Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What Can the History of Military Revolutions in Military...
Transcript of Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What Can the History of Military Revolutions in Military...
title:
PastRevolutions,FutureTransformations:WhatCantheHistoryofRevolutionsinMilitaryAffairsTellUsAboutTransformingtheU.S.Military?
author: Hundley,RichardO.publisher: RAND
isbn10|asin: 0833027093printisbn13: 9780833027092ebookisbn13: 9780585163857
language: English
subject Militaryartandscience,Militaryhistory,UnitedStates--ArmedForces--Organization.
publicationdate: 1999lcc: U104.H891999ebddc: 355.4/0973
subject: Militaryartandscience,Militaryhistory,UnitedStates--ArmedForces--Organization.
UnitedStates--ArmedForces--Organization.
TheresearchdescribedinthisreportwassponsoredbytheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency.TheresearchwasconductedinRAND'sNationalDefenseResearchInstitute,afederallyfundedresearchanddevelopmentcentersupportedbytheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,theJointStaff,theunifiedcommands,andthedefenseagencies,ContractDASW01-95-C-0059.
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Hundley,RichardO.Pastrevolutions,futuretransformations:whatcanthehistoryofrevolutionsinmilitaryaffairstellusabouttransformingtheU.S.military?/RichardO.Hundley.p.cm"PreparedfortheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectAgency(DARPA)byRAND'sNationalDefenseResearchInstitute.""MR-1029-DARPA."Includesbibliographicalreferences(p.).ISBN0-8330-2709-31.Militaryartandscience.2.Militaryhistory.3.UnitedStatesArmedForcesOrganization.I.Title.U104.H891999355.4´0973dc2199-25786CIP
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PastRevolutions,FutureTransformationsWhatcanthehistoryofrevolutionsinmilitaryaffairstell
usabouttransformingtheU.S.military?
RichardO.Hundley
PreparedfortheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency
Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionunlimited
Pageiii
PREFACEThehistoryofthe20thcenturyhasshownthatadvancesintechnologycanbringaboutdramaticchangesinmilitaryoperations,oftentermed"revolutionsinmilitaryaffairs"orRMAs.Technology-drivenRMAshavebeenoccurringsincethedawnofhistory,theywillcontinuetooccurinthefuture,andtheywillcontinuetobestowamilitaryadvantageonthefirstnationtodevelopandusethem.Accordingly,itisimportanttothevitalityandrobustnessoftheU.S.defenseposturefortheDepartmentofDefense(DoD)researchanddevelopment(R&D)communitytobeawareoftechnologydevelopmentsthatcouldrevolutionizemilitaryoperations,andfortheU.S.militaryservicestobeonthelookoutforrevolutionarywaysinwhichtoemploythosetechnologiesinwarfare.
Thisleadstothreeinterrelatedquestions:
Regardingpastrevolutionsinmilitaryaffairs(RMAs),
Whatlessonscanwelearnfromthehistoricalrecord?
RegardingbeingpreparedforfutureRMAscarriedoutbyothers,
Whatdoesittaketobeprepared?
RegardingtransformingU.S.militaryforcesbycarryingoutourownRMAs,
Whatdoesittaketobesuccessful?
Thisreportaddressesthesequestions,whichareparticularlyrelevanttodaywhentheDoDhassetoutonaconcertedefforttobringaboutatechnology-driventransformationoftheU.S.militarytoachieve
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theoperationalgoalsoutlinedinJointVision2010(Shalikashvili,1996).
ThisresearchwassponsoredbytheDirector'sOfficeoftheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency(DARPA)andconductedbytheAcquisitionandTechnologyPolicyCenterofRAND'sNationalDefenseResearchInstitute(NDRI).NDRIisafederallyfundedresearchanddevelopmentcentersponsoredbytheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,theJointStaff,thedefenseagencies,andtheunifiedcommands.
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CONTENTS
Preface iii
Figures ix
Tables xi
Summary xiii
Acknowledgments xxv
ChapterOneIntroduction 1
PartI.LessonsFromPastRMAs
ChapterTwoTheCharacteristicsofRevolutionsinMilitaryAffairs 7
WhatIsanRMA? 8
OtherNotableCharacteristicsofRMAs 11
LessonsfromtheBusinessWorldRegardingParadigmShifts
17
TheRelationshipbetweenBreakthroughTechnologiesandRMAs
19
IstheCurrentMilitary-TechnicalRevolutionaTrueRMA?
19
ChapterThreeTheBreakthroughProcessLeadingtoRMAs 21
RMAsResultfromSerendipitousConceptual 21
Breakthroughs
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RMAsAretheResultofMultipleInnovations 22
MuchoftheRMAProcessCanBeObservedandAnticipated
25
MuchCanBeLearnedfromFailedorIncompleteRMAs 26
NecessaryTechnologyExistsButContemplatedDevicesProveImpractical 26
NewDevicesCannotBeTurnedIntoViableSystems 27
NoOperationalConceptExiststoEmployanOtherwiseViableSystemConcept 27
WrongorIncompleteOperationalConceptIsUsed 28
NoDoctrineandForceStructuretoExploittheOperationalConceptBecausetheConceptIsUnacceptabletoPrevailingMilitaryCulture 29
NoForceStructuretoExploitOperationalConceptBecausetheNewForceStructureRequiresTooLargeaChangeinExistingMilitaryOrganizations 30
ForceStructureandOperationalConceptNotCongruentwithGrandStrategy 32
PartII.BeingPreparedforFutureRMAs(CarriedOutbyOthers)
ChapterFourBeingAwareoftheNextRMA:TheObservablesoftheEmergenceofNewRMAs 37
TheRMAProcessProducesObservablesinaNumberofVenues
37
OpenandClosedVenuesRequireDifferentCollectionApproaches
39
CollectionIsNotEnough;AssessmentIsAlsoRequired 41
InAssessingPotentialBreakthroughs,DoNotDependonExpertsAlone
42
TheEssentialElementsofaWorldwideRMABreakthroughWatchandAssessmentActivity 45
ChapterFiveBeingResponsivetotheNextRMA:TheCharacteristicsofaFuture-OrientedMilitaryOrganization 49
OvercomingtheObstaclestoResponsiveness 49
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OvercomingDenial 50
OvercomingEscapeorDiversion 52
AchievingAcceptanceandPertinentAction 53
TheCharacteristicsofaFuture-OrientedMilitaryOrganization
55
PartIII.BringingAboutFutureRMAs(OfYourOwn)
ChapterSixWhatDoesitTaketoBringAboutaSuccessfulRMA? 59
YouMustHaveaFertileSetofEnablingTechnologies 60
YouMustHaveUnmetMilitaryChallenges 60
YouMustFocusonaDefinite"Thing"oraShortListof"Things"
61
YouMustUltimatelyChallengeSomeone'sCoreCompetency
63
YouMustHaveaReceptiveOrganizationalClimate 65
YouMustHaveSupportfromtheTop 65
YouMustHaveMechanismsforExperimentation 66
YouMustHaveSomeWayofRespondingPositivelytotheResultsofSuccessfulExperiments 68
DoctrinalChanges 68
ResponsiveAcquisitionPrograms 70
ForceStructureModifications 71
ChapterSeven
Dod'sCurrentForceTransformationActivities:DoesAnythingAppeartobeMissing?WhatcanbeDonetoFillintheMissingElements? 75
Today'sForceTransformation/RMAActivities 76
DoesAnythingAppeartoBeMissing? 79
EnablingTechnologies 79
MilitaryChallenges 80
OrganizationalClimate 81
SupportfromtheTop 81
MechanismsforExperimentation 81
FocusonaDefinite"Thing" 81
ChallengingSomeone'sCoreCompetency 82
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WaysofRespondingPositivelytoSuccessfulExperiments
82
"TheRMA":WhereWeSeemtoBeToday 83
SomeKeyQuestionsfortheDoD 84
WhatCanBeDonetoFillintheMissingElements? 84
InSummary 88
Bibliography 91
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FIGURES
3.1.OneModeloftheRMAProcess:RMAsResultfromSerendipitousConceptualBreakthroughs 22
3.2.AnotherModeloftheRMAProcess:RMAsAretheResultofMultipleInnovations 23
3.3.MuchoftheRMAProcessCanBeObservedandAnticipated 25
4.1.SomeofTheseVenuesAreOpen,SomeAreClosed 40
4.2.SinceAllPotentialRMAsDoNotPanOut,CollectionIsNotEnough:Careful,BalancedAssessmentIsAlsoRequired 42
7.1.AnRMABranchoftheDoDAcquisitionSystem 87
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TABLES
S.1.DoesAnythingAppeartoBeMissingfromDoD'sCurrentRMAActivities? xxiii
2.1.RMAs:SomeIllustrativeExamples 12
4.1.ExpertsCan'tAlwaysForeseetheFuture 43
4.2.NorCanMilitaryExpertsAlwaysForeseetheMilitaryFuture 44
6.1.TheTechnologiesBehindSomeRMAs 61
6.2.The''Things"InvolvedinSomeRMAs 62
7.1.DoesAnythingAppeartoBeMissingfromDoD'sCurrentRMAActivities? 80
7.2.APossibleSetofMilestonesforan"RMABranch"oftheDoDAcquisitionSystem 88
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SUMMARYAstheGulfWarshowed,advancesintechnologycanbringaboutdramaticchangesinmilitaryoperations.Suchtechnology-drivenchangesinmilitaryoperationswillcontinuetobestowamilitaryadvantageonthefirstnationtodevelopandusethem.Accordingly,thevitalityandrobustnessoftheU.S.defenseposturedependontheDoDR&Dcommunitybeingontheleadingedgeofbreakthroughtechnologiesthatcouldrevolutionizemilitaryoperations.Also,theU.S.militaryservicesmustbeonthelookoutforrevolutionarywaysinwhichtoemploythosetechnologiesinwarfare.
LessonsFromPastRMAs
TheCharacteristicsofRevolutionsinMilitaryAffairs
Basedonanexaminationoftwohistoricalrecordsthelonghistoryofmilitarytechnologyandthemilitary"revolutions"inthe20thcenturyweconcludethatthedefiningcharacteristicofarevolutioninmilitaryaffairs(RMA)canbestatedasfollows:
AnRMAinvolvesaparadigmshiftinthenatureandconductofmilitaryoperations
whicheitherrendersobsoleteorirrelevantoneormorecorecompetenciesofadominantplayer,
orcreatesoneormorenewcorecompetencies,insomenewdimensionofwarfare,
orboth.
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WeelaborateonthekeytermsinthisdefinitioninChapterTwo.
Basedonceagainonthehistoricalrecord,wecanlistothernotablecharacteristicsofRMAs:
RMAsarerarelybroughtaboutbydominantplayers.
RMAsfrequentlybestowanenormousandimmediatemilitaryadvantageonthefirstnationtoexploitthemincombat.
RMAsareoftenadoptedandfullyexploitedfirstbysomeoneotherthanthenationinventingthenewtechnology.
RMAsarenotalwaystechnology-driven.
Technology-drivenRMAsareusuallybroughtaboutbycombinationsoftechnologies,ratherthanindividualtechnologies.
Notalltechnology-drivenRMAsinvolveweapons.
Allsuccessfultechnology-drivenRMAsappeartohavethreecomponents:technology,doctrine,andorganization.
ThereareprobablyasmanyfailedRMAsassuccessfulRMAs.
RMAsoftentakealongtimetocometofruition.
ThemilitaryutilityofanRMAisfrequentlycontroversialandindoubtupuntilthemomentitisproveninbattle.
WeprovidehistoricalexamplesofeachofthesecharacteristicsinChapterTwo.
Paradigmshiftsarenotlimitedtothemilitaryarena.Theyoccurinthebusinessworldaswell,whereinrecentyearstheyhavebeenamuchstudiedphenomenon.Oneoftheclearmessagesfromthebusinessliteratureisthatparadigmshiftsthatdestroycorebusinesscompetenciesarerarelybroughtaboutbydominantplayers.(This
reinforcesoneoftheRMAcharacteristicsnotedabove.)
TheNatureoftheBreakthroughProcessLeadingtoRMAs
RMAsaretheresultofmultipleinnovations:
Anewtechnology(orseveralnewtechnologies),whichenablesdevicesandsystemsnotpreviouslypossibleorcontemplated.
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Anewdevice,basedonthisnewtechnology,whichdoessomethingnotpreviouslydoable.
Anewsystem,basedonthisnewdevice,whichperformsamilitaryfunctioneitherdramaticallybetterordramaticallydifferentlythanithadbeenperformedbefore,orperformsanewmilitaryfunction.
Anewoperationalconcept,whichdescribesthemannerinwhichthenewsystemisemployedinsometypeofmilitarysituation,accomplishingsomemilitarytaskeitherdramaticallybetterordramaticallydifferentlythanithadbeenaccomplishedbefore,orperforminganewtaskthatdidnotexistpreviously.
Anewdoctrineandforcestructuredoctrinethatcodifiestheprinciplesgoverningtheemploymentofthenewsystemandforcestructurethatprovidesthemilitaryorganizationnecessarytofullyrealizeitspotential.
Thesevariousstagesculminateinanewmilitaryreality,inwhichaparadigmshifthasoccurredinsomesegmentofthemilitaryarena.
ThereareseveralimportantfeaturesofthisbreakthroughprocessleadingtoRMAs:
Unmetmilitarychallengesareanessentialelementdrivingcreativityateachstepintheprocess.Withoutoneormoreexistingchallenges,technologiesareunlikelytobecombinedintodevicesanddevicesintosystems,andnewoperationalconcepts,doctrine,andforcestructuresareunlikelytobedeveloped.
Thevariousinnovationssometimesoccuroutoforder:e.g.,anoperationalconceptis"invented"beforeatechnology,device,and/orsystemexistsadequatetorealizeitspostulatedpotential.
RMAscanfailinthefaceofobstaclesatanystepinthechain.Thenecessarytechnologymayexistbutthecontemplateddevicesprove
impractical.Itmaynotbepossibletoturnthenewdevicesintoviablesystems.Nooperationalconceptmayexisttoemployanotherwiseviablesystemconcept.Theforcestructurenecessarytoexploittheoperationalconceptmaynotexistbecausetheoperationalconceptisunacceptabletotheprevailingmilitaryculture,orbecausethenewforcestructurerequirestoo
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largeachangeinexistingmilitaryorganizations.(WeprovidehistoricalexamplesofeachofthesesituationsinChapterThree.)
BeingPreparedforFutureRMAs(CarriedOutbyOthers)
BeingAwareoftheNextRMA:TheObservablesoftheEmergenceofNewRMAs
ThefirststepinbeingpreparedforfutureRMAscarriedoutbyothersisbeingawarethatanRMAmaybeoccurring.MuchoftheRMAprocesscanbeobservedandanticipated,asdiscussedinChapterFour.Thisisparticularlytrueduringtheexploitationandsellingphasethatleadsfromanewdevice,operationalconcept,andsystemconcepttoanewdoctrineandforcestructureandwhichisabsolutelyessentialifthenewdoctrineandforcestructurerequiredtotrulyrealizeanRMAareevertobeachieved.DuringthesephasesoftheRMAprocess,readilyobservablesignalsareproducedinanumberofvenues,including:
Variouspressorgans,includingthetradepress(defense,aerospace,etc.),themilitaryartandsciencepress,thescienceandtechnologypress,theinternationalsecurityandforeignaffairspress,andthegeneralbusinesspress,aswellasleadingnewspapersandmagazines.
Theworldwidearmsmarket,bothlegitimateandclandestine.
Inferiormilitaryestablishments,whicharetryingtoleapfrogthedominantmilitaryplayers.
Dominantmilitaryplayers,whoaretryingtodiscreditnewideasthatthreatentheircorecompetencies.
Militaryresearch,development,test,andevaluation(RDT&E)activities,particularlythoseinvolvingnewtechnologies,systems,and/oroperationalconcepts.
Someofthesevenuesareopen,someareclosed.Theactivitiesinopenvenuesareusuallyreadilyobservablebyalmostanyone;theactivitiesinclosedvenuesarenormallyshutofffromviewby
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outsiders.Openandclosedvenuesobviouslyrequiredifferentinformation-collectionapproaches.
CollectionisNotEnough;AssessmentisAlsoRequired
NotallpotentialRMAscometopass;manyareabortedandfallbythewayside,foravarietyofreasons.Accordingly,thecollectionofobservablestotheemergenceofnewRMAsisnotenough;theseobservablesmustalsobecarefullyassessed,toseparateouttheseriousRMAcandidatesfromallofthewild-eyeddreams.Amultistepcollectionandassessmentprocessisrequired,withthefollowingcomponents:
Aninitial,wide-area-searchcollectionprocess,todetectanyandallRMAvisionsanddreams,nomatterwheretheyarisethroughouttheworld,nomatterhowfarouttheymayappear.TheoutputofthiscontinuallyongoingcollectionactivityisalivinglistofRMA"visionsanddreams."
Aninitialscreeningprocess,basedonsomesortofplausibilitycriteria,toweedoutthe"antigravity"ideas1(ortheirequivalent)fromthislistbutkeepinallthoseitemswithsomeprospectsofsuccess.TheoutputofthisstepisalistofpotentialRMAcandidates.
Amonitoringcollectionprocess,focusedoneachofthesepotentialRMAcandidatesandcontinuingoveranextendedperiod.
Amorecarefulassessmentprocess,whichcouldincludechallenges,hurdles,andteststhatacandidateRMAmustpass.TheoutputofthisongoingstepisalistofseriousRMAcandidates,tobecloselymonitoredandreassessedastheyevolveandmature.
Thisprocessrequirespatienceandstayingpower.SincefutureRMAscannotbescheduled,onemustestablishacollectionandassessmentprocessthatcanendureoveralongtime.
1Byantigravityideaswemeanconceptsthatareclearlynotfeasible,basedonfundamentalphysicalorengineeringconsiderations.
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TheEssentialElementsofaWorldwideRmaBreakthroughWatchandAssessmentActivity
ThisleadsustotheessentialelementsofaworldwideRMAbreakthroughwatchandassessmentactivity:
Aninformationcollectionactivitythatconductstwotypesofcollection:worldwidesearch,primarilyopensource,touncovernewRMAvisions,andcontinuedmonitoring,usingopensourceand(ifnecessary)standardclosed-sourcetechniques,andfocusedonspecificRMAcandidatesthathavesurvivedtheinitialscreeningprocess.
AnRMAassessmentactivitythatconductstwotypesofassessment:initialscreening,whichkeepsinallthoseitemswithsomeprospectsofsuccess,andcontinuedandmorecarefulassessment,overtime,tofollowpotential/seriousRMAcandidatesastheymaturetoseeiftheysurmountvariouschallengesandhurdles.
ThesecollectionandassessmentactivitiescanbecarriedoutintwoseparatebutcloselycoupledorganizationsinformationcollectioninsomesortofintelligenceorganizationandRMAassessmentinsomesortofanadvancedmilitaryresearchanddevelopmentorganization,ortheycanbecarriedoutinoneorganizationhavingcombinedcapabilities.Whicheverwayitisdone,suchaworldwideRMAbreakthroughwatchandassessmentactivityshouldensureU.S.awarenessoffutureRMAsbeingcarriedoutbyothers,ifproperlyimplementedinanenduringfashion.2
BeingResponsivetoanEmergingRMAisaMoreDifficultChallenge
BeingawareofemergingRMAsisnotenough;onemustalsoberesponsive.HistoryisfullofexamplesofmilitaryorganizationsthatwereawareofanemergingRMAbutfailedtorespondinanadequate
2ItisvitallyimportantthatthisRMAbreakthroughwatchandassessment
activityendureoverlongperiods,sinceonecannotpredictwhenanRMAharmfultoU.S.militarycapabilitiesmayarise.ThecurrentU.S.focuson"theRMA"mayconstituteaninformal,temporarybreakthroughwatch.Weareproposingaformal,morepermanentone.
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fashion.Failuretorespondcanleadanationtomilitarydisasterjustaseasilyasunawarenesscan.
HistoryshowsthatestablishedmilitaryorganizationsmoreoftenthannotfailtorespondadequatelytoemergingRMAsthreateningtheircorecompetencies,evenRMAsofwhichtheyareaware.ThisoccursprimarilybecauseofinherentobstaclestothechangesnecessarytocopewithanRMA.Theseobstaclesarenotuniquetomilitaryorganizations;rathertheyareforthemostpartgeneric,psychologicalobstaclestotheorganizationallearningandchangenecessarytocopewithparadigmshiftsthreateningcorecompetencies,nomatterwhattheirshapeorform.
Inrecentyears,analystsinboththemilitaryandbusinessarenashaveaddressedthisproblem,characterizingthevariousobstaclestoorganizationallearningandchangeinthefaceofparadigmshifts,andidentifyingproventechniquestoovercomethem.Usingthisliteratureasourpointofdeparture,wehaveidentifiedthefollowingcharacteristicsofwhatwewouldtermafuture-orientedmilitaryorganizationlikelytorespondadequatelytoanemergingRMA:
"Productiveparanoia"3regardingthefuture.
Acontinuallyrefinedvisionofhowwarmaychangeinthefuture.
Anorganizationalclimateencouragingvigorousdebateregardingthefutureoftheorganization.
Mechanismsavailablewithintheorganizationforexperimentationwithnewideas,evenonesthatthreatentheorganization'scurrentcorecompetencies.
Seniorofficerswithtraditionalcredentialswillingtosponsornewwaysofdoingthings.
Newpromotionpathwaysforjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayof
war.
3WehavecoinedthistermtocapturethemajorthemeexpressedbyAndrewGrove,theformerCEOofIntel,inhisrecentbookregardingparadigmshiftsinthebusinessworld,OnlytheParanoidSurvive.
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WeexpandoneachofthesecharacteristicsinChapterFive.
Possessingthesecharacteristicsisnoguaranteeoffuturesuccess.However,amilitaryestablishmentlackingoneormoreofthemislesslikelytorespondadequatelytoanemergingRMAbeingcarriedoutbyothers.
BringingAboutFutureRMAs(OfYourOwn)
WhataboutdevelopingyourownRMA,ratherthanmerelyrespondingtosomeoneelse's?HistorysuggeststhatforamilitaryorganizationtobringaboutanRMAofitsownallofthefollowingitemsareprobablynecessary:
Youmusthaveafertilesetofenablingtechnologies.4
Youmusthaveunmetmilitarychallenges.
Youmustfocusonadefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things"adeviceorsystemexploitingtheenablingtechnologiestogetherwithaconceptforitsoperationalemployment.5
Youmustultimatelychallengesomeone'scorecompetency.
Youmusthaveareceptiveorganizationalclimate,whichfostersacontinuallyrefinedvisionofhowwarmaychangeinthefutureandwhichencouragesvigorousdebateregardingthefutureoftheorganization.
Youmusthavesupportfromthetop:seniorofficerswithtraditionalcredentialswillingtosponsornewwaysofdoingthingsandabletoestablishnewpromotionpathwaysforjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayofwar.
Youmusthavemechanismsforexperimentation,todiscover,learn,test,anddemonstrate.6
4Assumingwearetalkingaboutatechnology-drivenRMA.5Thisfocusingprocesscantakeconsiderabletime;untilitoccursthereisnoRMA.6Thepurposeoftheseexperimentsistodiscoverwhatyoucandomilitarilywithnewtechnologiesandcombinationsofnewtechnologies;tolearnwhichcombinationsofdevices,systems,andoperationalconceptsworkbetterandwhichdonotworkaswell;totestpromisingdevices,systems,andoperationalconceptsinawidevarietyofreal-
(footnotecontinuedonnextpage)
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Youmusthavesomewayofrespondingpositivelytotheresultsofsuccessfulexperiments,intermsofdoctrinalchanges,acquisitionprograms,andforcestructuremodifications.
