Parfit - An interview with Derek Parfit.pdf
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An
Interview
with Derek Parfit
Derek Parfit is a Fellow of ll Souls College Oxford and author of the
controversial and widely acclaimed book Reasons and ersons
Derek Parfit
Cogito: We usually start t he se in te rvi ew s by
asking
ou r
interviewees
samething
about
what turned
their
interests towards philoso-
phy. Was there same particular person or
problem or work
that
made y ou a p hi lo so -
pher?
Parfit: Yes there was. As
an
undergraduate I
di d
only
modern
history.
Then
I r ea d D avi d
Wiggins s book Identity n Spatiotempo-
ral ontinuity an d
in
p ar ti cu la r h is dis-
cussion of the ac
tu
al cases in which the
hemispheres of people s b ra in s h av e been
disconnected in
attempts
to treat epilepsy.
As a r es ul t t he se people seem to have two
0950-6664/95/020115-10
©
Th e
Cogito Society
quite separate streams of thoughts an d expe-
riences
in
having
each
of which t he y are
unaware of t he other. Wiggins
then
imag-
ined a case in w hi ch t he t wo halves of o ur
brain
would be successfully
transplanted
int o a pair of empty skulls an d there would
later be two people each of
whom
has
half
o ur b ra in
an d is fully psychologically con-
tinuous with u Since these would be two
different people it
can t
b e t ru e
that
e ac h of
them
is
u
So
h ow s ho ul d
we
regard
ou r
relation to these people? I found that a fasci-
nating question.
wa s t hi s i ma gi ne d cas e
that
drew m e i nt o p hi lo so ph y.
Cogito: is of course for your views on
personal identity
that
yo u are best known in
the philosophical world. But personal
i de nt it y is onl y o ne area-and by
no
means
t he s im pl es t
where
metaphysical concep-
tions of re al it y h av e b ee n t hou ght to be
practically important. Da you have a general
vie w ab ou t
th e
nature
of the relation be-
tween
metaphysics on the one hand
an d
practical reason
on
the other?
Partit: Yes.
Wh
at interests me most are those
m et ap hy si ca l q ue st io ns whose answers
seem to be relevant-ar to make a differ-
ence-to wh
at we have reason to care about
an d to da an d to ou r moral beliefs. Personal
i de nt it y is one such subject; tw o others are
freewill an d t im e s pass age. F re e w il l is
th e
most straightforward. Many
people
have ar-
gued
that if determinism is true no one ca n
d es er ve to be
punished a nd w ha t
Strawson
calls
ou r
reactive attitudes -such as re-
sentment indignation or
gratitude-would
be unjustified. I believe that
in
this an d
same other cases metaphysics should affect
ou r attitudes
an d
acts.
Cogito: So you re
no t
impressed
with
th e
view usually ascribed to Hume
that
we
ca n
care about
anything-that
ca ri ng is n ot con-
strained
b y t he facts? On this view even
if
time isn t real ly p as si ng o r no o ne ha s free
will
t ha t n ee d
make
no
diffe rence at all to
what we should care about.
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Parfit No I reject that view. It
h as b ec om e
th e
dominant
view
in
much
of philosophy
an d
economics. On this view while we can
have
reasons
for
acting an d ou r
acts ca n be
irrational
we
can t
have reasons
for
caring
e xc ep t o f a derivative
kind
an d ou r desires
can t
be in
themselves
i rr at io na l. I f
that
we re true
metaphysics couldn t
have th e
significance that I think it has. Bu t I see no
reason to
accept
this view. On
t hi s v ie w
what
we
have
reason
to
do
is
w ha t w ou ld
get
us
what
we w an t. B ut most good reasons
for acting are no t given I believe by our
desires. They are
given by
ou r
reasons
for
having
these desir es. I
have th e
old-fash
ioned view that there can be straightforward
truths about
what
w e h av e r ea son
to
want.
To
d ef en d t ha t view
i1 s
better
to
start no t
with ethics b ut w it h simpler and
l es s c on
troversial
reasons. Mackie claimed
that
ob
jectively prescriptive values were too queer
to be part of the fabric
of
th e Universe. But
o ur o rd in ar y
reasons
for c ar in g an d
acting
don t
seem
too queer. If
we believe that
there can t be
such
reasons we ought to
conclude
that
there can t
b e r ea so ns
for be
l ieving either
and then we
might
as weIl
give up both philosophy an d science.
ogito
B ut presumably the
queerness
is no t in
th e
reasons
for acting;
th e
queerness
is
in
the idea that the reasons for a cti ng ar e c on
nected with
th e
n1etaphysical nature
of
th e
w or ld b y s om e
direct means that doesn t
involve
an y
d ep en de nc e o n
what we
hap
pe n
to
care
about.
Parfit There
isn t a sharp distinction between
metaphysical and ordinary facts.
Both
kinds
of fact a re involved in
on e
of th e
questions
that
interests
me most: t ha t o f t he
rationality
of ou r attitudes
to time.
On e
such
attitude
is
what I ve c al le d t he bias towards the near:
caring
more
about the near
future
than
about the d is ta nt
future.
This attitude
is
m os t p ro no un ce d when we re
considering
events that
are good or ba d to
experience
or
live
through. Pain provides
th e
clearest
case.
Since
we care more about the near
future we
sometimes
choose to postpone
s om e o rde al
knowing
that
this
postpone
ment
will only ma ke th e ordeal
worse.
