Paul L. Posner George Mason University
Transcript of Paul L. Posner George Mason University
Paul L. Posner
George Mason University
Business oriented approach to government
Performance goals and contracting
Shift from traditional bureaucracies to quasi-autonomous units
Shifting accountability from inputs to results
Replacing monopolies with competitive suppliers
Greater reliance on market institutions
Hollow state Disarticulated state Third Way Third party governance Privatization Hiving off, boarding out, outsourcing Devolution Governance, not government Network management Not your father’s public administration
Traditional Direct Government
Fully Private
Internal Managerial
Reforms
Quasi- Governmental organizations
Contracting for specific
Services/ products
Market based regulatory approaches
Public-Private Partnerships
Devolution
Tax credits and vouchers
Divestiture
From program/agency to tools and actors
From hierarchies to networks
From public vs. private to partnerships
From command/control to negotiation
From management skills to “enablement”
From internal controls to design
Shift in Public Management
Tools
Spend
Revenue
Regulate
Direct Services Grant-in-Aid Leases Procurement & Contracts Transfer Payments to Individuals Government Credit & Insurance
Corrective Taxes & Fees Tax Expenditures User Fees & Charges Vouchers
Social & Economic Regulation Permit Trading Information Training & Advise
Government Non-Government
Expands reach of government
Access skills and technology
Leverage additional financing
Promote efficiency
Access to clients
Reflect diverse local values and interests
Gain legitimacy
Advantages of
Indirect Government
Expanding the range of providers to decentralize service delivery
Relying on private partners to provide resources and deliver services
Shifting accountability from inputs to results
Supplant monopolies with competition
Increase financing for public initiatives
Improve technical capacity
Promote greater flexibility
Privatization Pressures
Public Finance Private Finance
Public Delivery
Direct Government
User Fees
Private Delivery
Contract Vouchers
PPP’s
Finance
Delivery
Public-Private Roles and Tools
Support services – non critical to mission and easily measured. Examples including building cleaning, guard services
Information technology and other back-office functions – economies of scale,
Traditional core government activities – prisons, food inspection, audit office, welfare administration, education, health care.
Infrastructure assets – public private partnerships
Types of services outsourced
Savings considerable. 33 percent savings in U.S. federal government from 2000 outsourcing initiatives.
UK – 20 percent savings, 15 percent in Australia
US - $6 billion savings achieved over four years
Economies of scale through shared services
Enhanced capacity and access to technology
Improved public sector productivity when they compete with private firms
Benefits gained from
private provision
Lack of competition reduces rationale for private over public Exclusivity at outset- sole source Overdependence over time – indispensable From competition to monopoly – entropy
Capacity of government to oversee contracts Exodus of government employees to contractors
General Privatization Concerns
(1/2)
Cost shifting and cherry picking
Inherently governmental functions Public ensures we get right things done Private ensures we do them right
Transparency – assigning credit and blame Private contractors’ information not publicly accessible Laws on public accountability and redress may not apply
General Privatization Concerns
(2/2)
Information asymmetries
Monopolies over production
Adverse selection
True capacities and incentives of agents unknown
Moral hazard
Inobservable behavior by agents
QUESTIONS:
The Painter and the Home Owner: Principal Agent
Homeowner needs information:
• What work is needed?
• How much should I pay?
• Which painter can be trusted?
• How much should I pay?
• How do I know if he is doing a good job?
B = Build
D = Design
F = Finance
L = Lease
M = Maintain
O = Operate
P = Purchase
T = Transfer
DB – contracts with public for design and construction
FDBOM – private role in all phases
BOT – private transfer to public
PMO – sale from public to private
LDO – private lease of public facilities
LO/LPO – public lease/public lease-purchase
Public Private Partnerships
For Assets
Classic PPP – Design, build, finance, maintain and operate over many years
Different from traditional outsourcing Private financing of up front capital costs
Private responsibility for multiple phases of project
Long term nature of contract
Relationship between public and private collaborative rather than arms length
Competition limited due to high capital financing and long term nature of commitment
Budgetary treatment tends to annualize costs, rather than recognize up front
Public Private Partnerships
Private Sector Brings Capabilities
Financing Capitalize underutilized assets Technical expertise Market efficiencies Integrated management across all phases of projects including
maintenance
Benefits include greater efficiency and savings UK – 90% on-time completion, compared with 30% for public projects UK – 75 percent of projects meet or exceed performance expectations
Public Private Partnerships:
Rewards
Risks from Private Participation
Higher costs of capital
Public values and support – concern over fees and control
Budgetary control
Contingent Liabilities – how much risk is government responsible for?
Oversight and Accountability
Truncated Competition
Public Private Partnerships:
Concerns
Construction risk: delays and cost overruns.
Financial risk: increases in financing costs.
Availability risk: threats to the continuous supply of capital services.
Demand risk: potential shortfalls in use of the asset by the public.
Force majeure: risks from natural or man-made disasters and war
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Between 1993 and 2001 Chile awarded 21 road concession worth US$ 5 billion on a competitive basis
Bidding started with smaller projects, in order to test the market and reduce the risk to the private sector
The bidding attracted 27 consortia and more than 40 Chilean and foreign companies, from 10 countries
PPP program is viewed as transparent and competitive, with only one minimum revenue guarantee called
Surveys of users, consultations with local and national leaders, and focus groups graded Concessions System at 6 on scale from 1 to 7
Source: Cuttaree, World Bank, 2008
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Between 1987 and 1995, 52 projects (25 competitively tendered) was awarded (largest PPP toll road program)
By the end of 1995, 34 projects had reached financial close for US$ 9.9 billion in private investment committed
Shortest concession period would win (max 15 years), led to very high tolls
Concessioned roads obligated to have a parallel toll free road Construction cost overruns averaged 25% and average actual
revenues were about 30% below forecasts (only 5 projects met or exceeded targets)
Average toll road fee increased from US$ 0.02/km to US$ 0.17 after concessioning
Government took over 23 projects and paid outstanding debt to Mexican Banks (about US$ 5 billion) and construction companies (about US$ 2.6 billion)
Source: Cuttaree, World Bank, 2008
Chile
Procurement process was transparent
Focus on creating public awareness (tolling culture)
Government learned as program developed and made adjustments
Attracting international firms brought finance, credibility, know-how etc…
Mexico
Combination of small contract duration and low traffic resulted in high tolls
Existence of free roads contributed to financial distress of concessionaires
Situation aggravated by Tequila crisis
Program resulted in massive Government bail-out
Source: Cuttaree, World Bank, 2008
Source? Wqold Bank
•Rate structures were immediately modified,
which resulted in increases of up to $20 in water
bills for local families, many of whom often earn
as little as $100/month
• In October 1998, groups gathered in protests,
which led to an outbreak of violence, when the
Bolivian army killed as many as nine, injured
hundreds and arrested several local leaders
•In 1999, the Bolivian government privatized the
water system in Cochabamba by granting a 40-
year concession to an international consortium
called Aguas del Tunari
•Finally, Aguas del Tunari announced that the
consortium was withdrawing from the project
Political leadership support
Legal frameworks to ensure enforcement of contracts
Effective governmental analysis and monitoring
Competitive procurement
Performance based contracts
Explicit risk allocations
Guaranteed revenue stream
Support from stakeholders including unions, public clients, other interests
PPP Success Factors