WeelaborateoneachoftheseinChapterSix.
WithallofthesethingsandatleastonebrilliantideaamilitaryorganizationhasareasonablechanceofbringingaboutasuccessfulRMA.Withoutanyoneoftheseelements,thechancesaremuchless,evenifthereisabrilliantidea,andhistorysuggeststheRMAprocessislikelytofail.
Today'sForceTransformation/RMAActivities
Sincepublicationofthe1997QuadrennialDefenseReview(QDR)(Cohen,1997),theDoDhasbeeninvolvedinaconcertedeffortto"transform"theU.S.military,motivatedbyafourfoldsetofobjectives:
toachievetheoperationalgoalsoutlinedinJointVision2010(JV2010)(dominantmaneuver,precisionengagement,fulldimensionalprotection,focusedlogistics),
tobringaboutthecostsavingsnecessarytopayforforcemodernization,
toachieveanew,affordableforcestructurethatcanbemaintainedinthefuture,and
totakeadvantageofthe[so-called]revolutioninmilitaryaffairscurrentlyongoing"theRMA."7
(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)
worldcircumstances,therebyfocusingonthecombinationofdevice(s),system(s),andemploymentconcept(s)mostlikelytobringaboutanRMA;andfinallytodemonstratethatthechosensetofdevice(s),system(s),and
operationalconcept(s)offersthepotentialforarevolutionaryimprovementinmilitarycapabilitiesinreal-worldconflictsituations.7BasedonthedefinitionofanRMAusedhereaparadigmshiftupsettingacorecompetencyofadominantplayerorcreatinganewcorecompetencyinsomenewdimensionofwarfareitistooearlytotellifthecurrentmilitary-technicalrevolutionwillresultinoneormoretrueRMAs.Thejuryisstillout.
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DoDforcetransformationactivitiesunderwaythusfarincludethedevelopmentofseveralfuturevisionsofwarfare,theestablishmentofanumberofbattlelaboratoriesandwarfightingcentersdedicatedtoexploringnewwaysofwarfare,anumberofwargamesexploringnewwaysofwarfare,anumberofdevelopmentalandfieldexperiments,andsomeneworganizationalarrangements.Thesevariousactivitiesarepursuingalargenumberoftechnology/device/system/operationalemploymentconceptcombinations,manyofwhichprobablyrepresentevolutionaryimprovementsoncurrentwaysofwagingwar,butseveralofwhichcouldpossiblyleadtoRMAs.Severaldifferentconceptshavebeenproposedasthekernelof''theRMA,"includinglong-rangeprecisionfires,informationwarfare,a"systemofsystems,""networkcentricwarfare,"anda"cooperativeengagementcapability."
DoesanythingappeartobemissinginthesecurrentDoDforcetransformation/RMAactivities?BasedonthehistoryofpastRMAsandtheRMAchecklistabove,theanswerseemstobe"yes."TableS.1summarizesourassessment;weelaborateonthisinChapterSeven.
"TheRMA":WhereWeSeemtobeToday
UsingSecretaryCohen'sQDRterminologytodescribetheforcetransformationprocess,whereis"theRMA"today?HarkingbacktothemodeloftheRMAprocesswepresentedearlier,wecansaythefollowing:
Newtechnology.Wehavealotofthis.
Newdevicesandsystems.Wehavealotofideasfornewdevicesandsystems.Many(butnotall)ofthemhavebeenorarebeingbuilt.Some(butnotmost)ofthemareundergoingexperiments,butnotnecessarilyriskyexperiments,coveringtheentirediscover,learn,test,
anddemonstratespectrum.
Newoperationalconcepts.Wehavemanyofthese,eachwiththeiradvocatesanddetractors.Afewareundergoingactualexperiments.Mostarestillinpaperdiscussionsandarguments.
Newdoctrineandforcestructure.Wearealongwayfromthis,averylongway.
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TableS.1DoesAnythingAppeartoBeMissingfromDoD's
CurrentRMAActivities?RMAChecklist DoD'sCurrentSituationYoumusthaveafertilesetofenablingtechnologies
Weclearlyhavethis
Youmusthaveunmetmilitarychallenges
Wehaveseveralofthese(butaretheycompellingenough?)
Youmusthaveareceptiveorganizationalclimate
WemayhavethisinsomeServices(butnotinothers)
Youmusthavesupportfromthetop
Wehavethis(butdoesitincludealloftheServices?)
Youmusthavemechanismsforexperimentation(todiscover,learn,test,anddemonstrate)
Wehavethese(butdotheycovertheentirediscover,learn,test,anddemonstratespectrum,anddotheyencourage"risky"experiments?)
Youmustfocusonadefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things"
Thusfar,thisseemstobemissing
Youmustultimatelychallengesomeone'scorecompetency
Thusfar,thisseemstobemissing
Youmusthavewaysofrespondingpositivelytosuccessfulexperiments(intermsofdoctrine,acquisition,andforcestructure)
Thiscouldbeaproblem(cantheDoDsystemrespondpositivelytoariskynewideainvolvingradicalchange?)
Wearealsoalongwayfromfocusingonashortlistofpotentiallyrevolutionarydevices,systems,andoperationalconceptsaroundwhichwecantransformtheforce.Thisnecessaryfocusingprocesscouldtakeafewyears,probablywilltakeseveralyears,andpossiblywilltakemanyyears.8
Anotherconcern:InmostpastRMAs,theforcewasnottransformedi.e.,oldforcestructureelementsreplacedbyRMAelementsuntiltheRMAhadbeenproveninbattle.Untilthen,theRMAelementsweretreatedasadd-onstothethen-existingforcestructure.BasedontheQDR,theDoDappearstobeplanningto
8OneormoretrueRMAs,inthesensedefinedhere,areprobablyrequiredtotransformtheforcetotheextentpostulatedintheQDR:alotmorecapabilityforalotfewerresources.
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transformtheforce,i.e.,replacingoldelementswithnewRMAelementsratherthanmerelyaddingthoseelements,before"theRMA"isprovenincombat.Thisfliesinthefaceofhistory.
WhatNeedstobeDone?
BasedonthehistoryofpastRMAs,thereappeartobesomekeyelementsmissinginDoD'scurrentforcetransformationactivities:
NoneoftheServices'currentcorecompetenciesarebeingchallenged;
Thereisinadequatefocusonadefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things";
TheDoDacquisitionsystemmaynotbeadequatelyreceptivetonovel/radicalinnovations.
Thesemissingelementscanbefilledinby:
SettingupDoDconceptgroupsandexperimentalgroupstoidentifyandexperimentwithnewsystemsandoperationalconceptsthat(a)challengecurrentServicecorecompetenciesand(b)increasethefocusofthecurrentRMAefforts;
Establishingprovisionaloperationalunitstoparticipateinexperimentswithnewsystemsandoperationalconcepts;
EstablishinganewbranchintheDoDacquisitionsystemthattoleratessubstantialuncertaintiesregardingmilitaryutilitytoamuchlaterstageintheacquisitionprocess.
WeelaborateoneachoftheseinChapterSeven.
DoingtheabovewillfacilitateDoD'sforcetransformationactivitiesandhelpensurethatthenextRMAisbroughtaboutbytheUnitedStatesandnotsomeothernation.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSTheintellectualfoundationsforthematerialpresentedinthisreport,alongwithmanyofthedetails,wereoriginallydevelopedinaseriesof1995workinggroupsessionsinvolvingtheauthorandfourofhisRANDcolleagues:BrunoW.Augenstein,StevenC.Bankes,JamesA.Dewar,andSamuelGardiner.Withouttheircontributions,theauthorcouldnothavewrittenthisreport.
TheresearchalsobenefitedgreatlyfromsubsequentdiscussionswithSamuelGardineronrevolutionsinbothmilitaryandbusinessaffairs;PaulK.DavisandEugeneC.GrittononDoD'scurrentforcetransformationprocess;JohnBirklerandGilesSmithonchangesintheDoDacquisitionprocess;MartinLibickiontherecentRMArelatedliterature;andF.L.(Frank)Fernandez,theDirectorofDARPA,andThomasTesch,OfficeoftheUndersecretaryoftheNavy,regardinginnovationinmilitaryandbusinessaffairs.Inaddition,PaulDavisandMartinLibickireviewedanearlydraftofthisreportandcontributedseveralinsightfulcomments.
Theauthorisdeeplygratefultoalloftheseindividualsfortheirnumeroussuggestionsandinsights.
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ChapterOneIntroductionAsillustratedbytheGulfWar,recentadvancesintechnologyhavebroughtaboutdramaticchangesinmilitaryoperations:theuseoflow-observableaircrafttonegateairdefenses,smartweaponsforprecisionconventional-strikeoperations,theemploymentofbothballisticmissilesandantiballisticmissiles(ABMs)inconventionalwarfare,andsoforth.Thesedramatictechnology-drivenchangesinmilitaryoperations,sometimestermedarevolutioninmilitaryaffairs(RMA),arenotuniqueinthehistoryofwarfare,butmerelythelatestinachainofbreakthroughtechnologies1extendingbackovertimeandincludingexamplessuchastheironcladinthe1860s,themachineguninthe1890s1910s,themannedaircraftandthetankinthe1920s1930s,theaircraftcarrierandradarinthe1930s1940s,andnuclearweaponsinthe1940s1950s.2
Suchtechnology-drivenbreakthroughsinmilitaryoperationswillcontinuetooccur,andtheywillcontinuetobestowamilitaryadvantageonthefirstnationtodevelopandusethem.Accordingly,theDepartmentofDefense(DoD)researchanddevelopment(R&D)communitymustbeontheleadingedgeofbreakthroughtechnolo-
1Thetermbreakthroughtechnologieswasfirstused(inrecenttimes)bytheDefenseScienceBoardandDirectorDefenseResearchandEngineering(DDR&E)in19901991inconjunctionwithmajortechnology-drivenshiftsinthenatureandconductofmilitaryoperations.(SeeDSB,1990,andHerzfeld,1991.)2Thislistincludesjustsomeofthemorerecentexamples.Thelongbow,developedbytheEnglishduringthe13thcenturyandusedagainsttheFrenchwithdevastatingeffectatCrecy(1346),Poitiers(1356),andAgincourt(1415)duringtheHundredYears'War,isanearlierexampleofa
breakthroughtechnologyinthemilitaryarena.SeeChurchill(1958),pp.332351,354357,and400408.
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giesthatcouldrevolutionizemilitaryoperationsinthefuture,andtheU.S.militaryservicesmustbeonthelookoutforrevolutionarywaysinwhichtoemploythosetechnologiesinwarfare.
Thisleadstothreeinterrelatedquestions:
Regardingpastrevolutionsinmilitaryaffairs,
WhatlessonscanwelearnfromthehistoricalrecordregardingthecharacteristicsofRMAsandofthebreakthroughprocessleadingtoRMAs?
RegardingbeingpreparedforfutureRMAscarriedoutbyothers,
WhatwillittakefortheUnitedStatestoanticipateandbepreparedforfuturetechnology-drivenRMAscarriedoutbyothers?
RegardingtransformingU.S.militaryforcesbycarryingoutourownRMAs,
Whatdoesittaketobesuccessful?
Thisreportaddressesthesethreequestions,whichareparticularlyrelevanttodaywhentheDoDhassetoutonaconcertedefforttobringaboutatechnology-driventransformationoftheU.S.militarytoachievetheoperationalgoalsoutlinedinJointVision2010.3
RegardingthefirstofourthreetopicslessonstobelearnedfrompastRMAswebegininChapterTwobyidentifyinganddescribinganumberofsignificantcharacteristicsofRMAsanddiscussingtherelationshipbetweenbreakthroughtechnologiesandRMAs.InChapterThreewedevelopanumberofmodelsdescribingvariousaspectsofthebreakthroughprocessleadingtoRMAs.Inbothofthesechapterswehavetakenasourpointofdeparturethehistoricalrecordofpasttechnology-drivenrevolutions,inbothmilitaryaffairsandinthebusinessworld.Wehavealsoconsideredthespecific
3SeeShalikashvili(1996)foradiscussionofJointVision2010.SeetheQuadrennialDefenseReview(Cohen,1997)forahigh-levelstatementofDoD'splanstobringaboutatechnology-driventransformationoftheU.S.military.
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lessonslearnedinRAND'srecentinvestigationofRMAsfortheOfficeofNetAssessment.4
RegardingoursecondtopicbeingpreparedforfutureRMAscarriedoutbyothersinChapterFourweidentifyanumberofobservablesthatcouldbeusedtoanticipatetheemergenceofnewRMAs.WeusetheseobservablesasthefoundationsforaworldwideRMAbreakthroughwatchandassessmentactivity,whichcouldbeusedtomonitorandassessworldwidedevelopmentsintechnologyandoperationalmilitaryconceptsthatmightgiverisetofutureRMAs.
Asthehistoricalrecordshows,beingawareofanemergingRMAisnotenoughtoavertmilitarydisaster;anationmustalsoberesponsivetotheimplicationsofthatRMA.Thiscanbeadifficultchallenge,particularlyforadominantmilitaryplayersuchastheUnitedStatesistoday.WediscussthissecondchallengeinChapterFive,whereweidentifythecharacteristicsofafuture-orientedmilitaryorganizationlikelytorespondadequatelytoanemergingRMA.
Regardingourfinaltopicsuccessfullycarryingoutone'sownRMAsinChapterSixwelistthevariouselementsthathistorysuggestsarenecessarytobringaboutasuccessfulRMA.InChapterSeven,wecompareDoD'scurrentforcetransformationactivitieswiththislistandask:IsanythingmissingtobringaboutanRMA?Theanswer,inourview,appearstobeyes.Weconcludebydiscussingwhatcanbedonetofillinthese(seemingly)missingelements.
4In1995,SamGardinerandDanielFoxofRANDcarriedoutanextensiveseriesofwargamingexercisestoinvestigatetheRMAprocess.
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PARTI.LESSONSFROMPASTRMAS
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ChapterTwoTheCharacteristicsofRevolutionsinMilitaryAffairsTechnology-drivenchangesinmilitaryoperationsarenotrecentphenomena.Indeed,technologicaldevelopmentshavebeenbringingaboutprofoundchangesinthenatureofwarfaresincethedawnofhistory.1Brodie(1973),Dupuy(1984),andvanCreveld(1989)provideoverviewsofthehistoricalpanoramaofmilitarytechnologyanditsimpactonwarfareoverthelast(roughly)4000years,fromtheearliestdevelopments(e.g.,thechariot)tothemostrecent(e.g.,nuclearweapons).
BeginningwiththeSovietfocusontheso-calledmilitary-technicalrevolution2andcontinuingwiththeworkinitiatedbytheOfficeofNetAssessmentonthecurrentrevolutioninmilitaryaffairs,3considerableattentionhasbeenpaidtothesometimesrevolutionarynatureofadvancesinmilitarytechnology,withparticularfocusoneventsin
1Arichliteratureofthehistoryofmilitarytechnologydescribesthisprocess.VanCreveld(1989)includesabibliographicalessayreviewingthisliterature,withnumerousreferences.2In1984,MarshalNikolaiV.OgarkovandotherSovietmilitarythinkersbegantostressthattheemergenceofadvanced,nonnucleartechnologieswasengenderinganewmilitary-technicalrevolutioninmilitaryaffairs.SeeFitzGerald(1987)foranoverviewofSovietthoughtonthissubject.3SeeMarshall(1993and1995)fororiginalstatementsoftheviewsofAndrewMarshall,theDirectoroftheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(OSD)OfficeofNetAssessment,regardingthecurrentrevolutioninmilitaryaffairs.Ricks(1994)containsanearlypublisheddiscussionoftheseviews.
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the20thcentury.Thishasledtoaresurgenceofwritingonthesubject.4
Weusethesetwohistoricalrecordsofthelongsweepofmilitarytechnologyandofthemilitaryrevolutionsinthe20thcenturyasourpointofdepartureindescribingthecharacteristicsofRMAs.
WhatIsAnRMA?
MuchhasbeenwrittenrecentlyregardingthecurrentRMA,whichisoftenviewedas
amilitarytechnicalrevolutioncombining[technicaladvancesin]surveillance,C3I[command,control,communications,andintelligence]andprecisionmunitions[withnew]operationalconcepts,includinginformationwarfare,continuousandrapidjointoperations(fasterthantheadversary),andholdingtheentiretheateratrisk(i.e.,nosanctuaryfortheenemy,evendeepinhisownbattlespace).5
AnumberofpeoplehavewrittenregardingthisRMA,includingKendall(1992),Marshall(1993and1995),Mazarretal.(1993),Mazarr(1994),Krepinevich(1994and1995),LibickiandHazlett(1994),Gray(1995),Barnett(1996),Libicki(1996and1999),Blaker(1997),Buchan(1998),andDavisetal.(1998).6ThisliteraturewelldescribestheelementsofthecurrentRMA,butdoesnotshedmuchlightonthecharacteristicsofRMAsingeneral.Thatis,itdoesnotaddressquestionssuchas:HowdoesonedescribegenericallywhatconstitutesanRMA?WhatarethedefiningcharacteristicsofanRMA?Toanswerthesequestions,wemustturntothehistoricalrecordoftechnology-drivenchangesinmilitaryoperations.
Basedonthehistoricalrecord,itappearsthatthedefiningcharacteristicofanRMAcanbestatedasfollows:
4SeeKrepinevich(1994),MurrayandWatts(1995),Gray(1995),Bartlettetal.(1996),Libicki(1996),MurrayandMillet(1996),andBlaker(1997)
forasamplingofthisrecentliterature.5SeeMcKendree(1996).6ThevariousDoDscienceboardshavealsodiscussedthecurrentRMA,notalwaysbyname.Forexample,seeSAB(1995),DSB(1996),andNSB(1997).
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AnRMAinvolvesaparadigmshiftinthenatureandconductofmilitaryoperations
whicheitherrendersobsoleteorirrelevantoneormorecorecompetenciesofadominantplayer,
orcreatesoneormorenewcorecompetencies,insomenewdimensionofwarfare,
orboth.
Thereareanumberofkeytermsinthisdefinition:
Paradigm.Anacceptedmodelthatservesasthebasicpatternforasegmentofmilitaryoperations.7Forexample,opposinginfantryunitsarrangedinorderlyformationsmaneuveringintheopentoengageeachotheratclosequarters,withsupportingartilleryfire,wastheoperationalparadigmforlandcombatduringtheNapoleonicWars.Opposingwarshipsarrangedinline-of-battleonparallelcoursesandengagingwithgunfirewastheoperationalparadigmfornavalfleetengagementsduringthosesamewars,aswellasduringtheFirstWorldWar100yearslater.
Corecompetency.Afundamentalabilitythatprovidesthefoundationforasetofmilitarycapabilities.Forexample,theabilitytodetectvehiculartargetsfromtheairandattackthemwithprecisionweaponsistodayacorecompetencyoftheU.S.AirForce.IntheperiodbetweenWorldWarIandII,theabilitytodeliveraccuratenavalgunfireatrangesupwardsof20mileswasacorecompetencyofthesurfacecombatunitsoftheU.S.Navy.Inthe13thand14thcenturies,theabilityofalongbowmantoputanarrowaccuratelythroughthe
chainmailarmorofaknightonhorsebackoraman-at-armsonthegroundatrangesof250300yardswasacorecompetencyoftheEnglisharchers.8
7Paradigmsalsoplayacentralroleinotherareasofhumanendeavor.Forexample,Kuhn(1970)discussestheroleofparadigmsandparadigmshiftsinscience.Likewise,Barker(1992)andGrove(1996)discusstheroleofparadigmsandparadigmshiftsinbusiness.Groveusestheterm''strategicinflectionpoint"ratherthan"paradigmshift"todenotethephenomenon,butthemeaningisthesame.8Dupuy(1984,pp.8184)andBurke(1978,pp.5962)discussthecapabilitiesoftheEnglishlongbowmen.
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Dominantplayer.Amilitaryorganizationthatpossessesadominatingsetofcapabilitiesinanareaofmilitaryoperations.Forexample,todaytheU.S.AirForceisthedominantplayerinair-to-aircombatandair-to-groundattack.AttheendofWorldWarII,thecarrierforceoftheU.S.Navywasthedominantplayerinnavalwarfare.AttheendofWorldWarI,thebattlefleets(e.g.,thebattleshipandbattlecruiserforces)oftheBritishNavyandtheU.S.Navywerethedominantplayersinnavalsurfacewarfare.Goingbackfurtherinhistory,duringtheMiddleAgesthearmoredcavalry(i.e.,knightsonhorseback)wasthedominantplayerinlandwarfareinEurope.Evenfurtherback,inRomantimestheRomanlegionwasthedominantplayerinlandwarfarethroughouttheRomanEmpire.
Dimensionofwarfare.Thedimensiononwhichwarfareisconducted,thefirstandmostancientofwhichwasthelandsurfaceoftheearth(landwarfare).Thesecondandalmostasancientdimensiononwhichwarfarewasconductedwasthewatersurfaceoftheearth(navalwarfare).Inthe20thcenturyseveralnewdimensionswereadded:theunderwaterportionsoftheoceans(underseawarfare),theairabovetheearth'ssurface(airwarfare),andthehomelandsofthecombatants(strategicwarfareandintercontinentalwarfare).AnotherdimensionmuchtalkedaboutsincetheSecondWorldWarbutinwhichactualcombathasnotyetoccurredistheregionoutsidetheearth'satmosphere(spacewarfare).Astheinformationrevolutioncontinues,thereisincreasingdiscussionofcyberspaceasstillanotherdimensionofwarfare(informationwarfare).9
Paradigmshift.Aprofoundchangeinthefundamentalmodelunderlyingasegmentofmilitaryoperations.Forexample,thecarrierwarfareparadigm,inwhichopposingnavalforcesengagedeachotherat100-to200-miledistanceswithoutevercomingwithinnavalgunfirerange,representedaprofoundchangeinthebasicmodelunderlyingnavalwarfare.Itrenderedobsoletethecore(navalgunfire)
competencyofthehitherto
9SeeToffler(1993),Molanderetal.(1996),andArquillaandRonfeldt(1997)forthreeviewsofthisnewestdimensionofwarfare.
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dominantbattleshipfleets,andwasthereforeanRMA.10Theblitzkriegparadigm,inwhichhighlymobilearmoredforcesbrokethroughenemylinesandrapidlypenetratedtotherear,representedaprofoundchangeinthebasicmodelunderlyinglandwarfare.Itrenderedobsoletethecorecompetencyofthehithertodominantinfantryandartilleryforcesforstaticdefensesofpreparedpositions,andwasthereforeanRMA.11Thenuclear-warhead-tippedintercontinentalballisticmissile(ICBM)createdanewcorecompetency(anoverwhelming,virtuallyunstoppableabilitytodestroycitiesandotherlarge-scaletargetsinthehomelandofanopponentthousandsofmilesaway)inanewdimensionofwarfare(intercontinentalstrategicwarfare),andwasthereforeanRMA.
