Jennie Park

Capstone

Professor McNerney

St. Edward’s University

Fall 2014

Pot, ganja, weed, grass, hemp, cannabis, hash, marijuana-- they’re all names for the

same plant. Recently, this plant has been the center of media attention. This is due to the state

of Colorado’s recent passage of Amendment 64, an amendment calling for the legalization,

and subsequent regulation, of marijuana for recreational use for those 21 and older. Colorado

is creating a media buzz not only because it’s the first state to make marijuana legal for

recreational use, but also because the federal government still staunchly maintains that

marijuana is an illegal drug (Mikos 1453). However, the conflict between state governments

and the federal government is only one facet of the legalization argument.

The legalization of marijuana is also widely debated as its economic repercussions

are far-reaching. The majority of prisoners in jail for drug-related crimes are doing time for

marijuana (Barna Census). Additionally, the cost of keeping one of these inmates in jail for a

year is roughly $30,000 in taxpayer dollars (Santora). To add to the urgency of the marijuana

debate is the steadily rising number of drug offenders occupying prisons. In 1960, 1 in 25

prisoners was in prison for a drug-related crime. Today, half of all prisoners are in prison for

a drug-related crime, with the majority of drug-related crimes pertaining to marijuana

(Federal Bureau of Prisons). The increase in both prisoners and dollars spent on maintaining

prisons underlies a social problem that is rooted in the legal status of marijuana. All of these

problems stem from the issue of legalization itself. So, should the US government federally

legalize marijuana?

Most proponents of legalization argue that by legalizing marijuana, regulating it, and

taxing it, state governments can remedy overcrowding in prisons as well as save taxpayers

money by effectively reducing the amount of prisoners overall. Advocacy groups such as the

Marijuana Majority support the aforementioned claims. Their website features specific

stakeholders such as Morgan Freeman, Bill Gates and the California Democratic Party. While

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much support for the advocacy of legalization leans to left on the political spectrum, it is

important to note that while political affiliation may influence a person’s view on the

legalization debate, there is no overarching correlation. In fact, a prominent stakeholder listed

on the Marijuana Majority’s homepage is Texas’ Rick Perry, a notoriously conservative

politician. Other stakeholder groups in favor of legalization include The National

Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) and Marijuana Policy Project

(MPP). Both NORML and MPP make similar claims and exist to incite change in legislation.

What all of these groups value most is justice-- a value that advocates of legalization believe

is being violated by the rising number of marijuana-related arrests as well as the increasing

amount of money American citizens must pay to keep these drug offenders in prison.

While justice is a value held dear by most Americans, so is health. On the other side

of the debate are stakeholder groups such as SAM (Smart Approaches to Marijuana), CALM

(Citizens Against Legalizing Marijuana) and Grass is not Greener. All of these groups make

claims arguing that marijuana imposes serious health threats, especially to youth. These

stakeholder groups rely on data from studies that reveal the ill effects of marijuana on the

respiratory system and the brain (CALM). Concerns from opponents of legalization stem

from statistics claiming that, “290,563 emergency department visits involved marijuana, the

second leading drug cause, surpassing heroin, for an ER visit” (CALM).

Both sides of the legalization debate are underlied by values that bear equal

importance in American society. This being said, should the US government legalize

marijuana? Before attempting to answer this question, it is important to first understand the

associated terminology as well as the historical context of marijuana in American society.

Although many might be familiar with the term legalization, this word takes on a

specific meaning in the context of this debate. While marijuana is currently legal in Colorado,

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it is important to note that it is not legal under federal law. This is due to the nature of state

and federal power. Legally, this power-relationship is referred to as the state of nature

benchmark. The state of nature benchmark says that as long as states do not actively assist

marijuana users and growers, they can turn a blind eye when citizens defy federal law (Mikos

1454). The state of nature benchmark is the sole reason why Colorado is able to make a

Schedule I drug (the most prohibited class of all drugs) legal within its borders even though it

is not legal federally. However, for the sake of this argument, the definition of legalization

this paper is most concerned with is federal legalization, meaning that marijuana should be

legalized nationally, by the federal government.

Another term that is frequently used when talking about the legality of marijuana is

decriminalization. Decriminalization is defined as “the repeal or amendment of statutes

which made certain criminal acts criminal, so that those acts are no longer subject to

prosecution.” This means that if marijuana is decriminalized in a given state, or if one is

charged with possessing or using marijuana, the given person will not suffer federal

penalties, rather, whatever penalties (if any) are dictated by the state.

Now that some key terms have been defined in the scope of marijuana legalization,

the history of marijuana usage in America will be examined in full as its role in American

history may help to illuminate significant cultural shifts in America that will deepen an

understanding of various stakeholders’ arguments.

Hemp, the plant from which marijuana is derived, first arrived in America during

colonial times when England’s only colony began to harvest hemp (Frontline: Busted).

However, it is important to note that while hemp and marijuana are often used

interchangeably, they aren’t the same thing nor do they produce the same effects.

Additionally, the historical etymology of the word marijuana as well as its various

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nicknames is particularly important in understanding the role of the media in affecting public

perception throughout American history. By chronicling the favored colloquial term for

marijuana in a given time period, it becomes easier for one to discern the general societal

views of marijuana during that time. As prevalent as the usage of the word marijuana is

today, prior to the 20th century marijuana was never referred to as marijuana. Instead,

scientists and apothecaries used its scientific name, cannabis. Why and how marijuana came

to be the most widely used term for the plant is a fascinating historical tale worthy of further

inspection. However, this paper will revisit the etymological importance of marijuana much

later, as the story can only be told and understood in its entirety with a historical context for

the plant.  

The plant has its origins in early colonial America for its economic utility. Colonists

used hemp for a variety of things, such as making clothes, paper, and rope, among other

things. However, the hemp used during early America likely lacked significant psychotropic

properties. Hemp is merely the stalk of the marijuana plant, which consists mainly of

threadlike fibers (Gray 21). There are myriad strains of hemp, but the ones used during this

time likely had low levels of THC, tetrahydrocannabinol, the constituent of the plant that

creates a high in the user. The low levels of THC found in hemp during the colonial period is

correlated with the durability of the hemp fiber (Gray 22). Hemp was so popular during this

time period that George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and the most active grower,

Benjamin Franklin, all cultivated large amounts of hemp for its various uses. Hemp

parchment was even used for several drafts of the Declaration of Independence.

However, it was not until the early 19th century that the medicinal properties of

marijuana were appreciated. In Europe, significant studies surfaced revealing the perceived

success of marijuana as a way to treat whooping cough and mental illnesses (O’Shaughnessy

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7). As French and English colonial outposts took interest in the plant, eventually, so did

America.

Many regard the 19th century as a type of Golden Age for hemp as during this time

marijuana use was both widespread and lucrative. As big pharmaceutical companies began to

pop up in America, pharmaceutical cannabis was ubiquitous (Russo 43). Americans used

pharmaceutical cannabis to treat everything from menstrual cramps to asthma (Frontline:

Busted).

In 1894, an important study was released: The Indian Hemp Drugs Commission

Report was an English survey that revealed the burgeoning trade and business of cannabis as

a recreational drug, which is not to be confused with cannabis the pharmaceutical drug.

Where pharmaceutical use concerns the use of cannabis to alleviate pain or to treat an illness,

recreational use is defined as the use of a drug solely for pleasure. Today, recreational and

medicinal use of marijuana is deemed illegal by the federal government. However, in 1894,

even after the study caused much contention, a committee eventually decided that because

the use of marijuana, it did not seem necessary to forbid the growing, production or sale of

hemp drugs (Russo 43).

