Patriot or Traitor:

Assessing Otto John's Motives for "Defecting" in 1954

By David A. Meier, Dickinson State University

On December 4, 1950, Otto John was appointed president of the Bundesamt für

Verfassungsschutz. On July 20, 1954, after a ceremony in Berlin remembering the conspirators

of 1944, he disappeared. He reappeared in East Berlin. Before his disappearance, Otto John

headed the equivalent of the West German Central Intelligence Agency but focused internally

overall rather than externally. After presiding over the review of tens of thousands of

background checks, running his own agents in East Germany, investigating radical right and left

wing internal threats to the West German state, a known micro-manager, Otto John was allegedly

kidnaped or defected into Soviet hands. The stakes were immense. By the early 1950s, the BfV

accumulated over 40,000 files. Otto John sat in the unique position of potentially knowing more

about the key figures in the West German state than any other person at the time. Adenauer

asked the Allied High Commission to inquire with Soviet authorities regarding the whereabouts

of John.1 Uncertainty mixed with a bit of a panic. Klaus Tiedge, who in August 1985 became

the first high level official within West Germany’s counter-intelligence community to “go over

to the communists,” wrote in his own memoirs, Der Überläufer (1998), one word about Otto

John: “traitor.”2

Complicating matters further, Otto John appears to have run his own agents in East

Germany. Once selected to head the BfV, he traveled throughout West Germany often micro-

managing the activities or regional offices of his agency. He would be regularly briefed about

the intelligence activities of other West German agencies while also maintaining a working

relationship with other intelligence agencies from West Germany’s allies in NATO. Not many

months before his defection, Otto John met with Allen Dulles, representing the CIA. His habit

of micro-managing regional offices became a source of irritation as his experience did not lend

itself to inspiring confidence or giving him the tools he needed to advise regional offices. He

appeared to have a regular habit of drinking too much and making something of a spectacle of

himself at prominent hotels downtown Cologne, Germany.

The central question remained decades later: Why did Otto John go into East Berlin?

Three possible scenarios were investigated: (1) he defected, (2) he was kidnapped, or (3) he

went voluntarily. All three involved a review of John’s past. This article blends material from a

variety of archival and secondary sources. Combined with documents released in 2008 and the

research of the Forschungsbeirat für Fragen der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands for 1952-1954

in Bundesarchiv (Koblenz) – viewed last March -- were hoped to provide a bit more substance to

the circumstances of Otto John’s decision to go into East Berlin.

Throughout the entire Otto John affair, investigators across the spectrum assumed that in

some sense John’s past had finally caught up with him. Otto John war-time contacts ranged

from high ranking Nazis to links with the Allies as well as the German Resistance. Wounded on

the Eastern Front in 1941, Otto John’s brother, Hans John, would be placed in hands of two SS

doctors, Drs. Ferdinand Sauerbruch and Wolfgang Wohlgemuth. Inspired by Wohlgemuth’s

apparent anti-Nazi stance and his medical assistance for his brother, Otto John came to view

Wohlgemuth as an “Edelcommunist“ or “salon communist” – as someone who declared himself

in favor of Communism but never quite understood what it was all about. Although both Hans

and Otto were involved in the resistance to Hitler, Hans John perished in the Nazi prison

Plötzensee in April 1945.3 Called before the International Military Tribunal on June 8-9, 1948,

John testified as to his involvement with the resistance to Hitler and his affiliation with it leading

figures, including Klaus Bonhöffer and Hans von Dohnanyi, and provided him with a viable

cover story for his ride to Madrid (via Barcelona) aboard a Lufthansa machine on July 24, 1944.4

John counted among his contacts Dietrich Bonhöffer, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, Adam von Trott

zu Solz, Jakob Kaiser, and Generals Ludwig Beck, Ludwig Freiherr von Hammerstein, and Hans

Oster. (John’s first link in this process was his boss at Lufthansa, Klaus Bonhöffer, though not

Klaus’s brother Dietrich.) John also coupled himself with Graf Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg –

while also acknowledging that this link came through Abwehr Captain Ludwig Gehre. Alluding

to contacts with American authorities (which he indicated dated back to 1942), John presented

himself as someone actively working to bring down the Nazi regime. (According to a British

Special Intelligence Service officer in the British embassy in Lisbon, John had made contact with

him in 1942 regarding possible British support for the German underground against Hitler.)

Overall, the impression John leaves is clearly as one deeply implicated in the resistance and

involved directly and or indirectly with almost every key figure.5 After the July 20, 1944, plot to

kill Hitler, John took a flight to Madrid. Once in Madrid, John made his way to the Palace Hotel.

A little later, Britain’s MI6 arranged for his transportation to Lisbon via Vigo. Though disguised

as a Royal Air Force pilot, the Portuguese secret police found and arrested him. The Abwehr

official charged with assassinating John, Fritz Cramer, tipped off British officials, who obtained

John’s release and flew him to England. Once in Great Britain, he began working under Sefton

Delmar in the Office of Political Warfare in preparing anti-Nazi propaganda. Later on, John

would work with the British in screening former German generals as part of the denazification

process. Nothing, however, linked John with British intelligence.6

As for John’s rise to high office, the government explanation began with the creation of

the law regarding relations between the states and the BfV from September 27, 1950.7 Shortly

thereafter, extensive talks began with the Allied Security Directors to find and place individuals

in the new institution’s leading positions. Largely out of frustration, Otto John became a favored

candidate of the Allied High Commission in November 1950. In December 1950, John assumed

his duties as director of the BfV.8 Officially, the background investigations of Otto John

revealed nothing of significance. Similar investigation conducted through1952 did not add

substantially to these materials.9

As for his alleged defection and return, Otto John returned from East Germany on

December 12, 1955. His reappearance in the West was just as mysterious as his disappearance

on July 20, 1954. Residing just outside Potsdam, John made know his desire to return to the

West to the Danish journalist Henrik Bonde-Henriksen. Initially, John allegedly thought of

seeking political asylum in England and/or Denmark. Denied these possibilities, John

reconsidered a return to West Germany. John’s escape plan had little flare. As he made regular

trips to Humbolt University to do research, John evaded his guards and got into Bonde-

Henriksen’s waiting car. As the car approached the border, the East German guards allegedly

recognized the driver and vehicle and waved the car through – with John “concealed in the floor

in the back seat.” Proceeding directly to Tempelhof airfield, John boarded a British plane and

flew to Wahn airport near Cologne. Upon arrival, the “Security Detachment of the Federal

Criminal Police” (BKA) in Bonn questioned John for several hours about his seventeen-month

stint in the East.10

The BKA report presented five possible explanations for John’s return. First, “John is

basically a psychiatric case who crossed into East Berlin on an emotional impulse, which

stemmed from a belief he was being frustrated in his job that was brought to a head by the July

20 celebration in Berlin in 1954, and who has now again impulsively sought escape, this time

from the new situation in which he had embroiled himself.” According to this theory, John acted

out of desperation. Second, John is a true idealist who had become convinced that a dramatic

gesture such as his crossing into the East Zone was the only means by which the Germans could

be awakened to [the] realization that reunification is first of all a German problem which cannot

be solved by rigid German adherence to the specific and conflicting interests of either the West

or the East.

This second theory constituted little more than a variation off the first. Third, “John was

simply kidnapped [sic] and taken to East Berlin. Once there he chose the best means of survival

which was to seem to play the Soviet‘s game by adopting their line (but without yielding up any

information of value) until such time as he could engineer his escape again to the West.” A more

romantic and heroic suggestion, it fit the first impulses of West German investigators and, much

later, the description offered by John himself. It did not, however, fit well with subsequent

evidence and never had more than a few advocates. Fourth, “John is a top-flight intelligence

agent for the British (or for the Federal Republic as the case may be) who has now completed

brilliantly a very tough assignment.” Romantic and exciting, no solid evidence surfaced to make

it stick. Fifth and finally, “John is a top-flight Soviet agent whose return to the West marks [a]

resumption of the outstanding career he has had as a Soviet agent since the day when he was a

member of the ‘Rote Kapelle’.” Equally romantic and exciting, only limited circumstantial

evidence surfaced to make it believable. In sum, these theories reveal more about what the

American embassy did not know than what it did know. The United States did not know if John

had been a Soviet mole or a spy for the West.11

The Commentaries

What information is available comes from a few select sources. Otto John’s memoirs,

Zweimal kam ich heim (1969) and his quasi-autobiographical account of the July 20, 1944,

“Falsch und zu spät.“ Der 20. Juli 1944. Epilogue (1984), about the attempt on Hitler’s life,

were part of a conscious attempt to rehabilitate his own reputation.12

According to John, the

British Secret Service intended for a British embassy vehicle to take John to Gibralter and then

fly him on to London.13

Wolfgang Putlitz prepared himself for a career in the German Foreign Office by studying

English at Oxford University in1924 and became a close friend of Klop Ustinov, a future

German diplomat himself and the father of the famous actor.14

During the war, John and Putlitz

both worked in Sefton Delmer’s radio broadcast “Soldatensender Calais” in 1944 from Woburn

Abbey in England. After John assumed the post of president of the BfV, the American Counter

Intelligence Corps intercepted at least one letter (dated March 22, 1953) from Putlitz to John.