Ifadevelopmentinmilitarytechnologydoesnoteitherrenderobsoleteacorecompetencyofadominantplayerorcreateanewcorecompetency,itisnotanRMA.Ifitdoes,itis.12Table2.1givesafewillustrativeexamplesofdevelopmentsinmilitarytechnologythatsatisfythiscriteria.
OtherNotableCharacteristicsOfRMAs
Basedonthehistoricalrecord,othernotablecharacteristicsofRMAsare:
RMAsarerarelybroughtaboutbydominantplayers.Forexample,duringtheperiodbetweentheFirstandSecondWorldWars,theFrenchandBritishinfantryandartilleryforces,thedominant
10TheBattleoftheCoralSea(1942)wasthefirstengagementinwhichthisnewparadigmplayedadominatingrole.SeeMorison(1963),pp.140147.11Therearemanydescriptionsofthedevelopmentandimpactoftheblitzkriegparadigm.Guderian(1952)providesasubjective,firsthandview;Corum(1992)providesamoreobjective,balancedpresentation.
12Krepinevich(1994)hasproposedalogicallysimilardefinitionofanRMA:"Whatisamilitaryrevolution?Itiswhatoccurswhentheapplicationofnewtechnologiesintoasignificantnumberofmilitarysystemscombineswithinnovativeoperationalconceptsandorganizationaladaptationinawaythatfundamentallyaltersthecharacterandconductofconflict."WepreferourwordingbecauseoftheemphasisitplacesonchangesincorecompetenciesascentraltotheRMAprocess.
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Table2.1RMAs:SOMEILLUSTRATIVEEXAMPLES
RMANatureof
ParadigmShiftCore
CompetencyAffected
DominantPlayerAffected
Carrierwarfare
Creatednewoperationalandtactical-levelmodelfornavalwarfare
Accuratenavalgunfireofbattleshipfleets(renderedobsolete)
Battleshipfleets(U.S.andBritish)
BlitzkriegCreatednewoperationalandtactical-levelmodelforlandwarfare
Staticdefenseofpreparedpositionsbyinfantryandartillery(renderedirrelevant)
Frencharmy
ICBM Creatednewdimensionofwarfare(intercontinentalstrategicwarfare)
Long-range,accuratedeliveryofhigh-yieldnuclearweapons(anewcorecompetency)
Machinegun
Creatednewtactical-levelmodelforlandwarfare
Abilitytomaneuvermassedinfantryforcesintheopen(renderedobsolete)
Allarmiesemployingmassedinfantryforcesintheopen
LongbowCreatednewtactical-levelmodelforland
Man-to-mancombatcapabilityof
Frencharmoredcavalry
warfare knightsonhorseback(renderedobsolete)
EuropeanplayersinlandwarfareattheendofWorldWarI,didnotdeveloptheblitzkriegconceptoftankwarfare,andtheBritishnavy,oneofthedominantplayersinseawarfare,didnotdeveloptheconceptofcarrierwarfare.13
13Ontheotherhand,theU.S.Navy,oneofthetwodominantnavalpowersintheworldattheendofWorldWarI(alongwiththeBritishnavy),didbringaboutthecarrierwarfareRMAinthe1920sand1930s.Thisisoneofthefewhistoricalcases(knowntotheauthor)ofadominantplayerdevelopinganRMA.Itmaytellussomethingaboutwhatittakesforadominantplayer(liketoday'sU.S.military)tobesuccessfulintransformingitsmilitaryforcesbycarryingoutitsownRMA.Forthisreason,wewillcomebacktothisexampleinChapterSix.ThecarrierwarfareRMAwasdevelopedindependentlybytheJapanesenavyduringthesameperiod.LittleisavailableinEnglishregardingtheJapanesedevelopmentof
(footnotecontinuedonnextpage)
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RMAsfrequentlybestowanenormousandimmediatemilitaryadvantageonthefirstnationtoexploitthemincombat.AfewofmanyexamplesaretheuseofthelongbowbytheEnglishagainsttheFrenchatCrecyin1346,14theuseofthemachinegunbytheBritishagainsttheZulusin1879(wediscussthisfurtherbelow),theuseoftheblitzkriegbytheGermanarmyagainstthePolesin1939andtheBritishandFrenchin1940,and,mostrecently,theuseofstealthaircraftandprecision-guidedmunitionsbytheUnitedStatesagainsttheIraqisin1991.
RMAsareoftenadoptedandfullyexploitedfirstbysomeoneotherthanthenationinventingthenewtechnology.Forexample,eventhoughthekeyinventorsofthemachinegunwereallAmericans(WilliamBrowning,RichardGatling,IsaacLewis,andHiramMaxim),15machinegunswerefirstusedinadecisivefashionbyEuropeanarmiesagainstnativeforcesinAfricainthe1870s1890s.16TheAmericanarmydidnotbeginbuyingtheminquantityandactivelyincorporatethemintoitstacticaldoctrineuntilmanyyearslater,17aftertheywereemployedbytheGermanarmyinSeptember1914tostoptheAlliedadvanceattheChemindesDamesridgeontheriverAisne.18Similarly,theBritishinventedthetank.AlthoughtheyfirstemployeditincombatduringtheBattleoftheSommeonSeptember15,1916andlaterattheBattleofCambraionNovember20,1917,they
(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)
carrieraviation.Also,theJapanesenavywasnotadominantplayerattheendofWorldWarI,whenitsdevelopmentofcarrieraviationbegan.Forthesereasons,wedonotdiscusstheJapaneseexperienceinanydetailinthisreport.14TheEnglishhaddevelopedthetechnologyofthelongbowandoperationalconceptsforitsuseincombatduringalongseriesofcivilwarswithinBritain,buttheFrenchhadneverseenitemployedincombat.SeeChurchill
(1958),pp.332351.15SeeEllis(1975).16OneofthefirstengagementsinwhichmachinegunsplayedadecisiverolewastheBattleofUlundi,inNatalin1879,inwhichaBritishforceequippedwithfourGatlinggunsdefeatedtheZuluarmy.(Earlierthesameyear,asimilarsizeBritishforcewithoutGatlinggunshadbeenvirtuallywipedoutbythesameZuluarmyattheBattleofIsandhlwana.)SeeEllis(1975),pp.8284.17ItisalittleknownfactthatGeneralGeorgeArmstrongCuster'sSeventhCavalrypossessedfourGatlingguns.CusterleftthemingarrisonwhenhedepartedonthecampaignthatledtoLittleBigHornin1876,sincehefelttheydidnothavetacticalvalue(Ellis,1975,p.74).18SeeEllis(1975),p.119andp.124.TheGermanemploymentofmachinegunsfromdug-inpositionsinthisbattlemarkedthebeginningofWorldWarItrenchwarfare.
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didnotunderstandhowtofullyexploititscapabilities.ThiswasfirstshownbytheGermansin19391940.19Likewise,in1914theBritishconductedthefirstcarrierairraidinhistory,yearsbeforeanyothernavyhadoperationalcarriersorcarrier-basedaircraft.However,theydidnotdeveloptheRMAofcarrierwarfare,theAmericanandJapanesenaviesdid,astheydemonstratedinthefourmajorcarrierbattlesof1942.20
RMAsarenotalwaystechnology-driven.Forexample,AmericancombattacticsduringtheRevolutionaryWar(i.e.,engaginganopponentfrombehindcoverratherthaninformationoutintheopen)broughtaboutarevolutionarychangeinlandcombatwithoutanychangeintheweapontechnologiesinvolved.
Technology-drivenRMAsareusuallybroughtaboutbycombinationsoftechnologies,ratherthanindividualtechnologies.Moreprecisely,technology-drivenRMAsareusuallybroughtaboutbyweaponsorsystemsexploitingcombinationsoftechnologies.Examplesincludetheblitzkrieg,whichwasenabledbythecombinationofthreetechnologiesthetank,thetwo-waytacticalradio,andthedivebomber;andtheICBM,whichwasenabledbythecombinationofthreetechnologieslong-rangeballisticmissiles,lightweightfusionwarheads,andhighlyaccurateinertialguidance.
Notalltechnology-drivenRMAsinvolveweapons.Forexample,thecomingoftherailroadtoEuropeandAmericainthe1830s1850sledtoarevolutioninstrategicmobility.ThiswasfirstdemonstratedbytheFrenchwhentheymoved250,000menatheretoforeunheard-ofspeedtothefrontinnorthernItalytoengagetheAustriansduringtheWarof1859.Itwaslaterdemonstrated(bybothsides)onnumerousoccasionsinthe1860sdur-
19SeeMacksey(1975),Corum(1992),andMurrayandWatts(1995)fordiscussionoftheinventionofthetankanditssubsequentexploitationin
theblitzkriegconcept.20ThebattlesoftheCoralSea,Midway,theEasternSolomons,andtheSantaCruzIslands(seeMorison,1963,pp.140163,177182,and190196).SeeMurrayandWatts(1995,pp.6184)andWattsandMurray(1996,pp.383405)forthestepsthatledtothecarrierwarfareRMA,whytheAmericans"gotit,"andwhytheBritishdidnot.
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ingtheAmericanCivilWar,and(particularlybytheGermans)in1870duringtheFranco-PrussianWar.21
Allsuccessfultechnology-drivenRMAsappeartohavethreecomponents:technology,doctrine,andorganization.Technology,evenwhendevelopedintoarevolutionaryweaponorsystem,isnotenoughtoproduceanRMA.Itmustbecombinedwithdoctrine(i.e.,anagreed-uponconceptfortheemploymentofthenewweaponorsystem)22andorganization(i.e.,amilitaryforcestructurecraftedtoexploitthenewweaponorsystem).Forexample,theblitzkriegRMAresultedfromthecombinationofthetank,two-wayradio,anddive-bombertechnologies,anoperationalconceptinwhichhighlymobilearmoredforcesbrokethroughenemylinesandrapidlypenetratedtotherear,andaforcestructure(thepanzerdivision)thatconcentratedtheavailabletanksintoafewspecializeddivisions.23ThecarrieraviationRMAresultedfromthecombinationoftechnologiesenablingmilitaryaircrafttotakeoffandlandoncarrierdecks;theoperationalconceptallowedcarrieraircrafttoengageanopposingnavalforceatdistanceswellbeyondnavalgunfirerangeandconcentratetheirattackontheopposingcarriers.Theforcestructure(thecarriertaskforce)wasbuiltaroundtheaircraftcarrieranditsplanes.24
Thereareprobablyasmany"failed"RMAsassuccessfulRMAs.Somecomparativelyrecentexamplesincludethenuclear-
21SeeBrodie(1973,pp.148151)andvanCreveld(1989,pp.158159).22Dupuy(1966)definesdoctrineas"Principles,policies,andconceptswhicharecombinedintoanintegratedsystemforthepurposeofgoverningallcomponentsofamilitaryforceincombat,andassuringconsistent,coordinatedemploymentofthesecomponents."Doctrinenormallyincludesconceptsofoperation,tactics,and,atitsfullest,principlesofstrategy.23Incontrast,theFrench,whohadmore(andbetter)tanksin1940thandidtheGermans,spreadthemoutmoreorlessequallythroughoutallthedivisionsoftheFrencharmy(thewrongforcestructure)andusedthemas
mobilefiresupporttotheinfantry(thewrongdoctrine).Duringthe1920sand1930s,theU.S.Armyalsoviewedtanksprimarilyasinfantrysupportweapons(thewrongdoctrine);thisledthemtodeveloptankswithlow-velocityguns(thewrongsystem),whichweresignificantlyinferiortotheGermantanks(withhigh-velocityguns)theyfacedinWorldWarII.(SeeJohnson,1990and1998.)24Dupuy(1984)discussesthecriticalrolethatthemarriageofnewweaponsandnewdoctrineplaysinthecreationofanRMA.
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poweredmilitaryaircraft,theelectromagneticgun,andthethus-farunfruitfulattemptstodevelophigh-energylaser(HEL)weaponsforuseinmilitarycombat.25(WewillcomebacktothesubjectoffailedRMAsinChapterThree.)
RMAsoftentakealongtimetocometofruition.Therearemanyexamplesofthis.TheU.S.Navybeganexperimentingwithaircraftin1910;ittookthemalmostthreedecadestofullydevelopthecarrierwarfareRMA.26Similarly,theGermanarmybeganexperimentingwithtanksintheearly1920s;ittookthemalmosttwodecadestocreatetheblitzkrieg.27Furtherbackintime,althoughallofthemajortechnologydevelopmentsembodiedinthemachinegunwereessentiallycompletedbythe1870s,itdidnotcometofruitionasanRMAinEuropeanwarfareuntilSeptember1914,some40yearslater.28Evenfurtherbackintime,theEnglishdevelopedthetechnologyofthelongbowandoperationalconceptsforitsuseincombatoveralmostacenturyofcivilwarsinBritain,beforespringingitontheFrenchatCrecyin1346.29Sothe"revolution"inrevolutionsinmilitaryaffairsdoesnotmeanthechangewilloccurrapidlysometimesitwill,oftenitwon'tbutultimatelyitwillbeprofound.30,31
25SeeJDR(1986)fordiscussionsoftheevolutionofHELapplicationthinkingasofthemid-1980s.SeeAPS(1987)foranassessmentoftheballisticmissiledefenseapplicationsofHELs.Thusfar,alloftheseattemptstodevelopmilitarilyusefulHELweaponshavebeenunsuccessful.However,thejuryisstillout;thelatestapplicationfocusisonairborneHELsasanantitheaterballistic(ATBM)weapon.(SeeAviationWeek,1996.)26WediscusstheU.S.Navy'sdevelopmentofthecarrierwarfareRMAmorefullyinChapterSix.27SeeGuderian(1952),Macksey(1975),andCorum(1992).28SeeEllis(1975).
29SeeChurchill(1958),pp.332351.30AndrewMarshall(1995)makesthissamepointinhis1995writingonRMAs,inwhichhesays:"Theterm'revolution'isnotmeanttoinsistthatthechangewillberapidindeedpastrevolutionshaveunfoldedoveraperiodofdecadesbutonlythatthechangewillbeprofound,thatthenewmethodsofwarfarewillbefarmorepowerfulthantheold."31SomeRMAsdohappenquickly,however.Thebestrecentexamplemaybetheatomicbomb,whichwasdevelopedandemployedoveraperiodofonlyfouryears.SeeRhodes(1986).
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ThemilitaryutilityofanRMAisfrequentlycontroversialandindoubtupuntilthemomentitisproveninbattle.TheBritishdidnotbegintorealizethecombatvalueofthemachinegununtiltheyuseditwithdevastatingforceagainsttheZulusatUlundiin1879.ManyBritishandFrenchgeneralscontinuedtoseriouslydoubtthevalueofmachinegunsinaEuropeanwarupuntiltheGermansemployedthemtostoptheAlliedadvanceinSeptember1914.32NotonlymostFrenchandBritishgeneralsbutmanyGermangenerals,includingsomeintheGermanhighcommand,doubtedthevalueoftheblitzkriegupuntilthemomentGuderianbrokethroughatSedanonMay1314,1940,andwerevehementinexpressingtheirdoubts.SomeFrench,British,andGermangeneralscontinuedtodoubtitfordaysthereafter,evenafterGuderianreachedtheEnglishChannelonMay20.33ManyAmericanadmiralsseriouslydoubtedthepowerofcarrieraviationupuntilthebattleofMidwayinJune1942.34
LessonsFromtheBusinessWorldRegardingParadigmShifts
Paradigmshiftsarenotlimitedtothemilitaryarena.Theyoccurinthebusinessworldaswell,wheretheyhavebecomeamuch-studiedphenomenon.35Aclearmessagefromthebusinessliteratureregardingproductandprocessinnovationisthatproductrevolutionsthebusinessworld'sversionofparadigmshiftsarerarelybroughtaboutbydominantplayers.AccordingtoUtterback(1994):
Discontinuousinnovationsthatdestroyestablishedcorecompetencies...almostalwayscomefromoutsidetheindustry(23of29cases,with4frominsideand2inconclusive).36
32SeeEllis(1975).33SeeGuderian(1952),Macksey(1975),LiddellHart(1979),andCorum(1992).34SeeTurnbullandLord(1949).35SeeBarker(1992),Utterback(1994),Grove(1996),andChristensen
(1997)forfourrecentexamplesofthisliterature.(Groveusestheterm"strategicinflectionpoint"andChristensenusestheterm"disruptivetechnologicalchange"todenotethephenomenon,ratherthan"paradigmshift,"buttheirmeaningsarethesame.)36Utterback(1994,p.208).
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Thefollowinglistisillustrative:37
Electrictypewritersdidnotcomefromamajortypewritermanufacturer.
Ballpointpensdidnotcomefromthepenindustry.
Levi'sdidnotcomeupwithdesignerjeansforwomen.
Semiconductorsdidnotcomefromthevacuumtubeindustry.
Radialtiresdidnotcomefromamajortiremaker.
Personalcomputersdidnotcomefromamajorcomputermanufacturer.
Winecoolerscamefromneitherthewinenorsodaindustries.
Disposablediapersdidnotcomefromthediaperservices.
Thetypicalimpactofthese"discontinuousinnovations"ondominantplayersinthebusinessworldisstatedbyBowerandChristensen:
Oneofthemostconsistentpatternsinbusinessisthefailureofleadingcompaniestostayatthetopoftheirindustrieswhentechnologiesormarketschange.38
OrinthewordsofGrove:
whenastrategicinflectionpointsweepsthroughtheindustry,themoresuccessfulaparticipantwasintheoldindustrystructure,themorethreateneditisbychangeandthemorereluctantitistoadapttoit.39
Thehistoricalmessageisclear:inneithermilitarynorbusinessaffairsare"revolutions"(i.e.,paradigmshiftsthatdestroycorecompetencies)oftenbroughtaboutbydominantplayers.
37PrivatecommunicationfromSamuelGardiner.38SeeBowerandChristensen(1995).
39SeeGrove(1996),p.50.
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TheRelationshipBetweenBreakthroughTechnologiesandRMAs
WhatistherelationshipbetweenbreakthroughtechnologiesandRMAs?Asourpreviousdiscussionshows,technology-drivenRMAsarebroughtaboutbyweaponsorsystemsexploitingcombinationsoftechnologies,combinedwithsupportingdoctrineandorganization.Technologyalone,withoutaccompanyingdoctrineandorganization,cannotproduceanRMA.
Useoftheterm''breakthroughtechnologies,"therefore,focusesononeoftheinputstothebreakthroughprocess;useoftheterm"RMA"focusesontheoutputfromthatprocess.ThisistheessenceoftherelationshipbetweenbreakthroughtechnologiesandRMAs.
WediscusstheprocessthatleadsfrombreakthroughtechnologiestoRMAsinChapterThree.
IstheCurrentMilitary-TechnicalRevolutionaTrueRMA?
ThereisanotherinterestingquestionregardingRMAs:Isthecurrentmilitary-technicalrevolutioncalledbysome"theRMA"atrueRMA?Basedonourdefinition,itistoosoontotell.ForittobeatrueRMA,itmustrenderobsoleteorirrelevantoneormorecorecompetenciesofadominantplayer,orcreateoneormorenewcorecompetenciesinanewdimensionofwarfare.Thishasnotyethappened.
Butitcouldhappen.Forexample,theusebytheU.S.AirForceofair-delivered,precision-guided,antiarmorsubmunitionsinafutureregionalconflictmightconceivablystoptheadvanceofasizable(e.g.,division-sizeorgreater)enemyarmoredforceinitstracks,withoutrequiringinterventionbyU.S.Armymechanizedforces.40Ifthisweretooccur,andifitcouldbeconfidentlyaccomplishedinawidevarietyoftank-accessibleterrainandinthefaceofenemyairdefenses,itwouldbeatrueRMA,sinceitwouldrenderirrelevantacore
competency(tank/antitankwarfare)ofadominantplayer(thearmoredforcesoftheU.S.Army).
40SeeBowieetal.(1993).
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Asanotherexample,theemploymentofcyberspace-basedtechniquesbyonesideinafutureconflictmightinflictstrategicdamageontheothersidesufficienttosignificantlyalterthecourseoftheconflict.41Ifthisweretooccur,itwouldalsobeatrueRMA,sinceitwouldcreateanewcorecompetency(informationwarfare)inanewdimensionofwarfare(cyberspace).
Neitherofthesenorotherexamplesthathavebeenmentionedintherecentmilitary-technicalrevolution/RMAliteraturehasasyetoccurred.Butbecausetheycould,thejuryisstilloutregardingwhetherthecurrentmilitary-technicalrevolutionwillresultinoneormoretrueRMAs.
ThisconclusionisinkeepingwithAndrewMarshall'sinitialwordsregardingwhathascometobecalled"theRMA":
Thereisalsoatendencytotalkaboutthemilitaryrevolution.Thiscouldhavethesensethatitisalreadyhere,alreadycompleted.Idonotfeelthatisthecase.Probablywearejustatthebeginning,inwhichcasethefullnatureofthechangesinthecharacterofwarfarehavenotyetfullyemerged;therefore,thereferentofthephase,"themilitaryrevolution,"isunclearandindeedshouldremaintosomeextentundefined.Itwouldbebettertospeakabouttheemergingmilitaryrevolution,orthepotentialmilitaryrevolution.Whatweshouldbetalkingaboutisahypothesisaboutmajorchangetakingplaceintheperiodahead,thenextcoupleofdecades.(Emphasisintheoriginal.)(Marshall,1993.)
Indeed,byprematurelydeclaringthecurrentmilitary-technicalrevolutiona"revolutioninmilitaryaffairs,"themostenthusiasticproponentsof"theRMA"mayhaveunnecessarilyopenedthemselvesuptocriticism.42
41SeeMolanderetal.(1996).42Mann(1998)isbutoneexampleofsuchcriticism.Evenworse,bytermingtheongoingmilitary-technicalrevolution"the"revolutioninmilitary
affairsratherthanmerely"a"revolutioninmilitaryaffairs,asifitweretheonlyRMAthateveroccurred,theproponentsof"theRMA"showalackofhistoricalsense.
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ChapterThreeTheBreakthroughProcessLeadingtoRMAsHereagainthehistoricalrecordoftechnology-drivenchangesinmilitaryoperationsprovidesnumerousinsightsintothenatureofthebreakthroughprocessleadingtoRMAs.
RMAsResultFromSerendipitousConceptualBreakthroughs
OneinsightisthatRMAsalmostalwaysinvolvesomesortofconceptualbreakthroughthatcouldnotbeanticipatedinadvance,andoftenwasnotsoughtfor.1Basedonthisinsight,Figure3.1presentsourfirstandsimplestmodelofthebreakthroughprocess,inwhichRMAsresultfromserendipitousconceptualbreakthroughs.
Inthepreparatoryphase,oneormoretechnologydevelopmentsandvariousunmetmilitarychallenges2setthestageforthesubsequentconceptualbreakthrough.Inthebreakthroughphase,thekeycreativeeventintheRMAprocessthecriticalconceptualbreakthroughoccurs.Suchconceptualbreakthroughsusuallycannotbeanticipatedinadvance,andoftenarenotsoughtfor.Theyoftenoccuraccidentallyandhappenserendipitously.
1Burke(1978)givesmanyhistoricalexamplesofsuchserendipitousconceptualbreakthroughs,inthemilitaryaswellasinotherarenas.2Unpublished1995RANDresearchbySamGardinerandDanielFoxon"UnderstandingRevolutionsinMilitaryAffairs"showsthatwithoutoneormoreunmetmilitarychallenges,thereislittlelikelihoodofaconceptualbreakthrough.Theunmetchallengesprovideacreativeimpetusessentialtothebreakthroughprocess.