Until 1906, no laws existed that explicitly forbade the usage of marijuana. However,

in 1906, this changed with the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act. The act was instigated

by a time of heavy narcotics addiction, an unintended consequence of the Civil War. During

the Civil War, many soldiers were treated with morphine and opium to diminish pain. Due to

a lack of education and scientific research, users and physicians alike were not yet aware of

the highly addictive nature of these pain-relievers. As a result, after the war many veterans

found themselves addicted. For this reason, drug addiction during the early 20th century was

often called, “soldier’s disease” (Gray 23). To combat these addictions, the Pure Food and

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Drug Act required that all medications meet federal “purity standards” and that accurate

labeling and potency of the given drug was included on the label. This applied to any drug--

including drugs with trace amounts of marijuana. Following the Pure Food and Drug Act was

the Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914, which made it illegal for physicians to prescribe drugs to

alleviate symptoms of narcotics withdrawal. Increased scrutiny and regulations imposed on

physicians by the two acts eventually led to a decline in drug use and consequently affected

public perception of drugs. Where drugs were once openly available, under the acts,

increased federal scrutiny prevented much drug use and sped up its decline in the

marketplace (Gray 23).

Six years after the Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914 was passed, another important

cultural change occurred in America that may or may not have facilitated the decline of

marijuana use in America. Just across the border, the Mexican Revolution had come to a halt,

prompting many Mexicans to immigrate to America. With them, the Mexicans brought a rich

culture of recreational marijuana use. Due to America’s unfamiliarity with Mexican culture,

sentiment towards Mexican immigrants during this time was generally negative. Mexican

newspaper articles recovered from this time period cite the usage of the term, marijuano, as a

man who becomes violent under the influence of marijuana. This term gained popularity in

America and consequently cast the plant in a negative light through its association with crime

and violence (Thomson).

Suddenly headlines in newspapers read, “Delirium or death: terrible effects produced

by certain plants and weeds grown in Mexico” and  ‘"Mexican, Crazed by Marihuana, Runs

Amuck With Butcher Knife."’ These headlines appeared in the Los Angeles Times and the

New York Times, published in 1905 and 1925 respectively (Frontline: Busted). But

surely, resentment of Mexican immigrants could not have been the sole impetus for a

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complete shift in the perception of a plant that, prior to 1900, was extolled for its

medicinal benefits (Thomson). It was not. There were other greater authorial forces at

work--enter Harry J. Anslinger.

Before the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), there was the Federal

Bureau of Narcotics (FBN). The government formed the FBN in 1930 in response to

rising fears about the effects of marijuana-- fears that did not seem unwarranted due to

the media’s aforementioned portrayal of marijuana as harmful as well as its association

with foreigners. At the head of the FBN was Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger, who

would maintain his post as commissioner for 32 years (1930-1962). Anslinger lobbied

and campaigned for the passage of an act that would be more restrictive than the

previously mentioned Harrison Act of 1914. It is important to note that Anslinger was

close to William Randolph Hearst of the Hearst Corporation. Hearst personally aided

Anslinger in his effort to rally Americans against marijuana with sensationalized

newspaper articles (Frontline: Busted). Many of these articles either completely

disregarded proponents’ views or used heavily-loaded language such as “menace” and

“devil” and “violence” in headlines regarding the effects of marijuana (Thomson).

Anslinger, a man cognizant of the powers of the media, used the media as a vehicle to

change public perception regarding marijuana. By 1932, there was palpable fear in the air

regarding marijuana and its highly-publicized ill effects. In an attempt to quell rising

fears, the federal government passed the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act in 1934. The

Act serves as the framework for how states handle marijuana legislation currently. Under

the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act, responsibility was passed off to the states to lessen

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the pressure on the federal government to determine what it would do about marijuana

legislation (Frontline: Busted).

In the wake of this new legislation, Anslinger co-produced a movie entitled,

Reefer Madness with the help of the FBN. A quote from the movie warns, “one puff of

pot can lead clean-cut teenagers down the road to insanity, criminality, and death”

(Thomson). This film was clearly a work of propaganda as it was produced by two

entities with a vested interest in terminating marijuana’s prevalence in American society.

The propaganda campaign succeeded, for in 1937 a supplement to the Harrison Narcotics

Tax Act was passed that would effectively criminalize marijuana.

However, in the 1940s the U.S. Department of Agriculture began a “Hemp for

Victory” campaign to encourage farmers to grow hemp. The campaign was spurred by a

dearth of supplies crucial to World War II such as parachutes and cords. Hemp farming

was incentivized by giving farmers of hemp the option to defer being drafted into the

war. Around this time, an important study conducted by the New York Academy of

Medicine was released. The study found that, unlike its portrayal in Reefer Madness,

marijuana use was neither linked to violent or sexual behavior nor was it a gateway to

harder drugs (Frontline: Busted).

In 1970, Congress repealed minimum sentencing laws for drug offenders as

during this time marijuana use was so culturally embraced that the laws often came

across as unnecessarily harsh in proportion to the crime. Two years later, President

Richard Nixon created a bipartisan group called the Shafer Commission that would

determine the future of marijuana laws. The Commission recommended that marijuana be

decriminalized. Although Nixon rejected the Commission’s suggestions, marijuana was

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decriminalized by 11 states. One year after the Commission’s creation, a merger occurred

that resulted in the creation of the Drug Enforcement Agency (Frontline: Busted). In

response to the cultural ubiquity of marijuana during the 1970s, many conservative

parents banded together to halt its usage and protect their children from using marijuana.

The groups gained power in their sheer numbers and facilitated the change of public

perception that would lead up to the War on Drugs (Frontline: Busted).

The War on Drugs began in the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan placed

stricter federal laws on marijuana possession, use, and distribution. After Reagan’s term,

President George H. W. Bush would pick up where Reagan left off and publicly

announced on a national broadcast that he would declare a new War on Drugs (Frontline:

Busted). Despite Bush’s efforts, however, in 1996, California became the first state to

allow the use of medical marijuana within its borders. California would serve as an

example for the possibility of defying federal law.

After examining the tumultuous history of marijuana in its entirety, it becomes

easier to digest the seemingly polar views of both pro-legalization and pro-prohibition

stakeholders. The history of marijuana is full of cultural shifts, changes in public

perception, and fluctuating legislation. Now, with a context for marijuana’s varied

history-- amidst all of the propaganda, stigmas, scientific data, and legislation associated

with marijuana over the years--two very different sides of the legalization argument

remain.

The pro-legalization side of the debate is most concerned with issues of justice,

race, and cost. By examining figures of the amount of tax dollars spent annually on drug

enforcement and on prisons, proponents of legalization argue that the American

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government should stop wasting its time on waging a war it cannot win. General

stakeholder groups in favor of legalization include groups such as the Marijuana

Majority, NORML, and MPP while the specific constituents that make up these groups

range from celebrities like Rihanna and Willie Nelson to regular folk like my Ethics

professor, who authored an acclaimed book on the legalization debate.

However, the pro-prohibition side of the debate generally argues that the War on

Drugs has not been lost and that US dollars have not been wasted. Proponents of

marijuana prohibition are generally concerned with issues of safety, health, and addiction.

