Part 6 Trial Proper

7/28/2019 Part 6 Trial Proper

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M. COURSE OF TRIAL

1. TRIAL PROPER

RULE30

Trial

Section1.NoticeofTrial.Uponentryofacaseinthetrialcalendar,theclerkshallnotifythepartiesofthedateofitstrialinsuchmannerasshallensurehisreceiptofthatnoticeatleastfive

(5)daysbeforesuchdate.(2a,R22)

Section2.Adjournmentsandpostponements.Acourtmayadjournatrialfromdaytoday,

andtoanystatedtime,astheexpeditiousandconvenienttransactionofbusinessmayrequire,but

shallhavenopowertoadjournatrialforalongerperiodthanonemonthforeachadjournmentnormorethanthreemonthsinall,exceptwhenauthorizedinwritingbytheCourtAdministrator,

SupremeCourt.(3a,R22)

Section3.Requisitesofmotiontopostponetrialforabsenceofevidence.Amotionto

postponeatrialonthegroundofabsenceofevidencecanbegrantedonlyuponaffidavitshowingthematerialityorrelevancyofsuchevidence,andthatduediligencehasbeenusedtoprocureit.

Butiftheadversepartyadmitsthefactstobegiveninevidence,evenifheobjectsorreserves

therighttoobjecttotheiradmissibility,thetrialshallnotbepostponed.(4a,R22;BarMatterNo.

803,21July1998)

Section4.Requisitesofmotiontopostponetrialforillnessofpartyorcounsel.Amotiontopostponeatrialonthegroundofillnessofapartyorcounselmaybegrantedifitappearsupon

affidavitorsworncertificationthatthepresenceofsuchpartyorcounselatthetrialis

indispensableandthatthecharacterofhisillnessissuchastorenderhisnon-attendanceexcusable.(5a,R22)

Section5.Orderoftrial.Subjecttotheprovisionsofsection2ofRule31,andunlessthecourtforspecialreasonsotherwisedirects,thetrialshallbelimitedtotheissuesstatedinthepre-

trialorderandshallproceedasfollows:

(a)Theplaintiffshalladduceevidenceinsupportofhiscomplaint;

(b)Thedefendantshallthenadduceevidenceinsupportofhisdefense,counterclaim,

cross-claimandthird-partycomplaints;

(c)Thethird-partydefendantifany,shalladduceevidenceofhisdefense,counterclaim,

cross-claimandfourth-partycomplaint;


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(d)Thefourth-party,andsoforth,ifany,shalladduceevidenceofthematerialfactspleadedbythem;

(e)Thepartiesagainstwhomanycounterclaimorcross-claimhasbeenpleaded,shalladduceevidenceinsupportoftheirdefense,intheordertobeprescribedbythecourt;

(f)Thepartiesmaythenrespectivelyadducerebuttingevidenceonly,unlessthecourt,forgoodreasonsandinthefurtheranceofjustice,permitsthemtoadduceevidenceupon

theiroriginalcase;and

(g)Uponadmissionoftheevidence,thecaseshallbedeemedsubmittedfordecision,

unlessthecourtdirectsthepartiestoargueortosubmittheirrespectivememorandaoranyfurtherpleadings.

Ifseveraldefendantsorthird-partydefendants,andsoforth,havingseparatedefensesappearbydifferentcounsel,thecourtshalldeterminetherelativeorderofpresentationoftheirevidence.

(1a,R30)

Section6.Agreedstatementoffacts.Thepartiestoanyactionmayagree,inwriting,uponthe

factsinvolvedinthelitigation,andsubmitthecaseforjudgmentonthefactsagreedupon,

withouttheintroductionofevidence.

Ifthepartiesagreeonlyonsomeofthefactsinissue,thetrialshallbeheldastothedisputedfactsinsuchorderasthecourtshallprescribe.(2a,R30)

Section7.Statementofjudge.Duringthehearingortrialofacaseanystatementmadebythejudgewithreferencetothecase,ortoanyoftheparties,witnessesorcounsel,shallbemadeof

recordinthestenographicnotes.(3a,R30)

Section8.Suspensionofactions.Thesuspensionofactionsshallbegovernedbythe

provisionsoftheCivilCode.(n)

Section9.Judgetoreceiveevidence;delegationtoclerkofcourt.Thejudgeofthecourt

wherethecaseispendingshallpersonallyreceivetheevidencetobeadducedbytheparties.However,indefaultorexpartehearings,andinanycasewherethepartiesagreeinwriting,the

courtmaydelegatethereceptionofevidencetoitsclerkofcourtwhoisamemberofthebar.

Theclerkofcourtshallhavenopowertoruleonobjectionstoanyquestionortotheadmission

ofexhibits,whichobjectionsshallberesolvedbythecourtuponsubmissionofhisreportandthe

transcriptswithinten(10)daysfromterminationofthehearing.(n)

CIRCULAR NO. 39-98.

Full text of BAR MATTER NO. 803

CIRCULAR NO. 39-98


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TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL

COURTS, SHARI'AH DISTRICT COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL

COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS AND

SHARI'AH CIRCUIT COURTS.

SUBJECT: BAR MATTER NO. 803 - RE: CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS IN AND ADOPTION OF

AMENDMENTS TO THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

For the information and guidance of all concerned, quoted hereunder is the Resolution of the

Court En Banc dated July 21, 1998 in Re: Correction of clerical errors in and adoption of

amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"Bar Matter No. 803 - Re: Correction of clerical errors in and adoption of amendments to the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which were approved on April 8, 1997 effective July 1, 1997. - The

Court Resolved to CORRECT the following provisions in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: (a)

Section 3 of Rule 30; and (b) Section 5 of Rule 71, to read as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

RULE 30

SEC. 3. Requisites of motion to postpone trial for absence of evidence. - A motion to postpone a

trial on the ground of absence of evidence can be granted only upon affidavit showing the

materiality or relevancy of such evidence, and that due diligence has been used to procure it.

But if the adverse party admits the facts to be given in evidence, even if he objects or reserves

the right to object to their admissibility, the trial shall not be postponed. (4a, R22)

RULE 71

SEC. 5. Where charge to be filed. - Where the charge for indirect contempt has been committed

against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer

appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court. Where such contempt has been

committed against a lower court, the charge may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the


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place in which the lower court is sitting; but the proceedings may also be instituted in such

lower court subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such place in the same manner as

provided in Section 11 of this Rule. (4a)

The Court further Resolved to AMEND the following provisions in the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure: (a) Section 3 of Rule of Civil Procedure: (a) Section 3 Rule 46; and (b) Section 4 of

Rule 65, to read as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

RULE 46

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements.- The

petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and

respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved and the factual background of the

case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing

when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a

motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof

was received.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together wih proof of service thereof on the

respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner,

and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the

judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as

are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification

shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized representative, or

by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized

representative. The other requisite number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by

clearly legible, plain copies of all documents attached to the original.


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The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition, a sworn certification that he has not

theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the

Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such

other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter

learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court,the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he

undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within

five (5) days therefrom.

The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court

and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be

sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.(n)

RULE 65

SEC 4. Where and when petition to be filed. - The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60)

days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme

Court or, if it relates to the acts or omission of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officeror person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined

by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in

aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it

involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law

or the Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of

said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion isdenied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall

not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of

time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case

to exceed fifteen (15) days. (4a)


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The foregoing amendents to Section 3 of Rule 46 and Section 4 of Rule 65, after due publication

in two (2) newspapers of general circulation, shall take effect on September 1, 1998."

The amendments appeared on the July 26, 1998 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, PhilippineStar, Manila Standard and Manila Bulletin.

August 19, 1998.

CIRCULAR NO. 1-89.

CIRCULAR NO. 1-89

TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS,

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS,

SHARIA DISTRICT TRIAL COURTS AND SHARIA CIRCUIT COURTS, ALL MEMBERS OF THE

GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE

PHILIPPINES

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED BY DESIGNATED BRANCHES OF THE TRIAL COURTS IN

THE CONDUCT OF MANDATORY CONTINUOUS TRIAL.

A pilot project to test the efficacy of continuous trial was established under Administrative

Circular No. 4 dated September 22, 1988. Under Administrative Order No. 135 dated December

21, 1988, the Court designated the branches of trial courts that shall participate in the pilot

project for mandatory continuous trial.cralaw

The continuous trial system envisioned under Administrative Circular No. 4 is a mode of judicial

fact-finding and adjudication conducted with speed and dispatch so that trials are held on the

scheduled dates without needless postponement, the factual issues for trial, well defined at

pre-trial and the whole proceedings terminated and ready for judgment within ninety [90] days


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from the date of initial hearing, unless for meritorious reasons, an extension is permitted, as

hereinafter provided for.cralaw

The system requires that the Presiding Judge should (a) adhere faithfully to the session hoursprescribed by law; (b) maintain full control of the proceedings; and (c) efficiently allocate and

use time and court resources to avoid court delays.cralaw

Considering the provisions of Section 12, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, mandating the

adoption of a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases in the trial courts

and complementing further the Courts Resolution of April 7, 1988 implementing

Administrative Circular No. 1 of January 28, 1988, the Supreme Court, effective February 1,

1989, hereby establishes the following guidelines to be observed by designated branches of thetrial courts in the conduct of mandatory continuous trial under Administrative Order No.

135:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I. Pre-Trial

A. Civil Cases

[1] The parties shall submit at least three (3) days before the conference pre-trial briefs

containing the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) Brief statement of the parties respective claims and defenses;

(b) The number of witnesses to be presented;

(c) An abstract of the testimonies of witnesses to be presented by the parties, and the

approximate number of hours that will be required by them for the presentation of their

respective evidence;


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(d) Copies of all documents intended to be presented;

(e) Admissions;

(f) Applicable laws and jurisprudence;

(g) The parties respective statements of the issues; and

(h) The available trial dates of counsel for complete evidence presentation, which must be

within a period of three months from the first day of trial.