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Figure3.1OneModeloftheRMAProcess:
RMAsResultfromSerendipitousConceptualBreakthroughs
Intheexploitationandsellingphase,theconceptualbreakthroughisexploitedandsold.Itisdevelopedintoamilitaryweaponorsystem,combinedwithasuitableoperationaldoctrine,andexpressedinaforcestructureadequatetorealizethepotentialities.Itissoldbyovercomingtheresistanceofthemanyindividualsandorganizationswhocansay"no"tothenewidea.3Inthepayoffphase,thenewweaponorsystemisusedincombatandshowsitsrevolutionarypotential;theRMAbecomesareality.
RmasaretheResultOfMultipleInnovations
ThemodelinFigure3.1issimple,andportraystheaccidentalnatureofthekeycreativeeventintheprocess.However,insuggestingthateachsuccessfulRMAdependsononlyonesuchkeyinnovation,itis
3WediscussfailedRMAsinmoredetaillater,andgiveexamplesofsuchnaysayers.
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deficient;historyshowsthateachindividualRMAisusuallytheresultofanumberofinnovationsintechnology,doctrine,andorganiza-tion.Accordingly,Figure3.2presentsasecond,morecomplexmodelofthebreakthroughprocess,inwhichRMAsaretheresultofmultipleinnovations.
Theinnovativestagesinthismodelare:
Anewtechnology(orseveralnewtechnologies)thatenablesdevicesandsystemsnotpreviouslypossibleorcontemplated.
Anewdevice,basedonthisnewtechnology,thatdoessomethingnotpreviouslydoable.
Anewsystem,basedonthenewdevice,thatperformsamilitaryfunctioneitherdramaticallybetterordramaticallydifferently
Figure3.2AnotherModeloftheRMAProcess:
RMAsAretheResultofMultipleInnovations
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thanithadbeenperformedbefore.(Insomecases,itmayperformafunctionthathadneverbeenperformedbefore.)
Anewoperationalconceptthatdescribesthemannerinwhichthenewsystemisemployedinsometypeofmilitarysituation,accomplishingsomemilitarytaskeitherdramaticallybetterordramaticallydifferentlythanithadbeenaccomplishedbefore,orperforminganewtaskthatdidnotexistpreviously.
Anewdoctrineandforcestructuredoctrinethatcodifiestheprinciplesgoverningtheemploymentofthenewsystemandforcestructurethatprovidesthemilitaryorganizationnecessarytofullyrealizeitspotential.
Thesevariousstagesculminateinanewmilitaryreality,inwhichaparadigmshifthasoccurredinsomesegmentofthemilitaryarena.
Figure3.2alsoshowsthat
Unmetmilitarychallengesareanessentialelementdrivingcreativityateachstepintheprocess.Withoutoneormorechallenges,technologiesareunlikelytobecombinedintodevicesanddevicesintosystems,andnewoperationalconcepts,doctrine,andforcestructuresareunlikelytobedeveloped.
Thevariousinnovationssometimesoccuroutoforder:e.g.,anoperationalconceptis"invented"beforeatechnology,device,and/orsystemexistsadequatetorealizeitspostulatedpotential.4
RMAscanfailtooccurinthefaceofobstaclesatanystepinthischain.Thenecessarytechnologymayexist,butthecontemplateddevicesproveimpractical.Itmaynotbepossibletoturnthenewdevicesintoviablesystems.Nooperationalconceptmayexisttoemployanotherwiseviablesystemconcept.Theforcestructuretoexploittheoperationalconceptmaynotexistbecausetheoperational
conceptisunacceptabletothepre-
4Forexample,theoperationalconceptofstrategicbombardmentwasdevelopedduringthe1920sand1930s.(SeeMitchell,1925,foradiscussionbyoneofitsearlyproponents.)However,theaircraftandweapontechnologieswerenotrobustenoughtosupportanRMA.Itwasonlywiththedevelopmentofnuclearweapons,intercontinental-rangebombers,andICBMsinthe1940s1960sthatanRMAresulted.
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vailingmilitaryculture,orbecausethenewforcestructurerequirestoolargeachangeinexistingmilitaryorganizations.
WewillreturntothesubjectoffailedRMAslaterinthischapter.
MuchoftheRMAProcessCanbeObservedandAnticipated
ThemodelinFigure3.1emphasizestheserendipitousnatureof(atleastsome)keycreativeeventsintheRMAprocess.ThemodelinFigure3.2emphasizesthemultipleinnovationsthatmakeuptheprocess.BothofthesemodelsdealwiththeinternalsoftheRMAprocess.ThemodelinFigure3.3,ontheotherhand,dealswithanaspectoftheexternalsoftheprocess:thesignalsthatcanbeseenbyoutsideobservers.
SerendipitousinventionthatistheessentialcreativeelementattheheartoftheRMAprocessandleadsfromthenewtechnologytothenewdevice,operationalconcept,andsystemconceptisdifficultto
Figure3.3MuchoftheRMAProcessCanBeObservedandAnticipated
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anticipateandmaynotbereadilyobservable,particularlyatthemomentitoccurs.However,duringtheexploitationandsellingphasethatleadsfromthenewdevice,operationalconcept,andsystemconcepttoanewdoctrineandforcestructureandwhichisabsolutelyessentialifanewdoctrineandforcestructurearetobeachievedthereisusuallypublicdebateandexperimentationthatarereadilyobservable.Thus,thelatterstagesoftheRMAprocessarealmostalwaysaccompaniedbyreadilyobservablesignals,whichanticipatetheemergenceofnewRMAs.5Wediscusstheseobservablesinmoredetaillater.
MuchCanbeLearnedFromFailedorIncompleteRMAs
AdditionalinsightsconcerningtheRMAprocesscanbegleanedfromamoredetailedlookatthehistoryofsomefailedorincompleteRMAsandwhytheyfailedtoachievetheiranticipatedpotential.Asindicatedearlier,RMAscanfailtooccurinthefaceofobstaclesatanystepinthechainportrayedinFigure3.2.Wenextconsiderhistoricalexamplesassociatedwitheachofthesepossibilities.
NecessaryTechnologyExistsbutContemplatedDevicesProveImpractical
Inthe1950s,muchthoughtwasgiventoanuclear-poweredaircraft,whichwouldhavevirtuallyunlimitedrangeandendurance,andwouldtherefore(initsproponents'view)revolutionizeaerialwarfare.
Thisdreamnevercametofruition.Eventhoughthenecessarynuclearreactorandenergyconversiontechnologiesexisted,thecontemplateddevice(anuclear-poweredaircraftengine)provedmuchtooheavytobepractical.Becauseoftheweightoftheengine,suchanaircraftwouldliterallyhavenevergottenofftheground.
5Inthe20thcentury,theauthorknowsofonlytwoRMAsthatwerenotprecededbyreadilyobservable,publicsignals:theatomicbombandthe
stealthaircraft(andthejuryisstilloutastowhetherthestealthaircraftisatrueRMA).
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NewDevicesCannotbeTurnedintoViableSystems
Morerecently,inthe1970sandearly1980s,thoughtwasgiventoanelectromagnetic(EM)gunthatwouldshootprojectilesatmuchhighermuzzlevelocitiesthanconventionalguns,andwouldtherefore(initsproponents'view)beasuperiorantitank,antiaircraft,andantimissileweapon.
Inthiscase,EMgunsorratherEMacceleratorsthatacceleratedsmallprojectilestovelocitiesofseveralkilometerspersecondwereinfactdevelopedandtested,andperformed(asadevice)moreorlessastheirproponentshadclaimed.However,eventhoughtheseEMgunsworkedinprinciple,inpracticetheywerecumbersome,withinternalbarrelcomponentsthatworeoutrapidlyandhadtobereplacedoften(sometimesaftereveryshot).Forthesereasons(andprobablyothersaswell)ithas,thusfaratleast,notbeenpossibletoturnEMgunsintoviablemilitarysystems.
NoOperationalConceptExiststoEmployanOtherwiseViableSystemConcept
Withoutanoperationalconcept,thebestweaponsystemintheworldwillneverrevolutionizeanything.ThemachinegunorratherthelackofapositionforthemachineguninmostEuropean-basedarmiesduringthelastquarterofthe19thcenturyprovidesagoodexampleofthis.By1885,thedevelopmentofaworkablemachinegunwasrelativelycomplete,andseveralfirmswereactivelymarketingsuchguns.ButmostEuropeanarmieswiththeexceptionoftheBritish(theymissedthefullsignificanceofthisRMAforadifferentreason)didnothavetheslightestconceptofhowtoemploythesegunseffectivelyincombat.InthebattlesofWissembourgandSpichernin1870duringtheFranco-PrussianWar,theFrenchtriedusingmachinegunsmountedonartillerycarriagesandsitedwiththefieldartilleryasindirectfireweapons.6TheywereoutrangedbythePrussianartillery
piecesandblowntobitsbeforetheyhadachancetofire.NoneoftheotherleadingEuropean-basedarmies(excepttheBritish,aboutwhichmorelater)cameupwithabetterideaduringtheperiodbefore1900.Theideathattheuseof
6SeeEllis(1975),pp.6364.
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machinegunsasdirect-fireinfantry-supportweaponscoulddecimateinfantryforcesattemptingtocrossopengrounddidnotoccurtothem.7
WrongorIncompleteOperationalConceptisUsed
SometimesoneormoreseeminglysmallmissingelementsinanoperationalconceptcancausethefailureofanRMA,orcancauseoneplayertomissrealizingthefullpotentialofanRMAthatanotherplayerachieves.Carrierwarfareprovidesanexample.OnChristmasDay1914theBritishconductedthefirstcarrierairraidinhistorytheattackontheCuxhavenZeppelinbasenearWilhelmshavenbysevenBritishseaplanesfromthreeimprovisedcarriersintheHeligolandBight.8AtthecloseofWorldWarI,theRoyalNavyhadoverthreeyearsofwartimecarrieroperationsandpossessednearlyadozencarriersofonesortoranother,atatimewhennoothernavalpowerhadevenone.9
Inspiteofthisheadstart,theBritishcompletelymissedrealizingthefullpotentialofthecarrierwarfareRMA;atthebeginningofWorldWarII,thefirst-lineBritishcarrierswereincapableofgeneratingthecombatstrikingpowerofAmericanandJapanesecarriers,assoconvincinglydemonstratedinthecarrierbattlesof1942.WhydidtheBritishmissthisRMA?Fortheseeminglysmallestofreasons.Theirconceptofoperationsdidnotincludethe"deckpark,"thepracticeofstowingamajorfractionofacarrier'scomplementofaircraftontheflightdeck,andrefuelingandrearmingthereaswell.TheBritishstowed,refueled,andrearmedalloftheiraircraftbelow,onthe
7ItdidoccurtotheRussiansandlatertotheJapanese,whobothemployedmachinegunseffectivelyduringtheRusso-JapaneseWarof19041905.Germanobserversofthiswartooktheideabackhome,wheretheGermanarmyadopteditandbeganaddingmachinegunstoitsforces,thussettingthestagefortheiremploymenttostoptheAlliedadvanceon
theriverAisneinSeptember1914.SeeEllis(1975),pp.6568.8Threetroopcarriers,Engadine,Riveria,andEmpress,modifiedtocarrysmallnumbersofseaplanes,conductedthisraid.Forflightoperations,theseaplaneswereloweredintothewaterusingcranes.SeeMurrayandWatts(1995),WattsandMurray(1996),andFriedman(1988).9Thesevesselsrangedfromearlyseaplanecarriers,suchasEmpressandRiveria,toArkRoyal,thefirstshipdesignedandbuiltasanaircraftcarrier,andArgus,thefirstflat-deckcarrier.SeeMurrayandWatts(1995),WattsandMurray(1996),andFriedman(1988).
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hangerdeck.Thus,in1939afirst-lineBritishcarriercarriedonly2430aircraft,whereasAmericanandJapanesecarrierscarried80100aircraft.10Itturnedoutthatthekeydeterminantsoftheoffensivestrikingpowerofacarrierforcewerethenumberofstrikeaircraftthatcouldbelaunchedinasingleattackandhowquicklysuccessiveattackscouldbemounted.BecausetheAmericanandJapanesecarrierscarriedmanymoreaircraft,theycouldlaunchmuchlargerattacks;becausetheyrefueledandrearmedtheiraircraftontheflightdeck,theycouldturnaroundreturningaircraftmuchfaster,therebylaunchingmoreandfastersuccessiveattacks.Thesefeaturesmadeallthedifferenceintheworld.11
ThedevelopmentoftankdoctrinebytheAmericanarmyduringthe1920sand1930sisanotherexampleoftheconsequencesofawrongorincompleteoperationalconcept.TheU.S.Armyviewedtanksprimarilyasinfantrysupportweapons,anincompleteoperationalconceptthatignoresthepossibilityandimportanceoftank-versus-tankengagements.Thisledthemtodeveloptankswithlow-velocityguns(thewrongsystem),whichweresignificantlyinferiortotheGermantanks(withhigh-velocitygunsdesignedtogoagainstothertanks)theyfacedinWorldWarII.12
NoDoctrineandForceStructuretoExploittheOperationalConceptBecausetheConceptisUnacceptabletoPrevailingMilitaryCulture
Sometimesbothaviablesystemandaneffectiveoperationalconceptexist,butbecausetheoperationalconceptisunacceptabletotheprevailingmilitaryculture,thedoctrineandforcestructurenecessarytoexploitthenewweaponarenotdeveloped.ThiswasthecaseregardingtheuseofthemachinegunintheBritisharmyduringtheperiodleadinguptoWorldWarI.
10TheBritishcarriersweresomewhatsmallerthantheAmericanandJapanesecarriers,whichalsolimitedthenumberofaircrafttheycould
carry.Butthebiggestlimitingfactorwastheirlackofdeckparks.11SeeMurrayandWatts(1995),pp.6184,andWattsandMurray(1996),pp.383405.12SeeJohnson(1990and1998).
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IncontrasttothecontinentalEuropeanarmies,bythe1880stheBritishknewhowtoemploymachinegunsincombattoachievedevastatingeffect:asdirect-fireinfantryweapons.TheBritishlearnedthisinAfrica,fightingthenativetribes.MachinegunswereusedagainsttheZulusatUlundiin1879,intheassaultonTel-el-KebirinEgyptin1882,againsttheDervishatAbuKleaintheSudanin1884,andagainagainsttheDervishattheBattleofOmdurmanin1898.13
ButtheseweretheBritishcolonialforces,notthemainstreamBritisharmy;andthesewerenativetribes,notother''civilized"Europeanarmies.Simplyput,theprevailingBritishmilitaryculturecouldnotconceiveof"officersandgentlemen"employingsuchanuncivilizedweaponagainstotherofficersandgentlemen.InthewordsofEllis:
Sothemachinegunbecameassociatedwithcolonialexpeditionsandtheslaughterofnatives,andwasthusbydefinitionregardedasbeingtotallyinappropriatetotheconditionsofregularEuropeanwarfare.14
Thus,intheyearsbeforeWorldWarI,theBritisharmydidnotdevelopthedoctrineandforcestructurenecessarytoexploitthemachinegun.15
NoForceStructuretoExploitOperationalConceptBecausetheNewForceStructureRequirestooLargeaChangeinExistingMilitaryOrganizations
Sometimestheforcestructurenecessarytoexploitaviablesystemandarecognizedoperationalconceptrequirestoolargeachangeinexistingmilitaryorganizations,andisthereforenotdeveloped.Thiswasthecaseregardingthedevelopmentorratherthearrested
13SeeEllis(1975),pp.8286.Asbutoneexampleofthedevastatingeffectofmachinegunsintheseengagements,intheBattleofOmdurman11,000Dervishwerekilled,broughtdownprimarilybysixMaximguns;ontheBritishside,only28Britishsoldiersand20other(colonial)soldierswere
killed.14Ellis(1975),p.57.15SeeEllis(1975),pp.4860.
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developmentoftankwarfareintheBritisharmyduringthe1920sand1930s.16
Asmentionedearlier,theBritishinventedthetankandwerethefirsttoemployitincombat,duringWorldWarI.Followingthatwar,anumberofBritishindividuals(mostprominentlyJ.F.C.FullerandB.H.LiddellHart)wroteandspokepassionatelyregardingthetank'spotentialtorevolutionizelandwarfare,laidoutoperationalconceptstothatend,andadvocatedanewforcestructurefortheBritisharmycenteredonall-tankunits.Further,theBritisharmycarriedoutaninnovativeseriesofexperimentsinthelate1920sandearly1930sinvolvingtheuseofarmorinmobile,mechanizedwarfare.Themostnotableoftheseexperimentswerethe1926maneuversontheSalisburyplain,inwhichanarmoredforcecarriedouta25-milepenetrationthatwreckedthedefendingforces'position.17
Inspiteoftheapparentlessonsofthesemaneuversandthepassionateargumentsofarmored-warfareadvocatessuchasFullerandLiddellHart,18theleadersoftheBritisharmyrejectedthisnewoperationalconceptandtheforcestructurethatwentalongwithit.ThenewforcestructureproposedbyFuller,LiddellHart,andtheirfollowersrequiredtoolargeachangeinthethen-existingorganizationalstructureoftheBritisharmy;itupsettoomanyapplecartsandprovokedtoomuchoppositionfromdefendersoftraditionalregiments.InthewordsofMurrayandWatts:
ThepathofBritishinnovationinarmor...remainedoutsidethearmy'smainstream,andtheeducationalprocessthattheexperi-
16SeeMurrayandWatts(1995),pp.2530,foradetaileddiscussionoftheabortedBritishattemptsduringthisperiodtodevelopadoctrineandforcestructurefullyexploitingthetank.17Germanobserverswerepresentatthese1926maneuversandcarriedthe(apparent)messageregardingthetank'soperationalpotentialbackhome,
whereitwaspickedupbyforward-lookingthinkersintheGermanarmy.(SeeMurrayandWatts,1995,pp.1830.)18Infact,theincreasinglyvehementandstridentargumentsofFuller,LiddellHart,andtheirfollowersmaywellhavebeenpartoftheproblem;theytendedtopolarizethedebateandantagonizethemainstreamBritishmilitaryleaders.(SeeMurrayandWatts,1995,pp.2530.)
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mentswitharmormighthavedevelopedintobecamea"weversusthem"contestbetweenoldandnew.19
Thesplitofthe[British]armyintotwoseparatecamps(withtheradicalinnovators,byfar,thesmaller)insuredthat[theradicalinnovators']ideasplayedlittleifanyroleinthepreparationoftheBritisharmyforwarinthelate1930s.20
Thus,intheyearsbeforeWorldWarII,theBritisharmydidnotdevelopthedoctrine(mobile,mechanizedwarfare)andforcestructure(armoreddivisions)necessarytoexploitthetank,andtherebymissedoutontheblitzkriegRMA.
ForceStructureandOperationalConceptNotCongruentwithGrandStrategy
TheFrenchalsofailedtoadoptadoctrineofoffensivetankwarfareduringtheperiodbetweentheWorldWars,butforadifferentreason:theywerefocusedonagrandstrategyforlandwarfarethatwasprimarilydefensive.TheenormouscasualtylistsofWorldWarItrenchwarfarehadconvincedtheleadersoftheFrencharmythatinthefuturealloffensiveoperations,exceptthosethatwerelimitedandtightlycontrolled,wouldnolongerbeworththeprice.Theycouldnotconceiveofthetankovercomingthepowerofthedefensethathadbeendemonstratedin19141918.Accordingly,inthe1920sand1930stheyadoptedalandwarfaredoctrinethatwasalmostentirelydefensive.Moreover,andmoreimportant,theycouldnotconceiveofanyother(successful)waytofight.Doughtydescribes
thefundamentalunwillingnessandinabilityofseniorFrenchmilitaryleaderstoacceptthepossibilitythatothersmightwagefuturewarinafashionverydifferentfromtheirs.21
OffensivetankoperationshadnoplaceintheFrenchstrategy,sotheFrenchalsomissedoutontheblitzkriegRMA.
19SeeMurrayandWatts(1995),p.28.20SeeMurrayandWatts(1995),p.29.21Doughty(1985and1990),asparaphrasedbyMurrayandWatts(1995,p.25).
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ThesehistoricalexamplesoffailedorincompleteRMAsreinforcesomeofthecharacteristicsofRMAsdiscussedinChapterTwo.
Successfultechnology-drivenRMAsrequiretechnology,doctrine,andorganization.Missingorincompleteelementsinanyoneoftheseareascancauseamilitaryforceto"missout"onanRMA.
RMAsarerarelybroughtaboutbydominantplayers,becausesuchplayersareoftennotmotivatedtomakethenecessarydoctrinalororganizationalchanges.22
RMAsareoftenadoptedandfullyexploitedbysomeoneotherthanthenationoriginallyinventingthenewtechnology,becausethatnation'smilitaryfailed(forwhateverreason)tomakethenecessarydoctrinalororganizationalchanges.
TheyalsohighlightsomeadditionallessonsregardingtheRMAprocess:23
Militaryinstitutionsmustbewillingtodevelopavisionofhowwarmaychangeinthefuture,ortheyareincapableofdevelopingRMAs.
Acceptanceofnewideasby(atleastsome)seniormilitaryleadersandby(atleastpartof)themilitarybureaucracyisessentialtothesuccessfuldevelopmentofRMAsbyexistingmilitaryinstitutions.24
22Asmentionedearlier,theU.S.Navy,oneofthedominantnavalplayersattheendofWorldWarI,diddevelopthecarrierwarfareRMAduringthe1920sand1930s.WediscussthisinChapterSix.23MurrayandWatts(1995,pp.8493)andWattsandMurray(1996,pp.405415)highlighttheseadditionallessons.24AsstatedbyMurrayandWatts(1995,p.87),"itseemsunlikelythatanysmallhandfulofvisionaries,howeverdedicatedandvocal,havemuchchanceofforcingmilitaryinstitutionstoadoptfundamentallynewwaysoffightingwithouttheacquiescenceorgrudgingcooperationimpliedbyemergingbureaucraticrecognitionandacceptance."SeealsoWattsandMurray(1996,
p.409).Asanexampleofthesuccessfulharnessingofthisbureaucraticprocess,Rosen(1991)discussesthekeyroleplayedbyafewseniornavalleadersinfacilitatingthedevelopmentofthecarrierwarfareRMAbytheU.S.Navyduringthe1920sand1930s.
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Thepotentialforcivilianoroutsideleadershiptoimposeanewvisionoffuturewar(i.e.,thevisionofanRMA)onareluctantmilitaryservicewhoseheartremainscommittedtoexistingwaysoffightingis,atbest,limited.
Institutionalprocessesforexploring,testing,andrefiningconceptionsoffuturewari.e.,forconductingexperimentsandassessingtheirresultsareessentialtothedevelopmentofRMAs.(TheGermanarmyandtheU.S.Navy'saviationcommunityhadsuchprocessesduringthe19181939period;theBritishandFrencharmiesdidnot.)
WenowturntoadiscussionofhowonemaybepreparedforfutureRMAscarriedoutbyothers.
