or

anothe r , in a l l the sys tems. In pa r t icula r , th is can be sa id about thehierarchical rank of the court , the composit ion of the court ( full bencho r n o t ) , c h a n g e s i n t h e p o l i t i c a l, e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l b a c k g r o u n d ,s o u n d n e s s o f t h e s u p p o r t i n g a r g u m e n t s i n t h e o p i n i o n , a g e o f t h ep r e c e d e n t a n d w h e t h e r the precedent r epresents a t r end. However ,the re a r e a l so some d i f f e r e nc e s be twe e n sys te ms . In Po la nd , the da teof a de c is ion (be fore o r a f te r the f a ll o f c om mu nism) p la ys a pa r t ic u-lar role in this context. In Sweden, appeal to the authority of theSupreme Court seems to weigh much more than the substantiver e a sons u t te r e d by i t . The sys te m se e m s to e vo lve towa rds a gre a te rd egree o f ' fo rmal i ty ' . An in te res t in g co mp l ica t io n o ccu rs in Germ an y ,France and I ta ly : s ince i t i s not ma de publ ic which j udge w rote theopin ion , h i s o r he r r e pu ta t ion i s ge n e ra l ly no t r e le va ra . The a ge o f ap r e c e d e n t i s o f m i n o r w e i g h t a s s u c h . T h e b r a n c h o f l a w i n v o l v e ds e e m s n o t t o b e o f i m p o r t a n te . E v e n t h e s e e x d u s i o n s m a y b e u n d e r -s tood a s showing a t r e nd tow a rds a c e r ta in ' fo rma l i ty ' in the sys te m.Bi b l i o g r a p h yAa rnio, A . (1987 ) , Th e R ational as R easonable, D ordrech t : K luwer .Aa mio, A . (1989 ) , Laintulk innan teoria. Helsinki: WSOY.Alexy and Pecz en ik , 'The Concep t o f Coheren ce and i t s S ign i f i can te fo r D iscurs ive

Rationality' , Ratio luris, 3 , pp.130-47 (1991 ) .B a n k o w s k i , Z . ( 1 9 9 1 ) , ' A n a l o g i c a l R e a s o n i n g a n d L e g a l I n s t i t u ti o n s , i n N e r h o t ,Pat r i ck (ed . ) , Legal Knowledge and A nalogy , D o r d r e c h t /B o s t o n / L o n d o n : K l u w e r .Dworkin, R. (1986), Law's Empire, London: Fon tana Press .F r n d b e r g , . ( 1 9 7 3 ) , O m analog antgindning ay rttsnorm er (with a summary inEngl i sh : O n Ana logica l U se o f Lega l N orm e) , S tockho lm: N ors ted t s .Hart, H.L.A. (1961), Th e Concept of Law, O xford : Cla rendon Press .Heuman, L. (1992), 'Heigsta domstolens prejudikatnedbrytande verksamhet',Festsk rift till Per Olof H olding, Stockho lm: Ju r i s tfr l age t .J a c ks on, B . (1988 ) , Law, Fact and N arrative Coh erence, Roby: D eborah Char les Pub l i -ca t ions .K rygie r , M. 'Law as Trad i t ion , Law and Philosophy, 5 , pp.237 -62 (1986) .McCormick, D.N. (1984), 'Coherence in Legal Just if icat ion' , in Peczenik, A., Lindahl,L . a n d R o e r m u n d , B . ( e d s ) , Theory of Legal Science, Dordrecht /Boston/Lancas ter :Reide l Pub l i sh ing Company , pp 235-51Malt, Gert-Fredrik (1992), 'To glemte linjer i tradisjonell rettsfinriingslaere' , Tidsskriftfor Rettsvitenskap, pp .48-83 .N erho t , Pa t r i ck (ed . ) (1991) , 'Lega l K nowledge and Ana logy Be tween Cases ' , Frag-m ents of Legal Epistemology , Herm eneutics and Linguistics, D o r d r e c h t / B o s t o n /London: K luwer .Pe c ze nik, A . (1989 ) , On Law and R eason, D ordrech t / Bos ton / London: K luwer .Pe c ze nik, A . (1995 ) , V ed r ra t t? , S tockho lm: N ors ted t s .Raz, J . ( 1979) , The A uthority of Law, O xford : Cla rendon Press .

Peczenick, The Binding Force of Precedent, La Fuerza Vinculante Del Precedente

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