PART I: ADVANCES OVER THE PAST 30 YEARS Consciousness in Physics and Philosophy A Brief Review
Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
-
Upload
alfonsougarte -
Category
Documents
-
view
213 -
download
0
Transcript of Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
-
8/21/2019 Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
1/14
A HUNDRED
YEARS
OF
PHILOSOPHY
:
John
Passmore
@
PENGUIN
BOOKS
,-/
1' r
("
(r '
r-- |
\
t - - l
I tq--, ) i
rl
\___
f
-
8/21/2019 Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
2/14
A HUNDRED
YEARS
OF PHILOSOPHY
of relationship;
Whitehead exhorts
them
to reflect
upon
visceral
sensations. hen they
will
come to
see,he thinks,
appropriation
and
resistance
not
'the
having
of a blue
datum'-
are
he
characteristiceatures
ot only
of
perception
of all
the relationships
which together
make
up the
'niverse.
342
343
CHAPTER
15
Some
Cambridge
Philosophers
and Wittgenstein'
Tractatus
I rtr I'r'uitfulnessf the CambridgeMoral Science aculty during
llre
tlst dccades
f the
present
entury has alreadybeen abund-
Itrtly
llrrstrated.
university
whichcan ay
claim o Moore and
Hulrrll,
McTaggart
and
Whitehead,Ward
and Stout, need
ear
rrr *r'cusutions
itherof sterilityor of
narrowness.
et
our
tale s
rllll
trreornplete.
therCambridge-bred
hilosophers
dded
o the
I
lrrlvclsity's
hilosophical
ame; and t
gave
hospitality, irst as
Itr
erlvunccd
tudent,
ater
as
a Professor,o
the most remarkable
rrrnrry
ouldsay he
greatest philosopher
f our century,
he
Arrnt trr LudwigWittgenstein.
(
)l
W.
E. Johnson, neof the
morenotable f
the
home-grown
;rr
rlrrcls,
e havealreadyspoken
briefly
(Chapter
6). His articles
r
rt 'l
lrcLogicalCalculus'
1892)
nticipated
he one,and n
part
llrr.
lctlil.
of much hat was ater
o
be
written
n
Cambridge.
n
tlre
yerrrs
hat followed
he
exercised
reat
nfluenceas a
teacher,
Irul
prrblished
othing.
Not
until
the
nineteen-twentiesid
he
prrlrlrshis major work, with
the simple
itle Logic.tEven hen,
llre
ircc
of characterof
one
of
his students,
ather than any
m-
glrlreof his own,brought hirp to the point of publication.His
I r4rlr',
ndeed,s
a
series f
manuscripts ollected ogether
o make
r
lrook -
not
a
composition,ruled
by some
governing
dea.
Its
r'llrrc
ies n its detail; all
thal can now be attempted,
owever,
s
r
r.lrunrcterizationf
the most
general
ort.
AlllroughJohnson
was
rained asa mathematician,
is
Zogrc s
r+t:rrtinlly
philosophical,
not mathematical,
n character.
Sym-
pntlrctically
nclined
to the logistic
programme
of
deducing
rrurtlrcrnatics
rom logic,
he
yet
does
not
participate
n it; except
irr l rlctailedand somewhat evere riticismof Russell's heory
rrl
Pl1r11e5i1iqnal
unctions,ndeed,
e
scarcely
efers o thework
l|
h
gicians
unior
to
J.
N. Keynes whose
enovatedraditional
Lrsit' lre bsorbednto
hisown work.
l lc bcgins,we havealready
pointed
out,
from the
proposition.
At tlrc same ime, his
break from Idealist
ogic is not a
wholly
-
8/21/2019 Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
3/14
A HUNDRED
YEARS
OF PHILOSOPHY
sharp
one;
the
proposition,
he
writes,
'is
only
a
factor
in
tha
concreteact
of
judgement'.
In spite of
Johnson'semphasis
o[
the importance of clear distinctions, his various
accounts
of
the
relation
between
udgement
and
propositionare
mpossible
O
bring
into consistency; his
fact,
touching the very heart
of hlt
Logic, doesmuch
to
explain why
that
book does not leave
single mpressionon his readers.Unlike the Idealists,he
cedes certainautonomy o
formal
logic, considered
s a
of
propositions;
at the same
ime,
his autonomy s
so
hedged
reservations hat
formal logic is little
more
than a
puppotJ
kingdom, he
real
power
ying in the
handsof epistemology.
l
Johnson's Logic,
in consequence,
ventures into unexpectcd'
fields;
t contains, or
example,
n elaborate
nalysis f the mind.
body relationship.Logic, he argues,
s
an
analysis nd cri
of thought' cannot
gnore
probability
and induction;
any
quatediscussion f induction must explore the conceptions
cause
and substance; uch an exploration, f
it is at all
must take account of, and resolve, he special
problems
set
the mind-body elationship.Johnson, n short, follows
his
ment
wherevert leadshim; hisZogrc s
a contribution
o
philosophy,
not only to logic in the narrower
sense f the
But
it manifests to a notable degree
what one thinks
of
'Cambridge'
characteristics; is
philosophical
discussions
dear, analytic, discriminating, but
rarely
decisive.
At
a
few
points,
however, ohnsonhas
beenwidely
His neologisms,as
rarely happens,
have won wide
such
phrases
as
'ostensive
definition',
such contrasts
as th
between'epistemic'
nd'constitutive','determinates'
nd'
terminables','continuants
and'
occurrents',are now familiar
philosophical
iterature.Nor does his mean,
only, that
was a clever
coiner of words: he demonstrated
he usefulnesg
his innovations
in sharpening and reshaping
controversies.
He setsout to show,
or
example, hat there s not
one
of definition,
or one
process
of induction, but
many; if he
gives
a
name to
these
newly-discovered
pecies,his is not
merely
decorative
purposes.
Or again
he rebukes
ogicians
carelessness
n discriminating ogical forms.
In
particular,
thinks, they
have
wrongly
grouped
ogether,
as being ofthe
3M
345
SOME
CAMBRIDGE
PHILOSOPHERS
lype, uch
ropositions
s
Red
s
a colour'and
Plato
s a
man';
Irr
orrlcr
o
make
he distinction hey
haveoverlooked e intro-
rlr
t't'sris
contrast
between'determinates'
nd' determinables'.
Wlrclcts'Plato
s a man',
so
he
argues, ssertslass-membership,
'ltctl
is
a colour' relates,not
a member o a class,but a
'rlctclrlinate'
to
a
'determinable'.Red,
green,yellow
are
al l
f
cf
'tlrf frates
f the
determinable olour,just as
square,
ircular,
ellllrtit:rrl,
re all determinates
f the determinable hape.What
lrrtlcs
set
of determinatess not
that - like the members f a
r,lnrn
thcy
agree n some espect,
but
rather,
Johnsonsuggests,
lhnt tlrcy
differ in
a
peculiar
manner.
Determinatesof the same
rlelcrrrrirrableexclude'one
nother,
n the
special ensehat
hey
r
rrrrrrrrl inrultaneously
haracterize
he
same
area; the
one area
r rrrr x: llrth
red
and circular, but cannot be
both
red and
gxeen.
I
urllrclrnore,
e
argues, heir differences re 'comparable',as
rltlil'rcrrccs etweendeterminates f different determinables re
ltrrl
()nc
can
sensiblyassert,he means, hat the
difference
be-
lwrr'rr
cd
and
green
s
greater
han the difference
etween
ed and
rl,lrg(:,
[.lutnot
that it is
greater
han, ess han, or equal o, the
rllllr.tcrrcc
etweened
and circular.
.fulrrrson's
alents, t will
be
obvious, ay
particularly
in his
trpalily for
making
careful
distinctions.Recallingalsohis
mathe-
flul['lrl
powers,
ne s not
surprised o find that he wasattracted
Iuwnrtls he theory of probability where, f anywhere,careful
llrtlyris
of
problems
on the
borderland between
mathematics,
lurrrrrl
log'c,
and epistemologycan reap a rich harvest. His
wrlllngn
on
probability,
however, are f ragmentaxy and not
lllogr.llrcr
oherent;
hey were
not
published
ntil eleven
ears
tlllr
urrolher
Cambridgeman,
J.