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PARTII.BEINGPREPAREDFORFUTURERMAS(CARRIEDOUTBYOTHERS)
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ChapterFourBeingAwareoftheNextRMA:TheObservablesoftheEmergenceofNewRMAsThefirststepinbeingpreparedforfutureRMAscarriedoutbyothersisbeingawarethatanRMAmaybeoccurring.AsmentionedinconjunctionwithFigure3.3,muchoftheRMAprocesscanbeobservedandanticipated.Thisisparticularlytrueduringtheexploitationandsellingphase(seeFigure3.3)thatleadsfromanewdevice,operationalconcept,andsystemconcepttoanewdoctrineandforcestructureandwhichisabsolutelyessentialifthenewdoctrineandforcestructurerequiredtotrulyrealizeanRMAareevertobeachieved.Wediscusstheseobservablesinthischapteranddescribetheessentialelementsofanactivitytomonitorandassesssuchobservablesonacontinuingbasis.
TheRMAProcessProducesObservablesinaNumberofVenues
DuringtheexploitationandsellingphaseoftheRMAprocess,observablesareproducedin:
Variouspressorgans,includingthetradepress(defense,aerospace,etc.),themilitaryartandsciencepress,thescienceandtechnologypress,theinternationalsecurityandforeignaffairspress,andthegeneralbusinesspress,aswellasleadingnewspapersandmagazines.
TradepressorganscoveringthedefenseandaerospacearenaincludeAsia-PacificDefenseForum,AsianDefenceJournal,Asia-PacificDefenceReporter,AviationWeek&SpaceTechnology,CanadianDefenceQuarterly,Defense&AerospaceElectronics,
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DefenseNews,DefenseWeek,InternationalDefenseReview,Jane'sDefenceWeekly,MilitaryTechnology,andSignal.1
MilitaryartandsciencepressorgansincludeAirForceMagazine,AirForceTimes,AirpowerJournal,ArmedForcesJournalInternational,Armor,Army,ArmyTimes,FieldArtillery,Infantry,MarineCorpsGazette,MilitaryReview,NavalWarCollegeReview,NavyInternational,NavyTimes,andProceedingsoftheUnitedStatesNavalInstitute.ScienceandtechnologypressorgansincludeNature,Science,ScientificAmerican,andTechnologyReview.
TheinternationalsecurityandforeignaffairspressincludesDefense&ForeignAffairs,EuropeanSecurity,ForeignAffairs,InternationalAffairs,NATOReview,NATO'sSixteenNations,StrategicReview,andTheJournalofStrategicStudies.GeneralbusinesspressorgansincludeBarron's,BusinessWeek,Forbes,Fortune,TheEconomist,TheFinancialTimes,andTheWallStreetJournal.LeadingnewspapersandmagazinesincludeDerSpiegel,DieWelt,DieZeit,FrankfurterAllgemeine,InternationalHeraldTribune,NeueZürcherZeitung,TheNewYorkTimes,TheTimes(ofLondon),andTheWashingtonPost.
Becausetheemergenceofany"true"RMAisalmostcertaintoprovokeconsiderablepublicdebate(becauseoftheestablishedmilitaryinstitutionswhosepositionitthreatens)andhavesignificantbusinessandeconomicimpact(becauseofthechangesitimpliesinthedefenseindustry),itishighlyunlikelythatsuchanRMAwouldnotbecoveredinanyofthesepressorgans.Itisboundtoshowupsomewhere.
Theworldwidearmsmarket,bothlegitimateandclandestine.Armsdealersandtheirsalesmentouttheirproductsworldwide.Theiractivitiescouldbeusefulindicationsofanemergingtechnology-drivenRMA.
Inferiormilitaryestablishmentstryingtoleapfrogthedominantplayers.Often,suchmilitaryestablishmentsareamongthefirsttotryoutanewanddistinctlydifferentmilitarysystem/
1Thislistandtheonesthatfollowaremeanttobeillustrative;theyaremostcertainlynotexhaustive.
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operationalconceptthatoffersthehopeofrenderingobsoleteacorecompetencyofadominantmilitaryplayer.MonitoringtheactivitiesofsuchlessermilitaryestablishmentsmayleadtoearlyindicationsofanemergingRMA.
Dominantmilitaryplayerstryingtodiscreditnewideasthatthreatentheircorecompetencies.Thefocushereshouldnotbeonthenewmilitarysystems/operationalconceptsthatthedominantmilitaryplayersarepursuing,butratherthenewsystems/conceptsthatthedominantplayersarearguingagainstandthemorevehementlytheyarearguingagainstsomethingnewandpotentiallyrevolutionary,themorelikelyitisthatthismightindeedbeanemergingRMA.
Militaryresearch,development,test,andevaluation(RDT&E)activities,particularlythoseinvolvingnewtechnologies,systems,and/oroperationalconcepts.2
Anyprocessdesignedtobeonthelookoutforemergingtechnology-drivenRMAsshouldwatchallofthesevenues,bothwithinandoutsidetheUnitedStates.3
OpenandClosedVenuesRequireDifferentCollectionApproaches
Someofthesevenuesareopen,someareclosed.Theactivitiesinopenvenuesareusuallyreadilyobservableby(almost)anyone;theactivitiesinclosedvenuesarenormallyshutofffromviewbyoutsiders.AsindicatedinFigure4.1,thelegitimatearmsmarketisgenerallyanopenvenue;itsactivitiesarenormallyreadilyobservable.(Indeed,frequentlytheyareactuallyadvertised.)Theunclassified
2AnillustrativeexampleofthepotentialusefulnessofthisvenueisthatoftheGermanswhoobservedthe1926BritishmaneuversontheSalisburyplainandcarriedthemessageregardingthetank'soperationalpotentialformobilewarfarebackhometotheintellectualleadersofthe(thenembryonic)Germanarmy.
3Unpublished1997RANDworkbyJeffreyIsaacson,ChristopherLayne,andJohnArquillapresentsanumberofpredictorsonwhetherastateislikelytoachievemilitaryinnovation.Suchpredictorscanhelpfocusthisprocess.
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Figure4.1SomeofTheseVenuesAreOpen,SomeAreClosed
pressisanopenvenue.Theclandestinearmsmarket,ontheotherhand,isaclosedvenue;participantsinthismarketgotogreatlengthstohidetheiractivitiesfromgeneralview.Theclassifiedpressisalsoaclosedvenue,accessibleonlytothosewiththepropersecurityclearances.
Openandclosedvenuesrequiredifferentcollectionapproaches.Foropenvenues,thestandardopen-sourcecollectiontechniquessurveyingnewspapers,periodicals,andbooks,monitoringtelevisionandradiobroadcasts,attendingconferences,etc.areapplicable,albeittailoredtotargetsofspecificrelevancetotheRMAprocess.Forclosedvenues,standardhumanintelligence(humint)andcommunicationsintelligence(comint)techniquesareapplicable,mostlikelytargetedbasedonopen-sourcecueinginformation.
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CollectionisNotEnough;AssessmentisAlsoRequired
AsthediscussionsinChaptersTwoandThreehaveshown,notallpotentialRMAscometopass;manyareabortedandfallbythewaysideforavarietyofreasons.Accordingly,thecollectionofobservablesemanatingfromtheemergenceofnewRMAsisnotenough;theseobservablesmustalsobecarefullyassessed,toseparateouttheseriousRMAcandidatesfromthewild-eyeddreams.Figure4.2illustrateswhatisneededinthisassessmentprocess.
Asshowninthefigure,amultistepcollectionandassessmentprocessisrequired,withthefollowingcomponents:
Aninitial,wide-area-searchcollectionprocess,todetectanyandallRMAvisionsanddreams,nomatterwheretheyariseandnomatterhowfar-outtheymayappear.Theemphasishereshouldbeoninclusionratherthanexclusion.TheoutputofthiscontinuallyongoingcollectionactivityisalivinglistofRMAvisionsanddreams.4
Aninitialscreeningprocess,basedonsomesortofplausibilitycriteria,toweedoutthe''antigravity"ideas5(ortheirequivalent)fromthislistbutkeepinallthosewithsomeprospectsofsuccess.Atthisstageintheassessment,itismuchsafertokeepquestionableideasinthantothrowgoodideasout;theplausibilitycriteriausedshouldbeselectedaccordingly.TheoutputofthisstepisalistofpotentialRMAcandidates.
Amonitoringcollectionprocess,focusedoneachofthepotentialRMAcandidatesandcontinuingoveranextendedperiod.Thespecificsofthiscollectionwillvary,dependingonthenatureofeachpotentialRMA,andmayfocusonspecificchallenges,hurdles,orteststhatagivencandidateRMAmustpass.
Acarefulassessmentprocess,whichcouldincludechallenges,
hurdles,andteststhatacandidateRMAmustpass.6Theoutput
4Alivinglistmaybechangingallthetime,oratleasteveryyearorso.5"Antigravity"ideasareconceptsthatareclearlynotfeasible,basedonfundamentalphysicalorengineeringconsiderations.6Thespecificswillvary,basedonthenatureofeachRMAcandidate.
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Figure4.2SinceAllPotentialRMAsDoNotPanOut,CollectionIsNotEnough:Careful,BalancedAssessmentIsAlsoRequired
ofthisongoingstepisalistofseriousRMAcandidates,tobecloselymonitoredandreassessedastheyevolveandmature.
Thisprocessrequirespatienceandstayingpower.SincefutureRMAscannotbescheduledandmaytakeyearstocometofruition,onemustestablishacollectionandassessmentprocessthatcanendureoveralongperiod.
InAssessingPotentialBreakthroughs,DoNotDependonExpertsAlone
Inconductingboththeinitialscreeningandcarefulassessmentstepsinthisprocess,onecannotrelyontheviewsofexpertsalone;theycannotalwaysforeseethefuture.Table4.1,takenfromCerfandNavasky(1984),givesexamplesofcaseswhereexperts"gotitwrong."7Table4.2,fromthesamesource,showsthatmilitaryexpertssimilarlycannotalwaysforeseethemilitaryfuture.
7CerfandNavasky(1984)haveover300pagesofsuchexamples.
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Table4.1ExpertsCan'tAlwaysForeseetheFuture
"Thephonograph...isnotofanycommercialvalue."
ThomasAlvaEdison,inventorofthephonograph,c.1880
"Heavier-than-airflyingmachinesareimpossible."
LordKelvin,Britishmathematician,physicist,andpresidentoftheBritishRoyalSociety,c.1895
"Manwillnotflyforfiftyyears."
WilburWrighttohisbrotherOrville,1901
"Icannotimagineanyconditionwhichcouldcauseashiptofounder....Modernshipbuildinghasgonebeyondthat."
CaptainEdwardJ.Smith,WhiteStarLine(futurecommanderoftheTitanic),1906
"Withthepossibleexceptionofhavingmorepleasinglinestotheeyewhileinflight,themonoplanepossessesnoadvantagesoverthebiplane.''
GlenH.Curtiss(FounderofCurtissAircraft),December31,1911
"Whothehellwantstohearactorstalk?"
HarryM.Warner(PresidentofWarnerBrothersPictures),c.1927
"Aseveredepressionlikethatof19201921isoutsidetherangeofprobability."
TheHarvardEconomicSociety,16November1929
"Ithinkthereisaworldmarketforaboutfivecomputers."
ThomasJ.Watson,chairmanofIBM,1943
"Wedon'tliketheirsound.Groupsofguitarsareonthewayout."
DeccaRecordingCo.executive,turningdowntheBeatlesin1962
"Withoverfiftyforeigncarsalreadyonsalehere,theJapaneseautoindustryisn'tlikelytocarveoutabigsliceoftheU.S.marketforitself."
BusinessWeek,2August1968
"Thereisnoreasonforanyindividualtohaveacomputerintheirhome."
KenOlson,president,DigitalEquipmentCorporation,1977SOURCE:ChristopherCerfandVictorNavasky,TheExpertsSpeak,PantheonBooks,NewYork,1984.
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Table4.2NorCanMilitaryExpertsAlwaysForeseetheMilitaryFuture
"Makenomistake,thisweaponwillchangeabsolutelynothing."
FrenchDirectorGeneralofInfantry,dismissing(beforemembersoftheFrenchparliament)theimportanceofthemachineguninwarfare,1910
"[Themachinegunis]agrosslyoverratedweapon."
BritishFieldMarshalDouglasHaig,attheoutbreakofWorldWarI,c.1914
"Itishighlyunlikelythatanairplane,orfleetofthem,couldeversinkafleetofNavyvesselsunderbattleconditions."
FranklinD.Roosevelt(formerAssistantSecretaryoftheNavy),1922
"Asfortanks,whicharesupposedbysometobringusashorteningofwars,theirincapacityisstriking."
MarshalHenriPhilippePétain(formerFrenchMinisterofWarandformerCommander-in-ChiefoftheFrenchArmies),1939
''Their[theGerman]tankswillbedestroyedintheopencountrybehindourlinesiftheycanpenetratethatfar,whichisdoubtful."
GeneralA.L.Georges(Major-GénéraldesArmées),1939
"TherearenourgentmeasurestotakeforthereinforcementoftheSedansector."
GeneralCharlesHuntziger(CommanderoftheFrenchSecondArmy),May13,1940
"Nomatterwhathappens,theU.S.Navyisnotgoingtobecaughtnapping."
FrankKnox,SecretaryoftheNavy,4December1941,justbeforetheJapaneseattackonPearlHarbor
"Thisisthebiggestfoolthingwehaveeverdone....Thebombwillnevergooff,andIspeakasanexpertinexplosives."
AdmiralWilliamD.Leahy,advisingPresidentHarryS.TrumanontheimpracticalityoftheU.S.atomicbombproject,1945
"Theycouldn'thitanelephantatthisdist..."
GeneralJohnB.Sedgwick(UnionArmy),lastwords,utteredduringtheBattleofSpotsylvania,1864
SOURCE:ChristopherCerfandVictorNavasky,TheExpertsSpeak,PantheonBooks,NewYork,1984.
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ThemessageofTables4.1and4.2is(atleast)twofold,insofarastheassessmentofpotentialRMAsisconcerned:
Onecannotalwaysdependontheviewsofexpertsregardingtheprospectsforrevolutionarychange.
Theviewsofexpertscanbeparticularlyunreliablewhentheyhaveastakeintheoldwayofdoingthings.
BoththeinitialscreeningandcarefulassessmentstepsintheprocessoutlinedinFigure4.2mustbestructuredwiththeseadmonitionsinmind.
TheEssentialElementsofaWorldwideRMABreakthroughWatchandAssessmentActivity
Wehaveidentifiedtheessentialelementsofwhatweterma"worldwideRMAbreakthroughwatchandassessmentactivity":8
Aninformationcollectionactivitythatconductstwotypesofcollection:
Worldwidesearch,primarilyopen-source,touncovernewRMAvisions.
Continuedmonitoring,usingopen-sourcetechniquesand(ifnecessary)standardclosed-sourcetechniques(e.g.,HumintandComint),focusedonRMAcandidatesthathavesurvivedtheinitialscreeningprocess.
AnRMAassessmentactivitythatconductstwotypesofassessment:
Initialscreening,toweedouttheequivalentofanti-gravityideasbutkeepinallthoseitemswithsomeprospectsofsuccess.
8EugeneGritton(RAND)andDavidSignori(thenattheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency[DARPA]andnowatRAND)
suggestedthistermtotheauthor.
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Continuedandmorecarefulassessment,overtime,tofollowpotential/seriousRMAcandidatesastheyevolveandmatureandseeiftheysurmountvariouschallengesandhurdles.
Asmentionedearlier,sinceoneneverknowswhenafutureRMAmayariseorcometofruition,thesecollectionandassessmentactivitiesmustbeestablishedinsuchawaythattheycanendureoveralongperiod.TheycanbecarriedoutintwoseparatebutcloselycoupledorganizationsinformationcollectioninsomesortofintelligenceorganizationandRMAassessmentinsomesortofanadvancedmilitaryresearchanddevelopmentorganizationortheycanbecarriedoutinanorganizationhavingcombinedcapabilities.Ineithercase:
Theorganizationcarryingouttheinformationcollectionactivitiesmustbeabletoaccessopensourcesofinformation(newspapers,periodicals,books,televisionandradiobroadcasts,conferences,etc.)onaneffective,worldwidebasis,andmustalsobeabletocalluponclosed-sourcehumintandcomintcollectiontechniqueswhereneeded.
TheorganizationcarryingouttheRMAassessmentactivitiesmusthaveaccesstocreativethinkerswithexpertiseinscience,technology,militarysystems,andmilitaryoperationscreativethinkerswhocancombine"outofthebox"thinkingwithanappreciationforpracticalrealities.9
ThisworldwideRMAbreakthroughwatchandassessmentactivity,ifproperlyimplementedinanenduringfashion,shouldensureU.S.
9DARPAisanobviouscandidatetobetheorganizationentrustedwithRMAassessmentactivities.Infact,itperformssomewhatsimilarfunctionstoday,albeitfocusedinanumberofareasDARPAmanagementhasidentifiedaspotentiallyrevolutionaryinsofarasU.S.militaryoperationsareconcerned,ratherthanencompassingtheentiretyofRMA"dreamsandvisions"throughouttheworld,whetherornottheywouldapplytoU.S.militaryforcesandthecurrentU.S.militarystrategy.
DARPAcertainlyhasaccesstocreative,"outofthebox"thinkerswithexpertiseinscience,technology,militarysystems,andmilitaryoperations.DARPAalsohasahistoryofcloseandfruitfulinteractionswithintelligenceagenciesskilledinaccessingopensourcesofinformationandinconductingclosed-sourcecollectionoperations.
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awarenessoffutureRMAsbeingcarriedoutbyothers.10ButbeingawareofemergingRMAsisnotenough;onemustalsoberesponsive.WeturntothatchallengeinChapterFive.
10InadditiontoalertingtheUnitedStatestoRMAthreatsbeingdevelopedbyothers(intimefortheUnitedStatestopreparecountermeasures),theRMAbreakthroughwatchcanalsogenerateRMAopportunitiesfortheUnitedStatestodevelopitself(astheGermansdidafterobservingthe1926BritishtankmaneuversontheSalisburyplain).
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ChapterFiveBeingResponsivetotheNextRMA:TheCharacteristicsofaFuture-OrientedMilitaryOrganizationBeingadequatelypreparedtocopewithanemergingRMAbeingdevelopedbyothersisatwofoldchallenge:
BeingawareofapotentialemergingRMA
BeingresponsivetotheimplicationsofthatRMA.
Failuretomeeteitheroneofthesechallengescanleadanationtomilitarydisaster.TheZuluswereunawareofthemachinegunRMAbeforetheBattleofUlundi,whichledthemtodisasterinthatbattle.TheBritishandFrencharmieswereawareoftheblitzkriegRMAwellbeforetheeventsofMay1940,butfailedtorespond;thisledthemtodisasterintheBattleofFlandersandthesubsequentBattleofFrance.
ChapterFourdealtwiththefirstofthesechallenges,describingtheessentialelementsofaworldwideRMAbreakthroughwatchandassessmentactivitydesignedtoensureawarenessoffutureRMAs.Thischapterdealswiththesecond.
OvercomingtheObstaclestoResponsiveness
EstablishedmilitaryorganizationsmoreoftenthannotfailtorespondadequatelytoemergingRMAsthreateningtheircorecompetencies,evenonesofwhichtheyareaware,primarilybecauseofinherentobstaclestothechangesnecessarytocopewithanRMA.ThiscanbethoughtofintermsofobstaclesinthepathofeachofthestepsintheRMAprocess;wetookthisviewpointinChapterThree.
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Itcanalsobethoughtof,moregenerally,intermsofgenericpsychologicalobstaclestotheorganizationallearningandchangenecessarytocopewithparadigmshifts,nomatterwhattheirshapeorform;1wewilltakethisviewpointhere.
PsychologicalobstaclestochangeareascommonforbusinessorganizationsconfrontingparadigmshiftsasformilitaryorganizationsconfrontingRMAs.AndrewGrove(1996,p.124),theco-founderandformerCEOofIntel,laysoutthetypicalstepsinanorganization'sresponsetoaparadigmshiftthreateningoneofitscorecompetencies:
Denial
Escapeordiversion
Acceptanceandpertinentaction.
HowdoesamilitaryestablishmentcopewithorganizationaldenialwhenconfrontedwithapotentialRMA?HowdoesamilitaryestablishmentcopewithorganizationalescapeordiversioninthefaceofapotentialRMA?HowdoesamilitaryestablishmentachieveacceptanceandpertinentactioninresponsetoapotentialRMA?Weaddressthesequestionsnext.
OvercomingDenial
Psychologiststellusthatthefirststageinanindividual'sresponsetothedeathofalovedoneisalmostalwaysdenial:psychologicaldenialthatthepersonisgone.Thesameistrueformilitaryorganizationsthreatenedwiththeforthcoming"death"ofacherishedcorecompetency(corecompetenciesareamilitaryorganization's"lovedones").
RecenthistoryisfullofexamplesofmilitaryorganizationsthatwereawareofanemergingRMAbutfailedtorespond,mostoftenbecause
ofdenial.IntheperiodbeforeWorldWarI,theleadersoftheinfantryandcavalryforcesofmostEuropeanarmieswereawareofthe
1Weuse"psychological"inthesenseoforganizationalpsychologyi.e.,thebehavioroforganizations.
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machinegunandwhatithadaccomplishedagainstnativearmiesinAfrica,buttheydeniedthepossibilitythatitwouldbeusedincombatbetweencivilizedarmiesinEurope,aswellasthepossibilitythatitcouldovercomethemoraleofproperlytrainedinfantryorthechargeofproperlymotivatedcavalry.IntheperiodbeforeWorldWarII,theleadersoftheBritishandFrencharmieswereawareoftheclaimsoftheproponentsofwhatbecametheblitzkriegRMA,buttheydenieditsefficacy.Thelistgoesonandon.
Howdoesoneovercomesuchorganizationaldenial?AccordingtoGrove(1996,pp.13):
Onlytheparanoidsurvive.Soonerorlater,somethingfundamentalinyourbusinessworldwillchange.
Whenitcomestobusiness,Ibelieveinthevalueofparanoia.Businesssuccesscontainstheseedsofitsowndestruction.Themoresuccessfulyouare,themorepeoplewantachunkofyourbusinessandthenanotherchunkandthenanotheruntilthereisnothingleft.Ibelievetheprimeresponsibilityofamanageristoguardconstantlyagainstotherpeople'sattacks[onhisorganization'scorecompetencies]andtoinculcatethisguardianattitudeinthepeopleunderhisorhermanagement.
Thisattitudeof"productiveparanoia"ourterm,notGrove'sisjustasapplicabletosuccessfulmilitaryorganizationsastosuccessfulbusinessorganizations.Abasicsenseofproductiveparanoiaregardingthefutureisausefulfirststepinovercomingorganizationaldenial,particularlyforadominantplayersuchastheU.S.military.
Butthat'snotallthatisrequired.AccordingtoMurrayandWatts(1995,p.85),basedontheiranalysisofinstancesofmilitaryinnovation(andnoninnovation)duringtheperiodbetweenWorldWarIandII:
Theevidence...attests,firstofall,totheimportanceofdevelopingvisionsofthefuture.Militaryinstitutionsnotonlyneedtomakeup-front
intellectualinvestmentstodevelopavisionoffuturewar,buttheymustcontinueagonizingoverthatvision,strugglingtodiscernhowthenextwarmaydifferfromthelast.
