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    1/14

    A HUNDRED

    YEARS

    OF

    PHILOSOPHY

    :

    John

    Passmore

    @

    PENGUIN

    BOOKS

    ,-/

    1' r

    ("

    (r '

    r-- |

    \

    t - - l

    I tq--, ) i

    rl

    \___

    f

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    A HUNDRED

    YEARS

    OF PHILOSOPHY

    of relationship;

    Whitehead exhorts

    them

    to reflect

    upon

    visceral

    sensations. hen they

    will

    come to

    see,he thinks,

    appropriation

    and

    resistance

    not

    'the

    having

    of a blue

    datum'-

    are

    he

    characteristiceatures

    ot only

    of

    perception

    of all

    the relationships

    which together

    make

    up the

    'niverse.

    342

    343

    CHAPTER

    15

    Some

    Cambridge

    Philosophers

    and Wittgenstein'

    Tractatus

    I rtr I'r'uitfulnessf the CambridgeMoral Science aculty during

    llre

    tlst dccades

    f the

    present

    entury has alreadybeen abund-

    Itrtly

    llrrstrated.

    university

    whichcan ay

    claim o Moore and

    Hulrrll,

    McTaggart

    and

    Whitehead,Ward

    and Stout, need

    ear

    rrr *r'cusutions

    itherof sterilityor of

    narrowness.

    et

    our

    tale s

    rllll

    trreornplete.

    therCambridge-bred

    hilosophers

    dded

    o the

    I

    lrrlvclsity's

    hilosophical

    ame; and t

    gave

    hospitality, irst as

    Itr

    erlvunccd

    tudent,

    ater

    as

    a Professor,o

    the most remarkable

    rrrnrry

    ouldsay he

    greatest philosopher

    f our century,

    he

    Arrnt trr LudwigWittgenstein.

    (

    )l

    W.

    E. Johnson, neof the

    morenotable f

    the

    home-grown

    ;rr

    rlrrcls,

    e havealreadyspoken

    briefly

    (Chapter

    6). His articles

    r

    rt 'l

    lrcLogicalCalculus'

    1892)

    nticipated

    he one,and n

    part

    llrr.

    lctlil.

    of much hat was ater

    o

    be

    written

    n

    Cambridge.

    n

    tlre

    yerrrs

    hat followed

    he

    exercised

    reat

    nfluenceas a

    teacher,

    Irul

    prrblished

    othing.

    Not

    until

    the

    nineteen-twentiesid

    he

    prrlrlrshis major work, with

    the simple

    itle Logic.tEven hen,

    llre

    ircc

    of characterof

    one

    of

    his students,

    ather than any

    m-

    glrlreof his own,brought hirp to the point of publication.His

    I r4rlr',

    ndeed,s

    a

    series f

    manuscripts ollected ogether

    o make

    r

    lrook -

    not

    a

    composition,ruled

    by some

    governing

    dea.

    Its

    r'llrrc

    ies n its detail; all

    thal can now be attempted,

    owever,

    s

    r

    r.lrunrcterizationf

    the most

    general

    ort.

    AlllroughJohnson

    was

    rained asa mathematician,

    is

    Zogrc s

    r+t:rrtinlly

    philosophical,

    not mathematical,

    n character.

    Sym-

    pntlrctically

    nclined

    to the logistic

    programme

    of

    deducing

    rrurtlrcrnatics

    rom logic,

    he

    yet

    does

    not

    participate

    n it; except

    irr l rlctailedand somewhat evere riticismof Russell's heory

    rrl

    Pl1r11e5i1iqnal

    unctions,ndeed,

    e

    scarcely

    efers o thework

    l|

    h

    gicians

    unior

    to

    J.

    N. Keynes whose

    enovatedraditional

    Lrsit' lre bsorbednto

    hisown work.

    l lc bcgins,we havealready

    pointed

    out,

    from the

    proposition.

    At tlrc same ime, his

    break from Idealist

    ogic is not a

    wholly

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    A HUNDRED

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    OF PHILOSOPHY

    sharp

    one;

    the

    proposition,

    he

    writes,

    'is

    only

    a

    factor

    in

    tha

    concreteact

    of

    judgement'.

    In spite of

    Johnson'semphasis

    o[

    the importance of clear distinctions, his various

    accounts

    of

    the

    relation

    between

    udgement

    and

    propositionare

    mpossible

    O

    bring

    into consistency; his

    fact,

    touching the very heart

    of hlt

    Logic, doesmuch

    to

    explain why

    that

    book does not leave

    single mpressionon his readers.Unlike the Idealists,he

    cedes certainautonomy o

    formal

    logic, considered

    s a

    of

    propositions;

    at the same

    ime,

    his autonomy s

    so

    hedged

    reservations hat

    formal logic is little

    more

    than a

    puppotJ

    kingdom, he

    real

    power

    ying in the

    handsof epistemology.

    l

    Johnson's Logic,

    in consequence,

    ventures into unexpectcd'

    fields;

    t contains, or

    example,

    n elaborate

    nalysis f the mind.

    body relationship.Logic, he argues,

    s

    an

    analysis nd cri

    of thought' cannot

    gnore

    probability

    and induction;

    any

    quatediscussion f induction must explore the conceptions

    cause

    and substance; uch an exploration, f

    it is at all

    must take account of, and resolve, he special

    problems

    set

    the mind-body elationship.Johnson, n short, follows

    his

    ment

    wherevert leadshim; hisZogrc s

    a contribution

    o

    philosophy,

    not only to logic in the narrower

    sense f the

    But

    it manifests to a notable degree

    what one thinks

    of

    'Cambridge'

    characteristics; is

    philosophical

    discussions

    dear, analytic, discriminating, but

    rarely

    decisive.

    At

    a

    few

    points,

    however, ohnsonhas

    beenwidely

    His neologisms,as

    rarely happens,

    have won wide

    such

    phrases

    as

    'ostensive

    definition',

    such contrasts

    as th

    between'epistemic'

    nd'constitutive','determinates'

    nd'

    terminables','continuants

    and'

    occurrents',are now familiar

    philosophical

    iterature.Nor does his mean,

    only, that

    was a clever

    coiner of words: he demonstrated

    he usefulnesg

    his innovations

    in sharpening and reshaping

    controversies.

    He setsout to show,

    or

    example, hat there s not

    one

    of definition,

    or one

    process

    of induction, but

    many; if he

    gives

    a

    name to

    these

    newly-discovered

    pecies,his is not

    merely

    decorative

    purposes.

    Or again

    he rebukes

    ogicians

    carelessness

    n discriminating ogical forms.

    In

    particular,

    thinks, they

    have

    wrongly

    grouped

    ogether,

    as being ofthe

    3M

    345

    SOME

    CAMBRIDGE

    PHILOSOPHERS

    lype, uch

    ropositions

    s

    Red

    s

    a colour'and

    Plato

    s a

    man';

    Irr

    orrlcr

    o

    make

    he distinction hey

    haveoverlooked e intro-

    rlr

    t't'sris

    contrast

    between'determinates'

    nd' determinables'.

    Wlrclcts'Plato

    s a man',

    so

    he

    argues, ssertslass-membership,

    'ltctl

    is

    a colour' relates,not

    a member o a class,but a

    'rlctclrlinate'

    to

    a

    'determinable'.Red,

    green,yellow

    are

    al l

    f

    cf

    'tlrf frates

    f the

    determinable olour,just as

    square,

    ircular,

    ellllrtit:rrl,

    re all determinates

    f the determinable hape.What

    lrrtlcs

    set

    of determinatess not

    that - like the members f a

    r,lnrn

    thcy

    agree n some espect,

    but

    rather,

    Johnsonsuggests,

    lhnt tlrcy

    differ in

    a

    peculiar

    manner.

    Determinatesof the same

    rlelcrrrrirrableexclude'one

    nother,

    n the

    special ensehat

    hey

    r

    rrrrrrrrl inrultaneously

    haracterize

    he

    same

    area; the

    one area

    r rrrr x: llrth

    red

    and circular, but cannot be

    both

    red and

    gxeen.

    I

    urllrclrnore,

    e

    argues, heir differences re 'comparable',as

    rltlil'rcrrccs etweendeterminates f different determinables re

    ltrrl

    ()nc

    can

    sensiblyassert,he means, hat the

    difference

    be-

    lwrr'rr

    cd

    and

    green

    s

    greater

    han the difference

    etween

    ed and

    rl,lrg(:,

    [.lutnot

    that it is

    greater

    han, ess han, or equal o, the

    rllllr.tcrrcc

    etweened

    and circular.

    .fulrrrson's

    alents, t will

    be

    obvious, ay

    particularly

    in his

    trpalily for

    making

    careful

    distinctions.Recallingalsohis

    mathe-

    flul['lrl

    powers,

    ne s not

    surprised o find that he wasattracted

    Iuwnrtls he theory of probability where, f anywhere,careful

    llrtlyris

    of

    problems

    on the

    borderland between

    mathematics,

    lurrrrrl

    log'c,

    and epistemologycan reap a rich harvest. His

    wrlllngn

    on

    probability,

    however, are f ragmentaxy and not

    lllogr.llrcr

    oherent;

    hey were

    not

    published

    ntil eleven

    ears

    tlllr

    urrolher

    Cambridgeman,

    J.

    M, Keynes,z ad

    completed

    lts,rttl|t,on Probability

    (1921)

    which in

    part

    incorporated

    Irrlrrrrorr's

    cachings,

    n

    part

    went beyond hem

    in ways

    which

    fllrrrrotr lid not

    quite

    know how to estimate,

    hr.yrrt's' ndebtednesso Johnson whom he knew first as a

    rllls

    I r rcr

    tl

    of his ather,

    J.