In
such cases I would claim th e fact t ha t our
ordeal will
be worse
is a reason for not
postponing
it
an d
th e
fact
that
it
will
be
further in th e future is no reason for p os t
poning it. That
it will be further
in th e
C O GI TO : S U M ME R 1995
future won t make it
at
th e time an y less
painful
or an y less ours.
Ou r bias
towards
t he n ea r can I
think
be
usefully
compared with a
purely imaginary
attitude
to time. I
described
someone
who
ha s
wh
at I called Future uesd y Indiffer-
ence
This
person
cares
equally
about
hi s
whole
future except
that
he
doesn t
care at
all
about
wh
at
will
happen to hirn
on
future
Tuesdays. So if he had to
choose whether
to
have
a
mild
pain
on
e it he r M on da y
or
Wednesday of next week
o r g re at
agony on
Tuesday
he
would choose th e agony on
Tuesday.
Here again I would say the fact
that th e
agony
will
be
much worse
is a
reason
for
not
preferring it and th e fact that
itwill b e o n T ue sd ay is no reason for prefer
ring
i
This attitude
would be
qu i
te ir
rational.
Some people think this attitude
too
crazy to be
worth discussing.
Bu t
it s
like
ou r
bias
towards the ne
ar
e xc ep t t ha t
i s
more
obviously arbitrary. I also imagined an
intermediate
case:
caring
more about the
next year.
In
t he se e xa mpIes th e fact t ha t s om e p ai n
will
be more
painful isn t a metaphysical
fact
no r
are th e facts
that
some pain
w il l b e
on a Tuesday or further in th e future. Bu t
s om e o f o ur
attitudes to time
d o r es t
on facts
that
involve metaphysics.
On e
is
what
I
called
ou r bias towards the future This
applies to
events that
are
good or ba d
to
experience or live through. We care
more
about these events
when they are in
th e
future rather
t ha n t he
past.
A nd t hi s distinc
tion raises
deep
philosophical
questions.
On
one view
a bo ut t ime
th e
property
of
being present or occurring
now
is an objec
tive feature
of
reality an d time s
passage
is
t he m ov em en t o f t ha t
feature
into th e
future.
This
is t he vi ew t ha t c an s eem to justify
ou r
bias
towards
th e
future.
O n a no th er
vievy
which
I m i nc li ne d
to a cc ep t now is
no
more
objective than or here time s pass
age is a
myth
and there is l es s metaphysical
difference b et we en t he
past
and
th e
future.
T ha t s up po rt s t he a tt it ud e o f
caring
equally
about
good or ba d experiences whether
they are in th e f ut ur e o r
th e
past.
ogito Bu t
isn t ou r
bias
towards
th e future
so
deep-seated t ha t n o m et ap hy si ca l reasoning
could ever dispel it?
Parfit
There
are
tw o
ways
in which
meta
physics ca n
affect
ou r attitudes.
First
it ma y
only
change ou r beliefs about whether ou r
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AN INTERVIEW
WITH
DEREK PARFIT
attitudes are justified or
what
we have rea
sons to care about. Second it mayaiso
change our attitudes or desires. O n t he first
more pe ss imis tic view we are just lum
bered with c er ta in a tt it ud es . We m ay c om e
to see that these attitudes are irrational but
that
will
da
nothing
to get
rid of
t he m. B ut
even this might make a practical difference.
Suppose for example
that
thinking abou t
free will
won t
enable us to get ri d of reac
tive a tt it ude s like anger. T her e s still a dif
ference between anger
which
we regard as
irrational
an d resentment
since the latter
includes the belief
that
t he person we want
to make suffer deserves to suffer.
we come
to believe this attitude to be unjustified that
ma y make a difference to
what
we da.
It s less easy to say ho w
th e
metaphysics
of personal identity should affect our view
about what we have reason to care abou t
an d d a. T he i mp li ca ti on s h er e ta ke l an ge r to
describe. But there is one well-known ex
ample. One central claim of early Buddhism
was that most of ou r suffering arises from a
false belief in the self. T he r em ed y was t he
n o s el f vi ew a ccording to
which
there
aren t really any selves or pers ans. But it
Were the Buddhists right about personal identity
wa s also claimed t ha t t he no self view was
very hard to believe. One main ai m of Bud
dhist monks
when
t he y m ed ita te is to try
fully to internalize the truth of this view so
that it ca n affect their attitudes an d emo
tions.
ogito Can I ask you about another of
Mackie s points? When Mackie doubted that
there could be objectively prescriptive val
ues part of
what
he doubted was
that
there
could
be facts about values o r about rea
sons which it would b e i mpo ss ib le to rec
ognize without being m oved to act.
Parfit
It might be p uz zl ing beliefs about
reasons could necessarily motivate u
That s
one of
Hume s main
arguments:
moral beliefs necessarily motivate
bu t
mere
beliefs
can t
da that so moral beliefs
must
really be a kind
of
des ire. B ut I
would
reject
that argument s first premise. Beliefs about
reasons da not I think necessarily motiv
ate.
ogito But presumably you
think
that suc h
beliefs could m ot iv at e us
and
that they
would then provide the explanation
of
wh y
we act. Isn t that w ha t Mackie finds puz
zling? reasons are facts a bo ut t he worl d
ho w
could
such
facts b ri ng it a bo ut
that
we
act in same particular way?
