Paternity.adoption.parentalauthority.digests

7/23/2019 Paternity.adoption.parentalauthority.digests

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PATERNITY & FILIATION

TEOFISTA BABIERA vs. PRESENTACION B.CATOTAL

G.R. No. 138493June 15, 2000

Facts:TeofistaBabiera claims that she was born to the spouses

Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera then 65 and 54 years oldrespectively, at the time of her birth. PresentacionBabiera-Catotal,daughter of the late spouses Eugenio and Hermogena countersthis claim, saying that she saw with her own eyes that Teofistawas actually born to their housemaid named Flora Guinto.

Presentacion testified that Teofista was born through the help ofa hilot and that her mother Flora forged the Teofistas birthcertificate, making it appear that HermogenaBabiera was themother by forging Hermogenas signature. Presentacion furtherclaims that Teofistas real surname is Guinto, her mother beingsingle; the father, a carpenter, refused to sign the birth certificate.Teofista on her defense, claims that Presentacion has no legalcapacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of theFamily Code which states that only the father could impugn thechild's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateralattack.

Issue:Whether or not such petition may prosper considering

Teofistas claim that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file theinstant petition and can the presumption of regularity in theissuance of her birth certificate be upheld.

Ruling:

Yes, the petition may prosper. The case at bar is notcovered by Article 171 for the prayer therein is not to declare thatTeofista is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establishthat the former is not the latter's child at all. The present action

does not impugn Teofistas filiation to Spouses Eugenio andHermogenaBabiera, because there is no blood relation to impugnin the first place. Presentacion only aims to assail and cancelTeofistas birth certificate for the void and simulated birthcertificate of the latter would affect the formers hereditary rights.

Also, Teofistas birth certificate cannot be taken intoconsideration for there were already irregularities regarding thebirth certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civilregistrar.More importantly, the Court of Appeals observed thatthe mothers signature therein was different from her signatures

in other documents presented during the trial. The mostsignificant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition ofHermogenaBabiera which states that she did not give birth toTeofista, and that the latter was not hers nor her husbandEugenios.

JANICE MARIE JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.G.R. No. L-49162

July 28, 1987

Facts:In 1967, Arlene Salgado was introduced to PericoJao.

After such introduction, Jao courted Arlene. Not long thereafter,they had sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived together.1968, Arlene became pregnant. Jao paid for all the expensesrelated to Arlenes pregnancy but when the child, Janice wasborn, Jao insisted that she could not be the father of such child.


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When the case was filed with the RTC, the RTC ordered the NBIfor a group blood testing. The group blood testing result showedthat Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Jao andArlene.

Issue:Whether or not group blood testing could be conclusive

evidence to impugn the legitimacy of Janice.

Ruling:Yes, group blood testing could be admitted as conclusive

evidence to impugn the legitimacy of Janice. For the past threedecades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentagehas already become an important legal procedure. There is nowalmost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests

are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as topaternitythat is, the fact that the blood type of the child is apossible product of the mother and alleged father does notconclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, ifthe blood type of the child is not the possible blood type whenthe blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the allegedfather.

Medical science has shown that there are four types of

blood in man which can be transmitted through heredity.Although the presence of the same type of blood in two personsdoes not indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the factthat they are of different types will indicate the impossibility ofone being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed fatherand the alleged child are not in the same blood group, theycannot be father and child by consanguinity.

COMPULSARY RECOGNITION

TAYAG vs. TAYAG-GALLORGR. No. 174680

March 24, 2008

Facts:On January 15, 2001, respondent, Felicidad A. Tayag-

Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administrationover the estate of Ismael Tayag. The respondent alleged that sheis one of the illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag andEster Angeles.

On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate,leaving behind two real properties both of which are in the

possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter soldon 10 October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of thedecedents estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to giverespondent and her brothers P100, 000.00 each as their share inthe proceeds of the sale. However, petitioner only gave each ofthem half the amount she promised.

In a Motion dated August 31, 2001, petitioner reiteratedher sole ownership of the properties and presented the transfercertificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is

necessary to allege that respondent was acknowledged andrecognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child. There beingno such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognitionwhich cannot be brought after the death of the putative father.To prevent further encroachment upon the courts time,petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses.

The motion was denied.


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Issue:Whether or not respondents petition for the issuance of

letters of administration sufficiently states a cause of actionconsidering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an

illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she hadbeen acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter.

Ruling:The appellate court held that the mere allegation that

respondent is an illegitimate child suffices. Rule 79 of the Rulesof Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters ofadministration must be filed by an interested person. The Court,applying the provisions of the Family Code which had thenalready taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claimingillegitimate filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of

the Family Code, i.e., open and continuous possession of thestatus of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by thedeath of the alleged father.

In contrast, respondent in this case had not been giventhe opportunity to present evidence to show whether she hadbeen voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceasedfather because of petitioners opposition to her petition andmotion for hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as yet, noway to determine if her petition is actually one to compel

recognition which had already been foreclosed by the death ofher father, or whether indeed she has a material and directinterest to maintain the suit by reason of the decedents voluntaryacknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate filiation.

RODOLFO FERNANDEZ, et al. vs. ROMEOFERNANDEZ, et al.