[2] At the pre-trial conference:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) The Judge, with all tact and patience, shall endeavor to persuade the parties to arrive at a

settlement of the dispute, or agree to stipulation of facts including the authenticity of

documents to be submitted during the trial.

(b) The Judge shall then define the factual issues arising from the pleadings and endeavor to

narrow them down to material issues.cralaw

(c) If only legal issues are presented, the Judge shall require the parties to submit their

respective memoranda on the issues and shall render judgment thereon.cralaw

(d) If a trial is to be conducted, the Judge shall fix the necessary trial dates to complete

presentation of evidence by both parties within 90 days from initial hearing.cralaw

[3] The pre-trial order shall include the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) A statement of the nature of the case;


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(b) The stipulations or admissions of the parties, including testimonial and documentary

evidence;

(c) The issues involved: [1] factual; and [2] legal;

(d) Number of witnesses;

(e) The dates of trial.cralaw

[4] This is without prejudice to a finding that either judgment on pleadings or summary

judgment is appropriate.

[5] Failure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the failure to appear at the

pre-trial.

B. Criminal Cases

[1] The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for purposes of

plea-bargaining, determination of civil liability or other matters requiring his presence.

[2] Where the accused and counsel agree to a pre-trial, the pre-trial shall proceed in accordance

with Rule 118.cralaw

[3] If the accused does not agree to a pre-trial, the Court shall fix the trial dates for the

presentation of evidence by the parties. The trial fiscal, the accused, and counsel shall affix theirsignatures in the minutes to signify their availability on the scheduled dates set for reception of

evidence.cralaw

II. TRIAL (Civil, Criminal)

[1] Not more than three (3) cases shall be scheduled for daily trial.


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[2] The Presiding Judge shall make arrangements with the Prosecutor and the CLAO Attorney so

that a relief Prosecutor and CLAO Attorney are always available in case the regular Prosecutor

and CLAO Attorney are absent.cralaw

[3] Likewise, contingency measures must be taken for any unexpected absence of a

stenographer and other support staff assisting in the trial.cralaw

[4] The issuance and service of subpoenas shall be done in accordance with Administrative

Circular No. 4 dated September 22, 1988.cralaw

[5] A strict policy on postponements shall be observed.cralaw

[6] The Judge shall conduct the trial with utmost dispatch, with judicious exercise of the Courts

power to control the trial to avoid delay.cralaw

[7] The trial shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from initial hearing. Appropriatedisciplinary sanctions may be imposed on the Judge and the lawyers for failure to comply with

this requirement due to causes attributable to them.cralaw

[8] Each party is bound to complete the presentation of his evidence within the trial dates

assigned to him. After the lapse of said dates, the party is deemed to have completed his

evidence presentation. However, upon verified motion based on serious reasons, the judge

may allow a party additional trial dates in the afternoon: Provided, That said extension will not

go beyond the three-month limit computed from the first trial date.cralaw

[9] Copies of all judgments rendered by the designated courts shall be furnished the Office of

the Court Administrator within five (5) days from rendition.cralaw

January 19, 1989.


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Regalado:Regalado:Regalado:Regalado:Does a motion to postpone a trial due to illness require a medical certificate?

A mere medical certificate is generally insufficient. It must be under oath, or in the form

of an affidavit.

When can a civil action or proceeding be suspended?Under Article 2030 of the Civil Code, every civil action or proceeding shall be

suspended:1. if willingness to discuss a possible compromise is expressed by one or both parties.2. if it appears that one of the parties, before the commencement of the action or proceeding,

offered to discuss a possible compromise but the other party refused the offer.The duration and terms of suspension of the civil action or proceeding and similar

matters shall be governed by such provisions of the ROC as the SC shall promulgate. Said ROC

shall likewise provide for the appointment and duties of amicable compounders.What are the requisites for delegation of reception of evidence to the clerk of court?

1. The delegation may be made only in defaultor ex parte hearings,or on agreement in writingbythe parties.2. The reception of evidence shall be made only by the clerk of courtwho is a member of the bar.3. Said clerk shall have no power to ruleon objections to any question or to the admission ofevidence or exhibits4. He shall submit his report and transcriptsof the proceedings, together with the objectionsto be resolved by the court, within ten days from the termination of the hearing.Bautista Notes:Bautista Notes:Bautista Notes:Bautista Notes:Whatare the grounds for

postponing a trialupon motion of the party?

1. absenceof evidence2. illnessof the party or counselIs impending deatha ground for postponing trial?

On a case to case basis.Can the court require the plaintiff to present witnesses first, on direct testimony, before

anyone of them is cross-examined?Yes. Because it is still within the rule that the plaintiff presents his evidence first in the

form of testimony.Can a judge in a civil case direct that a party present all the direct testimony of all his witnesses

in the form of affidavits subject to cross examination?It depends on the character of the proceeding. In case of summary proceedings,

testimony by affidavits and counter-affidavits are allowed. (Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of SummaryProcedure)

But in non-summary proceedings, it is not allowed.


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2. KINDS OF TRIAL

A. CONSOLIDATED/SEPARATE

RULE31

ConsolidationorSeverance

Section1.Consolidation.Whenactionsinvolvingacommonquestionoflaworfactarependingbeforethecourt,itmayorderajointhearingortrialofanyorallthemattersinissuein

theactions;itmayorderalltheactionsconsolidated,anditmaymakesuchordersconcerning

proceedingsthereinasmaytendtoavoidunnecessarycostsordelay.(1)

Section2.Separatetrials.Thecourt,infurtheranceofconvenienceortoavoidprejudice,mayorderaseparatetrialofanyclaim,cross-claim,counterclaim,orthird-partycomplaint,orof

anyseparateissueorofanynumberofclaims,cross-claims,counterclaims,third-party

complaintsorissues.(2a)

Regalado Notes:Regalado Notes:Regalado Notes:Regalado Notes:What is the rationale for consolidation or joint hearing?1. to avoid multiplicity of suits2. to guard against oppression or abuse3. to prevent delay4. to clear congested dockets

5. to simplify the work of the trial court6. to save unnecessary costs and expenses

In short, consolidation seeks to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to thelitigants. (Palanca v. Querubin, 29 Nov. 1969)Is consolidation limited to cases pending before the same court?

Generally, the rule on consolidation of cases applies only to cases pending before the

same judge, not to cases pending in different branches of the same court or in different courts.

(PAL v. Teodora, 97 Phil. 461)But Regalado is of the opinion that, whenever appropriate, and in the interest of justice,

consolidation of cases in different branches of the same court or in different courts can be

affected. Consolidation of cases on appeal andassigned to different divisions of the SC or CA isalso authorized, and generally the case which was appealed and bearing the higher docket numberhigher docket numberhigher docket numberhigher docket number

is consolidated with the case having the lower docket number. (But Regalado gives no legal basisfor this.)What are the ways of consolidating a case?1. by recasting the cases already instituted, conducting only one hearing and rendering only one

decision.2. by consolidating the existing cases and holding only one hearing and rendering only one

decision.


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3. by hearing only the principal case and suspending the hearing on the others until judgmenthasbeen rendered in the principal case. (Salazar v. CFILaguna, 64 Phil. 785)Can the SC order the consolidation of cases involving the same parties and same issues where

one was filed in RTC-QC and RTC-Cavite?Yes. On considerations of judicial economy

and for theconvenience of parties, the SC can

also order the consolidation of cases involving substantially the same parties and issues butwhich have been filed in different courts of equal jurisdiction. (Superlines Transco., v. Victor,30 Sept. 1983)Can the RTC QC order separation of trial of claims, where one of the claims involves propertyin Hong Kong?

Yes. The provision permitting separate trialspresupposes that the claims involved arewithin the jurisdiction of the court.When one of the claims is not within its jurisdiction, thesame should be dismissed, so that it may be filed in the proper court.

SECONDDIVISION

G.R.Nos.138701-02:October17,2006

SPOUSESROQUEYU,SR.andASUNCIONYUandLEYTELUMBERYARD&

HARDWARECO.,INC.,Petitioners,v.BASILIOG.MAGNOCONSTRUCTIONAND

DEVELOPMENTENTERPRISES,INC.andTHEESTATEOFBASILIOG.MAGNO,Respondents.

DECISION

GARCIA,SR.,J.:

InthispetitionforreviewunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt,thespousesRoqueYu,Sr.andAsuncionYu,withco-petitionerLeyteLumberYard&Hardware,Co.,Inc.,(LeyteLumber)

assailandseektosetasidetheconsolidatedDecision1datedOctober20,1998oftheCourtof

Appeals(CA)inCA-G.R.CVNos.43714and43715,asreiteratedinitsResolution2ofMay11,

1999,denyingthepetitioners'motionforreconsideration. CA-G.R.CVNo.43714isanappealbythespousesRoqueYu,Sr.andAsuncionYufromthedecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourt

(RTC)ofTaclobanCityinitsCivilCaseNo.5823,whileCA-G.R.CVNo.43715isanappealtakenbyLeyteLumberYardfromthedecisionofthesameRTCinitsCivilCaseNo.5822.

TheassailedCAdecisionholdspetitionerLeyteLumberliabletothehereinrespondentsinCivilCaseNo.5822fortheamountofP631,235.61withinterest,and,onthesamebreath,holdsthe


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respondentsliabletopetitionerspousesRoqueYu,Sr.andAsuncionYuinCivilCaseNo.5823intheamountofP625,000.00withinterest,andP50,000.00asandbywayofattorney'sfees.

Thefacts: cra:nad

ThespousesRoqueYu,Sr.andAsuncionYuarethecontrollingstockholdersofLeyteLumber,abusinessenterpriseengagedinthesaleoflumber,buildingandelectricalsuppliesandotherconstructionmaterials.Duringhislifetime,Engr.BasilioG.Magno(Magno)enteredintoa

verbalagreementwithLeyteLumberthroughRoqueYu,Sr.,wherebythelatteragreedtosupply

Magnowithbuildingmaterialshemayneedinhisconstructionbusiness.ThesuccessofMagno'sbusinessgavebirthtotheBasilioG.MagnoConstructionandDevelopmentEnterprises,Inc.