    N. Keynes, ater asa teacher, nd hen

    nr n

    r ollcrrguc

    is sometime$

    upposed o

    consistmerely

    n the

    l* | tlrrrt

    Keyncs ook

    over

    certain

    of

    Johnson's

    heorems, n fact,

    Irrrr'rvrr,

    lrc spirit

    of the

    philosophical arts

    of

    the

    Treatises

    r'Frtrrtlly

    lolrnson's.3

    n his introductionKeynescoupled

    John-

    .llr'r rrurne

    with

    those

    of

    Moore and Russell,as

    philosophers

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    A HUNDRED

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    OF

    PHILOSOPHY

    who

    'are united in

    a

    preference

    or

    what is

    matter of fact,

    and

    have

    conceived

    heir

    subject

    as a

    branch rather of

    science han

    of creative

    magination,

    prose

    writers,hoping

    to be understood'.

    Moore

    had

    said n

    his Principia

    Ethica that

    good

    s indefinable:

    Keynes

    was

    emboldened

    o

    say the

    same

    of

    probability.

    Russell

    had

    deduced

    arithmetic

    from

    logic; Keynes

    set

    out to do the

    same

    or

    probability

    theory. But

    the

    peculiarly

    epistemologico.

    logical

    atmosphere

    of the Treatise

    may fairly

    be

    regarded

    ai

    deriving

    from

    Johnson.

    In

    Johnsbn's

    manner,

    Keynes

    begins rom

    the

    proposition,

    not,

    as

    Venn

    had done,

    rom

    a'happening'or

    an

    'event'.

    On Venn'$

    version

    of

    the

    'frequency'

    theory,

    the

    statement

    the

    next ball

    from

    the

    urn

    will

    probably

    be black' is

    an

    assertionabout tho

    percentage

    of

    draws from

    the

    urn in which

    a

    black

    ball

    appears;

    for Keynes,

    on

    the

    other hand,

    the

    problem

    is to

    ascribe

    a

    probability o theproposition the nextball will be black'. Unlesr

    probability

    theory

    is

    prepared

    o

    surrender

    all claims to be useful

    in everyday

    determinations

    of

    probability,

    Keynes

    argues, t

    must

    extend

    its interest

    into

    areas

    where the frequency theory,

    which

    ooks

    plausible

    enough

    n

    the case

    of ball-drawing,would

    be obviously

    napplicable.

    To

    assign

    a degree

    f

    probability

    to

    a

    proposition,

    on KeyncSt

    theory, is

    to relate

    t to

    a body

    of knowledge.

    Probability is not

    I

    property

    of the

    proposition-in-itself;

    t

    expresses

    he

    degree

    0

    which it would be rational, on the evidence t our disposal, o

    regard

    he

    proposition

    astrue.Thus

    probability

    s always elativoS

    it is nevertheless

    objective', n the

    sensehat

    a

    proposition

    as

    e

    sertain

    probability

    relative

    to the

    evidence,

    whether or not

    wa

    recognize

    hat

    probability.

    What

    precisely,

    we may

    ask,

    s thir

    relation

    of

    'making

    probable'

    which

    holds

    between vidence nd

    conclusion?

    A

    unique logical

    relation,

    Keynes answers,not

    reducible

    o any

    other;

    we

    apprehend

    t intuitively,

    as

    we

    appro.

    hend mplication.

    Unlike implication,however,heprobability elation admitsof

    degrees.

    On

    given

    evidence,

    ne

    conclusion

    may be

    'more

    protr

    able'

    than another.

    Recogrrizing

    his fact,

    some

    probability.

    theorists

    have

    umped

    to the conclusion

    hat

    probabilities

    murt

    always

    be

    quantitatively

    omparable.

    Once

    again,Keynes hinkl,

    they

    have

    generalized

    rom a

    quite

    untypical

    case the casewhero,

    346

    SOME CAMBRIDGE

    PHILOSOPHERS

    el

    ln drawing balls from an

    urn

    which contains none

    but black or

    wltite balls, the

    alternatives

    are exclusive,

    equiprobable and

    oxhaustive.Then, no doubt,

    probability

    can be numerically

    ontimated;but if we look

    at the

    matter more broadly, Keynes

    llrinks,

    we soon see hat even compaxisons f order, let alone

    pl'ccise

    uantitative

    ormulations,are often completely

    out

    of the

    quostion.Consider he relation between etsof experiments nd a

    gcncralization:

    suppose hat rn CaseA the experiments

    are

    more

    trurnerous,

    n CaseB more varied, andin CaseC the

    generaliza-

    tion is

    wider in scope.

    n

    terms of what unit$, Keynesasks,are

    we

    to compare

    he

    probabilities

    of the

    generalization

    n

    relation

    to these

    ifferentsetsofevidence?

    On

    Keynes'

    theory of

    probability,

    there is a close connexion

    bctween

    probability

    and

    induction.

    To say that a

    proposition

    has

    bccnarrived

    at by a

    'justifiable

    nduction'is,

    he

    thinks,

    dentical

    with saying hat it is 'highly probable'. The classical roblem-

    how

    s

    induction o

    be

    ustified?

    -

    thus turns nto

    another:

    when

    nro we

    entitled to assert hat

    a

    generalization

    s highly

    probable?

    Kcynes ries

    to show that any such conclusiondepends pon a

    gcncral

    postulate,

    which

    he

    calls

    the Principle

    of

    Limited

    Variety

    '-

    n

    revised

    version of Mill's 'Uniformity of Nature'.

    'We

    can

    Jurtify

    he method

    of

    perfect

    aoalogy,'

    he

    writes, and other

    in-

    ductive methods so far as they can be

    made

    to approximate to

    llrir,

    by

    meansof the assumption hat the objects n the field,

    ovcr which our genera"trizationsxtend, do not have an infinite

    turnrber

    of

    independent

    qualities;

    that,

    in

    other words,

    their

    clruracteristics,owevernumerous, ohere ogether n

    gxoups

    n

    Invoriable

    onnexions,which are

    finite in number.'

    ln

    other words, induction is

    justified

    because he

    qualities

    of

    llrings

    carry other

    qualities

    with

    them. Whether this

    principle

    s

    nrorc

    eflective han Mill's in

    'saving

    nduction', Keynes' succes.

    nols

    gravely

    doubted.

    Of other

    Cambridge

    philosophers

    who took a lively interest n

    llrc processesf scientific hinking oneof the bestknown is that

    rrrodest

    ut voluminouswriter,

    C.

    D. Broad.lBroad, n his

    ^Scl'ez-

    tllic

    Thought

    1923),

    stimates is talents hus:

    If

    I

    haveany

    kind

    ol'

    philosophical

    merit, t is neither he constructive ertility of

    an

    Alexander,

    nor the

    penetrating

    critical acumenof a

    Moore;

    still

    lcss s

    it

    that extraordinarycombination

    of

    both

    with tecbnical

    347

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    A HUNDRED

    YBARS

    OF PHILOSOPHY

    mathematical

    skill which

    characterizesWhitehead and

    Russell.

    I

    can

    at most claim

    the humbler

    (yet

    useful)

    power

    of

    stating

    difficult things clearly

    and not too superficially.'

    To this

    can

    be added what

    Russellwrote

    in his review of Broad's Percep.

    tion,

    Physics ndReality

    1914);

    This book

    doesnot

    advance ny

    fundamental

    novelties

    of its own,

    but

    it

    appraises, with extra.

    ordinary justice and impartiality and discrimination, the argu.

    ments

    which have

    been advanced

    by others on

    the

    topics with

    which it

    deals.'What more

    s there o say?One cannot

    describo

    'Broad's

    philosophy'

    for,

    as he freely admitg

    'there

    is nothing

    which

    answers o that

    description.' To summarize his

    clear and

    meticulous

    summaries

    would

    be to

    gild

    the lily. We shall

    content

    ourselves,

    herefore, with

    an outline

    of

    his views

    about the naturo

    of

    philosophy,

    partly

    to

    correct a not

    uncommon

    misapprehen.

    sion,

    partly

    because his is

    the easiest way to

    place

    him in

    tho

    context of Cambridgephilosophy.

    Broads

    distinguishes

    etween

    critical'

    and

    'speculative'

    phil.

    osophy.

    Critical

    philosophy

    is

    philosophy

    in

    what

    he

    takes to

    bo

    the Moore-Russell

    manner;

    its object, according to Broad,

    is to

    'analyse' the basic concepts

    of science and of everyday

    life

    -

    concepts hke

    cause,

    quality,

    position

    -

    and to submit

    to cross.

    examination the

    general

    propositions

    which the scientist

    and tho

    ordinary man

    daily

    presume,

    uch

    propositions

    as'every event

    has

    a

    cause'

    or'Nature is

    uniform'. Most

    of

    Broad's

    work, then,

    is analytic n its intention; although,often enough, t is analytic

    at second emove.

    t doesnot

    so much

    analysethe

    conception

    of

    a material thing'

    as describe he

    views which

    have

    been, or

    might

    be,

    held

    about ts correct

    analysis.The final chapter n

    Mind

    and

    ils Place

    in Nature

    (1925),

    n

    which Broad distinguishes

    seven

    teen

    possible

    theories

    of the mind-matter

    relation, is the finest

    flower

    -

    or

    should

    one s:ry

    the

    reductio

    ad

    absurdam?

    'of

    thio

    method.

    .

    Yet Broad is not,

    as some have thought,

    an enemy of specula-

    " tion. 'If we do not look at the world synoptically,'he writes, wo

    shall

    have a very nuurow

    view of it'

    ;

    a

    purely

    critical

    philosophy,

    he hinks, s

    arid and rigid. He

    praises

    dealism,becauset

    at least

    attempts to incorporate

    within

    a

    single

    heory the

    findings

    of

    arl

    of

    science, of religion,

    of social theory. It is certain types

    of

    speculative

    philosophy,

    only,

    which Broad

    attacks.