M, Keynes,z ad
completed
lts,rttl|t,on Probability
(1921)
which in
part
incorporated
Irrlrrrrorr's
cachings,
n
part
went beyond hem
in ways
which
fllrrrrotr lid not
quite
know how to estimate,
hr.yrrt's' ndebtednesso Johnson whom he knew first as a
rllls
I r rcr
tl
of his ather,
J.
N. Keynes, ater asa teacher, nd hen
nr n
r ollcrrguc
is sometime$
upposed o
consistmerely
n the
l* | tlrrrt
Keyncs ook
over
certain
of
Johnson's
heorems, n fact,
Irrrr'rvrr,
lrc spirit
of the
philosophical arts
of
the
Treatises
r'Frtrrtlly
lolrnson's.3
n his introductionKeynescoupled
John-
.llr'r rrurne
with
those
of
Moore and Russell,as
philosophers
-
8/21/2019 Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
4/14
A HUNDRED
YEARS
OF
PHILOSOPHY
who
'are united in
a
preference
or
what is
matter of fact,
and
have
conceived
heir
subject
as a
branch rather of
science han
of creative
magination,
prose
writers,hoping
to be understood'.
Moore
had
said n
his Principia
Ethica that
good
s indefinable:
Keynes
was
emboldened
o
say the
same
of
probability.
Russell
had
deduced
arithmetic
from
logic; Keynes
set
out to do the
same
or
probability
theory. But
the
peculiarly
epistemologico.
logical
atmosphere
of the Treatise
may fairly
be
regarded
ai
deriving
from
Johnson.
In
Johnsbn's
manner,
Keynes
begins rom
the
proposition,
not,
as
Venn
had done,
rom
a'happening'or
an
'event'.
On Venn'$
version
of
the
'frequency'
theory,
the
statement
the
next ball
from
the
urn
will
probably
be black' is
an
assertionabout tho
percentage
of
draws from
the
urn in which
a
black
ball
appears;
for Keynes,
on
the
other hand,
the
problem
is to
ascribe
a
probability o theproposition the nextball will be black'. Unlesr
probability
theory
is
prepared
o
surrender
all claims to be useful
in everyday
determinations
of
probability,
Keynes
argues, t
must
extend
its interest
into
areas
where the frequency theory,
which
ooks
plausible
enough
n
the case
of ball-drawing,would
be obviously
napplicable.
To
assign
a degree
f
probability
to
a
proposition,
on KeyncSt
theory, is
to relate
t to
a body
of knowledge.
Probability is not
I
property
of the
proposition-in-itself;
t
expresses
he
degree
0
which it would be rational, on the evidence t our disposal, o
regard
he
proposition
astrue.Thus
probability
s always elativoS
it is nevertheless
objective', n the
sensehat
a
proposition
as
e
sertain
probability
relative
to the
evidence,
whether or not
wa
recognize
hat
probability.
What
precisely,
we may
ask,
s thir
relation
of
'making
probable'
which
holds
between vidence nd
conclusion?
A
unique logical
relation,
Keynes answers,not
reducible
o any
other;
we
apprehend
t intuitively,
as
we
appro.
hend mplication.
Unlike implication,however,heprobability elation admitsof
degrees.
On
given
evidence,
ne
conclusion
may be
'more
protr
able'
than another.
Recogrrizing
his fact,
some
probability.
theorists
have
umped
to the conclusion
hat
probabilities
murt
always
be
quantitatively
omparable.
Once
again,Keynes hinkl,
they
have
generalized
rom a
quite
untypical
case the casewhero,
346
SOME CAMBRIDGE
PHILOSOPHERS
el
ln drawing balls from an
urn
which contains none
but black or
wltite balls, the
alternatives
are exclusive,
equiprobable and
oxhaustive.Then, no doubt,
probability
can be numerically
ontimated;but if we look
at the
matter more broadly, Keynes
llrinks,
we soon see hat even compaxisons f order, let alone
pl'ccise
uantitative
ormulations,are often completely
out
of the
quostion.Consider he relation between etsof experiments nd a
gcncralization:
suppose hat rn CaseA the experiments
are
more
trurnerous,
n CaseB more varied, andin CaseC the
generaliza-
tion is
wider in scope.
n
terms of what unit$, Keynesasks,are
we
to compare
he
probabilities
of the
generalization
n
relation
to these
ifferentsetsofevidence?
On
Keynes'
theory of
probability,
there is a close connexion
bctween
probability
and
induction.
To say that a
proposition
has
bccnarrived
at by a
'justifiable
nduction'is,
he
thinks,
dentical
with saying hat it is 'highly probable'. The classical roblem-
how
s
induction o
be
ustified?
-
thus turns nto
another:
when
nro we
entitled to assert hat
a
generalization
s highly
probable?
Kcynes ries
to show that any such conclusiondepends pon a
gcncral
postulate,
which
he
calls
the Principle
of
Limited
Variety
'-
n
revised
version of Mill's 'Uniformity of Nature'.
'We
can
Jurtify
he method
of
perfect
aoalogy,'
he
writes, and other
in-
ductive methods so far as they can be
made
to approximate to
llrir,
by
meansof the assumption hat the objects n the field,
ovcr which our genera"trizationsxtend, do not have an infinite
turnrber
of
independent
qualities;
that,
in
other words,
their
clruracteristics,owevernumerous, ohere ogether n
gxoups
n
Invoriable
onnexions,which are
finite in number.'
ln
other words, induction is
justified
because he
qualities
of
llrings
carry other
qualities
with
them. Whether this
principle
s
nrorc
eflective han Mill's in
'saving
nduction', Keynes' succes.
nols
gravely
doubted.
Of other
Cambridge
philosophers
who took a lively interest n
llrc processesf scientific hinking oneof the bestknown is that
rrrodest
ut voluminouswriter,
C.
D. Broad.lBroad, n his
^Scl'ez-
tllic
Thought
1923),
stimates is talents hus:
If
I
haveany
kind
ol'
philosophical
merit, t is neither he constructive ertility of
an
Alexander,
nor the
penetrating
critical acumenof a
Moore;
still
lcss s
it
that extraordinarycombination
of
both
with tecbnical
347
-
8/21/2019 Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
5/14
A HUNDRED
YBARS
OF PHILOSOPHY
mathematical
skill which
characterizesWhitehead and
Russell.
I
can
at most claim
the humbler
(yet
useful)
power
of
stating
difficult things clearly
and not too superficially.'
To this
can
be added what
Russellwrote
in his review of Broad's Percep.
tion,
Physics ndReality
1914);
This book
doesnot
advance ny
fundamental
novelties
of its own,
but
it
appraises, with extra.
ordinary justice and impartiality and discrimination, the argu.
ments
which have
been advanced
by others on
the
topics with
which it
deals.'What more
s there o say?One cannot
describo
'Broad's
philosophy'
for,
as he freely admitg
'there
is nothing
which
answers o that
description.' To summarize his
clear and
meticulous
summaries
would
be to
gild
the lily. We shall
content
ourselves,
herefore, with
an outline
of
his views
about the naturo
of
philosophy,
partly
to
correct a not
uncommon
misapprehen.
sion,
partly
because his is
the easiest way to
place
him in
tho
context of Cambridgephilosophy.
Broads
distinguishes
etween
critical'
and
'speculative'
phil.
osophy.
Critical
philosophy
is
philosophy
in
what
he
takes to
bo
the Moore-Russell
manner;
its object, according to Broad,
is to
'analyse' the basic concepts
of science and of everyday
life
-
concepts hke
cause,
quality,
position
-
and to submit
to cross.
examination the
general
propositions
which the scientist
and tho
ordinary man
daily
presume,
uch
propositions
as'every event
has
a
cause'
or'Nature is
uniform'. Most
of
Broad's
work, then,
is analytic n its intention; although,often enough, t is analytic
at second emove.
t doesnot
so much
analysethe
conception
of
a material thing'
as describe he
views which
have
been, or
might
be,
held
about ts correct
analysis.The final chapter n
Mind
and
ils Place
in Nature
(1925),
n
which Broad distinguishes
seven
teen
possible
theories
of the mind-matter
relation, is the finest
flower
-
or
should
one s:ry
the
reductio
ad
absurdam?