(BGMagno).

Owingtothisfruitfulrelationship,thetwo(RoqueYu,Sr.andMagno)enteredintoajoint

venture,theGreatPacificConstructionCompany(GREPAC),withYuasPresidentandMagno

asVicePresident.3cra

Magno,forwhatheobtainedfromLeyteLumber,paideitherincashorbycheck.TherelationshipbetweenYuandMagnobeganin1975andcontinueduntilMagno'sdeathonAugust

21,1978.4cra

BythetimethebusinessrelationshipbetweenYuandMagnowascomingtoanend,the

respondentsallegethatthepartieshavedealtwitheachothertotheamountofatleast

P7,068,000.00.5cra

OnJanuary30,1979,intheRTCofTaclobanCity,thepetitionersinstitutedtwo(2)separate

complaintsforsumsofmoneywithdamagesandpreliminaryattachmentagainstthe

Respondents.OnewasCivilCaseNo.5822,

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raffledtoBranch8ofthecourt,institutedbyLeyteLumberagainstBGMagnoandtheEstateofBasilioMagno,tocollectontheprincipalamount

ofP1,270,134.87forconstructionmaterialsclaimedtohavebeenobtainedoncreditbyBGMagno,andtheotherwasCivilCaseNo.5823,7raffledtoBranch6,filedbytheYuspouses

againstBGMagnoandtheEstateofBasilioMagno,tocollectuponloansandadvances

(P3,575,000.00)allegedlymadebythespousestoBGMagno.

AsdefendantsinCivilCaseNo.5823,therespondentsmovedtodismissthecaseontheground

thattheclaimsmustbepursuedagainsttheestateofthedeceasedMagno.Themotionwasdenied,andeventuallytheestateofMagnowasdroppedasparty-defendant.

Ontheotherhand,inCivilCaseNo.5822

,duringthepretrialconference,thepetitioners,asplaintiffsinthatcase,proposedthatacommissionerbeappointed.Therespondentsasdefendants

inthecaseinterposednoobjections,andsoAtty.RomuloTiuwasappointedandtaskedwiththedutytoexamineandmakeadetailedreportonthedocumentsandbooksofaccountoftheparties

todeterminethenatureandextentoftheirrespectiveclaimsandliabilities. 8Atty.Tiuwaslater

replacedbyMr.UldaricoQuintana,andfinallybyMr.ErnestoC.Silvano,whoisalawyerand

anaccountant9byprofession.


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Thecommissionerpreparedasummaryofaccountreceivables10andsubmittedthreereports:the

first,datedNovember1,1980;thesecond,datedFebruary19,1981;andthethird,datedMarch

29,1982.11Tothesereportsthepartiessubmittedtheirrespectivecommentsandobjections.

Duringtrial,thepetitionerspresentedin CivilCaseNo.5822beforeBranch8threewitnesses,

namely:petitionerRoqueYu,Sr.,himself,Atty.ErnestoC.Silvano(thecommissioner)andYaoPingChan,cashierofConsolidatedBankandTrustCo.,whotestifiedmerelyonthecircumstancessurroundingspecificchecksthatwereissuedduringthecourseofthetransactions

betweentheparties.Fortheirpart,therespondentsofferedtwowitnesses:thewidowPerpetua

MagnoandcommissionerSilvano.

AsregardsCivilCaseNo.5823beforeBranch6,thepetitionerspresentedthreewitnesses:

RoqueYu,Sr.,RoqueYu,Jr.,andseniorbookkeeperEduardodeVeyraoftheTaclobanBranchoftheUnitedCoconutPlantersBank.Fortheirpart,therespondentsdidnotpresentasingle

witness,butadoptedtheirevidencepresentedinCivilCaseNo.5822.Theydidnot,however,

makeaformalofferoftheirevidenceinbothcases.

OnJune17,1993,Branch8ofthecourtrendereditsdecision12inCivilCaseNo.5822,the

decretalportionofwhichreads:

WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavorofthedefendantandagainsttheplaintiff:

1.Dismissingthecomplaint;

2.DeclaringthatdefendanthadmadeoverpaymenttotheplaintiffinthesumofP620,239.61;

3.OrderingtheplaintifftoreturntothedefendanttheamountofP620,239.61withinterestof

12%perannumfromthedatehereofuntilfullypaid;

4.OrderingtheplaintifftopaydefendantthesumofP200,000.00forexemplarydamages;

5.OrderingtheplaintifftopaydefendantthesumofP50,000.00forattorney'sfeesandlitigation

expenses;and

6.Orderingplaintifftopaythecostsofthissuit.

SOORDERED.

Also,onthesamedate-June17,1993-Branch6rendereditsdecision

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inCivilCaseNo.5823,thefalloofwhichreads:

WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavorofthedefendantandagainsttheplaintiffs:

1.Dismissingtheplaintiffs'complaint;


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2.DeclaringthatdefendanthadmadeoverpaymentstotheplaintiffsinthesumofP1,602,625.52;

3.OrderingplaintiffstoreturntodefendantthesumofP1,602,625.52with12%interestperannumfromthedatehereofuntilfullypaid;

4.TheWritofAttachmentisherebyorderedimmediatelydissolved;

5.OrderingtheplaintiffstopaydefendantthesumofP200,000.00moralandexemplarydamages;

6.OrderingtheplaintiffstopaydefendantP100,000.00attorney'sfeesandlitigationexpenses;

7.Orderingplaintiffstopaythecostsofthissuit.

SOORDERED.

ThetwoseparatedecisionsofevendatewerepennedbyJudgeGetulioM.Francisco,the

presidingjudgeofBranch6towhichonlyCivilCaseNo.5823wasraffled.Inotherwords,JudgeFranciscoofBranch6renderedthedecisioninCivilCaseNo.5822earlierraffledtoand

heardbyBranch8ofwhichhewasnotthepresidingjudge.Thepartiesdidnotmovefora

reconsiderationofthetwodecisionsnordidtheycalltheattentionofJudgeFranciscoonthe

absenceofanorderforconsolidationofthetwocases.Instead,theydirectlyinterposedtheirrespectiveappealstotheCA.

IntheCA,thetwocasesonappeal,docketedasCA-G.R.CVNos.43714(forCivilCaseNo.

5823)and4371514(forCivilCaseNo.5822),wereconsolidated.

OnOctober20,1998,theCArendereditsquestionedconsolidateddecision 15dispositively

reading,thus:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,judgmentisherebyrenderedasfollows: cra:nad

InCivilCaseNo.5822,theappealeddecisionisMODIFIEDbydeclaringthatdefendantB.G.

MagnoConstructionandDevelopmentEnterprises,Inc.,madeanoverpaymentintheamountof

P631,235.61,insteadofP620,239.61asfoundbythecourtaquo,andorderingplaintifftoreturnsaidamounttodefendant,withinterestof12%perannumfrompromulgationhereofuntilfully

paid,andbyDELETINGtheawardofexemplarydamagesinthesumofP200,000.00infavor

ofdefendant.Thusmodified,thejudgmentbelowis AFFIRMEDinallotherrespects.

InCivilCaseNo.5823,theappealeddecisionisREVERSEDandSETASIDE.Accordingly,

defendantB.G.MagnoConstructionandDevelopmentEnterprises,Inc.isorderedtopayplaintiffsthesumofP625,000.00,with12%interestperannumfrompromulgationhereofuntil

fullypaid,andthefurthersumofP50,000.00bywayofattorney'sfees,pluscostsofsuit.

SOORDERED.


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17

WiththeirmotionforreconsiderationhavingbeendeniedbytheCAthroughitsResolutionofMay11,1999,thepetitionersarenowwiththisCourtviathepresentrecourse,submittingthe

followingargumentsforourconsideration:

A.Re:C.A.-G.R.CVNo.43714:(CivilCaseNo.5823)

1.THECOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDGRAVEERRORINREFUSINGTOEXCLUDEEVIDENCEOFFEREDTORTCBRANCH8,BUTNOTTOBRANCH6,OF

WHICHEVIDENCERTCBRANCH6IMPROPERLYTOOKJUDICIALNOTICE.

2.ASSUMINGFORTHESAKEOFARGUMENTTHATRTCBRANCH6COULDTAKE

JUDICIALNOTICEOFEVIDENCENOTOFFEREDTOIT,NONETHELESS,SUCHEVIDENCESHOWTHATRESPONDENTB.G.MAGNOISLIABLETOPETITIONERS

FORP3,675,000.00.

B.Re:C.A.-G.R.CVNo.43715:(CivilCaseNo.5822)

1.THECOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDGRAVEERRORINAFFIRMINGTHEDECISIONOFRTCBRANCH6BECAUSETHELATTERHADNOJURISDICTIONOVER

CIVILCASENO.5822WHICHWASTRIEDINITSENTIRETYBYRTCBRANCH8.

2.THECOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDGRAVEERRORINAFFIRMINGTHE

DECISIONOFRTCBRANCH6BECAUSEBASEDONEVIDENCEPRESENTEDTORTCBRANCH8,NOCOURTCOULDHAVEDECIDEDINFAVOROFRESPONDENTS.

Insum,thepetitionersquestion,first,theproprietyofthepresidingjudgeofBranch6renderingadecisioninacasefiledandheardinBranch8.TheyclaimthatBranch6hadnojurisdictionto

decideCivilCaseNo.5822pendinginBranch8intheabsenceofamotionororderofconsolidationofthetwocases; second,Branch6erredinconsideringtheevidencepresentedinBranch8;andthird,thepreponderanceofevidenceinbothcaseswarrantsaresolutionofthe

casesintheirfavor.

Therespondents,ontheotherhand,holdsteadfasttotheCA'sfindingofoverpaymentontheir

part,andthatBranch6hadjurisdictiontorenderadecisioninCivilCaseNo.5822ofBranch8

sincethecircumstancethatthejudgewhopennedthedecisioninbothcasesdidnotheartheothercaseinitsentiretyisnotacompellingreasontojettisonhisfindingsandconclusions. 16chanroblesvirtuallawlibary

OntheissueofBranch6takingjudicialnoticeoftheevidencepresentedinBranch8,the

respondentsarguethattherewasapreviousagreementofthepartieswithrespecttothesame.

