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![Page 1: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict
When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated Cooperation to the Out-group in Intergroup Conflict
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Parochial Cooperation
The tendency to make self-costly contributions to one’s in-group
![Page 3: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Examples parochial cooperation
![Page 4: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Examples parochial cooperation
![Page 5: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Examples parochial cooperation
![Page 6: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Examples parochial cooperation
![Page 7: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Examples parochial cooperation
![Page 8: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
Parochial Cooperation
The tendency to make self-costly contributions to one’s in-group
Can be, but does not have to be, harmful to the other party
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Universal cooperation
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Universal cooperation
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Universal cooperation
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Universal cooperation
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Parochial cooperation is pervasive!
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Parochial cooperation is pervasive!
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Parochial cooperation
How can potentially negative parochial cooperation be shifted towards mutually beneficial universal cooperation?
What is the role of intergroup competition in the display of parochial cooperation?
What is the role of individuals’ predisposition towards cooperation?
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Cooperation and social value orientation
Svo: ‘General preference for distribution of outcomes between oneself and interdependent others’ To prefer good outcomes for oneself (pro-self) or for both oneself and
others (pro-social)
Pro-socials compared to pro-selves: Value equality, reciprocity, fairness, cooperation More willing to self-sacrifice for collective (in social dilemmas) More generous in negotiation settings Expect others to cooperate more
Pro-socials are cooperators!
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Pro-socials are cooperative!
But to whom? What is cooperation in an intergroupconflict?
Parochial? Universal?
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Pro-socials’ cooperation dilemma in intergroup conflict
Cooperation with own group may hurt other group Cooperation with other group may hurt own group (or be
perceived as disloyal)
Research found pro-socials to be parochial cooperators: Sacrifice themselves for their own group, sometimes at the expense of the other group (Aaldering et al., 2013; Abbink et al., 2012; De Dreu, 2010; De Dreu et al., 2010)
What about decades of research suggesting that pro-socials care about collective welfare? (Au & Kwon, 2004; Balliet et al., 2009; Bogaert et al., 2008; Van Lange et al., 2007)
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Possible solution?
Research showing pro-socials to be parochial and competitive did no include option for universal cooperation (Abbink et al., 2012; De Dreu, 2010)
Research showing pro-socials to be universal cooperation did not investigate an intergroup setting
We integrate these by investigating an cooperation in an intergroup setting where i) A mutually beneficial (universal) cooperation option is available ii) Competition is either present or absent
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Nested Social Dilemma
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Nested Social Dilemma
Three levels: Individual, group, collective
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Game Instructions NSD
10 euro endowment. Investment in ingroup pool (A):
Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by four (equally among team members) Thus: 1 in, 0.5 return.
Investment in collective pool (B): Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by eight (equally among
members of both teams) Thus: 1 in, 0.25 return.
Personal pool: Euros kept to self.
Competitive NSD (NSD IPD) Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by four (equally among
team members) Thus: 1 in, 0.5 return plus subtracts 1 from out-group (0.25 per out-group member).
![Page 23: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
Hypotheses
1 Individuals will display more parochial than universal cooperation2ab. Pro-socials will invest more in the in-group and in the collective than pro-selves (De Pauw et al., 2014; Polzer, 2004)
When there is competition between the groups…..3a. Parochialism will be fueled: Even more investments in in- group, especially by pro-socials 3b. Parochialism will shift to universal cooperation: Especially
pro-socials are reluctant to harm out-group when there is a mutually beneficial alternative available
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Method
98 classifiable undergraduate students 2 X 2 design (Svo: Pro-social or pro-self and Task: competitive
or normal NSD) Start with decomposed game measure to assess svo Decision task: Member of Team Triangle (four members)
Other group: Team Square Instructions for Game Comprehension check Play the Game Manipulation check
![Page 25: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Main effects
H1: Overall, more investmenst in in-group than in collective (= parochialism):
Msubgroup = 3.21, SD = 2.22 vs Mcollective = 2.03, SD = 2.42, F [1, 97] = 14.95, p < .001, η2 = .13
![Page 26: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
Main effects
H1: Overall, more investmenst in in-group than in collective (= parochialism):
Msubgroup = 3.21, SD = 2.22 vs Mcollective = 2.03, SD = 2.42, F [1, 97] = 14.95, p < .001, η2 = .13
H2a: No effect svo on investments in-group F (1, 97) < 1, ns
H2b: Pro-socials invest more in collective than pro-selves Mpro-social = 2.99, SD = 2.79, Mpro-self = 0.92, SD = 1.19, F [1, 97] = 21.50, p < .001, η2 =.18
![Page 27: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
Main effects
H1: Overall, more investmenst in in-group than in collective (= parochialism):
Msubgroup = 3.21, SD = 2.22 vs Mcollective = 2.03, SD = 2.42, F [1, 97] = 14.95, p < .001, η2 = .13
H2a: No effect svo on investments in-group F (1, 97) < 1, ns
H2b: Pro-socials invest more in collective than pro-selves Mpro-social = 2.99, SD = 2.79, Mpro-self = 0.92, SD = 1.19, F [1, 97] = 21.50, p < .001, η2 =.18
![Page 28: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
Results
In-group Pool
Pro-social:F [1, 97] = 11.26, p = .001, η2 = .10
Pro-social Pro-self0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
NSD
NSD IPD
![Page 29: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Results
In-group Pool Collective Pool
Pro-social: Pro-social: F [1, 97] = 11.26, p = .001, η2 = .10 F [1, 97] = 8.910, p = .004, η2 = .08
Pro-social Pro-self0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
NSD
NSD IPD
Pro-social Pro-self0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
NSD
NSD IPD
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Hypotheses
When there is competition between the groups…
3a. Parochialism will be fueled: Even more investments in in- group by pro-socials
3b. Parochialism will shift to collective cooperation: Pro-socials reluctant to harm out-group
when there is an alternative available
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Conclusion
Humans are parochial cooperators (more than universal) Pro-socials are parochial, but
They shift to universal cooperation under competition! They do not want to harm the other group if there is another
option to benefit the own group (collective benefit)
Intergroup competition is not necessary for parochial cooperation!