According to Vladimir Appolonovich Karpov, Putlitz initiated contact with John in 1951 after

obtaining permission from the KGB. John himself had informed Keith Randall, Britain’s chief

intelligence officer in West Germany, of Putlitz’s several attempts to recruit him for the East.15

As for newly opened Soviet sources, three former insiders, David E. Murphy, Sergei

Kondrashev, and George Bailey, were among the first to examine edited Russian intelligence

reports on the John affair -- but not the actual file on Otto John. “Soviet sources reported that

John was spineless in his resistance to the influence of others, inconsistent in his actions,

intemperate in his use of alcohol, and lacking discernment in his choice of friends.” While there

is no hard evidence of his working for the East as a spy, Soviet interest in John grew with John’s

critical disposition towards the Adenauer government. Wolfgang Wohlgemuth and KGB officer

Max Wonsig met to work out plans to manipulate John. Soviet officials did not expect to

succeed. John’s close ties with the British during the Second World War also made them

suspicious of a possible trap. Pitovranov’s superiors, Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, KGB

Chairman, and Alekssandr Semyonovich Paniushkin, controlling the First Chief Directorate of

the KGB, would have been shocked at John’s expressed willingness to work with the Soviets.

Pitovranov, however, “considered the recruitment of John both inexpedient and unrealistic. We

have taken the decision to persuade him not to return to West Germany and to make an open

break with Adenauer that would be accompanied by a corresponding political declaration by

him.” Russian sources did not indicate that John had provided them with useful information or

had spied for them -- a point at odds with Karpov’s earlier statement.16

John Crosses in East Berlin

Shortly after John crossed into East Berlin, the West Berlin police moved quickly on July

21, 1954, to collect statements from everyone connected with the John affair. Within a matter of

a few weeks, police officials would interview roughly 800 individuals associated with either Otto

John or Wolfgang Wohlgemuth. The results of this investigation were, in turn, forwarded to

Hans Egidi, director of Public Security within the Federal Ministry of the Interior, by Hans-

Georg Urban, Vice President of the Police in Berlin.17

Lucie John

Of the early statements, Lucie John’s on July 28, 1954, proved one of the most detailed.

In contrast to her husband, Lucie seemed somewhat out-of-touch with the work done by her

husband or even the circles in which he moved. Contrary to previous statements, she stood as a

witness to the events leading to her husband’s alleged abduction by Dr. Wohlgemuth. Lucie did

not recall any visible security for her husband. Lucie first met Wolfgang Wohlgemuth in

December 1953 when he visited their home in Cologne for dinner. On this occasion, Lucie

learned of Wolfgang’s role in caring for Otto’s older brother, Hans, who had been severely

wounded on the eastern front. Lame on one side and shot in the heart and lungs, Hans’s situation

had been desperate. However, Hans’s involvement with the resistance resulted in his being shot

by the Gestapo with seven others in the back of the head near the former Lehrter train station on

April 23, 1945. Since that time, Wolfgang and Otto had been friends. 18

Wolfgang finally telephoned Lucie in Hohkeppel on June 11, 1954. Wolfgang

apparently called the BfV in Cologne first and obtained the telephone number. Lucie politely

asked if Wolfgang had an hour to share with her. Surprised to hear of Otto’s trip to the United

States, Wolfgang wanted to share his recent experiences with Lucie. At Wolfgang’s request,

Lucie had him picked up at the train station in Cologne and brought to Hohkeppel. Wolfgang

arrived around 4:30 p.m. Leaving, Wolfgang indicated his intention to return in two weeks for

another meeting with officials with Bayer.19

In Berlin on Saturday, July 17, 1954, Otto picked up Lucie and her aunt around 6:00

p.m. Otto seemed drunk. His eyes were half closed and his mouth half open. He gave the

impression of being literally dead tired. However, Otto did not smell of alcohol. Lucie knew he

enjoyed a drink now and again. But when he did, he generally remained a jovial and enjoyable

person. At the Berlin office of the BfV, Otto allegedly intended to fire everyone and dissolve the

office. To assist him, he brought Detlev von Platen from the Cologne office. Lucie also thought

Otto expected to see Wolfgang Hoffer that same morning. Hoffer worked for the American

Counter-Intelligence Corps (C.I.C.) until his mysterious suicide on July 23, 1954. However,

Otto arrived in a normal state but appeared drunk and seriously unsteady after consuming three

cups of black coffee and three bottles of Steinhäger beer. Otto seemed in a comparable state that

afternoon. However, Otto reportedly drank a great deal of coffee, a few shots of Schnaps, and a

glass of wine.20

On the evening of July 15, 1954, Lucie and Otto John along with Wolfgang Hoffer and

Prince Louis Ferdinand went to the “Ritz” restaurant on Ranke Street for a very pleasant dinner.

Nearing 11:00 p.m., the group moved to the “Maison de France,” a club exclusively for members

of the Allied forces. Hoffer got them in and they shared a bottle of champaign. Forty minutes

later, Hoffer drove them back to the “Schätzle.” Things seemed normal.21

Lucie saw little of Otto on July 16. The pace slowed somewhat on July 17. Otto had

several official visits in the morning, including a meeting with the governing mayor of Berlin,

Lucie recalled. Guests began to arrive that afternoon, including the Parkinsons and Hoffer.

Otto, Lucie, and their guests sat down to a dinner of red wine and duck. That evening, however,

Otto telephoned Wolfgang Wohlgemuth. Clearly irritated that Wohlgemuth had not already

taken care of the matter, Otto expected Wohlgemuth to provide Elisabeth Nehlsen with a death

certificate for her late husband. When Lucie continued with her statement on July 30, she

significantly altered her comments on the events of Saturday, July 17, 1954. While Lucie visited

with her aunt, Otto returned to the hotel to relax. As best she could remember, Otto picked her

up one hour later.22

On Sunday morning, July 18, Otto and Lucie drove about town. Lucie seemed

preoccupied with the fear that they would inadvertently drive into the Soviet sector. Her

grandparents had had a substantial estate in the East, more specifically, in Hubertushöhe bei

Storkow. A visit, Otto explained, would be out of the question. During their walk in a park, Otto

talked about his experiences during the war, the resistance, and the people he had known. After

dropping Lucie off at her aunt’s, Otto went on to his meeting with seven gentlemen representing

the Allies slated for 12:30 p.m. After the meeting, Otto picked Lucie up and they returned to the

hotel between 5:00-6:00 p.m. Later on, Otto expected Hoffer, who was taking the Parkinsons to

the train station.23

Hoffer rolled in at 8:30 p.m. in his American-made vehicle. Everyone wanted to eat at

the “Maison de France.” After the first course, their hunger grew faster than the restaurant

service could satisfy so they sought a smaller, less congested establishment. Hoffer apologized

for having even suggested the “Maison de France.” At the “Gockel” restaurant on Uhland Street,

the conversation resumed. When Wohlgemuth was brought up, Otto said that Wohlgemuth

complained about the feeling of being locked up in Berlin and that the only recourse he had was

to drink. On this occasion, outside of a few beers, little alcohol had been consumed.24

On Monday, July 19, Lucie and Otto went into the city again. Otto got his hair cut at a

place on Olivaer Square and then they walked along Konstanz Street to visit Lucie’s lawyer, Dr.

Leonhard. There had been a few issues relating to her inheritance – an old matter. The pair then

drove down the Kurfürstendamm to Jacobi’s and other men’s clothing stores but found nothing

of interest. They were back at the hotel by noon.25

Visiting Seimens first, Lucie expected to be back by 3:00 p.m. to prepare for 5:00 p.m.

ceremonies for victims of the July 20th

plot. To her surprise, Siemens had prepared a dinner in

her honor. She did not return to the hotel until 4:00 p.m. Otto had already left but left behind the

official vehicle and chauffeur, von Wassow. Making matter worse, the driver was unfamiliar

with the university where the ceremonies were being held. Dropped off at the wrong entrance,

Lucie went on foot until she found Otto and her aunt, who were both looking for her. The key-

note speaker, Federal President Theodor Heuss, made a strong impression on the audience. At

about a quarter after six p.m., the ceremony ended.26

Later that evening, Lucie’s aunt, Lucie, and Otto made the rounds at a reception held by

the Berlin Senate in the “Haus Gerhus.” Otto made a point of introducing Lucie to a number of

his old friends from his days in the resistance. Otto had invited many of these same individuals

to join them at the hotel. Even before their arrival at the “Schätzle,” a number of their old

friends had already arrived, including General von Falkenhausen, Hans Dohnanyi’s widow, and

Prince Louis Ferdinand. Lucie estimated twenty to thirty guests. The party continued through

2:00 a.m. Otto and Prince Louis closed the evening together over a final beer. Everyone knew

that July 20, 1954, would be their “Großkampftag” (great struggle) given the extensive activities

planned for the commemoration of victims of the July 20, 1944, plot to kill Hitler.27

On July 20, 1954, a Tuesday, everything seemed to change. Lucie, Otto, and Prince

Louis Ferdinand road together to the church in Berlin-Dahlem. Arriving a bit later than planned,

they barely fit into the space reserved for them in the first row. Otto was deeply moved by

Pölchau’s sermon. Pölchau served as chaplain to the prison where Otto’s brother, Hans, had

been tortured. When Lucie asked what bothered Otto in particular, he responded “jetzt Schluß

mit dem 20. Juli!” – meaning that it was time to put this chapter of history behind him. After the

service, there came a moment of confusion in finding their car and driver. Once underway, Otto

instructed the driver to get out at the next subway station and go home. The remaining trio

returned to the hotel for a brief rest but not to go directly to the prison at Plötzensee, where many

involved in the plot were brutally executed.28

Close to 11:00 a.m., the same trio headed out for the second event of the day. Heading

towards Bendler Street, Otto wanted Lucie to keep an eye out for the office of British European

Airways where they would need to go to pick up their tickets for their return flight to Cologne.