Parfit
It wouldn t be t he fact itself
bu t
only
ou r bel ie f i n thi s fact. T hos e w ho hold my
kind of view-or what are called External
ists -might cl aim at t hi s
point
that most of
us have a standing des ire to da what we
believe that we have reason to da. That
could be how if we bel ieve we have a
reason that belief tagether w it h t ha t desire
leads us to act. This reply accepts the
H um ea n a cc au nt a cc or di ng to which we
cannot
act
w it ho ut sa me
desire. That ac
count ca n b e chall enged bu t Externalists
don t need to challenge it. According to
Ross for example if I remember right
most
people have same d es ir e to da t he ir du ty
bu t we could know
that
samething was our
duty even if we completely lacked that de
sire.
I ve n ot t ri ed
to reach a view about the
Humean ac count be caus e it seems irrel
e va nt to t he q ue st io ns
w it h w hi ch
I m con
cerned.
I was
p er su ad ed t ha t w e
couldn t
believe
that
we
h ad s am e
reason unless we
had same corresponding desire I would
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have to consider this issue. But I m per
suaded by an example of C hr is ti ne Kors
gaard s:
that of
someone
wh o
is so
depressed
that
sh e just
doesn t
c ar e a bo ut
anything. Such a person
could
still believe
that sh e ha d a reason to act in s om e way
because
sh e
will
later regret
it
sh e
doesn t.
If
sh e
lacks all motivation we
don t
h av e to
c on cl ude t ha t she c an t have
that
belief.
Cogito: When yo u
mentioned
th e Buddhists I
wondered
if you might
say
something
like
this.
Perhaps
the difficulty of c omi ng to act
on a re as on
that
is given you by the meta
physical
facts is th e same as the difficulty of
coming to believe in the metaphysical facts
in the
first place. So what th e Buddhists are
d oi ng is ac qui ri ng t he belief and
through
that th e motivation.
P arf it: In some cases such a claim may be
true; bu t I don t think i t s always true. fwe
take free will which may be the clearest
case many
people
have not
found
it
diff ic ult to b el ie ve
in
determinism. Many
indeed
have found
it
diff ic ult to b el ie ve
that determinism
could be false. f
they
con
clude
that th e truth of determinism under-
mines desert the effect on
their
attitudes
ca n be more straightforward.
T he y c an
still
h av e t he s tr on g c on vi ct io n that what some
c ri mi na l h as d on e
is a terrible thing. And
as I ve said
they
may s ti ll feel anger.
Bu t
they
won t
endorse il\-will towards the
criminal. They won t think either
that it
would
be good
if
th e criminal suffered or
that it matters less if t he c ri mi na l suffers
than if some
innocent
person suffers.
Cogito: So
th e
metaphysics might have
an
effect on
ou r
second-order
attitudes
e
ou r attitudes towards ou r ow n first-order
attitudes an d this second-order difference
might
in turn have an influence on our
behaviour? We might come to regard ou r
anger perhaps as m er el y a p at ho lo gi ca l re
action
an d
seek therapy for ourselves rather
than
demanding punishment
for t he crimi
nal?
Parfit: Yes;
an d
I think i t s also likely t ha t t hi s
would
make ou r anger less
intense
an d less
la st ing. W e all h av e t he se natural reactions
bu t
if we don t endorse
the m t ha t h elp s
to
ove rc ome t hem . I m helped in
this
area by
the fact that I get angry with material objects
all the time. I sometimes
want
to kick my
car for e xa mpl e. S inc e I have t hi s a nge r at
material objects which is manifestly ir-
C O GI T O: S U M ME R 1995
rational it s easier to me to think when I
get angry
with
people t hat t hi s is also ir
rational.
n obviously irrational aet But is
ny
more
rational
to
get angry t other people
Cogito: I was surprised to
hear
you say that
many
people find it eas y to be li ev e
in
deter
minism. Didn t Ka nt c la im t ha t a t th e mo
ment
when we are actually making a
decision we necessarily act under th e
idea
of freedom ? Isn t t ha n a n essential
aspect
of
facing up to adecision?
Parfit: Some people
have
t ho ug ht t ha t t ha t w e
can t at the time of making adecision
believe in determinism. Others of whom
I m one see no
tension
here.
When
I con
sider
wh
at it s like to make adecision I
d on t t hi nk I am presupposing the falsity of
determinism.
I would
no w
d is ti ng ui sh t wo ways
in
which metaphysics
ca n
m ak e a di ffe rence .
In the clearest cases there is one intelligible
metaphysical view
whose
t ru th w ou ld jus
tify s om e
attitude
or moral belief of ours
an d
another metaphysical view w ho se tru th
would
show t ha t ou r
attitude
is unjustified.
In such cases whether the
attitude
is
justified
depends
on which metaphysical
vie w is true.
S om e ca ses are m or e c om pl ic at ed . Thus
in the case of free
will
an d
time s
passage
there is one metaphysical view whose truth
would
undermine some
of
ou r attitudes.
f
determinism
is true there ca n be no desert;
and if time s passage is an illusion we
cannot
justify
ou r
bias t ow ard s t he future.
In both cases there are
other metaphysical
views whose truth might seem to justify ou r
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AN INT ER VIEW W IT H DEREK
P A R F I T
attitudes. But I m i nc li ne d to be lie ve that
this is
no t
so. I agree
with
those
w ho t hi nk
that
even
if
determinism
is false there
could be no ba si s for dese rt.
An d
I doubt
whether
even
if
time s
passage were
not an
illusion we cou ld justify ou r bias towards
th e
future.