'of
thio
method.
.
Yet Broad is not,
as some have thought,
an enemy of specula-
" tion. 'If we do not look at the world synoptically,'he writes, wo
shall
have a very nuurow
view of it'
;
a
purely
critical
philosophy,
he hinks, s
arid and rigid. He
praises
dealism,becauset
at least
attempts to incorporate
within
a
single
heory the
findings
of
arl
of
science, of religion,
of social theory. It is certain types
of
speculative
philosophy,
only,
which Broad
attacks.
348
SOME
CAMBRIDGB
HILOSOPHERS
Thus,
in the
frst
place,
those
for
whom
philosophy
is by
its
noture
suggestive,
metaphorical,
poetic,
are
not likely
to
regard
Itroad with
sympathetica,ffection.
What
can
be said at all,'he
writes,
can
be said simply
and
clearly
n
aay
civilized
languageor
ln o suitable systemof
symbols.'
Secondly,
he will
not
allow
that
npcculative
philosophy
can ever
aspire
to the heights
of strict
tlcmonstration.By its nature, he thinks, it must be tentative, fluid,
rcudy to adjust
itself
to
new fndings
in science,
new
paths
in arl
ncw experiments
n
social
life.
It cannot determine
a
priori
what
h the case;
ts materials come
o it
from outside.
Then, thirdly,
a
sound speculative
philosophy
must
always
est,
llroad
thinks, upon a
foundation
of critical
philosophy;
the
rpcculative
philosopher
who is content
to take over
uncriticized
whatever anyone cares
to affirm
is at
the mercy of fantasies.
llroad's own work
is meant as a
propaedeutic
to,
not
as a
sub-
rtitute for, speculativephilosophy - and to a certain degree t is
Itrcf
speculative.
Scientiftc
Thought
s an attempt to clarify
some
o1' he conceptsused n
the natural
scienceslat the
same ime
it
nright be describedas
an
attempt
to
combine
nto
a
single heory
wlrutever
s
viable
in
physics,
n
epistemolory, and
in common-
rcnse.Mind and
ils
Place
in Nature
undertakes
an
analysis
of
prychological
oncepts;
yet
in
so far as
it
attempts
to'place'
rrrlnd
within
Nature,
it
passes
eyond criticism
to speculation.
(ltroad
defends species f
'emergent
materialism'.)
ndeed,we
bogin to wonder whether the distinction between analysis and
rpcculation can be as
sharp bs Broad
at first suggests.
Many
of
Broad's readerswere
shockedbecause,in
Mind and its
l'lacc in Nature, he took
seriously and discussed
n detail the
lhrclings
f
psychical
esearch; his,
they felt,
is not the sort of
conduct to be expected
rom a Cambridge
philosopher.
Broad's
rlclbnce in his
essay on 'Psychical
Research and
Philosophy'o
tlrrows considerable ight on his approach
to
philosophy.
F'irst of all, he condemnsunsparingly
those
or whom
'philos.
ophy consists n acceptingwithout question,and then attempting
lo analyse,
he beliefs that are cornmon
to contemporary
plain
rrrcn n Europe
and
North America, .e.
roughly, he beliefs
which
ruch
persons
mbibe
uncritically
in their nwseries
and have never
lirund
any reason o doubt'.
As he wrote
elsewhere,
it
is
now
nbundantlyevident that
little
can
be done
for commonsense'.
349
-
8/21/2019 Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
6/14
A HUNDRED
YEARS
OF PII ILOSOPHY
Analysis
thus understood
s, he
thought,
.a
trivial
academic
exer.
cise'.
In
this
respect,
he
stands
close
to
Russell,
and
at the
ro.
motest pole
from
Moore.
His
starting-point
is
science,
ather
thao
conrmonsense;
f
there
s
a conflict,
commonsense
must
give
way.
He
seeks
o imitate,
all
the
same,
Moore's
meticulousness
athof
than
Russell's
audacity.
Once
he amented
hus
.
si Moore
savait,
si
Russell pouvait';
this
may
be read
as nominating
his ideal
_
Russell's nowledge onjoinedwith Moore,sanalyticpowen.
Commonsense,
hen,
has
no
rights
against
the
fndings
of
psychical
esearch
nor
an
an
a
priorimetaphysics
ule
out
ghosts,
if
only
for
the
very
good
reason
hat
there
s
no
such
metaphysics.
Psychical
esearch,
he
concludes,
must
be
left to
speak
or
itself,
subject
of
course
to
the
control
of
critical
philosophy.
This
ii
Broad's
characteristic
attitude.
-
Of
all
metaphysicians,
Broad
most
admires
McTaggart,
for
all
that
McTaggart
attempted
the
impossible,
the
construction
of
a
deductivemetaphysics.Broad devotedseveralyearsof his life to
the
wdting
of
his
vast
hree-vohrned,
Examinatlon
of McTaggart,s
Philosophy
1933-8),
a book
which
as
well
as conmentax/
cotr
tains
many
striking
examples
of Broad,s
own
philosophical
work.
Two
things
delighted
Broad
in
McTag&rt:
his
coolness
and
hir
clarity.
No
metaphysiciaa
has
been less
dithyrambic,
none
ha
made
so desperate
an effort
to
be clear.
For
once,Broad
remarks,
'definite
premises
are
stated
n
plain
language
and
defnite
con
clusions
are
drawn
from
them
by arguments
we
can all follow
and
acceptor reject'. That BroadconsideredMcTaggart to be worthy
of
so
extensive
an
examination
is further
evidence
at once
of hh
sympathy
with
speculation
and
of
the special
character
of
that
sympathy.
'I
shall
watch
with
a fatherly
eye,'
Broad
wrote
in
the
preface
to
The
Mind
and
its Place
n
Nature,.the philosophical
gambols
of
my
younger
riends
as hey
dance
o
the higbly
syncopated
pipingt
of
lbrr
Wittgenstein's
lute.,
That was
in
1925,
and
Wittgen.
stein's
Tractatus
Logico-philosophicus
had
frst
appeared
in
rytirtrt
three
years'previously
(the
German version was pub.
lished
in
l92l).
Broad,s
comment,
hen,
bears
witness
o
thc
immediate
impact
of
the Tractatus
upon
certain
of
the
younger
philosophers
at
Cambridge,
for
all that
it
was
by
no mean6
widely
read
n
England
until
the ate
nineteen-thirties,
and was
not
350
SOMB CAMBRIDGE
PHILOSOPHBRS
until the nineteen-sixties
made the
subject
of detailed
criticism
tnd commentary.
It is a
book,
indeed,
which one
s€tsout
to describe
with more
than
ordinary
diffidence.s Partly
this is
a consequence
of
the
cnthusiasmWittgenstein
nspired n
his
pupils.
If there
is now
nobody,
if indeed
there never has
been anybody,
who
would
subscribe
o all
the
leading
doctrines of the
Tractatus
Wittgen-
rtcin, as we
shall see ater, came
o criticize
t severely
there s
still
in many
quarters
a reluctance
o believe
hat Wittgenstein
could
have
been mistaken in
ways
hat
were
not somehow
wiser,
nrore
penetrating,
than the mistakes
of his contemporaries.
Again,
delicate
questions
of
discipleship
re involved:
the
ques-
tion,
'What
did Wittgenstein
mean?'
is closely
linked
with
onother,
Who
can truly
claim to be carrying
on his
work?'
On
lhc other side,
here
are still thosewho
would
dismiss
Wittgen-
rtcin
as
a charlatan. t
will be appaxent
hat no
account of
the
'l'raclatus s likely 1s veinrrniysrsal aoceptance.
Apart from
these
extrinsic difficulties,
which
the
chronicler
Inust earn
o regard
with relative
equanirgity
s he
perils
ncident
trr his
profession,
he
Tractatus tself
is
sufficiently intimidating.