G.R. No. 143256August 28, 2001

Facts:

The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and GenerosaA. de Venecia being childless by the death of their son, purchasedfrom a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one month baby boy. Theboy being referred to was later on identified as RodolfoFernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken care of bythe couple and was sent to school and became a dentaltechnician. He lived with the couple until they became old anddisabled. On August 31, 1989, after the death of Dr. Jose,appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the estateleft by the deceased. Same day, Generosa sold her share to

Rodolfos son, Eddie Fernandez. After learning the transaction,Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro,Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, beingnephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, theirfather Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21,1994, an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estateand Deed of Sale void ab initio. They claimed that Rodolfo is nota legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. JoseFernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfocould not inherit from the spouses.

Issue:Whether or not Rodolfo is a legitimate or a legally

adopted child of Jose Fernandez and Generosa de VeneciaFernandez.

Ruling:No, Rodolfo is neither a legitimate nor a legally adopted

child of Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez.


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Rodolfo failed to come up with evidences to prove his filiation.The only public document he could show was the Application forRecognition of Back Pay Rights under Act No. 897. 897. Such isa public document but nevertheless, it was not executed to admit

the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with him. Rodolfo also claimsthat he enjoyed and possessed the status of being a legitimatechild of the spouses openly and continuously until they died.Open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimatechild is meant the enjoyment by the child of the position andprivileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate child suchas bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the parents andfamily of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the child'ssupport and education, and giving the child the reputation ofbeing a child of his parents. However, it must be noted thatpossession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an

acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compelrecognition by his assumed parent. His baptismal certificate,although public documents, is evidence only to prove theadministration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified,but not the veracity of the statements or declarations madetherein with respect to his kinsfolk. It may be argued that abaptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed by theRules of Court and special laws of proving filiation but in thiscase, the authenticity of the baptismal certificate was doubtfulwhen Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the Evangelist

Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a certificationon October 16, 1995 attesting that the records of baptism onJune 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged. The pictures hepresented do not also constitute proof of filiation.

CAMELO CABATANIAvs.COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 124814

October 21, 2004

FACTS:

This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and

support filed by Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son,private respondent Camelo Regodos.

During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of

private respondent who was born on September 9, 1982 and that

she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her

husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante,

Negros Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as

petitioners household help. It was while working there as a maid

that, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked

in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner

promised to support her if she got pregnant.

Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioners

child 27 days after their sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse

was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on

suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioners wife sent her

home. But petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod

City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982,

assisted by a hilot in her aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City,she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was different. He testified

that he was a sugar planter and a businessman. Sometime in

December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During

the course of her employment, she would often go home to her

husband in the afternoon and return to work the following


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morning. This displeased petitioners wife, hence she was told to

look for another job.

In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to

go home and spend New Years Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner mether on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited

her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was

hard up and petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later,

they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual

intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and when

he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the

child of her husband. They went home the following day.

In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another

household, went to petitioners house hoping to be reemployed

as a servant there. Since petitioners wife was in need of one, she

was re-hired. However petitioners wife noticed that her stomach

was bulging and inquired about the father of the unborn child.

She told petitioners wife that the baby was by her husband.

Because of her condition, she was again told to go home and they

did not see each other anymore.

Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on

him by Florencias counsel. She was demanding support forprivate respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying

the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when

they had sex. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and

checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having

sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in

Singcang, Bacolod City.

TC: gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia

despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow

when, in reality, her husband was alive. Deciding in favor of

private respondent, the trial court declared:

The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to

decide this case, based on the personal appearance of the child

then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the

child of the defendant with plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia

Regodos.

Issue:Whether or not respondent may compulsorily be

recognized by petitioner.

Ruling:No. Respondent failed to show conclusive evidence as to

establish his filiation with petitioner. Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her, privaterespondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntaryrecognition. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the

putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when thereis no showing that the putative father had a hand in thepreparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has noauthority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on theinformation of a third person.

More importantly, the fact that Florencias husband isliving and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them givesrise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is


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legitimate even though Florencia may have declared against itslegitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Only thehusband or in exceptional cases, his heirs may impugned thepresumed legitimacy of the child.

With regards the personal appearance of the child, theSupreme Court provided that in this age of genetic profiling anddeoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjectivetest of physical resemblance or similarity of features will notsuffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before thecourts of law.

SAYSON VS CA

FACTS:

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio,

Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November

10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married

Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years

later, on March 26,1981. Their properties were left in the

possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson,

who claim to be their children.

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios,

together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint

for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and

Isabel Sayson. It was filed in the RTC of Albay. The action was

resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged

successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedent's lawful

descendants.

On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own

complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate

estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four

surviving children. And filed in the RTC of Albay. The complainants

asserted the defense they raised , that Delia and Edmundo were theadopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of

Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's

share in his parents' estate by right of representation.

Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents

on the basis of practically the same evidence.

The Judge declared in his decision dated May 26, 1986, that Delia

and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and

Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption. Doribel was their

legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate.

Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno

and Rafaela by right of representation. In his decision dated

September 30, 1986, Judge Jose S. Saez dismissed Civil Case,

holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro

and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded

the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.

Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they wereconsolidated and affirmed. In Civil Case, the appealed decision is

modified in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from

inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and

Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the birth certificate is a formidable evidence ?


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SC HELD:

On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of

the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be

sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece ofevidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under

Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is

true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only

prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary

evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.

Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to

Edita Abila was understandably suspect, coming as it did from an

interested party. The affidavit of Abila denying her earlier statement

in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay,

let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower

courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be

upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, where we ruled that

"the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in

the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or

nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the

impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel'slegitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and

accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper

party. The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code x x x does not

have this purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental

purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,

and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy

of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that

by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The

legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as

a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR. vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO,et al.

G.R. No. 138961March 7, 2002

Facts:Corazon Garcia alleges that she was cohabiting with

William Liyao from 1965 up to Williams death in December,1975 even though Corazon is still legally married but livingseparately to a Ramon Yulo. William Liyao himself was legallymarried to Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao at the time of his cohabitationwith Corazon. Corazon and deceased lived together with thecompany of Corazons two children from her subsistingmarriage- Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo. In 1974,they begot a child, William Liyao, Jr. It was alleged that WilliamLiyao paid for all the expenses for the subsistence of William Jr.and also that of Corazon and her two children from hersubsisting marriage during their cohabitation. William Jr. was saidto be in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the

child of said William Liyao, having been recognized andacknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime.Upon the death of his alleged father, William Jr. prays that he berecognized as an illegitimate child and an heir by the family of thedeceased from his subsisting marriage. The deceaseds legitimatechildren on their part, alleges that the deceased could not havefathered petitioner for their father and mother have never beenseparated.


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Issue:Whether or not petitioner may impugn his legitimacy with

that of his mothers subsisting marr iage and establish his claim offiliation with the late William Liyao.

Ruling:Holding that Corazons marriage with Ramon Yulo is still

subsisting, it is presumed that petitioner is the legitimate child ofRamon Yulo and not the illegitimate child of William Liyao.Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during avalid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. This presumption isgrounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from theodium of illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child,however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrownby evidence to the contrary. Article 255 of the New Civil Code

provides: Children born after one hundred and eighty daysfollowing the celebration of the marriage, and before threehundred days following its dissolution or the separation of thespouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. No evidence otherthan that of physical impossibility of the husband having accessto his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of thethree hundred which preceded the birth of the child can beadmitted. Such physical impossibility may be caused by: (a) By theimpotence of the husband; (b) by the fact that husband and wifewere living separately in such a way that access was not possible;

(c) by the serious illness of the husband.

Petitioner cannot impugn his own legitimacy. Article 255of the Civil Code provides that only the husband, or in propercases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262of the Civil Code can impugn such legitimacy. And, in the case atbar, the petition was initiated by petitioner himself through hismother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and

Bernadette Yulo who are the undisputed children of Corazon andRamon Yulo. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation.

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS vs. ESTATE OFDECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON

G.R. No. 142877October 2, 2001

Facts:Danilo and Carolina de Jesus were married on 23 August

1964. It was within this marriage that the petitioners, Jinkie andJacqueline were born. In 1991 though, Juan Dizon acknowledgedpetitioners as his own illegitimate children through a notarizeddocument. Thereafter, Juan died intestate and petitioners filed aprayer that they be given their legitime and be recognized as

illegitimate children by the surviving spouse and legitimatechildren of Juan Dizon.

Issue:Whether or not petitioners legitimacy as children of

Danilo may be impugned and they be recognized as illegitimatechildren of Juan Dizon.

Ruling:No. The petitioners were born under the subsisting

marriage of Danilo and Carolina. It is presumed that childrenborn in wedlock are legitimate. This presumptionbecomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physicalimpossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of thechild due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to havesexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wifeare living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is notpossible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely


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prevents sexual intercourse. And only the father, or inexceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in anappropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Sincethe petitioners failed to show records of the impossibility of theirparents access to each other during the first 120 days of the 300days which preceded their birth, they cannot assail theirpresumed legitimacy. Failing therefore to impugn their legitimacy,petitioners cannot claim that they are the acknowledgedillegitimate children of the deceased, Juan Dizon.

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS,et al.

G.R. No. 123450

August 31, 2005

Facts:Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almontewere

married on December 29, 1989. A year later, they begot JoseGerardo. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition toannul his marriage to Ma. Theresa on the ground of bigamy. Thiswas because it was found out that Ma. Theresa had alreadymarried a Mario Gopiao nine years before their marriage. Suchmarriage of Ma. Theresa to Mario was never annulled. The trial

court ruled that Gerardo and Ma. Theresas marriage wasbigamous and that her marriage to Mario is valid and subsisting.It declared the child as being illegitimate. The Court of Appealsaffirmed the lower courts decision but on appeal, reversed itsruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresaby Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage.

Issues:

a) Whether or not the child born out of a bigamousmarriage is considered legitimate.

b)

Whether or not Gerardo could assail Jose Gerardoslegitimacy.