In
such
cases
it
may seem t hat
metaphysics doesn t make a difference
since
th e
justifiability of our attitudes
doesn t depend on which
metaphysical
view
is tr ue .
Mark Johnston defends a view that is
s ha rp ly o pp os ed to mine. On his view
which he
calls
Minimalism
metaphysics
is always irrelevant to ou r p ra ct ic al c on-
cerns. It would support that view if we
decided
that
whichever
metaphysical
view
is true o ur a tt it ud es or moral beliefs re
justified. But in th e cases I ve just men-
tioned
my conclusion
is
t ha t ou r
attitudes
ren justified. A nd that means that
in
a
different way
metaphysics
s ti ll m ak es a dif-
ference.
Th e
justifiability o f t he se a tt it ud es
ma y
not depend on which metaphysical
view is true. But we need to
think
about
metaphysics to see tha t
on an y
o f t he poss-
ible views the se a ttitudes are no t justified.
ogito Ca n we return to th e cases in which
on
one metaphysical view
ou r
attitudes are
justified but
on another
view
they
are not?
In such cases some people might say ou r
v ie ws a bo ut m et ap hy si cs are likely to de-
pend
on
our
views about ethics rather
than
vice versa.
Parfit Some
people
have
said
this;
but
I
think
that
in
so me ca ses this c le arIy gets t hi ng s
the
wrong
way round. Suppose
someone
argued We ca n deserve
punishment
for
what
we
do; but we
couldn t
deserve pun-
ishment if determinism
were true; therefore
determinism
is no t true . As it stands
this
argument seems to
me
useless since it s
hard to see
ho w we
could
be
sure
that
we
di d
deserve
punishment
for ou r crimes if
we thought that this could not
be
true
un -
less
determinism
were false
an d
w e w er en t
sure that determinism wa s false. We might
ad d
an extra premise to th e argument. We
might believe that God treats
us
as d ese rv -
ing
punishment
for
ou r
crimes
an d
that
God
wouldn t
treat us unjustly. Then we
would
have
a useful argument against deter-
m in is m. B ut i t
w ould now
be another
meta-
physical premise about th e existence
an d
nature of God w hic h w hic h
would
give us
reason to accept th e metaphysical con-
clusion. At
the moment
I n1
inclined
to
doubt
whether it s ever
th e
case
that
we ca n
believe b ot h t ha t some mora l belie f
presup-
poses some metaphysic al belief
an d that
th e meta physica l belie f must be true be-
cause
th e
moral
belief
is tr ue .
ogito
That
suggests that
yo u
think t ha t as a
g en er al r ul e
t he gr ou nds
of metaphysic al
a rgume nts provide
a better or firmer basis
than th e
sorts of attitude
that
lead
people
to
h ol d t he moral convictions that they do.
Parfit That
isn t
quite it. My view is
rather
that
when ou r
moral beliefs appeal to cer-
tain facts
they
rest
on
t ho se facts. Sin ce
that s so we can t
decide
whether those
facts obtain
b y a pp ea li ng
to t ho se beliefs.
That
isn t exactly
wishful
thinking
bu t
it
involves th e same kind of mistake.
ogito Yes
but w ha t we ve
got to compare
are th e grounds for ou r beliefs in metaphys-
ical facts
on
th e one side against th e
grounds for a cc ep ta nc e o f ethical convic-
tions
on
th e ot he r. F or what
you re
saying
y ou n ee d to be c on vi nc ed t ha t t he grounds
for metaphysical views are of a sort
that
gives
them
greater strength
than th e
grounds
for ou r ethical attitudes ca n give to those
attitudes.
Parfit
N ot q uite
because
I agree
t ha t t he re
ma y
be
areas where as Johnston claims
metaphysics is irrelevant. In
such
cases
perhaps
we can
b e c on fi de nt of our moral
beliefs an d justifiably confident that these
beliefs
c annot be threat ened by
metaphys-
ics.
Al l
I wa s s ay in g w as that we couldn t
usefull
y argue both that our moral
belief
requires some metaphysical
view
to
be
true
an d
that
since
ou r moral
belief
is t ru e th e
metaphysical
view
must be
true.
ogito Perhaps
we
ought to shift at this
point an d discuss in a little more detail
your
views a bo ut p er so na l identity. Ho w
di d
yo u c om e to ta ke
such
a special interest
in this
particular subject?
Parfit It s n ot h a rd to
explain that
interest. It s
easy to
be
specially concerned about ou r
own continued existence over time. But per-
haps
I
could
sa y this. Consider Wiggins s
imagined case in
which
m y brai n will
be
divided
an d
e ac h h al f w il l be successfully
transplanted into the e mpt y
skull
of some
other
body.
An d
s up po se w e
agree as
most
people would
that there are two resulting
p eo pl e. I f that is so these tw o
people
can t
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Severing
the
corpus callosum separates the two
hemispheres
of the
brain
n seems
to create two
distinct centres of consciousness
e ac h b e
on e
an d
th e
same person
me
And
since there s
no
reason
to believe
that
I
would
be one of these people we ought to
concl
ude that I would
be
neither
of thes e
people
and
that
I
would
t he re fo re c ea se to
exist.
This
case seemed to
me
to
s ho w t ha t
what
we
have reason
to c ar e a bo ut in caring
about
ou r future isn t that
w e o ur se lv es
should
continue to exist. If we were about
to
divide
in
this
way we
should conclude
that our relation to each of the resulting
people
though
it
wouldn t be personal
identity
would contain everything that mat
ters in our ordinary survival. If
that
is so it
seemed to me
ou r reason
to
b e s pe ci al ly
c on ce rn ed a bo ut o ur future
can t
be as
we
assurne
that
this will
be our
f ut ur e. Pe r
sonal identity
is
n ot w ha t
matters.
