PDF Vol 12 No 02 663-692 Positivism Special Petroski FINAL

8/7/2019 PDF Vol 12 No 02 663-692 Positivism Special Petroski FINAL

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SpecialIssue

TheManyFatesofLegalPositivism

IsPostPositivismPossible?

ByKarenPetroski*

A. Introduction

In some of his last publishedworks,NeilMacCormick began to refer to his theoretical

positionaspostpositivist.1 Inlightofthewidelyperceivedlimitationsofthepositivist

label, this selfidentification might seem prudent.2 Was it anything more? Was

MacCormickspositionreallypostpositivist? Inthispaper,Iarguethatitwasnot,butthat

thisneednotbeviewedasafailingofMacCormickswork,sincethereisasenseinwhich

modern jurisprudence cannot and need not hope to become generally postpositivist.

More specifically, given the institutional context inwhich legal scholarship isproduced,

positivism is likely to be an inevitable (if not necessarily dominant)mode of theorizing

aboutlaw. Yetmuchinformativeworkremainstobedoneunderthepositivistrubricnot

justalongthelinessuggestedbyMacCormick,butalongothersaswell.

My ultimate point concerns the institutional possibility and desirability of a shift to a

theoreticalpositioncalledpostpositivism. Addressingthispointrequiresmetotakea

positionnotonlyonwhatthatphrasemeans,butalsoonwhatlegalpositivismitselfis. As

aresult,inthispaper,Irecapitulateaspectsofthedebatesregardingthenatureoridentity

oflegalpositivism,butIalsoaddresstopicsbeyondthetraditionalscopeofthosedebates.

* Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Andrs Jakab, Jrgen Busch, Otto

Pfersmann,andThomasBustamanteforvaluableinput. Email:[email protected]

1SeeNEILMACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONSOFLAW:ANESSAYINLEGALTHEORY(2007)[hereinafterMACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONS];

NEILMACCORMICK,H.L.A.HART(2007)[hereinafterMACCORMICK,HART].

2See,e.g.,KentGreenawalt,TooThinandTooRich: DistinguishingFeaturesofLegalPositivism,inTHEAUTONOMY

OFLAW: ESSAYSONLEGALPOSITIVISM1,8(RobertP.Georgeed.,1996)(notinguseofpositivismlabelforsummary

condemnation);FrederickSchauer,PositivismasPariah, inTHEAUTONOMYOFLAW,ESSAYSONLEGALPOSITIVISM31,

35;Wilfrid J.Waluchow, TheMany Faces of Legal Positivism, 48U. TORONTO L.J. 387, 390 (1998) (discussing

meaningless[ness]

of

debates

within

legal

positivism).

Much

of

twentieth

century

positivist

legal

theory

has

soughttoredeemthetermfromitsuseasanepithet. See,e.g.,H.L.A.Hart,PositivismandtheSeparationofLaw

andMorals, 71HARV. L. REV.593, 61521 (1957) (discussingpostWorldWar II critique of legalpositivismby

Radbruch, among others); ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 2, 23 (1998) (discussing

derogatoryuseofpositivistlabel).


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[Vol.12No.02664 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lMydiscussionhas important limitations. First, sinceMacCormickswork ismypointof

departure,IfocusontheAngloAmericanlegalpositivisttraditionwithinwhichhewrote.3

ThecontinentaltraditionoflegalpositivismassociatedinthetwentiethcenturywithHans

Kelsen lies largely beyond the scope of my argument. Second, my focus is on the

institutionalconditionsofproductionoflegaltheories,ratherthanonassessmentoftheir

content. Thisessay isnotacontributiontopositivist jurisprudence,although itarguably

buildsona tradition that ispositivist inamoregeneral sense. Finally,my thesis is the

modest one that, as long as the current institutional conditions of legal and academic

endeavors persist, some form of legal positivism is also likely to persist,making post

positivismdifficult toattain. Idonotargue thatall,orevenmost, legal theorymustbe

positivist.

Mydiscussionhasthreemainsections. SectionBseekstoclarifythenatureofthe legal

positivism

beyond

which

MacCormick

sought

to

move

and

the

reasons

for

his

desire

to

movebeyondit. Iamhardlythefirstpersontoconsiderthequestionofthenatureoflegal

positivism; in SectionB.I, I describe some previous efforts to address it, identifying the

principal areas of overlap of these efforts. (I call these prior attempts to identify the

natureof legalpositivismsecondorderaccounts,becausetheyarenotaccountsofthe

natureoflawassuch,butrathertheoreticalaccountsofotherfirstorderaccountsofthe

natureof law.) Thesecondorderaccounts IconsiderinSectionB.Isuggestthatapplying

thepositivistlabeltoatheoryoflawhasbeenconsideredappropriatewhenthetheory

characterizesitssubjectmatterinaparticularway. IconcludeSectionBbyexaminingwhy

themovebeyondpositivismmight seemattractive toa legal theorist,given thecontext

withinwhich such theoristsproduce their theories, and the relatedquestionofwhat it

mightmeantobepostpositivist.

SomeofthesecondorderaccountsIconsidernotethatthefirstorderlegaltheoriesthey

discuss seem to share important features with the subject matter, law, for which the

theoriesseektoaccount. InSectionC,Iconsiderthisparallelfromadifferentperspective.

I argue that given the modern institutional setting of scholarly activity, something

resembling thepositivistmodeof inquiry,anddebatesover itsproprietyanddetailswill

alwaysbepartoflegaltheory. Indeed,theexistenceofpositivistlegaltheoryappearsto

be a product of social and institutional forces very similar to those engendering the

features identifiedby legalpositivistsascharacteristicof legalsystems. Inthissection, I

alsobrieflyexplorehow thisargument clarifies theworkofmajor figures in theAnglo

American positivist tradition. I conclude Section C by considering some potential

objectionstomyargument;SectionDaddressesanotherpotentialobjectionthat if it is

notpossibletomovebeyondpositivism,legaltheoristswillrunoutofinterestingquestions

to

investigate.

In

fact,

legal

positivism

has

important

contributions

to

make

to

other

areas

of legal scholarship. In SectionD, I examine two areas inwhich a positivistinfluenced

3 SeeNEILMACCORMICK&OTAWEINBERGER,AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORYOF LAW: NEWAPPROACHES TO LEGALPOSITIVISM

(1986)(identifyingMacCormickswork,incontrasttoWeinbergers,asintheBritishtraditionoflegalpositivism).


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2011] 665PostPositivism

vocabularycouldenrichdebatesproceeding,andperhapsstalling,withoutthebenefitof

thatvocabulary.

B. DefiningPositivismandPostPositivism

Attemptstoclarifythenatureoflegalpositivismhavemultipliedinrecentdecades. Inthis

section I examine the general landscapeof these attempts at clarification and some of

theirlimitations.

Assuggestedabove,accountsoflegalpositivismmaybeconsideredexamplesofsecond

order legal theory, since they theorize about the nature of firstorder theories, those

concernedwith thenatureof law itself. SectionB.Ioffers something like a thirdorder

accountof these secondorder theories,describing first theirgeneralcharacteristicsand

then

their

main

points

of

agreement

on

the

nature

of

legal

positivism.

From

this

agreement,Idrawasetofconsensusattributesoflegalpositivismmyownsecondorder

accountof legal positivism. In SectionB.II, Idistinguishmy account from a fewof the

accounts towhich itmay seem to bear some superficial similarities. In Section B.III, I

consider thepossible reasons for seeking to avoid the positivist label, asMacCormick

appearstohavedone.

I. ExistingAccountsofLegalPositivism

1. TypesofSecondOrderAccount

Sincetheearly1980s,thevolumeofAngloAmericancommentaryonthenatureof legal

positivismitselfhasincreasedsignificantly.4 Individualexamplesofthiscommentaryhave

variedaimsandcharacteristics. Some,forexample,appearaspreamblestoneworrevised

theoriesofthenatureoflaw,whichneednotthemselvesbepositivist. Inthesecondhalf

ofthetwentiethcentury,thistypeofworkhasbeendonebyH.L.A.Hart,RonaldDworkin,

JosephRaz,andMacCormick,tonameonlysomeofthemostnotablefigures. Whilethese

accounts of legal positivism have a critical, normative component, others are more

descriptive, aiming mainly to clarify the landscape of theories of law or to correct

misapprehensionsaboutsuchtheories.

4 These decadesweremarked, for example, by thepublicationofmonographson legalpositivism andmany

symposiaandanthologieson the topic. See,e.g.,TOMCAMPBELL,THE LEGALTHEORYOFETHICALPOSITIVISM (1996);

HARTSPOSTSCRIPT: ESSAYSONTHEPOSTSCRIPTTOTHECONCEPTOFLAW (JulesColemaned.,2001) [hereinafterHARTS

POSTSCRIPT]; RUTH GAVISON, ISSUES IN JURISPRUDENCE: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART (1987) [hereinafter ISSUES IN

JURISPRUDENCE];THEAUTONOMYOF LAW: ESSAYSONLEGALPOSITIVISM (RobertP.Georgeed.,1996) [hereinafterTHE

AUTONOMY

OF

LAW];

POSITIVISM

TODAY

(Stephen

Guest

ed.,

1996);

MATTHEW

KRAMER,

IN

DEFENSE

OF

LEGAL

POSITIVISM:

LAWWITHOUTTRIMMINGS (1999);GERALD J.POSTEMA,BENTHAMANDTHECOMMONLAWTRADITION(1986);SEBOK,supra

note 2;WILFRIDWALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994); Symposium: TheHartFullerDebateAt Fifty, 83

N.Y.U.L.REV.993(2008). Manyotherinstancesofsecondorderaccountsoflegalpositivismbytheseauthorsand

othersappearedasstandalonearticlesandarecitedinthefootnotestothisSection.


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[Vol.12No.02666 Ge rman L aw J ou rna l

Oneapproachcommoninthisworkusestheidiomsofanalyticphilosophy,explaininglegal

positivismasamatterofconceptualcommitmenttoparticulartheses. IfHartinitiatedthe

twentiethcenturylinkbetweenanalyticphilosophyandlegaltheory,5Dworkinappearsto

haveinitiatedthisthesisbasedapproachinhisearlycritiquesofHart.6 Theobjectivesof

this kind ofwork are consistentwith the conventions of philosophicalwriting, but still

diverse; indeed, the heterogeneity of the debates in this area is often cited as a good

reason to try tomovebeyondpositivism.7 Thus, someworkof this kinddrawson the

thesespurportedlyunderlying the legalpositivistposition inorder todemonstrate their

incoherence,8 their identitywithnatural law theses,

9or, froma lesscriticalperspective,

their logicalentailments.10

Otherworkstresseseitherthesuperiordescriptivepowerof

thetheses11

ortheirabsenceofdescriptivepower.12

5 SeeNicola Lacey,Analytical JurisprudenceVersusDescriptive SociologyRevisited,84TEX. L.REV.945,94750

(2006).