OnthequestionoftheproprietyofJudgeFranciscoofBranch6formulatingthedecisioninCivil

CaseNo.5822whichwaspendingandtriedinBranch8,wedeclarethattherewasnothing

irregularintheproceduretaken.Therecordsshowthatthereappearstohavebeenaprevious

agreementtoeithertransferorconsolidatethetwocasesfordecisionbythepresidingjudgeofBranch6.AsfoundbytheCA:


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.althoughCivilCaseNo.5822wasraffledtoandtriedinBranch8.,thecourtaquoissuedjointordersdatedFebruary16,1993andSeptember10,1993inCivilCaseNos.5822and

5823.RecognizingtheapparenttransferofCivilCaseNo.5822tothecourtaquo,appellants'

[petitioners']counselfiledhisformalappearancedatedOctober20,1993

withBranch6.Thereisthereforenobasistoappellants'contentionthatthecourtaquoisdevoidofauthoritytodecideCivilCaseNo.5822.17cra

Indeed,whentherespondentsfiledaMotiontoLift,DissolveandQuashtheWritsofAttachment

withBranch6onJanuary20,1993,thecaptionthereofindicatedthedocketnumbersofbothcases.18Likewise,onOctober29,1993,whenthepetitioners'newcounselenteredhisFormal

Appearance,inthecaptionthereofwasalsowrittenthedocketnumbersof bothcases.19

Petitioners'previouscounseloflongstanding(whoserepresentationdatesbacktothefilingofthetwocomplaintsin1979)filedhisMotiontoWithdrawasCounselonOctober30,1993,andthe

captionthereofsimilarlyindicatedthedocketnumbersof bothcases.20Subsequentordersofthe

courtwhichemanatedfromBranch6alsobear,inthecaptionthereof,thetitlesanddocket

numbersofbothcases.

21

Inotherwords,asearlyassixmonthspriortothepromulgationofJudgeFrancisco'sdecisionsinthetwo(2)cases,thereappearstohavebeenatransferor

consolidationofsaidcasesinBranch6andthepartiesknewofit,albeittheactualdatewhenthe

twocaseswereconsolidatedortransferreddoesnotappearonrecord.Nonetheless,thefactremainsthatnooppositionorobjectioninanymannerwasregisteredbyeitherofthepartiesto

thesame,therebyevincingtheirconsentthereto.Itis,therefore,alreadytoolateinthedayfor

thepetitionerstoquestionthecompetenceofJudgeFranciscotorendertheseparatedecisionsinthetwocases.ToreechowhatthisCourthassaidbefore:

Petitionersmaynotnowquestionthetransferorconsolidationofthetwocasesonappeal,for

theyknewofitanddidnotquestionthesameinthecourtbelow.Theymaynotnowmakeatotal

turn-aroundandadoptacontrarystance;moresowhenthejudgmentissuedisadversetotheircause.22

Thenextlogicalquestionsare:Istheconsolidationofthetwocases(CivilCaseNos.5822and5823)aproceduralstepwhichthecourt aquocouldhaveproperlytaken?Isitaremedy

availablewithinthecontextofthesurroundingcircumstances? cralaw

Weanswerbothquestionsintheaffirmative.Thetwocaseswerefiledjustafewmonthsapart;23

theyinvolvesimplecasesofcollectionofsumsofmoneybetweenidenticalpartiesandnoother;

therespondents(asdefendantstherein)claim,inbothcases,essentiallythesamedefense,whichisoverpayment;theycoverthesameperiodoftransactingcontinuousbusinessthatspansfour

years;theyrelatetosimpleissuesoffactthatareintimatelyrelatedtoeachother;theyentailed

thepresentationofpracticallyidenticalevidenceandwitnesses;infact,abroadpartoftheevidenceandtestimoniesinonecasewastotallyadoptedorreproducedintheotherbyeitheror

bothparties.Andthetrialcourt,beingmulti-salacourts,itsBranches6and8possessed

jurisdictiontotryeitherorbothcasesontheirown.

Acourtmayorderseveralactionspendingbeforeittobetriedtogetherwheretheyarisefromthe

sameact,eventortransaction,involvethesameorlikeissues,anddependlargelyor


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substantiallyonthesameevidence,providedthatthecourthasjurisdictionoverthecasetobeconsolidatedandthatajointtrialwillnotgiveonepartyanundueadvantageorprejudicethe

substantialrightsofanyoftheparties(citing1CJS,1347).Consolidationofactionsisexpressly

authorizedunderSection1,Rule31oftheRulesofCourt:

"Section1.Consolidation.-Whenactionsinvolvingacommonquestionoflaworfactarependingbeforethecourt,itmayorderajointhearingortrialofanyorallthemattersinissueintheactions;itmayorderalltheactionsconsolidated;anditmaymakesuchordersconcerning

proceedingsthereinasmaytendtoavoidunnecessarycostsordelay."

Theobviouspurposeoftheaboveruleistoavoidmultiplicityofsuits,toguardagainst

oppressionandabuse,topreventdelays,toclearcongesteddockets,tosimplifytheworkofthe

trialcourt;inshorttheattainmentofjusticewiththeleastexpenseandvexationtothepartieslitigants(citing1CJS1342-1343).

Consolidationofactionsisaddressedtothesounddiscretionofthecourt,anditsactionin

consolidatingwillnotbedisturbedintheabsenceofmanifestabuseofdiscretion.Intheinstantcase,respondentjudgedidnotabusehisdiscretioninorderingthejointtrialofthetwocases.

Thereisnoshowingthatsuchjointtrialwouldprejudiceanysubstantialrightofpetitioner.Neitherdoesthelatterquestionthecourt'sjurisdictiontotryanddecidethetwocases. 24

Likewise,itbecameapparentthat,afterthecommissionerfiledhisreportsincourtandthepartiestheircommentsthereto,butbeforetrialcouldcommence,theclaimsanddefensesofthe

partiesinCivilCaseNo.5823arecoveredbyandmaybethreshedoutbyaconsiderationofthe

evidencepresentedinCivilCaseNo.5822aswell,whichconsistedmainlyofthereportsofthecommissioner.Basedonthecommissioner'sreportsinthecasependinginBranch8(CivilCase

No.5822),thepetitioners'claims,includingthoseinBranch6,appeartohavebeenpaid;indeed,

thisisinessencethedefenseoftherespondentsassetforthintheirAnswerstothetwocomplaints.Yet,despiteallthese,neitherofthelawyersforthepartiessoughtaconsolidationof

thetwocases,whichwouldotherwisehavebeenmandatory.

Whentwoormorecasesinvolvethesamepartiesandaffectcloselyrelatedsubjectmatters,they

mustbeconsolidatedandjointlytried,inordertoservethebestinterestsofthepartiesandto

settleexpeditiouslytheissuesinvolved.Consolidation,whenappropriate,alsocontributestothedecloggingofcourtdockets.

InasmuchasthebindingforceoftheDealershipAgreementwasputinquestion,itwouldbe

morepracticalandconvenienttosubmittotheIloilocourtalltheincidentsandtheir

consequences.TheissuesinbothcivilcasespertaintotherespectiveobligationsofthesamepartiesundertheDealershipAgreement.Thus,everytransactionaswellasliabilityarisingfrom

itmustberesolvedinthejudicialforumwhereitisputinissue.Theconsolidationofthetwocasesthenbecomesimperativetoacomplete,comprehensiveandconsistentdeterminationof

alltheserelatedissues.

Twocasesinvolvingthesamepartiesandaffectingcloselyrelatedsubjectmatters mustbe

orderedconsolidatedandjointlytriedincourt,wheretheearliercasewasfiled.The


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consolidationofcasesisproperwhentheyinvolvetheresolutionofcommonquestionsoflaworfacts.

Indeed,upontheconsolidationofthecases,theinterestsofbothpartiesinthetwocivilcaseswillbestbeservedandtheissuesinvolvedthereinexpeditiouslysettled.Afterall,thereisno

questionontheproprietyofthevenueintheIloilocase.

25

(Emphasissupplied)

Consolidationofcases,whenproper,resultsinthesimplificationofproceedings,whichsaves

time,theresourcesofthepartiesandthecourts,andapossiblemajorabbreviationoftrial.Itisa

desirableendtobeachieved,withinthecontextofthepresentstateofaffairswherecourtdocketsarefullandindividualandstatefinancesarelimited.Itcontributestotheswift

dispensationofjustice,andisinaccordwiththeaimofaffordingthepartiesajust,speedy,and

inexpensivedeterminationoftheircasesbeforethecourts.Anothercompellingargumentthatweighsheavilyinfavorofconsolidationistheavoidanceofthepossibilityofconflicting

decisionsbeingrenderedbythecourtsintwoormorecaseswhichwouldotherwiserequirea

singlejudgment.26cra

Infine,wedeclaretheconsolidationofthetwocasestohavebeenmadewithregularity.To

quotewhattheCourthassaidinanearliercase:

Theorderedconsolidationofcases,toourmind,crystallizesintorealitythethinkingofourpredecessorsthat:

"...Thewholepurposeandobjectofprocedureistomakethepowersofthecourtfullyandcompletelyavailableforjustice.Themostperfectprocedurethatcanbedevisedisthatwhich

givesopportunityforthemostcompleteandperfectexerciseofthepowersofthecourtwithin

thelimitationssetbynaturaljustice.Itisthatonewhich,inotherwords,givesthemostperfect

opportunityforthepowersofthecourttotransmutethemselvesintoconcreteactsofjusticebetweenthepartiesbeforeit.Thepurposeofsuchaprocedureisnottorestrictthejurisdictionof

thecourtoverthesubjectmatter,buttogiveiteffectivefacilityinrighteousaction.Itmaybesaidinpassingthatthemostsalientobjectionwhichcanbeurgedagainstproceduretodayisthat

itsorestrictstheexerciseofthecourt'spowersbytechnicalitiesthatpartofitsauthorityeffective

forjusticebetweenthepartiesismanytimesaninconsiderableportionofthewhole.Thepurpose

ofprocedureisnottothwartjustice.Itsproperaimistofacilitatetheapplicationofjusticetotherivalclaimsofcontendingparties.Itwascreatednottohinderanddelaybuttofacilitateand

promotetheadministrationofjustice.Itdoesnotconstitutethethingitselfwhichcourtsare

alwaysstrivingtosecuretolitigants.Itisdesignedasthemeansbestadaptedtoobtainthatthing.Inotherwords,itisameanstoanend.Itisthemeansbywhichthepowersofthecourtaremade

effectiveinjustjudgments.Whenitlosesthecharacteroftheoneandtakesonthatoftheother

theadministrationofjusticebecomesincompleteandunsatisfactoryandlaysitselfopentogravecriticism."27

HavinggiventheirassenttotheconsolidationofCivilCaseNos.5822and5823,petitioners'otherassignmentoferrorsmustfail.Theevidenceineachcaseeffectivelybecametheevidence

forboth,andthereceasedtoexistanyneedforthedecidingjudgetotakejudicialnoticeofthe

evidencepresentedineachcase.