Bu t that s
very hard
to believe.
ogito
It mi gh t h el p some of our readers if
you co ul d relate y ou r v ie w to th e famous
d is cu ss io n o f p er so na l i de nt it y in Locke s
Essay Locke
argued
for psychological conti
nuity
as
th e
real
criterion
o f p er so na l i de nt
ity or a s what
makes
us
on e
an d
th e
same
person over
time. I
suppose
yo u
would
sa y
2
left fi l right fi l
~ t t l orpus llosum
C O GI TO : S U M ME R
1995
that his theory
can t adequately handle
cases of division?
Parfit Locke does
mention
a case of
division
though
it
involves
curiously th e
continuity
of
consciousness in
a severed toe. I like to
think
that
Locke
could have
b ee n w on
over
to
t he vi ew t ha t
what
matters
is
no t
identity
bu t psychological
continuity.
Because he
thought that
both
of
these mattered
he
wa s
le d to
claim
that
if
we are
conscious
of
some
past act
it
must
have been us who
d id t ha t
act an d if we
cannot
remen1ber it we can t
have done
it.
T ha t c an t be
right.
ogito It s central to y our vi ew th at what we
should
care about is n ot p er so na l
identity.
So it s
puzzling
that you nonetheless spend
a gre at
deal
of
t ime discussing identity
and
rather less
time
on
those t hi ng s th at on
your view we
should
care about.
Parfit T he m ai n
reason
for that is t ha t it s so
hard
to b eli eve
that
identity-or ou r own
continued
existence-isn
what matters.
Another
related point
is
th e
following. It
seems
to
me
well
worth
considering
th e
bizarre problem cases
that
Locke intro
duced an d that still dominate the literature.
By
considering these
cases we
discover that
we are deeply
inclined
to hold certain be
liefs
about
ourselves an d
ou r identity.
If
we
imagine
t ha t w e
are
about
to
undergo
on e
of
these
bizarre operations we may not know
wh
at we should
expect to happen: whether
for
example we
should
expect ever
to wake
up again. But if we ask Will t he pe rs on
wh o
wakes
up
be
me? it ca n s eem
that
this
question must
have an answer which
n1ust
be either
yes or no. We
take o ur c on ti nu ed
existence to be a kind of fact that
must
be
determinate
and all-or-nothing. If someone
willlater be
in
pain
we
assurne
that
person
must either
be
or not be uso
That a ss um pt ion c oul d
only be
true
I
believe on something like a Cartesian vie V .
On such a view w e e it he r have
or
a re p er
sisting
i nd iv is ib le i mm at er ia l
entities
souls or
pure
egos-whose identities must
be determinate. I m not claiming
that most
of
us accept tha t
kind of
view.
Most
of
us
nowadays
reject such views.
Bu t we
con
tinue
to think a bo ut ou r
identity in
a
wa y
t ha t c ou ld only be justified if some
such
view
were
true. In order to come to se e that
identity
i sn t w ha t
matters
we
need
to
be
shown
that
w e c on ti nue to think in
that
w a y - t h a t we
believe t ha t o ur
own
contin-
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AN INT ERV IEW W IT H DEREK
P A R F I T
ued existence does have this very special
character. That belief, I think, under lies ou r
v ie w t ha t i de nt it y
must be what matters.
ogito I s now ten years
since th e
appear
ance of Reasons n Persons How have
your
views about personal
identity
changed
in
the intervening
decade?
Parfit
Th e main
c ha ng e is
th e
following.
In
my book I was inconsistent in my attitude
to th e criteria
of
pers on al identity. I n the
first printing, I argued in favour
of
a
purel
y
psychological criterion. I
no w
t hi nk t ha t it s
amistake to
s pe nd m uc h t ime discussing
the choice between the
different criteria.
W ha t s m or e
important
is to see that, when
these criteria conflict, que stions a bout
ou r
identity
are what I c al l empty Even without
answering
these
questions
,
we
c ou ld k no w
th e
full
truth about what wa s
going to
hap
pen. And I n ow t hi nk that, even in ordinary
cases,
where
questions
abo ut ou r id entity
h ve
answers, these
questions
are, in a wa y,
empty. If
we
know all
th e
facts
about
physi
cal an d psychological co nt in ui ty , w e k no w
what s going to happen. Q ue st io ns a bo ut
ou r
identity are merely questions about ho w
we can
redescribe what s g oi ng to
happen.
They
are,
in
asense,
m er el y c on ce pt ua l
questions.
ogito If these questions are merely concep
tua I, d oe s it follow that t he an sw er s can t
provide
reasons for
having
son1e
particular
attitude
o r o th er ?
Parfit That doesn t stric tly follow, bu t I think
it s true. Let
me
give
another
example, to
illustrate
th e
difference
be twe en que stions
about reality and conceptual questions.
Suppose
I learn
th at m y
b ro th er s p la ne h as
c ra she d. I ask, Is
he
still alive? This
might
be
a
question about
reality,
since
I
ma y
have
no idea
whether
my brother
is
quite
all
right, or ha s b ee n b lo w n to p ie ce s . Su
ppose
n ex t t ha t
I
le arn that
my
brother
is in hospi
tal,
an d t ha t b ec au se o f
dan1age to
h is b ra in
he is irreversibly unconscious. His heart is
still beating, and h is o th er organs ar e s ti ll
functioning, but
that
is o nly becaus e h e is
attached
to some
machine.