Ruling:Yes, a child born out of a bigamous marriage is

considered legitimate. The legitimacy would come from thevalidity of the first marriage and not on the bigamous marriagefor that bigamous marriage is void from the very beginning(abinitio). Ma. Theresa was married to Mario Gopiao, and that shehad never entered into a lawful marriage with the Gerardo sincethe so-called marriage with the latter was voidab initio. Ma.Theresa was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child

Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, thechild Jose Gerardounder the lawis the legitimate child of thelegal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and MarioGopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of thevoid and non-existent marriage between Ma. Theresa andGerardo.The status and filiation of a child cannot becompromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A childwho is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents islegitimate.

As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect hisstatus of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides thatthe child shall be considered legitimate although the mother mayhave declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentencedas an adulteress.

No, Gerardo is not in a position to assail Jose Gerardoslegitimacy. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of JoseGerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a propercase, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose


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Gerardo born to his wife.Impugning the legitimacy of a child is astrictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, hisheirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was voidfrom the very beginning; he never became her husband and thusnever acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY

EDGARDO A. TIJING vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 125901

March 8, 2001

Facts:

Edgardo and BienvenidaTijing are husband and wife, theyhave six children, youngest of whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. InAugust 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for anurgent laundry job. Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month oldchild, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let Angelita take care of her childwhile she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned fromwork to get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, anddespite her and her husbands efforts, they could not locateAngelita and their childs whereabouts.

Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of

Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband of Angelita, whoseinterment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw her sonEdgardo Jr., now named John Thomas Lopez. John is now beingclaimed by Angelita as her own son, sired by her common-lawhusband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida nowalleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita andTomas for it was the latters own brother who admitted thatTomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begotno children from his legal marriage nor with the cohabitation

with Angelita. Tomas brother even testified that Tomas himselfadmitted to him that the subject child was adopted.

Issue:Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject

child.

Ruling:Bienvenida. It was Bienvenida who was able to produce

the competent evidences to establish the childs filiation with herand her husband. She substantiated her claim with sufficientclinical records, presenting the proper and credible witnesses whoassisted her in her childs birth. Not to mention the fact that itcould be readily observed that Bienvenida and the child havestrong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.

Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent iscompetent and material evidence to establish parentage. Whereas,Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation years beforethe alleged birth of the child and the admission of Tomas ownbrother that Tomas was sterile makes it impossible that he andAngelita could have produced subject child. More importantly,the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and privaterespondent were legally married which is false because evenprivate respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife. Thisfalse entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

AGUSTIN V. PROLLAMANTE

Facts:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued

Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for

support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.


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In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe,

after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel

supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite

Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their

child out of wedlock, Martin. The babys birth certificate waspurportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the

pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated

requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial

capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for

adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at

the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped

off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. Thisincident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was

diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing

chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support.

Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all

the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which

Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-

incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of

cause of action.

The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit

themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the

applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus

this petition.

Issue:

W/N the respondent court erred in denying the petitioners

Motion to Dismiss and directing parties to subject to DNA

paternity testing and was a form of unreasonable search.

Held:

No. The trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to

dismiss because the private respondents complaint on its face

showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The

elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right

and the defendants corresponding primary duty, and (2) the

delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the

primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action isdetermined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts

alleged.

No. In Ople v. Torres, the Supreme Court struck down the

proposed national computerized identification system embodied

in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:In no uncertain terms,

we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all

incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to

stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhancepublic service and the common good... Intrusions into the right

must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public

service and the common good.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches

and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of

communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been

critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already


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stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in

jeopardy holds no water.

For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by

fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing

sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a

much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned

progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and

have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at

a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a

dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We

therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand

that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby

DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision is hereby

AFFIRMED in toto.

IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN LIN WANG

Facts:

Petitioner Julian Lin Wang a minor represented by his mother

Anna Lisa Wang filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for

change of name of entry in the civil registry of Julian Lin Wang.

Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered

name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin

Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to

drop his middle name as this would help him adjust more easily

to integrate himself into Singaporean society.

Issue:

Whether or not the law the law provides for his middle name to

be changed.

Ruling:

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be

proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. tojustify a request for the change of name, the petitioner must show

not only some proper reason therefore but also that he will be

prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the

grounds for the change of name which have been held valid are:

a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely

difficult to write or pronounce. b.) When the change results as a

legal consequence

c.) When the change will avoid confusion.

d.) When one has continuously used and been known since

childhood by a Filipino name and was not aware of the alien

parentage.

e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name and


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f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no

showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent

purpose.

BRIONES V. MIGUEL

Facts:On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a

Petition for Habeas Corpus to obtain custody of his minor childMichael Kevin Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minorMichael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondentLoreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P.

Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presentlyresiding in Japan. The petitioner prays that the custody of his sonMichael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father andhas demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.

Issue:Whether or not the natural father may be denied the

custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of themother who is away.

Ruling:Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor isdeemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta.Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitlyprovides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shallbe under the parental authority of their mother, and shall beentitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the ruleregardless of whether the father admits paternity.

Parental authority over recognized natural children whowere under the age of majority was vested in the father or themother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child,authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awardedby the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimatechildren applied. In other words, in the latter case, parentalauthority resided jointly in the father and the mother.