In fact, many of these constituents argue that if legalized, marijuana will become rampant

and new users will be created in the process (SAM). Prominent general stakeholder

groups on this side of the argument are groups such as SAM, CALM and Grass is Not

Greener. All of these groups highlight the risks marijuana presents to health. Many of

these groups also liken the looming possibility of legalized marijuana to the next “Big

Tobacco.” Both SAM and CALM mention the comparison to “Big Tobacco” on both of

their websites as a way to paint a picture of what marijuana legalization could easily turn

into. Police, such as Will Travis, the sheriff of Denton County, make up some of the

specific stakeholders on this side. Travis is aligned with another specific stakeholder

group called the Texas Sheriff's Association Against Legalization of Marijuana. These

stakeholders rely on experiential evidence to found their claims about the dangers of

marijuana.

The first issue the aforementioned general pro-legalization stakeholders are

concerned with is justice-- stakeholders argue that too many American citizens are being

put in jail for something that is not serious enough to warrant being sent to jail. The

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nature of these arrests is also supported by data that shows that 88% of all marijuana-

arrests are made simply for having marijuana (ACLU). While some argue that marijuana

use is not criminal in nature, for the sake of consistency and accuracy, the inherent status

of marijuana as a crime will not be considered in this paper. However, it is important to

note that marijuana’s status as a Schedule I drug is likely linked to its high incarceration

rates. The data provided by the ACLU is reinforced by another study that claims, “There

has been a dramatic rise in the number of arrests for simple possession since 1991. In

2008, about 800,000 individuals were arrested for possession of small amounts of

marijuana” (Ngyuen and Reuter 880). Furthermore, the Federal Bureau of Prisons

confirms that today, marijuana accounts for over half of all drug-related arrests, with

methamphetamines and powder cocaine coming in second. A statistic cited by the New

York Times further validates this point; “In 2011, there were more arrests for marijuana

possession than all violent crimes put together.”

The second issue pro-legalization stakeholders raise is an issue of race. In a study

conducted regarding marijuana-related arrests in New York over time, the data shows

interesting changes in the probability of arrest pre-1991 and post-1991. While the

probability of arrest before 1991 was fairly equal across age and race, significant

disparities begin to arise after 1991, when high arrest rates for adolescents, Blacks, and

males begin to emerge (Nguyen and Reuter 882). Although this study only examines

marijuana-related arrests in New York over time, other studies examining marijuana-

related arrests over time in various parts of the U.S. show similar findings. A study that

examined marijuana-related arrests in the 25 largest counties in California over the span

of four years shows a clear racial bias. The data shows that Blacks were four times as

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likely to be arrested for marijuana than Whites (Levine 11). In places such as Iowa and

Minnesota, the probability is greater still. In these states, Blacks are about eight times as

likely as Whites to be arrested for marijuana. Pro-legalization stakeholders’ views that the

illegal status of marijuana is reinforcing racial inequality is corroborated by data analyzed

by the American Civil Liberties Union. The ACLU reports that, “despite roughly equal

usage rates, Blacks are 3.73 times more likely than whites to be arrested for marijuana.”

Data from the ACLU reports instances of racial injustice across America, regardless of

the size of minority populations. Researchers at Stanford University also independently

reviewed the study conducted by the ACLU, in order to determine the legitimacy of the

ACLU’s claims. However, a study reviewing usage rates in New York alone shows that

Whites use marijuana at a higher rate than Blacks and Latinos yet, Blacks and Latinos are

arrested for marijuana at much higher rates than Whites in New York (Levine 16).  

The third issue raised by pro-legalization stakeholders is an issue of cost.

Stakeholders assert that in making marijuana illegal, the federal government and its

constituents are wasting billions of dollars solely on enforcing marijuana possession laws

that have not proven effective in reducing marijuana use (Beckett and Herbert 19). In an

article that appeared in the New York Times last year, data reveals that, “In 2010, states

spent an estimated $3.6 billion enforcing marijuana possession laws, a 30 percent

increase from ten years earlier” (Urbina). In New York alone, costs for low-level

marijuana arrests were estimated at $75 million in 2010 (Levine 11). In a broader scope,

statistics show a significant increase in the amount of money spent on drug enforcement

in America over time. In 1981, federal spending on drug enforcement was estimated at

$1.5 billion. In 2002, that number rose to $12 billion (Shepard and Blackley 404). After

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factoring in inflation rates, federal drug enforcement spending in 2008 was estimated at

$17.1 billion (Miron and Wadlock 7).

However, while proponents of legalization perceive the amount of money

allocated to drug enforcement as a waste of tax dollars, opponents of legalization argue

that if legalized, marijuana usage would not only increase, but that marijuana would

become more affordable and more widespread. The first issue raised by opponents to

legalization is an issue concerning addiction. The SAM homepage references various

studies that support the claim that marijuana is highly addictive. One study offers

statistics that reveal that one out of every eleven marijuana users will become addicted to

marijuana and that the likelihood of addiction increases amongst adolescents. The same

study cites marijuana as the leading cause for substance abuse treatment in adolescents

(Wagner and Anthony 918). Supplementary data released by the National Institute on

Drug Abuse found that since 1992, marijuana-related treatment increased by 188%, while

statistics for other drug-related treatment remained constant over time (NIDA). One study

claims that use of marijuana in adolescent years can lead to later loss of IQ (GING).

Another study claims that 1 in 6 adolescent marijuana users will become addicted

(Anthony 257).

A second issue opposing stakeholders raise is an issue of accessibility. Opponents

claim that legalization will lead to increased usage amongst minors. On Grass is not

Greener’s “Research” page, a study is cited regarding marijuana consumption post-

legalization in California. The study showcases data that predicts decreased prices with

increased availability. As a consequence of this, the study predicts that lowered prices

paired with increased availability will cause an increase in use (GING). A study

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conducted by the National Survey of American Attitudes on Substance Abuse reveals that

adolescents from ages 12-17 reported that 50% could easily obtain alcohol within a day

while 44% reported they could obtain tobacco within a day. The lowest of all figures was

in regard to obtaining marijuana; with 19% of adolescents aged 12-17 claiming they

could obtain marijuana within a day. The argument made by these stakeholders is that if

legalized, like alcohol and tobacco, the percentage of youth able to obtain marijuana will

also increase. This argument is reinforced by opponents’ claims that legalization will

“usher in America’s new version of Big Tobacco,” which will only increase accessibility

and subsequent usage among minors (SAM). This claim is supported by quotes from

corporate figureheads, such as Microsoft’s head of Strategy. He is quoted as saying that

he wants to make a “Starbucks of marijuana” and that he wants to “mint more

millionaires than Microsoft” (Shapiro). The comparison of legalized marijuana to Big

Tobacco is further supported by references to start-ups already marketing marijuana

goods in a way that is appealing to youth. Items such as “Ring-Pots” and “Pot-Tarts” are

referenced by opponents of legalization as indicators of the beginnings of a corporate pot

enterprise targeted at America’s youth (GING).

The third-most prominent issue opponent stakeholders raise is an issue of crime.

The headline of an article published by the New York Daily News in 2009 reads: “Driver

in deadly Taconic crash Diane Schuler was drunk, had marijuana in system.” Diane

Schuler, a 36-year-old mom, was inebriated and high when she crashed her SUV on the

Taconic State Parkway, instantly killing herself, her daughter, three nieces and the three

men she hit. A year later, in 2010, Patrick Bedell, 36, was the perpetrator of a shooting at

the Pentagon. An article from the World Tribune claims that, “He [Bedell] hated a

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government that he believed was standing in the way of his desire to use, grow and

glorify marijuana. He virtually worshipped the drug.” According to an article referenced

by CALM, a man driving a bus under the influence of marijuana and dizzy from

Benadryll caused the death of 22 passengers. All of these articles make the implicit

argument that marijuana use causes impaired judgment that results in severe crime.