    348

    SOME

    CAMBRIDGB

    HILOSOPHERS

    Thus,

    in the

    frst

    place,

    those

    for

    whom

    philosophy

    is by

    its

    noture

    suggestive,

    metaphorical,

    poetic,

    are

    not likely

    to

    regard

    Itroad with

    sympathetica,ffection.

    What

    can

    be said at all,'he

    writes,

    can

    be said simply

    and

    clearly

    n

    aay

    civilized

    languageor

    ln o suitable systemof

    symbols.'

    Secondly,

    he will

    not

    allow

    that

    npcculative

    philosophy

    can ever

    aspire

    to the heights

    of strict

    tlcmonstration.By its nature, he thinks, it must be tentative, fluid,

    rcudy to adjust

    itself

    to

    new fndings

    in science,

    new

    paths

    in arl

    ncw experiments

    n

    social

    life.

    It cannot determine

    a

    priori

    what

    h the case;

    ts materials come

    o it

    from outside.

    Then, thirdly,

    a

    sound speculative

    philosophy

    must

    always

    est,

    llroad

    thinks, upon a

    foundation

    of critical

    philosophy;

    the

    rpcculative

    philosopher

    who is content

    to take over

    uncriticized

    whatever anyone cares

    to affirm

    is at

    the mercy of fantasies.

    llroad's own work

    is meant as a

    propaedeutic

    to,

    not

    as a

    sub-

    rtitute for, speculativephilosophy - and to a certain degree t is

    Itrcf

    speculative.

    Scientiftc

    Thought

    s an attempt to clarify

    some

    o1' he conceptsused n

    the natural

    scienceslat the

    same ime

    it

    nright be describedas

    an

    attempt

    to

    combine

    nto

    a

    single heory

    wlrutever

    s

    viable

    in

    physics,

    n

    epistemolory, and

    in common-

    rcnse.Mind and

    ils

    Place

    in Nature

    undertakes

    an

    analysis

    of

    prychological

    oncepts;

    yet

    in

    so far as

    it

    attempts

    to'place'

    rrrlnd

    within

    Nature,

    it

    passes

    eyond criticism

    to speculation.

    (ltroad

    defends species f

    'emergent

    materialism'.)

    ndeed,we

    bogin to wonder whether the distinction between analysis and

    rpcculation can be as

    sharp bs Broad

    at first suggests.

    Many

    of

    Broad's readerswere

    shockedbecause,in

    Mind and its

    l'lacc in Nature, he took

    seriously and discussed

    n detail the

    lhrclings

    f

    psychical

    esearch; his,

    they felt,

    is not the sort of

    conduct to be expected

    rom a Cambridge

    philosopher.

    Broad's

    rlclbnce in his

    essay on 'Psychical

    Research and

    Philosophy'o

    tlrrows considerable ight on his approach

    to

    philosophy.

    F'irst of all, he condemnsunsparingly

    those

    or whom

    'philos.

    ophy consists n acceptingwithout question,and then attempting

    lo analyse,

    he beliefs that are cornmon

    to contemporary

    plain

    rrrcn n Europe

    and

    North America, .e.

    roughly, he beliefs

    which

    ruch

    persons

    mbibe

    uncritically

    in their nwseries

    and have never

    lirund

    any reason o doubt'.

    As he wrote

    elsewhere,

    it

    is

    now

    nbundantlyevident that

    little

    can

    be done

    for commonsense'.

    349

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    6/14

    A HUNDRED

    YEARS

    OF PII ILOSOPHY

    Analysis

    thus understood

    s, he

    thought,

    .a

    trivial

    academic

    exer.

    cise'.

    In

    this

    respect,

    he

    stands

    close

    to

    Russell,

    and

    at the

    ro.

    motest pole

    from

    Moore.

    His

    starting-point

    is

    science,

    ather

    thao

    conrmonsense;

    f

    there

    s

    a conflict,

    commonsense

    must

    give

    way.

    He

    seeks

    o imitate,

    all

    the

    same,

    Moore's

    meticulousness

    athof

    than

    Russell's

    audacity.

    Once

    he amented

    hus

    .

    si Moore

    savait,

    si

    Russell pouvait';

    this

    may

    be read

    as nominating

    his ideal

    _

    Russell's nowledge onjoinedwith Moore,sanalyticpowen.

    Commonsense,

    hen,

    has

    no

    rights

    against

    the

    fndings

    of

    psychical

    esearch

    nor

    an

    an

    a

    priorimetaphysics

    ule

    out

    ghosts,

    if

    only

    for

    the

    very

    good

    reason

    hat

    there

    s

    no

    such

    metaphysics.

    Psychical

    esearch,

    he

    concludes,

    must

    be

    left to

    speak

    or

    itself,

    subject

    of

    course

    to

    the

    control

    of

    critical

    philosophy.

    This

    ii

    Broad's

    characteristic

    attitude.

    -

    Of

    all

    metaphysicians,

    Broad

    most

    admires

    McTaggart,

    for

    all

    that

    McTaggart

    attempted

    the

    impossible,

    the

    construction

    of

    a

    deductivemetaphysics.Broad devotedseveralyearsof his life to

    the

    wdting

    of

    his

    vast

    hree-vohrned,

    Examinatlon

    of McTaggart,s

    Philosophy

    1933-8),

    a book

    which

    as

    well

    as conmentax/

    cotr

    tains

    many

    striking

    examples

    of Broad,s

    own

    philosophical

    work.

    Two

    things

    delighted

    Broad

    in

    McTag&rt:

    his

    coolness

    and

    hir

    clarity.

    No

    metaphysiciaa

    has

    been less

    dithyrambic,

    none

    ha

    made

    so desperate

    an effort

    to

    be clear.

    For

    once,Broad

    remarks,

    'definite

    premises

    are

    stated

    n

    plain

    language

    and

    defnite

    con

    clusions

    are

    drawn

    from

    them

    by arguments

    we

    can all follow

    and

    acceptor reject'. That BroadconsideredMcTaggart to be worthy

    of

    so

    extensive

    an

    examination

    is further

    evidence

    at once

    of hh

    sympathy

    with

    speculation

    and

    of

    the special

    character

    of

    that

    sympathy.

    'I

    shall

    watch

    with

    a fatherly

    eye,'

    Broad

    wrote

    in

    the

    preface

    to

    The

    Mind

    and

    its Place

    n

    Nature,.the philosophical

    gambols

    of

    my

    younger

    riends

    as hey

    dance

    o

    the higbly

    syncopated

    pipingt

    of

    lbrr

    Wittgenstein's

    lute.,

    That was

    in

    1925,

    and

    Wittgen.

    stein's

    Tractatus

    Logico-philosophicus

    had

    frst

    appeared

    in

     rytirtrt

    three

    years'previously

    (the

    German version was pub.

    lished

    in

    l92l).

    Broad,s

    comment,

    hen,

    bears

    witness

    o

    thc

    immediate

    impact

    of

    the Tractatus

    upon

    certain

    of

    the

    younger

    philosophers

    at

    Cambridge,

    for

    all that

    it

    was

    by

    no mean6

    widely

    read

    n

    England

    until

    the ate

    nineteen-thirties,

    and was

    not

    350

    SOMB CAMBRIDGE

    PHILOSOPHBRS

    until the nineteen-sixties

    made the

    subject

    of detailed

    criticism

    tnd commentary.

    It is a

    book,

    indeed,

    which one

    s€tsout

    to describe

    with more

    than

    ordinary

    diffidence.s Partly

    this is

    a consequence

    of

    the

    cnthusiasmWittgenstein

    nspired n

    his

    pupils.

    If there

    is now

    nobody,

    if indeed

    there never has

    been anybody,

    who

    would

    subscribe

    o all

    the

    leading

    doctrines of the

    Tractatus

    Wittgen-

    rtcin, as we

    shall see ater, came

    o criticize

    t severely

    there s

    still

    in many

    quarters

    a reluctance

    o believe

    hat Wittgenstein

    could

    have

    been mistaken in

    ways

    hat

    were

    not somehow

    wiser,

    nrore

    penetrating,

    than the mistakes

    of his contemporaries.

    Again,

    delicate

    questions

    of

    discipleship

    re involved:

    the

    ques-

    tion,

    'What

    did Wittgenstein

    mean?'

    is closely

    linked

    with

    onother,

    Who

    can truly

    claim to be carrying

    on his

    work?'

    On

    lhc other side,

    here

    are still thosewho

    would

    dismiss

    Wittgen-

    rtcin

    as

    a charlatan. t

    will be appaxent

    hat no

    account of

    the

    'l'raclatus s likely 1s veinrrniysrsal aoceptance.

    Apart from

    these

    extrinsic difficulties,

    which

    the

    chronicler

    Inust earn

    o regard

    with relative

    equanirgity

    s he

    perils

    ncident

    trr his

    profession,

    he

    Tractatus tself

    is

    sufficiently intimidating.

    I tliscusses

    uestions

    of

    a

    peculiarly

    intricate

    kind

    -

    meaning,

    he

    nutureof

    logic, facts

    and

    propositions,

    he task

    of

    philosophy

    In o

    manner

    which

    disconcertingly

    combines

    he Romantic,

    not

    to

    rny

    apocalyptic,

    and the

    precisely

    ormal.

    The

    preface

    at once displays

    tfese two

    streaks.