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Ontheissuerelativetothepecuniaryliabilitiesofthepartiesinrespectoftheircorrespondingclaimsanddefenses,sufficeittostatethatthisCourtisnotatrieroffacts.Thefindingsoffactof

theCA,supportedastheyarebytheevidenceonrecord,bindthisCourt.

Prefatorily,werestatethetime-honoredprinciplethatinpetitionsforreviewunderRule45of

theRulesofCourt,onlyquestionsoflawmayberaised.Itisnotourfunctiontoanalyzeorweighalloveragainevidencealreadyconsideredintheproceedingsbelow,ourjurisdictionbeinglimitedtoreviewingonlyerrorsoflawthatmayhavebeencommittedbythelowercourt.

Theresolutionoffactualissuesisthefunctionoflowercourts,whosefindingsonthesematters

arereceivedwithrespect.Aquestionoflawwhichwemaypassuponmustnotinvolveanexaminationoftheprobativevalueoftheevidencepresentedbythelitigants. 28

Wedisagree,however,withtheCAinholdingthepetitionersliabletotherespondentsintheamountofP142,817.27representingtheunpaidaccountofGREPACforfillingmaterials

deliveredtoitbyBGMagno.Asitis,GREPACpossessesadistinctcorporatepersonality

separatefromLeyteLumberwhomBGMagnosoughttobeliabletherefor.GREPAC'sown

liabilitiesmaynotbemadechargeableagainstpetitionerLeyteLumberastheCAruledafterpiercingthecorporateveilofGREPAC.Toourmind,thesituationdoesnotcallforapiercingof

GREPAC'scorporateveilsincethereisnoclearandconvincingevidenceshowingfraudand

illegalityintheformationandoperationofGREPAC.Quitethecontrary,whathasbeenprovedsuggeststhatGREPACwasaproductoftheclosebusinessandpersonaltiesthatboundRoque

Yu,Sr.,andMagnoduringbettertimes.Itwasabonafidejointventurebetweenthetwo.

Wecannothelpbutdiscernhowtherespondentswereputtoexpensebythepetitioners'

mishandlingofthecasesinthetrialcourts.Firstofallisthepetitioners'filingoftwo(2)separateactionsofsimplecollectioncaseswhichwereultimatelyfoundtorevolveessentiallyaroundthe

samefactualmilieu.And,assoonasitbecameapparentthatthetwocaseswereinexorably

linked,itbecamethedutyofthepetitionerstoseekaconsolidationofthecasesaquo.Yettheydidnot;instead,theytookadvantageofeveryperceivedtechnicality,allthewaytothisCourt,in

ordertodefeattherespondents'case.Theyvigorouslyopposedtheadoptionbytherespondents

ofthelatter'sevidenceintheotherbranchofthecourt,therebyadvancingmisleadingarguments

forconsolidationthathadalreadyoccurredwiththeirvisibleconsent.Theyattributeerrortothetrialcourt's"takingjudicialnotice"oftherespondents'evidenceintheothercourt,whenitno

longerwasaproperargumentinviewoftheresultantconsolidation.Wedonotapproveofthe

practiceofcounselemployingsubtlety,advancinggratuitousargumentsthattendonlytomuddletheissues,andseizinguponeveryopportunitytowinthecaseforhisclient,wheninthefirst

placetheconfusionintheproceedingswasprecipitatedbyhisfailuretoactaccordingly,as

counselfortheplaintiffs,inseekingtheproperconsolidationofthetwocases.Theresultisasimplecollectioncasethathasremainedpendingfortwenty-sevenyearsnow.

Likewise,whatthepetitionersdidinfilingthetwocasesindifferentbranchesofthecourtmaybeheldtobetantamounttoforumshoppingwhichnotonlyputtherespondentstoadditional

unnecessaryexpense,butwastedtheprecioustimeofthecourtsaswell.

Forum-shoppingisadeplorablepracticeoflitigantsinresortingtotwodifferentforaforthe

purposeofobtainingthesamerelief,toincreasehisorherchancesofobtainingafavorable


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judgment.Whatispivotaltoconsiderindeterminingwhetherforumshoppingexistsornotisthevexationcausedtocourtsandtheparties-litigantsbyapersonwhoasksappellatecourtsand/or

administrativeentitiestoruleonthesamerelatedcausesand/ortograntthesameorsubstantially

thesamerelief,intheprocesscreatingthepossibilityofconflictingdecisionsbythedifferent

courtsorforauponthesameissues.29

Finally,weadmonishRTCBranches6and8forthemannerinwhichthecasebeforeeachsalawashandledandconducted.Wenotethelackofanorderofconsolidationintherecordsofthe

cases.AstoJudgeFrancisco'stwoseparatedecisions,wedonotperceiveanyadvantageor

benefitderivedfrompromulgatingtwoseparatedecisionsonthesamedayinthetwocasesthathavealreadybeenconsolidatedintoone.Althoughwerecognizenoillintentorattributeno

deliberateirregularitytothesame,suchdemeanorcanonlybreedsuspicionandpromotedistrust

forourjudicialinstitutions.Ajudgeshouldavoideverysituationwheretheproprietyofhis

conductwouldbeplacedinquestion.Hisofficialactsmustatalltimesbeabovereproach,30and

theymustbeconsistentwiththeproceedingstakeninhiscourt.

WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedMODIFYINGtheassailedCAdecisionbySETTINGASIDEandDELETINGtheawardoftherespondents'counterclaimintheamount

ofP142,817.27inCivilCaseNo.5822;REITERATINGtheP50,000.00awardofattorneys'

feesandlitigationexpensesinfavoroftherespondentsinCivilCaseNo.5822;andDELETINGtheawardofattorneys'feestothepetitionersinCivilCaseNo.5823.Inallotherrespects,the

assaileddecisionisAFFIRMED.

Costsagainstthepetitioners.

SOORDERED.

THIRDDIVISION

[G.R.No.175380:March22,2010]

GREGORIOESPINOZA,INHISOWNPERSONALCAPACITYANDASSURVIVING

SPOUSE,ANDJOANNEG.ESPINOZA,HEREINREPRESENTEDBYTHEIR

ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,BENSANGIL,PETITIONERS,VS.UNITEDOVERSEAS

BANKPHILS.(FORMERLYWESTMONTBANK),RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CORONA,J.:Thisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorari[1]oftheNovember9,2006decision [2]oftheCourtof

Appeals(CA)inCA-G.R.SPNo.62250.

OnMarch24,1996,FirematicPhilippineswasgrantedacreditlinebyrespondentUnited

OverseasBank(thenknownasWestmontBank).Assecurity,petitionersGregorioEspinozaand

thelateJojiGadorEspinoza(spousesEspinoza)executedathird-partymortgageinfavorof


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respondentoverfourparcelsofland,oneofwhichwascoveredbyTransferCertificateofTitle(TCT)No.197553oftheRegistryofDeedsofCaloocanCity.Throughitscreditline,Firematic

obtainedseveralloansfromrespondent,asevidencedbypromissorynotesandtrustreceipts.

DuetoFirematic'sfailuretopayitsloans,respondentfiledapetitionforextrajudicialforeclosure

inJuly1996withnotarypublicEduardoS.RodriguezinCaloocanCity.Aftercomplyingwiththelegalrequirements,thepropertycoveredbyTCTNo.197553wassoldatpublicauction.

Respondentwasawardedtheproperty,beingtheonlybidderintheamountofP200,000.[3]

ThecertificateofsalewasregisteredwiththeRegisterofDeedsofCaloocanCityonSeptember

25,1996.InJuly1998,anaffidavitofconsolidationofownershipoverthepropertywasalsoregisteredwiththesameoffice.OnJuly24,1998,ownershipwasconsolidatedinthenameof

respondentasevidencedbytheissuanceofTCTNo.C-328807.

OnMarch10,2000,respondentfiledan expartepetitionfortheissuanceofawritofpossession

whichwasdocketedasLRCCaseNo.C-4233intheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofCaloocan

City,Branch124.ThisactionwasopposedbypetitionerswhomovedfortheconsolidationoftheproceedingswithCivilCaseNo.C-17913pendingbeforeRTCBranch120ofthesamecity.

CivilCaseNo.C-17913wasanactionforthenullificationoftheextra-judicialforeclosure

proceedingsandcertificateofsaleofthepropertysubjectofthiscase.

InanorderdatedApril18,2000,RTCBranch124grantedpetitioners'motionforconsolidation

andorderedthatLRCCaseNo.C-4233beconsolidatedwithCivilCaseNo.C-17913,provided

thatthepresidingjudgeofRTCBranch120didnotobject.Respondent'smotionforreconsiderationwasdeniedinanorderdatedSeptember7,2000.

Respondentthenfiledapetitionforcertiorariandmandamus[4]intheCA,whichwasgranted.