6SeeRonaldM.Dworkin,TheModelofRules,35U.CHI.L.REV.14,1718(1967)describingastheskeletonof

legalpositivismasthreecentralandorganizingpropositions.

7Seeinfranotes4445andaccompanyingtext.

8 See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in HARTS

POSTSCRIPT,supranote4,at99;DavidDyzenhaus,PositivismsStagnantResearchProgramme,20OXFORDJ.LEGAL

STUD.703(2000);JohnFinnis,Onthe IncoherenceofLegalPositivism,75NOTREDAMEL.REV.1597(2000);Klaus

Fueer,FarewelltoLegalPositivism: TheSeparationThesisUnravelling,inTHEAUTONOMYOFLAW,supranote4,

at119,152;Gerald J.Postema,CoordinationandConventionat theFoundationsofLaw,11 J.LEGALSTUD.165

(1982).

9See,e.g.,BrianBix,OntheDividingLineBetweenNaturalLawandLegalPositivism,75NOTREDAMEL.REV.1613,

1624 (2000) (suggesting that positivists differ from one another as much as they differ from naturallaw

theorists); TimothyA.O.Endicott,HerbertHart and the Semantic Sting, 4 LEGAL THEORY283 (1998) (describing

overlapofassumptionsbetweenHartandDworkin);PhilipSoper,SearchingforPositivism,94MICH.L.REV.1739

(1996) (review of WALUCHOW, supra note 4); Jeremy Waldron, Normative (or Ethical) Positivism, in HARTS

POSTSCRIPT,supranote4,410.

10See,e.g.,MatthewD.Adler,ConstitutionalFidelity, theRuleofRecognition,and theCommunitarianTurn in

ContemporaryPositivism,75FORDHAML.REV.1671(2006)(exploringnatureoftheconventionsregardingaruleof

recognitionthatmustexistintheU.S.constitutionalorder);JulesColeman,NegativeandPositivePositivism,11J.

LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982); KRAMER, supra note 4; Andrei Marmor, The Separation Thesis and the Limits of

Interpretation,12CAN.J.L.&JURIS.135(1999).

11See,e.g.,FrederickSchauer&VirginiaJ.Wise,LegalPositivismasLegal Information,82CORNELLL.REV.1080,

108788,1092(1997);FrederickSchauer,TheLimitedDomainoftheLaw,90VA.L.REV.1909,195154(2004).

12

See,

e.g.,

David

Dyzenhaus,

The

Demise

of

Legal

Positivism?,

119

HARV.

L.

REV.

F.

112

(2006);

Robert

P.

George,

NaturalLawandPositiveLaw, inTHEAUTONOMYOFLAW,supranote4,at321; JeffreyD.Goldsworthy,TheSelf

DestructionofLegalPositivism,10OXFORDJ.LEGALSTUD.449(1990);LeslieGreen,PositivismandConventionalism,

12CAN. J.L.&JURISPRUDENCE35(1999);GeraldJ.Postema,JurisprudenceasPracticalPhilosophy,4LEGALTHEORY

329(1998);PhilipSoper,LawsNormativeClaims,inTheAUTONOMYOFLAW,supranote4,at215.


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Theothersetofprominentacademicconventions followedbyaccountsofthenatureof

legalpositivismare thoseassociatedwith theworkof legaland socialhistorians. Some

genealogicalaccountsofthiskinddescribeacoherentlegalpositivisttradition,restingon

anessentialcontinuityofattitude,method,vocabulary,orconceptualcommitmentamong

thoseselfidentifiedordescribedaslegalpositivists.13

Otherspointtotheincoherenceof

the positions espoused by the same figureseither to deny the absence of any such

tradition,awayofconfirmingclaimsaboutthemeaninglessnessofthepositivistlabel,14

or topointoutparticular theoristsmisinterpretationsof theirpredecessorspositions,a

wayofredescribingthetradition.15

Whilesomeoftheseaccountsfocusonaspectsofthe

institutionalsettingwithinwhichparticularlegaltheoristshavewritten,16

nonerelatesthat

contexttothedebatesaboutlegalpositivismitselfinanysustainedway.

2.

Where

Second

Order

Accounts

Agree

Astheabovediscussionsuggests,theoreticalaccountsoflegalpositivismdisagreeonmany

points. Theydonotonlydisagree about the academic conventions according towhich

legaltheoryshouldbedone,ortheotherdisciplinaryresources itshoulddrawon. They

disagree about the nature of legal theory itself, and about whether positivism is a

13 See, e.g., Brian Bix, Patrolling the Boundaries: Inclusive Legal Positivism and theNature of Jurisprudential

Debate, 12 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 17 (1999) (tracing legal positivism to Hobbes); Owen M. Fiss, The Varieties of

Positivism,90YALEL.J.1007(1981);JohnGardner,LegalPositivism: 51/2Myths,46AM.J.JURIS.199(2001);Neil

MacCormick, A Moralistic Case for AMoralistic Law?, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1985); Stephen Perry, Harts

Methodological Positivism, inHARTS POSTSCRIPT, supra note 4, at 311; Kevin Toh,Harts Expressivism and His

Benthamite Project, 11 LEGAL THEORY 75 (2005);William Twining,General and Particular JurisprudenceThree

ChaptersinaStory,inPOSITIVISMTODAY,supranote4,at119;JeremyWaldron,AllWeLikeSheep,12CAN.J.L.&

JURIS.169(1999).

14 See,e.g.,DeryckBeyleveld&RogerBrownsword,NormativePositivism: TheMirageof theMiddleWay, 9

OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.462,462 (1989) (concluding thatmodern normativepositivism is incoherent);David

Dyzenhaus, The Genealogy of Legal Positivism, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2004); Andrew Halpin, The

MethodologyofJurisprudence: ThirtyYearsoffthePoint,19CAN.J.LAW&JURIS.67(2006).

15 See, e.g., James Allan, AModest Proposal, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 197 (2003); Brian Leiter, Beyond the

Hart/DworkinDebate: TheMethodologyProbleminJurisprudence,48AM.J.JURIS.17(2003);DavidLyons,Review,

Principles,Positivism, and Legal Theory,87 YALE L.J.415, 42425 (1977);Michael S.Moore,HartsConcluding

Scientific Postscript, 4 LEGAL THEORY 301 (1998); Schauer, supra note 2, at 31; Brian Z. Tamanaha, The

ContemporaryRelevanceofLegalPositivism,32AUST.J.LEG.PHIL.1(2007).

16See,e.g.,MartinKrygier,TheConceptofLawandSocialTheory,2OXFORD J.LEGALSTUD.155,15567 (1982);

Lacey,supranote5,at94749;AndrewLewis,LegalPositivismSomeLessonsfromLegalHistory, inPOSITIVISM

TODAY, supra note 4, at 65, 6773; Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and NineteenthCentury English

Jurisprudence,12J.LEGALHIST.58,6175(1991);Twining,supranote13,at119,12331.


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[Vol.12No.02668 Ge rman L aw J ou rna ldescriptiveornormativetheory.

17 Theyalsodisagreeonthepreciseboundariesof legal

positivism (such aswhetherRonaldDworkinmaybe consideredapositivist).18 And,of

course, theydisagreeonwhether legalpositivism,howeverunderstood, isdescriptively

true or theoretically coherentor useful. Despite all of this disagreement, there is also

implicitagreementamongtheseaccountsaboutcertainfeaturesoflegalpositivism. These

areasofoverlapare,however,differentfromthose,suchastheseparabilitythesis19

or

thesourcesthesis,oftenassociatedwithlegalpositivism.20

First, all seem to agree that to the legal positivist (and perhaps to any legal theorist,

positivist or not), law can be differentiated from other things that exist.21

(Of course,

certainlegaltheoristsnearlyuniversallyunderstoodnottobepositivistsalsosubscribeto

this view.22

I return to thequestionofwhether thesepointsuniquelydistinguish legal

positivistsbelow.) Second,positivistsaredescribedasagreeingthatanimportantaspect

of

law

is

its

character

as

a

social

phenomenon

made

up

of

interrelated

communicative

acts

involving the identificationandprovisionof reasons foraction. Inotherwords, law isa

discursiveandnormativesystem.23

Third,asaresultofthesefirsttwopremises,second

orderaccountsseem toagree thattothe legalpositivist,thesystemof lawhas limits; it

doesnotcoincidewiththeuniverseofexperienceorthe full rangeoforderedbehavior.

Different accounts put this point in different ways. Some focus on the phenomenon

17 See,e.g.,DeryckBeyleveld&RogerBrownsword,ThePracticalDifferenceBetweenNaturalLawTheoryand

LegalPositivism,5OXFORD J.LEGALSTUD.1,31 (1985) (arguing thattheultimate reason forchoosingbetween

naturallawtheoryandpositivismisnotthemoralreasonbutthereasonoftheoreticalsuperiority).

18Dworkincharacterizedhis theoryasageneralattackonpositivism.Dworkin,supranote6,at20;seealso

Dyzenhaus, supranote8,at712, 716 (noting thataDworkinian judgewouldnotbea legalpositivist). But

othershavearguedthatDworkinisneverthelessalegalpositivistinsomesense. See,e.g.,Leiter,supranote15,

at27;Perry,supranote13,at317;StephenPerry,TheVarietiesofLegalPositivism,9CAN.J.L.&JURIS.361,361

(1996).

19See,e.g.,LeslieGreen,Positivismand the InseparabilityofLawandMorals,83N.Y.U.L.REV.1035,103536

(2008);GeraldPostema,LawsAutonomyandPublicPracticalReason, inTHEAUTONOMYOFLAW,supranote4,at

79,80.

20See,e.g.,Coleman,supranote10,at140;Gardner,supranote13,at199.

21 This point is related to but distinct from the socalled separability thesis. Voluminous citationswould be

requiredtosupportthisassertionfullyandspecifically;inidentifyingthesepointsofagreement,Ihavedrawnon

thesourcesinsurroundingfootnotes.

22SeeJOHNFINNIS,NATURALLAWANDNATURALRIGHTS14(1980)(describinglawasasignificantlydifferentiatedtype

ofsocialorder).

23Commitmenttothispositiondoesnotimplyanormativeordescriptiveaim,aparticularmodeofargumentor

description,oranyparticularcharacterizationof theacts inquestion. SinceHart, thisaspectof thepositivist

positionhasprobablymostoftenbeendiscussedintermsofthefollowingofrules,butworkonrulefollowingis

bestunderstoodasaparticularwayofdiscussingthereasonseekingfunctionoflaw.


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identifiedbyHartinhis1957essayontheseparationoflawandmorals.24

Othersfocuson

thedistinctionbetweennorms thatare intentionallygeneratedandothers thatarenot.