    The

    opening

    rcntence 'this book will perhapsonly be understoodby those

    who have

    themselves

    already thought

    the

    thoughts

    which

    are

    cxpressedn

    it, or similar thoughts'

    -

    is in

    the

    best tradition

    of

    l{omanticism,

    in

    so far

    as

    it

    suggests hat

    only

    a chosen

    few,

    rympathetic

    souls, will

    really

    underctand.

    Yet

    Wittgenstein

    goee

    rrn to

    tell us that

    the

    'whole

    meaning'

    of the

    Tractatus

    can be

    nummed

    up

    as

    follows:

    'what can be said

    at

    all can

    be said

    clcarly; and whereof

    onecannot

    speak hereofone

    must

    be silent.'

    llere

    at

    once the central

    paradox

    of the

    Tractalas

    leaps

    to

    the

    cyc; it tells us what, it says,caDnotbe said,and tells usobscurely,

    irr metaphor

    and

    epigram, that

    what can be said

    at all can

    be said

    cfcarly. The

    very form of the Tractatus

    eflects

    his

    paradox.

    Each

    ptragraph

    is

    numbered n

    accordance

    with

    an elaborate

    system,

    uq

    f now

    at last

    we were dealing

    with

    a

    philosopher

    who would

    35 1

  • 8/21/2019 Passmore_100 Years Philosophy

    7/14

    aid

    our

    comprehension

    n

    every

    possible

    way.

    yet

    the

    paragraphs

    thus

    numbered

    are

    composed

    in

    a style

    so

    enigmatic,

    with

    A HUNDRED

    YBARS

    OF

    PHILOSOPHY

    sentence-links

    so

    tenuous,

    that

    scarcely

    one

    of them

    does

    raise

    serious

    problems

    of interpretation.

    An

    elucidation

    ofthe

    Tractatus,

    hen

    -

    even

    supposing

    hat

    felt

    competent

    to

    undertake

    it

    -

    would

    need

    to

    be lengthy

    ar

    minute. All that I canhope to do, within limits at all reasonable,

    is

    to

    select

    for

    slight

    consideration

    those

    points

    at which

    the

    Tractatus

    has,

    so far,

    been

    mainly

    influential.

    Something

    should

    irst

    be

    said

    about

    the

    ntellectual

    background

    of

    the

    Tractatus.

    Wittgenstein

    was

    trained

    as

    ao

    engrneer,

    not

    as

    a

    philosopher,

    so that

    one

    aurnot

    presume

    n

    him

    an

    ordinary

    acquaintance

    with

    academic philosophy.

    Like

    many

    another

    amateur,

    he

    was

    nterested

    n

    Schopenhauer;

    f there

    s

    sometimes

    a Kantian

    flavour

    in his

    work,

    that

    is

    perhaps

    the

    explanation.

    He knew something of Mach and Hertz, and perhaps he had

    dipped

    into,

    or

    heard

    somebody

    discuss,

    Meinong

    and

    Husserl.

    All

    one

    can

    say

    with

    confidence

    s

    that

    in

    writing

    the

    Tractatus

    Wittgenstein

    was

    taking

    as

    a

    point

    of

    departure

    some

    of

    the

    things

    he

    had

    read

    n

    the

    works

    of, or

    picked

    up in

    discussion

    with,

    Frege

    and

    Russell.

    euite

    what

    he

    owed

    to,

    and

    quite

    what

    hi

    contributed

    to,

    Russell's

    .philosophy

    of

    logical

    atomism'

    it

    is

    difficult

    to

    say.

    He nowhere

    refers

    to

    any

    of his

    predecessors

    except

    in

    an

    elusive

    and

    off-hand

    fashion;

    what

    he

    says

    even

    about FregeandRussell s sometimes eryprrzzling.

    n

    short,

    this

    is

    not

    a

    case

    n

    which

    the

    detailed

    pursuit

    of influences

    s

    likely

    to

    prove

    at all

    rewarding.

    Now for

    the

    Tractatus

    tself.

    It

    begins

    with

    a series

    of

    staccato

    pronouncements:

    'The

    world

    is

    everything

    that

    is

    the

    case.

    The

    world

    is the

    tbtality

    of facts,

    not

    of

    things

    . . .'

    yet

    this,

    it is

    fairly

    clear,

    is

    not

    the

    real

    beginning.

    Wittgenstein has

    ordered

    the

    paragraphs

    of

    lhe Tractatz.r

    n

    what

    he

    judges

    to

    be

    the

    most

    artistig

    the most

    striking

    sequence;

    f

    we hope

    to understandwSt Ae says what

    he

    does,

    we

    have

    to

    move

    Uapt*aras

    anJ

    forwards

    through

    their

    serried

    array.

    His

    real

    starting-point

    is

    a

    theory

    of

    meaning,

    not

    a directly-intuited

    ontolory.

    Wittgenstein's

    crucial

    assumption

    s

    that

    every

    proposition

    has

    a

    clear

    and

    definite

    sense;

    and

    conjoined

    with

    that,

    the

    assump-

    tion

    that

    this

    sense

    ies

    in

    the

    proposition's

    relation

    to

    the

    352

    SOME

    CAMBRIDGE

    PHILOSOPHERS

    'world'.

    Now

    the

    propositions

    of everyday

    ife

    contain

    complex

    exprossions,

    xpressions

    which

    are

    certainly

    not

    what

    Russell

    urilcd

    'logically

    proper names''

    Such

    complex

    expressions

    an

    elwnys

    bJreptacla

    uy descriptions.

    f,

    for

    example,

    somebody

    nrks

    us

    what

    t

    means

    o say

    hat

    .all

    millionaires

    are

    stubborn',

    wo

    c$nanswer

    by

    substituting

    descriptions

    or

    'millionaires'

    and

    'ttubborn',

    by

    saying,

    or example,'allpersonswhopossess ore

    llr||n

    a

    million

    poundsare

    difficult

    to

    persuade" But

    by

    offering

    llrls

    sort of

    elucidation,

    we

    have

    still

    not

    made

    he

    sense

    erfectly

    'clcar

    and

    definite'

    in Wittgenstein's

    sense

    of

    that

    phrase; we

    could

    sensibly

    e asked

    o

    substitute

    urther

    descriptions

    or the

    trrnrplex

    expiessions

    n

    our

    new

    assertion'

    To

    arrive

    at a

    deter-

    rrrinnt.

    sens"

    or

    the

    proposition

    -

    to

    give

    the 'one

    and

    only

    conrplete

    nalysis

    of

    the

    proposition'

    -

    we

    must,

    according

    o

    Wittgenstein,define

    the

    complex

    sign

    by

    means

    of

    (logicatly

    pr,,perl names'

    It

    is obvious,'

    he

    writes,

    that

    in

    the analysisof

    propositions

    we

    must

    come

    to

    elementary

    propositions'

    which

    *.,,rrirt

    of

    names

    n

    immediate

    combination''

    At

    that

    point

    we

    urtt

    no longer

    ask

    that

    the

    sense

    e

    made

    clearer

    o us;

    a

    name

    crtnnot

    be

    defined.

    Nor

    do

    we

    need

    o

    make

    this

    request'

    or a

    lrruposition

    containing

    no

    expressions

    xcept

    names

    points

    im-

    i,,..iiut"ty

    to

    the

    world -

    its

    senpe

    s

    given

    directly

    to

    us

    as

    the

    rrrrntbination

    f simple

    entities

    o which

    t refers'

    'l'hcremustbe simpleentities, hen- what

    Wittgenstein

    alled

    'objccts'e

    because

    here

    are

    names;

    and

    there

    must be

    names

    hcciru*"

    propositions

    have

    a definite

    sense'

    Wittgenstein

    was

    not

    Irrtcrested

    n

    nominating

    examples

    f

    simples.

    The

    point,

    for

    him,

    l,r lhat

    there

    must

    be

    simples;

    what

    they

    are

    is a

    matter

    of

    secon-

    rlury

    importance.

    Even

    if the

    world

    is

    infinitely

    complex"

    he

    *rli*,

    "o

    that

    every

    act

    consists

    of

    an

    infinite

    number

    of atomic

    fncts

    and

    every

    atomic

    act

    is composed

    f

    an

    infinite

    number

    of

    ohiccts,

    even

    hen

    there

    must

    be

    objects

    and

    atomic

    facts"

    This

    lr nruchmore n the spirit of Leibniz than of Hume'

    N&mes,

    Wittgenstein

    argues,

    have

    no

    sense

    xcept

    n

    the con'

    lcxl

    of a

    proposition;

    correspondingly,

    we

    cannot

    think

    of

    an

    ,rbicct

    except

    as

    having

    various

    possibleconnexions

    with

    other

    ,rbiccts;such

    possibleconnexions

    between

    objects

    are 'atomic

    frrcts'.

    This

    sounds

    very

    strange

    to

    call

    possibleconnexions

    'lircts'. We

    ordinarily

    think

    of

    a

    fact

    as

    actual,

    by

    its very

    natlue'

    353

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    A HUNDRED

    YEARS

    OF PHILOSOPHY

    Yet

    it

    is

    difficult

    to

    find

    any

    other

    translation

    for

    the

    German

    'Sachverhalt'.

    The

    strangeness

    iminishes

    liehtly

    f

    we think

    of

    an atomic

    fact

    as

    that

    which

    makes

    a

    proposition

    rue

    or false'.

    A

    proposition

    s

    true

    if certain

    atomic

    facts

    .exist,,

    false

    f they

    'do

    not

    exist'

    : the

    atomic

    acts

    must,

    hen,

    be of such

    a kind

    that

    the

    question

    whether

    hey

    ,exist'

    or

    .do

    not

    exist,

    .obtain'

    or

    'do

    not

    obtain')

    can

    always

    be raised.