TheordersofRTCBranch124datedApril18,2000andSeptember7,2000,respectively,were

reversedandsetaside.TheCAadheredtothelong-establisheddoctrinethatpurchasersina

foreclosuresaleareentitled,asamatterofright,toawritofpossessionandthatanyquestionregardingtheregularityandvalidityofthesaleistobedeterminedinaseparateproceeding.The

CAalsoheldthatsuchquestionsarenottoberaisedasajustificationforopposingtheissuance

ofthewritofpossession,sincesuchproceedingsare exparte.Hence,theCAdirectedtheissuanceofawritofpossessioninfavorofrespondent.

Aggrieved,petitionersfiledthispetition.

Thecoreissueforresolutioniswhetheracasefortheissuanceofawritofpossessionmaybe

consolidatedwiththeproceedingsforthenullificationofextra-judicialforeclosure.

Petitionerscontendthatpeculiarcircumstancesintheinstantcasemakeitanexceptionfromthe

generalruleontheministerialdutyofcourtstoissuewritsofpossession.Giventhattheissuance

ofawritofpossessioninthiscasemustbelitigated,consolidationwiththependingcaseonthenullificationofextra-judicialforeclosureismandatorybecausebothproceedingsinvolvethe

samepartiesandsubjectmatter.


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Respondent,ontheotherhand,insiststhattheconsolidationofthe expartepetitionfortheissuanceofawritofpossessionwiththecomplaintfornullificationofextra-judicialforeclosure

ofmortgageishighlyimproperandirregularbecausetherearenocommonquestionsoffactand

lawbetweenthetwocases.Respondentalsoarguesthatanyquestionregardingthevalidityof

themortgageorforeclosurecannotbeagroundforrefusingtheissuanceofthewritof

possessionandshould,instead,betakenupintheproceedingsforthenullificationoftheforeclosure.

Weruleforrespondent.

Theorderforawritofpossessionissuesasamatterofcourseuponthefilingofthepropermotionandtheapprovalofthecorrespondingbondiftheredemptionperiodhasnotyetlapsed. [5]

Iftheredemptionperiodhasexpired,thenthefilingofthebondisnolongernecessary.Anyand

allquestionsregardingtheregularityandvalidityofthesaleislefttobedeterminedinasubsequentproceedingandsuchquestionsmaynotberaisedasajustificationforopposingthe

issuanceofawritofpossession.[6]

InSantiagov.MerchantsRuralBankofTalavera,Inc., [7]wedefinedthenatureofapetitionfora

writofpossession:

Theproceedinginapetitionforawritofpossessionisexparteandsummaryinnature.Itisa

judicialproceedingbroughtforthebenefitofonepartyonlyandwithoutnoticebythecourtto

anypersonadverseofinterest.Itisaproceedingwhereinreliefisgrantedwithoutgivingthepersonagainstwhomthereliefissoughtanopportunitytobeheard.

Byitsverynature,anexpartepetitionforissuanceofawritofpossessionisanon-litigiousproceeding.[8]Itisajudicialproceedingfortheenforcementofone'srightofpossessionas

purchaserinaforeclosuresale.Itisnotanordinarysuitfiledincourt,bywhichonepartysues

anotherfortheenforcementofawrongorprotectionofaright,orthepreventionorredressofawrong.[9]

Ontheotherhand,byitsnature,apetitionfornullificationorannulmentofforeclosure

proceedingsconteststhepresumedrightofownershipofthebuyerinaforeclosuresaleandputsinissuesuchpresumedrightofownership.Thus,apartyschemingtodefeattherighttoawritof

possessionofabuyerinaforeclosuresalewhohadalreadyconsolidatedhisownershipoverthe

propertysubjectoftheforeclosuresalecansimplyresorttothesubterfugeoffilingapetitionfornullificationofforeclosureproceedingswithmotionforconsolidationofthepetitionforissuance

ofawritofpossession.Thiswecannotallowasitwillrendernugatorythepresumedrightof

ownership,aswellastherightofpossession,ofabuyerinaforeclosuresale,rightswhichare

supposedtobeimplementedinan expartepetitionforissuanceofawritofpossession.

Besides,themerefactthatthe"presumedrightofownershipiscontestedandmadethebasisofanotheraction"doesnotbyitselfmeanthattheproceedingsforissuanceofawritofpossession

willbecomegroundless.Thepresumedrightofownershipandtherightofpossessionshouldbe

respecteduntilandunlessanotherpartysuccessfullyrebutsthatpresumptioninanactionfornullificationoftheforeclosureproceedings.Assuch,andinconnectionwiththeissuanceofa

writofpossession,thegrantofacomplaintfornullificationofforeclosureproceedingsisa


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resolutorycondition,notasuspensivecondition.

Giventheforegoingdiscussion,itisclearthattheproceedingsfortheissuanceofawritof

possessionshouldnotbeconsolidatedwiththecaseforthedeclarationofnullityofaforeclosure

sale.Theglaringdifferenceinthenatureofthetwomilitatesagainsttheirconsolidation.

Thelong-standingruleisthatproceedingsfortheissuanceofawritofpossessionare exparte

andnon-litigiousinnature.[10]TheonlyexemptionfromthisruleisActiveWoodProductsCo.,

Inc.v.CourtofAppeals[11]wheretheconsolidationoftheproceedingsfortheissuanceofawrit

ofpossessionandnullificationofforeclosureproceedingswasallowedfollowingtheprovisions

onconsolidationintheRulesofCourt.However,thecircumstancesinthiscasearesubstantiallydistinctfromthatinActiveWood.Therefore,theexceptiongrantedinthatcasecannotbeapplied

here.

InActiveWood,thepetitionforwritofpossessionwasfiledbeforetheexpirationoftheone-year

redemptionperiod[12]while,inthiscase,thepetitionforwritofpossessionwasfiledafterthe

one-yearredemptionperiodhadlapsed.Moreover,in ActiveWood,titletothelitigatedpropertyhadnotbeenconsolidatedinthenameofthemortgagee.Therefore,inthatcase,themortgagee

didnotyethaveanabsoluterightovertheproperty.In DeVerav.Agloro,[13]weruled:

Thepossessionoflandbecomesan absoluterightofthepurchaserasconfirmedowner.The

purchasercandemandpossessionatanytimefollowingtheconsolidationofownershipinhis

nameandtheissuancetohimofanewtransfercertificateoftitle.Aftertheconsolidationoftitleinthebuyer'snameforfailureofthemortgagortoredeemtheproperty,thewritofpossession

becomesamatterofright.[14]

Inanothercaseinvolvingthesetwoparties, FernandezandUnitedOverseasBankPhils.v.

Espinoza,[15]weheld:

Upontheexpirationoftheredemptionperiod,therightofthepurchasertothepossessionofthe

foreclosedpropertybecomesabsolute.Thebasisofthisrighttopossessionisthepurchaser's

ownershipoftheproperty.[16]

Inthiscase,titletothelitigatedpropertyhadalreadybeenconsolidatedinthenameof

respondent,makingtheissuanceofawritofpossessionamatterofright.Consequently,theconsolidationofthepetitionfortheissuanceofawritofpossessionwiththeproceedingsfor

nullificationofforeclosurewouldbehighlyimproper.Otherwise,notonlywilltheverypurpose

ofconsolidation(whichistoavoidunnecessarydelay)bedefeatedbuttheproceduralmatterofconsolidationwillalsoadverselyaffectthesubstantiverightofpossessionasanincidentof

ownership.Finally,petitionsfortheissuanceofwritsofpossession,alandregistrationproceeding,donot

fallwithintheambitoftheRulesofCourt.[17]Thus,therulesonconsolidationshouldnotbe

applied.

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisherebyDENIED.Costsagainstpetitioners.


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B. TRIAL BY COMMISIONERS

RULE32

TrialbyCommissioner

Section1.Referencebyconsent.Bywrittenconsentofbothparties,thecourtmayorderany

oralloftheissuesinacasetobereferredtoacommissionertobeagreeduponbythepartiesor

tobeappointedbythecourt.AsusedintheseRules,theword"commissioner"includesa

referee,anauditorandanexaminer.(1a,R33)

Section2.Referenceorderedonmotion.Whenthepartiesdonotconsent,thecourtmay,upontheapplicationofeitherorofitsownmotion,directareferencetoacommissionerinthe

followingcases:

(a)Whenthetrialofanissueoffactrequirestheexaminationofalongaccountoneither

side,inwhichcasethecommissionermaybedirectedtohearandreportuponthewholeissueoranyspecificquestioninvolvedtherein;

(b)Whenthetakingofanaccountisnecessaryfortheinformationofthecourtbeforejudgment,orforcarryingajudgmentororderintoeffect.