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MurrayandWatts(1995,p.85)andWattsandMurray(1996,p.407)recounttheimportanceofGeneralHansvonSeeckt's"postWorldWarIvisionofmobilewarfarebyahighlyprofessional,well-trained,well-ledarmy"tothesubsequentdevelopmentoftheblitzkriegconceptbytheGermanarmy.2
Thecombinedmessagefromthebusinessandmilitaryarenasisthatdenial(ofchange)canbeovercomebymaintainingabasicsenseofproductiveparanoiaregardingthefuture,andbydevelopingandcontinuallyrefiningavisionofhowthefuture(i.e.,futurewars)maydifferfromthepast.Twousefultechniquesforthedevelopmentofsuchvisionsoffuturewarsarewargaming,asemployedbyGardinerandFox,3andtheconceptofasymmetricstrategies,describedinBennettetal.(1994a,1994b,1998,1999).4,5
OvercomingEscapeorDiversion
Inthebusinessworld,escapeordiversionisoftenthenextstepinanorganization'sresponsetoanoncomingparadigmshift.TurningagaintoGrove(1996,pp.124125):
Escape,ordiversion,referstothepersonalactionsoftheseniormanager.Whencompaniesarefacingmajorchangesintheircorebusiness,theyseemtoplungeintowhatseemtobetotallyunre-
2GeneralvonSeecktwasheadoftheGermangeneralstaffandchiefoftheGermanarmyduringtheperiod19191926.Corum(1992)makesthissamepoint.3Intheir1995unpublishedRANDworkon"UnderstandingRevolutionsinMilitaryAffairs,"SamGardinerandDanielFoxconductedanextensiveseriesofwargamesexploringsixfuturewarsinSouthwestAsia.Thechallenge-responsecycleinthisse-riesoffutureGulfwarsfirstonesidegainstheadvantage,thentheothergeneratedacontinuallyevolvingvisionofhowfuturewarsmaydifferfrompreviouswars.4Theterm"asymmetricstrategies"denotesacertainclassofmilitary
strategies(oroperationalconcepts)employedbyanopponentofadominantmilitaryplayer.Thesestrategiesareasymmetricinthesensethattheydonotmimicthedominantplayer'sapproachtowarfare.Rather,theydeliberatelychooseadifferentwayofconductingcombatawaychosentonegatethedominantplayer'smanyadvantages.5Other"futuringtechniques"recentlyemployedinthebusinessormilitaryarenaswhichmaybeusefulhereinclude"scenario-basedplanning"(Schwartz,1991),"microworlds"(Senge,1990),"futuresearch"(WeisbordandJanoff,1995),''assumption-basedplanning"(Dewar,1993),"discovery-drivenplanning"(McGrathandMacMillan,1995,andChristensen,1997),and"TheDayAfter..."methodology(Molanderetal.,1996).
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lated[activities].Inmyview,alotoftheseactivitiesaremotivatedbytheneedofseniormanagementtooccupythemselvesrespectablywithsomethingthatclearlyandlegitimatelyrequirestheirattentiondayinanddayout,somethingthattheycanjustifyspendingtheirtimeonandmakeprogressininsteadoffiguringouthowtocopewithanimpendingstrategicallydestructiveforce.
Militaryorganizationsfacingparadigmshiftsareoftensubjecttothesamephenomena.
Howdoesoneovercomesuchorganizationalescapeordiversion?Developingandcontinuallyrefiningavisionofhowfuturewarsmaydifferfrompastwars,mentionedaboveasameansofovercomingdenial,willcertainlyhelpherealso.Broadandintensivedebateregardingthefutureoftheorganizationisalsoofvalue.InthewordsofGrove(1996,p.99):
Howdoweknowwhetherachangesignalsastrategicinflectionpoint[Grove'stermforaparadigmshift]?Theonlywayisthroughtheprocessofclarificationthatcomesfrombroadandintensivedebate.
Themessageisclear:escapeordiversioncanbeovercomebydevelopingandcontinuallyrefiningavisionofhowfuturewarsmaydifferfrompastwars,andbyfosteringanorganizationalclimateencouragingbroadandintensivedebateregardingthefutureoftheorganization.
AchievingAcceptanceandPertinentAction
Overcomingdenial,escape,anddiversioninthefaceofanemergingRMAisnottheendofthestory.Theorganizationmustthenunitebehindaneffectiveresponsetothechallenge(whatGrovecalls"acceptanceandpertinentaction").AccordingtoGrove(1996,p.121):
Resolutioncomesthroughexperimentation.Onlysteppingoutoftheold
rutswillbringnewinsights.
Or,inthewordsofMurrayandWatts(1995,p.88),basedontheiranalysisofmilitaryinnovationbetweenWorldWarIandII:
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Institutionalprocessesforexploring,testing,andrefiningconceptionsoffuturewar...areliterallythesinequanonofsuccessfulmilitaryinnovationinpeacetime.
Inboththebusinessandmilitaryarena,theremustbemechanismsavailablewithintheorganizationforexperimentationwithnewideas,eveniftheythreatentheorganization'scurrentcorecompetencies.
Moreisrequiredtoachieveacceptanceandpertinentaction.Rosen'sinvestigationofthepoliticsofpeacetimeinnovationin20thcenturymilitaryorganizationsshowsaneedfor(atleastsome)seniorofficerswithtraditionalcredentialswhosponsorthenewwaysofdoingthings(withinatleastpartoftheorganization).6InRosen'swords(p.76):
Innovationsoccurredwhenseniormilitaryofficerswereconvincedthatstructuralchangesinthesecurityenvironmenthadcreatedtheneed.Theseseniorofficers,whohadestablishedthemselvesbysatisfyingthetraditionalcriteriaforperformance,hadthenecessarypowertochampioninnovations.
GeneralvonSeecktplayedthisroleduringtheinitialstagesofdevelopmentoftheblitzkriegRMA;7AdmiralWilliamS.Sims(thepresidentoftheNavalWarCollegeduring19171922)8andRearAdmiralWilliamA.Moffett(thedirectoroftheU.S.Navy'sBureauofAeronauticsfrom1921to1933)playedthesameroleduringtheearlydevelopmentalstagesofthecarrieraviationRMA.9
Inaddition,newpromotionpathways(withinatleastpartoftheorganization)forjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayofwararealsonecessary.InthewordsofRosen(1991,p.251):
6SeeRosen(1991),pp.76105.7SeeCorum(1992).8InApril1917,AdmiralSimswascalledawayfromhisNavalWarCollegepositiontobecomeCommander,U.S.NavalForcesinEurope,inpreparationfortheU.S.entryintoWorldWarI.SimsreturnedtotheNavalWarCollege
inDecember1918,whereheremaineduntilhisretirementin1922.(SeeMurrayandWatts,1995,pp.6970.)9SeeTurnbullandLord(1949),Melhorn(1974),andMurrayandWatts(1995,pp.1922and6974).
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Peacetimeinnovationhasbeenpossiblewhenseniormilitaryofficerswithtraditionalcredentials,reacting...toa[perceived]structuralchangeinthesecurityenvironment,haveactedtocreateanewpromotionpathwayforjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayofwar.
Insummary,threethingsappeartobenecessarytoachieveacceptanceandpertinentactioninamilitaryorganizationconfrontedwithanemergingRMA:mechanismswithintheorganizationforexperimentationwithnewideas,seniorofficerswillingtosponsornewwaysofdoingthings,andnewpromotionpathwaysforjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayofwar.
TheCharacteristicsofaFuture-OrientedMilitaryOrganization
Thecharacteristicsofafuture-orientedmilitaryorganizationlikelytorespondadequatelytoanemergingRMAinclude:
"Productiveparanoia"regardingthefuture.
Acontinuallyrefinedvisionofhowwarmaychange.
Anorganizationalclimateencouragingvigorousdebateregardingthefutureoftheorganization.
Mechanismsavailablewithintheorganizationforexperimentationwithnewideas,evenonesthatthreatentheorganization'scurrentcorecompetencies.10
Seniorofficerswithtraditionalcredentialswillingtosponsornewwaysofdoingthings.
10AsarecentstudybytheCNO[ChiefofNavalOperations]ExecutivePanelshows,thisusuallyrequiresseparationoftherevolutionaryinnovativeactivitiesfromthemainstreamactivityofthemilitaryorganizationi.e.,inseparate,nonbureaucraticorganizations.R.RobinsonHarris(CAPT,USN),ExecutiveDirector,CNOExecutivePanel,"NavalWarfareInnovation,"briefingtoRAND,August5,1998;andThomas
Tesch,staffmember,CNOExecutivePanel,"NavalWarfareInnovationTaskForce,"briefingtotheCNOExecutivePanel,June16,1998.Christensen(1997)makesthesamepointregarding"disruptive"productinnovationinbusinessorganizations;tobesuccessfulitmustbecarriedoutinspeciallycreatedorganizationsseparatefromthemainstream.
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Newpromotionpathwaysforjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayofwar.
Possessingthesecharacteristicsisnoguaranteeoffuturesuccess.However,amilitaryestablishmentlackingoneormoreofthesecharacteristicsislesslikelytorespondadequatelytoanemergingRMA.
Thereisafinalchallenge:Thesecharacteristicsmustcomefromwithinthemilitaryestablishmentinquestion;theycannotbeimposedfromtheoutside.AsMurrayandWatts(1995,p.87)concludedbasedontheircasestudiesofmilitaryinnovationinthe1920sand1930s:
Thedynamicsevidentinthecasestudiessuggestthatthepotentialforcivilianoroutsideleadershiptoimposeanewvisionoffuturewaronareluctantmilitaryservicewhoseheartremainscommittedtoexistingwaysoffightingis,atbest,limited.
Thus,thisfuture-orientedmilitaryorganizationmustbewithinthemilitaryestablishmentinquestion(i.e.,theU.S.Army,Navy,AirForce,orMarineCorps)ratherthanoutside.
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PARTIII.BRINGINGABOUTFUTURERMAS(OFYOUROWN)
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ChapterSixWhatDoesitTaketoBringAboutaSuccessfulRMA?WhatdoesittakeforamilitaryorganizationtobringaboutanRMAofitsown,ratherthanmerelyrespondingtoanRMAbeingdevelopedbysomeoneelse?Historysuggeststhatallofthefollowingitemsareprobablynecessary:
Youmusthaveafertilesetofenablingtechnologies.
Youmusthaveunmetmilitarychallenges.
Youmustfocusonadefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things."
Youmustultimatelychallengesomeone'scorecompetency.
Youmusthaveareceptiveorganizationalclimate
thatfostersacontinuallyrefinedvisionofhowwarmaychangeand
thatencouragesvigorousdebateregardingthefutureoftheorganization.
Youmusthavesupportfromthetop
seniorofficerswithtraditionalcredentialswillingtosponsornewwaysofdoingthings
newpromotionpathwaysforjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayofwar.
Youmusthavemechanismsforexperimentation
todiscover,learn,test,anddemonstrate.
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Youmusthavesomewayofrespondingpositivelytotheresultsofsuccessfulexperiments
intermsofdoctrinalchanges,acquisitionprograms,andforcestructuremodifications.
Inwhatfollowsweexpandoneachoftheseitems.
YouMustHaveaFertileSetofEnablingTechnologies
Foratechnology-drivenRMA,youmusthaveafertilesetofenablingtechnologies.1Ithelpsgreatlyifthesetechnologiesarenewand/oremergingratherthanoldandmature:newandemergingtechnologiesaremuchmorelikelytobefertilebreedinggroundsforrevolutionarydevelopmentsthanold,maturetechnologies,whose"revolutions"areusuallywellinthepast.Indeed,militaryhistoryisfullofRMAsintheyearsimmediatelyfollowingmajoradvancesintechnology.Table6.1givesafewexamples.
YouMustHaveUnmetMilitaryChallenges
UnmetmilitarychallengesareessentialelementsdrivingcreativityateachstepintheRMAprocess.Withoutoneormorechallenges,technologiesareunlikelytobecombinedintodevicesanddevicesintosystems;andnewoperationalconcepts,doctrine,andforcestructuresareunlikelytobedeveloped.
Inferiormilitaryestablishments,particularlythosethatlostthelastwar,areusuallywellsuppliedwithunmetmilitarychallengesobviousunmetchallengesthatcanserveasadrivingforceforsubstantialchange.Thismaynotbethecaseforsuperiormilitaryestablishments,particularlythosethatwonthelastwar.Suchmilitaryorganizationsfrequentlyfeelontopoftheworld,withnoneedforchange,certainlynotradicalchange.SpecialattentionisthereforerequiredtomotivatetheRMAprocess.
1AsmentionedinChapterTwo,notallRMAshavebeentechology-driven.Butmostofthemhavebeen,andthefocusofrecentRMA-relateddiscussionsandofthisreportisontechnology-drivenRMAs.
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Table6.1TheTechnologiesBehindSomeRMAs
RMAPeriodof
DevelopmentEnablingTechnology
YearsofEmergencea
ICBM 19551965 Fusionweapons19501955Multistagerockets
19451955
Inertialguidance
19501955
Atomicbomb
19411945 Nuclearfission 1938
Carrierwarfare
19211939 Aviation 19001915
Radiocommunications
19001915
Blitzkrieg19211939 Tanks 19151918Radiocommunications
19001915
Divebombing 19211926aTheyearsofemergenceare(approximately)wheneachtechnologyfirstappeared.Eachcontinuedtodevelopandmatureformanyyears.
YouMustFocusonaDefinite"Thing"oraShortListof"Things"
Fertileenablingtechnologiesbythemselvesarenotenough.Theymustcometogetherinadefinite"thing":adeviceorsystemexploitingtheenablingtechnologiestogetherwithaconceptforoperationalemployment.Table6.2illustratesthis,showingthedevice/systemandemploymentconcept"things"involvedinseveralRMAs.
Themorefertileasetofenablingtechnologies,themorepossibilitiesitoffersforcombinationsofdevices,systems,andemployment
concepts,andthemoreofachallengeitistofocusdownontherightcombinationofdevice,system,andemploymentconcepttobringaboutanRMA.Thisfocusingprocesscantakeconsiderabletime;untilitoccursthereisnoRMA.
TheU.S.Navy'sexperienceindevelopingthecarrierwarfareRMAisillustrative.Beginningintheearly1910s,theNavyexperimentedwithanumberofairvehicles:seaplanes,flyingboats,planeswithwheels,andthreetypesoflighter-than-airvehicles(rigidairships,blimps,andkiteballoons);anumberofdifferentbasingconceptsfor
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Table6.2The"Things"InvolvedinSomeRMAs
RMA Device/System EmploymentConcept
ICBM Long-rangeballisticmissilewithfusionwarheadandinertialguidance
Bombardmentofstrategic,fixedtargets
Carrierwarfare
Wheeledplanesoperatingfromfast,flat-deckships
Airborneattackofnavalsurfacetargets
BlitzkriegTanks,two-wayradios,anddivebombers
Mobilemaneuverwarfare
Machinegun
Rapidfire,anti-personnelgun
Direct-fireweaponagainstmassedinfantryformations
theseairvehicles:airfieldsonland,seaplanetenders,shipswithcatapults,andshipswithflatdecksforlandingandtakeoff;andavarietyofmissions:scouting,spotting(thefallofnavalgunfire),airdefense(ofthefleet),attackoflandtargets(e.g.,navalbases),andattackofnavaltargets(e.g.,shipsatsea).Alloftheseairvehiclesweremadepossiblebytheevolvingaviationtechnology,aswereallofthebasingconcepts.AndallofthedifferentmissionsseemedofvaluetosomepartoftheU.S.Navy.
IttooktheNavyover20yearstoexperimentwiththedifferentcombinationsofairvehicle,basingconcept,andmissionapplicationandfinallyconcentrateonwheeledplanes,basedonfast,flat-deckshipsthatcouldkeepupwiththebattlefleetwhereveritwent(i.e.,fleetaircraftcarriers),tobeusedprimarilytoattacknavaltargetsandsecondarilyforairdefenseofthefleetthatis,thecarrierwarfareRMA,whichfinallyemergedinthe1930sandwasprovenincombat
in1942.2
2SeeTurnbullandLord(1949),Melhorn(1974),MurrayandWatts(1995),andWattsandMurray(1996)fordetaileddiscussionsoftheU.S.Navy'sdevelopmentofcarrieraviation.
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YouMustUltimatelyChallengeSomeone'SCoreCompetency
RMAsareallaboutcorecompetencies:creatingnewonesandupsettingoldones.TocreateanRMA,youhavetochallengeanexistingcorecompetencyofadominantmilitaryplayer.Thisisnatural(albeitpossiblydifficult)foranondominantplayertodo;itisnotsonaturalforadominantplayertodo,becauseitmayhavetochallengeoneofitsowncorecompetenciesitmayhavetorenderobsoletesomethingthatmakesitapowerful,superiormilitaryorganization.
Aswesaidearlier,historyisfullofexamplesofinferiormilitarypowersdevelopingRMAsthatovercomeasuperioropponent.Inmanyofthesecases,theinferiorpowerdeliberatelysetouttoupsetacorecompetencyofitssuperioropponent.TheGermanarmyunderGeneralvonSeecktdeliberatelysetoutinthe1920stoovercomethecorecompetencyoftheFrencharmy(demonstratedduringWorldWarI)forstaticdefenseofpreparedpositionsbyinfantryandartillery;theysucceededandcreatedtheblitzkriegRMA.3Somewhatearlier,theGermannavydevelopedandexploitedtheU-boat(duringWorldWarI)asacountertothedominant(surface)navalpoweroftheBritishnavy.Stillearlier,intheearly1800s,Napoleoncombinedthelevéeenmasse(themobilizationofmassarmies),thegrandebatterie(thephysicalmassingofartillery),the''attackcolumn,"andseveralothertacticalandoperationalinnovationsintoanoverallsystemofwartoovercomethePrussianarmy,thendominantinEuropeanwarfare.4Muchearlier,inthe1300s,theEnglishdeliberatelysetouttoovercomethenumericallysuperiorFrencharmy'scorecompetencyforman-to-mancombatbyknightsonhorsebackbyexploiting(inatacticalsystem/operationalconcept)thelongbowtechnologytheyhaddevelopedduringaseriesofcivilwarsinGreatBritain.
Again,therearefewhistoricalexamplesofasuperiormilitarypowerdevelopinganRMAthatupsetsoneofitscorecompetencies.ThedevelopmentofcarrierwarfarebytheU.S.Navyistheonlyclearexampleknowntothisauthor.Inthiscase,thedevelopersofU.S.navalaviationrenderedobsoletethecorecompetencyoftheU.S.
3SeeCorum(1992).4SeeDupuy(1984),pp.154168.
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battleshipforceforaccurate,overwhelmingnavalgunfire,acorecompetencythatmadetheU.S.Navyoneofthetwodominantnavalwarfareplayersintheworld(alongwiththeBritishnavy)attheendofWorldWarI.
However,thepeoplewhodevelopedU.S.navalaviationdidnotsetouttochallengethebattleship'scorecompetency;theyinitiallysetouttosupportthebattleshipforcetoprovidescoutingsupport,gunfirespottingsupport,andairdefensesupporttothebattleshipforce,sothatitcouldcontinuetodominateanddefeatanopposingbattleshipforce,anyopposingbattleshipforce,insurfacecombat.5ItwasonlyovertimethattheycametorealizethatcarrieraviationcouldreplacethebattleshipforceastheprincipalcombatforceoftheU.S.Navy.6
Youdonothavetostartoutchallengingsomeone'scorecompetency,althoughthatistheusualhistoricalpattern.Butultimatelyyouhavetomountsuchachallenge,oryouwillnothaveanRMA.
5Intheearly1920s,Brig.Gen.WilliamMitchelloftheArmyAirServicewastheapostleofthosewhobelievedthatairpowerwouldmakethebattleshipobsolete.(SeeMitchell,1921and1925).Theleadersofthethen-fledglingnavalaviationdidnotsubscribetoMitchell'sview.TheybroughtaboutthecreationoftheBureauofAeronauticsin1921explicitlytodevelopnavalaviationinsupportofthebattleshipforce,nottoeliminatethebattleship.(SeeTurnbullandLord,1949,andMelhorn,1974.)Thisprimaryfocusofnavalaviationasasupporttothebattleshipforcecontinuedthroughoutthe1920sandwellintothe1930s.Aslateas1938,theNavyversionofWarPlanOrange,theplanformilitaryoperationsagainstJapaninthePacific,envisagedcarriersaccompanyingthebattleshipforcetoprovidescoutingandairdefensesupportasitfoughtitswayacrossthePacifictoregainthePhilippines.(SeeMelhorn,1974.)6Somenavalaviatorscametothisrealizationearlierthanothers.AmongtheearliestwerethestaffofAircraftSquadrons,BattleFleet(COMAIRONS),whoin1928beganthinkingaboutthepossibilityofcarriertaskforcesoperatingindependentlyofthebattleshipforceconductingoffensive
operations(includingattackingopposingbattlefleets).TheCOMAIRONSstaffplannedthefirstsuchindependentcarriertaskforceoperation,conductedduringthe1929fleetexercise:ThecarrierUSSSaratoga(CV-3)accompaniedbythecruiserOmahabrokeofffromthemainRedforceoffthecoastofsouthernMexico,steamed660milessoutheast,andthennortheastaroundtheopposingBlueforceovera24-hourperiod,pasttheGalapagosIslands,alongthenorthcoastofSouthAmerica,andintotheGulfofPanama.Then150milesoffofthePanamaCanal(Red'sobjectiveinthefleetexercise),itlauncheda66-planeairstrikethat(theoretically)destroyedthelocksoftheCanalandheavilydamagedArmyairfieldsintheCanalZone.(SeeWilson,1950.)
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YouMustHaveaReceptiveOrganizationalClimate
WesaidinChapterFivethatyouneedareceptiveorganizationalclimatetorespondtosomeoneelse'sRMA.Youalsoneedonetodevelopyourown.Youneedanorganizationalclimatethatencouragesvigorousdebateregardingthewaysinwhichwarmaychangeandtheimpactofthosechangesonthemilitaryorganizationinquestion.Youneedaclimatethatencourageschange,wantstheorganization'sfuturetobedifferentfromitspast,andthatwantsandwelcomeschange.YouneedthisreceptiveorganizationalclimateevenmoreiftheRMAinquestion,inthiscaseinternallyratherthanexternallygenerated(thecaseinChapterFive),threatensacorecompetencyoftheorganization.Ittakesabraveorganizationtomakeapartofitselfobsolete.Historically,thishasbeenrareinthemilitaryworld.
Ithasalsobeenrareinthebusinessworldrarebutnotunknown.Therehavebeenafewcompaniesthatforperiodsoftimehavehaddeliberatepoliciesofmakingtheirleadingproducts(i.e.,theircorecompetencies)obsolete,ofmakingthemobsoletebeforesomeoneelsedid,andhadorganizationalclimatessupportingthesepolicies.7Theseexamplesshowthatitcanbedone,thatsuchorganizationalclimatescanexist.
Inanutshell,ifamilitaryorganizationwantstobringaboutasuccessfulRMA,itmusthaveareceptiveorganizationalclimate.IfthemilitaryorganizationisadominantplayerandwantstobringaboutanRMAthatupsetsoneofitscorecompetencies,itmusthaveaveryreceptiveorganizationalclimate.