Stillothersfocusontheexclusionary25

orlimited26

natureof legalreasonsforaction.

Allofthesearedifferentwaysofmakingthesamepoint. Finally,secondorderaccountsof

legal positivism in the AngloAmerican tradition agree that for the positivist, law

necessarily involvessome formofhigherorderdiscourse thatbothconcernsandcarries

out the acts of delimitation constitutive of legal systems, what Hart called secondary

rules.27

(Thisposition iscommonlyassociatedwithHart;below, IdiscusshowpreHart

theoristsalsodescribedlawasnecessarilyinvolvingsomesuchhigherordercontent.)28

In addition, a point increasingly common to these accounts of legal theory is the

observation that all positivist theories of law are necessarily partial accounts of their

subjectmatter,sothatanygiventheoristcanonlyhopetocaptureoneorafewaspectsof

the

nature

of

law.

Both

theorists

of

the

nature

of

law

and

accounts

of

these

theories

have,

moreandmore,cometoacknowledgethispointexplicitly.29

II.WhatThisAccountAdds

Myaccount isconsistentwithbutextendsboth theaccountssurveyedaboveandother

morespecificpositionstakenbyparticularlegaltheorists. InthissectionIclarifyhowmy

perspectiveisrelatedtotheseotherpositions.

Torecapitulate,thepointsofagreementamongtheaccountsoflegalpositivismdiscussed

aboveare (1)to thepositivist, law isanactuallyexisting socialphenomenonnecessarily

includingadiscursivesystemincludingpracticesofidentifyingandprovidingreasons,and

it isusefullyconsideredassuch;(2)tothepositivist,thissystem islimited;and(3)tothe

24Hart,supranote2,at599,601n.25.

25See,e.g.,JOSEPHRAZ,PRACTICALREASONANDNORMS3548(1990).

26SeeSchauer,supranote11,at191516.

27H.L.A.HART,THECONCEPTOFLAW94(1994).

28Seeinfranotes99107andaccompanyingtext.

29 See H.L.A. Hart, Comment, in ISSUES IN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 35, 39; but see Stephen R. Perry,

InterpretationandMethodology inLegalTheory, inLAWAND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGALPHILOSOPHY97,120

(AndreiMarmored.,1995)(arguingthatHartsawhistheoryof lawastheonlypossibleconceptualanalysisof

law).

Joseph

Raz

makes

this

point

often.

See,

e.g.,

The

Problem

About

the

Nature

of

Law,

21

U.

W.

ONTARIO

L.

REV. 203, 218 (1982); On the Nature of Law [hereinafter Raz, On the Nature], in BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND

INTERPRETATION:ONTHETHEORYOFLAWANDPRACTICALREASON[hereinafterRAZ,BETWEEN]91,9798(2009)(Whilethe

lawhasmanyessentialfeatureswearenotawareofallofthem....Thestudyofjurisprudenceisneverending,

forthelistoftheessentialpropertiesoflaw isindefinite.). SeealsoFINNIS,supranote22,at17;KRAMER,supra

note4,at21627.


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[Vol.12No.02670 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lpositivist, legal systems include mechanisms for sustaining their own boundaries, or

effectuating these limitson the system, in the formof communications referring to the

system and the reasons it offers. Further, although this point is not universally

acknowledged,notheoristhascapturedallofthefeaturesoflawinasingleaccount.

Iwilltakethesepointstoconstitutethecoreoflegalpositivismas it isunderstoodby

contemporary AngloAmerican legal theorists. It is possible that none of these points

distinguish legalpositivistsfrom legaltheorists ingeneral,aquestiontowhich Ireturn in

SectionC.II.3below. Inaddition, theunderstandingof legalpositivismproposedhere is

notentirelyderivedfromtheseearlieraccounts,whichsharetworelatedblindspots. With

a fewexceptions,thesetheoriesof legal theoryhavenotexploredthesocialcontexts in

whichpositivist legal theoryhasbeenproduced; theexceptionshaveexploredonly the

contextswithinwhichspecifictheoristshaveworked.30

Thesesecondorderaccountshave

also

largely

failed

to

explore

the

curious

parallel

between

the

characteristics

of

law,

on

the

positivist account, and the characteristics of theoretical discourse about law.31

The

discussion inSectionCsuggeststhatconsideringthese issuesoneapositivisticconcern,

theotheraformaloneindicatesthatpostpositivismisnotnecessarilyarealisticgoal.

Featuresof theaccountpresentedherealso closely resemble,butdepart from, specific

positions taken by particular legal theorists. Mydistinction between first and second

order theories, for instance, recalls StephenPerrysdistinctionbetweenmethodological

andsubstantivepositivism,althoughmyconclusionsdiffer fromhis.32

Perrypointedout

that the term positivism has been used to refer to two types of position, one a

substantivepositionaboutthenatureof law(thepositionthatthere isnonecessary link

betweenmoral normativity and legal normativity), the other amethodological position

about the nature of legal theory (the position that legal theory should be purely

descriptive,ratherthannormative).33 Thisdistinctionismorespecificthanmydistinction

between first and secondorder theory. Perrys main point in making it is that it is

conceptually inconsistent to defend a substantively positivist position using

methodologicalpositivism,sincethisamountstotreatinganormativesubjectinawaythat

cannotaccountforitsnormativity.34

IncontrasttoPerry,Iarguebelowthattheconditions

30Seesupranote16.

31Somesecondorderaccountsofpositivismhaveexplored the relationshipbetweenexternalandinternal

legaltheory,andtherelationshipbetweenthisdistinctionandthenecessarilypartialnatureoflegaltheory. See,

e.g.,Perry,supranote29. Othershaveexploredthecontextsinwhichlegaltheoryisproduced. See,e.g.,Lacey,

supranote5,at94748;Schofield,supranote16,at6970,82,85. Butthe linkbetweenthesetwotopicshas

been

much

less

scrutinized.

32SeePerry,supranote13;Perry,supranote18;Perry,supranote29.

33Perry,supranote13,at311.


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encouraging the production of what he calls methodological positivism may actually

encourage(withoutrequiring)substantivelypositivistpositions.

Finally,mypositionmayalsoattimesseemreminiscentoftheclaim,oftenattributedto

Hart, thata satisfactory accountof the conceptof lawmustproceed froman internal

pointofview.35

Ononeaccount, this is theclaim that, togivea fullaccountof law,a

theoristmustgrasptheway law isexperiencedby legalprofessionals. Thisrequirement

arguablyleadslegaltheorytodevelopformalorsystematiccharacteristicsmirroringthose

ofitssubjectmatter,althoughitneednotdoso.36

Iseektomaketherelatedbutdistinct

pointthatbecauselawandacademiclegaltheoryarepracticesthathistoricallydeveloped

inparallel,weshouldnotbesurprisedtofindthattheysharecertaincharacteristics(rather

thanthatlegaltheorymustaccountforaparticularsubsetofthesecharacteristicsinorder

togiveaninformativeaccountoflaw).

Incomingtothisconclusion,Iamindebtedontheonehandtoworksthathavelookedat

the institutionalcontextwithinwhich legalpositivist theoryhasbeenproduced37

andat

theconnectionbetweenthiscontextandthesocialandinstitutionalhistoryoflawitself,38

andon theother toa literatureon thesociologyofacademicand legalexpertise that is

seldomlinkedtometatheoreticaldebatesinjurisprudence.39

Thisworkindicatesthatthe

partialityoflegaltheory,andsomeofitsspecificcharacteristics,areusefullyconsideredas

functionsofthesocialandinstitutionalcontextwithinwhichitiscreated.

34Id.at347,354.

35SeePerry,supranote29;HART,supranote27,at91(opiningthatallourcriticismsofthepredictiontheoryof

obligationmaybebestsummarizedasthecriticismthattheydefine...outofexistencetheinternalaspectof

obligatoryrules).

36SeePerry,supranote29. SeealsoHART,supranote27,at91,24344.

37SeeKrygier,supranote16;Lacey,supranote5;FrederickSchauer,(Re)TakingHart,119HARV.L.REV.852(2006)

(reviewingNICOLALACEY,ALIFEOFH.L.A.HART: THENIGHTMAREANDTHENOBLEDREAM(2004));Schofield,supranote

16.

38See,e.g.,HaroldJ.Berman,TheOriginsofWesternLegalScience,90HARV.L.REV.894(1977);Lewis,supranote

16;DavidSugarman,LegalTheory, theCommonLawMindand theMakingof theTextbookTradition, inLEGAL

THEORYANDCOMMONLAW26(WilliamTwininged.,1986).

39

See,

e.g.,

ANDREW

ABBOTT,

THE

SYSTEM

OF

PROFESSIONS:

AN

ESSAY

ON

THE

DIVISION

OF

EXPERT

LABOR

(1988)

[hereinafter

ABBOTT, SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS]; ANDREW ABBOTT, CHAOS OF DISCIPLINES (2001) [hereinafter ABBOTT, CHAOS]; TONY

BECHER,ACADEMICTRIBESANDTERRITORIES: INTELLECTUALENQUIRYANDTHECULTURESOFDISCIPLINES(1989);HARRYCOLLINS&

ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE (2007); RANDALL COLLINS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHIES: AGLOBAL THEORY OF

INTELLECTUALCHANGE(1989).


10/30

[Vol.12No.02672 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lIII.WhySeekPostPositivism?

HavingclarifiedwhatItaketobethecoreoflegalpositivismasitisunderstoodbyAnglo

American legal theorists,and thescopeofmyobjectives, I turn in this section toa final

backgroundquestion: thereasonsalegaltheoristmightseektomovebeyondpositivism,

tobecomeapostpositivist. So far,NeilMacCormick ismostvisibleAnglophone legal

theorist tohaveapplied this label tohimself repeatedlyand tohaveexplained indetail

why he considers himself a postpositivist. In this section, I briefly identify several

possiblereasonsfortheimpulsetolabeloneselfpostpositivist,notallofthemcitedby

MacCormick. A number of these reasons are intimately linked to the phenomenon

describedabovethestaggeringproliferationoffirst andsecondorderlegaltheoriesover

thepastseveraldecades,thepreciseperiodwithinwhichMacCormickwrote. Thissection

providesa foundation formyexamination, inSectionC,ofhow, if atall,MacCormicks

position

differs

from

the

legal

positivist

commitments

discussed

above.

Asithasbeenusedfromthemidtwentiethcenturyon,firstinliterarycriticismandthenin

many other areas, the post label signifies the desire for a fresh start, based on

disillusionmentwithexistingtradition.40

Useoftheprefiximpliesthattheroottraditionis

no longer viable in itsoriginal form. This ishowMacCormickuses the term.41

A legal

theoristmightconclude that the root traditionlegalpositivismisno longerviable for

eitherconceptualorprudentialreasons. Conceptualreasonsforseekingtomovebeyond

legal positivism could include (1) dissatisfactionwith the increasingly narrow questions

addressed by positivists and their apparently increasingly trivial conclusions42

or (2) a

conclusion thatoneormoreof thepremisesormethodsof legalpositivismhavebeen

discredited or are irreconcilable. (Note that this second reason, while it is a common

criticalapproach inlegaltheory,43

cannotbeasoundreasonforrejectinglegalpositivism

unlessthetheoristhasexhaustivelyidentifiedthepremisesormethodsoflegalpositivism.)