    Atomic

    facts

    are realized

    possibilities if the proposition

    which

    pictures

    them

    is

    true,

    un-

    realizedpossibilities

    f

    it is false,

    but

    their

    .existence,

    as

    possi-

    bilities

    is

    unaffected

    by

    the

    question

    whether

    they

    are realized

    or

    not,

    by

    the

    question,

    hat is,

    whether

    hey

    are

    ,

    facts

    in

    the harder

    sense

    of

    that

    word.

    In

    studying

    logic,

    according

    to

    Wittgenstein,

    we

    are not

    really

    nterested

    n

    the

    hardness

    f facts

    ,all

    possibili-

    ties

    are its

    facts.'This

    is inevitably

    so, he

    thinks.

    because

    alse

    propositions

    -

    propositions

    which

    assert

    possibilities

    which

    are

    not realized

    are asmuch

    part

    of the

    field

    dealt with

    by logic,

    as

    much capableof being assertedand denied,of implying or not

    implying,

    as

    true

    propositions.

    How

    exactly

    are

    propositions

    elated

    o

    facts

    ? Wittgenstein's

    answer

    s

    that they

    are

    pictures'

    of the fact.

    Various

    anecdotes

    are old

    a'bout he

    circumstances

    n which

    his

    view

    first

    occurred

    to him,

    anecdotes

    which

    agree

    n

    one

    respect:

    he

    was

    mpressed

    by

    a model

    which

    had

    been

    constructed

    to

    illustrate

    some

    cal-

    amity,

    let

    us say

    a motor

    accident.

    .Thsre,'

    he thought

    as he

    looked

    at

    the

    miniature cars,

    the

    miniature

    road,

    the

    miniature

    hedges,

    is a

    proposition.'

    Theproblem, as Wittgensteinsaw t, was o give

    an account

    of

    the

    proposition

    which

    will

    allow,

    first,

    that

    we are

    free

    to

    con-r

    struct

    false

    propositions

    as well

    as true

    ones,

    and secondly,

    hat

    the

    point

    of

    a

    proposition

    ies

    in its

    relation

    to

    the

    world.

    The,

    'picture'

    analogy

    seemed

    o

    be satisfactory

    n

    both

    respects;

    x

    Obviously,

    by

    means

    of miniature

    motor-cars

    we

    can

    give

    a

    false

    picture

    of

    what

    actually

    happened;

    obviously

    again,

    thq

    point

    of our

    manipulations

    with

    the

    motor-cars

    is

    to

    .convey

    something

    about

    the

    world'.

    Themotor-cars, f course,axenot in themselves proposition;

    we could

    use

    them in

    a

    game

    as

    well

    as to

    picture

    an apcident.

    Only when

    they

    are arranged

    in

    a certain

    way

    do they

    convey

    what has

    happened.

    Thus

    arranged,

    abcording

    to

    Wittgenstein,

    354

    SOMB CAMBRIDGB

    PHILOSOPHERS

    llroy

    are a'propositional

    sign';

    the'proposition'is

    su€ha sign

    'projected

    n heworld',

    i.e.

    used

    o affirm or

    deny hat

    something

    lr thecase.

    But

    what about he

    case

    the normal case

    where he

    plopositional

    sign

    consists

    of

    words? Wittgenstein

    admits

    that

    rucha

    proposition

    s

    not, superficially,

    he

    sort

    of thing we

    should

    ordinarily

    describe

    as a'picture'.

    Even although,

    however,our

    ordinary language

    s

    no longer hieroglyphic,

    it has kept,

    he

    tlrinks, what is essentialn hieroglyphicwriting. It retains its

    power

    of conveying

    o

    us what

    it represents,

    ven although

    we

    Irnvc

    never actually

    observed

    what is

    thus

    conveyed

    and

    indeed

    Irr

    hat case

    where

    he

    proposition

    s false,we

    could not

    possibly

    Iurve

    observed

    what

    it

    conveys.

    This

    power

    of

    conveying depends,

    lrc

    maintains,

    on

    the fact

    that the

    proposition

    has

    precisely

    he

    r$rnc structure

    as

    what

    it represents.One

    name stands

    or one

    tlring,'

    he writes,

    and

    another

    for another

    thing, and

    they

    are

    r,rrrrrnected

    ogether;

    n this way,

    the

    whole, ike a

    tableau

    vivant,

    Drelrentshe atomicfact . . . in the proposition here must be arl

    nurny

    hings distinguishable

    s

    there are in

    the state of

    affairs

    wlrich

    t

    represents.'lo

    One objection

    which

    naturally

    o@urs o us

    is that

    this theory

    tould

    apply,

    at

    most, to elementary

    propositions.

    Ordinary

    prolrositions

    o

    not

    picture

    dtomic

    facts: they

    contain such ex-

    prorsions

    s'all', 'some',

    or',

    'not',

    noneof

    whichcanhave

    any

    nnulogue

    n

    an

    atomic

    fact.'For

    in calling such

    facts

    'atomic'

    wlrnt

    Wittgenstein

    means above

    all

    is that they

    are logically

    lnrlopendent;

    rom

    the

    'existence' of an

    atomic

    fact, nothing

    wlrnteverollowsabout the 'existence'or the 'non-existence'of

    nny

    other

    atomic

    fact.

    Thus there can

    be

    no negative atomic

    lhcts

    let

    alone universal

    atomic

    facts

    -.since

    the

    'existence'

    of

    l' ls

    not Iis

    not

    logically

    ndependent

    f the

    'non-existence'of

    .Y ,r l'.

    'My

    fundamental

    hought,'

    Wittgenstein

    herefore

    wrote,

    'i8

    tlrut

    the

    "logical

    constants"

    do

    not represent.'Although

    hey

    r

    ccur

    within

    propositions,

    e means,

    ogical

    constants

    re not one

    ol'the elements

    n the

    picture.

    He discusses

    n considerable

    etail

    t rccrucial ase f'not'. It is obvious, e thinks, hat not'

    is

    not

    thc

    nameof a

    relation,

    n

    the

    sense hat

    'right'

    and 'left'

    name

    relntions.

    ndeed,

    not'cannot be a

    nameat all;

    if

    it were,

    not'

    rrot-p'

    would be

    a

    quite

    different

    assertion

    rom

    'p',

    as

    naming

    35 5

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    OF PHILOSOPHY

    two nots

    which

    'p'

    does not mention.

    Then

    -

    a

    conclusion

    ho

    regards

    as ridiculous

    -

    from

    the

    single fact

    that

    p,

    an infinite

    number

    of other facts

    could be

    made o follow,

    by the

    process

    of

    adding

    double-negations.

    Not', then, is

    no nanre; t

    does not

    refer to

    an object.

    What it

    does s

    to indicate

    -

    and the

    same s

    true of

    all the other

    logical

    constants

    that

    an

    operation

    has

    been

    performedupon'p', in this case he operationof denial.

    As

    a result

    of his

    consideration

    of the role

    played

    by

    'logical

    constants'

    n

    propositions,

    Wittgenstein

    s led

    to conclude

    hat

    every non-elementary

    proposition

    is

    a

    'truth-function'

    of ele-

    mentary

    propositions.

    In

    his

    paperilSome

    Remarks

    on Logical

    Form

    (PIS,S,

    1929) e

    puts

    he matter

    hus: If we

    try to

    analyse

    any

    given

    propositions

    we shall

    find

    in

    general

    that

    they are

    logical

    sums,

    products

    or other

    truth-functions

    of simpler

    propositions.

    But

    our

    analysis, f

    carried

    far

    enough,

    must come

    to the point where t reaches ropositional orms which are not

    themselves

    omposed

    of simpler

    propositional

    orms. We must

    eventually

    reach

    the ultimate

    connexion

    of the terms,

    the im-

    mediate connexion

    which

    cannot

    be broken

    without

    destroying

    the

    propositional

    form

    as such. The

    propositions

    which represent

    this ultimate

    connexion

    call,

    after Russell,

    atomic

    propositions.

    They, then,

    are the

    kernels of every

    proposition,

    they contunthe

    material,

    and

    all the rest is

    only a

    development of

    this material.'

    Suppose

    we consider he

    prop

    osition

    p

    or

    q

    Then

    the word

    '

    or

    I

    doesnot represent'anultimate connexion'; ascomesout in thg

    fact

    that

    the

    sense

    fp or

    q

    anbewholly

    given

    by referring to its

    'truth-grounds', in

    which

    'or'

    plays

    no

    part.

    It

    will be true if

    p

    andqarebothtrue,

    trueif

    p

    istrueand4isfalse,

    'rueif

    p

    isfalse

    and

    4

    is true, false

    if

    p

    is false

    and

    4

    is false.

    Set out these esults

    in a

    diagram

    -

    a

    'truth-table'

    -

    and the result is

    a

    propositional

    sign which

    clearly

    pictures

    the

    senseof

    p

    or

    4.11

    Byery aq1.

    elementary

    roposition

    can

    be analysed y this

    method, accord-

    ing to Wittgenstein,

    even

    when

    -

    although this

    presents

    special

    difficulties it

    contains he

    universal

    quantifier'all'.

    This result

    can,Fbe

    alternatively expressed

    by saying

    that

    all

    propositions

    *Wittgenstein

    was sb dissatisfied

    with

    this

    paper,

    his

    only

    publication

    after the Tractatus,

    that he refused

    either

    to

    read

    or

    discuss

    t when the timo

    came

    for

    its

    delivery.

    But

    I do not think

    he was then dissatisfied with tho

    passage

    have

    quoted.

    356

    3s7

    SOME CAMBRIDGE

    PIIILOSOPHERS

    Iurvc

    he

    same

    general

    orm:

    that

    of

    a selection out of the range

    ol'ltomic facts, a selectionmade

    by negatingcertain

    combina-

    I ions.