Lucie and Otto planned to return on the 8:00 p.m. flight that Thursday, July 22. After arriving,

Otto took Lucie on a tour of the house where he had last spoken with Claus von Stauffenberg. In

the court yard, Stauffenberg had been shot and killed for his involvement in the July 20th

plot.

Konrad Adenauer and Theodor Heuss arrived from Plötzensee and the ceremony started shortly

thereafter. As the ceremony ended, Otto noticed two individuals who had worked with the

Gestapo and mentioned this to Lucie. Otto seemed visibly distressed. Otto conveyed his

concerns to both Franz Josef Strauß and Jakob Kaiser before moving on to the city hall in Berlin-

Schöneberg.29

The twelve guests at their table in the city hall did not appeal to Lucie. Her statement

moved quickly to that afternoon, dropping General von Falkenhausen off at the Kaiser Wilhelm

Memorial Church at 3:40 p.m., and picking up their airline tickets. Otto expected guests from

Potsdam and Lucie had a 5:00 meeting with an engineer from Siemens named Mr. Herrmann.

Otto’s guests, the Hoettlers (Lucie did not know their names), were the parents of an American

friend of his, Mr. Sichel, who worked closely with Allen Dulles. While Lucie rested in their

room, Otto met with the couple for light conversation. As Lucie understood it, Otto thought the

couple might give him a few insights into life in the East. When Otto came back to the room at

about 5:50 p.m., Lucie and Mr. Herrmann were engaged in conversation and having coffee.

Lucie noticed drops of sweat on Otto’s forehead. When Lucie asked if he still had time, Otto

said only that he had an 8:00 p.m. appointment. While Otto rested, Lucie and her guest went

downstairs for more coffee and cake. When she returned to wake him at 7:45 p.m., however,

Otto was already gone. The hotel owner’s wife saw Otto leave around 7:30 p.m. and then return.

The gears in his official vehicle needed repair. A rental limousine was requested and Otto

relaxed drinking a beer until it arrived. Lucie perceived no cause for alarm as Otto never

interrupted her during business meetings of any sort. Lucie spent her evening with Prince Louis

Ferdinand, his nephew, Prince Leiningen, and a Danish reporter (presumably Hendrik van

Bergh).30

Approaching midnight, Lucie grew concerned. Close to 1:00 a.m., Lucie realized that

Otto had left his room key behind on the suitcase. Within his suitcase, Lucie found Otto’s

papers, files, and appointment/address book. She also found his passport and family pictures

which he normally carried on his person. (She did not, however, find his personal identity

booklet.) She also discovered a note for Otto to telephone Wolfgang Hoffer between 11:00-

11:30 p.m. at the hotel by the Berlin Zoo. As Lucie assumed Otto had an official evening

meeting, it made no sense that he would leave these materials behind in the hotel. At 1:30 a.m.,

Prince Louis and the reporter arrived at the hotel. Lucie quickly dressed to inquire with them

about her husband’s whereabouts. They had no idea of Otto’s evening arrangements.31

Lucie’s patience wore thin by early the next morning so she spoke with Otto’s secretary,

Vera Schwarte, who was staying in the same hotel. Vera contacted Kurt Rheindorf at the Berlin

Document Center. A professor of history, Rheindorf served as Otto’s historical advisor.

Arriving some twenty minutes later, Kurt encouraged Lucie to remain calm as Otto probably

spent the night with a friend. It was too soon to contact the police. Lucie thought of Hoffer.

When she called him, however, Hoffer said he had no idea of what had become of Otto but he

would come over to the hotel. What about the couple from Potsdam? Perhaps this couple

engineered Otto’s kidnaping? Hoffer encouraged Lucie to inquire with the car rental agency.

The driver might know more -- but he could not be found. At 12:00 a.m., Lucie phoned the office

in Cologne and spoke with Detlev von Platen and Richard Gerken. They flew to Berlin that

same evening. Beginning around 7:00 p.m., Lucie attempted to contact Berlin’s Police

President, Johannes Stumm. Stumm could also not be reached, but she did finally get the vice

president, Hans-Georg Urban.32

Gerken, von Platen, and two other officials arrived at 9:00 p.m. They wanted to hear the

entire story for themselves. Finally, von Platen asked if she knew a Wolfgang Wohlgemuth?

Pulling these threads together, Lucie saw in Wohlgemuth a solution. The two of them, Otto and

Wolfgang, may have spent the evening drinking with Wolfgang talking about his many female

conquests. Gerken and von Platen asked Lucie to call Wolfgang’s office to inquire. Wolfgang’s

office assistant, A.W., indicated that the doctor was not in and she did not know when to expect

his return. She first heard of A.W. back on July 11 when they found a note at their Hohkeppel

hideaway for Otto to call her at a number in Berlin. Given that Wolfgang had been in Hohkeppel

the previous day, Lucie did not give it a second thought.33

Lucie did not know why Otto met with Wohlgemuth on the evening of July 20 without

saying a thing to her about it. Otto would have known that she would have nothing against such

a visit. She felt her relationship with her husband to be a strong one through to the present. His

disappearance suggested something clearly out of the ordinary. The evidence against Wolfgang

Wohlgemuth appeared to be mounting. Lucie was convinced that Wohlgemuth’s office assistant,

U.G., had placed some drug in Otto’s coffee to incapacitate him. U.G., openly jealous regarding

Wohlgemuth’s new female friend, seemed determined to do whatever would endear her to

Wolfgang. Lucie felt she was hiding something. Lucie did not see any way Otto would have so

carelessly driven into the Soviet zone. In conversation with Claus von Dohnanyi on the evening

of July 19, Claus suggested that Otto travel into the East to buy books -- where books were well

known to be quite cheap. Otto made clear that he would have to be crazy to travel in the Soviet

sector. In addition, when Otto had official business to attend to, he still kept Lucie generally

informed.34

Albert Wilhelm Eberhard Radke

Albert Radke, who offered his statement of July 30, 1954, had been with the BfV since

the beginning. Officially transferred from the Ministry of the Interior in November 1950,

Colonel Radke served under Reinhard Gehlen. At the request of the Ministry of the Interior,

Gehlen had him transferred to the nascent BfV, which Radke helped build from the ground up.

As he understood John’s rise to head the nascent BfV, West German and Allied authorities

reviewed a number of candidates before finding one acceptable to the Allies. From the German

side, Jakob Kaiser and Josef Müller -- according to Radke -- first recommended John as a

candidate. Radke met John once and only briefly before 1945. Within Admiral Canaris’s

Abwehr, Radke met John through Captain Ludwig Gehre, who would hang later for his

involvement with the resistance. Radke himself did not belong to the resistance. However,

Radke’s close contact with individuals who were resulted in his incarceration by the Gestapo

after July 20, 1944. Subsequently, Radke was assigned a regiment to command and in March

1945, wounded, landed in an American prisoner of war camp.35

Radke became truly acquainted with John only after he became the head of the BfV.

Radke’s extensive background in intelligence and John’s general lack of experience complicated

matters. In several cases, John did not follow normal procedure and acted on his own. As far as

Radke knew, John had never even consulted the BfV’s agent files and, thus, no danger existed of

his revealing the names of BfV or state-level agents. Additionally, the BfV could say with almost

certainty that John had not taken any files with him into the East. The files which he had taken

to Berlin had since been returned to Cologne. Radke knew John did not work at night and so the

possibilities of copies having been made seemed remote. Radke never suspected that John had

been engaged in anything subversive. As for John’s personal contacts with foreigners, Radke

knew John had retained extensive ties with his former British friends and Allied intelligence

officials. However, these ties were all oriented towards the West. Radke knew of only two

exceptions.36

According to Radke, John directed his own undercover agent in the East. Radke learned

of John’s undercover agent long after John had taken the initiative. As for the information

gathered from this agent, Radke had serious reservations about its reliability. Radke identified

the second exception as Wolfgang zu Putlitz, whose relations with John he had been kept in the

dark about until John’s disappearance. Putlitz’s letters were handled by John and his secretary,

Vera Schwarte, as John’s personal correspondence and only recently discovered among his

personal papers. Through another BfV official, Rudolf Merz, Radke learned of John’s using

Putlitz to develop contact with Fritz Heine, a member of the executive board of the Social

Democratic Party in East Germany.37

In Radke’s opinion, John’s behavior did not warrant the fear of his revealing state secrets

or endangering the BfV. Furthermore, John’s marriage seemed sound as did his relationship

with Lucie, his wife, and his step-daughter. John did not seek, as far as Radke knew, any form of

extra-marital or erotic encounters. Radke could not conceive of John having turned traitor.