Once again, I
ask, Is
m y b ro th er
sti ll alive?
But t hat
is
no w
a
q ue st io n o f
a
quite
different
kind.
I
know
wh
a t s ta te my brother is in. My ques
tion
is
no longer a bo ut t wo
different possi
bilities, e it he r o f which
might
be true. It is
only
about ho w
we
ca n re-classify
my
brother s state , or about
o ur c on ce pt
of be
in g alive.
Suppose that, given our use of that con
cept, there is
no d oub t
that someone whose
heart
is stil l beating,
an d w ho se o th er
or
ga ns ar e s ti ll f un ct io ni ng , is s ti ll a liv e. Th e
fact
that this person
s
heart
is
beating
doesn t
cause
it to be
true
that
this pe rson
is
still alive. The relation
between
these facts
is c lose r than that. In such a case,
that
s
wh t
it
is for
this
person to be still alive.
M an y p eo pl e assurne that, i f su ch a person
is sti ll alive, it n1ust be wrong to stop his
heart
from beating,
since
we
w o ul d t he n
be
killing hirn. On my view, if w e d ec id e that,
in itself, i t is morally unimportant
that
this
person
s
heart
is still beating,
we
should
conclude that i1 s unin1portant that he is
sti ll alive. Tha1 s because, in th e s en se I ve
sketched, that is a
conceptual
fact. Concepts
like alive and kill have, we assurne, great
rational an d moral significance. But, on
my
view,
it
doesn t
matter
that such a
concept
applies. What matte rs is why
it
applies. In
t hi s i ma gi ne d case,
even
if
my
brother is
still alive,
he
is irreversibly
unconscious.
If
h is b ei ng
sti ll alive
just
consists in
th e
fact
that his heart is s ti ll be at in g, it is
no t
mor
ally significant that
he
is still alive. Nor is it
significant that,
if
we
stopped
h is h ea rt
from
beating,
we
would be k il li ng hirn. If that s
wh
at he
would have
wanted,
that is what
we should do.
ogito Th e
philosophical
literature
on
per
sonal
identity
often
sounds,
to th e outside,
like a wild excursus into science fiction.
Y
ou
have
played your part in
t hi s t re nd.
Recently, however, there has been a reac
tion
in t he l it er at ur e against
th e
use of
bizarre
thought-experiments.
Kathy Wilkes,
for example, in h er b oo k Real Persons tries
do do without thought-experiments an d
us e
only
real examples. An d
Bernard
Willian1s,
though
he ha s used biz arre thought-experi
ments in
th e
past
to argue for a criterion
of
p ers on al id ent ity bas ed on bodily
conti
nuity, no w warns that yo u ca n tell what is
e ssentially the same story in different ways
to generate different
and
conflicting
intu
itions.
Parfit People a ppe al to b iz ar re examples for
different reasons.
S om e p eo pl e h op e
to v in
dicate one
p ar ti cu la r v ie w a bo ut
th e
true
c ri te ri on o f p er so na l i de nt it y. I agree that
can t be achieved. I also agree that, as
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Williams says
we can produce
different in
tuitive responses by giving different de
s cr ip ti on s o f t he same case. But 1 appeal to
such
c ase s for a di ff er en t r ea son .
That
is to
get us to see as W il li am s
was the
first to
argue in his wonderful article T he s el f
and
th e future
that
we
are
inclined
to b el ie ve
that
our identity must be determinate. Sup
p os e w e i ma gi ne ourselves about to undergo
s om e b iz ar re operation and we ask Will
th e resulting
person b e me?
Or am 1 about
to
di e? Is
this
t he e nd ? As I ve said
i t s n at u
ral to assurne
that this
question
must have
an
answer.
1 appeal to
such
cases to show
how compelling
that
assumption s
On my view
ou r
question would be
empty.
If
we
knew what was
go in g t o
hap
pen
to
our brain
and
body
a nd w ha t k in d
of
experiences would l at er o cc ur we would
know
e ve ry th in g t he re is to
know.
We
w ou ld kn ow everything even though we
didn t
k no w w heth er we were about to die
or would wake up
again.
Instead of
asking
Would
th e resulting person be me?
it
would be
clearer
t o a sk Would i t b e c or re ct
to call that
person
me? That reminds us
that there ar e
no t
here at the level of what
happens
tw o
different possibilities.
There
are
merely two ways of
redescribing
what
will
happen.
If
we come
to
understand that
fact
we
ought to conclude 1 believe that
o ur i de nt it y is
no t
what m at te rs . To us e a
slogan that 1
no w
find tempting
what
mat
t er s is r ea li ty
no t
how
it
is described.
Cogito S om eo ne m ig ht try to resist your
views at this point by admitting that
in
some of
th e bizarre cases
there
is
no
deter
m in at e a ns we r to t he q ue st io n Will it be
me? but insisting
that in
almost a ll or di
nary cases t hi s q ue st io n h as a clear an swe r.
Such a p er so n mi ght ask Wh y should 1
take
th e
s ub ve rs iv e P ar fi ti an m es sa ge
on
board by g en er al iz in g f rom
th e
bizarre
cases?