Regardless of position, all of the aforementioned stakeholder groups have a plan

for action. Almost all of the stakeholder groups’ websites include links to participate in

rallies and to donate money to the respective groups. Some websites include a link to

subscribe to updates about changes in marijuana policy. Groups such as NORML have

satellite groups in various cities in the U.S. so each city has a collective group of

supporters to rally support and influence legislation. However, what all of these

stakeholder groups emphasize is education. All of the stakeholder groups provide their

own version of why marijuana should or shouldn’t be legalized. In a sense, a given

stakeholder’s way of taking action is to convince a non-stakeholder to become invested in

the debate and take a stance and both do so by highlighting the importance of education.

The emphasis of education by both sides is an adept tactic as society as a whole generally

values and upholds education as a panacea to social problems.

After surveying the arguments of both proponents and opponents of legalization,

this paper will now critically examine the arguments made by both sides in order to more

easily discern the weaknesses and pitfalls of each side’s respective arguments. It is

important to note that because not all of the arguments made by proponents and

opponents directly stem from the same issues, I will only examine comparable issues. In

doing so, I will reinforce fairness as well as logical soundness in my critical examination

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of both sides’ arguments. An issue both sides are generally concerned with remedying

pertains to crime. Proponents of legalization assert that marijuana drug-offenders receive

punishments that are not proportional to the crimes committed (possession and/or use of

marijuana). Opponents of legalization, however, claim that marijuana use causes users to

commit heinous crimes, thus implicitly deeming the punishment of criminals as both fair

and warranted. Proponents of legalization incontrovertibly present a stronger argument

regarding the issue of crime in that much of the evidence presented by proponents is not

only corroborated, but also validated by an objective third party or non-partisan

organization whereas the evidence cited by opponents is flimsy at best. The data-set that

the proponents’ argument most heavily relies on is a survey conducted by the American

Civil Liberties Union. The survey reveals that an alarming 88% of all marijuana-arrests

are made for simply having marijuana. The survey is not only the most comprehensive

one to date, but is also associated with a credible source. The ACLU is both a non-

partisan and non-profit organization, which helps to reinforce its credibility in that the

ACLU seemingly does not have an ulterior motive other than to protect the rights of

American citizens. Additionally, the survey conducted by the ACLU was examined by a

group of analysts at Stanford for a New York Times article. Because the New York Times

has long established its credibility in the media realm due to its editors’ known

expectations for journalistic integrity and because Stanford is a prestigious and lauded

academic entity, the statistics provided by the ACLU are triply credible. The evidence

provided by the opponents side, however, is unfounded. Amazingly enough, upon further

inspection I found that many of the articles cited by anti-legalization activists and

organizations link back to dead news-sites or cannot be found at all.

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Earlier, I mentioned the most severe crime committed by a bus-driver under the

influence of marijuana-- the death of 22 passengers. Due to the sheer magnitude of

casualties in a single incident, almost large enough to be deemed a massacre, I attempted

to find other articles to confirm the exact details of the accident. I only found one detailed

news article on the accident, which resides in the archives of NOLA.com, a local New

Orleans newspaper. However, the article I had originally used as evidence in my

presentation of arguments was taken from the CALM website. CALM inaccurately

quoted the NOLA newspaper so much so that it now reads as a blatant lie. The original

quote on CALM’s website reads, “Frank Bedell should never have been behind the wheel

of a bus on Mother’s Day… He was high on marijuana and dizzy from Benadryl. The

Mother’s Day bus crash near City Park that killed 22 passengers is being blamed on

driver Frank Bedell, who police say was seriously ill and under the influence of drugs

when he got behind the wheel of the motor coach that morning.” While the use of an

ellipsis to omit information in a quote is not expressly forbidden in journalism, lying is.

The ellipsis that was so strategically placed in the aforementioned quote provided by

CALM conveniently omits a key piece of information, and omitting information integral

to the accident that occurred is simply a lie of omission. Referring to the original article

on NOLA.com, it is clear where the omission takes place. The original article states that,

“Frank Bedell should never have been behind the wheel of a bus on Mother's Day. He

was high on marijuana and dizzy from Benadryl. He was suffering from congestive heart

failure and bad kidneys. And he had gotten out of the hospital less than eight hours before

reporting to work that morning. If the system [of inspections conducted by Custom Bus

Charters] had worked correctly, Bedell would have been home in bed at 8 a.m. when 42

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casino-bound passengers climbed into a coach operated by Custom Bus Charters.”

Immediately, my perception of the events changes because now the cause of the accident

does not rest solely on drug use. Instead, another important contributing cause to the

accident is noted, one that makes it hard to blame marijuana use as the sole reason for the

death of 22 people.

Another issue on which both proponents and opponents of legalization make

arguments for is the issue of cost. Proponents of legalization maintain that the War on

Drugs has largely failed in that the federal government has spent billions of dollars

attempting to combat drug use with no data to support that the War on Drugs has quelled

marijuana use at all. Opponents of legalization assert that once legalized, marijuana use

would cost the US the future of its youth. While immeasurable monetarily, the possible

degradation of the US’ youth is also a cost to society that can be quantified. However,

while both sides make salient arguments and back them up with evidence, the opponents’

evidence is weak and does not follow logically. The evidence that supports proponents’

claims that the federal government’s exorbitant spending has been fruitless comes from

the ACLU, and scholarly articles by Beckett and Herbert, and Shepard and Blackley.

Earlier, I established the credibility of the ACLU’s data and its overall integrity as

an entity. Upon researching Beckett and Herbert respectively, I found that both are not

only Washington affiliates of the ACLU, but also esteemed members of academia and

professors in the Law, Societies and Justice program at the University of Washington.

Shepard and Blackley too, seem credible, as they are both professors of economics at Le

Moyne University, where they collaborated on research that led to the publication of their

scholarly article, “The Impact of Marijuana Law Enforcement in an Economic Model of

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Crime.” Opponents of legalization cite statistics that reveal the likelihood of minors

becoming addicted to marijuana as well as statistics that identify marijuana as the leading

culprit of abuse among drug addicts in treatment centers. However, some of the statistics

seem wildly absurd. The National Institute on Drug Abuse reported that since 1992,

marijuana-related treatment increased 188% while other drug-related treatment remained

stagnant over time. NIDA as an entity is well-respected and generally deemed credible by

most, as it’s a government organization. Additionally, nothing is glaringly wrong with the

report in which the 188% statistic is found. However, I am curious to know why there’s

such a disparity between rates of treatment between marijuana and other prevalent

“street” drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines. In a study conducted by

the Drug Policy Research Center, cost savings of the federal government’s law

enforcement spending and drug treatment spending is reviewed in full. The statistics

presented in the study show that sending a criminal to a treatment center saves the

government the most amount of money, whereas indicting a criminal or boosting law

enforcement infrastructure costs more and requires more labor (Rydell and Everingham).

Even though the figures supplied by NIDA are factual, they are not representative of the

whole. If the federal government has an alternative to putting criminals in prison to save

money, it seems logical that it would do that. Instead of sending minors in possession or

drug-offenders with negligible offenses to prison, they send them to treatment centers.

In order to thoroughly examine the legalization debate, it is also necessary to

understand and articulate the moral reasoning that guides both sides. By looking at the

obligations, values, and consequences that contribute to the moral reasoning of each side,

a more thorough understanding of each side will follow.