Prudentialreasonsforidentifyingapositionaspostpositivismmightinclude(3)adesireto

free the theorists work from the pejorative connotations associated with the legal

40SeeMalcolmBradbury,WhatWasPostModernism? TheArts inandaftertheColdWar,71INTLAFFAIRS763,

76774(1995)(discussing IrvingHowes initialuseoftheprefix in1959and itssubsequentshifts inmeaning in

differentcontextsandperiods).

41SeeMACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS, supranote1,atv (explainingabandonmentofpositivist labelasa resultof

debatesovertheissue).

42See,e.g.,Twining,supranote13,at12325(suggestingthatJohnAustinsworkinitiatedthisnarrowingofthe

issuesaddressedbylegaltheory);R.GeorgeWright,DoesPositivismMatter?,inTHEAUTONOMYOFLAW,supranote

4,

at

57,

57,

68

(arguing

that

legal

positivist

positions

are

trivial).

43Manylegaltheoristshavetakenthisposition,butpriortoMacCormicktheydescribedthemselves,andwould

most likelyhavebeendescribedas,antipositivist rather thanpostpositivist. See,e.g.,WILLIAME.CONKLIN,THE

INVISIBLEORIGINSOFLEGALPOSITIVISM: AREREADINGOFATRADITION3,68,304(2002);Fueer,supranote8,at119,

120;George,supranote12,at321,330;Tamanaha,supranote15,at3536.


11/30


positivism label;44

(4)exhaustion with the volume of material produced under the

positivist rubric; and/or (5)a desire tomark the theoristswork as original rather than

derivative,thatis,astrategyofreputationalortheoreticalbranding.45

The distinctionbetween conceptual andprudential reasons for using the postpositivist

label is important because the theory in question ismore likely to be genuinely post

positivisttranscending or fundamentally departing from the core positions outlined

aboveif theuseof postpositivist label is supportedby conceptual, rather than just

prudential, reasons. As I suggest below, it seems thatMacCormicks chief reasons for

applying the label to himself were probably, in fact, prudential, and that powerful

incentiveswill continue to deter anywidespread rejection or denunciation of the core

preoccupationsoflegalpositivism.

C.

The

Possibility

of

Post

Positivism

Inthissection,Iarguethatlegalpositivismisbothadefensiblemodeoftheorizingabout

lawandaninescapableone. Wecannothopetoeliminateitentirelyfromthelandscapeof

legaltheories,aslongasthattheorizingproceedswithinaninstitutionalcontextsimilarto

itspresentone. This isbecausemodern legal theorists,positivistandnonpositivist,are

always simultaneously concernedwith twodomains: (1)that of law, aboutwhich they

theorize, and (2)that of academic theoretical inquiry,withinwhich they produce their

work. Bothofthesedomainsaffectthescopeofwhat it ispossiblefor legaltheoriststo

thinkandwrite. All legal theoristswrite fromwithin theseconddomain; legalpositivist

theoristshappentoproducetheoreticalaccountsfromthatseconddomainthatbearsome

of the same characteristics they also ascribe to the first domain, law. This parallel is

sometimes represented as a deliberate theoretical choice, but deliberate or not, it is

encouraged by the parallels between the social and institutional histories of the two

domains,parallels that in turngenerateparallel incentives for theproductionofhigher

ordercommentary.

My discussion in this section has three parts. In Section C.I, I argue that the reasons

suggestedbyMacCormick formovingbeyond legalpositivismarenotcompelling. Ialso

argue thatMacCormickdidnot succeed in thisgoal. SectionC.IIexamines someof the

factors thatmakepostpositivismaquixoticgoal, througha reviewof thehistoryof the

44See,e.g.,Greenawalt,supranote2,at19(notingthatthe labellegalpositivismmaybemainlyamatterof

rhetorical

force,

now

usually

negative);

SEBOK,

supra

note

2,

at

2

(noting

that

the

positivist

term

has

in

recent

years...becomeapejorative inmodernAmerican legalcircles);Schauer, supranote2,at3235 (discussing

pejorativeusesofpositivistlabel).

45Cf.BECHER,supranote39,at70.


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[Vol.12No.02674 Ge rman L aw J ou rna llegalpositivistnegotiationofthetwodomainsidentifiedjustabove. InSectionC.III,Ibegin

toaddresspossibleobjectionstomyargument,aprojectcontinuedinSectionD.

I. MacCormicksPostPositivism

Asnoted, it seems that forMacCormick,prudentialmotivations for resort to the post

positivist labelmighthavebeenparamount.46

Hedoesnot take theposition that the

premisesoflegalpositivismhavebeendiscredited;47

indeed,heconsistentlyidentifiedhis

workasinthesametraditionasthatofHart.48

Nordoesheseemtroubledbythenit

pickingdetailsoflegalpositivistcontroversies,sinceheengagesinandacknowledgesthe

relevanceofmanyofthosequarrels.49

MacCormickinfactadmitsthatthejustificationshe

provides forhis selflabelingaspostpositivistdonot reallydistinguishhisposition from

legalpositivism. Hewritesthatheidentifieshimselfaspostpositivistbecausehebelieves

that

law

is

necessarily

geared

to

some

conception

of

justice,

a

moral

concern.

50

But

he

concedes that it isonly the more austere and rigorous formsof legal positivism that

absolutelyexcludethepossibilitythatthereisanymoralminimumthatisnecessarytothe

46MacCormicksuseofthe labelmayalsoberelatedtoterminologicalbleedingfromonespecialtytoanother.

Thetermpostpositivistisnotuncommoninworkoninternationallawandinternationalrelations,anotherfield

inwhichMacCormickwrote. See,e.g., INTERNATIONALTHEORY: POSITIVISMANDBEYOND (SteveSmith,KenBooth&

MarysiaZalewskieds.,1996);ThomasBiersteker,CriticalReflectionsonPostPositivisminInternationalRelations,

33INTLSTUD.Q.263(1989);StanGontarek,InternationalLegalTheory:Positivist,Naturalist,andMuchMore,1

INTLLEGALTHEORY5(1995). Inthissubfield,thetermisusednottorefertoapositionbeyondorfollowinglegal

positivismbutinamannerborrowedfromitsmeaninginthephilosophyofscience,whereitreferstopostlogical

positivist theoretical positions. See, e.g., RUTH GROFF, CRITICAL REALISM, POSTPOSITIVISM, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF

KNOWLEDGE(2004);JOHNH.ZAMMITO,ANICEDERANGEMENTOFEPISTEMES:POSTPOSITIVISMINTHESTUDYOFSCIENCEFROM

QUINE TO LATOUR (2004). Larry Laudan is known forhavingargued that these postpositivistpositions share

importantassumptionswiththepositivismtheyclaimtomovebeyondandarelargelyanextensionofpositivism

rather thana truedeparture from it. SeeLARRYLAUDAN,BEYONDPOSITIVISMANDRELATIVISM:THEORY,METHOD,AND

EVIDENCE(1996).

47Forexample,hemaintainsthatlawandmoralityareconceptuallydistinct. MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS,supra

note1,at261,264.

48 MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 27879. See alsoMACCORMICK, HART, supra note 1, at 16, 167;

MACCORMICK&WEINBERGER,supranote3,at7.

49See,e.g.,MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS,supranote1,at2530 (discussingvariousaspectsof theoreticaldebates

over rules,norms, exclusionary reasons,discretion,and standards); id.at 5657 (offering critiqueof received

understanding of Harts Rule of Recognition concept); id. at 6273 (clarifying distinction between rules and

habits);id.at16165(discussingvalidityanddefeasibilityoflegalnorms).

50

MACCORMICK,

INSTITUTIONS,

supra

note

1,

at

264.

See

also

id.

at

4

(writing

that

he

believes

that

some

minimum

ofjusticeisessentialtolegalvalidity). MacCormickalsopointstohisincorporationofpositionsassociatedwith

legal theorists identifiedasnatural law theoristsaswellas legalpositivists. Id.at279. Butashasoftenbeen

discussed,manylegalpositivistshavemoderatedtheirpositiontoaccommodatecriticismsofferedbynaturallaw

theoristsornonpositivists,withoutrelinquishingtheircommitmenttothepositionsdescribedabove inSection

B.I.2. See,e.g.,RobinBradleyKar,HartsResponsetoExclusiveLegalPositivism,95GEO.L.J.393(2007).


13/30


existence of law as such.51

(I am not the first to note that the theory articulated in

InstitutionsofLaw,whichisarestatementoftheoriesMacCormickbegandevelopingmuch

earlier, is best understood as an extension of legal positivism, one that draws on

theoretical sources outside the mainstream tradition of legal positivism, rather than a

movementbeyonditsbasicperspective.)52

ButnoneofthedetailsofMacCormickspositioninInstitutionsofLaw,hisfinalsummation

of his theoretical commitments, distinguishes those commitments from the core legal

positivist commitments described above. MacCormick identifies the heart of his

institutional theory of law as the proposition that law is an institutional normative

order53

that isheteronymous [i.e.,providing reasons foractionexternal toagents],as

well as authoritative and institutional, in contrast to morality, which is autonomous,

discursive,andcontroversial.54

Thus,MacCormickdescribeslawasasocialphenomenon,

systemic

in

character,

involving

the

communication

and

suspension

of

particular

(autonomous or moral) reasons for action.

He also understands legal systems and

institutions as necessarily containing selfreferential components; in this aspect of his

account,hedrawsonthesocialsystemstheory

ofNiklasLuhmannandGuntherTeubner.55

Indeed,oneoftheprimarywaysinwhichMacCormickmovesbeyondlegalpositivismin

this finalwork isbyconsidering theworkof theoristsoutside the legalpositivistcanon,

suchasLuhmann,Teubner,KarlPopper,MichelFoucault,andSundramSoosay.56

Butthe

useofavocabularythatispartlynoveldoesnotcauseMacCormickstheorytodiffermore

fromadmittedlypositivistpositionsthanthosepositionsalreadydifferfromoneanother.57

51MACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONS,supranote1,at278.

