Part i 2 Columns Jaguars

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANPART I DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

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1. Define: a. Political Lawis that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory. (PEOPLE VS. PERFECTO, 43 Phil. 887) b. Constitutional Law c. Constitution d. Administrative Law e. Law of Public Officers f. Law on Public Corporations g. Election Law h. Distinction between Political Law and Constitutional Law 2. Read: MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION, 114 SCRA 77 JUDGE

the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not selfexecuting. But a provision, which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is selfexecuting. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 4. Kinds of Constitution

The provision in the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges, justices, etc., (public officers) from engaging in business within the territorial jurisdiction of their courts is political in nature and therefore, said provision was deemed abrogated when there was a change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States at the turn of the century. Political laws are deemed abrogated if there is a change of sovereignty and unless re-enacted under the new sovereign, the same is without force and effect. 3. The Supremacy of the Constitution Read: 1. MUTUC VS. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228 2. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS COLLEGE OF LAW

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANa) written or unwritten b) rigid and flexible c) cumulative or conventional 5. AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Art. XVII) Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: [1] The Congress upon a vote of of all its Members; or [2] A constitutional Convention. Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voter therein. No amendment under this Section shall be authorized within five (5) years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. Section 3. The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of all its members, cal a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than ninety days after the certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition. NOTE: Amendments to, or revision of the Constitution is VALID

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only when approved by a majority of the votes cast during the plebiscite, not by the votes of the Members of Congress. 2. Read: R.A. 6735 Requisites for a valid peoples initiative to amend the Constitution; distinctions between amendment and revision. RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO , together with 6,327,952 registered voters vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160 Carpio, J. Facts: Petitioners filed a Petition for Initiative and Referendum with the COMELEC to amend the 1987 Philippine Constitution, particularly Articles VI and VII to replace the present Presidential-Bicameral system of government to Parliamentary-Unicameral system using Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. Petitioners claim that their petition was signed by 6,327,952 million voters all over the country and the same constitutes over 12% of all the registered voters in the entire country and that more than 3% of the registered voters in every legislative district signed the same in accordance with Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. The petition to change the Constitution involves sections 1-7 of Article VI; Sections 1-4 of Article VII and an Article XVII entitled Transitory Provisions. The petitioners prayed with the COMELEC that after due publication of their Petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters ratification: DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL BICAMERAL TO A


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANUNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER? The COMELEC dismissed the petition citing SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 where it was held that: RA 6735 intended to include the System of Initiative on Amendments to the Constitution, but is, unfortunately, Inadequate to cover that system under Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. x x x . The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry the purposes of this act. Considering the said dismissal, petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on Certiorari and Mandamus alleging rave abuse of discretion and to set aside the COMELEC Decision and to compel the latter to give due course to their initiative petition. THE ISSUES: 1. WHETHER THE LAMBINO GROUPS PETITION COMPLIES WITH SECTION 2, ARTICLE XVII OF THE CONSTITUTION ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH PEOPLES INITIATIVE; 2. WHETHER THE COURT SHOULD REVISIT ITS RULING IN DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, DECLARING THAT RA NO. 6735 INCOMPLETE, INADEQUATE OR WANTING IN ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE INITIATIVE CLAUSE ON PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION; and

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3. WHETHER THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE LAMBINO GROUPS PETITION. H E L D: There petition. is no merit to the

The Lambino group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a peoples initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Groups glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. As such, there is likewise no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This Section provides: Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention vividly explain the meaning of the amendment directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition. Thus: MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. IS THE DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT READY TO BE SHOWN TO THE PEOPLE WHEN THEY ARE ASKED TO SIGN?