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Proponent stakeholders of marijuana legalization generally value justice-- both

monetary justice and racial justice. Proponents maintain that as taxpayers, it is unfair that

tax dollars are going towards a War on Drugs that has not proved effective. Proponents

also assert that the illegal status of marijuana only contributes to racial injustice in our

society, due to the disproportionate number of minorities imprisoned simply for

possessing marijuana. Proponents have an obligation to fellow citizens of America,

themselves included, to protect taxpayer dollars as well as promote racial equality, as

both reflect intrinsic American rights as stated in the Constitution. While opponents of

legalization also value justice, their explication of justice is reserved for protecting the

youth, while proponents of legalization tend to focus more on adults-- fully-formed

humans capable of rational thought and old enough to pay taxes.

Due to the values and obligations proponents hold, they foresee the consequences

of legalization reinforcing sentiments of justice across the board. If legalized, proponents

predict a sharp drop in race-related incarcerations for marijuana as well as a subsequent

decrease in the amount of tax dollars spent to keep inmates in prison. Another

repercussion of legalization that proponents hope to see is a decrease in overall drug-

related criminal activity, as most drug-offenders do time for marijuana, more so than any

other drug. With marijuana’s legalization, the influence of the underground market (such

as cartel influence) would likely wane and cause a decrease in crime.

The normative principles that guide the values and obligations of proponents are

the principle of justice and John Stuart Mill’s harm principle. The principle of justice

dictates that each person has the right to a justice devoid of political bargaining or ill

interests. This principle underlies proponents’ desire to remedy racial injustice and unfair

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allocation of taxpayer dollars. Additionally, proponents generally do not have a problem

with the status of marijuana as a drug. This is guided by John Stuart Mill’s harm principle

which maintains that as long as partaking or participating in a given activity or substance

does not harm a third party, it’s ok to harm one’s self. Earlier on, when discussing the

history of marijuana, I recounted the ultimate decision of the committee responsible for

writing up the Indian Hemp and Drugs Commission Report. One can see the reach of

Mill’s harm principle as early as the 19th century when the committee came to the

conclusion in 1894 that marijuana should remain legal as it did not seem to harm third

parties.

Opponent stakeholders of marijuana legalization value health and safety above all

else. Opponents assert that if legalized, marijuana use will only increase among minors,

causing a slew of social problems such as crime and addiction, which are also

impediments to health and safety. Opponent stakeholders feel it is their obligation as

mothers and fathers to protect the welfare of their children as well as future children of

America. The values and obligations opponent stakeholders hold inform their notion of

the consequences that will follow if marijuana is legalized.

Opponents’ assumptions of what will happen if marijuana is legalized is guided

by three normative principles-- the precautionary principle, paternalism, and Mill’s

articulation of a rational being. When simplified, the precautionary principle aims at

minimizing bad outcomes before they happen. Opponent stakeholders assume that

legalization will lead to increased use among minors, so instead of taking the risk of

legalizing marijuana, they assert that the better way to reduce potential harm is to not take

the risk of legalizing marijuana at all. Paternalism dictates that the government exists to

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minimize human suffering, and in the scope of the legalization debate, opponents place

the responsibility on the government to act accordingly and to resist legalizing marijuana

in order to protect America’s youth. Additionally, opponents’ concern for youth and

longevity is underlied by a tacit agreement of Mill’s articulation of a rational being. Mill

asserts that adolescents are not yet fully-formed humans capable of rational thought, and

thus are excluded from the scope of many of his prominent theories, including the harm

principle. Having said this, proponents of legalization, who are likely parents and adults,

put this principle into practice by making decisions for the youth regardless of what

opinions youth might have on the debate.

After critically examining evidence produced by both sides of the debate as well

as dissecting their respective moral reasoning patterns and the normative principles that

underlie their arguments, I have come to side with the proponents. As a realist, I find it

hard to digest the uncertainties on which much of the arguments made by opponents’ rest.

The precautionary principle, although a functioning facet of some European countries,

has not rooted itself in America for a reason. There is no true way to know the future, and

it is in this way that I staunchly side with proponents’ views that it is fruitless, unfair, and

wasteful to continue waging a War on Drugs we have continued to lose.

In my tentative solution, I proposed education as the best way to inspire more

positive sentiment regarding marijuana and the legalization of it. However, after talking

to two experts on marijuana, I no longer stand by my initial solution. Prior to conducting

interviews, I made the executive decision to make the interview questions the same for

both the proponent expert and the opponent expert in hopes of revealing where the two

experts’ opinions intersect and diverge. The most fascinating result of the interviews was

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the question both interviewees responded similarly to. When both interviewees were

presented with the sixth and final question regarding what they believed to be the best

solution to the legalization debate, both answered: “Education.” This was extremely

problematic for me, as this answer illuminated an underlying impediment to compromise

I had not yet considered: both parties think they are right. This also caused me to think

about the nature of education, which is rooted in information. Today, information is

abundant in a way it has never been before. One can access ancient texts and

congressional hearings all with the click of a mouse. However, amidst this informational

and technological shift, a new problem arises. The problem is rooted in selection. One is

left with the arduous task of discerning which sources are credible and which are not, a

task that requires a keen and critical eye. Surely not everyone is capable of this. Worse

yet, many are so staunch in their beliefs that it might cause them to reject information that

does not coincide with their own views. This was the case for one of my interviewees. “I

will not change my position,” said the Sheriff. After he made this statement, I felt our

entire conversation lose its productivity because it didn’t matter what I told him-- his

beliefs prevented him from objectively analyzing information. However, I do not blame

him nor do I resent him. For many, beliefs are a facet of identity, a facet of a culture, and

thus, it is almost impossible for one to extricate one’s self from one’s identity. The self

and the identity are intrinsically tied up in each other.

This ontological realization was further illuminated by my civic engagement

activity. For my civic engagement activity I conducted an anonymous survey. I passed

out surveys to random students in the Munday Library. I crafted questions 1-5 in a way

that would make it easy to discern proponents from opponents. Those who answered A

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on questions 1-5 were clearly opponents, while those who answered B on questions 1-5

were proponents. However, questions 6-10 were “wildcard” questions. I included these

questions as a sort of experiment, and some of the questions were not directly related to

marijuana. I was unsure how participants would respond to these questions. Question 6

asked participants whether they support ethically sourced food (ie: organic). Question 7

dealt with race. Question 8 asked participants if their views on legalization align with

their parents’ views. Question 9 asked participants if they perceive “Big Tobacco” as

negative or positive. The final question articulated the distinction between beliefs and

truths and asked the participant whether or not they think it is possible to change a belief.

Interestingly enough, the answers to questions 6-10 were an entirely mixed bag. Some of

the participants who answered A on questions 1-5 contradicted themselves in 6-10.

Almost all interview participants said they support ethically-sourced food. Marijuana,

with its current illegal status, is infrequently ethically-sourced. Much of our marijuana

comes from cartels and perpetuates illegal activity and crime. At least everyone can agree

that ethically-sourced anything is alarmingly positive. The results of questions 6-10 lead

me to believe that it is possible to establish common ground among both opponents and

proponents, however, the answers to question 10 were truly baffling. Roughly 60% of

participants answered, B-- It is not likely that one will change a belief. This brings us

back to the results of my interviews. If some are unwilling to change their beliefs, and if

many maintain that it’s not likely that one is capable of changing a belief, then my initial

solution to the legalization debate is no longer valid.