YouMustHaveSupportFromtheTop
WealsosaidinChapterFivethatyouneedsupportfromthetoptorespondtosomeoneelse'sRMA.Youneedsupportfromthetopto
developyourown,too.Youneed(atleast)twotypesofsupport:seniorofficerswithtraditionalcredentialswillingtosponsornewwaysofdoingthings,andnewpromotionpathwaysforjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayofwar.BothareessentialifanRMAistooccur.
7Intelisarecentexampleofsuchacompany.(SeeGrove,1996.)
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TheU.S.NavyhadbothoftheseduringtheperiodbetweenthetwoWorldWars.SeveralNavyadmiralsprovidedessentialsupportatcrucialperiodsduringthedevelopmentofcarrieraviation,mostnotablyincludingAdmiralWilliamS.SimsandRearAdmiralWilliamA.Moffett.Promotionofnavalaviatorstotherankofcommanderandcaptainwasaproblemintheearlyyears,butfromthemid-1930son,allcaptainscommandingcarriersandnavalairstationshadtobequalifiednavalaviators;thisprovidedapromotionpathwaytohigherranks.8
TheU.S.Army,ontheotherhand,didnothavehigh-levelsupportduringtheinterwarperiodforchangesinthewayitwagedwar,particularlychangesinvolvingnewwaysofemployingtanksoraircraft.NotonlydidthegeneralscommandingthetraditionalbranchesoftheArmy(infantry,artillery,andcavalry)opposethedevelopmentofinnovativewaysofusingtanksandaircraft,theyalsoputpromotionroadblocksinthewayofanyofficerspersistingincareersinthefledglingArmoredCorpsorArmyAirCorps.9
Insum,theinnovatorsintheU.S.Navyhadsupportfromthetopduringtheinterwarperiod;theyproducedthecarrierwarfareRMA.TheinnovatorsintheU.S.Armylackedsuchsupport;theArmyenteredWorldWarIIwithbotharmorandaviationdoctrineandtechnologymarkedlyinferiortothatoftheGermans.10
YouMustHaveMechanismsforExperimentation
TobringaboutanRMA,amilitaryorganizationmusthavemechanismsavailablewithintheorganizationforexperimentationwithnewideas,todiscover,learn,test,anddemonstrate:
8SeeTurnbullandLord(1949).9SeeJohnson(1990and1998)foradetaileddiscussionofhowtheU.S.Army"gotitwrong"regardingthedevelopmentofinnovativearmorand
aviationdoctrinesandtechnologiesduringthe1920sand1930s.AsbutoneofmanyexamplesofpromotionroadblocksputinthewayofjuniorArmyofficerswantingtopursuenewwaysofwar,bothDwightEisenhowerandGeorgePattonwereadvisedtotransferoutoftheArmoredCorpsiftheyeverwantedtomakemajor.(PrivatecommunicationfromDavidE.Johnson,1998.)10SeeJohnson(1990and1998).
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Todiscoverwhatyoucandowithnewtechnologiesandcombinationsofnewtechnologies,whatnewdevicesandsystemsbecomepossible,whatexistingmilitarytaskscanbedonedifferently,whatnewmilitarytasksbecomeachievable,whatworksandwhatdoesnot.
Tolearnwhatcombinationsofdeviceandsystemparametersworkbest,whatoperationalconceptsthenewdevicesandsystemssupportwellandwhichonestheydonotsupportwell,whichoperationalconceptsappearmorepromisingandwhichlesspromising,whatworksbetterandwhatdoesn'tworkaswell,whatmakessenseandwhatdoesnot.
Totestpromisingdevice,system,andoperationalconceptcombinationsinawidevarietyofreal-worldcircumstances,therebyfocusingonthecombinationofdevice(s),system(s),andemploymentconcept(s)mostlikelytobringaboutanRMA.
Todemonstrate,finally,thatthechosensetofdevice(s),system(s),andoperationalconcept(s)offersthepotentialforarevolutionaryimprovementinmilitarycapabilitiesinreal-worldconflictsituations.
Theseexperimentalmechanismsmustallowonetotakerisksandfail(fromtimetotime),particularlyintheearlierdiscoverandlearnstagesbutalsointheteststage.Itisthroughtakingrisks,failingfromtimetotime,andtherebylearningwhatdoesnotworkthatthenecessaryfocusingdiscussedearlierisaccomplished.
Theseexperimentalmechanismsmustbeavailableevenfornewideasthatthreatentheorganization'scurrentcorecompetencies.Thiscanbedifficult.Itusuallyrequiresseparationoftheexperimentalactivitiesinvolvingrevolutionaryinnovationfromthemainstreamactivityofthemilitaryorganizationi.e.,insomeseparate,nonbureaucraticorganizations.11
(footnotecontinuedonnextpage)
11TheU.S.Navy'sCNOExecutivePanelmakesthispointstronglyinitsrecentinvestigationofinnovationinnavalwarfare.Seefootnote10inChapterFive."Nonbureaucratic"isthetermitusestodescribetherequiredorganizationalattribute.Inthebusinessarena,Christensen(1997)makesasimilarpointregardingtheprocessofdiscoveryrequiredtofindmarketsfornewproductsthatthreatentodisruptthemainstreamproductlinesofacompany;tobesuccessfulthesemarketdiscoveryactiv-
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TheU.S.Navy'sdevelopmentofcarrieraviationfollowedthepatternoutlinedhere.TheearlynavalaviationexperimentswerecarriedoutseparatefromthemainstreamNavyinanumberoftemporaryorganizationsduringthe1910sandbytheBureauofAeronauticsfrom1921onandfeaturedagreatdealofdiscovery(ofwhatworkedandwhatdidnot)andlearning(whatworksbetterandwhatlesswell,whatmakessenseandwhatdoesnot)intheearlystages.Itwasnotuntilfleetexercisesbeginningin1929thatinnovativecarrieraviationexperiments(ofthetestanddemonstratevariety)werecarriedoutinconjunctionwithmainstreamNavyactivities.12
YouMustHaveSomeWayofRespondingPositivelytotheResultsofSuccessfulExperiments
Evenifeverythingworksyouhaveafertilesetoftechnologies,youfocusonagoodideathatchallengessomeone'scorecompetency,youhaveareceptiveorganizationalclimateandsupportfromthetop,youhavemechanismsforexperimentation(evenforanideathatthreatensoneofyourorganization'scorecompetencies),andtheexperimentssuccessfullydemonstratethetechnicalfeasibility,operationalutility,andpotentiallyrevolutionaryimpactofyourRMAcandidateyoustillneedmorebeforeyouhaveanRMA.Youneedwaysofrespondingpositivelytosuccessfulexperimentsintermsofdoctrinalchanges,acquisitionprograms,andforcestructuremodifications.Thesearethefinalthreehurdles.
DoctrinalChanges
DoctrinalchangestoaccommodateandfullyexploitthenewdeviceorsystemareanessentialelementofanysuccessfulRMA.13Future-orientedmilitaryorganizationshavemechanismsforperiodicallyrethinking,refining(insmallways),andrevising(inbigways)theiroperationaldoctrine.RMAsusuallyrequiremajordoctrinalchanges.
(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)
itiesmustbecarriedoutinspeciallycreatedorganizationsseparatedfromthemainstream.12SeeTurnbullandLord(1949)andMelhorn(1974)fordetailsofthe20-plusyearsofNavyexperimentsthatledtothecarrierwarfareRMA.13Asindicatedearlier,militarydoctrinenormallyincludesagreed-uponconceptsofoperation,tactics,andprinciplesofstrategy.
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OnemightassumethattherethinkingleadingtoRMA-relateddoctrinalchangesnormallycomesaftersuccessfulexperimentshaveproventhepotentialoftheprospectiveRMA;thishasnotalwaysbeenso.Inthecaseofcarrieraviation,AdmiralSimsbeganaseriesofstrategicandtacticalexercisesattheNavalWarCollegein1919toexploretheuseofaircraftinnavaloperations.TheseWarCollegegamingexercisescontinuedthroughoutthe1920sand1930s,inparallelwiththeBureauofAeronautics'developmentofnavalaviationtechnologyandexperimentswithsystems,basingconcepts,andoperationalconcepts.Theyledtoanevolvingseriesofdoctrinesfortheemploymentofnavalaviation,culminatinginthecarrierwarfaredoctrineof19411942.Inthiscase,thedoctrinalrethinkingwascarriedoutinparallelwiththeRMAexperiments.14
Inatleastonecase,theGermandevelopmentoftheblitzkrieg,thedoctrinalrethinkingtookplacelargelybeforetheRMAexperiments.UndertheleadershipofGeneralHansvonSeecktbetween1919and1926,theGermanarmydevelopedadoctrineofmobile,maneuverwarfarethatemphasizedcombinedarmsandindependentactionbycommandingofficersatalllevels;itwasdesignedtoregainprimacyfortheoffense(incontrasttothedefensedominanceofWorldWarI).Thisdoctrinaldevelopmentwaslargelycompleteby1926whenvonSeecktsteppeddownasheadoftheGermanarmy.Overthenexttenyears,theGermansproceededtodevelopthedevices/systems(thetank,two-waytacticalradio,anddivebomber)andforcestructure(thepanzerdivision)tobringthisdoctrinetofulfillmentintheblitzkrieg.15
TheU.S.Navy'sdevelopmentofcarrierwarfareandtheGermanarmy'sdevelopmentoftheblitzkriegarecaseswherethedoctrinalchangesnecessarytorealizeanRMAwereaccomplishedinastraightforwardfashion.AswediscussedinChapterThree,manypotentialRMAshavefailedbecauseofdoctrinalhurdles.Inthe1920s
and1930s,forexample,theAmericanandBritishadvocatesofnewlandwarfareparadigmsexploitingthetankwereunabletobring
14TurnbullandLord(1949)andMelhorn(1974)discussthecentralrolethattheNavalWarCollegegamingexercisesinitiatedbyAdmiralSimsplayedintheNavy'sdevelopmentofcarrierwarfaredoctrine.15SeeCorum(1992)foradetaileddiscussionofvonSeeckt'sroleindevelopingtheconceptualfoundationsfortheblitzkrieg.
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aboutthenecessarydoctrinalchangesbecauseofoppositionfromleadersofthetraditionalbranches(infantry,artillery,andcavalry)oftheU.S.andBritisharmies.16
DoctrinalchangesprobablymostoftencomeaftersuccessfulRMAexperiments,althoughsometimestheycomeinparallelwiththeexperiments,andonatleastoneoccasiontheycamebeforetheRMAexperimentsbuttheyalwaysmustcome,ortherewillnotbeanRMA.
ResponsiveAcquisitionPrograms
AmilitaryacquisitionsystemabletorespondpositivelytoradicalinnovationsisanothernecessaryelementofanysuccessfulRMA.17Thechallengehereishowthemilitaryservice'sacquisitionsystemdealswithrisk,specificallyriskassociatedwithuncertaintiesregardingthemilitaryneedandutilityofthecandidateRMA.SuchuncertaintiesoftenpersistupuntilthemomenttheRMAisproveninbattle.18
Typically,militaryacquisitionsystemsaresetuptodealwithnewequipmentembodyingevolutionaryimprovementsinmilitarycapability,operatingwithinthewell-definedcontextofexistingdoctrine(i.e.,operationalconcepts,tactics,andstrategy).Suchimprovementsusuallyinvolvelimitedandwell-understoodrisk,ofbothatechnicalandmilitary-utilitynature,andmeetawell-recognizedmilitaryneed.Operatinginthisenvironment,present-daymilitaryacquisitionsystemsarenormallydesignedtoberiskadverse,takingasfewchancesaspossibleandusuallyrequiringthatalluncertainties(regardingtechnicalissues,militaryneed,andmilitaryutility)areresolvedbeforefull-scaleproductionbegins.19
16Johnson(1990and1998)discussestheU.S.Army'slackofdoctrinalinnovationduringthe1920sand1930s.17By"militaryacquisitionsystem"wemeanthetotalityofrules,regulations,
processes,andproceduresgoverningtheacquisitionofnewequipmentforthemilitaryserviceinquestion.18CandidateRMAsofteninvolvetechnicalrisks,buttheyareusuallyresolvedearlierinthedevelopmentprocessthanarethemilitary-utilityrisks.19TheDoD5000Series'policiesandproceduresisanexampleofsucharisk-adverseacquisitionsystem.SeeDoD(1996and1997).
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AnRMApresentsadifficultsituationforsuchanacquisitionsystem,evenaftertheRMA'spotentialhasbeendemonstratedinasuccessfulexperiment.Whiletheprincipaltechnicalissuesmayhavebeenresolved,themilitaryneedandutilityofthenewRMAsystemmaystillbeindoubt,oratleasthighlycontroversial,becauseitinvolvesanewconceptofoperation,newtactics,andperhapsevenanewstrategyalluntestedinbattle.Theusualacquisitionsystem,withitsnumerousrisk-reduction/eliminationmilestones,offersnumerousopportunitiesfordisbelieversinoropponentsoftheRMAtoimpedetheacquisitionprocessbyraisingquestionsregardinguncertaintiesandrisk.20
WhatisrequiredforamilitaryacquisitionsystemtorespondeffectivelyandefficientlytoanRMAisthatabranchoftheacquisitionsystembesetuptohandlenovelandradicalinnovations.ThisRMAbranchoftheacquisitionsystemshouldtoleratesubstantialmilitary-utilityriskstoamuchlaterstageintheacquisitionprocess,insomecasesallthewaytoinitialoperationalcapability(IOC).ThestagesanddecisionpointsinthisnewacquisitionbranchshouldbeconstructedinkeepingwiththelikelyuncertaintiesateachstageintheRMAprocess,withanemphasisonfosteringnovel/radicalinnovationsratherthanavoidingmistakesandsavingmoney.21
ForceStructureModifications
Finally,aftereverythingelseisaccomplished,theforcestructureofthemilitaryorganizationinquestionmustbemodifiedtoaccommodatenewunitsequippedwiththenewdevicesandsystems,operatingaccordingtothenewdoctrine.InthecaseofthecarrierwarfareRMA,thenewandessentialforcestructureelementwasthecarriertaskforce,organizedaroundtheaircraftcarrierwithsupportingcruisersanddestroyers.Theconceptofacarriertaskforcewasfirst
20Ifthenewsystemisatallnovel(andRMAsare),therewillalwaysbe
uncertaintiesanddisbelievers.IfthecandidateRMAchallengesanycorecompetencyofthemilitaryorganizationinquestion,therewillalwaysbeopponents.21Birkleretal.(1999)proposethatjustsuchabranchbeaddedtotheDoDacquisitionprocess,tohandlenovelandradicalinnovationswhetherornottheyqualifyasRMAs.
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triedoutbytheU.S.Navyduringthe1929fleetexercise.22Followingitssuccessinthatexercise,carriertaskforceswereplayedinmostsubsequentfleetexercisesduringthe1930s.By1941thecarriertaskforcewasarecognizedelementoftheNavy'scombatorganization.23
InthecaseoftheblitzkriegRMA,thenewandessentialforcestructureelementwasthepanzerdivision,madeupofacombined-armsteamoftanks,motorizedinfantry,artillery,reconnaissancetroops,engineers,andsupportandsupplyunits.Thepanzerdivisionwasdevelopedinthe1930sbyHeinzGuderian,onthedoctrinalandequipmentfoundationsestablishedbyvonSeecktandhisfollowersinthe1920s.24
Toalargeextent,thecarriertaskforcesintheU.S.NavyinDecember1941(priortoPearlHarbor)andthepanzerdivisionsintheGermanarmyinSeptember1939(priortotheinvasionofPoland)andMay1940(priortotheinvasionofTheNetherlands,Belgium,andFrance)wereadd-onstothepreviouslyexistingforcestructures,notreplacementsformajorelementsofthosestructures.ThebulkoftheGermanarmyin19391940andthebulkoftheU.S.Navyin1941wereorganizedin"pre-RMA"units.25
ThisistypicalofthehistoryofpastRMAs.Mostoften,thenewRMAelementsaretreatedasadd-onstotheexistingforcestructureuntilthecandidateRMAhasbeenproveninbattle.26Majorreplacements
22SeeWilson(1950).23Aslateas19401941,manyoftheU.S.Navy'sleaderscontinuedtoviewthecarriertaskforces'primarywartimemissionassupporttothebattleshipforce,notindependentoperations.FollowingPearlHarbor,however,thecarriertaskforceshadtowageindependentoperationsagainsttheJapanesenavy;essentiallyalloftheU.S.battleshipsinthePacifichadbeensunkorheavilydamaged.24SeeGuderian(1952),Macksey(1975),andCorum(1992).Thiswasone
ofGuderian'stwokeycontributionstotheblitzkriegRMA;theotherwashisoperationalleadershipinPoland(September1939)andFlanders(May1940).25Forexample,theGermanforceinvadingPolandonSeptember1,1939,includedsixpanzerdivisions,fourlightpanzerdivisions,and48old-fashionedinfantrydivisions;theGermanforceinvadingTheNetherlands,Belgium,andFranceonMay10,1940,included10panzerdivisionsand126infantrydivisions.(SeeChurchill,1948,pp.442443;andChurchill,1949,pp.2931.)26Thecarriertaskforceadd-onstotheU.S.Navy'sforcestructureinthe1930swerefinanciallypossiblebecauseoftheexpenditureincreasesinitiatedbytheRooseveltAdministrationbeginningin1934aseconomicstimulants.Ifthebudgetpoliciesof
(footnotecontinuedonnextpage)
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ofoldforcestructureelementsbyRMAelementsdonotoccuruntilafterthathashappened.
*
Withafertilesetofenablingtechnologies,unmetmilitarychallenges,focusonadefinite''thing"orashortlistof"things,"achallengetosomeone'scorecompetency,areceptiveorganizationalclimate,supportfromthetop,mechanismsforexperimentation,andwaystorespondpositivelytosuccessfulexperimentsintermsofdoctrinalchanges,acquisitionprograms,andforcestructuremodificationsandatleastone"brilliantidea"amilitaryorganizationhasareasonablechanceofbringingaboutasuccessfulRMA.Withoutanyoneoftheseelements,thechancesaremuchless,evenifthereisabrilliantidea,andhistorysuggeststheRMAprocessislikelytofail.
(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)
theHarding,Coolidge,andHooveradministrationshadbeencontinuedinthe1930s,theseforce-structureadd-onswouldnothavebeenpossible.(SeeTurnbullandLord,1949,pp.284295.)
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ChapterSevenDod'SCurrentForceTransformationActivities:DoesAnythingAppeartobeMissing?WhatCanbeDonetoFillintheMissingElements?Sincepublicationofthe1997QuadrennialDefenseReview(QDR)(Cohen,1997),theDoDhasbeeninvolvedinaconcertedeffortto"transform"theU.S.military,motivatedbyafourfoldsetofobjectives:1
ToachievetheoperationalgoalsoutlinedinJointVision2010(JV2010)(dominantmaneuver,precisionengagement,full-dimensionalprotection,focusedlogistics)(Shalikashvili,1996;andJointStaff,1997)
Tobringaboutthecostsavingsnecessarytopayforforcemodernization2
Toachieveanew,affordableforcestructurethatcanbemaintainedinthefuture(inthewordsoftheQDR,"morecapabilityforlessmoney")3
Totakeadvantageofthe[so-called]revolutioninmilitaryaffairscurrentlyongoing"theRMA."
1Davisetal.(1998)pointoutthatforcetransformationisalsonecessarytomeetfuturemilitarychallenges,"alreadyvisibleandcertaintoworsen."2Muchofthecapitalequipment(e.g.,planes,tanks,ships)oftheU.S.militaryisagingandgraduallywearingout.Soonerorlaterthisequipmentmustbereplaced.Thus,theforcemustbemodernizedwhetherornotitis"transformed."3ItappearsthatthecurrentU.S.forcestructurecannotbemaintainedwithinlikelyfuturebudgetlevels.Transformationisneededtoshifttheforceto
smallerbutmorecapableforces.OtherwisetheU.S.militarywilllosecapabilitiesandthenation'sabilitytoshapetheinternationalenvironmentwillbereduced.TransformationisthereforeanecessityfortheDoD,notanoption.(SeeDavisetal.,1998.)
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Wefirstbrieflydescribetheforcetransformationeffort.
Today'SForceTransformation/RMAActivities
Thecurrenteffortsto"transformtheforce"arebroadbased,extendingacrosstheDoD.DoDcomponentsinvolvedincludeOSD,theJointStaff,theAtlanticCommand(ACOM),theServices(Army,Navy,MarineCorps,andAirForce),andtheDefenseScienceBoard(DSB).Forcetransformationactivitiesthusfarinclude:4
Thedevelopmentofseveralfuturevisionsofwarfare,includingtheChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff'sJointVision2010,theAirForce's"GlobalEngagement,"theArmy's"ArmyVisionXXI,"theNavy's"Forward...fromtheSea,"andtheMarineCorps'"OperationalManeuverfromtheSea."
Theestablishmentofanumberoflaboratoriesdedicatedtoexploringnewwaysofwarfare,includingtheJointWarfightingCenter,theJointBattleCenter,anumberofArmyandAirForceBattleLabs,theNavySea-BasedBattleLab,andtheMarineCorpsWarfightingLab.
Anumberofwargamesexploringnewwaysofwarfare,includingOSDNetAssessmentwargames,theArmyAfterNextWargames,theNavy'sGlobalWargameseriesandStrategicConceptsWargames,theMarineCorpsConceptGameseries,andtheAirForce'sGlobalEngagementWargames.
Anumberofdevelopmentalandfieldexperiments,includingAdvancedConceptTechnologyDemonstrations(ACTDs)andAdvancedTechnologyDemonstrations(ATDs)conductedunderthesponsorshipandsupervisionoftheUndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisitionandTechnology(USDA&T),JointexperimentssponsoredbytheJointStaff(e.g.,theJ-6'sInformationSuperiorityexperiments),ArmyAdvancedWarfightingexperi-
4ThislistingofDoDforcetransformation-relatedactivitiesisbasedonmaterialfromEdwardL.WarnerIII(AssistantSecretaryofDefense,StrategyandThreatReduction),"PreparingNowforanUncertainFuture:ModernizationandtheRMA,"andGeorgeT.SingleyIII(ActingDirector,DefenseResearchandEngineering),"DoDResearchandDevelopment:PlanningforMilitaryModernization,"briefingspresentedatDefenseWeek's18thAnnualDefenseConference,December10,1997.
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ments(e.g.,WarriorFocusandForceXXI),NavyFleetBattleexperimentsand"DistantThunder"AntisubmarineWarfare(ASW)experiments,MarineSeaDragonexperiments,andAirForceExpeditionaryForceexperiments.
Neworganizationalarrangements,includingtheArmy'sbrigade-sizedExperimentalForce(EXFOR),andtheAirForce'sAirExpeditionaryForcesandinformationwarfare(IW)andunmannedaerialvehicle(UAV)squadrons.
Theseactivitiesarepursuingvarioustechnology/device/system/operationalemploymentconceptcombinations,manyofwhichprobablyrepresentevolutionaryimprovementsoncurrentwaysofwagingwar,butseveralofwhichcouldpossiblyleadtoRMAs.Amongspecificconceptsproposedasthekernelof"theRMA"arethefollowing:
Long-RangePrecisionFires.ThisRMAcandidatewasproposedbyAndrewMarshall(Director,OSDNetAssessment)inhistwoinitialRMApapers(1993and1995).Itwasalsoproposed,inmoredetail,byWalterMorrow(CNOExecutivePanel)(1997).TheessenceofthisideaisexpressedbyMarshall(1995):5
Long-rangeprecisionstrikeweaponscoupledtoveryeffectivesensorsandcommandandcontrolsystemswillcometodominatemuchofwarfare.Ratherthanclosingwithanopponent,themajoroperationalmodewillbedestroyinghimatadistance.