    'l'here

    are two extreme cases

    n

    such a selection:

    he case

    where

    no combination whatever

    s ruled out,

    and the casewhere every

    rrrrrnbinations ruled out.

    Thus

    suppose

    we substitute

    not-p

    for

    tlrc4 n p orq,then theresultingexpressionpr tnt-p is truefor

    n

    possibilities

    the only

    possibility

    ruled out by

    p

    or

    4

    is the case

    wfrcre

    ar'd

    q

    areboth false,and

    this

    casecannot occur

    when

    4

    lr rcplacedby not-p. An expression uch as

    p

    or not-p

    Wittgen-

    rtcin

    callsa'tautology'

    ;

    p

    andnot-p,

    which

    dlows no

    possibilities,

    Irc calls a

    'contradiction'.

    Tautologies and

    contradictions are

    'without

    sense'because

    hey do not

    picture

    he world.

    I

    know

    nothing

    about

    the weather,' Wittgensteinwrites,

    when

    I know

    tlrut t is either raining or

    not raining.'Yet

    they are

    not useless;

    lhcy form 'part of the symbolism'.

    All

    the ruths of logic, ndeed,are classed y

    Wittgensteinwith

    'luutologies'.

    This

    follows

    directly

    from the truth-functional

    nnulysis.

    ake, or example, he logical ruth that

    p

    or

    q

    together

    wllh

    not-p mplies

    4.

    Set out the truth-grounds

    for

    p

    or

    q

    and the

    f rrth-grounds

    or not-p

    and we shall be able o

    read

    off

    immedi-

    ntcfy

    hat

    p

    or

    q

    and

    not-p

    c,anaot

    oth be

    true

    except

    n

    the case

    wlrcre

    q

    is true. This

    fact

    can be alternatively

    expressed,on

    Wittgenstein'sheory

    of

    'sense',

    by

    saying hat the senseof

    4

    h included n the senseof Qt or q) and not-p. In an adequate

    rynrbolism in an

    ideal

    language this, according o Wittgen-

    rtcin, would

    be

    immediatelyobvious. We are

    not, then, saying

    rrrrnething

    bout the world

    when we

    assert

    hat

    p

    or

    q

    and not-p

    tollcther mply

    4;

    in making this assertionwe are

    not

    excluding

    rorrre

    genuinepossibility,

    All

    we are

    doing, according o Witt-

    gcnstein,

    s drawing attention to a

    feature

    of our

    symbolism,

    rornethinghe symbolism tself should

    show.

    It

    is a characteristic

    rrrlrk of logical

    propositions,'

    he

    writes,

    that

    we can

    perceive

    n

    tlrc symbol tself that they are true.'

    ll'logic

    consistswholly of

    tautologiegwe might ask,why do

    we

    flrrtl t necessaryo construct

    proofs

    ofthe

    propositions

    oflogic?

    A

    'proof',

    Wittgenstein answers,

    s nothing but a mechanical

    expcdient

    or

    recognizing

    autologies more rapidly; the view that

    llrcre are

    'primitive

    propositions'

    of

    logic from which all the

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    other

    propositions

    of logic

    ought

    to

    be

    deduced s

    a delusion.

    All

    the

    propositions

    of logic,

    he

    argues,

    stand

    on exactly

    the

    same

    footing;

    they all say

    he

    same

    hing,

    i.e.

    nothing

    at all.

    What

    of mathematics?

    hat

    consists,

    Wittgenstein

    argues,

    of

    equations;

    from

    which

    it follows

    directly

    that the

    propositions

    of

    mathematics,

    oo,

    are without

    sense. or

    it is alwaysnonsense,

    he

    maintains,

    to say

    of

    two

    distinct

    things

    that

    they are

    dentical;

    and osayof one hing that it is denticalwith itself s to saynoth-

    ing.

    Mathematics

    says,

    what in

    its

    symbolism

    we can

    see,

    that

    certain

    expressions

    an

    be

    substituted

    for

    one

    another;

    that

    this

    can

    be

    done

    shows

    us something

    about

    the world

    but

    does not

    picture

    the

    world.

    Thus

    the

    propositions

    of mathematics

    are

    'senselesg'.

    Senseless,

    ut

    not nonsensical;

    n

    the other hand,

    Wittgenstein

    axgues,

    he

    metaphysician

    alks

    nonsense,

    n

    the fullest

    sense

    of

    the

    word.

    There

    is

    no

    novelty

    in

    this

    accusation:

    as we have

    already seen, it formed part of the regular stock-in-trade of

    nineteenth-century

    positivism,

    to

    trace

    it no

    further

    back.

    What

    was

    novel,

    however,

    was the

    accusation

    hat

    metaphysics

    arises

    out of

    the fact

    that

    philosophers

    do not

    understand

    .the

    logic

    of

    our

    language'.

    In

    the most

    obvious

    case,

    he

    philosopher

    is misled,

    according

    to Wittgenstein,

    by the fact

    that

    the

    grammatical

    form

    of

    our

    propositions

    does not

    always

    reflect

    their logical

    form.

    Merely

    because

    millionaires are non-existent,

    resembles

    n

    grammatical

    form

    'millionaires

    are non-cooperative', the philosopher is led

    to

    suppose

    that

    'non-existent'

    is

    a

    quality,

    and is

    then

    well

    embarked

    upon

    a metaphysical

    nqulry

    into.the

    nature

    of non-

    existence'.

    In

    a

    perfect

    language,

    one in which

    every

    sign

    im-

    mediately

    ndicated

    its logical

    function,

    such misunderstandings,

    Wittgenstein

    thinks,

    would

    vanish;

    what

    we now write

    as

    'millionaires

    are

    non-existent'

    would

    be

    so expressed

    hat

    .nou-

    existent'would

    no longer

    ook like

    a

    predicate.

    Sucha language,

    we

    might

    say,

    would make

    logic

    unnecessary

    and metaphysics

    impossible.

    In other instances,Wittgensteinthinks, metaphysics

    arises

    out

    of the

    attempt

    to

    pass

    beyond

    the

    boundaries

    of

    language

    by

    talking

    as we have

    been

    doing,

    about

    the relations

    between ang.

    uage

    and

    the

    world.

    No

    proposition,

    Wittgenstein

    maintains,

    358

    SOME CAMBRIDGE

    PHILOSOPHERS

    cnn

    represent

    what it has n

    common with the world

    -

    that

    form

    Irr virtue of

    which

    it

    is an

    accurate

    icture.

    To

    do this,

    it would

    lruve

    o include within

    itself a

    portion

    of the world in a non-

    pictured

    orm

    -

    so as o be able

    o make he comparison etween

    thc world and

    the

    picture.

    But this, according o

    Wittgenstein, s

    inrpossible;

    o

    talk about

    the world is at

    once

    to

    picture

    t. To

    fluppose therwise s to

    imagine hat we c{rn

    somehow ay what

    lics

    beyond

    anguage,

    .e.

    beyond

    anything hat can be said.

    What, hen, canthe

    philosopher

    ay? Wittgenstein's nswer

    s

    uncompromising

    'nothing

    at all '

    'The

    right

    method

    of

    philos.

    ophy,' he ells us,

    would

    be

    this: to say

    nothing exceptwhat can

    hc said, .e.

    the

    propositions

    of

    natural science,.e. something

    thot has

    nothing

    to

    do with

    philosophy:

    and then, always,

    when

    rt()nreonelsewishes o say

    something

    metaphysical,o demon-

    Blrate o him that

    he had

    given

    no

    meaning o certain signs

    n his

    propositions.'

    Philosophy,on this

    view, is not a theory but

    an

    nctivity: the activity of making clear to peoplewhat they can,

    nnd

    what they

    cannot, say.

    lly

    way of reply, we might be

    templed

    to

    assert

    hat there axeat

    lctrst some

    non-metaphysical,

    sensible,

    philosophical

    assertions,

    rrnmely

    hosewhich ariseout

    of the analysis

    f scientific

    method.

    'l'lris

    Wittgensteindenies.Such

    propositions,

    he says,are

    either

    propositions

    bout the

    psychology

    of

    human beingsor else urn

    out,

    on

    analysis, o be

    propositions

    of logic,

    propositions

    which

    'hclong

    o the symbolism'.

    Of the

    first type, he most

    mportant

    elunrples'the so-called aw ofinduction'. Induction, as defined

    hy

    Wittgenstein,s

    'the

    process

    f assuming

    he simplest

    aw that

    cnn be

    made o harmonize

    with our experience';

    nd,

    he argues,

    'there are

    no

    grounds

    or believing

    hat

    the

    simplest

    course

    of

    cvcnts

    will

    really happen'.

    t is

    'only

    a hypothesis,'

    e says,

    hat

    thc sun will

    rise omorrow;

    we do

    not know that it

    will rise. We

    slrould only

    know it will

    rise if this

    were

    a

    logically

    necessary

    consequence

    f our experience;

    here

    s no sort of

    necessity, e

    l)rcsumes,

    xcept ogical

    necessity,

    o sort of

    inferenceexcept

    'logical'

    (i.e.

    tautological)

    nference.

    In

    no way,' he writes,

    can

    nn inference e made

    rom the existence

    f one state

    of affairs o

    lhc

    existence f

    anotherentirely different

    rom it

    . . .

    superstition

    is the belief

    n the causal

    nexus.' t

    follows that

    'the

    law of

    in-

    duction'is

    certainly not a

    proposition

    of

    logic;

    on

    Wittgenstein's

    359

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    CAMBRIDGB

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    not

    equations,

    and

    is

    thus enabled

    still to uphold the

    doctrine

    that

    mathematics s deducible from logic; at the

    same

    time, of

    course, t was rom Wittgenstein

    that he eamt to

    think

    of logic as

    beingcomposedof tautologies.