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANMR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President. MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign? Now, who prepares the draft? MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam PresidentAs it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature. Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment should be ready and shown to the people before they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that before they sign there is already a draft shown to them. The framers also envisioned that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must prepare the proposal and pass it around for signature. The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition IS THAT THE ENTIRE PROPOSAL ON ITS FACE IS A PETITION BY THE PEOPLE. This means two (2) essential elements must be present: 1. The people must author and must sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign for and on their behalf; 2. As an initiative upon a petition, THE PROPOSAL MUST BE EMBODIED IN A PETITION. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who will express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETIITON ONLY IF THE PEOPLE SIGN ON A PETITION THAT OCNTAINS THE FULL TEXT OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS. The petitioners bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in

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gathering the signatures---that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition a copy of the document containing the proposed amendments and as such, the people signed initiative petition without knowing the actual amendments proposed in the said initiative. Instead , the alleged 6.3 million people who signed the petition had to rely the representations of Atty. Lambino. Clearly, Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation. 2. A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress and a Constitutional Convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. This is clear under Section 1 of Art. XVII of the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution under Section 2 of Art. XVIII clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments. The two are distinguished as follows: Revision is the alterations of the different portions of the entire document [Constitution]. It may result in the rewriting whether the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANAmendment of the Constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change or only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, et al. Vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 & June 10, 1997 RA 6735 intended to include the System of Initiative on Amendments to the Constitution, but is, unfortunately, Inadequate to cover that system. Section 2 Art. XVII is not self-executory and unless Congress provides for its implementation , it would remain in the cold niche of the Constitution. RA 6735 in all its 23 sections mentions the word Constitution only in section 2 and Section 3 as compared to the initiative on statutes and local legislation. The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry the purposes of this act. Enumerate the steps to be followed and the requisites to be met in order that the people may proposed the amendments, repeal, amend or enact a law or provision of the Cnstitution. 3. What are the different modes of amending the constitution? Distinguish Revision from amendment of the Constitution.

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Revision is the alterations of the different portions of the entire document [Constitution]. It may result in the rewriting whether the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one. Amendment of the Constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change or only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect. (SINCO, Vicente, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW) 4. Read: a) MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1 b) GONZALES vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 There is no prohibition for Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution and at the same time call for the convening of a Constitutional Convention to amend the Constitution. The word or in the provision Congress, upon a vote of of all its members; OR [2] A constitutional Convention under Section 1, Art. XVII also means AND. c) TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 Doctrine of Proper Submission means all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the ratification or


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANrejection at piecemeal. the same time, not

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d) SANIDAD vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 e) ALMARIO vs. ALBA, 127 SCRA 69 If the question regarding the proposed amendment to the Constitution deals with its necessity, expediency or wisdom, the same is political in nature and beyond the power of the courts to decide. f) MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 ACRA 106

PART II PREAMBLE 1. Purpose and Effect of a Preamble. WE, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. 2. AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 Phil. 201 It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. PART III ARTICLE I - THE NATIONAL TERRITORY Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine Archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. 1. What is the most significant change in this Article, compared with those of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions?


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN2. What is the archipelago theory or archipelagic doctrine? 3. Methods used in fixing the baseline from which the territorial belt is measured: a. The normal baseline method b. The straight baseline method 4. Read: The Law of the Sea: Its major implications to the Philippines, by Justice Jorge R. Coquia, p. 31, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 8, No.1. 5. 6. R.A. 3046 R.A. 5446 Definitions: a. Territorial sea b. Internal or inland waters c. high seas or international d. sea-bed e. sub-soil f. Insular shelves g. other submarine areas 7. Reason and effect of having an Article on the National Territory. 8. Read: 1) Presidential Decree No. 1596 - June 11, 1978 (Making the Kalayaan Island Group [Freedomland] as part of the Philippine Territory) 2) Presidential Decree No. 1599 - June 11, 1978 (Declaring the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines which is 200 nautical miles from its baseline)

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b.Manifestations of a republican state. c. Define "state"

COLLECTOR VS. CAMPOS RUEDA, 42 SCRA 23 each: d. Elements of a state. Define 1. 2. 3. 4. people territory sovereignty government

e. Different meanings of the word people as used in the constitution: 1. as inhabitants (Art. XIII, Sec. 1; Art. III, Sec. 2); 2. as citizens (Preamble; Art. II, Sec. 1 & 4; Art. III, Sec. 7); 4) 3. as voters (Art. VII, Sec.