InformationWarfare.ThisRMAcandidatewasalsoproposedbyAndrewMarshallinhistwoRMApapers.IthasalsobeenimplicitlyproposedbyRogerMolanderandhiscolleagues(1996)in
5Long-rangeprecisionfireshavebeenunderactivedevelopmentforatleast20years.MorrisonandWalker(1978)quoteWilliamPerry(thenDirectorofDefenseResearchandEngineering)assaying:
[TheUnitedStatesis]convergingveryrapidly[onthreeobjectives:]tobeabletoseeallhigh-valuetargetsonthebattlefieldatanytime,tobeabletomakeadirecthitonanytargetwecansee,andtobeabletodestroyanytargetwecanhit...[inorderto]makethebattlefielduntenableformostmodernforces.
AlthoughnotexpressedinRMAterms,thisisclearlyanearlyexpressionofthelong-rangeprecisionfiresconcept.
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theirworkonstrategicinformationwarfare.TheessenceofthisideaisalsoexpressedbyMarshall(1995):
Theinformationdimensionoraspectofwarfaremaybecomeincreasinglycentraltotheoutcomeofbattlesandcampaigns.Therefore,protectingtheeffectiveandcontinuousoperationofone'sowninformationsystems,andbeingabletodegrade,destroyordisruptthefunctioningoftheopponent's,willbecomeamajorfocusoftheoperationalart.
SystemofSystems.ThisRMAcandidatewasfirstexplicitlyproposedbyAdmiralWilliamA.Owens(ViceChairman,JointChiefsofStaff)(1996).IthassubsequentlybeenelaboratedonbyBlaker(1997).Theessenceofthisideaisthatcombiningavastassemblageofintelligencecollection,surveillance,andreconnaissance(ISR);advancedcommand,control,communications,computers,andintelligenceprocessing(C4I);andprecision-weaponsystemsresultsinawholewithcapabilitiesmuchgreaterthanthesumoftheparts.6
Network-CentricWarfare.ThisRMAcandidatewasproposedbyViceAdmiralArthurK.CebrowskiandhiscolleaguesinJointStaff/J-6(CebrowskiandGarstka,1998).Thenetwork-centricwarfareconceptemploysanoperationalarchitectureinvolvingthreegridstoenabletheoperationalobjectivesofJV2010:an"InformationGrid,"a"SensorGrid,"andan"EngagementGrid."TheInformationGridprovidesthecomputingandcommunicationsbackbonefortheothertwogrids.TheSensorGridisanassemblageofspace,air,ground,sea,andcyberspacesensorsandsensortasking,processing,andfusionapplications,providingbattlespaceawareness.TheEngagementGrid,anassemblageofplatformsandweapons,exploitsthisbattlespaceawarenesstoenabletheJV2010forceemploymentobjectivesofprecisionengagement,dominantmaneuver,andfull-dimensionalprotec-
6Somewhatearlier,Perry(1991and1994)alsodiscussedthesystem-of-
systemsconcept,althoughnotstrictlyintheRMAcontext.
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tion.Eachofthesethreegridsisconnectedandfunctionsinanetworkfashion.7
CooperativeEngagementCapability.Thisconcepthasbeenproposed,developed,anddemonstratedbytheU.S.Navy.8TheessenceofthisconceptasappliedtoaNavybattlegroupisthat
combatsystems[ongeographicallyseparatedplatforms]shareunfilteredsensormeasurementdataassociatedwithtrackswithrapidtimingandprecisiontoenablethebattlegroupunitstooperateasone[intheirengagementofenemytargets].(APL,1995.)
Ratherthanastand-aloneRMAcandidate,thisconceptshouldprobablybethoughtofasanimportantharbingerofnetwork-centricwarfare.
Thereareundoubtedlyadditionalitemsthatcouldbeaddedtothislist.
DoesAnythingAppeartobeMissing?
DoesanythingappeartobemissingfromtheseDoDforcetransformation/RMAactivities?BasedonthehistoryofpastRMAsandtheRMAchecklistwedevelopedinChapterSix,theanswerseemstobe"yes."Table7.1summarizesourassessment;weelaborateinwhatfollows.
EnablingTechnologies
Theongoinginformationrevolutionisclearlyprovidingafertilesetofenablingtechnologies.
7ThenotionofanRMAemergingfromnetworkingdistributedsensorsandweaponshadearlierbeenbroachedinaneverdistributed1991study,"Project2025,"bytheNationalDefenseUniversity'sInstituteforNationalStrategicStudies.ThetechnologyportionsofProject2025werelaterpublishedinLibicki(1994)andinArquillaandRonfeldt(1997,Chapter8).
8SeeAPL(1995).
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Table7.1DoesAnythingAppeartoBeMissingfromDoD's
CurrentRMAActivities?RMAChecklist DoD'sCurrent
SituationYoumusthaveafertilesetofenablingtechnologies
Weclearlyhavethis
Youmusthaveunmetmilitarychallenges
Wehaveseveralofthese(butaretheycompellingenough?)
Youmusthaveareceptiveorganizationalclimate
WemayhavethisinsomeServices(butnotinothers)
Youmusthavesupportfromthetop
Wehavethis(butdoesitincludealloftheServices?)
Youmusthavemechanismsforexperimentation(todiscover,learn,test,anddemonstrate)
Wehavethese(butdotheyencourage"risky"experiments?)
Youmustfocusonadefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things"
Thusfar,thisseemstobemissing
Youmustultimatelychallengesomeone'scorecompetency
Thusfar,thisseemstobemissing
Youmusthavewaysofrespondingpositivelytosuccessfulexperiments(intermsofdoctrine,acquisition,andforcestructure)
Thiscouldbeaproblem(cantheDoDsystemrespondpositivelytoariskynewidea?)
MilitaryChallenges
EventhoughtheUnitedStatesisnowcommonlybelievedtobetheworld'sonlysuperpower,therearestillmilitarytasksitcannot
performasconfidentlyasitwouldlikeinawiderangeofcircumstances.Moreover,theseunmet(oratleastnottotallymet)challengesarelikelytogrowinnumber.9
Butarethesechallenges,particularlythosefuturechallengesthatarenothereyetforalltoseeandnonetodeny,compellingenoughto
9TheQDR(Cohen,1997)sketchesoutsomeofthesechallenges;RANDworkonasymmetricthreats(Bennettetal.,1994a,1998,1999)identifiesstillothers.
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causeconservativemilitaryorganizationstoacceptsubstantialchange?Thejuryisstillout.10
OrganizationalClimate
ThereappearstobeareceptiveorganizationalclimateinsomeoftheServices;reportsfromotherServicesaremixed.
SupportfromtheTop
WeconcludethereissupportattheverytopintheDoD:i.e.,theSecretaryofDefense,theChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,andtheirimmediatesubordinates.ButdoesthissupportextendacrossallbranchesofallfourServices?Reportsaremixed.
MechanismsforExperimentation
Asourearlierlistingofdevelopmentalandfieldexperimentsindicates,therearealargenumberofRMA-relatedexperimentsgoingonintheDoDtoday.Buttheseexperimentsmaynotcovertheentirediscover,learn,test,anddemonstratespectrum.Itappears(atleasttothisauthor)thattoomanyoftheseexperimentsare"successoriented";thattoomanyoftheexperimentersdonotfeelfreetotakethekindsofchancesnecessarytoreallydiscoverandlearnwhatworksandwhatdoesnotwork,whatmakessenseandwhatdoesnot;andthattoomanyoftheseexperimentalmechanismsdonotencourageriskyexperimentsandtoleratefailure.
FocusonaDefinite"Thing"
DoD'scurrentRMAactivitiesclearlylackfocusononedefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things"whichwillbethecentralkernelof"theRMA."Suchafocusisstilltocome.Itisnotapparenthowthe
10Davisetal.(1998)haveproposedasetof"operationalchallenges"fortheSecretaryofDefensetouseasamanagementtechniquetomotivate
andfocustheServices'forcetransformationefforts.FutureeventswilldeterminetheefficacyofsuchOSD-imposedplanningchallenges.
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vastpanoplyofDoDRMA-relatedexperimentsnowunderwaywillbringaboutsuchafocus.11
ChallengingSomeone'sCoreCompetency
ThereisnoevidencethatanyoneanywhereintheDoDisdeliberatelysettingouttochallengeacorecompetencyofoneoftheServices.12Untilthathappens,wewillnothaveanRMA.13
WaysofRespondingPositivelytoSuccessfulExperiments
Inprinciple,eachoftheServiceshasmechanismsformakingdoctrinalchangesandtheDoDhaswell-establishedproceduresforacquiringnewsystemsandmodifyingforcestructures,allofwhichcouldrespondtosuccessfulRMA-relatedexperiments.Inprinciple.But,inpracticetheseformalmechanismsandproceduresworkbest
11ThecurrentlackoffocusofDoD'sforcetransformation/RMAactivitiesisreminiscentofthesituationintheU.S.Navy'saviationcommunityinthelate1910sandearly1920s.Atthattime,theNavywasexperimentingwithmanydifferentcombinationsofairvehicles,basingconcepts,andmissionapplications.ItwasseveralyearsbeforetheNavybeganfocusingonwheeledplanes,basedonflat-deckships,usedtoattacknavaltargetsi.e.,theessenceofcarrieraviationandwhatbecamethecarrierwarfareRMA.12Inprinciple,itisimmaterialwhetheraU.S.-ledrevolutionischallengingoneofitsowncorecompetenciesorsomeoneelse's.Ineithercase,iftheUnitedStatessucceedsinupsettingthatcorecompetence,bytheauthor'sdefinitionitwillhaveachievedarevolutioninmilitaryaffairsitwillhaveoverturnedtheestablishedmilitaryorderandreplaceditwithaneworder(insomemilitaryarena).AU.S.-ledRMAcouldaffectseveralcorecompetenciesotherthanitsown.TherearearenasofconflictinwhichtheUnitedStatesisnotsuperior,notthedominantplayer.Terrorismandcounterterrorismareexamples.Today,andforthelastfewdecades,anumberofterroristgroupshavehadacapablecorecompetencytocausesubstantialcivilianandmilitarycasualties,andtheUnitedStates'scapabilitiestocounter,
prevent,anddefeatsuchattackshavebeenlimited.Guerrillawarfare,particularlyincities,isanotherexample.TheUnitedStatesdidnothandlethiswellduringtheVietnamWarorinSomalia.Anumberofadditionalexamplescanbefoundinthegeneralareaofasymmetricstrategies.Havingsaidallthis,however,themostprofoundchangesinwarfarewouldoccuriftheUnitedStatessuccessfullychallengedoneofitsowncorecompetencies.13Todaythecorecompetenciesembodied1inthetank,mannedaircraft,andaircraftcarrierappeartobesacredintheirrespectiveServices,withnosignificantin-Servicechallengesallowed.Wherearethechallenges(andchallengers)intheU.S.militarytoday?Noneisapparenttothisauthor.Withoutsuchchallengesandchallengers,theUnitedStatesmaymissoutononeormoreimportantRMAs.
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whenthedoctrinalchangesaresmallanddonotchallengeanyone'straditionalwaysofwagingwar,thenewsystemstobeacquiredrepresentevolutionaryimprovementsonexistingsystems,andtheforcestructuremodificationsareminor,notmajor.IthasbeenalongtimesincetheformalDoDdoctrinal,acquisition,andforce-structure-modifyingsystemshavehadtorespondtoradicalchange.14Itisunclearhowwelltheywilldo.15
"TheRMA":WhereWeSeemtobeToday
UsingSecretaryCohen'sQDRterminologytodescribetheforcetransformationprocess(inspiteofthereservationsexpressedearlierconcerningthischoiceofwords),whereis"theRMA"today?HarkingbacktothemodeloftheRMAprocessinFigure3.2,wecansaythefollowing:
Newtechnology.Wehavealotofthis.
Newdevicesandsystems.Wehavealotofideasfornewdevicesandsystems.Many(butnotall)ofthemhavebeenorarebeingbuilt.Some(butnotmost)ofthemareundergoingexperiments,butnotnecessarilyriskyexperimentscoveringtheentirediscover,learn,test,anddemonstratespectrum.
Newoperationalconcepts.Wehavemanyofthese,eachwiththeiradvocatesanddetractors.Afewareundergoingactualexperiments.Mostareinpaperdiscussionsandarguments.
Newdoctrineandforcestructure.Wearealongwayfromthis,averylongway.
Wearealsoalongwayfromfocusingonashortlistofpotentiallyrevolutionarydevices,systems,andoperationalconceptsaround
14Inrecentyears,mosttrulynovel/innovativesystems(e.g.,theF-117A)havebeenacquiredvia"blackprograms,"notthroughtheformal
acquisitionsystem.15TherecentcancellationoftheArsenalShipbecauseoflackofNavysupport,withoutbuildingevenonetotryouttheconcept,isnotreassuringinthisregard.Imaginewhatwouldhavehappenedtothedevelopmentofcarrieraviationtechnologyandoperationalconceptsinthe1920sand1930siftheNavyhadcanceledthe19191922conversionofthecollierJupiterintothecarrierLangley(CV-1),theNavy'sfirstexperimentalcarrier.
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whichwecan''transformtheforce."Thisnecessaryfocusingprocesscouldtakeafewyears,probablywilltakeseveralyears,andpossiblywilltakemanyyears.Untilithappens,wearewheretheU.S.Navywasin1920:alongwayfromanRMA,alongwayfrombeingabletotransformtheforce.
Anotherconcern:InmostpastRMAs,theforcewasn't"transformed"i.e.,oldforcestructureelementsreplacedbyRMAelementsuntiltheRMAhadbeenproveninbattle.Untilthen,theRMAelementsweretreatedasadd-onstothethen-existingforcestructure.16BasedontheQDR,theDoDappearstobeplanningto"transformtheforce,"i.e.,replacingoldelementswithnewRMAelementsratherthanmerelyaddingthoseelements,beforetheRMAisprovenincombat.Thisfliesinthefaceofhistory.
SomeKeyQuestionsfortheDod
WeareleftwithsomekeyquestionsconcerningDoD'scurrentforcetransformation/RMAactivities:
CantheDoDbringaboutatrueRMAwithoutultimatelychallengingoneormoreoftheServices'currentcorecompetencies?
CantheDoDbringaboutatrueRMAwithoutfocusingonadefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things"?
CantheDoDbringaboutatrueRMAusingitscurrentacquisitionprocess?
CantheDoD"transformtheforce"totheextentpostulatedintheQDR(alotmorecapabilityforalotlessresources)withoutbringingaboutoneormoretrueRMAs,inthesensedefinedhere?
Theauthorfearstheanswertoeachofthesequestionsis"no."
WhatCanbeDonetoFillintheMissingElements?
Threethingsinparticularseemtobeneeded:
16Inthe1930s,theGermanarmyaddedpanzerdivisions,butitkeptallofitsinfantrydivisions;theU.S.Navyaddedaircraftcarriers,butitkeptallofitsbattleships.
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Somemechanismtoencouragechallenges(overtime)tooneormoreoftheServices'currentcorecompetencies
Somemechanismtobringaboutafocus(overtime)oftheforcetransformation/RMAprocessonadefinite"thing"ora(fairly)shortlistof"things"
ChangesintheDoDacquisitionsystemtomakeitmorereceptivetonovel/radicalinnovations.
Meetingthefirstoftheseneeds,encouragingchallengestocorecompetencies,initiallyrequiresoneormoremultidisciplinarygroupsofcreativepeople,withtechnology,militarysystems,andmilitaryoperationsbackgrounds,workingtogetherforanextendedperiodtoconceptualizenewsystemsandoperationalconceptsthatchallengeoneormorecorecompetencies.TheseconceptgroupsmustbefreetochallengewhateverServicecorecompetencytheirexpertise,vision,andintuitiontellthemisripetobeoverturned,withnothingheldsacred.17
ContinuingtheRMAprocessbeyondtheconceptualstageandmeetingthesecondoftheabovementionedneedsbringingaboutafocusoftheforcetransformationprocessonadefinite"thing"requiresoneormoreexperimentalgroupsthatwilllayoutexperimental
17Othershaveproposedentitiessimilartoourconceptgroups.Krepinevich(1995)proposesapermanentConceptDevelopmentCenter(CDC)to"facilitatethe'intellectualbreakthroughs'inoperationalconcepts,andincorrespondingmilitarysystemsandorganizations...toprovidethefoundationforsuccessfulU.S.[military]adaptation."Heestimatesthatsuchanorganizationshouldhaveroughly100individuals.Inasimilarvein,theCNOExecutivePanel'sNavalWarfareInnovationTaskForceproposestheestablishmentofConceptGenerationTeam(s)toaccomplishmuchthesamepurpose,limited,however,tonavalwarfare.Theseteamswouldhavethefollowingcharacteristics:"CNOtoenunciate
objectives;strongleadership(RADMlevel)providingcontinuityoverseveralyears;locationatnavaleducationfacility(s)wellinsulatedfromWashington,D.C.;separateactivityfromcurrentfunctionoffacility;smallteam(s)(<10)ofNavyandMarineCorps'mostinnovativethinkersatO-5/O-6levelsandequivalentlevelcivilians;abilitytoutilizemostinnovativemembersofcurrentfacultiesandstudentclasses;abilitytodrawonresourcesofleadinguniversities;teamstooperateona46monthtemporarydutybasiswithoutputsbriefedtoCNO;outputsanalyzedpromptlybyindependentresidentcapability."(Harris,briefingtoRAND,1998).Alternatively,theRANDConceptOptionsGroup(COG)constructmightbeusedasthefoundationforanumberoftemporaryconceptgroups(seeBirkleretal.,1998).
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roadmaps(coveringtheentirediscover,learn,test,anddemonstratespectrum)forpromisingconceptscreatedbytheconceptgroups,andthendesign,conduct,andevaluatetheexperiments,iteratingtheprocessasmanytimesasrequired,foraslongasisrequired(withnoartificialdeadlines).18Theseexperimentalgroupsmustbefreetotakerisksandtofail(fromtimetotime).Theyshouldinteractfrequentlywiththeconceptgroups;theycouldbepartofthesameorganization(s).
Establishingtheproperorganizationalposition(s)forboththeconceptandexperimentalgroupsrelativetothemainstreammilitaryiscomplicatedandproblematic.Ontheonehand,theCNOExecutivePanelemphasizestheimportanceofseparatingsuchconceptualandexperimentalactivitiesinvolvingrevolutionaryinnovationfromthemainstreamactivityofthemilitaryorganization(s),sothattheywillbefreetotakechancesandtrulychallengecorecompetencies.19Ontheotherhand,MurrayandWatts(1995)emphasizethedangerofsuchinnovativeactivitiesbeingtooseparatedfromthemainstreammilitaryorganization(s),inwhichcasetheymaybeviewedasoutsidersandtheirnewideasmaynotbeacceptedbythepeoplewhowillfightthenextwar.
Thus,theconceptgroupsandexperimentalgroupsshouldbesomewhatseparatedfromthemainstreammilitary,butnottoomuchclearlyadelicatetaskinorganizationaldesign.Onepossiblesolution,suggestedbyBirkleretal.(1999),istocreateprovisionaloperationalunitsthatwouldparticipateinthe(learn,test,anddemonstrate)experimentsalongwiththeexperimentalgroups,therebyaccumulatingfieldoperatingexperience,developingmilitaryuser"buyin"forthenewsystems,motivatingandinformingthenecessarydoctrinaldevelopments,and(ifallofthisissuccessful)providinganearly,limitedbutusefulcombatcapability.20
MeetingthethirdoftheabovementionedneedsmakingtheDoDacquisitionsystemmorereceptivetonovel/radicalinnovations
18IttooktheBureauofAeronauticsabouttenyearstoestablishthefoundationsofcarrieraviation.19Seefootnote10inChapterFive.20Suchunitshavebeentriedinthepast.TheinitialF-117Asquadronswereofthisnature,aswastheUSSLangley(CV-1).
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requiresthatanewbranchbeaddedtotheacquisitionsystem.21AsdiscussedinChapterSix,this"RMAbranch"oftheacquisitionsystemshouldtoleratesubstantialmilitary-utilityriskstoamuchlaterstageintheacquisitionprocess,insomecasesallthewaytoIOC.ThephasesanddecisionpointsinthisnewacquisitionbranchshouldbeconstructedinkeepingwiththelikelyuncertaintiesateachstageintheRMAprocess.Figure7.1andTable7.2illustratewhatthisnewbranchmightlooklikeintermsofacquisitionphasesandmilestones.22
Figure7.1AnRMABranchoftheDoDAcquisitionSystem
21JohnBirklerandhisRANDcolleagueshaveproposedasimilarbranchbeaddedtotheDoDacquisitionprocesstohandlenovelandradicalinnovations,whetherornottheyqualifyasRMAs.22TheacquisitionphasesandmilestonesshowninFigure7.1andTable7.2aresimilartobutslightlydifferentfromthoseproposedbyBirkleretal.(1999).
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Table7.2APossibleSetofMilestonesforan"RMABranch"
oftheDoDAcquisitionSystemMilestone Certainties
RequiredUncertaintiesandRisksTolerated
MilestoneA
Ifitworksasadvertised,itcouldbringaboutamajorincreaseinU.S.militarycapabilities.
Technicalfeasibility,exactoperationalsystemconfiguration,exactoperationalemploymentconcept,differencesofopinionregardingmilitaryutility.
MilestoneB
Proof-of-conceptdemonstrationofmajortechnicalissues.
Exactoperationalsystemconfiguration,exactoperationalemploymentconcept,differencesofopinionregardingmilitaryutility.
MilestoneC
Operationalsystemconfigurationdetermined;initialoperationalemploymentconceptestablished;plausiblecasemadeformilitaryutility.
Finaloperationalemploymentconcept;somedifferencesofopinionregardingmilitaryutility.
Doingthesefourthingssettingupconceptgroups,experimentalgroups,andprovisionaloperationalunits,andaddinganewbranchtotheDoDacquisitionsystemshouldgoalongwaytowardfillinginthemissingelementsinDoD'scurrentforcetransformation/RMA
activities.
InSummary
BasedonthehistoryofpastRMAs,thereappeartobemissingelementsinDoD'scurrentforcetransformationactivities:
NoneoftheServices'currentcorecompetenciesarebeingchallenged.
Thereisinadequatefocusonadefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things."
TheDoDacquisitionsystemmaynotbeadequatelyreceptivetonovel/radicalinnovations.
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Thesemissingelementscanbefilledby:
SettingupDoDconceptandexperimentalgroupstoidentifyandexperimentwithnewsystemsandoperationalconceptsthat(a)challengecurrentServicecorecompetenciesand(b)increasethefocusofthecurrentRMAefforts.
Establishingprovisionaloperationalunitstoparticipateinexperimentswithnewsystemsandoperationalconcepts.
EstablishinganewbranchtotheDoDacquisitionsystemthattoleratesmilitary-utilityriskstoamuchlaterstageintheacquisitionprocess.
DoingtheabovewillfacilitateDoD'sforcetransformationactivitiesandhelpensurethatthenextRMAisbroughtaboutbytheUnitedStatesandnotsomeothernation.
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