Parfit That
d ep end s on w ha t
th e message s
M y c la im is that what matters isn t personal
identity bu t certain other facts which nor
mally go along with personal identity. 1
advance two different kinds of argument for
this claim. The first appeals to imagined
cases
in which personal
identityand
these
other facts
come
apart.
When
we
think
about
such
cases
we
can
be
le d
to see
believe
that
it is
th e
other facts which mat
ter. S om eo ne m ig ht say agree that
in
C O GI T O: S U M M ER 1 9 9 5
those bizarre cases identity i sn t w ha t mat
ters. But it what matters
in
al l ordinary
cases . That response is 1 think unreason
able. I m
appealing
to a
kind of
inference
that
we
often make. If X
and
Y
always
go
together an d we
think that
X -a nd -Y to
gether have a
certain
significance
we
ma y
wonder
whether
both matter or only one of
them matters. The obvious move is to im
agine cases i n w hi ch X and Y come apart . If
we decide
that
in these
cases it
would be
Y
that mattered we
h av e g oo d
reason to con
clude that even in ordinary cases
it
is Y
that matters. This is l ik e
th e
us e
of
artificial
experiments in s ci en ce . W e c re at e a purified
situation
in
which tw o factors come apart
a nd t he n
extrapolate
o u r ans wer
to
th e
ordi
nary
cases
in w hic h
these
factors
hold
to
gether.
The other a rgun1e nt I v e
mentioned
is
quite different. T ha t a pp ea ls to the general
claim that when
we
know th e facts about
physical an d
psychological
continuity
there
is a
sense in which
we
know
what
would
happen. G ive n a knowledge of
those
other facts claims a bo ut p er so na l i de nt it y
do
no t
give f ur th er information about re
ality but merely tell us how given ou r
concepts
w ha t h ap pe ns c an be redescribed.
then
appeal
to
t he c la im
t ha t w ha t
matters
is reality
no t
how reality ca n be described.
T hi s a rg um en t does no t appeal to b iz ar re
examples. It
appeals
to
th e implications of
what
1 call a
Reductionist
view.
On my
view though facts a bo ut p er so na l i de nt it y
are no t t he s am e as facts about physical and
psychological continuity they just consist
in those other
facts.
W he n we
see how
that
is t rue we
should
conclude believe
that
it can only be the other facts which matter.
Cogito You are a revisionary metaphysician
in t he s en se that yo u th in k that
we
al l hold
certain de eply held bu t
incorrect vie\vs
about
reality.
Many such
philosophers
adopt a
twofold
strategy. First
they
explain
wh y
our deeply held views
in
some area are
incorrect; then they go on
to
provide an
e rr or t he or y : an account
of
ho w people
come to h ol d s uc h incorrect beliefst Do yo u
have an error theory to account for what
ar e- on your v i e w - o u r
mistaken beliefs
about personal
identity
an d
its in1portance?
Parfit
have
some thoughts
on
this
subject
but they re
no t
original. A partial expla
nation is
that
we are
m is led b y
our concep-
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4
time.
That seems
to
me
amistake. I think we
should recognize that
there
ca n be alterna-
tive conceptual
schemes
which are
both
ad-
equate
an d whi ch both make true
claims
about reality. That s why
I m n ot t em pt ed
to
d en y t ha t t he re
are
persons.
Th e
B ud dh is t no s el f v ie w c ou ld
b e i nt er
preted like this. As I ve said we are in-
clined to
h av e c er ta in
strong beliefs
abou
t
personal
identity
such as t he b el ie f t h a t o ur
identity must be
determinate.
We might re-
gard
such b el ie fs as
entering into ou r
con-
cept of
aperson.
That
would
e xp la in t he
claim that there are no persons. That
would
be a way of
claiming
that
there
are no enti-
ties with th e
special properties
t ha t w e take
persons to have: subjects of
experience
w ho se i de nt it y
must
b e d et er min at e. B ut
I
prefer
to
sa y that
we are
no t entities
like
that.
ogito One of the
uses
to which th e tra-
ditional
conceptual scheme
ha s
been put is
to provide a
rational
grounding for
pru
de nc e. I f
we
believe that
we have a
special
relation
to
ourselves
in
th e
future which
we
don t have to
other
people that
ha s
been
thought to
make
prudence a pre-eminently
rational
form
of practical concern.
What im-
plications do your views
of identity hold for
this
subject?
Parfit That question raises son1e difficult
and
complicated issues. Butler said
of
Locke s
theory
that if it
were true we would
have
no
reason to
c ar e a bo ut ou r
future . I
don t
think
that s right. We do have reason I
b el ie ve t o c ar e
about
ou r future.
Bu t
we
ma y
no t
have as mu
reason
as
some of
us
think
we
have. We
have
several
kinds of
c on ce rn a bo ut o ur future.
O ne k in d
which
we might call nticip tory
concern
we
can t
have
about
other
people s future. If we
know
that ou r child
will later
be in
pain we
ma y care
more
about
that
p ain than we care
about our own future
pain;
but we
can t
anticipate ou r c hi ld s pain. This kind of
concern may I think be in s om e w ay s tied
to certain false beliefs
about personal ident
ity or what is involved in ou r ow n
contin
ue d existence. If we lose
those
beliefs
that
concern might
be
weakenBd a nd sh ow n to
be
g ro un dl es s. B ut t he re
are
o th er r ea so ns
for
special concern
which might
be
unaf-
fected.
ogito W ha t o th er sorts of reasons are yo u
thinking of?