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f. presidential & parliamentary forms of government Read: 1. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. OPLE, 108 SCRA 757 The government of the Philippines under the 1973 Constitution is essentially presidential with parliamentary features. 2. LEGASPI VS. FINANCE, 115 SCRA 418 SEC. OF

PART IV ARTICLE II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

The form of government is essentially parliamentary with presidential features. g. Two-fold function of the government. Read: 1)BACANI VS. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468 (Ministrant [merely directory] and Constituent [Mandatory] Functions)

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. a. The basic principles underlying the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN2) SCRA 649 Due to complexities of the changing society, the two-fold function of the government as classified by President Wilson is no longer relevant. h. Parents Patriae Read: 1) GOVT. VS. MONTE DE PIEDAD, 35 Phil 738 2) CABANAS VS. PILAPIO, 58 SCRA 94 i. govt.? Read: 1. AQUINO VS. COMELEC, 62 SCRA 275 (on the de jure aspect) 2. In Re: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ, 145 SCRA 160 A government formed as a result of a peoples revolution, is considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family of nations or other countries like the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others. 3. Estrada vs. Macapagal & Desierto, infra. j. The three (3) kinds of de facto government? Read: CO KIM CHAM VS. VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75 Phil. 113 There are several kinds of de facto governments. a. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. b. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and De jure govt.? De facto ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30

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occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. c. And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto governments. "But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. In practice, the local ordinary tribunals


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANare authorized to continue administering justice; and judges and other judicial officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. These principles and practice have the sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject, and have been asserted by the Supreme Court and applied by the President of the United States. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones." The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and

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valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to that wellknown principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and the individuals the evil would be scarcely less, it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government ." (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his own sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to the Philippines and establishing the socalled Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.) l. Sovereignty: 1. legal 2. political m. The doctrine of sovereignty as auto-limitation? Read:


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN1. REAGAN VS. COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 30 SCRA 968 "By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions of the treaty." "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of sovereignty." Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal selfdetermination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may

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refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance. 2. PEOPLE VS. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476 3. COMMISSIONER VS. ROBERTSON, 143 SCRA 397 2. Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national police, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity among all nations. a. difference between aggressive & defensive war b. Read: 1) MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR PRISONS, 90 Phil. 70 OF

The Philippines adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since it is a generally accepted principle of international law. As such, it should be applied to illegal aliens like the petitioner so that it would be a violation of the said international law to detain him for an unreasonable length of time since no vessel from his country is willing to take him. "The meaning of "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away. Considering that this Government desires to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of this presumption assurances were made during the oral argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of this


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANpetitioner. On the other hand, the record fails to show how long he has been under confinement since the last time he was apprehended. Neither does he indicate neglected opportunities to send him abroad. And unless it is shown that the deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance for deportation 3 or unless the Government admits that it can not deport him or unless the detainee is being held for too long a period our courts will not interfere. 2) KURODA VS. JALANDONI, 83 Phil 171

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full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372): 3) SALONGA VS. HERMOSO, 97 SCRA 121 4) AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195 The Geneva Convention on Road Signs and Signals, is also considered part of the law of the Philippines since the same is a generally accepted principle of international law in accordance with the Incorporation clause of the Constitution. 5) REYES VS. BAGATSING,125 SCRA 553 Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. It is to be admitted that it finds support In the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. There was no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied. it does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that the distance is less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated, Should it come, then the qualification and observation of Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside. The high estate accorded the rights to free speech and