De santos vs Angeles

Facts:

- Antonio De Santos married Sofia Bona and had a child,

which is herein petitioner (Maria Rosario De Santos)

-

Their relationship became strained to the breaking point,thereafter Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita

Talag (herein private respondent)

- Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage

thru a divorce from a Nevada court, and aware that said

decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction,

they proceeded to Tokyo and got married, and they had

eleven children

- Sofia died in Guatemala, and less than a month later,

Antonio and private respondent got married in tagaytayunder Philippine laws

- Antonio died intestate having properties with an estimated

value of 15,000

- Private respondent went to court asking for letter of

administration in her favor and alleged that the decedent

was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself,


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their ten surviving children and petitioner, which were

granted by the court there having no opposition.

- Six years after, petitioner decide to intervene and argued

that private respondents children were illegitimate where

the court ruled in favor of private respondent and declaredthe children legitimated and thereupon instituted and

declared them as heirs of Antonio

- Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied, hence

this petition

Issues:

- WON court erred in declaring the ten children of private

respondent as legitimated

Held:

- Yes

- Art 269 of the Civil Code provides that only natural children

can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of

parents who, at the time of the conception of the former,

were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each

other, are natural

- In the present case, it is clear that all the children born to

private respondent and Antonio were conceived and born

when the latters valid marriage to petitioners mother was

still subsisting. The marriage under question is considered

void from the beginning because bigamous, contracted

when a prior valid marriage was still subsisting. It follows

that the children begotten of such union cannot be

considered natural children proper for at the time of their

conception, their parents were disqualified from marrying

each other due to the impediment of a prior subsisting

marriage.

- In this case, the term natural children by legal fiction was

invented, thus giving rise to another category of illegitimatechildren, clearly not to be confused with natural children as

defined in art 269 but by fiction of law to be equated with

acknowledged natural children and consequently, enjoying

the status, rights and obligations of the latter.

- Private respondent contends that, an acknowledged natural

children have the right to be legitimated, hence

respondents children have the right to be legitimated, as in

fact they were deemed legitimated by the subsequent valid

marriage of their parents in the Philippines- This contention of private respondent is not meritorious,

legitimation is not a right which is demandable by a child, it

is a privilege available only to natural children proper, as

defined under art 269. Although natural children by legal

fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural

children, it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude

that, they likewise have the right to be legitimated. Art 269

itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural

children as defined thereunder, there was, therefore fromthe outset, an intent to exclude children conceived or born

out of illicit relations from the purview of the law.

- Much more is involved here than the mere privilege to be

legitimized. The rights of other children like the petitioner in

this case, may be adversely affected as her testamentary

share may well be reduced in the event that her ten

surviving half siblings should be placed on par with her,


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when each of them is rightfully entitled to only half of her

share.

- Wherefore, petitioner is declared as the sole legitimate

child of the decedent

ADOPTION

Republic v. CA

G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992

On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to

adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living

with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the

Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City. The petition for adoption was

filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988,

when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child

and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption

may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However,

after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was

pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209,

the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new

law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. Petitioner

contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed

outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining

her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which

requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family

Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs.

Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason

Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption.

Issues:1.) Can the Family Code be applied retroactively to the petition for

adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles and;

2.) Granting that the FC should be applied retroactively should the

adoption in favor of private respondent only, her husband not being

a petitioner.

Held:


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1.)Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of

appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification

that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair

vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other

laws. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent

does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The

term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right

reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary

State action, or an innately just and imperative right which

enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable

individual rights, cannot deny. Vested rights include not only legal or

equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an

exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.

Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had

the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining

her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she wasexercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon

her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have

the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law

in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or

impaired by the enactment of a new law. When private respondent

filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court

acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing

law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established

rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute

in force at the time of the commencement of the action. We do notfind in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an

exception to the rule.

2.)Petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code

should not apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have

modified the trial court's decision by granting the adoption in favor

of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not

being a petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable position

and, accordingly, reject the same. Although Dioscoro Bobiles was

not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption

filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as

Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that

he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The

pertinent parts of his written consent and the foregoing

declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open

court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the

circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign

residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit

of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party to the petition.

This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in

language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to

and be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice.

The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by

arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on theform of pleadings.

HERBERT CANG vs CA

G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998

Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano are married and

begot 3 children Keith, Charmaine and Joseph. Anna learned of her

husband extra marital affair hence filed a petition for legal

separation which the court granted. Herbert went to the US to get

divorce, the court granted it and granted sole custody of the

children to Anna. Herbert took an American wife and thus became a

naturalized American citizen. He divorced his American wife and

never remarried. When Herbert was working in the US, he remitted

money for his children's expenses and another, deposited in the

bank in the name of his children. Ronald and Maria Clavano (

siblings of Anna ) filed for the adoption of the 3 children. Anna

Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband


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had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children and that

her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the

children.

Upon learning, Herbert immediately returned to the

Philippines and filed an opposition Pending resolution of the

petition for adoption, Herbert moved to reacquire custody.

Therefore RTC issued an order finding that Anna in effect

relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody

should be transferred to the father. The court then directed the

Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to Herbert. Thereafter

RTC issued a decree granting the petition for adoption of the 3

children to the Clavanos.