![Page 32: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Study 2: Depletion
Hampers self-control
Universal cooperation should decrease if it is a calculated strategy Due to not being able to compute maximizing parochial outcomes Due to harm aversion
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Study 2
Replicate study 1
If pro-socials are parochialists reluctant to harm out-group rather than intuitive universal cooperators:
Hypothesis 4: Collective investments in NSD IPD should decrease under cognitive load (compared to no cognitive load)
![Page 34: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
Method 174 classifiable undergraduate students 2 X 2 x 2design (Svo: Pro-social or pro-self, Task: competitive
or normal NSD, ego depletion: High or low) Start with decomposed game measure to assess svo Decision task: Member of Team Triangle (four members)
Other group: Team Square Instructions for Game Comprehension check Ego depletion manipulation Play the Game Manipulation check
![Page 35: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
Ego depletion manipulation
Stroop task: Indicate the colour of the word:
Depletion: BLUE
No depletion: RED
Procedure otherwise exactly equal to Study 1
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Main effects (replication)
H1: Overall, more investments in in-group than in collective (= parochialism):
Msubgroup = 3.02, SD = 2.25 vs Mcollective = 1.94, SD = 2.46, F [1, 166] = 14.95, p < .001, η2 = .08
![Page 37: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
Main effects (replication)
H1: Overall, more investments in in-group than in collective (= parochialism):
Msubgroup = 3.02, SD = 2.25 vs Mcollective = 1.94, SD = 2.46, F [1, 166] = 14.95, p < .001, η2 = .08
Pro-socials invest more in in-group than pro-selves F [1, 166] = 24.18, p = .237, η2 = .008
Pro-socials invest more in collective than pro-selves Mpro-social = 3.56, SD = 2.26, Mpro-self = 2.73, SD = 2.17, F [1, 166] = 4.92, p = .028, η2 = .029
![Page 38: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
Main effects (replication)
H1: Overall, more investments in in-group than in collective (= parochialism):
Msubgroup = 3.02, SD = 2.25 vs Mcollective = 1.94, SD = 2.46, F [1, 166] = 14.95, p < .001, η2 = .08
H2a: Pro-socials invest more in in-group than pro-selves F [1, 166] = 24.18, p = .237, η2 = .008
H2b: Pro-socials invest more in collective than pro-selves Mpro-social = 3.56, SD = 2.26, Mpro-self = 2.73, SD = 2.17, F [1, 166] = 4.92, p = .028, η2 = .029
![Page 39: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
For pro-socials (Replication)
Pro-social Pro-self0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
NSD
NSD IPD
Pro-social Pro-self0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
NSD
NSD IPD
IngroupCollective
F [1, 166] = 9.61, p = .002, η2 = .055 F [1, 166] = 3.98, p = .048, η2 = .023
![Page 40: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
Including ego depletion
Collective Ingroup
Only without depletion did No effect depletion on invest-pro-socials invest more in the ments in-group
collective after NSD IPD
Pro-socials no depletion
Pro-socials depletion
Pro-selves no depletion
Pro-selves depletion
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
NSD
NSDIPD
F [1, 166] = 3.85, p = .051
Pro-socials no depletion
Pro-socials depletion
Pro-selves no depletion
Pro-selves depletion
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
NSD
NSDIPD
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However….