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANpeaceable assembly demands nothing less. Without saying that the Ordinance is obnoxious per se to the constitution, it cannot be validly invoked whenever its application would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed right such as freedom of assembly and/or expression, as in the case at bar, regardless of whether the chancery of any foreign embassy is beyond or within 500 feet from the situs of the rally or demonstration. 4. Exec. Order No. 264

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5. Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. 6. Section 6. The separation of church and State shall be inviolable. Read: 1) PAMIL VS. TELERON, 86 SCRA 413 2) GERMAN VS. BARANGAN, 135 SCRA 514 (NOTE: Read the dissenting opinions in both cases) 3) Other provisions: Other provisions on church & state:

3. Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times supreme over the military. The armed forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. See also: Art. VII, Sec. 18 Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (2) Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (4) 4. Section 4. The prime duty of the government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal and military service. Read: 1. PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN, 66 Phil. 13 The appellants argument that he does not want to join the armed forces because he does not want to kill or be killed and that he has no military inclination is not acceptable because it is his obligation to join the armed forces in connection with the defense of the State provision of the Constitution. 2. PEOPLE VS. MANAYAO, 78 Phil. 721 3. PD1706, August 8, 1980

1. ART. III, Sec. 5. No lawshall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. NO RELIGIOUS TEST SHALL BE REQUIRED FOR THE EXERCISE OF CIVIL OR POLITICAL RIGHTS.

2. ART.

VI, Sec. 28 (3). Charitable institutions, churches, mosques, nonprofit cemeteriesactually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, for the benefit, directly or indirectly, for the use,

3. ART. VI, Sec. 29 .(2). No


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANbenefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination or religion, except when such priest, minister.. is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. 4. ART. IX, C, 2(5). Religious denominations and sects shall not be registeredas political parties. (NOTE: Religious organizations are also prohibited ion connection with sectoral representatives under Art. VI) 5. ART. XIV, Sec. 3(3). At the option in writing by parents, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children in elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by religious authorities to which said children belong, without additional cost to the government.

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services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.. 10. The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. 11. The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. a. Read together with entire provisions of Article XIII

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9. Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civil efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support the support of the government.

7. Sections 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination, 8. Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory. 1. meaning of "nuclear-free" Philippines; 2. . Art. XVIII, Secs. 4 & 25 9. Sections 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social

NOTE: Father Bernas opines that this provision does not take a stand on divorce. As such, a Divorce Law to be passed by Congress may or may not be unconstitutional. But definitely, a law allowing abortion , other than therapeutic, is unconstitutional. 1. Read together with the entire provisions of Article XV. 2. Read: a) GINSBERG VS. NEW YORK, 390 US 629 (1969) A law prohibiting the sale of girlie magazines [bold?) is constitutional and does not violate the above provision. This is so because parents could buy said magazines for their children if they believe the same is already suitable to the understanding of their child. This is in accordance with this provision which states that the parents have the


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANnatural and primary right in rearing their child for civic efficiency b) MEYER VS. NEBRASKA, 260 US 260 (1922) c) PIERCE VS. SOCIETY OF SISTERS, 268 US 510 (1925) A law requiring small kids to be enrolled in public schools only is unconstitutional since it interferes with the right of parents in rearing their children. They have the right to choose which school is best suited for the development of their children without interference from the State. d) PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, 97 Phil. 806 e) CABANAS VS. PILAPIL, 58 SCRA 94 10. Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. Read: 1) PD 684 2) PD 935 3) PD 1102 4) PD 603; see the objectives of the law 11. Sections 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of men and women. 12. Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. 13. Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. 14. Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science 1)

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and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote human liberation and development. Read together with Article XIV Read : VILLEGAS VS. SUBIDO, 109 SCRA 1 OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, July 30, 1993; In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "intergenerational responsibility" and "intergenerational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." The minors-petitioners have the personality to sue since the case deals with the timber licensing agreements entered into by the government which if not stopped would be prejudicial to their future. This is so because the DENR holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations the natural resources of the country. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANTheir personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of