While I formerly perceived education as the bridge between opponents and

proponents of legalization, the interviews and civic engagement activity have made me

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deeply skeptical. Knowing what I know now about human nature, I propose that the only

surefire way to change the illegal status of marijuana is to vote. In a survey conducted by

BARNA group, they found that 58% of participants believe that marijuana should be

legal. The only exceptions were religious-types and those over age 64. Religion is rooted

in belief, and since I have already discussed the nature of beliefs, I will assume that

religious-types will not change their beliefs on marijuana. Additionally, those over 64 are

likely set in their beliefs. To combat this cohort of people and their fixed disapproval of

marijuana, one need only vote. Voting is the easiest, fastest way to incite change, and not

enough of us are doing it. Many of my peers who claim that voting is useless are not

wrong for thinking this. It’s hard to see the impact of a singular vote. However, one must

recognize the power of solidarity, the power of numbers. History has proved time and

time again that there is strength in numbers. From Gandhi’s Salt March to MLK’s March

on Washington to workers’ unions and the recent “die-ins” in protest of the death of Eric

Garner, one cannot deny the power of the whole that is made up by individuals like you

and me.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Policy

Since 1996, 20 states and Washington, DC have passed laws allowing smoked marijuana

to be used for a variety of medical conditions. It is important to recognize that these state

marijuana laws do not change the fact that using marijuana continues to be an offense

under Federal law.  Nor do these state laws change the criteria or process for FDA

approval of safe and effective medications.

Many of these state medical marijuana laws originated in order to create a legal defense

to state criminal possession laws or to remove state criminal penalties for purported

medical use of marijuana. Since then, many have evolved into state authorization for

state-based production and distribution of marijuana for purported medical purposes.

These state laws vary greatly in their criteria and implementation, and many states are

experiencing vigorous internal debates about the safety, efficacy, and legality of their

marijuana laws. Many local governments are even creating zoning and enforcement

ordinances that prevent marijuana dispensaries from operating in their communities.

States with medical marijuana laws often have some form of patient registry, which may

provide some protection against state arrest for possession up to a certain amount of

marijuana for personal medical use. Medical marijuana growers or dispensaries are

authorized in some of these states and may be limited to a certain number of plants or

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products per medical user. Regulation of marijuana for purported medical use may also

exist at the county and city level, in addition to state laws.  

In enacting the Controlled Substances Act, Congress determined that marijuana is a

Schedule I controlled substance.

Controlled Substances Act

PART B: Authority to Control; Standards and Schedules

(a) Rules and regulations of Attorney General; hearingThe Attorney General shall apply the provisions of this subchapter to the controlled substances listed in the schedules established by section 812 of this title and to any other drug or other substance added to such schedules under this subchapter. Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this section, the Attorney General may by rule -

(1) add to such a schedule or transfer between such schedules any drug or other substance if he -

o (A) finds that such drug or other substance has a potential for abuse, and

o (B) makes with respect to such drug or other substance the findings prescribed by subsection (b) of section 812 of this title for the schedule in which such drug is to be placed; or

(2) remove any drug or other substance from the schedules if he finds that the drug or other substance does not meet the requirements for inclusion in any schedule.

Rules of the Attorney General under this subsection shall be made on the record after opportunity for a hearing pursuant to the rulemaking procedures prescribed by subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5. Proceedings for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of such rules may be initiated by the Attorney General (1) on his own motion, (2) at the request of the Secretary, or (3) on the petition of any interested party.

(b) Evaluation of drugs and other substancesThe Attorney General shall, before initiating proceedings under subsection (a) of this section to control a drug or other substance or to remove a drug or other substance entirely from the schedules, and after gathering the necessary data, request from the Secretary a scientific and medical evaluation, and his recommendations, as to whether such drug or other substance should be so controlled or removed as a controlled substance. In making such evaluation and recommendations, the Secretary shall consider the factors listed in paragraphs (2), (3), (6), (7), and (8) of subsection (c) of this section and any scientific or medical considerations involved in paragraphs (1), (4), and (5) of such subsection. The recommendations of the Secretary shall include recommendations with respect to the appropriate schedule, if any, under which such drug or other substance

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should be listed. The evaluation and the recommendations of the Secretary shall be made in writing and submitted to the Attorney General within a reasonable time. The recommendations of the Secretary to the Attorney General shall be binding on the Attorney General as to such scientific and medical matters, and if the Secretary recommends that a drug or other substance not be controlled, the Attorney General shall not control the drug or other substance. If the Attorney General determines that these facts and all other relevant data constitute substantial evidence of potential for abuse such as to warrant control or substantial evidence that the drug or other substance should be removed entirely from the schedules, he shall initiate proceedings for control or removal, as the case may be, under subsection (a) of this section.

(c) Factors determinative of control or removal from schedulesIn making any finding under subsection (a) of this section or under subsection (b) of section 812 of this title, the Attorney General shall consider the following factors with respect to each drug or other substance proposed to be controlled or removed from the schedules:

(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse. (2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known. (3) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other

substance. (4) Its history and current pattern of abuse. (5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse. (6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health. (7) Its psychic or physiological dependence liability. (8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already

controlled under this subchapter. (d) International treaties, conventions, and protocols requiring control;

procedures respecting changes in drug schedules of Convention on Psychotropic Substances

o (1) If control is required by United States obligations under international treaties, conventions, or protocols in effect on October 27, 1970, the Attorney General shall issue an order controlling such drug under the schedule he deems most appropriate to carry out such obligations, without regard to the findings required by subsection (a) of this section or section 812(b) of this title and without regard to the procedures prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) of this section.

o (2) (A) Whenever the Secretary of State receives notification

from the Secretary-General of the United Nations that information has been transmitted by or to the World Health Organization, pursuant to article 2 of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which may justify adding a drug or other substance to one of the schedules of the Convention, transferring a drug or substance from one schedule to another, or deleting it from the schedules, the Secretary of State shall immediately transmit the notice to

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the Secretary of Health and Human Services who shall publish it in the Federal Register and provide opportunity to interested persons to submit to him comments respecting the scientific and medical evaluations which he is to prepare respecting such drug or substance. The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall prepare for transmission through the Secretary of State to the World Health Organization such medical and scientific evaluations as may be appropriate regarding the possible action that could be proposed by the World Health Organization respecting the drug or substance with respect to which a notice was transmitted under this subparagraph.

(B) Whenever the Secretary of State receives information that the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations proposes to decide whether to add a drug or other substance to one of the schedules of the Convention, transfer a drug or substance from one schedule to another, or delete it from the schedules, the Secretary of State shall transmit timely notice to the Secretary of Health and Human Services of such information who shall publish a summary of such information in the Federal Register and provide opportunity to interested persons to submit to him comments respecting the recommendation which he is to furnish, pursuant to this subparagraph, respecting such proposal. The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall evaluate the proposal and furnish a recommendation to the Secretary of State which shall be binding on the representative of the United States in discussions and negotiations relating to the proposal.

o (3) When the United States receives notification of a scheduling decision pursuant to article 2 of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances that a drug or other substance has been added or transferred to a schedule specified in the notification or receives notification (referred to in this subsection as a ''schedule notice'') that existing legal controls applicable under this subchapter to a drug or substance and the controls required by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.) do not meet the requirements of the schedule of the Convention in which such drug or substance has been placed, the Secretary of Health and Human Services after consultation with the Attorney General, shall first determine whether existing legal controls under this subchapter applicable to the drug or substance and the controls required by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, meet the requirements of the schedule specified in the notification or schedule notice and shall take the following action:

(A) If such requirements are met by such existing controls but the Secretary of Health and Human Services nonetheless

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believes that more stringent controls should be applied to the drug or substance, the Secretary shall recommend to the Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for scheduling the drug or substance, pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section, to apply to such controls.