Self
Under depletion, pro-socials keep more to self after NSD IPD
Pro-
socia
ls no
depl
etion
Pro-
socia
ls de
pleti
on
Pro-
selv
es no
depl
etion
Pro-
selv
es de
pleti
on0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NSD
NSDIPD
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Results
When there is competition between the groups… H3. Parochialism will shift to collective cooperation: Pro- socials reluctant to harm out-group when there is an alternative
H4: Universal cooperation decreases under cognitive load: Not intuitive
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Conclusion
Pro-socials are parochial, but not at all costs! When this self-sacrificing may hurt the other group and there is
an option to benefit both groups, pro-socials become universally cooperative (invest in the collective)
This is a calculated tendency: When their cognitive resources are depleted, pro-socials refrain
from collective cooperation and instead become more pro-self (NOT more parochial! Their inequality aversion and reluctance to harm the other group seems to be a primary mechanism)
![Page 44: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/44.jpg)
But….
In NSD, maximal profit is equal on in-group and collective level
In NSD IPD, maximal profit is highest on collective level
Maybe, pro-socials are social welfare maximizers and choose the option that maximizes outcomes for both parties in general Which in the NSD could also be in-group investments; equal gain and smaller
risk
Pro-socials: Parochial or social welfare maximizers?
![Page 45: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/45.jpg)
Experiment 3
Include outgroup hate pool IPDC: IPD MD plus collective option IPDC+: IPDC with maximal collective outcomes higher than
ingroup outcomes If pro-socials are social welfare maximizers, they should invest
more in the collective pool after playing this game compared to the IPDC
If pro-socials are parochial, they should not be affected by the increase in possible collective outcomes
![Page 46: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/46.jpg)
Game Instructions IPDC
10 euro endowment. Investment in ingroup pool (A):
Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by four (equally among team members) Thus: 1 in, 0.5 return.
Investment in in-group love/ out-group hate pool (B) Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by four (equally among
team members) Thus: 1 in, 0.5 return plus subtracts 1 from out-group (0.25 per out-group member).
Investment in collective pool (C): Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by eight (equally among
members of both teams) Thus: 1 in, 0.25 return.
Personal pool: (D) Euros kept to self.
![Page 47: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/47.jpg)
Game Instructions IPDC+
10 euro endowment. Investment in ingroup pool (A):
Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by four (equally among team members) Thus: 1 in, 0.5 return.
Investment in in-group love/ out-group hate pool (B) Each invested euro multiplied by two and then divided by four (equally among
team members) Thus: 1 in, 0.5 return plus subtracts 1 from out-group (0.25 per out-group member).
Investment in collective pool (C): Each invested euro multiplied by 3.2 and then divided by eight (equally among
members of both teams) Thus: 1 in, 0.40 return.
Personal pool: Euros kept to self.
![Page 48: Parochial and Universal Cooperation in Intergroup Conflict When Parochialism Hurts Out-group Competitors, Pro-social Individuals Extend Their Calculated.](https://reader036.fdocuments.us/reader036/viewer/2022062803/56649f285503460f94c400ac/html5/thumbnails/48.jpg)
Method 170 undergraduate students 2 X 2 x 2design (Svo: Pro-social or pro-self, Task: NSD or
NSDC, ego depletion: High or low) Start with svo slider measure Decision task: Member of Team Circle (four members)
Other group: Team Square Instructions for Game Comprehension check Ego depletion manipulation Play the Game Manipulation check
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Main effects (replication)
H1: Overall, more investments in in-group (Pool A) than in collective (= parochialism):
Msubgroup = 3.02, SD = 2.25 vs Mcollective = 1.94, SD = 2.46, F [1, 166] = 7.25, p = .008, η2 = .08
Even stronger when investments ingroup include outgroup hate (combination of Pool A and B):
Msubgroup = 3.02, SD = 2.25 vs Mcollective = 1.94, SD = 2.46, F [1, 161] = 57.29, p < .001, η2 = .04
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Main effects (replication)
H2A Pro-socials invest more in in-group than pro-selves F [1, 161] = 5.38, p = .022, η2 = .032
H2B Pro-socials invest more in collective than pro-selves F [1, 161] = 8.57, p = .004, η2 = .05
No effect svo on outgroup hate (F [1,161] = 1.74, p = .19)
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Interactions
No interaction Svo * Game on investments in-group (F (1, 161) = .128) or collective (F (1,161) = .72.
No interaction Svo* Game * depletion on investments in-group (F (1, 161) = .002) or collective (F (1, 161) = .290).
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Conclusion
Pro-socials do not invest differently in the in-group depending on game structure and/or mental depletion
Pro-socials’ parochialism is real rather than a way to maximize social welfare
Role mental depletion unclear Increases cooperation in general? (Rand et al., 2012) Or
specifically parochial? (De Dreu et al., 2015) Decreases calculated cooperation? (Exp 2)
No reliable effects?
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Discussion
Parochialism is default cooperation strategy but can harm intergroup relations
Intergroup competition decreases occurrence of parochial cooperation- especially among pro-socials
Inconsistency about nature of pro-socials seems (partially) solved: Depends on accessibility of collectively beneficial option and on presence of competition
Social welfare maximization does not explain pro-socials pro-sociality