I tliscusses
uestions
of
a
peculiarly
intricate
kind
-
meaning,
he
nutureof
logic, facts
and
propositions,
he task
of
philosophy
In o
manner
which
disconcertingly
combines
he Romantic,
not
to
rny
apocalyptic,
and the
precisely
ormal.
The
preface
at once displays
tfese two
streaks.
The
opening
rcntence 'this book will perhapsonly be understoodby those
who have
themselves
already thought
the
thoughts
which
are
cxpressedn
it, or similar thoughts'
-
is in
the
best tradition
of
l{omanticism,
in
so far
as
it
suggests hat
only
a chosen
few,
rympathetic
souls, will
really
underctand.
Yet
Wittgenstein
goee
rrn to
tell us that
the
'whole
meaning'
of the
Tractatus
can be
nummed
up
as
follows:
'what can be said
at
all can
be said
clcarly; and whereof
onecannot
speak hereofone
must
be silent.'
llere
at
once the central
paradox
of the
Tractalas
leaps
to
the
cyc; it tells us what, it says,caDnotbe said,and tells usobscurely,
irr metaphor
and
epigram, that
what can be said
at all can
be said
cfcarly. The
very form of the Tractatus
eflects
his
paradox.
Each
ptragraph
is
numbered n
accordance
with
an elaborate
system,
uq
f now
at last
we were dealing
with
a
philosopher
who would
35 1
-
8/21/2019 Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
7/14
aid
our
comprehension
n
every
possible
way.
yet
the
paragraphs
thus
numbered
are
composed
in
a style
so
enigmatic,
with
A HUNDRED
YBARS
OF
PHILOSOPHY
sentence-links
so
tenuous,
that
scarcely
one
of them
does
raise
serious
problems
of interpretation.
An
elucidation
ofthe
Tractatus,
hen
-
even
supposing
hat
felt
competent
to
undertake
it
-
would
need
to
be lengthy
ar
minute. All that I canhope to do, within limits at all reasonable,
is
to
select
for
slight
consideration
those
points
at which
the
Tractatus
has,
so far,
been
mainly
influential.
Something
should
irst
be
said
about
the
ntellectual
background
of
the
Tractatus.
Wittgenstein
was
trained
as
ao
engrneer,
not
as
a
philosopher,
so that
one
aurnot
presume
n
him
an
ordinary
acquaintance
with
academic philosophy.
Like
many
another
amateur,
he
was
nterested
n
Schopenhauer;
f there
s
sometimes
a Kantian
flavour
in his
work,
that
is
perhaps
the
explanation.
He knew something of Mach and Hertz, and perhaps he had
dipped
into,
or
heard
somebody
discuss,
Meinong
and
Husserl.
All
one
can
say
with
confidence
s
that
in
writing
the
Tractatus
Wittgenstein
was
taking
as
a
point
of
departure
some
of
the
things
he
had
read
n
the
works
of, or
picked
up in
discussion
with,
Frege
and
Russell.
euite
what
he
owed
to,
and
quite
what
hi
contributed
to,
Russell's
.philosophy
of
logical
atomism'
it
is
difficult
to
say.
He nowhere
refers
to
any
of his
predecessors
except
in
an
elusive
and
off-hand
fashion;
what
he
says
even
about FregeandRussell s sometimes eryprrzzling.
n
short,
this
is
not
a
case
n
which
the
detailed
pursuit
of influences
s
likely
to
prove
at all
rewarding.
Now for
the
Tractatus
tself.
It
begins
with
a series
of
staccato
pronouncements:
'The
world
is
everything
that
is
the
case.
The
world
is the
tbtality
of facts,
not
of
things
. . .'
yet
this,
it is
fairly
clear,
is
not
the
real
beginning.
Wittgenstein has
ordered
the
paragraphs
of
lhe Tractatz.r
n
what
he
judges
to
be
the
most
artistig
the most
striking
sequence;
f
we hope
to understandwSt Ae says what
he
does,
we
have
to
move
Uapt*aras
anJ
forwards
through
their
serried
array.
His
real
starting-point
is
a
theory
of
meaning,
not
a directly-intuited
ontolory.
Wittgenstein's
crucial
assumption
s
that
every
proposition
has
a
clear
and
definite
sense;
and
conjoined
with
that,
the
assump-
tion
that
this
sense
ies
in
the
proposition's
relation
to
the
352
SOME
CAMBRIDGE
PHILOSOPHERS
'world'.
Now
the
propositions
of everyday
ife
contain
complex
exprossions,
xpressions
which
are
certainly
not
what
Russell
urilcd
'logically
proper names''
Such
complex
expressions
an
elwnys
bJreptacla
uy descriptions.
f,
for
example,
somebody
nrks
us
what
t
means
o say
hat
.all
millionaires
are
stubborn',
wo
c$nanswer
by
substituting
descriptions
or
'millionaires'
and
'ttubborn',
by
saying,
or example,'allpersonswhopossess ore
llr||n
a
million
poundsare
difficult
to
persuade" But
by
offering
llrls
sort of
elucidation,
we
have
still
not
made
he
sense
erfectly
'clcar
and
definite'
in Wittgenstein's
sense
of
that
phrase; we
could
sensibly
e asked
o
substitute
urther
descriptions
or the
trrnrplex
expiessions
n
our
new
assertion'
To
arrive
at a
deter-
rrrinnt.
sens"
or
the
proposition
-
to
give
the 'one
and
only
conrplete
nalysis
of
the
proposition'
-
we
must,
according
o
Wittgenstein,define
the
complex
sign
by
means
of
(logicatly
pr,,perl names'
It
is obvious,'
he
writes,
that
in
the analysisof
propositions
we
must
come
to
elementary
propositions'
which
*.,,rrirt
of
names
n
immediate
combination''
At
that
point
we
urtt
no longer
ask
that
the
sense
e
made
clearer
o us;
a
name
crtnnot
be
defined.
Nor
do
we
need
o
make
this
request'
or a
lrruposition
containing
no
expressions
xcept
names
points
im-
i,,..iiut"ty
to
the
world -
its
senpe
s
given
directly
to
us
as
the
rrrrntbination
f simple
entities
o which
t refers'
'l'hcremustbe simpleentities, hen- what
Wittgenstein
alled
'objccts'e
because
here
are
names;
and
there
must be
names
hcciru*"
propositions
have
a definite
sense'
Wittgenstein
was
not
Irrtcrested
n
nominating
examples
f
simples.
The
point,
for
him,
l,r lhat
there
must
be
simples;
what
they
are
is a
matter
of
secon-
rlury
importance.
Even
if the
world
is
infinitely
complex"
he
*rli*,
"o
that
every
act
consists
of
an
infinite
number
of atomic
fncts
and
every
atomic
act
is composed
f
an
infinite
number
of
ohiccts,
even
hen
there
must
be
objects
and
atomic
facts"
This
lr nruchmore n the spirit of Leibniz than of Hume'
N&mes,
Wittgenstein
argues,
have
no
sense
xcept
n
the con'
lcxl
of a
proposition;
correspondingly,
we
cannot
think
of
an
,rbicct
except
as
having
various
possibleconnexions
with
other
,rbiccts;such
possibleconnexions
between
objects
are 'atomic
frrcts'.
This
sounds
very
strange
to
call
possibleconnexions
'lircts'. We
ordinarily
think
of
a
fact
as
actual,
by
its very
natlue'
353
-
8/21/2019 Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
8/14
A HUNDRED
YEARS
OF PHILOSOPHY
Yet
it
is
difficult
to
find
any
other
translation
for
the
German
'Sachverhalt'.
The
strangeness
iminishes
liehtly
f
we think
of
an atomic
fact
as
that
which
makes
a
proposition
rue
or false'.
A
proposition
s
true
if certain
atomic
facts
.exist,,
false
f they
'do
not
exist'
: the
atomic
acts
must,
hen,
be of such
a kind
that
the
question
whether
hey
,exist'
or
.do
not
exist,
.obtain'
or
'do
not
obtain')
can
always
be raised.