(B) If such requirements are not met by such existing controls and the Secretary of Health and Human Services concurs in the scheduling decision or schedule notice transmitted by the notification, the Secretary shall recommend to the Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for scheduling the drug or substance under the appropriate schedule pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section.

(C) If such requirements are not met by such existing controls and the Secretary of Health and Human Services does not concur in the scheduling decision or schedule notice transmitted by the notification, the Secretary shall -

(i) if he deems that additional controls are necessary to protect the public health and safety, recommend to the Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for scheduling the drug or substance pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section, to apply such additional controls;

(ii) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified acceptance, within the period specified in the Convention, pursuant to paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

(iii) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified acceptance as prescribed in clause (ii) and request the Secretary of State to ask for a review by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, in accordance with paragraph 8 of article 2 of the Convention, of the scheduling decision; or

(iv) in the case of a schedule notice, request the Secretary of State to take appropriate action under the Convention to initiate proceedings to remove the drug or substance from the schedules under the Convention or to transfer the drug or substance to a schedule under the Convention different from the one specified in the schedule notice.

o (4) (A) If the Attorney General determines, after consultation

with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, that

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proceedings initiated under recommendations made under paragraph (FOOTNOTE 1)

(B) or (C)(i) of paragraph (3) will not be completed within the time period required by paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention, the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary and after providing interested persons opportunity to submit comments respecting the requirements of the temporary order to be issued under this sentence, shall issue a temporary order controlling the drug or substance under schedule IV or V, whichever is most appropriate to carry out the minimum United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. As a part of such order, the Attorney General shall, after consultation with the Secretary, except such drug or substance from the application of any provision of part C of this subchapter which he finds is not required to carry out the United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. In the case of proceedings initiated under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3), the Attorney General, concurrently with the issuance of such order, shall request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified acceptance to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. A temporary order issued under this subparagraph controlling a drug or other substance subject to proceedings initiated under subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall expire upon the effective date of the application to the drug or substance of the controls resulting from such proceedings. (FOOTNOTE 1) So in original. Probably should be ''subparagraph''.

(B) After a notice of qualified acceptance of a scheduling decision with respect to a drug or other substance is transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with clause (ii) or (iii) of paragraph (3)(C) or after a request has been made under clause (iv) of such paragraph with respect to a drug or substance described in a schedule notice, the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and after providing interested persons opportunity to submit comments respecting the requirements of the order to be issued under this sentence, shall issue an order controlling the drug or substance under schedule IV or V, whichever is most appropriate to carry out the minimum United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention in the case of a drug or substance for which a notice of qualified acceptance was transmitted or whichever the

32

Attorney General determines is appropriate in the case of a drug or substance described in a schedule notice. As a part of such order, the Attorney General shall, after consultation with the Secretary, except such drug or substance from the application of any provision of part C of this subchapter which he finds is not required to carry out the United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. If, as a result of a review under paragraph 8 of article 2 of the Convention of the scheduling decision with respect to which a notice of qualified acceptance was transmitted in accordance with clause (ii) or (iii) of paragraph (3)(C) -

(i) the decision is reversed, and (ii) the drug or substance subject to such decision

is not required to be controlled under schedule IV or V to carry out the minimum United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention,

the order issued under this subparagraph with respect to such drug or substance shall expire upon receipt by the United States of the review decision. If, as a result of action taken pursuant to action initiated under a request transmitted under clause (iv) of paragraph (3)(C), the drug or substance with respect to which such action was taken is not required to be controlled under schedule IV or V, the order issued under this paragraph with respect to such drug or substance shall expire upon receipt by the United States of a notice of the action taken with respect to such drug or substance under the Convention.

(C) An order issued under subparagraph (A) or (B) may be

issued without regard to the findings required by subsection (a) of this section or by section 812(b) of this title and without regard to the procedures prescribed by subsection (a) or (b) of this section.

ooo (5) Nothing in the amendments made by the Psychotropic Substances

Act of 1978 or the regulations or orders promulgated thereunder shall be construed to preclude requests by the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Attorney General through the Secretary of State, pursuant to article 2 or other applicable provisions of the

33

Convention, for review of scheduling decisions under such Convention, based on new or additional information.

(e) Immediate precursorsThe Attorney General may, without regard to the findings required by subsection (a) of this section or section 812(b) of this title and without regard to the procedures prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) of this section, place an immediate precursor in the same schedule in which the controlled substance of which it is an immediate precursor is placed or in any other schedule with a higher numerical designation. If the Attorney General designates a substance as an immediate precursor and places it in a schedule, other substances shall not be placed in a schedule solely because they are its precursors.

(f) Abuse potentialIf, at the time a new-drug application is submitted to the Secretary for any drug having a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system, it appears that such drug has an abuse potential, such information shall be forwarded by the Secretary to the Attorney General.

(g) Exclusion of non-narcotic substances sold over the counter without a prescription; dextromethorphan; exemption of substances lacking abuse potential

o (1) The Attorney General shall by regulation exclude any non-narcotic substance from a schedule if such substance may, under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.), be lawfully sold over the counter without a prescription.

o (2) Dextromethorphan shall not be deemed to be included in any schedule by reason of enactment of this subchapter unless controlled after October 27, 1970 pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this section.

o (3) The Attorney General may, by regulation, exempt any compound, mixture, or preparation containing a controlled substance from the application of all or any part of this subchapter if he finds such compound, mixture, or preparation meets the requirements of one of the following categories:

(A) A mixture, or preparation containing a nonnarcotic controlled substance, which mixture or preparation is approved for prescription use, and which contains one or more other active ingredients which are not listed in any schedule and which are included therein in such combinations, quantity, proportion, or concentration as to vitiate the potential for abuse.

(B) A compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any controlled substance, which is not for administration to a human being or animal, and which is packaged in such form or concentration, or with adulterants or denaturants, so that as packaged it does not present any significant potential for abuse.

(h) Temporary scheduling to avoid imminent hazards to public safety

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o (1) If the Attorney General finds that the scheduling of a substance in schedule I on a temporary basis is necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety, he may, by order and without regard to the requirements of subsection (b) of this section relating to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, schedule such substance in schedule I if the substance is not listed in any other schedule in section 812 of this title or if no exemption or approval is in effect for the substance under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355). Such an order may not be issued before the expiration of thirty days from -

(A) the date of the publication by the Attorney General of a notice in the Federal Register of the intention to issue such order and the grounds upon which such order is to be issued, and

(B) the date the Attorney General has transmitted the notice required by paragraph (4).

(2) The scheduling of a substance under this subsection shall expire at the end of one year from the date of the issuance of the order scheduling such substance, except that the Attorney General may, during the pendency of proceedings under subsection (a)(1) of this section with respect to the substance, extend the temporary scheduling for up to six months.

(3) When issuing an order under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall be required to consider, with respect to the finding of an imminent hazard to the public safety, only those factors set forth in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) of subsection (c) of this section, including actual abuse, diversion from legitimate channels, and clandestine importation, manufacture, or distribution.

(4) The Attorney General shall transmit notice of an order proposed to be issued under paragraph (1) to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. In issuing an order under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall take into consideration any comments submitted by the Secretary in response to a notice transmitted pursuant to this paragraph.

(5) An order issued under paragraph (1) with respect to a substance shall be vacated upon the conclusion of a subsequent rulemaking proceeding initiated under subsection (a) of this section with respect to such substance.