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Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are selfexecuting and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and farreaching in nature even to be hinted at here. 12. Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYAN1) Read together with Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution. 2) Compare it with Section 9, Article II, 1973 Constitution. 3) Read: a. VICTORIANO VS. ELIZALDE POPE WORKERS UNION, 59 SCRA 54 The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an Iglesia Ni Kristo member may refuse to join a Union and despite the fact that there is a closed shop agreement in the establishment where he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority union therein. 13. Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

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COCONUT AUTHORITY, 286 SCRA 109 Mendoza, J. The Philippine Constitutions, starting from the 1935 document, HAVE REPUDIATED laissez faire (or the doctrine of free enterprise) as an economic principle, and although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nevertheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art. XII, Sections 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest so requires.

See Art. XII 14. Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments. a. Do we practice the free enterprise system in the Philippines or is it the welfare state concept? Distinguish the two. b. Read: ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649 (Note: Read the separate opinion of former Chief Justice ENRIQUE FERNANDO only) The Philippines never practiced the free enterprise system. It is the welfare-state concept which is being followed as shown by the constitutional provision on agrarian reform, housing, protection to labor (NOTE, however, that the 1987 Constitution have provisions which provide for free enterprise) PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS VS. PHILIPPINE 15. Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform. a. Read together with Secs. 4-10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution b. Read PD 27 - as to the extent of land reform under the MARCOS regime c. Read RA 3844 & 6389, as amended - THE CODE OF AGRARIAN REFORMS OF THE PHILIPPINES (Read the policy of the state on this matter) d .Read the COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM LAW, RA No. 6657 as signed into law by the President on June 7, 1988. e. Read: Association of Small Landowners vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, July 14, 1989 16. Sections 22. The State recognizes and promotes the right


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANof indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. To be discussed later with Art. X, Secs. 1521. Other provisions on indigenous cultural communities: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. VI, Sec. 5(2) X, Secs. 15 - 21 XII, Sec. 5 XIII, Sec. 6 XIV, Sec. 17 XVI, Sec. 12

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as amended by RA 3047, PD 77 and BP 195.. b. PD 749, July 18, 1975, which grants immunity from prosecution to givers of bribes and other gifts and to their accomplices in bribery other than graft cases against public officers. c. RA 1379. Forfeiture in favor of the State any property found to have been illegally acquired by a public officer or employee. 21. Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

17. Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation. 17-a. Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building. 18. Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. a. Define "autonomy" b. See Art. X Read the 1991 New Local Government Code and enumerate its provisions evidencing "autonomy" to local government units. 19. Section 26. The State guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. 20. Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption. To be discussed under Article XI. a. Please see RA 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,

Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; Public disclosure of government transactions CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704 Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. The Facts:

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),1[4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:

WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC skyrocketed to P4.3 million, asAnnex E of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.1[4]


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANcompared to the previous years mere P106 thousand; WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over P73 million had been allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability report given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT; WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee of Philcomsat has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an executive committee member; to date there have been no payments given, subjecting the company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.25 million in 2004; WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors. On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.2[6]

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commitment.3[7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.

On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum,4 [8] approved by Senate President Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455. All were disregarded by the petitioners.

On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained.

Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174340.

Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier; and the PCGGs nominees Andal and Jalandoni alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason; second, the inquiries conducted by respondent Senate Committees are not in aid of legislation; third, the inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure3[7]

On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior2[6]

Annex G of the Petition in G.R. Annex A of the Petition in G.R.

No. 174318. Annex F of the Petition in G.R.4[8]

No. 174318.

No. 174318.


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANGoverning Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; and fourth, respondent Senate Committees are not vested with the power of contempt. In their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents countered: first, the issues raised in the petitions involve political questions over which this Court has no jurisdiction; second, Section 4(b) has been repealed by the Constitution; third, respondent Senate Committees are vested with contempt power; fourth, Senates Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly published; fifth, respondents have not violated any civil right of the individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy; and (b) right against selfincrimination; and sixth, the inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into justiciable controversies.