Atomic
facts
are realized
possibilities if the proposition
which
pictures
them
is
true,
un-
realizedpossibilities
f
it is false,
but
their
.existence,
as
possi-
bilities
is
unaffected
by
the
question
whether
they
are realized
or
not,
by
the
question,
hat is,
whether
hey
are
,
facts
in
the harder
sense
of
that
word.
In
studying
logic,
according
to
Wittgenstein,
we
are not
really
nterested
n
the
hardness
f facts
,all
possibili-
ties
are its
facts.'This
is inevitably
so, he
thinks.
because
alse
propositions
-
propositions
which
assert
possibilities
which
are
not realized
are asmuch
part
of the
field
dealt with
by logic,
as
much capableof being assertedand denied,of implying or not
implying,
as
true
propositions.
How
exactly
are
propositions
elated
o
facts
? Wittgenstein's
answer
s
that they
are
pictures'
of the fact.
Various
anecdotes
are old
a'bout he
circumstances
n which
his
view
first
occurred
to him,
anecdotes
which
agree
n
one
respect:
he
was
mpressed
by
a model
which
had
been
constructed
to
illustrate
some
cal-
amity,
let
us say
a motor
accident.
.Thsre,'
he thought
as he
looked
at
the
miniature cars,
the
miniature
road,
the
miniature
hedges,
is a
proposition.'
Theproblem, as Wittgensteinsaw t, was o give
an account
of
the
proposition
which
will
allow,
first,
that
we are
free
to
con-r
struct
false
propositions
as well
as true
ones,
and secondly,
hat
the
point
of
a
proposition
ies
in its
relation
to
the
world.
The,
'picture'
analogy
seemed
o
be satisfactory
n
both
respects;
x
Obviously,
by
means
of miniature
motor-cars
we
can
give
a
false
picture
of
what
actually
happened;
obviously
again,
thq
point
of our
manipulations
with
the
motor-cars
is
to
.convey
something
about
the
world'.
Themotor-cars, f course,axenot in themselves proposition;
we could
use
them in
a
game
as
well
as to
picture
an apcident.
Only when
they
are arranged
in
a certain
way
do they
convey
what has
happened.
Thus
arranged,
abcording
to
Wittgenstein,
354
SOMB CAMBRIDGB
PHILOSOPHERS
llroy
are a'propositional
sign';
the'proposition'is
su€ha sign
'projected
n heworld',
i.e.
used
o affirm or
deny hat
something
lr thecase.
But
what about he
case
the normal case
where he
plopositional
sign
consists
of
words? Wittgenstein
admits
that
rucha
proposition
s
not, superficially,
he
sort
of thing we
should
ordinarily
describe
as a'picture'.
Even although,
however,our
ordinary language
s
no longer hieroglyphic,
it has kept,
he
tlrinks, what is essentialn hieroglyphicwriting. It retains its
power
of conveying
o
us what
it represents,
ven although
we
Irnvc
never actually
observed
what is
thus
conveyed
and
indeed
Irr
hat case
where
he
proposition
s false,we
could not
possibly
Iurve
observed
what
it
conveys.
This
power
of
conveying depends,
lrc
maintains,
on
the fact
that the
proposition
has
precisely
he
r$rnc structure
as
what
it represents.One
name stands
or one
tlring,'
he writes,
and
another
for another
thing, and
they
are
r,rrrrrnected
ogether;
n this way,
the
whole, ike a
tableau
vivant,
Drelrentshe atomicfact . . . in the proposition here must be arl
nurny
hings distinguishable
s
there are in
the state of
affairs
wlrich
t
represents.'lo
One objection
which
naturally
o@urs o us
is that
this theory
tould
apply,
at
most, to elementary
propositions.
Ordinary
prolrositions
o
not
picture
dtomic
facts: they
contain such ex-
prorsions
s'all', 'some',
or',
'not',
noneof
whichcanhave
any
nnulogue
n
an
atomic
fact.'For
in calling such
facts
'atomic'
wlrnt
Wittgenstein
means above
all
is that they
are logically
lnrlopendent;
rom
the
'existence' of an
atomic
fact, nothing
wlrnteverollowsabout the 'existence'or the 'non-existence'of
nny
other
atomic
fact.
Thus there can
be
no negative atomic
lhcts
let
alone universal
atomic
facts
-.since
the
'existence'
of
l' ls
not Iis
not
logically
ndependent
f the
'non-existence'of
.Y ,r l'.
'My
fundamental
hought,'
Wittgenstein
herefore
wrote,
'i8
tlrut
the
"logical
constants"
do
not represent.'Although
hey
r
ccur
within
propositions,
e means,
ogical
constants
re not one
ol'the elements
n the
picture.
He discusses
n considerable
etail
t rccrucial ase f'not'. It is obvious, e thinks, hat not'
is
not
thc
nameof a
relation,
n
the
sense hat
'right'
and 'left'
name
relntions.
ndeed,
not'cannot be a
nameat all;
if
it were,
not'
rrot-p'
would be
a
quite
different
assertion
rom
'p',
as
naming
35 5
-
8/21/2019 Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
9/14
A
HUNDRED
YEARS
OF PHILOSOPHY
two nots
which
'p'
does not mention.
Then
-
a
conclusion
ho
regards
as ridiculous
-
from
the
single fact
that
p,
an infinite
number
of other facts
could be
made o follow,
by the
process
of
adding
double-negations.
Not', then, is
no nanre; t
does not
refer to
an object.
What it
does s
to indicate
-
and the
same s
true of
all the other
logical
constants
that
an
operation
has
been
performedupon'p', in this case he operationof denial.
As
a result
of his
consideration
of the role
played
by
'logical
constants'
n
propositions,
Wittgenstein
s led
to conclude
hat
every non-elementary
proposition
is
a
'truth-function'
of ele-
mentary
propositions.
In
his
paperilSome
Remarks
on Logical
Form
(PIS,S,
1929) e
puts
he matter
hus: If we
try to
analyse
any
given
propositions
we shall
find
in
general
that
they are
logical
sums,
products
or other
truth-functions
of simpler
propositions.
But
our
analysis, f
carried
far
enough,
must come
to the point where t reaches ropositional orms which are not
themselves
omposed
of simpler
propositional
orms. We must
eventually
reach
the ultimate
connexion
of the terms,
the im-
mediate connexion
which
cannot
be broken
without
destroying
the
propositional
form
as such. The
propositions
which represent
this ultimate
connexion
call,
after Russell,
atomic
propositions.
They, then,
are the
kernels of every
proposition,
they contunthe
material,
and
all the rest is
only a
development of
this material.'
Suppose
we consider he
prop
osition
p
or
q
Then
the word
'
or
I
doesnot represent'anultimate connexion'; ascomesout in thg
fact
that
the
sense
fp or
q
anbewholly
given
by referring to its
'truth-grounds', in
which
'or'
plays
no
part.
It
will be true if
p
andqarebothtrue,
trueif
p
istrueand4isfalse,
'rueif
p
isfalse
and
4
is true, false
if
p
is false
and
4
is false.
Set out these esults
in a
diagram
-
a
'truth-table'
-
and the result is
a
propositional
sign which
clearly
pictures
the
senseof
p
or
4.11
Byery aq1.
elementary
roposition
can
be analysed y this
method, accord-
ing to Wittgenstein,
even
when
-
although this
presents
special
difficulties it
contains he
universal
quantifier'all'.
This result
can,Fbe
alternatively expressed
by saying
that
all
propositions
*Wittgenstein
was sb dissatisfied
with
this
paper,
his
only
publication
after the Tractatus,
that he refused
either
to
read
or
discuss
t when the timo
came
for
its
delivery.
But
I do not think
he was then dissatisfied with tho
passage
have
quoted.
356
3s7
SOME CAMBRIDGE
PIIILOSOPHERS
Iurvc
he
same
general
orm:
that
of
a selection out of the range
ol'ltomic facts, a selectionmade
by negatingcertain
combina-
I ions.
'l'here
are two extreme cases
n
such a selection:
he case
where
no combination whatever
s ruled out,
and the casewhere every
rrrrrnbinations ruled out.