(6) An order issued under paragraph (1) is not subject to judicial review.§ 812. Schedules of controlled substances.

(a) EstablishmentThere are established five schedules of controlled substances, to be known as schedules I, II, III, IV, and V. Such schedules shall initially consist of the substances listed in this section. The schedules established by this section shall be updated and republished on a semiannual basis during the two-year period beginning one year after October 27, 1970, and shall be updated and republished on an annual basis thereafter.

(b) Placement on schedules; findings requiredExcept where control is required by United States obligations under an international treaty, convention, or protocol, in effect on October 27, 1970, and except in the case of an

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immediate precursor, a drug or other substance may not be placed in any schedule unless the findings required for such schedule are made with respect to such drug or other substance. The findings required for each of the schedules are as follows:

(1) Schedule I. -o (A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.o (B) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted medical use

in treatment in the United States.o (C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other

substance under medical supervision. (2) Schedule II. -

o (A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.o (B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use

in treatment in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions.

o (C) Abuse of the drug or other substances may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence.

(3) Schedule III. -o (A) The drug or other substance has a potential for abuse less than the

drugs or other substances in schedules I and II.o (B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use

in treatment in the United States.o (C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to moderate or low

physical dependence or high psychological dependence. (4) Schedule IV. -

o (A) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule III.

o (B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.

o (C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to limited physical dependence or psychological dependence relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule III.

(5) Schedule V. -o (A) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse relative

to the drugs or other substances in schedule IV.o (B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use

in treatment in the United States.o (C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to limited physical

dependence or psychological dependence relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule IV.

(c) Initial schedules of controlled substancesSchedules I, II, III, IV, and V shall, unless and until amended (FOOTNOTE 1) pursuant to section 811 of this title, consist of the following drugs or other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or brand name designated: (FOOTNOTE 1) Revised schedules are published in the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1308 of Title 21, Food and Drugs.

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SCHEDULE I (a) Opiates

Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters, ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, whenever the existence of such isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within the specific chemical designation:

(1) Acetylmethadol. (2) Allylprodine. (3) Alphacetylmathadol. (FOOTNOTE 2) (FOOTNOTE 2) So in original.

Probably should be ''Alphacetylmethadol.'' (4) Alphameprodine. (5) Alphamethadol. (6) Benzethidine. (7) Betacetylmethadol. (8) Betameprodine. (9) Betamethadol. (10) Betaprodine. (11) Clonitazene. (12) Dextromoramide. (13) Dextrorphan. (14) Diampromide. (15) Diethylthiambutene. (16) Dimenoxadol. (17) Dimepheptanol. (18) Dimethylthiambutene. (19) Dioxaphetyl butyrate. (20) Dipipanone. (21) Ethylmethylthiambutene. (22) Etonitazene. (23) Etoxeridine. (24) Furethidine. (25) Hydroxypethidine. (26) Ketobemidone. (27) Levomoramide. (28) Levophenacylmorphan. (29) Morpheridine. (30) Noracymethadol. (31) Norlevorphanol. (32) Normethadone. (33) Norpipanone. (34) Phenadoxone. (35) Phenampromide. (36) Phenomorphan. (37) Phenoperidine. (38) Piritramide.

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(39) Propheptazine. (40) Properidine. (41) Racemoramide. (42) Trimeperidine. (b) Opium Derivatives

Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any of the following opium derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salt of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:

(1) Acetorphine. (2) Acetyldihydrocodeine. (3) Benzylmorphine. (4) Codeine methylbromide. (5) Codeine-N-Oxide. (6) Cyprenorphine. (7) Desomorphine. (8) Dihydromorphine. (9) Etorphine. (10) Heroin. (11) Hydromorphinol. (12) Methyldesorphine. (13) Methylhydromorphine. (14) Morphine methylbromide. (15) Morphine methylsulfonate. (16) Morphine-N-Oxide. (17) Myrophine. (18) Nicocodeine. (19) Nicomorphine. (20) Normorphine. (21) Pholcodine. (22) Thebacon. (c) Hallucinogenic Substances

Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation, which contains any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, or which contains any of their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:

(1) 3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine. (2) 5-methoxy-3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine. (3) 3,4,5-trimethoxy amphetamine. (4) Bufotenine. (5) Diethyltryptamine. (6) Dimethyltryptamine. (7) 4-methyl-2,5-diamethoxyamphetamine. (8) Ibogaine. (9) Lysergic acid diethylamide.

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(10) Marihuana. (11) Mescaline. (12) Peyote. (13) N-ethyl-3-piperidyl benzilate. (14) N-methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate. (15) Psilocybin. (16) Psilocyn. (17) Tetrahydrocannabinols.

Appendix B: Interview Questions

Question 1: Opponents rely on marijuana’s “potential” for abuse amongst minors. Is this a slippery slope fallacy in disguise?

Question 2: Do you believe there is an element of racial injustice embedded in marijuana incarceration?

Question 3: Does possession warrant jail time? (ACLU reports that 88% go to jail simply for possession)

Question 4: Is marijuana the next “Big Tobacco”?

Question 5: Is marijuana harmful?

Question 6: Is there a resolution to the legalization debate, or is this a non-issue that will resolve itself over time?

Appendix C: Civic Engagement Activity

Disclaimer: To make this survey as accurate as possible, the identity of the given participant will remain completely anonymous. One need not put his or her name on this survey, nor do anything other than circle the appropriate answer choice.

1) Do you think marijuana should be legalized federally?A. ANoB. Yes

2) Do you think marijuana is addictive and/or harmful?A. YesB. No

3) Do you smoke weed?A. NoB. Yes

4)  Can you think of an acquaintance who smokes weed?A. NoB. Yes

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5) If legalized, do you think marijuana usage will increase or will it stay roughly the same?

A. IncreaseB. Stay the same

6) Do you support the ethical sourcing of produce and livestock, ie: organic foods and cage-free products?

A. NoB. Yes

7) Do you correlate marijuana usage with a certain racial group?A. YesB. No

8) Do your views on marijuana align with your parents’ views?A. YesB. No

9)Does the word “Big Tobacco” generally have a negative or positive connotation for you?

A. NegativeB. Positive

10) Beliefs and Truths are inherently different. Truths can be substantiated with evidence and/or logic, whereas beliefs need not be substantiated by anything. Having said this, do you think it’s possible to change a given person’s beliefs? Or are beliefs fixed and unchanging?

A. It’s possible to change someone’s beliefs. B. It’s not likely one will change a belief.

Survey Results

Total number of participants: 32

Question 1A: 9 B: 23

Question 2A: 7B: 27

Question 3A: 10B: 22

Question 4A: 2B: 30

Question 5A: 15B: 17

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Question 6A: 0B: 32

Question 7A: 13B: 19

Question 8A: 13B: 19

Question 9A: 27B: 5

Question 10A: 20B: 12

Appendix D: Presentation Information

Prezi not copy and paste-able. Provided below is a link to access the Prezi online.

http://tinyurl.com/parkprezi

Appendix E: St. Edward’s Student Body Drug Use Data (2006)

provided by Dr. Fordhart

Students Who Have Consumed Alcohol and Marijuana in the Past 30 Days

Alcohol

SEU: 81%

National College Average: 71%

Marijuana

SEU: 32%

National College Average: 18%

Alcohol and Marijuana Consumption 3 Times a Week or More

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Alcohol

SEU: 29%

National College Average: 23%

Marijuana

SEU: 15%

National College Average: 6%

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