John’s radio broadcasts did not sound like John but like typical East German anti-West

propaganda. John never aired a pro-Soviet opinion when Radke had been present. On the other

hand, John’s lack of experience in intelligence and as head of a major agency could account for

his inclination to lose sight of reality. In one instance, Radke recalled how John accepted a

particularly fantastic tale from one of their under cover agents. Rather than seek confirmation of

the story, John simply accepted it at face value. Although Radke has been viewed as Reinhard

Gehlen’s man responsible for keeping an eye on John, Radke’s extensive experience in

intelligence stands at odds with the superficial statement he gave to the police.38

Detlev von Platen

Detlev von Platen began his career with the BfV on December 1, 1952. Von Platen flew

to Berlin on July 15 at 7:30 a.m. from Cologne-Wahn with Otto and Lucie John. After arriving

at Berlin-Tempelhof near 9:00 a.m., they proceeded to the hotel “Schätzle” in Berlin-Grünwald.

Von Platen did not see Otto John again until 8:40 a.m. the following morning when they rode

together to the Berlin office of the BfV. Nothing struck von Platen as unusual. His

conversation with John centered on the business at hand, namely, the organization of the Berlin

office. During their 11:00 a.m. visit to the Berlin Document Center, they met with John Müller,

the director of the center, a Mr. Guggenheim, and Kurt Rheindorf. After the discussion, they

arranged to meet back at the “Schätzle” for lunch at 1:30 p.m. – which allowed John time to

honor his 12:30 p.m. appointment with the governing mayor of Berlin, Walther Schreiber. 39

Beginning with lunch that afternoon, John’s behavior steadily worsened. Over lunch, the

group light-heartedly reviewed an article by the Berlin Abendpost. According to the article, the

BfV had been unduly influenced by the Allies. In contrast, John perceived in the Berlin

Abendpost a clear attack on the BfV. As for alcohol consumption, von Platen reported only a

few cocktails and little more. John left around 3:30 p.m. for a meeting with Berlin’s Senator for

the Interior.40

Saturday, July 17, von Platen met John at the Berlin BfV office. John had too much to

drink and continued to drink throughout the meeting. Not a social function, this meeting had

been called to discuss the gathering of intelligence and deal with personnel questions in the

Berlin office. After his fourth glass of beer (and an unspecified volume of coffee), John

appeared drunk with his eyes glazed over and his hair stuck to his forehead. John did not seem

able to follow the course of the conversation. Von Platen left the office at about 7:15 p.m. for

the airport and departed at 8:00 p.m. for Cologne. Upon arrival he telephoned the Berlin office;

they mentioned that John had departed for the “Schätzle” roughly ten minutes after he had left

for the airport.41

Informed of John’s disappearance on July 20, von Platen, accompanied by Kurt

Rheindorf and Richard Gerken, flew back to Berlin in a British machine. Upon arrival, von

Platen went to the “Schätzle” where he met with Lucie John, Wolfgang Hoffer (introduced as

“Herr Engels”), and Professor Meckendorf, who revealed “Engels’” to be an American C.I.C.

officer to von Platen. Gerken, von Platen, Rheindorf, and Hoffer went to Wohlgemuth’s clinic

and received the by then well-known answers to their questions. As for Hoffer’s telephone call

on July 20, he had intended only to say his farewells before John’s departure. With what facts

they had, they then informed the Berlin and Cologne offices of the BfV. On July 22, Gerken and

von Platen went to the police where they were joined by Hoffer and the American contact person

for the Berlin (Land) office of the BfV, a Mr. Rankin. The following evening, July 23, Gerken

and von Platen, flew back to Cologne.42

Kurt Rheindorf

Kurt Rheindorf met John during his years as a student. In 1951, John offered him a job

as historical advisor to the BfV in matters relating to National Socialism and comparable

movements. Rheindorf had gathered some experience when he assisted the Minister of the

Interior investigate the Socialist Reich Party and helped the state court in Munich during the

Huppenkothen Process. Rheindorf did not hold the position of civil servant in the BfV but as an

independent contractor. Since May 1954, Rheindorf had been in the Berlin Document Center

doing research for the Ministry of the Interior in preparing for the Friedrich Naumann and Otto

Strasser cases. Rheindorf had requested a visit by Otto John to the Document Center in order to

better acquaint him with its new director. Rheindorf did not know of John’s trip to Berlin until

von Platen informed him of John’s expected arrival in Berlin on July 15. John came to the

Center on July 16 around 11:30 a.m. Rheindorf could scarcely comprehend why he had not been

invited to this meeting given his own extensive knowledge of the holdings of the Center.

Rheindorf did, however, have a lunch appointment with John for 1:30 p.m. at the “Schätzle.”

Although John arrived a bit late, Rheindorf had time to alert John to an article in the Berlin

Abendpost in which Gerhard Schröder, the Minister of the Interior, allegedly criticized the

Document Center for being heavily influenced by the Allies. Rheindorf interpreted the article as

directed against John. Red-faced, John asked his American guests what they understood of the

situation. They understood the focal point to be the director of the Center, Dr. Mueller, and Mr.

Guggenheim. John thought Schröder’s comments had been directed against the American High

Commissioner.43

Rheindorf did not meet with John again until July 19. John invited him to a 1:00 p.m.

lunch at the “Schätzle.” Alone with John before sitting down, Rheindorf outlined the nature of

his research into the Naumann and Strasser cases. Jokingly, Rheindorf mentioned that John’s

name had not come up yet. John asked Rheindorf about possible documentation on Friedrich

Wilhelm Heinz (Organisation Gehlen/Amt Blank), Theodor Oberländer (conservative member of

the Bundestag), and Viktor-Emanuel Preusker (Minister for Construction). In this context, John

commented: “Everyone talks about the Communists when in fact the Nazis have already found

their way into the government again.” At the table, John talked of his desire to visit Berlin more

often and of a coming appointment in Berlin with the Allies on July 27. Once their meals

arrived, John reflected on his role in the various war trials, in particular, the Krupp,

Wilhelmstrasse (trial of the diplomats), and Manstein processes. Rheindorf knew, however, that

John wanted to cloak the true nature of his involvement in these trials in his response to public

criticisms of his support for the prosecution. Rheindorf did not hesitate to correct John’s

interpretation of his own personal history. Rheindorf reminded John of his, Rheindorf’s,

presence in the trial chamber and of his access to the trial protocols. On this subject, the

conversation stopped and moved on to other issues.44

During lunch, Vera Schwarte presented John with an envelope filled with press clippings

on the German resistance and on the continuing Bundestag debate over the BfV. John quickly

handed them back with the remark: “Not so important.” When she reminded him of his

Thursday appointments in Cologne, he was clearly irritated and told her to reschedule them for

Friday. John volunteered to re-book his flight for Thursday evening. As for Rheindorf, he

hoped John would take an interest in the translation of John W. Wheeler-Bennett’s book dealing

in part with the German resistance. Contrary to John’s initial expressions of interest, John was

not moved at all by the projected German translation. When John departed after their lunch,

Rheindorf never saw him again.45

On the morning after John’s disappearance, Vera Schwarte phoned Rheindorf by 6:45

a.m. and requested that he come over to the “Schätzle.” He arrived about an hour later near 7:30

a.m. Trying to calm Lucie, Rheindorf suggested that John probably lost account of the time and

fell asleep with some old friends. Lucie asked if Rheindorf knew Hoffer, whom she understood

to be a journalist and long time friend of Otto’s. Lucie went through a series of names she

thought might prove helpful. The only name Rheindorf would remember was “Müllenmeister.”

A short time later, Hoffer showed up at the hotel and Rheindorf learned of his true vocation.

Hoffer volunteered to look into the matter. He knew of three individuals in his office who had

gone drinking with John at a place called “Glocke” or “Gockel” at Uhland Street 47. There was

also the matter of John’s meeting with the Hoettlers at 7:30 p.m. Rheindorf knew their son-in-

law, Mr. Sichel, worked with American intelligence, and that their meeting with John had been

arranged by a man named Kallenbach, but nothing more. At this point in time, Rheindorf and

Hoffer agreed on engaging the officials of the C.I.C. first before involving West German

agencies. John may have been robbed, beaten, and left in some ditch or canal. By 1:00 p.m., the

consensus moved towards notifying the Berlin police.46

Gerken and von Platen arrived that evening from Cologne. Rheindorf picked up von

Platen at Tempelhof while Gerken, having flown in a British plane, had landed elsewhere

(presumably Tegel). Before returning to the “Schätzle,” Gerken checked the private home of an

Englishman in Berlin, who claimed to know nothing of the events at hand. Back at the hotel,

Hoffer informed Rheindorf and the others that C.I.C. agents had apprehended the taxi-chauffeur,

who had picked John up at the hotel. Hoffer wanted the man placed on a lie detector and asked

if anyone wanted to take part in the questioning. Rheindorf rejected the suggestion altogether.