Thus
suppose
we substitute
not-p
for
tlrc4 n p orq,then theresultingexpressionpr tnt-p is truefor
n
possibilities
the only
possibility
ruled out by
p
or
4
is the case
wfrcre
ar'd
q
areboth false,and
this
casecannot occur
when
4
lr rcplacedby not-p. An expression uch as
p
or not-p
Wittgen-
rtcin
callsa'tautology'
;
p
andnot-p,
which
dlows no
possibilities,
Irc calls a
'contradiction'.
Tautologies and
contradictions are
'without
sense'because
hey do not
picture
he world.
I
know
nothing
about
the weather,' Wittgensteinwrites,
when
I know
tlrut t is either raining or
not raining.'Yet
they are
not useless;
lhcy form 'part of the symbolism'.
All
the ruths of logic, ndeed,are classed y
Wittgensteinwith
'luutologies'.
This
follows
directly
from the truth-functional
nnulysis.
ake, or example, he logical ruth that
p
or
q
together
wllh
not-p mplies
4.
Set out the truth-grounds
for
p
or
q
and the
f rrth-grounds
or not-p
and we shall be able o
read
off
immedi-
ntcfy
hat
p
or
q
and
not-p
c,anaot
oth be
true
except
n
the case
wlrcre
q
is true. This
fact
can be alternatively
expressed,on
Wittgenstein'sheory
of
'sense',
by
saying hat the senseof
4
h included n the senseof Qt or q) and not-p. In an adequate
rynrbolism in an
ideal
language this, according o Wittgen-
rtcin, would
be
immediatelyobvious. We are
not, then, saying
rrrrnething
bout the world
when we
assert
hat
p
or
q
and not-p
tollcther mply
4;
in making this assertionwe are
not
excluding
rorrre
genuinepossibility,
All
we are
doing, according o Witt-
gcnstein,
s drawing attention to a
feature
of our
symbolism,
rornethinghe symbolism tself should
show.
It
is a characteristic
rrrlrk of logical
propositions,'
he
writes,
that
we can
perceive
n
tlrc symbol tself that they are true.'
ll'logic
consistswholly of
tautologiegwe might ask,why do
we
flrrtl t necessaryo construct
proofs
ofthe
propositions
oflogic?
A
'proof',
Wittgenstein answers,
s nothing but a mechanical
expcdient
or
recognizing
autologies more rapidly; the view that
llrcre are
'primitive
propositions'
of
logic from which all the
-
8/21/2019 Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
10/14
A HUNDRBD
YEARS
OF PHILOSOPHY
other
propositions
of logic
ought
to
be
deduced s
a delusion.
All
the
propositions
of logic,
he
argues,
stand
on exactly
the
same
footing;
they all say
he
same
hing,
i.e.
nothing
at all.
What
of mathematics?
hat
consists,
Wittgenstein
argues,
of
equations;
from
which
it follows
directly
that the
propositions
of
mathematics,
oo,
are without
sense. or
it is alwaysnonsense,
he
maintains,
to say
of
two
distinct
things
that
they are
dentical;
and osayof one hing that it is denticalwith itself s to saynoth-
ing.
Mathematics
says,
what in
its
symbolism
we can
see,
that
certain
expressions
an
be
substituted
for
one
another;
that
this
can
be
done
shows
us something
about
the world
but
does not
picture
the
world.
Thus
the
propositions
of mathematics
are
'senselesg'.
Senseless,
ut
not nonsensical;
n
the other hand,
Wittgenstein
axgues,
he
metaphysician
alks
nonsense,
n
the fullest
sense
of
the
word.
There
is
no
novelty
in
this
accusation:
as we have
already seen, it formed part of the regular stock-in-trade of
nineteenth-century
positivism,
to
trace
it no
further
back.
What
was
novel,
however,
was the
accusation
hat
metaphysics
arises
out of
the fact
that
philosophers
do not
understand
.the
logic
of
our
language'.
In
the most
obvious
case,
he
philosopher
is misled,
according
to Wittgenstein,
by the fact
that
the
grammatical
form
of
our
propositions
does not
always
reflect
their logical
form.
Merely
because
millionaires are non-existent,
resembles
n
grammatical
form
'millionaires
are non-cooperative', the philosopher is led
to
suppose
that
'non-existent'
is
a
quality,
and is
then
well
embarked
upon
a metaphysical
nqulry
into.the
nature
of non-
existence'.
In
a
perfect
language,
one in which
every
sign
im-
mediately
ndicated
its logical
function,
such misunderstandings,
Wittgenstein
thinks,
would
vanish;
what
we now write
as
'millionaires
are
non-existent'
would
be
so expressed
hat
.nou-
existent'would
no longer
ook like
a
predicate.
Sucha language,
we
might
say,
would make
logic
unnecessary
and metaphysics
impossible.
In other instances,Wittgensteinthinks, metaphysics
arises
out
of the
attempt
to
pass
beyond
the
boundaries
of
language
by
talking
as we have
been
doing,
about
the relations
between ang.
uage
and
the
world.
No
proposition,
Wittgenstein
maintains,
358
SOME CAMBRIDGE
PHILOSOPHERS
cnn
represent
what it has n
common with the world
-
that
form
Irr virtue of
which
it
is an
accurate
icture.
To
do this,
it would
lruve
o include within
itself a
portion
of the world in a non-
pictured
orm
-
so as o be able
o make he comparison etween
thc world and
the
picture.
But this, according o
Wittgenstein, s
inrpossible;
o
talk about
the world is at
once
to
picture
t. To
fluppose therwise s to
imagine hat we c{rn
somehow ay what
lics
beyond
anguage,
.e.
beyond
anything hat can be said.
What, hen, canthe
philosopher
ay? Wittgenstein's nswer
s
uncompromising
'nothing
at all '
'The
right
method
of
philos.
ophy,' he ells us,
would
be
this: to say
nothing exceptwhat can
hc said, .e.
the
propositions
of
natural science,.e. something
thot has
nothing
to
do with
philosophy:
and then, always,
when
rt()nreonelsewishes o say
something
metaphysical,o demon-
Blrate o him that
he had
given
no
meaning o certain signs
n his
propositions.'
Philosophy,on this
view, is not a theory but
an
nctivity: the activity of making clear to peoplewhat they can,
nnd
what they
cannot, say.
lly
way of reply, we might be
templed
to
assert
hat there axeat
lctrst some
non-metaphysical,
sensible,
philosophical
assertions,
rrnmely
hosewhich ariseout
of the analysis
f scientific
method.
'l'lris
Wittgensteindenies.Such
propositions,
he says,are
either
propositions
bout the
psychology
of
human beingsor else urn
out,
on
analysis, o be
propositions
of logic,
propositions
which
'hclong
o the symbolism'.
Of the
first type, he most
mportant
elunrples'the so-called aw ofinduction'. Induction, as defined
hy
Wittgenstein,s
'the
process
f assuming
he simplest
aw that
cnn be
made o harmonize
with our experience';
nd,
he argues,
'there are
no
grounds
or believing
hat
the
simplest
course
of
cvcnts
will
really happen'.
t is
'only
a hypothesis,'
e says,
hat
thc sun will
rise omorrow;
we do
not know that it
will rise. We
slrould only
know it will
rise if this
were
a
logically
necessary
consequence
f our experience;
here
s no sort of
necessity, e
l)rcsumes,
xcept ogical
necessity,
o sort of
inferenceexcept
'logical'
(i.e.
tautological)
nference.
In
no way,' he writes,
can
nn inference e made
rom the existence
f one state
of affairs o
lhc
existence f
anotherentirely different
rom it
. . .
superstition
is the belief
n the causal
nexus.' t
follows that
'the
law of
in-
duction'is
certainly not a
proposition
of
logic;
on
Wittgenstein's
359
-
8/21/2019 Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
11/14
SOME
CAMBRIDGB
PHILOSOPHERS
not
equations,
and
is
thus enabled
still to uphold the
doctrine
that
mathematics s deducible from logic; at the
same
time, of
course, t was rom Wittgenstein
that he eamt to
think
of logic as
beingcomposedof tautologies.