(c)Whenaquestionoffact,otherthanuponthepleadings,arisesuponmotionorotherwise,inanystageofacase,orforcarryingajudgmentororderintoeffect.(2a,

R33)

Section3.Orderofreference;powersofthecommissioner.Whenareferenceismade,the

clerkshallforthwithfurnishthecommissionerwithacopyoftheorderofreference.Theordermayspecifyorlimitthepowersofthecommissioner,andmaydirecthimtoreportonlyuponparticularissues,ortodoorperformparticularacts,ortoreceiveandreportevidenceonlyand

mayfixthedateforbeginningandclosingthehearingsandforthefilingofhisreport.Subjecttootherspecificationsandlimitationsstatedintheorder,thecommissionerhasandshallexercisethepowertoregulatetheproceedingsineveryhearingbeforehimandtodoallactsandtakeall

measuresnecessaryorproperfortheefficientperformanceofhisdutiesundertheorder.Hemay

issuesubpoenasandsubpoenasducestecum,swearwitnesses,andunlessotherwiseprovidedintheorderofreference,hemayruleupontheadmissibilityofevidence.Thetrialorhearingbefore

himshallproceedinallrespectsasitwouldifheldbeforethecourt.(3a,R33)

Section4.Oathofcommissioner.Beforeenteringuponhisdutiesthecommissionershallbesworntoafaithfulandhonestperformancethereof.(14,R33)

Section5.Proceedingsbeforecommissioner.Uponreceiptoftheorderofreferenceand

unlessotherwiseprovidedtherein,thecommissionershallforthwithsetatimeandplaceforthefirstmeetingofthepartiesortheircounseltobeheldwithinten(10)daysafterthedateofthe

orderofreferenceandshallnotifythepartiesortheircounsel.(5a,R33)


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Section6.Failureofpartiestoappearbeforecommissioner.Ifapartyfailstoappearatthetimeandplaceappointed,thecommissionermayproceed exparteor,inhisdiscretion,adjourn

theproceedingstoafutureday,givingnoticetotheabsentpartyorhiscounselofthe

adjournment.(6a,R33)

Section7.Refusalofwitness.Therefusalofawitnesstoobeyasubpoenaissuedbythecommissionerortogiveevidencebeforehim,shallbedeemedacontemptofthecourtwhichappointedthecommissioner.(7aR33)

Section8.Commissionershallavoiddelays.Itisthedutyofthecommissionertoproceedwithallreasonablediligence.Eitherparty,onnoticetothepartiesandcommissioner,mayapply

tothecourtforanorderrequiringthecommissionertoexpeditetheproceedingsandtomakehis

report.(8a,R33)

Section9.Reportofcommissioner.Uponthecompletionofthetrialorhearingorproceeding

beforethecommissioner,heshallfilewiththecourthisreportinwritinguponthematters

submittedtohimbytheorderofreference.Whenhispowersarenotspecifiedorlimited,heshallsetforthhisfindingsoffactandconclusionsoflawinhisreport.Heshallattachtheretoall

exhibits,affidavits,depositions,papersandthetranscript,ifany,ofthetestimonialevidencepresentedbeforehim.(9a,R33)

Section10.Noticetopartiesofthefilingofreport.Uponthefilingofthereport,thepartiesshallbenotifiedbytheclerk,andtheyshallbeallowedten(10)dayswithinwhichtosignify

groundsofobjectionstothefindingsofthereport,iftheysodesire.Objectionstothereport

basedupongroundswhichwereavailabletothepartiesduringtheproceedingsbeforethecommissioner,otherthanobjectionstothefindingsandconclusionstherein,setforth,shallnot

beconsideredbythecourtunlesstheyweremadebeforethecommissioner.(10,R33)

Section11.Hearinguponreport.Upontheexpirationoftheperiodoften(10)daysreferred

tointheprecedingsection,thereportshallbesetforhearing,afterwhichthecourtshallissueanorderadopting,modifying,orrejectingthereportinwholeorinpart,orrecommittingitwith

instructions,orrequiringthepartiestopresentfurtherevidencebeforethecommissionerorthe

court.(11a,R33)

Section12.Stipulationsastofindings.Whenthepartiesstipulatethatacommissioner's

findingsoffactshallbefinal,onlyquestionsoflawshallthereafterbeconsidered.(12a,R33)

Section13.Compensationofcommissioner.Thecourtshallallowthecommissionersuch

reasonablecompensationasthecircumstancesofthecasewarrant,tobetaxedascostsagainstthedefeatedparty,orapportioned,asjusticerequires.(13,R33)

RULE67Expropriation

Section5.Ascertainmentofcompensation.Upontherenditionoftheorderofexpropriation,thecourtshallappointnotmorethanthree(3)competentanddisinterestedpersonsascommissionerstoascertainandreporttothecourtthejust


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compensationforthepropertysoughttobetaken.Theorderofappointmentshalldesignatethetimeandplaceofthefirstsessionofthehearingtobeheldbythecommissionersandspecifythetimewithinwhichtheirreportshallbesubmittedtothecourt.

Copiesoftheordershallbeservedontheparties.Objectionstotheappointmentofanyofthecommissionersshallbefiledwiththecourtwithinten(10)daysfromservice,andshallberesolvedwithinthirty(30)daysafterallthecommissionersshallhavereceivedcopiesoftheobjections.(5a)

R30.Section9.Judgetoreceiveevidence;delegationtoclerkofcourt.Thejudgeofthecourt

wherethecaseispendingshallpersonallyreceivetheevidencetobeadducedbytheparties.

However,indefaultorexpartehearings,andinanycasewherethepartiesagreeinwriting,thecourtmaydelegatethereceptionofevidencetoitsclerkofcourtwhoisamemberofthebar.

Theclerkofcourtshallhavenopowertoruleonobjectionstoanyquestionortotheadmission

ofexhibits,whichobjectionsshallberesolvedbythecourtuponsubmissionofhisreportandthe

transcriptswithinten(10)daysfromterminationofthehearing.(n)

Regalado NotesRegalado NotesRegalado NotesRegalado Notes

Can the commissioner rule on the admissibility of evidence?Yes. In the proceedings under this section, the commissioner may rule upon the

admissibility of evidence, UNLESS otherwise provided in the order of reference.

Note that the clerk of court under Sec. 9, Rule 30 does NOT have the same power and the

clerk of court shall just receive the evidence subject to the objections interposed thereto and

such questions or objections shall be resolved by the court after the clerk has submitted his

report in it.Are the commissioners allowed to do whatever acts in proceeding with the trial, despite the

limited scope of their proceedings?Yes. What Section 3, authorizes to be limited is the scope of the proceedings before the

commissioner, not the MODALITY thereof. The order of reference may direct the commissioner

to perform different acts in and for purposes of the proceedings. (Aljems Corp. v. CA, 28 Mar.2001)Considering that the commissioners are allowed to proceed in whatever mode they deem fit and

necessary, are they allowed to dispense with hearing?No. When the commissioner did not hold a hearing in violation of Section 3 of Rule 30, it

is error for the trial court to issue an order approving said commissioners report over the

objection of the aggrieved party. (Jaca v. Davao Lumber, 29 Mar. 1982)Whatever may be the case, the requirement for the commissioners to hold a hearing

cannot be dispensed with as this is the essence of due process. (Jaca v. Davao Lumber, 29 Mar.1982)

Bautista NotesBautista NotesBautista NotesBautista Notes


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If the right to trial with the assistance of assessors is demanded, is it a matter of right?Yes. Under Sec.1, Rule 32, the judge SHALL... meaning the judge has NO discretion.NOTE: Bautista: This is practically a dead provision but it is the kind of provisions which

they resurrect in the bar. But as per wording in the 1997 ROC, it is now MAY and not SHALL, so it is

now discretionary.

Can the commissioners write opinions to cases?Yes, but it is the judge who finally determines the ruling. The value of the commissioners

opinion is merely to advise the judge on questions of facts.When are commissioners appointed by the trial court?

By written consent of both parties, or if they disagree upon motion of any of the partiesor by the court motu propio.

EDGARDO J. ANGARA, G.R. NO. 156822

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, Chairman

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, and

CALLEJO, SR., JJ.

FEDMAN DEVELOPMENT Promulgated:

CORPORATION,

Respondent.October 18, 2004

Fedman filed a complaint against Angara for refusing to vacate a parcel of land which

supposedly belonged to Fedman. TC ordered the constitution of a committee of 3 surveyors.

After the survey, Angara filed a motion to render judgment based on the commissioners report.TC denied Angaras motion saying that commissioners did not conduct a joint survey of the land.


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TC is not bound by the findings of the commissioners or precluded from disregarding thesame and it may adopt, modify or reject the report. TC did not adopt the survey made by

commissioners because the survey of the land was done individually.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution,1 dated April 2,

2003, which denied his petition for review on certiorari for failure to sufficiently show that the

Court of Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error in its Decision,2 dated September 26,2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 69776, dismissing his petition for certiorari.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On February 8, 1996, respondent filed a complaint for Accion Reinvindicatoria and/or Quieting

of Title against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Nasugbu, Batangas (RTC),

docketed as Civil Case No. 360.3

In its complaint, respondent alleges as follows:

It is the registered owner of several adjoining lots located at Barangay Balaytigue, Nasugbu,

Batangas among which are three adjoining lots covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-

51824, T-51825, and T-51826 of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas with a total area of 67,500

square meters. Sometime in August 1995, respondent learned that petitioner fenced said

parcels of land without its knowledge and consent. On August 28, 1995, respondent informedpetitioner that the said lots the latter fenced are titled in its name. In deference to petitioners

position as Senator of the Philippines, respondent undertook a relocation survey of the said

properties. The relocation survey disclosed that the subject lots fenced and occupied by

petitioner are covered by the certificates of title of respondent. Despite demand made by

respondent, petitioner refused to vacate the property in question. Respondent prays that


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petitioner and all persons claiming title under him be ordered to vacate the premises in

question and surrender possession thereof to the former.

In his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims, petitioner avers that: he is the lawful owner offour contiguous and adjacent parcels of land situated in Barangay Balaytigue, Nasugbu,

Batangas covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23875, T-20526, T-25093 and T-25092;

the said parcels of land do not encroach on respondents property; and assuming that there is

such an encroachment, he nevertheless had acquired title thereto by virtue of acquisitive

prescription.

In the pre-trial held on January 26, 1999, the RTC opined that the primordial issue for resolution

is whether the property of petitioner is outside or inside of the property titled in the name ofrespondent.4

On March 4, 1999, at the instance of the parties, the RTC authorized the ground relocation

survey of the adjoining lots of the parties by geodetic engineers.

On December 9, 1999, the RTC ordered the constitution of committee of three surveyors

composed of Geodetic Engineer Esmael Bausas as representative of the petitioner, Geodetic

Engineer Filemon Munar, as representative of respondent, and Geodetic Engineer RodolfoMacalino of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region IV, as chairman of

the panel, mandated to conduct a relocation survey on the subject property.5

Sometime on February 2000, the members of the committee submitted their individual reports

on the relocation survey conducted. 6

On June 22, 2000, the RTC issued subpoena ad testificandum to the three Geodetic Engineerswho composed the Board of Commissioners to testify in connection with their individual

reports.7 The RTC also reminded respondent that the case was filed as early as February 8,

1996, the pre-trial was conducted on January 20, 1999 and since then respondent has not even

commenced presenting its evidence on the merits.