Rheindorf saw no cause to question the driver’s story.47

In the meantime, Lucie called Wohlgemuth’s clinic – the results of which have already

been mentioned. Gerken, von Platen, Rheindorf, and Hoffer prepared to go over to the clinic.

Gerken had his own reservations about taking Hoffer given his job with the C.I.C. Rheindorf

saw this as absurd given that the C.I.C. constituted a “friendly” intelligence service. Even so,

Hoffer made several telephone calls without divulging the nature of the conversations. When

they arrived at the clinic, a vehicle with Swedish markings was parked out front. The vehicle

took off just as they arrived.48

Although Rheindorf and Hoffer did not actually go into the clinic, Gerken and von Platen

did. Roughly thirty minutes later, they returned to the car and reported on their conversation

with the office assistant. Gerken also had the letter which Wohlgemuth had left behind. With

this evidence in hand, Gerken telephoned the BfV in Cologne. Hoffer feared the worst and

seemed intent on leaving. If John had defected as Hoffer speculated, then Lucie John also knew

that John had voluntarily defected. Hoffer continued with this line of reasoning even further.

Lucie had been an actress and was perhaps even now putting those skills to use. Asked if John

had financial problems or any irregularity in his financial affairs, Rheindorf and von Platen said

no. Hoffer seemed determined to remain by his convictions irrespective of Rheindorf’s

statements to the contrary. Rheindorf was not ready to accept that John could have defected of

his own free will.49

Kurt Rheindorf - Otto John Correspondence, 1950-1954

The extensive correspondence between Rheindorf and John reveals a clear friendship

between the two men. As a historian and researcher at the Berlin Document Center, Kurt

Rheindorf searched for evidence among the materials left behind by Hitler’s party and

government for answers to questions put to him by various West German government agencies,

including the BfV, Otto John, and the West German courts. Rheindorf also traveled whenever

necessary to consult the other archival holdings. For example, Rheindorf investigated the

backgrounds of individuals leading radical-right wing political movements such as the Socialist

Reich Party. In particular, Rheindorf had apparently been directed by John to review the files

regarding the activities of the Red Orchestra (often referred to only as the “R.K.” for Rote

Kapelle in his letters) and those involved in the July 20, 1944, plot to kill Hitler. While the

letters themselves give away little of the results of Rheindorf’s final report, which John received

in March 1951, Rheindorf found it necessary to remind John that no restrictions had been placed

upon him, Rheindorf, obligating him to preserve the confidentiality of these materials. Given

that Rheindorf was not a civil servant, he retained his right to publish the results of his research if

he so desired. What motivated this concern remains unclear. John’s personal interest in the

German Resistance would have been well-known to Rheindorf. Nevertheless, their

correspondence does not include a clear indication of what John hoped Rheindorf would find

until May 24, 1951.50

Rheindorf’s letter of May 24, 1951, made reference to an SS figure by the name of

Martin Sandberger. Sandberger testified after the war on November 19, 1945, regarding the fate

of anti-Nazi Germans held in the Berlin Moabit and Charlottenburg (suburb of Berlin) prisons as

well as in the cells of the Gestapo on the Prinz Albrecht Street. These prisoners included most of

the leading figures of the German Resistance. At Moabit, Sandberger recalled a number of

names including John’s brother, Hans Otto. In February 1945, these prisoners were moved to

Dachau via Buchenwald and Flossenburg. Fearing these men would fall into the hands of the

Americans, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Heinrich Himmler’s right hand man, ordered their execution.

Marched into the hills for execution on the morning of April 4, 1945, these 100 men were saved

by the timely arrival of American troops coming out of Italy. The documents did not, however,

necessarily reveal the presence of John’s brother among the survivors.51

John’s interest in Rheindorf’s research is clearer. John may have harbored several

possible hopes. Could his brother have survived the war? Was Hans Otto a member of the Red

Orchestra? Did Wohlgemuth have special knowledge of John’s brother’s fate? As a point of

pure speculation, were Hans Otto associated with the Red Orchestra and if he survived the war,

Hans could have exerted considerable pressure on John. Perhaps the news which Wohlgemuth

conveyed to Otto John in early 1954 dealt with John’s brother? If so, what lengths would John

have gone to regain contact with him? On a more sinister note, John’s hope that Hans had

survived the war, would have been sufficient to manipulate John in various ways. Whether Hans

joined the Red Orchestra or not, Hans could have been used as a tool for extracting concessions

from Otto John. If Rheindorf suspected Hans had been a member of the Red Orchestra, it would

make complete sense that John would not want that information released to the public. No

matter which theory proves more attractive, the bottom line remained the same: John’s

continued interest in his brother’s fate (and possible survival) represented a clear weakness.52

Vera Schwarte

Vera served Admiral Canaris for nine years as his secretary. Prior to that, Vera worked

for four years in the Foreign Office. Placed under arrest after the July 20, 1944, plot, Vera

remained in custody until April 14, 1945. Kidnaped by the Russians in the American sector in

September 1945, she remained in Russian hands for roughly two months before being released.

Until leaving Berlin in December 1950, Vera felt that she had been under constant observation

by Soviet authorities. As for Otto John, she first met him in Cologne and did not recall him as

being connected with the resistance to the best of her knowledge. She was finally offered a job

in Bonn by Graf Schwerin in the newly created BfV.

In her statement of August 5, 1954, Vera turned immediately to the events of July 20,

1954. As John’s secretary, she had been privy to John’s personal and professional activities. As

for the events in Berlin, John planned his travel to Berlin three months earlier for the purpose of

visiting (perhaps accurately inspecting) the local office of the BfV and the Land office as well.

His plans were interrupted by his trip to the United States on June 18, 1954. After his return from

the United States, John received his invitation to take part in the ceremonies commemorating the

participants in the July 29, 1944, plot to kill Hitler. Shortly before his departure, John’s

American contact officer, a Mr. Hughes, asked John to contact Allied representatives in Berlin.

As far as Vera knew, these men had come from Stuttgart (the location of the American Counter

Intelligence Corps). Vera also expected John would also be meeting with Josef Müller, Kurt

Rheindorf, and the Hoettlers, whose son-in-law, a Mr. Sichel, John had met in America.

Additionally, Vera knew of John’s private correspondence with Wohlgemuth and Elisabeth

Nehlsen. These letters were kept in the office safe. John had spoken to Vera of Wohlgemuth in

1954. John described him to Vera as an “Edelkommunist” and somewhat crazy but a good

doctor nonetheless.53

After John and von Platen flew to Berlin on July 15, Vera accepted an American offer to

fly her at their cost to Berlin on July 19 to allow her to take part in the same commemoration

ceremonies. Vera walked into the “Schätzle” around 3:00 p.m. that afternoon. Over coffee,

Vera, John, and Kurt Rheindorf discussed press clippings Vera had brought with her for John.

As the conversation drifted to travel plans, John asked Vera to book his flight back to Cologne

for July 22 as his meeting with the Americans had taken more time than he expected. John had

planned to be back in Berlin again on July 27 and in Munich on July 30.54

During the first round of ceremonies, Vera noticed a clear change in John’s mood during

the ceremony. Vera caught up with the Johns again during the reception organized by the Berlin

Senate in Gerhus in Berlin-Grünwald. The Johns left the reception around 10:00 p.m. for the

“Schätzle” hotel. The party back at the hotel lasted through 2:00 a.m. Vera also remembered

three other items of possible interest. First, John asked Annedore Leber to help him get tickets

for an event associated with the up-coming Social Democratic Party convention. Second, John

mentioned his conversation with Federal President Theodor Heuss about recruiting a particular

candidate for the BfV. Third and finally, John spoke of a garden in Berlin where allegedly

writings from the war years by the resistance were buried.55

Vera described John as closed. His style of office management was impersonal,

unconventional, and unbureaucratic. He refused to allow co-workers to refer to him as “Herr

President” and always found time to help his old friends. John would not allow his co-workers

extended contact with him. Vera knew John could not hold his alcohol and often finished his

drinks quickly. Although John never appeared drunk during official meetings, he most certainly

did occasionally appear under the influence of alcohol. In such circumstances, John reverted to a

more child-like state, for example, yodeling during an office party. In his relationship with

Lucie, John seemed quite happy. Vera knew of no instance where John had been unfaithful or

demonstrated any homosexual inclinations.56

Searching Otto John’s Office Safe

Vera Schwarte no doubt raised expectations of what authorities would find in Otto John’s

office safe. However, it was not opened until August 10, 1954, or almost three weeks after

John’s disappearance. The official purpose behind opening the safe had been to return important

office documents to proper circulation. The list of documents gave some indication of Otto

John’s personal involvement in BfV activities as well as an indication of the nature of its

responsibilities. A number of folders were devoted to correspondence. There were specific files

for the Schleicher case, the Nauman Circle, conversations with Kurt Rheindorf, and materials for

the Berlin office. One folder contained “unresolved official matters.” These included specific

cases under investigation by the BfV, records of conversations, and special events. In addition,

there were folders dealing with the Blank office (“Dienststelle Blank”) as well as reports on

discussions with the Chancellory, the Ministry of the Interior, the Criminal Police, Ministry of

Justice, intelligence officials of the British, Americans, and French, as well as with the directors

of the Land level offices for the protection of the constitution. Another folder included notes

from a cooperative effort between the Foreign Office in Bonn and events in Yugoslavia. Other

folders included the key terms “Holland” and “Switzerland.” Another folder held materials from

a meeting between the Ministry of the Interior and Allied Security Directors. As these documents

suggested, the interests of the BfV extended well beyond the borders of the Federal Republic of

Germany. 57

A Reactionary Right

Long before the creation of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, all three

Western Allies actively worked to eliminate reactionary groups, including, the Bavarian

Homeland and Royalist Party in the American zone, Heinrich Leuchtgen's National Democratic

Party in the American and French zones, and the German Conservative Party-German Right

Party in the British zone. Generally, undesirable political groups were either prohibited, purged

of politically unacceptable personalities, forced out of existence, or fused with existing parties.