    His

    general

    object

    is

    to show, with

    the help of Wittgenstein's

    truth-functional

    analysis

    of

    general

    propositions,

    hat it is

    possible

    o derive

    mathematics rom a logic

    which containsno empiricalpropositions,no propositions ike

    the Axiom of Reducibility

    or the Axiom of

    Infinity,

    and

    yet

    which does not collapse

    nto

    paradox.*

    In attempting to con-

    tlnue, with

    aid

    from the Tractatus,

    the sort of inquiry which

    Whitehead

    and Russell had

    initiated, Ramsey was almost

    uniqueamongstBritish

    philosophers

    f the between-wars

    eriod.

    For

    the most

    part, philosophers-whose

    other

    nterestsare usually

    lltcrary,

    historical,or linguistic, ather than

    mathematical when

    fnccd with

    the

    formidable symbolism of Principia

    Mathematica

    dccided hat formal logic was

    no

    longer

    for them; they retreated

    Into the more congenial territory of epistemology.

    Ramseymoved

    in the

    same

    direction,

    partly

    under the influ-

    once, t

    would seem,

    ofJohnson,

    partly

    because

    e

    had

    now read

    l'olrce,

    partly

    following in Russell's footsteps.

    Thus the 6nal

    oonclusion f

    his

    'Facts

    and

    Propositions'

    (1927),

    although he

    lrrgcly derives

    his

    logical apparatus

    from Wittgenstein, is

    prag-

    nullc

    in tendency.One can.see his most clearly n

    his

    analysis

    rrf negation:he

    agrees

    with Wittgenstein hat

    not-not-p s the

    ralrro

    proposition

    as

    p,

    and,hence hat

    'not'

    is

    not a name,

    but

    ho rrunwilling o leave he matter at this point. The word 'not',

    Ito

    nrgues, xpresses difference n

    feeling,

    the differencebetween

    lrrcrting

    and denying.

    It

    will

    follow that

    'disbolieving

    p'

    is

    hforrlical

    with

    'believing

    not-p':

    and

    this conclusion,Ramseyries

    l

    n

    l

    r

    nt y

    i n

    a

    typically

    pragmatic

    manner,

    by

    dentifying the causes

    erxl

    theconsequences

    f these wo apparentlydifferent attitudes

    of

    nrind.

    l{inrilarly,

    n his'Truth and Probabili ty'

    (1926)

    he rejectsWitt-

    Scrntcin's

    doctrine that we

    'have

    no

    grounds'

    for inferences

    whlch are not tautological. nduction he describes, fter

    Peirce,

    .lloo,

    for the

    details,

    Ch. 9 above. He later had

    qualms

    about the

    possi-

    hlllty

    of

    '$oving'

    the whole

    of

    pure

    mathematics by

    a logio which contains

    rrl

    ornplricul

    propositions;

    so mucb the

    wors€

    for

    pure

    mathematics,

    ho

    Itrnrr

    lo hnvo concluded.

    A

    HUNDRED

    YEARS

    oF PHTLosoPHY

    I

    view

    it says

    merely

    -

    and

    so

    t is a

    proposition

    of

    psychology,

    not

    I

    of

    philosophy

    -

    that

    human

    beings

    ordinarily

    prefer

    simpler

    to

    I

    more

    complex

    exPlanations.

    I

    As for the

    aw

    of causality,

    hat,

    according

    o Wittgenstein,

    s

    a

    I

    proposition

    of logic

    n disguise

    an

    attempt

    o

    say

    what

    can only

    I

    be

    shown

    n our

    symbolism,

    hat 'there

    are

    natural

    laws'.

    We

    do

    I

    not discoverthat there are uniformities, he argues'by inspecting I

    the world

    around

    us;

    theseuniformities

    already

    show

    themselves

    t

    in

    our

    talk

    about

    the

    world,

    in

    the mere

    act, ndeed,

    hat

    we are

    f

    able

    to think.

    Similarly,

    what

    Hertz

    picked

    out as

    the a

    priori

    I

    laws of

    mechanics

    are

    simply

    descriptions

    of our

    symbolism,

    I

    descriptions

    which

    our symbolism

    tself

    ought

    to

    'show'.

    If

    we

    think

    of science

    s an

    attempt

    to describe

    he

    world

    by

    means

    of a

    t

    fine

    mesh,

    a

    priori

    laws,

    Wittgenstein

    says,

    axe

    not

    part

    of

    the

    I

    results at

    which

    we

    thus

    arrive:

    on

    the contrary

    they

    are

    the

    I

    characteristics

    of the

    mesh

    (although

    it shows

    us

    something

    I

    about the world, Wittgenstein hinks, that it can be described"

    I

    such-and-such

    aws;.rz

    So,

    Wittgenstein

    argues,

    his

    general

    *o-

    I

    clusion

    emains

    all

    propositionswhich

    picture

    he

    world belong

    I

    to the

    natural

    sciences,

    nd

    those

    which

    do

    not

    picture

    the

    world,

    I

    if they are

    not

    nonsense,

    re

    tautological.

    Nowhere

    s

    there

    any

    I

    room

    for

    a

    peculiar.

    elsss

    of

    philosophical

    propositions.

    This

    was

    I

    certainly

    a discqBsef{ingconclusion.

    I

    ,, Of

    those

    Garnb'nidFp"men

    ho

    were

    mmediately

    nflue-nced

    y

    I

    theTractatus,thepqgt

    remarkable

    was

    F.

    P. Ramsey'

    Ramsey

    died at the ageof twenty-six,and the few yearsof his maturelife

    were divided

    between

    @onomics,

    mathematical

    ogic and

    philos'

    I

    ophy;

    nor

    was

    he one

    of

    those

    who

    light

    in

    early

    life uron

    a

    I

    system to

    which

    they are

    thereafter

    faithful.

    Thus

    he

    wrote

    no

    ,

    major work,

    and

    the

    essays

    and

    fragments

    collected

    for

    post'

    I

    humous

    publication by R'

    B.

    Braithwaite

    as

    The

    Foundations

    f

    )

    Mathematics

    1931)

    epresent

    ifferent

    stages

    n the

    development

    I

    '1

    of a

    mind

    rather

    than

    varied

    aspects

    of a

    single

    point

    of

    view'

    f

    They have

    begn

    none the

    less

    nfluential

    for that'

    rI

    In

    the essay

    1925)

    which

    gave

    its title

    to

    The

    Foundotions

    of

    I

    Mathematics

    Ramsey

    akes

    his

    stand

    with

    the logistics

    of White-

    |

    head

    and

    Russell

    against

    Hilbert

    and

    Brouwer;

    but

    at once

    I

    displays

    his

    independence.

    n

    opposition

    to

    Wittgenstein'

    he

    I

    maintains

    that the

    ProPositions

    of

    mathematics

    are

    tautotoee+f

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    PHILOSOPHY

    as a'habit of the human

    mind',

    one which

    cannot,he

    admits,

    be

    justified

    by any

    purely

    formal

    methods

    -

    not

    even, as Keynes

    had

    thought,

    by the heory

    of

    probability

    but

    which t is none

    he ess

    'unreasonable'

    not to

    adopt. A

    logic of induction,

    a

    'human

    logic',

    will describe,

    he concludes,

    he degree

    of success

    with

    which

    inquirers employ

    different

    methods

    of

    arriving

    at the

    truth. Induction, he thinks, s pragmaticallyustified; and this is

    a rational

    justification,

    not,

    as Wittgenstein

    had

    argued,

    a

    mere

    matter

    of

    psycholory.

    The

    samemovement

    owards

    pragmatism

    an be discerned

    n

    'General

    Propositions

    nd Causality'

    (1929).

    Ramsey

    ow rejects

    the view, which

    he had

    previously

    taken

    over from Wittgenstein,

    that a

    general roposition

    s

    a conjunction

    of atomic

    propositions,

    althougha conjunction

    with the

    peculiar

    property

    hat we

    cannot,

    for lack

    of symbolic

    power,

    enumerate

    ts constituents.

    (On

    which Ramseycomments:

    But

    what

    we can't say

    we can't say,

    and we

    can't whistle t either.')

    At the

    same ime, he

    is still con-

    vinced that

    all

    propositions

    are truth-functions;

    the

    conclusion

    he draws is that

    general propositions

    are not,

    properly

    speaking,

    'propositions'.

    We

    ought

    not to distinguish

    hem,

    he argued, nto

    the true and the false,

    but rather nto

    thosewhich

    it is

    'right'

    or

    'wrong', 'reasonable'or

    'unreasonable', o maintain.

    They

    are

    waysof meeting he future:

    to say hat

    'all

    men

    are mortal',

    on

    this view, s

    to announce hat

    any man we meet

    we shall egard

    as

    mortal. People

    may

    try

    to wean

    us

    rom

    this way

    of regardingmen,

    they may condemn t as unreasonable. ut it cannot be proved

    to be false, Ramsey

    hinks,

    just

    because t makes

    no

    definite

    statement

    about

    the

    properties

    of

    objects.

    As opposed o Wittgenstein,

    again, Ramsey

    considers hat

    philosophy

    issues

    n a

    particular

    class of

    propositions

    - elucida-

    tions,

    classifications, efinitions,or,

    at least,

    descriptions

    f

    the

    way

    in

    which a term could be defined.