52SeeHuibM.DeJong&WouterG.Werner,ContinuityandChangeinLegalPositivism,17L.&PHIL.233,240,249

(1998). To be sure, there are some ways in which MacCormick moves beyond the concerns of prior legal

positivists, as outlined above. He suggests, for example, that lawmight not be reducible to discourse. See

MACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONS,supranote1,at6273. Healsosuggeststhatjudgmentsregardingthelegalvalidityof

normsoccuronacontinuumratherthanbeingbinaryjudgments. Id.at16165,25758. Andasnotedbelow,

hedrawsonawiderrangeoftheoreticalmaterialthanthetraditionallegalpositivistdoes. Seeinfranote56and

accompanyingtext.

53MACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONS,supranote1,at1,60.

54 Id.at255. SeealsoNeilMacCormick,TheConceptofLawandTheConceptofLaw, inTHEAUTONOMYOFLAW,

supranote4,at163,16471. MacCormickusesthetermdiscursiveinanarrowersensethanIdo,torefertoa

disputationalsettingratherthantopracticesofverbalarticulation.

55

MACCORMICK,

INSTITUTIONS,

supra

note

1,

at

24,

17778,

184,

289,

30203.

MacCormick

claims

that

his

theory

is

notderivedfromor

entailedbyLuhmannssystemstheory,butthatthetwoarestrikinglymutuallycompatible. Id.at302.

56MACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONS,supranote1,at65,154,29293.


14/30

[Vol.12No.02676 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lItseems,then,thatMacCormickcanonlybeusingthepostpositivistlabelforoneofthe

prudential purposes I identified above: as a device for avoiding unwanted negative

connotationsor forasserting thathis intellectualposition isdistinguishable fromothers.

As suggested above, these reasons for using the label cannot themselves establish the

conceptual or functional difference of a particular theoretical position from legal

positivism.

Still,evenifMacCormickdidnotdistinguishhispositionsufficientlyfromlegalpositivismto

justifylabelinghispositionpostpositivist,itispossiblethatadifferentlyformulatedfirst

order theory might achieve this distinction so conclusively as to make positiviststyle

commitmentsseemtrulyobsolete. Below Iconsiderwhetheritisfeasibletoexpectthat

legaltheorywillpassbeyondpositivisminthissense.

II.

The

Possibility

of

Post

Positivism

Within legaltheory,perhapsespecially includingthetraditionof legalpositivism,there is

anestablishedpracticeofdrawingonsociologicalconcepts to fleshoutaccountsof law,

even where the primary conceptual vocabulary comes from other analytical or

philosophicalwork.58

Asnotedabove,thereisalsoalimitedtraditionofreflectiononthe

relationship between the discourse of legal theory, including legal positivism, and the

discourseof law itself.59

Butmostof thework reflectingon thisparallel isdescriptive,

57MacCormickcomesclosetoacknowledgingthiswhenheacknowledgesthatscholarshipcanonlyeverhopeto

provideapartialaccountofitssubjectmatter. MACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONS,supranote1,at30102(assertingthat

scholarshipcannotclaimtohavefoundsomeArchimedeanpointoutside,perhapsabove,thepracticalactivity

fromwhichitlooksdownontheactivityandseesthatitrepresentsnothingreal. Rather,asLuhmannpointsout,

it involvesa kindof selfobservationof the legal system fromwithin it,butanobservation that isnotaimed

directlyatthesolutionofparticularcurrentpracticalproblemsarisingwithinit).

58See,e.g.,Lacey,supranote5,at95057;Perry,supranote29,at97(Asadisciplinejurisprudenceclaims...to

bebothabranchofpracticalphilosophy...andasocialscienceofacertainkind.). ButseeRogerCotterrell,

WhyMustLegalIdeasBeInterpretedSociologically?,25J.L.&SOCY171(1998). MacCormicks incorporationof

Luhmanniansystems theory intohisaccountof lawcanbeviewedasa logicalextensionof thistradition. See

MACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONS,supranote55andaccompanyingtext.

59 See, e.g., Krygier, supra note 16, at 164, 167 (noting howdifferent disciplinary commitmentsof analytical

theoristsandsocialscientistsstudyinglawleadthemtoidentifydifferentcharacteristicsoflegalsystems);Lacey,

supranote 5, at 95057 (providing critique ofH.L.A.Harts respect for anddisciplinary allegiance to analytic

philosophy);Lewis,supranote16,at65,7071(presentingdescriptiveaccountofparallelhistoriesofvalorization

of autonomy in legal practice and legal theory); Schauer, supra note 37, at 85869 (discussing disciplinary

commitmentsanddimensionsoftwentiethcenturypositivism in thewakeofHart);Twining,supranote13,at

12930(describinghistoryofparticularizingconclusionsofpostBentham legaltheorists,andparallelsbetween

particularization

in

legal

practice

and

in

jurisprudence).

Some

work,

to

be

sure,

has

rejected

the

thesis

that

the

legaldomaininvolvesthekindofpartialityorsuspensionidentifiedbylegalpositivism,whileacknowledgingthat

legaltheory isnecessarilypartial,anddrawsfromthesepremisestheconclusionthat legalpositivism inoneor

moreof itsvarieties is intellectually incoherent. But thisworkargues that thepositivistdescriptionof law is

inaccurate; itdoesnotseek to refute the idea that legalpositivism isan inevitable formof legal theory inthe

worldweinhabit. See,e.g.,Goldsworthy,supranote12,at45152(arguingthattheonlyplausiblelegalposition


15/30


simplyidentifyinganalogiesbetweenlegalpracticeandlegaltheory. Inthissection,Iuse

the firstof these techniques toextend theanalysisbegunby thesecond, lookingat the

social and institutional context within which legal theory is produced and the factors

encouragingproducersoftheorytogivetheirworkpositivisttraits.

1. TwoDomains

In a1981article,OwenFissexplored aquestion related tomy concernhere: whether

commitment to theenterpriseof generating a theoretical accountof law (or cognitive

positivism, identifiedbyFisswithpuredescription) logicallyentailscommitmentto legal

positivistconclusions,chiefly the socalledseparation thesis (orethicalpositivism).60

Fissconcluded (asothershavesince61) thatnosuch relation isnecessary,butsuggested

that the lackof awelldeveloped critical literatureon the practicesof legal scholarship

made

it

impossible

for

him

to

venture

any

firm

conclusions

about

the

necessary

shape

of

legaltheory.62

IntheyearssinceFisswrote,theliteratureonpracticesoflegalscholarshipandacademic

expertisemoregenerallyhavegrownsignificantly.63

(Theconsensusemerging from this

literature is reflected in the increasingly common position, noted above, regarding the

necessarypartialityorincompletenessoflegaltheory.64

Butthatobservationisjustoneof

alargersetofcommonobservationsabouttheWesternacademicdomain.) Thisliterature

agreesthat,startingintheearlymodernperiod,theacademicdomainhasbeenmoreand

more characterized by the policing of membership through extensive discursive

indoctrination65

and the evaluation of various forms of discursive performance.66

from the internal point of view is a natural law position); Perry, supra note 13, at 347 (arguing that

methodologicalpositivismisinconsistentwiththenormativityofitsdescriptiveobject,law);Postema,supranote

8,at16566(arguingthathistoryof legalphilosophy isahistoryofattempts toreconcile irreconcilabletheses

regarding legal normativity and social existence of legal institutions);Waldron, supranote 9, at 426, 43233

(discussing asymmetrybetween legal theoryasgraspedbyactorswithin the legal system from the internal

pointofviewandasgraspedbyacademictheorists).

60Fiss,supranote13,at1008.

61 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 13, at 31214 (discussing Harts mixture of methodological and substantive

positivism);Waldron,supranote9,at43233.

62Fiss,supranote13,at1016.

63See,e.g.,sourcescitedsupranote39;Sugarman,supranote38;ChristopherTomlins,FramingtheFieldofLaws

Disciplinary

Encounters:

A

Historical

Narrative,

34

L.

&

SOCY

REV.

911

(2000).

64Seesupranote29andaccompanyingtext.

65SeeBECHER,supranote39,at3244;COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at14,24;CatherineKemp,TheUsesof

Abstraction: Remarkson the InterdisciplinaryEfforts inLawandPhilosophy,74DENVERU. L.REV.877,87985


16/30

[Vol.12No.02678 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lAccording to this literature, the modern university, one of the institutions that has

emergedfromthisdynamic,hasdistinctivematerialandconceptualfeatures. Materially,

thoseactingwithinthe institutiondependtosomeextentonexternalsupportandmust

thereforejustifytheiractivitiestosocialactorsoutsidetheinstitution.67

Atthesametime,

theinstitutionalstructureislargelyselfreproducing,bothmateriallyandconceptually,and

its selfreproduction occurs primarily through discourse.68

These features make the

structure a competitive arena, and the resulting competition encourages academics to

draw distinctions between their positions and those of their forebears and

contemporaries.69

Sociologist Andrew Abbott calls this characteristic of academic

discourse thedrawingoffractaldistinctions.70

AlthoughAbbott focuseson the fractal

conceptualstructureofthesocialsciences,othershavemadesimilarobservationsabout

academicphilosophy71

andtheacademicstudyoflaw.72

Thenatureofthesedistinctionsis

suchastoencouragetheuseofarhetoricofinnovation,evenwhenatheoristisnottruly

making

a

novel

point.

73

And

these

features

also

encourage

an

implicit

normative

hierarchy

of intellectualpositions,one inwhichabstract,conceptual,orhigherorderaccountsofa

subject matter attain higher prestige, both within each specialty and across fields,74

despite the acknowledged impossibility of attaining a theory of everything. For the

academic, a high measure of selfawareness and facility with abstract selfreferential

discourseisaprizedandrewardedtrait.

(1997);WALTERJ.ONG,RAMUS,METHOD,ANDTHEDECAYOFDIALOGUE: FROMTHEARTOFDIALOGUETOTHEARTOFREASON

306(2nded.,2004).

66SeeABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at13031,13738,14042;COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at4576;COLLINS,

supranote39,at2536.

67ABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at141;COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at9.

68SeeABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at130,140,14749;COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at7,2427,3031,39,

86;COLLINS,supranote39,at2536.

69ABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at137(noting that[k]knowledgeexpertscompetewithoneanotherthrough

redefinitionofeachotherswork);COLLINS,supranote39,at31,71,80.

70ABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at1113,138,148.

71See,e.g.,COLLINS, supranote39,at31,76,8081;HANSJOHANNGLOCK,WHAT ISANALYTICPHILOSOPHY?24546

(2008).

72FIONACOWNIE,LEGALACADEMICS: CULTURESANDIDENTITIES134,198(2004);Sugarman,supranote38,at26,29,34;

Tomlins,supranote63,at92664.

73

ABBOTT,

CHAOS,

supra

note

39,

at

14042,

148;

BECHER,

supra

note

39,

at

70.

74See,e.g.,ABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at14547;ABBOTT,SYSTEMOFPROFESSIONS,supranote39,at5257,79

85,102104,11011,11821(discussingphenomenonofprofessionalregression intohighstatuspositionsof

pure reflectionon abstract knowledge linkedwithprofessional group);BECHER, supranote 39, at 57;COWNIE,

supranote72,at198.