His
general
object
is
to show, with
the help of Wittgenstein's
truth-functional
analysis
of
general
propositions,
hat it is
possible
o derive
mathematics rom a logic
which containsno empiricalpropositions,no propositions ike
the Axiom of Reducibility
or the Axiom of
Infinity,
and
yet
which does not collapse
nto
paradox.*
In attempting to con-
tlnue, with
aid
from the Tractatus,
the sort of inquiry which
Whitehead
and Russell had
initiated, Ramsey was almost
uniqueamongstBritish
philosophers
f the between-wars
eriod.
For
the most
part, philosophers-whose
other
nterestsare usually
lltcrary,
historical,or linguistic, ather than
mathematical when
fnccd with
the
formidable symbolism of Principia
Mathematica
dccided hat formal logic was
no
longer
for them; they retreated
Into the more congenial territory of epistemology.
Ramseymoved
in the
same
direction,
partly
under the influ-
once, t
would seem,
ofJohnson,
partly
because
e
had
now read
l'olrce,
partly
following in Russell's footsteps.
Thus the 6nal
oonclusion f
his
'Facts
and
Propositions'
(1927),
although he
lrrgcly derives
his
logical apparatus
from Wittgenstein, is
prag-
nullc
in tendency.One can.see his most clearly n
his
analysis
rrf negation:he
agrees
with Wittgenstein hat
not-not-p s the
ralrro
proposition
as
p,
and,hence hat
'not'
is
not a name,
but
ho rrunwilling o leave he matter at this point. The word 'not',
Ito
nrgues, xpresses difference n
feeling,
the differencebetween
lrrcrting
and denying.
It
will
follow that
'disbolieving
p'
is
hforrlical
with
'believing
not-p':
and
this conclusion,Ramseyries
l
n
l
r
nt y
i n
a
typically
pragmatic
manner,
by
dentifying the causes
erxl
theconsequences
f these wo apparentlydifferent attitudes
of
nrind.
l{inrilarly,
n his'Truth and Probabili ty'
(1926)
he rejectsWitt-
Scrntcin's
doctrine that we
'have
no
grounds'
for inferences
whlch are not tautological. nduction he describes, fter
Peirce,
.lloo,
for the
details,
Ch. 9 above. He later had
qualms
about the
possi-
hlllty
of
'$oving'
the whole
of
pure
mathematics by
a logio which contains
rrl
ornplricul
propositions;
so mucb the
wors€
for
pure
mathematics,
ho
Itrnrr
lo hnvo concluded.
A
HUNDRED
YEARS
oF PHTLosoPHY
I
view
it says
merely
-
and
so
t is a
proposition
of
psychology,
not
I
of
philosophy
-
that
human
beings
ordinarily
prefer
simpler
to
I
more
complex
exPlanations.
I
As for the
aw
of causality,
hat,
according
o Wittgenstein,
s
a
I
proposition
of logic
n disguise
an
attempt
o
say
what
can only
I
be
shown
n our
symbolism,
hat 'there
are
natural
laws'.
We
do
I
not discoverthat there are uniformities, he argues'by inspecting I
the world
around
us;
theseuniformities
already
show
themselves
t
in
our
talk
about
the
world,
in
the mere
act, ndeed,
hat
we are
f
able
to think.
Similarly,
what
Hertz
picked
out as
the a
priori
I
laws of
mechanics
are
simply
descriptions
of our
symbolism,
I
descriptions
which
our symbolism
tself
ought
to
'show'.
If
we
think
of science
s an
attempt
to describe
he
world
by
means
of a
t
fine
mesh,
a
priori
laws,
Wittgenstein
says,
axe
not
part
of
the
I
results at
which
we
thus
arrive:
on
the contrary
they
are
the
I
characteristics
of the
mesh
(although
it shows
us
something
I
about the world, Wittgenstein hinks, that it can be described"
I
such-and-such
aws;.rz
So,
Wittgenstein
argues,
his
general
*o-
I
clusion
emains
all
propositionswhich
picture
he
world belong
I
to the
natural
sciences,
nd
those
which
do
not
picture
the
world,
I
if they are
not
nonsense,
re
tautological.
Nowhere
s
there
any
I
room
for
a
peculiar.
elsss
of
philosophical
propositions.
This
was
I
certainly
a discqBsef{ingconclusion.
I
,, Of
those
Garnb'nidFp"men
ho
were
mmediately
nflue-nced
y
I
theTractatus,thepqgt
remarkable
was
F.
P. Ramsey'
Ramsey
died at the ageof twenty-six,and the few yearsof his maturelife
were divided
between
@onomics,
mathematical
ogic and
philos'
I
ophy;
nor
was
he one
of
those
who
light
in
early
life uron
a
I
system to
which
they are
thereafter
faithful.
Thus
he
wrote
no
,
major work,
and
the
essays
and
fragments
collected
for
post'
I
humous
publication by R'
B.
Braithwaite
as
The
Foundations
f
)
Mathematics
1931)
epresent
ifferent
stages
n the
development
I
'1
of a
mind
rather
than
varied
aspects
of a
single
point
of
view'
f
They have
begn
none the
less
nfluential
for that'
rI
In
the essay
1925)
which
gave
its title
to
The
Foundotions
of
I
Mathematics
Ramsey
akes
his
stand
with
the logistics
of White-
|
head
and
Russell
against
Hilbert
and
Brouwer;
but
at once
I
displays
his
independence.
n
opposition
to
Wittgenstein'
he
I
maintains
that the
ProPositions
of
mathematics
are
tautotoee+f
-
8/21/2019 Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
12/14
A HUNDRED
YEARS
OF
PHILOSOPHY
as a'habit of the human
mind',
one which
cannot,he
admits,
be
justified
by any
purely
formal
methods
-
not
even, as Keynes
had
thought,
by the heory
of
probability
but
which t is none
he ess
'unreasonable'
not to
adopt. A
logic of induction,
a
'human
logic',
will describe,
he concludes,
he degree
of success
with
which
inquirers employ
different
methods
of
arriving
at the
truth. Induction, he thinks, s pragmaticallyustified; and this is
a rational
justification,
not,
as Wittgenstein
had
argued,
a
mere
matter
of
psycholory.
The
samemovement
owards
pragmatism
an be discerned
n
'General
Propositions
nd Causality'
(1929).
Ramsey
ow rejects
the view, which
he had
previously
taken
over from Wittgenstein,
that a
general roposition
s
a conjunction
of atomic
propositions,
althougha conjunction
with the
peculiar
property
hat we
cannot,
for lack
of symbolic
power,
enumerate
ts constituents.
(On
which Ramseycomments:
But
what
we can't say
we can't say,
and we
can't whistle t either.')
At the
same ime, he
is still con-
vinced that
all
propositions
are truth-functions;
the
conclusion
he draws is that
general propositions
are not,
properly
speaking,
'propositions'.
We
ought
not to distinguish
hem,
he argued, nto
the true and the false,
but rather nto
thosewhich
it is
'right'
or
'wrong', 'reasonable'or
'unreasonable', o maintain.
They
are
waysof meeting he future:
to say hat
'all
men
are mortal',
on
this view, s
to announce hat
any man we meet
we shall egard
as
mortal. People
may
try
to wean
us
rom
this way
of regardingmen,
they may condemn t as unreasonable. ut it cannot be proved
to be false, Ramsey
hinks,
just
because t makes
no
definite
statement
about
the
properties
of
objects.
As opposed o Wittgenstein,
again, Ramsey
considers hat
philosophy
issues
n a
particular
class of
propositions
- elucida-
tions,
classifications, efinitions,or,
at least,
descriptions
f
the
way
in
which a term could be defined.
The
difficulty for
philos-
ophy, he thinks, is that its
elucidations
involve
one another;
we
cannot, for example,
begin our elucidation
by
presuming
hat the
nature of meaning s completelyclear and then go on to use
meaning o
elucidatespaceand time,
because
o clarify the nature
of meaningwe
must already
have
attained o some
understanding
of spaceand of time. The
great
danger of an elucidatory
philos-
ophy, Ramsey
says, s scholasticism
-
'the
essenceof which
is
362
SOME
CAMBRIDGE HILOSOPHERS
lreating
what is vague
as f it
were
precise
and trying
to
put
it
into
an exact
ogical category'.