Although the Allied presence cast a strong shadow over the developing party system, Allied

policies on political parties forced Germans to rethink long-held notions of political parties and

move towards the notion of catch-all parties, which had not been part of a German political

consciousness before 1945. Popular acceptance of these measures is supported by various

postwar opinion polls. Nevertheless, right-wing political groups/parties dotted the political

landscape in postwar western Germany.58

Placing Otto John Affair into this Context

Evidence existed demonstrating Otto John’s commitment to rooting out spies. John’s

BfV had uncovered Ludwig Weiss, a high-placed government administrator, as a spy for Polish

intelligence. Weiss would serve a four year sentence for his efforts. Within the Blank Office, the

BfV revealed two additional Polish agents. Under John’s direction, the BfV exposed the entire

East German “Institut für wirtschafts-wissenschafts Forschung” as a massive spy-ring. As for

John’s trip to the United States, it had nothing to do with military affairs and had taken place

under the supervision of American intelligence.59

John’s personal files did not leave much to go on. There were no written

recommendations within these files for his selection as president of the BfV. Within these same

files was also a brief explanation of how John came to be the West German nomination for the

newly created Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. According to this report,

nine candidates were considered: Werner Jakobi, Franz Thedieck, Reinhard Gehlen, Schneider-

Olpe, Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, Martini, Admiral Conrad Patzig, Fabian von Schlagrendorf, and

Freiherr von Fritsch. John’s candidacy was first discussed on November 14, 1950, with the

Allied Security Directors. The Allied Security Directors (Shute, General Haydon, and Cotony)

had no reservations about John’s candidacy. There was also Globke’s letter of December 19,

1950, clearly stating that “Der Herr Bundeskanzler ist damit einverstanden, dass Dr. John mit der

kommissarischen Leitung betraut wird.” Another letter dated December 11, 1950, placed John in

his new position effective as of December 1, 1950. Nevertheless, Dr. John didn’t formally began

his duties as head of the BfV until November 13, 1951.60

Gehlen and Heinz often struggled in their relationships with John’s BfV. Heinz moved

into the Blank Office (Amt Blank) in late 1953 and established the West German military

intelligence service. Heinz’s background could not have endeared him to John. Heinz had been

a conservative nationalist, a supporter of the Kapp Putsch, and a member of the Nazi Storm

Troops (SA). However, Heinz also worked under Admiral Canaris and became an active

member of the resistance during the war. While Gehlen’s commitment to fighting communism

could hardly be questioned, his image as a defender of democracy was weak at best. Gehlen and

Heinz led organizations which investigated all aspects of espionage, including communist front

organizations active on West German territory. A regular bump into the domain of John’s BfV

seemed a foregone conclusion.61

Sefton Delmer

Writing for the London Daily Express, Sefton Delmer, John’s former boss in the Political

Warfare Office, revealed after John’s defection several documented attempts by the Soviets to

lure John into the East and to work with them. During his visit with John in March 1954, John

relayed to him that Wolfgang zu Putlitz had attempted to recruit him for the East. Putlitz had

been a German diplomat and spy who went over to the Soviets. Putlitz assured John that he

would be welcomed in the East and well treated. According to Delmer, John rebuffed this and

all such attempts. Furthermore, John notified British intelligence of von Putlitz’s presence and

activities in West Germany.62

As Delmer understood the events of July 20, 1954, John had arranged to meet with two

officials with British intelligence at the Maison de France for dinner. Dropped off at the Maison

de France, John never went inside but walked a bit further to Uhland Street where he met up with

Wolfgang Wohlgemuth. Three days later on July 23, John explained his decision over East

German radio. For Delmer’s ears, John’s radio broadcast from East Berlin carried the same click

and clang of typical Communist propaganda. John sounded tired and his voice faltered.

Contrary to the line accepted by most journalists, Delmer did not believe John’s radio broadcast

constituted proof of his alleged voluntary defection to the East. Everything Delmer knew about

Otto John contradicted the message John broadcast.63

Otto John’s Second Press Conference

Otto John took to the podium again on August 11, 1954, in response to Adenauer’s

August 6 speech. The entire press conference later appeared under the title Ich wählte

Deutschland (1954). Laced with traditional anti-West invectives, John’s broadcast did not strike

listeners in the West as anything other than traditional East German political propaganda.

Underscoring his voluntary participation in this press conference, John went so far as to suggest

that it had been called on his initiative. His purpose in calling this press conference had been to

respond to the western press. John labeled “absurd” claims that he had worked for the East for

years. John accused the West Germans of putting aside the cause of reunification for furthering

the careers of former Nazis (John referred to this as renazification) and assisting the United

States in preparing a political and military crusade against Communism. The Organization

Gehlen and the “Blank” Office were heavily staffed with former SS and SD officials, John

alleged. Within this context, John interpreted the European Defense Community as setting the

stage for a war against the East by a European -- read German -- proxy. Responding to questions

about his recent visit to the United States and with Allen Dulles in the Pentagon, John believed

Americans driven by an “hysterical fear-psychosis” (“hysterischen Angstpsychose”) which

propelled preparations for the war against Communism. Overall, John appeared determined to

remain in the East and that his decision to defect had been entirely voluntary.64

Back to the European Continent

The day after the press conference, August 12, Soviet officials escorted Otto John to

Schönefeld airport in East Berlin. John climbed on board the awaiting Dakota and flew to

Moscow. During his first twelve days, John stayed in a small town outside Moscow,

specifically, Serebjany Bor. While John seemed to have forgotten where he stayed in his own

memoirs, he did recall the extravagant efforts of Soviet authorities to provide him with

everything he needed. After almost two weeks, the Soviets sent him to Gagra, a resort town on

the Black Sea. After a few days, it was time to get down to business.65

Dr. Otto John’s Ich wählte Deutschland

Otto John’s Ich wählte Deutschland carried all the trade marks of East German

propaganda but it also carried the name of West Germany’s former chief of counter-intelligence.

Published by the Ausschuss für Deutsche Einheit (Committee for German Unity), it contained a

brief history of Otto John’s life, a transcript of the press conference held shortly after John’s

appearance in East Berlin, reprints of newspaper headlines recounting the various rumors of

John’s disappearance, and letters from allegedly sympathetic parties. Combined with his

exposure to journalists from a number of western European news agencies, John, in their reports,

did not appear to have acted under duress or to have been under the influence of drugs or

alcohol.66

On the other hand, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency offered an alternative image

of Otto John at this time. In a report dated January 28, 1955, John Peet, a British journalist who

defected to the Communist bloc, stated that he is helping Otto John write a book – presumably

Ich wählte Deutschland. Peet remarked that “John is frequeantly so thoroughly intoxicated that

his conversation becomes unintelligible.”67

Otto John’s September 29, 1954, Radio Broadcast

John responded to the furor in the Bundestag over his departure via East German radio.

John interpreted the recent Bundestag debate about his defection as evidence of a severe political

crisis within the Federal Republic. West Germans, John held, sustained dangerous illusions

about the foreign and domestic politics of the Adenauer government. The people remained

unaware of the growing dangers behind West German rearmament and the problem of

reunification. A line of thinking reminiscent of Adolf Hitler, the policy could well lead to war.

America had already provoked a war with Korea. American policy in West Germany included

the integration of former Wehrmacht generals into the ranks of the American military.

Militarism ruled the day, John declared. The European Defense Community, consequently,

represented another aspect of American policy in Europe in pursuit of continued

remilitarization.68

Otto John’s Office Safe

Otto John’s safe revealed another interesting document composed shortly after his trip to

the United States. Within his short essay, “Verfassungsschutz in der Bundesrepublik”

(“Protecting the Constitution in the Federal Republic”), John outlined his ideas about the

character of West German society and politics. The Ministry of the Interior took John’s

statement to the press on August 11, 1954. Although the essay dealt at length with various

pieces of legislation, its core could be gleamed from an early paragraph: “The dangers of

political contamination are not yet recognized in the Federal Republic despite the bitter

experiences with the National Socialism and the enormous Communist efforts pushing for the

Bolshevization of Germany and the world. Only a society completely unaware of the refined

means and methods used to promote radical anti-democratic ideologies offers a possible

explanation. The greater part of the population in the Federal Republic refuses to face the

consequences of political contamination and remains apathetic towards state arrangements

working for their defense.” This statement and John’s recent press conference in East Berlin

convinced the Ministry of the Interior that John had become a traitor.69

Otto John’s Alleged Weaknesses

Another area under investigation had been John’s alleged homosexual activities.