17/30


Similar features characterize the modern legal domain as a set of social institutions.

Attainingexpertise inthisdomain involvesindoctrinationintodiscursivepractices.75

Like

theacademy,thissetofinstitutionsisbothmateriallyandconceptuallyselfperpetuating.

Materially,lawyersexpertiseinthediscourseusedtonavigatetheinstitutionsregulating

statepowerensurestheircontinuedsupportbynonlawyers. AndrewLewishasargued,

alongtheselines,thatlawyershaveaninherentinterestintakingatheoreticalperspective

on their activities, since such a perspective allows them to exclude the practical

consequencesof their judgment fromconsiderationand thus insulate themselves from

criticismbyoutsidersandwithdrawalofsupport. 76

Intheseways,lawyersmaintenance

of their discursive expertise shapes legal discourse, ensuring not only that it requires

certainreasonsforactiontobesetaside,77

butalsothatitcontainshigherorderdiscourse

aboutlawitself.78

Asintheacademicdomain,legaldiscoursethustakesafractalform,

even

at

the

level

of

what

Hart

called

primary

rules.

79

And

as

in

the

academic

domain,

the

proliferationofhigherorderdiscoursereflectsandcreatesastatushierarchy. Thosewho

workwithsuchhigherorderlegaldiscoursesuchasappellateandconstitutionallawyers

and judgesarewidelyaccordedahigher status than theirprimaryrulecounterparts.80

Atthesametime,legaldiscoursecontainsasignificantelementofwhatHarryCollinsand

RobertEvanscallinteractionalexpertise,thatis,fluencyinthediscursiveconventionsof

otherspecialties.81

Indeed, legalpracticeseemstobeoneofthetypesofexpertisethat

CollinsandEvansdescribeasalmostentirelydevotedtogaininginteractionalexpertisein

other specialisms, since it borrows its content and meaning from responses to and

discourseaboutothersocialphenomena.82

75COWNIE, supranote 72, at 12829; ELIZABETHMERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO THINK LIKE A

LAWYER1230,20723(2007).

76Lewis,supranote16,at66.

77Id.

78HART,supranote27,at94.

79 See J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986). Using a different

vocabulary,NiklasLuhmannhasexploredthisphenomenonextensively. See,e.g.,NIKLASLUHMANN,ASOCIOLOGICAL

THEORYOFLAW4148,7383(1972).

80Angela P.Harris&MarjorieM. Schultz, A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason: Toward Civic Virtue in Legal

Education,45STAN.L.REV.1773,1777n.14(1993)(notingprestigeofappellatejudgescomparedtotrialjudgesin

America,

and

of

certain

substantive

fields

of

law

involving

more

secondary

rule

content

and

valuing

rationality

over emotion); Deborah Jones Merritt,Who Teaches Constitutional Law?, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 145 (1994)

(concludingthatconstitutionallawishighprestigespecialtyamongAmericanlegalacademics).

81COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at3539.


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LegaltheorygenerallyandlegalpositivisttheoryinparticularthesubjectofSectionB.Iaregeneratedfromwithinthefirstofthesedomains,theacademic,andseektodescribe

or account for the second, the legal. Thus, legal theory is both amanifestation and a

description ofwhat Andrew Abbott calls the fractal fecundity of certain cultural and

intellectualphenomena.83

Thecharacteristicassumptionsof legalpositivism,outlined in

SectionB.I.2,observethesefactsaboutlaw,buttheyusuallydosowithoutturningthose

observations back upon the theoretical enterprise itself. If we engage in such self

reflection,wecanseethat legalpositivisttheoryfixatesonqualitiesof itssubjectmatter

that have analogues in the institutions within which the theorists themselves are

operatinga preoccupation with reasongiving, the systematic suspension of certain

considerations,communicativeselfreference. Mypointisnotthatlegaltheoryinevitably

adoptsthesefeaturesbecauseitisimpelledtotakeonthefeaturesofthesubjectmatterit

is

explaining

(either

because

this

is

necessary

for

a

complete

explanation

or

because

it

is

a

kindofirresistibletemptation).84

Itis,rather,thatbecauseoftheparallelsocialfunctions

andhistoricalpathsofthesetwopracticeslegalpracticeandtheoreticalinquirytheyin

fact share certain features,at leastwhen theyare regarded froma certainperspective.

Moreover, the institutionalandconceptualdynamicswithineachdomainprovidestrong

incentivesforthoseworking ineachtofixateonjustthesefeatures. Theassumptionsof

legal positivism are therefore over determined; those assumptions are demonstrably

accurate, if partial, descriptions of legal reality, and they are also types of descriptions

encouragedbythenatureoftheinstitutionwithinwhichtheyareformed.85

In the next section, I further explore, from a more historical point of view, how the

positions associated with legal positivism started to circulate just as both the modern

enterprise of theoretical inquiry andWestern legal systemswere starting to take their

modernform.86 Beforeproceeding,however,IwouldliketoclarifythatIamnotarguing

82COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at38. SeealsoDouglasW.Vick,InterdisciplinarityandtheDisciplineofLaw,31

J.L.& SOCY 163, 18990 (2004) (noting thatmost interdisciplinary legal scholarship is theoretical rather than

empirical,probablybecauseofstructuralandconceptualsimilaritiesbetweentheoryanddoctrinalwork).

83ABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at5355.

84Cf.ThediscussionofHartsargumentforthenecessityofadoptinganinternalpointofviewinPerry,supranote

29,at97,99100.

85 Thus, theory mirrors practice not because to study metaphors, one must do so metaphorically, the

assumptioncriticizedbyMichaelMooreinInterpretingInterpretation,inLAWANDINTERPRETATION,supranote29,at

1,26,butbecause,infact,lawdoeshavethesefeatures(alongwithothers),andacademictheorizingalsodoes,in

fact,

have

these

features

(along

with

others).

86Myposition isnot inconsistentwithGeraldPostemasargumentthat jurisprudence isan inherentlypractical

inquiry,sincehissenseofpracticalhavingtodowithnormativityandwithreasonsforactionoverlapswith

my senseof theoretical,which refersonly to the abstractaccounting foror explainingofa subjectmatter,

regardlessofwhethertheaccountorexplanationisnormativeordescriptive. Postema,supranote12.


19/30


eitherthatthediscourseidentifiableaslegalpositivismcanbegeneratedonlybyacademic

theoreticiansorthatallacademiclegaltheoryisnecessarilypositivist. Onthefirstofthese

points, Ibelievethat thedescriptionof judgesaspositivist isbothmeaningfulandmore

interestingthan isusuallyrealized; Ireturntothis issue inSectionD.I. Iexplainhowmy

argumentdiffersfromthepositionthatalllegaltheoryisnecessarilypositivisticinSection

C.IIIbelow.

2. TheLegalPositivistBridge

In this section, I briefly survey how five key figures in the development of the Anglo

American traditionof legalpositivismHobbes,Bentham,Austin,Hart,andRazfit into

theanalysispresentedabove.87

(BecauseIhavealreadydiscussedMacCormicksposition,

Idonotrepeatthatsummaryinthissection.) Inaddition,thisdiscussionhelpstoconfirm

the

features

of

legal

positivism

outlined

in

Section

B.I.

Eachofthefivefiguresinthislistwrotewithinthetypeofcompetitiveintellectualcontext

described in the previous section, even though that contextwas still in the process of

formation fortheearlier figures intheseries. Collectively,theworkofthese figureshas

supplied much of the basic conceptual vocabulary available in the domains of both

academic inquiryand law. For instance,whileHobbesdidnotwrite from theacademic

domainasweknowittoday,hewasoneofthearchitectsofthediscoursethathasshaped

thatdomain,aswellastheAngloAmericanlegalone.88

Bentham,too,wasakeyfigurein

thedevelopmentofthemodernacademicand legaldomains.89

Austindevotedmuchof

hiscareertotheestablishmentofthestudyofpositive lawasanautonomousscientific

disciplinewithintheacademy.90

Allofthemostinfluentialtwentiethcenturyproponents

of firstorder positivist legal theoryHart, Raz, andMacCormickhave benefited from

Austinsefforts inthis regardandhavebeen, firstand foremost,successfulacademics in

themoderncompetitivemold.91

87Althoughsomeaccountsof legalpositivismtraceitsoriginstopremodernEurope,see,forexample,CONKLIN,

supranote43,at1432(discussingGreekdistinctionbetweennomosandphysisasanalogoustopositive law

natural law dichotomy),most accounts of legal positivism identify Thomas Hobbes as the firstmodern legal

positivist. See,e.g.,Bix,supranote13,at18;Dyzenhaus,supranote8,at708;5860;Gardner,supranote13,

20405;Waldron,supranote13,at171.

88SeeSTEVENSHAPIN&SIMONSCHAFFER,LEVIATHANANDTHEAIRPUMP:HOBBES,BOYLE,ANDTHEEXPERIMENTALLIFE10002

(1985);SteveFuller,DisciplinaryBoundariesand theRhetoricof theSocialSciences,12POETICSTODAY301,320

(1991).

89

See

NEGLEY

HARTE

&

JOHN

NORTH,

THE

WORLD

OF

UCL

18282004

(2004).

90Twining,supranote13,at123.

91OnHart,seeLACEY,supranote37,at112208. SeealsoSchauer,supranote11,at195153(classingAustin

withBenthamandKelsenasbeingconcernedprimarilywiththedemarcationoflawfromitsneighbors).


20/30


Allofthesefigureswroteinparttowinauthorityfortheirsubjectmatter,agoalnotfully

distinguishablefromwinningpersonalandinstitutionalsecurityforthewritersthemselves.

Describing ones subjectmatter as differentiable from other subjectmatters reflects

positivelyonthedescribersauthoritytomakethedescription.92

Atthesametime,that

differentiationcannotbetoofinegrained;thedifferentiatorhasaninterestinclaimingas

muchintellectualterritoryaspossible.93

Theincentivestokeepdifferentiationsofsubject

matter(afocuson law)generalare intensionwith incentivestodifferentiatetheoretical

positions (a focuson theattributesof lawassociatedwith legalpositivism,andoneach

writersdifferencesfromhispredecessors). Thistensionhasbeencontinuouslymodulated

by these writers consistent description of law as basically discursive, normative, and

systemic. Hobbesexplainedlawasnecessitatedbythetransitionintoapostnaturalstate

oflanguageandasexistingonlytotheextentthesovereignscommandsarearticulated.94

Bentham,

similarly,

defined

a

law

as

an

assemblage

of

signs

declarative

of

a

volition

conceivedoradoptedbythesovereign.95

Austinreferredtothequestionofthenatureof

law as a question of identifying the principles, notions, and distinctions which are

commontosystemsoflaw.96

Hart,ofcourse,differentiatedhisaccountfromAustinsin

partbypointingout thatAustins accountpaid insufficientattention to the variety and

nuances of legal discourse.97

And Raz,while critical of aspects of Harts account, has

similarlydescribedlawastheauthoritativevoiceofapoliticalcommunity.98

Allof these figureshave alsodescribed law as a system of aparticular kind: one that

suspendstheoperationofcertainreasonsforactionandthathasselfreferentialfeatures.