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The Congress power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our shores through McGrain v. 5[15] Daugherty, cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.6[16] In those earlier days, American courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate.

In Arnault, the Supreme Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that the power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function, thus: Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it.

I S S U E:

Is Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution? Is its implementation wherein the petitioners are exempt from appearing in investigations involving their transactions violates Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution?

Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1, which limits the power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding provides:

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.

No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.

Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: Public office is a public trust. Public5[15]

273 U.S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71 L. No. L- 3820, 87 Phil. 29 (1950).

Ed. 580, 50 A.L.R. 1 (1927).6[16]


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANofficers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

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The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.7[24]

as valid and constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order, the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x. x x x

Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and nonaccountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea,8[25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as obiter the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:

It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.

Said provision of EO No. 1 violates Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution which mandates that Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Read together with Section 7, Article III and Sec. 20, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. PART V ARTICLE VI - THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding7[24]

De Leon, De Leon, Jr. The Law on

Public Officers and Election Law, p. 2. No. L-77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 558.8[25]

1. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANthe provision referendum. on initiative and

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a. Define legislative power - Basic concepts of the grant of legislative power: 1. it cannot pass irrepealable laws 2. principle of separation of powers 3. non-delegability of legislative powers - reason for principle that the legislature cannot pass irrepeablable laws - Separation of Powers Read: a. ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139 b. PLANAS VS. GIL, 67 Phil. 62 c. LUZON STEVEDORING VS. SSS, 34 SCRA 178 d. GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106 e. Bondoc vs. HRET, Sept. 26, 1991 f. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 b. Nature of legislative power

2) Sec. 28 (2) of Article VI. The Congress may by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government. - Other exceptions: traditional 3) Delegation to local governments The reason behind this delegation is because the local government is deemed to know better the needs of the people therein. a. X aa. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 39 Phil. 660 bb. PEOPLE VS. VERA, 65 Phil 56 A law delegating to the local government units the power to fund the salary of probation officers in their area is unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection of the laws. In areas where there is a probation officer because the local government unit appropriated an amount for his salaries, convicts may avail of probation while in places where no funds were set aside for probation officers, convicts therein could not apply for probation. d. Reason for the delegation 4) Delegation of Rule-making power to administrative bodies 5) Delegation to the People (Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution and Section 32, Article VI---The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the b. Read: See Section 5 of Article

c. What are the limitations to the grant of legislative powers to the legislature? d. Explain the doctrine of nondelegation power. e. Permissive delegation of legislative power. 1) Sec. 23 (2) of Article VI (Emergency powers to the President in case of war or other national emergency, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as Congress may provide, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by Resolution of Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANCongress of local legislative body after the registration of a petition thereof signed by at least 10% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof. f. Delegation of rule-making power to administrative bodies. 1) What is the completeness test? The sufficiency of standard test? Read: 1. PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569 During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress. Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3: All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof. Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least twothirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons.

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Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are based, provides: The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANexecutive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed. Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binagonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two municipalities. It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Although 1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

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Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President: ... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require. At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial pronouncements must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANwhich they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect. The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact. 2 TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108 (Most representative) 3. US VS. ANG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1 At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows: Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit: (a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn. August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold. August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho,

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charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows: The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows: That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence. The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919. The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the GovernorGeneral to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANmeasures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime. By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are vested in

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the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the GovernorGeneral to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void. The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANconformity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be issued. The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event. VIDEOGRAM 151 SCRA 208 4. REGULATORY TIO VS. BOARD,

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5. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, 108 SCRA 757 (Affecting National interest) 6. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ, December 18, 1989 Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof.

Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates. II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to respondents. Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasijudicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of due process. Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the


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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Atty. LARRY D. GACAYANfunction of the administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required, but where an order applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function involved is adjudicatory. Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the order in question need not be preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to respondent NTC's legislative function but because the assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing proceedings on petitioner's application for a certificate of public convenience;

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