    The

    difficulty for

    philos-

    ophy, he thinks, is that its

    elucidations

    involve

    one another;

    we

    cannot, for example,

    begin our elucidation

    by

    presuming

    hat the

    nature of meaning s completelyclear and then go on to use

    meaning o

    elucidatespaceand time,

    because

    o clarify the nature

    of meaningwe

    must already

    have

    attained o some

    understanding

    of spaceand of time. The

    great

    danger of an elucidatory

    philos-

    ophy, Ramsey

    says, s scholasticism

    -

    'the

    essenceof which

    is

    362

    SOME

    CAMBRIDGE HILOSOPHERS

    lreating

    what is vague

    as f it

    were

    precise

    and trying

    to

    put

    it

    into

    an exact

    ogical category'.

    With that remarlg

    however,

    we have

    crossed

    he

    border between

    he older

    and the newer

    Cambridge.

    l"-or

    he time

    being

    the emphasis

    was

    still on clarity.

    Russell,

    Moore,

    Wittgenstein,

    Broad,

    Johnson,

    were all read

    as

    making the

    rtrme

    point:

    that

    philosophy

    is analysis,

    clarification.

    A typical

    productof the period is the ournal lnalysis, which first appeared

    In

    1933,

    nder the

    editorship of

    A. Duncan-Jones,

    nd

    with the

    collaboration

    f L. S.

    Stebbing

    C. A. Mace,l3and

    G. Ryle. The

    object

    of Analysis,

    so it

    was

    laid

    down,

    was to

    publish

    'short

    nrticles

    on limited

    and

    precisely

    defined

    philosophical

    questions

    about he

    elucidation

    of known

    facts, nstead

    oflong,

    very

    general

    nnd abstract

    metaphysical

    speculations

    about

    possible

    facts or

    ebout

    the

    world as

    a whole'. This

    was clearly

    a reformulation of

    Russell's

    emand

    or'

    piece-meal

    nvestigations',

    as represented

    ln

    practice

    rather

    by Moore's

    philosophical

    articles than by

    Rrrsself's

    books. When

    the

    tlen editor

    of Analysis,

    Margaret

    Mucdonald,

    published

    a selection

    of

    articles from

    Arulysis as

    I'hlktsophyand Analysis

    (1954)

    she chose

    her epigraph,

    however,

    frorn

    the Tractatus,

    not from

    the work

    of Moore

    or of Russell:

    "l'lrc

    object

    of

    philosophy

    is

    the

    logical clarification

    of thoughts.

    . . .

    The

    result of

    philosophy

    is not

    a number

    of

    "philosophical

    propositions"

    but to make

    propositions

    clear.'Wittgenstein

    was

    protrching,

    it

    was thought,

    phat

    Moore

    had

    practised:

    the

    'lrtt(tatus

    was read

    as a sort of

    analyst's handbook.

    Nuturally, however, certatn difficulties arose out of this con-

    llation

    of

    Russell,

    Moore

    and Wittgenstein.

    What exactly, it

    wrur

    arkcd, does

    analysis

    analyse

    -

    a

    sentence,

    a

    propositionr

    :r cotr-

    c6pt,

    or

    a word?

    Moge

    mportant

    still, what

    does t

    analyse hem

    Into ?

    These

    questions

    were much

    discussed;tl

    andytic methods,

    ll in I'air to

    say,

    were

    more freely

    employed

    in

    the analysis of

    nnnlysishan

    in the

    analysis

    of

    anythingelse.

    'l'hc

    variations

    through

    which this

    discussion

    moved

    can be

    llhrstrated

    n the

    work

    of L. S.

    Stebbing.tsHer

    'The

    Method

    of

    Arrrrlysisn Philosophy' (PAS, 1931)begins rom a distinction

    lrclwcen he

    immediate

    eference'of

    a

    proposition

    what we

    all

    rrrrdcrstand

    hen

    we hear it

    uttered

    -

    and its

    'exact

    reference',

    which

    includes

    everything

    which

    must

    be the

    case f the

    proposi-

    t|on is

    true.

    The

    'immediate

    reference'

    of

    the

    proposition

    .All

    363

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    economists

    re

    fallible', for

    example,does not include

    the falli.

    bility of Keynes; we cau understand

    his

    proposition

    without

    evor

    having heard

    of

    Keynes.

    But the fallibility

    of Keynes forms

    part

    of its

    'exact

    reference',Stebbing

    says,since f the

    proposition

    s

    true

    Keynes must be fallible.

    Metaphysical

    analysis, according

    to Stebbing, works with

    two

    assumptions; irst

    that we understand

    quite

    well,

    at the level

    of

    immediate reference,quite

    a

    variety

    of

    propositions,

    secondln

    that

    such

    propositions

    make

    'exact

    reference'to

    basic

    proposi.

    tions,

    ultimate

    sets

    of elements,he ultimacy

    of which consists

    n

    the fact that their immediate

    referenceand their

    exact referenco

    are

    identical.

    Obviously, she

    has in mind

    Moore's

    doctrine that

    'we

    all know

    quite

    well'

    that hens ay eggs,

    but differ about

    tho

    'ultimate

    analysis'of

    this

    proposition;

    at the

    same ime, her'set

    of elements' s,

    she

    says, dentical

    with Wittgenstein's

    combina.

    tion

    of elements'or

    'atomic

    facts'. Thus, on her interpretation,

    Moore and the Tractatusare sayingmuch the same hing: that

    philosophical

    analysis

    consists

    n unveiling hose

    basic

    proposi.

    tions to which an everyday

    proposition

    ultimately refers.

    Fairly

    clearly, however, not

    all

    'analysis'

    satisfies his

    defini.

    tion. In

    her

    'Logical

    Positivism

    and Analysis'

    (PBA,

    1933)

    Stebbing

    distinguishes, herefore,

    between

    our

    different kinds

    of

    analysis.First, there s the

    analysisof sentences ith the

    object

    of

    clarifying

    their logical form,

    the sort of analysis typified

    in

    Russell's

    heory of descriptions;

    econdly, he analysisof a con

    cept, illustrated in Einstein's analysis of simultaneity; thirdly,

    the mathematician's

    postulational

    analysis', the

    definition

    of

    terms by analyticmethods;and hen ourthly,

    the sort of analysis,

    now christened

    directional

    analysis',shehad

    described

    n 'The

    Method of Analysis n

    Philosophy'. That,

    she thought, is the

    peculiarly

    philosophical

    sort of analysis in

    opposition, say, o

    Ramsey for whom Russell's

    theory of descriptions was

    the

    'paradigm

    of

    philosophy'.

    By

    the time Stebbingcame

    to write her essay

    on

    'Moore'g

    Influence' for The Philosophyof G. E. Moore (1942),she had

    begun o feel

    suspicious

    f

    the metaphysics hich s

    presumed

    y

    directionalanalysis. t now seemed

    o her

    that

    thereare no

    'basic

    facts'; the

    doctrine ofbasic facts, she suggests,

    s a relic ofthe

    days when

    philosophers

    thought they had to

    justify

    the

    beliefs

    3g

    365

    SOME

    CAMBRIDGB PHILOSOPHERS

    of commonsense

    y setting them

    on a solid

    'ultimate'

    founda-

    lirrrr.

    The mportant sort of analysis, hecame o think,

    is'same-

    level'

    analysis,

    n which

    expressions re defined by expressions

    und

    concepts re

    definedby concepts an

    analysis

    which makes

    rro

    nretaphysicalssumptions.n thus eactingagainst

    directional

    nrrulysis'

    Stebbing

    eflects

    he

    general

    endency

    of the

    'thirties.

    'Ihe

    earlier writings of John Wisdom

    may

    serve as a second

    cxumple

    of

    the analytic controversy. n his

    'Is

    Analysisa Useful

    Mcthod n PhilosophyT'

    PASS,

    1931),

    he

    distinguisheshree

    rorts of analysis:

    material, formal

    and

    philosophical.

    Russell's

    thcory of descriptions

    s'formal'analysis;

    the ordinary defini-

    tions of scienceare exarmples f

    'material'

    analysis.

    Both

    of

    lhcse

    are

    'same-level';

    philosophical

    analysis,

    n

    contrast,

    is

    'ncw-level',

    replacing the less by the more ultimate. He ex-

    plnins,

    by the use of

    examples,

    what

    he means

    by

    'more

    ulti-

    rrurte'.

    Individuals', he

    says,

    are

    more ultimate than nations.

    Se se-data ndmentalstates re n their turn more ultimate than

    lntlividuals.'

    t turns out, then, that

    philosophical

    analysiscon-

    rists n trying

    to

    show

    how

    statements bout

    minds can

    be

    reduced

    to statements bout

    mental

    states,and statementsabout

    material

    objccts o

    statements

    bout sense-data:

    n

    short,

    t is the

    practice

    ol'what

    a

    foreign observer asdescribed s

    the

    favourite English

    grnr'lour-game'

    reductive epistemology. Wisdom wrote

    an

    r Ier

    e

    n ary

    textbo

    ok Pr ob ems

    of

    M ind and Mat t er

    (

    934) n ord-

    cr to illustrate he

    usefulness f

    analytic

    methods; there is very

    littlc in it which would readstrangelyo Broad or even o Stout.

    'l'he

    long

    series

    of articles on

    'Logical

    Constructions'

    Mind,

    |

    9.1

    -3)

    s a different

    matter:

    thesewe

    might

    describe

    s

    he

    most

    wlrole-hearted f

    all

    attempts

    o

    set out

    the logical assumptions

    irnplicit

    n'philosophical

    nalysis'.t0n what

    espects,

    e

    asks,

    s

    rurr rdinary

    proposition

    an

    unsatisfactory

    picture'?

    There s

    a

    ncrrsc,t is

    obvious,

    n which

    England

    declaredwar on France'is

    n|rcady a

    perfectly

    satisfactory

    picture:

    we understand