Upon appeal, Herbert asserted that the petition for

adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parentalauthority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to the

adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and

Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and (d) the

petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the

representative of the Department of Social Welfare and

Development who made the case study report required by law. CA

affirmed the decree of adoption on the ground that the consent of

the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary.

Issue:WON Herberts consent is required for adoption to be valid?

WON Herbert has abandoned their children w/c dispenses his

required consent?

Held: YES and NO

When Clavanos filed the petition for adoption on September 25,

1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as

amended by Executive Order No. 91. It is thus evident that

notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent

of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for

its validity.

In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of

abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a

settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all

parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to

perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support

which parents owe their children."

Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral

desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.

He maintained regular communication with his wife and

children through letters and telephone. He used to send

packages by mail and catered to their whims.

The conclusion of the courts below that petitionerabandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other

than his inability to provide them the material comfort

that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There

should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned

them that his children would not miss his guidance and

counsel if they were given to adopting parents.

The letters he received from his children prove that

petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie

between him and his children. The children needed him not

only because he could cater to their whims but also becausehe was a person they could share with their daily activities,

problems and triumphs

the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a

paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the

conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit father.

"bad" husband does not necessarily make a "bad" father.


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The law is clear that either parent may lose parental

authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such

reason was established in the legal separation case.

Angelie CERVANTES vs FAJARDO

G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989

Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon are common law

spouses who had a daughter named Angelie Anne Cervantes.

Fajardo offered Angelie for adoption to Cervantes spouses.

Cervantes filed petition for adoption w/ the RTC w/c granted their

petition. Then Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents

demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they

would get back their child. Cervantes refused to accede to the

demand. Gina took the child and refused to return Angelie sayingthat she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the

affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully

explained to her. However, she would return the child to the

petitioners if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00. Cervantes

filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Issue:

WON the writ should be issued?

Held: YESIn all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost

consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child

concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as

social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court

deviated from this criterion.

Fajardos common law relationship will not accord the

minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and

develop into an upright and moral-minded person

Gina also has a child with another married man w/c became

Angelies sister. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes)

to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true

father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of

said minor.

Upon the other hand, Cervantes who are legally married

appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially

capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future

better than what the natural mother

Besides, Angelie has been legally adopted by petitioners with the

full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption

has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in

natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting

parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted.

In this case, parental authority over the adopted shall beexercised jointly by both spouses.

Adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of

the adopted child and exercise parental authority and

responsibility over him.


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MACARIO TAMARGO vs CA

G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

Adelberto Bundoc, who is 10 years old, shot Jennifer

Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her

death. Damages was filed by by petitioner Macario Tamargo

Jennifer's adopting parent against Sps Bundoc while they were still

living. Prior to the incident, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had

filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition for adoption was

granted after the said incident. In their Answer, spouses Bundoc,

Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing

petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting

parents sps. Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action since

parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the

moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. RTC

dismissed the complaint ruling that natural parents of Adelbertoindeed were not indispensable parties to the action.

They filed an appeal. Spouses Bundoc argues that parental

authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time

of the filing of the petition for adoption that is,beforeAdelberto had

shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that

they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for

Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct. Under Article 36 of the Child

and Youth Welfare Code, a decree of adoption shall be entered,

which shall be effective he date the original petition was filed.

Issue:

WON the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is

concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the

adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed

against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when

actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents?

Held: NO

The law imposes civil liability under vicarious liability, upon the

father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any

damages that may be caused by a minor childwho lives with them.

Parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of

the duties and responsibilities of parents their parental

authority which includes the instructing, controlling and

disciplining of the child.

The shooting occured when parental authority was still

lodged in Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor

Adelberto.

It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then

actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the

indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

Under Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, Parents andguardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child

under their parental authority in accordance with the civil Code.

Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines has similarly

insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act,

shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be

held liable for the ensuing damage.

parental authority cannot be properly regarded as having

been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting

parents at the time the air rifle shooting happened.

retroactive effect may not be given to the decree ofadoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting

parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no

actual or physically custody over the adopted child

Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of

the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit

the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the

adopted child.


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Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally

vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody

before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the

adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such

trial period.

trial custody period either had not yet begun or had already

been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting

actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural

parents, not the adopting parents.


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ISABELITA LAHOM vs JOSE SIBULO

G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom aremarried but was not blessed w/ a child. They decided to take into

their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo. After several years,

they decided to file a petition for adoption. RTC issued an order

granting the petition that made all the more intense than before the

feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. A sad turn of events

came many years later. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to

rescind the decree of adoption because Jose Melvin refused to take

up the surname Lahom.

Prior to the institution of the case, RA 8552 or the DomesticAdoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the

law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Therefore

Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition on this grounds.

Lahom argued that R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply to

cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under

the regime of then Article 348 of the Civil Code and Article 192of

the Family Code.

Petition is ordered dismissed on the ground that RA 8552

deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier

granted under the Family Code and it appears clear that the legal

grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to

petitioner for more than five (5) years hence, the action if any, had

already prescribed. Hence appeal.

Issue:

WON adoption decreed on 05 May 1972 may still be revoked or

rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?

