Password policies

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Ari Elias-Bachrach Defensium LLC http://www.defensium.com [email protected] @angelofsecurity November 2012 asuring Password Complexity

Transcript of Password policies

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Ari Elias-BachrachDefensium LLChttp://www.defensium.com

[email protected]@angelofsecurity

November 2012

Measuring Password Complexity

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This talk discusses the problems with our current methods of measuring password strength and proposes alternatives.

What this can give us

A better alternative

What’s wrong with password complexity?

P@ssw0rd!

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• 4 digits• 10 possibilities for each digit (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)

We usually calculate password complexity based on the total number of possible passwords

1 2 3 4

410 = 10000

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• 6 digits• 36 possibilities for each digit (0-9, A-Z)

We usually calculate password complexity based on the total number of possible passwords

A 1 2 3 4 B

636 =~ 1027

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We usually calculate password complexity based on the total number of possible passwords

636 =~ 1027

• Assuming X attempts per minute

• Calculate expected time to check all

passwords

• Mean time for a single password

• Time to exhaust entire space

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This only works if people are computersNote: people are not computers

Password

Letmein

Voldemort

5ga9n2kfb

b29cmna0

9h8g2bgun

Password

Password

#

#

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Human nature defeats complexity

# of occurrences

Passwords, sorted by commonality

password

bdsjgganqvoldemort

password1

bdsjgganq1voldemort1

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How wrong are our assumptions?

10 codes = 1/1000th of total passwordsTop 10 codes =~ 15% of all passcodes in use

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We need a new way of measuring complexity

# of occurrences

Passwords, sorted by commonality

Nth Password

password

H6#a*b7Ke

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We need a new way of measuring complexity

# of occurrences

Passwords, sorted by commonality

Nth Password

password

H6#a*b7Ke

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What’s needed now: analysis of password policies

# of occurrences

Passwords, sorted by commonality

Policy 1

Policy 2

Policy 3

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What’s needed now: analysis of password policies

1. Get password dumps

2. Crack them ALL (if hashed)

3. Run through previous metric

4. Correlate with applied policy

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We can actually quantify the risk of a given password policy!

What this gives us: the ability to quantify password policies

Which is better:Which is better:

Insisting on use of numbers

Insisting on the use of special characters

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We can actually quantify the risk of a given password policy!

What this gives us: the ability to quantify password policies

Which is better:

6 characters, must use 1 number and 1 letter

8 characters

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15 Questions?

Quantify the strength of a password policy

Compare policies

State with some confidence how many weak passwords people will generate with any given policy

In summary, a true measure of password policy complexity will allow us to make informed decisions on password policies

HUGE, when talking to business people

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About me

Ari Elias-BachrachDefensium LLChttp://www.defensium.com

[email protected]@angelofsecurity