ForHobbes,theLeviathanscommandsforbidcertainactionsand justificationsasasocial

even though (or because) they are natural;99

these commands contribute to the

maintenanceofanartificialbodycreatedthroughlanguagereferringtothatartificialbody

92SeeCOLLINS,supranote39,at31.

93SeeABBOTT,CHAOS,supranote39,at147;COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at7076.

94SeeCONKLIN,supranote43,at73,8191,9888.

95JEREMYBENTHAM,OFLAWS INGENERAL1(1782). Indeed,Benthamhasbeendescribedasanticipat[ing]various

trendsintwentiethcenturyphilosophyoflanguage(includingFregesandWittgensteinscontextprinciple,some

views of logical positivists, and the development of speech act theory). See Timothy Endicott, Law and

Language,StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,availableathttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawlanguage/.

96JOHNAUSTIN,THEUSESOFTHESTUDYOFJURISPRUDENCE365,367(1863).


98Raz,OntheNature,supranote29,at99.

99SeeCONKLIN,supranote43,at96.


21/30


and its operations.100

Benthams expository jurisprudencewhich anticipated in some

respectswhatPerrycallsmethodologicalpositivismsoughttodescribelawasasystemof

specific reasons, including higherorder reasons relating to the generation of those

reasons.101

Austin,too,thoughfaultedbyHartforinadequateattentiontothestructureof

secondary rules,102

did consider the constraint of legal systems by the higherorder

discourseofconstitutionallaw,103

andsuggestedthatlawisinherentlyselfreferentialinits

inability to represent the sovereigns pure will.104

Hart described his claim that legal

reasons must be distinguishable from moral reasons as entailed by the practices of

referring to something called law105

and, of course, identified the inclusion of self

referringnormsasadefiningfeatureofa legalsystem.106

AndRazhasfurtheradvanced

Hartsdiscussionsofthenormativeandexclusionaryfunctionsoflegaldiscourse.107

Eachofthesetheorists(amongmanyothersnotdiscussedhere)builtonandmodifiedhis

predecessors

ideas,

while

continuing

to

attribute

certain

consistent

characteristics

to

the

subjectmatterheaddressed. Thepatternofmodificationofpredecessors ideashasas

muchtodowiththegraduallysolidifyingacademicinstitutionalsystemwithinwhichthese

theorists functionedas itdoeswith the (inherent) incompletenessof theirpredecessors

explanations. Indeed, we could see this pattern of attributing a consistent set of

characteristicstothesubjectmatterasakindofconfirmationthatthisconceptualization

meaningfullycorrespondstoan identifiableaspectofexperience. Thisperspectiveoffers

100Id.at8286.

101IntheFragmentonGovernment,forexample,Benthamstressestheneedtoacknowledgehigherordernorms

orreasonswhenhecriticizesBlackstoneforexcessivefocusonthe lawmakingpowerofthegovernment(the

rightofGovernmenttomakeLaws)totheneglectoftherulesgoverningandrestrictingthatpower(thedutyof

theGovernmenttomakeLawsandtheBritishConstitution). SeeJEREMYBENTHAM,AFRAGMENTONGOVERNMENT

67(1776); id.at5355(discussingsovereignssubjectionto law). SeealsoSchofield,supranote16,at5960;

Twining,supranote13,at121.

102HART,supranote27,at1825,9199.

103JOHNAUSTIN,THEPROVINCEOFJURISPRUDENCEDETERMINED25758 (1863)(discussingconstitutionalprinciplesor

maximswhichthesovereignhabituallyobserves,which itisboundorconstrainedtoobserve,andwhichare

knowntothosewhomightapply(nonlegal)sanctionstothesovereignintheeventofitsfailuretoobservethese

principles).

104CONKLIN,supranote43,at14344.

105SeeHart,supranote2,at61415,620.


107See,e.g.,Raz,supranote25,at3548,14148,17077.


22/30

[Vol.12No.02684 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lanotherreasontosuspectthatthetraitsattributedtolawbypositivistsarelikelytoremain

compellingfocalpointsfortheoreticalaccountsoflegalphenomena.108

III.MustLegalTheoryBePositivist?

Mygoalistosuggestthatabroadpostpositivismisneitherdesirablenortrulypossible

giventhecurrentinstitutionalcontextofscholarlyproductioningeneralandlegaltheoryin

particular. Inarguingthatthetheoreticalpositionassociatedwithlegalpositivismisboth

accurateandcompelling,however, Idonotnecessarilymeanthat it is impossible foran

academic legaltheoristtobeanythingbuta legalpositivist,orthatAngloAmerican legal

theoryistrappedwithinasingleparadigm,theimplicationsofwhicharealreadyorsoonto

beexhausted,leavingnothingofinterestforlegaltheoriststodo. Inthissection,Iaddress

thefirstofthesepossibleconcerns;SectionDaddressesthesecond.

Myargumentmightbetakentosuggestnotonlythatpostpositivismisnotdesirablebut

also that all legal theory is positivistic. Brian Bix has argued that such a position is

untenablebecauseunderstanding legal theoryas a oneparty stateof thiskind isnot

illuminating.109

There are two problems with this contention from the perspective

advocatedhere. First,Bixsconclusionregardingthedesirabilityofamultipartystateof

legaltheorymaybeunrealisticandinconsistentwiththenatureoftheoreticaldiscourse. It

ispossiblethatwenotonlydobutmustinsomesensehaveakindofonepartystatein

legaltheory,ifalllegaltheoristsmustembracesomeorallofthepremisesidentifiedabove

inordertobecomprehensibletoandrecognizedbyotherlegaltheorists.110

Second,even

ifweassumethatBixisusingthetermmorenarrowlyandaccepthisconclusionaboutthe

undesirabilityofaonepartystate,hisobjectiondoesnotunderminemyargumentifit is

possibletoidentifyfeaturesdistinguishinglegalpositivismasIhavedescribeditfromother

forms of theoretical inquiry into law. This is possible by virtue of the features I have

identifiedwith legalpositivism inSectionB.I.2. Conceivablenonpositivistapproachesto

theacademicstudyof law includespecificrecommendations forthereformofparticular

legal institutions;accountsdenyingoneormoreoftheassumptionsdescribed inSection

B.I.2, such as the distinctiveness of law, the characterization of legal institutions as

systemic,ortheexistenceofmeaningfuldifferencesbetweenfirst andsecondorderlegal

discourse;andinterdisciplinaryaccountsoflaw,likesociologicalandanthropologicalones.

108 See, e.g., MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 29293 (discussing law, following Karl Poppers

terminology,asaWorldIIIthoughtobject). SeealsoRAZ,BETWEEN,supranote29,at265,269.

109

Bix,

supra

note

13,

at

29.

110Thus, JohnFinnis selfidentifiesand is identifiedbyothersas criticalof legalpositivism,yetheembracesa

perspectiveonthenatureof lawsimilar inmanywaystothatdescribedabove. SeeFinnis,supranote22. See

alsoBix,supranote9,at1613,1624.


23/30


All of these are possible positions, and many of them have been advanced by legal

theorists. TheveryfractallogicidentifiedbyAbbotthat,Iargue,ensurestheperpetuation

of debates within what we think of as a legal positivist paradigm also ensures the

proliferationofsuchcompetingvarietiesoflegaltheory.

In other words, I am proposing not that legal positivism is the only possible mode of

academic discourse about law, or even the dominant one, but thatwithout significant

institutionalchangeintheacademy,AngloAmericanlegaltheoryisnotlikelyevertoexit

the debate over whether the best explanation of law involves acknowledgment of its

discursive,normative,systemic,suspensive,andselfreferentialcharacteristics. Thenature

of theoreticaldiscourseand thedynamicsof the institutionswithinwhich it isproduced

encourage attention to and efforts to clarify these characteristics of lawnot to the

exclusionofotherperspectives,butbecausethesecharacteristicsareespeciallywellsuited

as

topics

for

the

kind

of

theoretical

discourse

rewarded

in

these

settings.

D. NewPathsforPositivistInquiry

Mycontentionthatlegalpositivismisprobablyheretostaydoesnotimplythatwemust

resignourselves to theendless recyclingof familiardebates. Anynumberof interesting

theoreticalquestionsandconcrete legalphenomenaremain largelyunexplored fromthe

perspective I identify as positivist. In this section, I briefly discuss two examples: the

phenomenonofpositivistadjudication(SectionD.I),andtheimplicationsoftheexclusivity

oflegalandtheoreticaldiscourse(SectionD.II).

I. PositivistAdjudicators

RonaldDworkinsworkhasbeenreadasacritiqueoftheaccuracyoflegalpositivismasa

description of actual practices of adjudication.111

Yet reallife adjudicators, including

judges in theUnited Statesthe system aboutwhichDworkinwrotehave adopted a

rhetoric intheirwrittenopinionsthatresembles the idiomsof legalpositivism.112

Some

111See,e.g.,Coleman, supranote10,at14546;Soper, supranote12,at50708,512. CompareDyzenhaus,

supranote8,at712,716(notingthataDworkinianjudgewouldnotbealegalpositivist)withLeiter,supranote

15,at27(notingthatDworkinmightbeconsideredanappliedpositivistseekingtodescribeadjudicativeprocess),

Perry,supranote13,at317(notingthatDworkinmightbeclassedasamethodologicalpositivist).

112Iamnotthefirsttomakethisobservation,butIhope inthissectiontosuggestsomeimplicationsthathave

notbeennotedbefore. Forpreviouscharacterizationsofparticularadjudicatorsandjudicialrhetoricasexamples

of legalpositivism inpractice, see, forexample,G.ToddButler,AMatterofPositivism: Evaluating the Legal

Philosophy

of

Justice

Antonin

Scalia

Under

the

Framework

Set

Forth

by

H.L.A.

Hart,

12

HOLY

CROSS

J.L.

&

PUB.

POLY

47,48,59 (2008) (concluding thatScalia isapositivistbecausehisopinionsbetrayhisadherenceto thesocial

factsthesisandtheseparationthesis,identifiedbyButlerasthetwofundamentaltenetsshare[d]byalllegal

positivists); Beau James Brock,Mr. Justice Antonin Scalia: A Renaissance of Positivism and Predictability in

ConstitutionalAdjudication, 51 LA. L. REV. 623 (1991);Anita J.Allen,AutonomysMagicWand: Abortion and

ConstitutionalInterpretation,72B.U.L.REV.683,69394(1992)(describingbothJusticeScaliaandJusticeThomas


24/30

[Vol.12No.02686 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lcommentators have even suggested that judicial rhetoric is by its nature positivistic.