Baron Friedrich von Oppenheim recalled John’s behavior from late 1953 (October-November) in

Cologne’s “Atelier” restaurant where John drank to the point that he could no longer stand and

had to be carried from the restaurant. Oppenheim added that John had never been “100% sober.”

In December 1953 en route to England by ship, Oppenheim reflected again on John’s extensive

drinking habits. As Oppenheim described it, John suffered from a “Nazi-Komplex.”

Everywhere he looked, he saw “Nazis” and their increasing influence. Oppenheim summed up

his view of John as follows: “Dr. John is very unstable. He came into his post when he was too

young and lacked the necessary experience.70

The American Estimate

Originating with the American Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in Heidelberg, Robert

Shea passed the American “Estimate of the Dr. Otto John Case” on July 25, 1954, on to the West

Germans. The report’s conclusion read: “It may be that John was a fool who got caught in a

well-baited trap. That such a thing should happen is fantastic and can only be explained on the

basis of John’s known character traits, plus the fact that less than two weeks ago a large number

of prominent West German and Berlin protestant politicians circulated freely in the Sovzone in

connection with the Leipzig Kirchentag (including militant anti-communists such as Tillmans,

Ehlers and Metzger). John very likely overestimated his own position to the extent of believing

that the Soviets would not dare harm him; he took a miscalculated risk in the pursuit of bait put

up by persons who evaluated correctly John’s psychology and his desire to score a major

personal coup following heavy attacks on his office in the recent Bundestag debates.”

No evidence for the use of drugs had been found. As for a post-hypnotic suggestion, the

Americans present placed no faith in this theory at all. Overall, John’s actions were inconsistent

with what was known of his personality.71

British Sources

The Office of the British High Commission responded to similar questions put to them by

State Secretary Ritter von Lex on October 28, 1954. According to British sources, John arrived

in the United Kingdom via Lisbon in October-November 1944. Interned through November 11,

1944, John worked in the German division of the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) under

Sefton Delmer. In June 1945, the PWE merged with the Political Information Department (PID)

and came under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office. In February 1946, John was transferred to

the German division within the Prisoners of War division of the PID. The PID, in turn, passed

into the hands of the Control Commission for Germany and Austria on July 1, 1946. John’s

work with German POWs continued through May 31, 1948, at which time John severed his ties

with British authorities. Hope underscored one final point: John had not worked with British

intelligence.72

The Case Against Otto John

In August 1956, a federal prosecutor presented the court in Karlsruhe with a 100-page

indictment of the former president of the BfV. John would be tried on the charge of treason.

The indictment covered Otto John’s career, personal life, and psychiatric condition were all

studied—including the possible problems with alcoholism and propensity for homosexual

disposition. John’s relationship with Wohlgemuth received special attention. The evidence

outlined John’s contributions to East German propaganda efforts against West Germany. In a

series of press conferences, John continued the line of thought first presented over the airwaves

and released later in Ich wählte Deutschlands. Whether compeltely true or not, Otto John had

served East German propaganda efforts and evoked a serious controversy in West Germany. In

return for his support, East German authorities provided him with a villa in Berlin-Schmöckwitz,

an office from the Committee for German Unity in the same building with the National Council

of the National Front, a personal body-guard, and placed a vehicle at his disposal. In addition,

John directed a number of personal letters to West German politicians, including Jakob Kaiser

and Parliamentary President Eugen Gerstenmaier. Paralleling his radio broadcasts and

newspaper accounts, John criticized the “insane plans for West Germany’s remilitarization.”

Within these letters, John described the proposed 500,000 man West German army as simply a

“new Wehrmacht” leading to the creation of a military state. Arranged by the National Front for

a Democratic Germany, John made comparable presentations in Schwerin, Wismar,

Neubrandenburg, Brandenburg, Thale, Erfurt, Gotha, Pössneck, Arnstadt, Altenburg, and East

Berlin. He spoke to more than 500 university students and professors in Jena, at the Professors

Club in Leipzig, and at East Berlin’s Humbolt University. John spoke in Weimar during the

Schiller festival and during commemoration ceremonies at the Buchenwald concentration camp.

The East German press followed up with articles outlining John’s presentations. Circumstanial

or not, the evidence proved damning. The court concurred and found John guilty of treason.73

An Alternative Approach:

Forschungsbeirat für Fragen der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands

In a closed session in Berlin’s Bundeshaus on March 24, 1952, Jakob Kaiser presided

over the opening meeting of the Forschungsbeirat für Fragen der Wiedervereinigung

Deutschlands. Consistent with Kaiser’s own aspirations to sustain a bridge with East Germany,

the council existed to address two basic issues: to prepare a future economic program for the day

when unity was achieved alongside a comprehensive and reliable balancing of the East German

economy. Despite obvious political ties with Kaiser’s Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche

Fragen, Franz Thedieck played a key role in the new council’s actual functioning. For the

purpsoes of this article, the council’s reports, planning, and data could well have served as an

additional catalyst and possible explanation for Otto John’s actions. Despite the absence of the

BfV in the documentation, the trend suggested a growing apprehension regarding Soviet reforms

within the “SBZ,” including both agricultural and industrial reforms. Placed within the context of

June 17, 1953, German unity appeared an increasingly distant goal. Adenauer may have been

resigned to Germany’s division but probably not Kaiser and, possibly, Otto John.74

After Otto John’s appearance in East Berlin in July 1954, however, he made no mention

in any of the aforementioned asctivities of this possible link with Kaiser’s Forschungsbeirat.

Instead, it appears John joined the ranks of East German Socialist Unity Party members on the

East German Committee for German Unity. According to the Archiv Friesdorf in Bad

Godesberg, East German press reports, inclunding Neues Deutschland, announced the

committee’s existence back in January 1954. Criticized as exercising little more than a

propaganda function, as of late July 1954, its rank-and-file included both Field Marshall von

Paulus and Otto John. John’s plethora of speaking engagements seemed ample opportunity to

make a connection between the two groups. Nothing ever emerged.75

Conclusions

So, why did Otto John go into East Berlin? The preponderance of the evidence weighs in

against a simple defection or the victim of a kidnapping. Rather, it appears he went over

voluntarily. Once there, Soviet and German authorities apparently wanted to keep him. John,

however, cooperated extensively with his public speaking tours and radio broadcasts. Nothing in

John’s past played a role in his public presentations. In sum, the preponderance of the evidence

favors a simpler conclusion: Given the context of his decision to go into East Berlin, two key

threads merge within the July 20th

ceremonies. First, despite his links with the German

Resistance, John remained a minor player. John’s actions in wartime exile and during the

Nuremberg Trials provide repeated attempts to enhance his own sense of place in history.

Second, despite his rise in the West German administration, John seemed anxious to prove his

worth. Events provoked an emotional response to a deep-seated insecurity. Once in the East,

however, John’s actions suggest again the possible belief in playing a more central role in

guiding affairs through his public image. When that failed to pan out, he wanted to return to the

West. After returning to the West, Otto John devoted the rest of his life seeking his own

rehabilitation.

1 Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung. Band 7. 1954 (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1993), pp. 333-334.

2 Rebecca West, The New Meaning of Treason (New York: Ballantine, 1964 (1947)). John O. Koehler, Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German

Secret Police (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), p. 166. Hansjoachim Tiedge, Der Überläufer: Eine Lebensbeichte (Berlin: Das Neue Berlin Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998), pp. 41, 94, 102, 205, and 207. Michaela W. Richter, The Verfassungsschutz (Washington: AICGS German Issues, 1998), p. 45. 3 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/15490, American Military Tribunal, June 8-9, 1948 (Militärgerichtshof Nr. III, Fall X,... Nuremberg, Germany, [8-]9

June 1948. 9-12:00 a.m.) Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nachlass Kurt Rheindorf, N1263/353. 4 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Bundesministerium des Innern, B106/15490.

5 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/15490, American Military Tribunal, June 8-9, 1948 (Militärgerichtshof Nr. III, Fall X,... Nuremberg, Germany, [8-]9

June 1948. 9-12:00 a.m. Otto John, “Falsch und zu spät.“ Der 20. Juli 1944. Epilogue (Munich, 1984). 6 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Bundesministerium des Innern, B106/15490 and Nigel West, MI6: British Secret Intelligence Operations, 1909-1945

(New York: Random House, 1983), pp. 187-189, and Philip Knightley, The Master Spy (New York: Vintage, 1990), pp. 108-109. For additional insights into how British authorities handled German POWs see Heiner Wember’s Umerziehung im Lager: Internierung und Bestrafung von Nationalsozialisten in der britischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands (Koblenz: Klartext, 1991). 7 Bundesgesetzblatt, (Bonn : Bundesanzeiger-Verlags-GmbH., [1959]), pp. 682.

8 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B136/1755, and Walter Imle, Zwischen Vorbehalt und Erfordernis. Eine historische Studie zur Entstehung des

nachrichtendienstlichen Verfassungsschutzes nach 1945 (Munich: tuduv-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1984), p. 289.