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On September 27, 2000, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the case due to the failure of the

respondent to prosecute its case for an unreasonable length of time. However, upon

respondents motion for reconsideration, the RTC reconsidered the order of dismissal.

On September 18, 2001, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion praying that judgment be

rendered on the basis of the commissioners report and, alternatively, all other persons who will

be adversely affected by the relocation survey be impleaded as parties.8

On November 13, 2001, RTC denied the said Omnibus Motion.9 The RTC held that according to

respondent there was no joint survey conducted by the commissioners as ordered by it and as

agreed upon by the parties, hence the report of the commissioners cannot be the basis of the

judgment. As regards the alternative prayer to implead the adjoining owners, the RTC ruled

that it cannot be assumed that the adjoining owners have common defenses; the adjoining

owners acquired their land from different sources hence they may have different defense;

joining them as party defendants will only complicate the issues and prolong adjudication of the

case.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC in its Order

dated January 14, 2002.10 The RTC held that the record is replete with explicit motions and

orders of the court calling for joint survey and there is a big mistake for the petitioner to say

that its orders were for the surveyor to merely coordinate in the survey to be done by them.

Anent the alternative prayer to implead adjoining owners, the RTC ruled that the

recommendation or observation by one witness or surveyor that the parties affected are all

indispensable parties cannot be taken into consideration since the report of the surveyor is not

in compliance with its order to make a joint survey, and therefore cannot be a basis for

concluding that there will be indispensable parties who will be affected. Besides, the RTC noted

that petitioner did not name any of the supposed indispensable parties to be included in the

case.

Ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction upon the RTC

in refusing to render judgment based on the commissioners report as well as its refusal to


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direct respondent to implead adjoining property owners, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari

before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69776.

On September 26, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and affirmed the assailedorders of the RTC.11 The CA declared that: the contention of petitioner regarding the conduct

of the relocation survey is belied by the records of the case which is replete with explicit

motions from the parties and orders from the RTC calling for a joint survey; and, the alleged

owners of the adjacent lands may not be considered as indispensable parties in the light of

Section 7 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.12

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said decision but the CA denied the same in a

Resolution dated January 14, 2003.13

Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court.14 He claims that the

CA erred in failing to declare that the orders of the RTC were rendered without or in excess of

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in

that: (a) there is no plausible and substantive explanation or justification for the RTC to

completely ignore the report(s) of the panel of commissioners and to act or render judgment

on the basis thereof; (b) the refusal of the RTC to alternatively direct respondent to implead the

surrounding property owners in the former Hacienda Balaytigue who are directly affected by

any judgment in the case as shown by the report(s) of the panel of commissioners contravenes

Section 7 of Rule 3 and Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court;15 and (c) it is fair, desirable,

practical, and in accord with the ends of law and the prompt administration of justice that the

issue of the incorrect or overlapping boundaries be determined by the proper government

agencies equipped with the technical expertise on the matter as suggested by respondents own

representative to the panel of commissioners.

In a Resolution16 dated April 2, 2003, the Court denied the petition for review on certiorari for

failure to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error. Hence, the present

Motion for Reconsideration.17

Petitioner posits that the case at bar can be resolved with dispatch if the Court will take a

second look at his petition. According to petitioner, this is a simple case of an alleged


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encroachment or overlapping of property boundaries. Considering that the issue involves

principally a factual and technical matter for which the RTC, at the instance of the parties,

created a Panel of Commissioners has done its job and the chairman submitted his report on

the basis of his evaluation of the separate surveys conducted by the members. The RTC,

however, simply ignored the report on the technical and lame excuse that the Panel ofCommissioners did not conduct a joint survey.

In its Comment to the motion for reconsideration,18 respondent points out that the

Commissioners Report was submitted as early as February 2000. After its submission, petitioner

did not ask that a decision be rendered based on said report. Various hearings were held. It was

only after respondent presented two witnesses who testified on the illegal encroachment of

petitioner that petitioner suddenly asked the RTC not to continue with the proceedings and

that judgment be rendered based on the Commissioners Report. Respondent also stresses thatno joint survey was conducted and that no joint report was submitted as required by the RTC.

Even assuming that the commissioners conducted a joint survey, it is clear from the joint

manifestation and motion of the parties submitted on April 3, 1997 that the results of the joint

survey are by no means final and binding upon them, but will only serve to guide the lower

court in resolving the issues of the case. The records of the case are even replete with motions

from the parties and orders for a joint survey report. It submits that the RTC is not a mere

rubber stamp of the commissioners, and that is only after the parties had completed the

presentation of their evidence that the RTC can intelligently decide the case, not before nor

based only on the Commissioners Report.

Respondent avers that petitioner should not be allowed to implead all the property owners in

Nasugbu, Batangas since the properties in this area have been the subject of requisite surveys

by the proper government agencies and that no questions have been raised respecting the

same up to the present.The properties of respondent and petitioner have a common tie line

and were based on the same BLLM 1 as determined by the Bureau of Land. Respondent states

that it is difficult to understand why petitioner would like to approach the survey based on

historical occupancy of the land, which is not only difficult to trace and too subjective but willultimately result in destroying the integrity of the torrens system. Respondent asserts that in

his answer, petitioner never alleged massive movement of the lands to justify inclusion of the

other parties. It is axiomatic that a defense not alleged in the answer is barred especially when

trial has already commenced and no evidence has been adduced in support thereof. In the

opinion of respondent, petitioner is muddling the issue.


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In his Reply,19 petitioner submits that the RTC cannot simply ignore the commissioners report

without considering its merits simply because the parties agreed that the same is not final and

binding. Petitioner asserts that respondent never impugned the integrity of the result of the

relocation survey. It never alleged fraud, mistake or inexcusable negligence in its conduct.

Petitioner argues that the RTC should have considered the merits of the report and acted on its

recommendation instead of rejecting it outright without any cause or reason.As to the

insistence of respondent that the RTC ordered a joint survey, petitioner submits that there is

nothing in the order of the RTC defining or specifying what a joint survey is.It has various

meanings. In this case, the commissioners acted together. They met, fixed and agreed on the

rules and set out to do their jobs to attain a common objective. Petitioner reiterates his

arguments in the petition that a joint survey, as understood by respondent, wherein the

commissioners literally go out together, conduct a survey in the presence of one another, and

prepare one report, could not have been contemplated by the RTC since the commissioners

nominated by the parties insisted on two different methods or approaches for the survey. The

commissioner nominated by respondent never objected to the conduct of the survey nor

interposed any objection to the result. Petitioner also claims that contrary to the

representation of respondent, petitioner timely filed an omnibus motion for the RTC to decide

or act on the survey report of the commissioners. It recounts the proceedings of the case,

pointing out that unfortunately, the present counsel of respondent was not the same one who

initially handled the case and as such, merely relied on the records of the case.

The motion for reconsideration was called for oral argument on October 15, 2003. Thereafter,

the Court declared the motion submitted for resolution20 and allowed the parties to submit

their respective memoranda.21

A battle of semantics is principally being waged before this Court.Petitioner argues that undue

emphasis was placed on the words joint relocation survey, which literally means one that is

conducted physically together or in the presence of one another. The order constituting the

panel of commissioners, however, does not define what a joint relocation survey entails nor

does it lay out the steps or procedures in conducting the same. Petitioner submits that the term

joint survey does not rule out a survey that is coordinated and linked together resulting in a

joint finding and recommendation. On the other hand, respondent subscribes to the

pronouncement of the RTC that the record is replete with explicit motion and orders of the

court calling for joint survey.


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Anent the refusal to direct respondent to implead the adjoining property owners, petitioner

claims that the RTC and the CA refused to acknowledge the observation of Engr. Macalino that

the approach adopted by respondent in conducting the survey will cause significant movement

in the position of petitioners property as well as other lot owners. On the other hand,

respondent posits that the RTC correctly denied the prayer to implead adjoining property

owners since petitioner did not identify who these persons are or whether they will be affected

by the outcome of the litigation.

It must be emphasizedthat the petition before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari under Rule 65is a remedy narrow in scope and

inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop.22It offers only a

limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its

jurisdiction.23 It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act

complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of

jurisdiction.24

Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though

within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer is not authorized, and invalid with

respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise

of the general power in respect of it are wanting.25 Without jurisdiction means lack or want of

legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in

general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority.26

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary

manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility,27 and it must be so patent or

gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty

enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.28 Not every error in proceeding, or every

erroneous conclusion of law or fact, is abuse of discretion.29

In this case, the assailed orders of the RTC are but resolutions on incidental matters which do

not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings.30 They are interlocutory


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orders since there leaves something else to be done by the RTC with respect to the merits of

the case.31

Ordinarily, the remedy against an interlocutory order is not to resort forthwith to certiorari, butto continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to

take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. However, where there are special

circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal, the special civil action of

certiorari may exceptionally be allowed.32 Special circumstances areabsolutely wanting in the

present case.

The wisdom or soundness of the RTCs orders involves a matter of judgment which is not

properly reviewable by petition for certiorari, which is intended to correct defects ofjurisdiction solely and not to correct errors of procedure or matters in the RTCs findings or

conclusions.Any error therein amounts only to an error of judgment. An error of judgment

committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as grave abuse

of discretion.33 Errors of judgment are correctible by appeal, while those of jurisdiction are

reviewable by certiorari.34

Furthermore, where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the orders or decisions

upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders or decisions within its jurisdiction andhowever erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari.35 Elsewise stated,

when the court has jurisdiction over the case, its questioned acts, even if its findings are not

correct, would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by the

extraordinary remedy of certiorari.36

Consequently, the Court is perplexed that,in resolving the petition before it, the Court of

Appeals chose to delve into the wisdom and soundness of the orders of the RTC, overlooking

the nature of the petition before it.The supervisory jurisdiction of the court to issue a certiorari

writ cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic

correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case.37 In the absence of a showing that

there is reason for the Court to annul the decision of the concerned tribunal or to substitute its

own ju

Part 6 Trial Proper

Documents

Transcript of Part 6 Trial Proper