113

More common is the identification of certain judges as positivist. U.S. Supreme Court

JusticeHugoBlackhasbeen referred to in thisway,114

but JusticeAntoninScalia is the

adjudicator nowmost commonly labeled a positivist.115

If, as I have argued, the legal

positivistcharacterizationoflawisintimatelytiedtotheacademicinstitutionalcontextin

which legal theory is produced, can a judge, who necessarily writes from a different

institutionalposition,trulybealegalpositivist? Inthissection,Ifirstconsiderthewaysin

whichajudgesuchasJusticeScaliamaybeconsideredalegalpositivistinthesenseIhave

outlined here. Analysis of this question suggests new ways of connecting currently

disparateareasoflegalscholarshiptogenerateinterestingnewquestions.

In the context of the framework presented here, calling a judge like Justice Scalia a

positivistmightmeanoneoftwothings: thatthejudgespeaksfromanacademicdomain

despite

his

or

her

role

as

a

judge,

or

that

the

judge

adopts

the

rhetoric

of

the

academic

domain. The latter seems tobe themoreaccuratedescriptionof JusticeScalia. Tobe

sure,JusticeScaliawasanacademicbeforebecominga judge,andtheapplicationofthe

legalpositivistlabeltohimisdueinparttohisscholarlywork.116

ButreferencestoJustice

Blackasapositivistcannotbeexplainedinthisway,andJusticeScaliahascontinuedtobe

identified as a positivist even after leaving the academy (although the precise sense in

which the termpositivist isbeingused isnotalwaysclear).

Atany rate,while Justice

Scalia ismoreofapublic intellectualthanmany judgesare,117

hedoesnotnowworkan

academiccontext. Rather,referencestohimasalegalpositivist,andhisselfidentification

assuch,appearmainlytorefertocertaincharacteristicsofhiswrittenopinions,thatis,to

hisadoptionofarhetoricofpositivism. Thesecharacteristicsincludeastressonstatutory

andconstitutionaltextandprecedentastheonlylegitimatereasonstoofferinsupportof

aspositivists);GeorgeKannar,TheConstitutionalCatechismofAntoninScalia,99YALEL.J.1297,1307,1310,1308,

1339(1990)(referringtoScaliaaspositivist).

113See,e.g.,GeraldB.Wetlaufer,RhetoricanditsDenialinLegalDiscourse,76VA.L.REV.1545,1555(1990).

114Brock,supranote112,at632.

115Seesourcescitedsupranote112.

116SeeANTONINSCALIA,AMATTEROFINTERPRETATION: FEDERALCOURTSANDTHELAW25(1997);AntoninScalia,Morality,

Pragmatism,and theLegalOrder,9HARV. J.L.&PUB.POLY123,125 (1986) (Ihaveneverbeenable to isolate

obligationsof justice,exceptbydefining themas thoseobligations that the law imposes.). Similarly, Justice

Scaliasdictum that[t]hereare timeswhenevenabad rule isbetter thanno ruleatallcanbe takenasan

articulationoftheseparabilitythesis. AntoninScalia,TheRuleofLawasaLawofRules,56U.CHI.L.REV.1175,

1179

(1989)

[hereinafter

Scalia,

The

Rule

of

Law].

117 SeeDavidM.Zlotnick, Jusice ScaliaandHisCritics: AnExploration of Scalias Fidelity toHisConstitutional

Methodology,48EMORYL.J.1377,142728(1999)(arguingthatJusticeScaliaismoreaccuratelycharacterizedasa

politicianthanasajudge);StephenA.Newman,PoliticalAdvocacyontheSupremeCourt:TheDamagingRhetoric

ofAntoninScalia,51N.Y.L.SCH.L.REV.907(2006).


25/30


a judicial decision and a disavowal of reliance on policy (i.e., moral or practical)

considerations118 and emotion.119 In other words, in his opinions, Justice Scalia

representsthelawasadiscursivesysteminwhichsometypesofreasonsaresuspendedor

excluded,andhedoessothroughstatementsreferringtothesystemitself.120

ReferencestoJusticeScaliaasapositivistarebasedonhisrepeateduseofstatementsof

thiskind,ratherthanonhisoccupationofaparticularinstitutionalrole.121

Thisdoesnot

mean that Justice Scalias opinionwriting technique offers support for the claim, often

attributedtoDworkin,thatevery judgeisa jurisprude.122

Rather,itsuggeststhatJustice

ScaliadeploysinhisopinionswhatHarryCollinsandRobertEvanshavecalledinteractive

expertise in the academictheoretical discourse of legal positivism. Collins and Evans

defineinteractiveexpertiseastheabilitytomasterthelanguageofaspecialistdomainin

theabsenceofpracticalcompetence (the latterwouldpermitthecontributionofnovel

propositions

in

the

discourse

of

the

domainfor

example,

Justice

Scalia

would

exhibit

practicalcompetence ifhewere tocontribute tooneofthetheoreticaldebateson legal

positivism).123

Alternatively,becauseofhisacademicbackground,JusticeScaliasrhetoric

mightbeunderstoodasaformofreferredexpertise,theuseofanexpertiselearnedin

onedomainwithinanother.124

118E.g.,Cardenv.ArkomaAssocs.,494U.S.185,196(1990)(Theresolutionswehavereached...canvalidlybe

characterizedastechnical,precedentbound,andunresponsivetopolicyconsiderations... but...thathasbeen

thecharacterofourjurisprudenceinthisfield.).

119E.g.,Penryv.Lynaugh,492U.S.302,359(1989)(Scalia,J.,concurringinpartanddissentinginpart)(Itisan

unguided,emotionalmoralresponse[injuries]thatthe[majorityopinion]demandsbeallowedanoutpouring

ofpersonalreaction...,anunfocusedsympathy. NotonlyhaveweneverbeforesaidtheConstitutionrequires

this, but [in prior decisions we have] sought to eliminate precisely the unpredictability it produces.).

CommentatorshavenotedthatthisdisavowalisbeliedbyJusticeScaliasuseofcolorfullanguagetocharacterize

viewswithwhichhedisagrees. SeegenerallyNewman,supranote117.

120InlinewithH.L.A.Hart,JusticeScaliahasarguedthattheexclusionofcertainconsiderationsfromthedomain

of legitimate legal reasonsadvancescertaintyandpredictability. CompareScalia,TheRuleofLaw,supranote

116,withHART,supranote27,at42,252(arguingthatabenefitofaruleofrecognition is itsenhancementof

certaintyandpredictability).

121Becausewecanonlydetecttheoccupationofalegalpositivistpositionthroughstatementslikethosemadeby

JusticeScalia,thedifferencebetweenoccupyingtheinstitutionalpositionassociatedwiththegenerationoflegal

positivistdiscourseandtheuseofpositivistrhetoricbyonefunctioningwithinanotherinstitutionmaynotbeall

thatsignificant. Cf.COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at86.

122

RONALD

DWORKIN,

LAWS

EMPIRE

90

(1986)

(Jurisprudence

is

the

general

part

of

adjudication,

silent

prologue

to

everydecisionatlaw.).

123COLLINS&EVANS,supranote39,at14.

124Id.at15.


26/30

[Vol.12No.02688 Ge rman L aw J ou rna lAjudgecouldborrowdiscursiveexpertisefromtheacademicdomainforuseinthejudicial

formanyreasons,mostofthemprudential: tobetterunderstandorexplain the judicial

domain, to contribute to the expansion of the intellectual territory claimed by that

domain,125

tofacilitatecommunicationwithexpertsinbothdomains,ortoconfersomeof

thestatusorauthorityassociatedwiththeacademicdomainonthejudicialone. Indeed,

to anonexpert audience, referredor interactiveexpertise is indistinguishable from

whatCollinsandEvanscallcontributoryexpertise,126

andwhenthestatusorlegitimacy

ofaborrowingdiscourseisquestionable,theuseofthiskindofparasiticexpertisemay

bevirtuallytheonlymethodoflegitimatingthediscourseinquestion.127

Inlightofother

characteristics of his jurisprudence, it seems most likely that Justice Scalia borrows

positivistidiomstoconferstatus,authority,andlegitimacyonhisopinions.128

ThisunderstandingofJusticeScaliaspositivismhelpstoclarifythenatureoftheparallels

between

the

academic

and

legal

domains

discussed

above.

Justice

Scalia

is

considered

a

positivistjudgebecauseofthestatementshemakesinhisopinionsabouttheproperkind

of reasons to provide in support of a legal decision. But the type of discursive self

referenceinvolvedinthesestatementsisnotthesameasthediscursiveselfreferencethat

is, on the legal positivist account, inherent in law. Instead, it is a selfreference that

importsthehigherorderdiscourseofanotherinstitutionalsetting,thatoftheoriesoflegal

justification,reasoning,andauthority.129

Considering the phenomenon of positivist adjudication in this light raises several

interestingquestions. OneisthebasicquestionofhowtypicalJusticeScaliasmethodis. If

positivistjudgingisdefinedasamatterofthedeploymentofinteractiveexpertise,orasa

matterofdiscursiveperformance,thenthecontentanalysisofjudicialopinionsshouldbe

abletotellushowoftenitoccurs.130

Initself,informationabouthowoftenjudgesusethe

languageofpositivismmightnotbeofgreat interest. Butcontextualizedproperly,such

information would have significant practical and political, not to mention theoretical,

125Id.at7076.

126Id.at5254,6063.

127AsCollinsandEvansargue,distancelendsenchantment,thatis,themoredistantoneisfromthelocusof

thecreationofknowledgeinspaceandtimethemorecertainwilltheknowledgeappeartobe. Id.at20.

128SeegenerallyKannar,supranote112;Zlotnick,supranote117. SeealsoMatthewKramersargument that

legalofficials often act forprudential rather thanmoral reasons, KRAMER, supra note 4, at 6477, and Jamal

Greenesargument,not limitedto JusticeScalia,about thereasonsfor theuseoforiginalistrhetoric in judicial

and

popular

discourse,

Jamal

Greene,

Selling

Originalism,

97

GEO.

L.J.

657

(2009).

129Seesupranotes116&117.

130Foranoverviewofworktakingthistypeofapproach,seeMarkHall&RonWright,SystematicContentAnalysis

ofJudicialOpinions,96CAL.L.REV.63(2006).


27/30


implications. One question to ask would be whether judges using the language of

positivismtendtodecidecases inawaythatdifferssystematically fromthedecisionsof

nonpositivist judges.131

Without relyingon the terminologyofpositivismandexpertise

usedhere,anumberofscholarshavealreadysoughttodeterminewhethertherear

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