WON Lahoms grounds already prescribed?

Held: YES and YES

R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted.

The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the

adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to

sever the legal ties created by adoption.

In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that

the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in

force at the time of the commencement of the action. The

Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be

resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the

petition was filed.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that

herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of

adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, hadalready abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter

under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a

decree of adoption.

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an

adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption

decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn

out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the

bounden duty of the Court to apply the law.

The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a conditionthat could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to

protection. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal

of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are

subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action

given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been

exercised.


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IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY

ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor

illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that

Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her

mothers surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to

"Catindig," his surname. The court granted the decree of adoption

but named Stephanie as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. Cantindig

filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that

Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural

mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. RTC denied this petition on

the ground that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an

adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his

middle name.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to

use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother

because it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies

filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the

Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus,

to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her

relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother

should be maintained. And there is no law expressly prohibiting

Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle

name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows. Lastly it is

customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is

ordinarily the surname of the mother.

Issue:

WON an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as

her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural

father?

Held: YES

Law Is Silent as to the Use Of Middle Name. The middle name or

the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1 ) to

identity of names and surnames between ascendants and

descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mothers

surname shall be added. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to

what middle name an adoptee may use.

For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a

legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the

reciprocal rights and obligations including the right of the

adopted to use the surname of the adopters

Justice Caguioa said that it should be mandatory that thechild uses the surname of the father and permissive in the

case of the surname of the mother.

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that

Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a

legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the

right to bear the surname of her father and her mother

it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the

mother should immediately precede the surname of the

father Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the

adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological

parent

Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary

rights from her natural mother in the future

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and

salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent


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purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted

child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every

reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill

these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child

adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as

middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why

she should not be allowed to do so.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Libi vs IAC

Facts:

- Respondent spouses (Gotiong) are the legitimate parents of

Julie Ann Gotiong while petitioners are the parents of

Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age.

- Julie Ann and Wendell were sweethearts but the former

broke up her relationship with the latter after finding him to

be sadistic and irresponsible

- Wendell kept on pestering Julie Ann with demands for

reconciliation until he resorted to threats against Julie Ann

- On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died each from

a single shot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a smith

and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner

Cresencio Libi which was recovered from the scene of the

crime.

- Parents of Julie Ann filed a civil case against the parents of

Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters

vicarious liability under article 2180 of the civil code which

was dismissed by the trial court but reversed by the CA,

hence this petition

Issue:

- WON the court erred in making the parents of Wendell

civilly liable


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Held:

- No, Under the present case, court correctly declared that

the parents of Wendell are and should be held liable for the

civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by

their minor child under their legal authority and control, or

who live in their company, unless it is proven that the

former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family

to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised

on the provisions of art 101 of the RPC with respect to

damages ex delicto, such primary liability shall be imposed

pursuant to 2180 of the civil code

- In imposing sanctions for the socalled vicarious liability of

petitioners. Courts hold that the subsidiary liability of

parents for damages caused by their minor children

imposed by art 2180 of the civil code covers obligations

arising from both quasi delicts and criminal offenses. Court

believes that the civil liability of parents for quasi delict of

their minor children as contemplated in art 2180 of the civil

code is primary and not subsidiary

David vs CA

Facts:

- Petitioner Daisie David worked as secretary of private

respondent Ramon Villar, who is married man and a father

of four children

- Their relationship became intimate and they had a child

named Christopher J. and followed by two more children

namely Christine and Cathy Mae

- Their relationship became known to private respondents

wife and their children were eventually accepted by thelegal family of private respondent

- Thereafter, private respondent asked petitioner to allow

Christopher , then six years old, to go with his family to

Boracay wherein petitioner agreed, but after the trip private

respondent refused to give back the child and said that he

had enrolled Christopher at the Holy Family Academy for

the next school year

- Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus which was

granted by the trial court but was reversed by the CA, hencethis petition

Issue:

- WON the petition for habeas corpus was proper

Held:

- Yes, rule 102 of the rules of court provides that the wri t of

habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal

confinement or detention by which any person is deprived

of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person

is withheld from the person entitled thereto

- In the case at bar, Christopher is an illegitimate child since

at the time of his conception his father, private respondent,

was married to another woman other than the childs

mother. As such, pursuant to art 176 of the Family Code,


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Christopher is under the parental authority of his mother,

who as a consequence of such authority is entitled to have

custody of him. Since admittedly, petitioner has been

deprived of her rightful custody of the child by private

respondent, she is entitled for the issuance of the writ ofhabeas corpus

- The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor

child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to

the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child.

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE

ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 115640March 15, 1995

Facts:Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita

Masauding first met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employedby the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as anurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, Californiato work as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the

National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as itsliaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintaina common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, theirdaughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a briefvacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married,and upon their return to the United States, their second child, ason, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on1988.

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until theydecided to separate. Instead of giving their marriage a secondchance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldoand the children and went back to California. Reynaldo broughthis children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment

in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by hiscompany to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with hissister, Guillerma Layug and her family.

Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippinesand filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against hereintwo petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus startingthe whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial courtdismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita'sparental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared

Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but withrights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to beapproved by the Court.