With that remarlg
however,
we have
crossed
he
border between
he older
and the newer
Cambridge.
l"-or
he time
being
the emphasis
was
still on clarity.
Russell,
Moore,
Wittgenstein,
Broad,
Johnson,
were all read
as
making the
rtrme
point:
that
philosophy
is analysis,
clarification.
A typical
productof the period is the ournal lnalysis, which first appeared
In
1933,
nder the
editorship of
A. Duncan-Jones,
nd
with the
collaboration
f L. S.
Stebbing
C. A. Mace,l3and
G. Ryle. The
object
of Analysis,
so it
was
laid
down,
was to
publish
'short
nrticles
on limited
and
precisely
defined
philosophical
questions
about he
elucidation
of known
facts, nstead
oflong,
very
general
nnd abstract
metaphysical
speculations
about
possible
facts or
ebout
the
world as
a whole'. This
was clearly
a reformulation of
Russell's
emand
or'
piece-meal
nvestigations',
as represented
ln
practice
rather
by Moore's
philosophical
articles than by
Rrrsself's
books. When
the
tlen editor
of Analysis,
Margaret
Mucdonald,
published
a selection
of
articles from
Arulysis as
I'hlktsophyand Analysis
(1954)
she chose
her epigraph,
however,
frorn
the Tractatus,
not from
the work
of Moore
or of Russell:
"l'lrc
object
of
philosophy
is
the
logical clarification
of thoughts.
. . .
The
result of
philosophy
is not
a number
of
"philosophical
propositions"
but to make
propositions
clear.'Wittgenstein
was
protrching,
it
was thought,
phat
Moore
had
practised:
the
'lrtt(tatus
was read
as a sort of
analyst's handbook.
Nuturally, however, certatn difficulties arose out of this con-
llation
of
Russell,
Moore
and Wittgenstein.
What exactly, it
wrur
arkcd, does
analysis
analyse
-
a
sentence,
a
propositionr
:r cotr-
c6pt,
or
a word?
Moge
mportant
still, what
does t
analyse hem
Into ?
These
questions
were much
discussed;tl
andytic methods,
ll in I'air to
say,
were
more freely
employed
in
the analysis of
nnnlysishan
in the
analysis
of
anythingelse.
'l'hc
variations
through
which this
discussion
moved
can be
llhrstrated
n the
work
of L. S.
Stebbing.tsHer
'The
Method
of
Arrrrlysisn Philosophy' (PAS, 1931)begins rom a distinction
lrclwcen he
immediate
eference'of
a
proposition
what we
all
rrrrdcrstand
hen
we hear it
uttered
-
and its
'exact
reference',
which
includes
everything
which
must
be the
case f the
proposi-
t|on is
true.
The
'immediate
reference'
of
the
proposition
.All
363
-
8/21/2019 Passmore_100 Years Philosophy
13/14
A
HUNDRED
YBARS
OF
PHILOSOPHY
economists
re
fallible', for
example,does not include
the falli.
bility of Keynes; we cau understand
his
proposition
without
evor
having heard
of
Keynes.
But the fallibility
of Keynes forms
part
of its
'exact
reference',Stebbing
says,since f the
proposition
s
true
Keynes must be fallible.
Metaphysical
analysis, according
to Stebbing, works with
two
assumptions; irst
that we understand
quite
well,
at the level
of
immediate reference,quite
a
variety
of
propositions,
secondln
that
such
propositions
make
'exact
reference'to
basic
proposi.
tions,
ultimate
sets
of elements,he ultimacy
of which consists
n
the fact that their immediate
referenceand their
exact referenco
are
identical.
Obviously, she
has in mind
Moore's
doctrine that
'we
all know
quite
well'
that hens ay eggs,
but differ about
tho
'ultimate
analysis'of
this
proposition;
at the
same ime, her'set
of elements' s,
she
says, dentical
with Wittgenstein's
combina.
tion
of elements'or
'atomic
facts'. Thus, on her interpretation,
Moore and the Tractatusare sayingmuch the same hing: that
philosophical
analysis
consists
n unveiling hose
basic
proposi.
tions to which an everyday
proposition
ultimately refers.
Fairly
clearly, however, not
all
'analysis'
satisfies his
defini.
tion. In
her
'Logical
Positivism
and Analysis'
(PBA,
1933)
Stebbing
distinguishes, herefore,
between
our
different kinds
of
analysis.First, there s the
analysisof sentences ith the
object
of
clarifying
their logical form,
the sort of analysis typified
in
Russell's
heory of descriptions;
econdly, he analysisof a con
cept, illustrated in Einstein's analysis of simultaneity; thirdly,
the mathematician's
postulational
analysis', the
definition
of
terms by analyticmethods;and hen ourthly,
the sort of analysis,
now christened
directional
analysis',shehad
described
n 'The
Method of Analysis n
Philosophy'. That,
she thought, is the
peculiarly
philosophical
sort of analysis in
opposition, say, o
Ramsey for whom Russell's
theory of descriptions was
the
'paradigm
of
philosophy'.
By
the time Stebbingcame
to write her essay
on
'Moore'g
Influence' for The Philosophyof G. E. Moore (1942),she had
begun o feel
suspicious
f
the metaphysics hich s
presumed
y
directionalanalysis. t now seemed
o her
that
thereare no
'basic
facts'; the
doctrine ofbasic facts, she suggests,
s a relic ofthe
days when
philosophers
thought they had to
justify
the
beliefs
3g
365
SOME
CAMBRIDGB PHILOSOPHERS
of commonsense
y setting them
on a solid
'ultimate'
founda-
lirrrr.
The mportant sort of analysis, hecame o think,
is'same-
level'
analysis,
n which
expressions re defined by expressions
und
concepts re
definedby concepts an
analysis
which makes
rro
nretaphysicalssumptions.n thus eactingagainst
directional
nrrulysis'
Stebbing
eflects
he
general
endency
of the
'thirties.
'Ihe
earlier writings of John Wisdom
may
serve as a second
cxumple
of
the analytic controversy. n his
'Is
Analysisa Useful
Mcthod n PhilosophyT'
PASS,
1931),
he
distinguisheshree
rorts of analysis:
material, formal
and
philosophical.
Russell's
thcory of descriptions
s'formal'analysis;
the ordinary defini-
tions of scienceare exarmples f
'material'
analysis.
Both
of
lhcse
are
'same-level';
philosophical
analysis,
n
contrast,
is
'ncw-level',
replacing the less by the more ultimate. He ex-
plnins,
by the use of
examples,
what
he means
by
'more
ulti-
rrurte'.
Individuals', he
says,
are
more ultimate than nations.
Se se-data ndmentalstates re n their turn more ultimate than
lntlividuals.'
t turns out, then, that
philosophical
analysiscon-
rists n trying
to
show
how
statements bout
minds can
be
reduced
to statements bout
mental
states,and statementsabout
material
objccts o
statements
bout sense-data:
n
short,
t is the
practice
ol'what
a
foreign observer asdescribed s
the
favourite English
grnr'lour-game'
reductive epistemology. Wisdom wrote
an
r Ier
e
n ary
textbo
ok Pr ob ems
of
M ind and Mat t er
(
934) n ord-
cr to illustrate he
usefulness f
analytic
methods; there is very
littlc in it which would readstrangelyo Broad or even o Stout.
'l'he
long
series
of articles on
'Logical
Constructions'
Mind,
|
9.1
-3)
s a different
matter:
thesewe
might
describe
s
he
most
wlrole-hearted f
all
attempts
o
set out
the logical assumptions
irnplicit
n'philosophical
nalysis'.t0n what
espects,
e
asks,
s
rurr rdinary
proposition
an
unsatisfactory
picture'?
There s
a
ncrrsc,t is
obvious,
n which
England
declaredwar on France'is
n|rcady a
perfectly
satisfactory
picture:
we understand