9 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B136/1755. United States, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD), American Embassy

Madrid to Department of State, February 14, 1951, and American Embassy Bogota to Department of State, December 7, 1950. 10

United States, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD), American Embassy (Bonn) to Department of State

(Washington, D.C.), December 16, 1955. 11

Ibid. 12

Otto John, “Falsch und zu spät.“ Der 20. Juli 1944. Epilogue (Munich, 1984), Zweimal kam ich heim. Vom Verschwörer zum Schützer der Verfassung (Düsseldorf-Wien, 1969), and Twice Through the Lines (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). 13

Otto John, Twice Through the Lines (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 158-159. 14

Bob de Graaff, “The Stranded Baron and the Upstart at the Crossroads: Wolfgang zu Putlitz and Otto John,” Intelligence and National Security Vol. 6, No. 4 (1991), pp. 669-700, and Wolfgang zu Putlitz, The Putlitz Dossier (London: Allan Wingate, 1957), pp. 220-224. 15

Ibid. 16

David E. Murphy, Sergei Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (1997), pp. 185-201. 17

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053. 18

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053, “In dem Ermittlungsverfahren gegen Dr. Wohlgemuth wegen Freiheitsberaubung in staatsfährdender

Absicht u.a. erscheint die Zeugin [Lucie] John ... Köln, den 28. Juli 1954.” 19

Ibid. 20

Ibid. 21

Ibid. 22

Ibid. 23

Ibid. 24

Ibid. 25

Ibid. 26

Ibid. 27

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053, “In dem Ermittlungsverfahren gegen Dr. Wohlgemuth wegen Freiheitsberaubung in staatsfährdender

Absicht u.a. erscheint die Zeugin [Lucie] John ... Köln, den 28. Juli 1954.” Otto John’s activities were also observed by von Dohnanyi’s widow and son, their statement to the states attorney on August 7, 1954, did not significantly add to the details of the events at hand. This statement is also part of B106/63053. 28

Ibid. 29

Ibid. 30

Ibid. 31

Ibid. 32

Ibid. 33

Ibid. 34

Ibid. 35

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053, “In dem Ermittlungsverfahren gegen u.a. ... Albert Wilhelm Eberhard Radke ... Köln, den 30. Juli 1954.” 36

Ibid. 37

Ibid. 38

Ibid. 39

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053, “Verhandelt ... Detlev von Platen ... Bonn, dem 2.8. 1954” and “[Witness] ... Detlev von Platen ... Bonn,

den 4. August 1954. 40

Ibid. 41

Ibid. 42

Ibid. 43

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053, “[Witness] Kurt Rheindorf ... Bonn, den 4. August 1954.” 44

Ibid. 45

Ibid. 46

Ibid. 47

Ibid. 48

Ibid. 49

Ibid. 50

Bundesarchiv, Nachlass Kurt Rheindorf, N1263/350. For an interesting German perspective, see Walter Schellenberg’s Hitler’s Secret Service (New York: Harper, 1977). Schellenberg served as the Heinrich Himmler’s specialist for foreign intelligence. 51

Ibid. 52

Ibid.

53

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053, “[Witness] Wera Schwarte ... Bonn, den 5. August 1954.” 54

Ibid. 55

Ibid. 56

Ibid. 57

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053, “Aus dem Panzerschrank Dr. Johns ... Köln, den 10. August 1954.” 58

Maria Mitchell, "Materialism and Secularism: CDU Politicians and National Socialism, 1945-1949," The Journal of Modern History, Volume 67, Number 2, June 1995. Daniel E. Rogers, Politics after Hitler: The Western Allies and the German Party System (New York: New York University Press, 1995). Office of the Military Government, United States, Office of the Political Advisor, "Report No. 131. 4 August 1948. Opinion Surveys Branch," POLAD 820/6 (Bundesarchiv, Koblenz), and Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1947-1966 (Bonn: Allensbach, 1967). Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), Files of the Office of the Director of Intelligence (ODI) 7/20-3/70, "Report on Nazi Underground Organizations," dated February 1947 (Bundesarchiv, Koblenz). These groups included the Danube (composed for former German intelligence personnel), the Armee der Rache, Odessa, Dach, Sturmgruppe Nordwest, and Vierundvierzig (appealing to former Schutzstaffel and Wehrmacht members), one composed of former members of the Stürm Abteilungen (SA), two for former Luftwaffe personnel (Skylark and the Green Devils), as well as others composed of the disgruntled and the young, for example, the Proppen Club, Schwarze Adler, Sonnenrad Division, and SOMA. Konrad Adenauer, Teegespräche 1950-1954 (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1984), p. 652. Nicht-etablierte Kleinparteien," in Alf Mintzel and Heinrich Oberreuter's (Hrsg.) Parteien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1992), p. 369-70. Uwe Backes/Eckhard Jesse, Politscher Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1993), pp. 299-300. 59

Henning Köhler, Adenauer: Eine politische Biographie (Propyläen, 1994), p. 841. 60

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63055. For more information about Franz Thedieck’s past see Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nachlass Jakob Kaiser,

N1018/89. 61

Schwarz, Hans-Peter, Die Ära Adenauer 1949-1957 (1991), pp. 236-239, and Reinhard Gehlen, Verschlußsache (Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler

Verlag, 1980), pp. 49-55. 62

Sefton Delmer, Die Deutschen und ich (1962), pp. 692-712. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B136/1755. 63

Sefton Delmer, Die Deutschen und ich (1962), pp. 692-712. 64

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Amtszeit Theodor Heuss, B122/192, and Otto John, Ich wählte Deutschland (1954), pp. 3-5. See also Rolf Steininger,

Eine vertane Chance: die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952 und die Wiedervereinigung: eine Studie auf der Grundlage unveröffentlichter britischer und amerikanischer Akten (Berlin : J.H.W. Dietz, 1985). Otto John, Ich wählte Deutschland (1954), pp. 14-28. See also Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nachlass Kurt Rheindorf, N1263/354. 65

Sefton Delmer, Die Deutschen und ich (1962), pp. 704-50, and Otto John, Twice Through the Lines (1969), pp. 258-271. 66

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nachlass Kurt Rheindorf, N1263/354. 67

Central Intelligence Agency, FOIA Documents, Reference: F-1998-01676, Released July 2002. 68

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63055. 69

Bundesarchiv – Zwischenarchiv (Sankt Augustin), VS - B106/143. The German text is as follows: “Die Gefahr der politschen Volksverseuchung

sind in der Bundesrepublik trotz der bitteren Erfahrungen mit dem Nationalsozialismus and trotz der ungeheueren und ungeheuerlichen kommunistischen Bestrebungen nach der Bolschewisierung Deutschlands und der Welt noch nicht richtig erkannt. Nur eine völlige Ahnungslosigkeit gegenüber den raffinierten Mitteln und Methoden der radikalen anti-demokratischen Ideologien kann eine Erklärung dafür sein, dass der allergrösste Teil der Bevölkerung in der Bundesrepublik der politischen Volksverseuchung gegenüber so gleichgiltig und den zu ihrer Abwehr geschlaffenen staatlichen Einrichtungen so ablehnend gegenübersteht. Es muss sehr viel mehr getan werden, um die Bevölkerung in der Bundeserpublik davon zu überzeugen, dass auch der Schutz der politischen Volksgesundheit eine notwendige staatliche Aufgabe ist, ab deren Erfüllung alle im eigensten Interesse nach Kräften mitwirken sollten.” 70

Bundesarchiv – Zwischenarchiv (Sankt Augustin), VS - B106/142. Oppenheim’s statement: “Dr. John sei sehr labil. Er sei zu jung in seine Stellung gekommen und sei ihr nicht gewachsen gewesen. Da er gemerkt habe, dass ihm in Bonn ‘die Felle wegschimmen’ und die Engländer sich von ihm distanzierten, habe er die Nerven verloren und nicht mehr ein noch aus gewusst. Hinzu komme die Einwirkung des Eriegnisses der Berliner Tage auf seine sensible Natur. Möglicherweise habe er dort auch Alkohol getrunken gehabt.” 71

Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (Sankt Augustin), Nachlass Gerhard Schröder, I-483/ 083/3, “Affäre John/Schmidt-Wittmack 1954-1957.“ Bundesarchiv – Zwischenarchiv (Sankt Augustin), VS - B106/142. United States, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD), Parkman (Berlin) to Secretary of State, July 21, 1954, and Cecil B. Lyon to Elbrick, July 22, 1954. 72

Ibid and Otto John, Twice Through the Lines (1972), p. 177. 73

Bundesarchiv – Zwischenarchiv (Sankt Augustin), VS - B106/142. 74

Bernd Adolf Idstein, “Die Anfӓnge des Forschungsbeirat für Fragen der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands,” in Deutschland Archiv 28. Jg. 1995.

S. 1048-1064. Bundesarchiv (Koblenz), B137/I-30. 75

Bundesarchiv (Koblenz), B137/I-7. “Betr.: “Auschuss für Deutsche Einheit,” Archiv Friesdorf (Bad Godesberg) to Link, 16 October 1954, and

“Vermerk. Betr. “Auschuss für Deutsche Einheit,” Berlin W.8. Friedrichstr. 119/121. 31.7.1954.