Issue:Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to

gain custody over the children be granted.

Ruling:Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus

petition by the mother and retain the custody of the children tothe father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother hadalready caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, andexposure to conflicting moral values against the children.

The children are now both over seven years old. Theirchoice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear fromthe record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. Thechildren understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their


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mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by herbehavior.


SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 113054March 16, 1995

Facts:Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia

Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986.Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who wasborn July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from thehospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and

custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein,Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.

On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his twobrothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year oldLeouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that throughdeceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy andclandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong,Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care,Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," beforethe Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. asrespondent. After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, thetrial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody ofthe child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo andOfelia Bedia.

Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In itsdecision dated April 30, 1992, respondent appellate courtaffirmed the trial court's order.

Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and

the appellate court to award custody of his minor son to hisparents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art.214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of thegrandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absentor unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has notbeen successfully shown by private respondents.

Issue:Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor

Leouel Santos, Jr.

Ruling:The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When

a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as afriend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merelytemporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation ofparental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence orunsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by thesurviving grandparent.

The court held the contentions of the grandparents areinsufficient as to remove petitioner's parental authority and theconcomitant right to have custody over the minor. Privaterespondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy,notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over thegrandparents.

The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularlybecause there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in


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no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previousinattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed asabandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against himand his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may beregarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award

him custody would help enhance the bond between parent andson. The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no barto allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform,who are assigned to different parts of the country in the serviceof the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children.

Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting awayhis boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not aground to wrest custody from him.


PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R.No. 118870March 29, 1996

Facts:Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa,

his wife, (petitioner) is a registered nurse. After six miscarriages,

two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gavebirth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayedwith her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she becamepregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visaand was not employed.

On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrivedin Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned tothe U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week

vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets. However, herhusband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother andpromised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, theyhad agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but onceNerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued

working. She was supposed to come back immediately afterwinding up her affairs there.

When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray IIs firstbirthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. They hadquarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and relysolely on her husbands meager income of P5,000.00. On theother hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his soneven as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it wouldnot be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a

car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed toreconcile.

Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of theirson to her. The trial court

issued an Order awarding custody toNerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the FamilyCode which provides that no child under seven years of age shallbe separated from the mother, unless the court finds compellingreasons to order otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Courtof Appeals reversed the trial courts order and held that granting

custody to the boys father would be for the childs best interestand welfare.

Issue:Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child?

Ruling:Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the

Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision. Rule 99,


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Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides: SEC. 6.Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated.Appeal. -When husband and wife are divorced or living separately andapart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody,and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought

before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident toany other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony asmay be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control ofeach such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the childto choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over tenyears of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge ofthe child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of ageshall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds thereare compelling reasons therefor.

The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate thata child under seven years of age shall not be separated from hismother unless the court finds compelling reasons to orderotherwise. The use of the word shall in Article 213 of theFamily Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules ofCourt connotes a mandatory character.

The general rule that a child under seven years of ageshall not be separated from his mother finds its reason in thebasic need of a child for his mothers loving care. Only the most

compelling of reasons shall justify the courts awarding thecustody of such a child to someone other than his mother, suchas her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past thefollowing grounds have been considered ample justification todeprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect,abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitualdrunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanityand being sick with a communicable disease.

It has long been settled that in custody cases, theforemost consideration is always the welfare and best interest ofthe child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, theConvention on the Rights of the Child provides: In all actionsconcerning children, whether undertaken by public or private

social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrativeauthorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the childshall be a primary consideration.

In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factorinasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that they have amplemeans. Nerissas present work schedule is not so unmanageableas to deprive her of quality time with her son. Quite a number ofworking mothers who are away from home for longer periods oftime are still able to raise a family well, applying time

management principles judiciously. Also, delegating child caretemporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers doesnot detract from being a good mother, as long as the latterexercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are oftenbrought up by housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother.

Although Rays is a general practitioner, the records showthat he maintains a clinic, works for several companies onretainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give thelove and care that a mother gives to his child.


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VANCIL vs. BELMESG.R. No. 132223June 19, 2001

Facts:

Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a USNavy serviceman who died on 1986. During his lifetime, Reederhad two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-lawwife, Helen G. Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a favorable courtdecision appointing her as legal and judicial guardian over thepersons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.

On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition tothe subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she hadalready filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of

Pagadian City. On June 27, 1988, Helen followed her oppositionwith a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment ofa New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actualcustody of and exercising parental authority over the subjectminors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they arepermanently residing. She also states that at the time the petitionwas filed, Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being anaturalized American citizen.

On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied

Helens motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia asguardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court ofAppeals rendered its decision reversing the RTC. Since Valeriehad reached the age of majority at the time the case reached theSupreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship ofVincent.

Issue:

Who between the mother and grandmother of minorVincent should be his guardian?

Ruling:Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of

the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitionerBonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Codeprovides: "Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointlyexercise parental authority over the persons of their commonchildren. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shallprevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen hasthe corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.

"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by

the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minorchildren is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, aright supported by law and sound public policy. The right is aninherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of thecourts, but derives from the nature of the parent

Paternity.adoption.parentalauthority.digests

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