COGITO: SUNINIER 1995
Parfit On e
class of
reasons
are those de-
scribed by Perry in hi s article T he import
ance of
being
identical . These reasons
appeal
to o ur p re se nt desires projects or
an1bitions. As
Perry points
out
we
are
likely to be the
people
wh o are
best
ab le to
fulfil
some
of
these
desires.
That
gives
us
a
derivative reason to want to remain alive
and weIl. But such concern is
very
different
from o ur ordinary
concern.
Suppose we
know that we
shall
be
destroyed
but
that
scientists
willlater make an
exact
replica
of
u
T ho ug h t ha t replica
will
no t e
us
hi s
similarity to us
would
make hirn just as
good at fulfilling many of our plans and
projects. T hus he c ou ld finish
th e
book that
we were
writing.
Perry claims
that we
would
have
as
much
reason
to
be specially
concerned about th e future of our
replica.
ogito W ha t i f t he re w as someone completely
different-not a
replica-who
would be as
good or better at carrying
ou t
ou r projects?
Parfit That would also give
us on Perry s
account
less
reason
to want to
survive
our-
selves.
ogito So th e big change here is
that
ou r
reason
to
be
prudent
or
to care specially
a bo ut o ur
ow n
future becomes something
entirely contingent?
Parfit
That s
true
on
P erry s account.
But as
I ve said that account explains only one
kind
o f r ea so n
for
s pe ci al c on ce rn .
There
a re o th er s.
Thus
as se ve ra l writers
claim
most o f u s
care
specially about
certain
other
people-such as ou r f am il y o r friends-and
w e might care
specially
about ourselves in
th e
same kind
of way. Since
ou r
family an d
friends are
no t
identical to us such
concern
would
also be in a wa y contingent and
would not be
founded on the fact of our
identity o ve r t im e.
This
concern is unlike
Perry s
since
it would also
no t
b e f ou nd ed
o n o ur
present projects. If
we
care about
ou r
friends
that
need
no t be
because
we and
they
ar e
trying
to
achieve th e same
things.
Bu t
i f w e cared about ourselves in th e future
only in the kind of way in w hic h we care
about
certain
other
people
s om e e le me nt s
in our
ordinary concern
would
I think
be
missing. T he m os t
obvious
element is
antic
i
patory concern.
ogito
Is
ou r
concern about
ou r friends based
on
reasons at
all?
Isn t this more
like a
Humean concern that exists
independently
of
reasons?
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AN I NT ER VI EW W IT H DEREK PARFIT
Parfit
That s a disputed question. Some writ
ers such as Whiting defend Aristotle s
view
that
our friendshi
p
should be b as ed o n
ou r friends admirable qualities. Others in
sist that love is
no t
based
on
reasons
an d
that
we
should go
on loving people however
much
they c ha nge
for
th e
worse. It s
hard
to
dec ide when an d how
we
have
reasons for
caring about ou r
friends.
Cogito But when we do have such reasons
some of these
don t
look as
if
they
would
also justify
ou r
caring
about
o ur o wn
future.
Parfit Williams suggested that on Aristotle s
view th e ideal friend
would be
a three
d im en si on al m ir ro r image of ourselves.
An d some suggest that
on
such a view
w e adm ire and
love
such
friends
because
t he y h av e
th e
qualities
that we
admire an d
love in ourselves. But this seems
no t
to
capture much o f o ur o rd in ar y
self-concern.
We
can be specially
concerned
abou t ou r
ow n future even if
we
don t
admire our
selves.
Cogito
W ha t o th er ch ang es in
ou r
thoughts
an d attitudes might flow from this different
w ay o f thi nk in g ab ou t
persons?
Parfit
Another a ttitude
worth
mentioning
is
our a ttitude to ou r death. 1 know that after
a few
more
years
1
shall
no t
exist.
That
fact
c an s ee m
very disturbing. But on my view
it can be redescribed. It is th e fact that after
a certain time none
of
th e experiences that
occur wi ll be
connected
in c ertain ways
to
my present e xperie nc es. That does no t seem
so bad. In that
redescription my dea th
se ems to disappear.
Time s passage is also relevant. When
we
are
depressed by
th e
t ho ug ht o f
ageing
an d
th e
approach
of death we are depressed
by
th e
fact that
we shall have
less
and
less to
look forward to.
That
seems
so
ba d
because
o f o ur
bias towards th e future. If
we
lost
that
bias perhaps
because
we concluded that
time s passage wa s an illusion t ha t w ou ld
make a great difference. 1 imagined someone
5
wh o
was temporally neutral an d
wh o
cared
in
th e
same w ay abo ut good or ba d experi
ences whether
th ey were
in the future or
th e past. Such a person would not be dis
t urbed if
he
wa s
about
to die.
Though
he
would h av e n ot hi ng
to
look
forward to
he
would
h av e h is
whole
life to l oo k
backward
to. His
position would be no
worse than if
he
ha d
only
just
started
to exist
an d
ha d
nothing to l oo k backward to. Wherever he is
in
hi s
li h e w ou ld have
h is w ho le
life to
look
either backward
o r f orw ard to.
Cogito
B ut y ou r i ma gi ne d ma n could still be
u ps et t ha t hi s life is less long than it
could
otherwise have
been?
Parfit Yes. If
he ha d j us t c om e i nt o
existence
he might regard it as ba d news that
he
ha d
only
years to look forward. He
might
p re fe r to l ive for s ev er al c en tu ri es . E ve n so
if
he was temporally neutral he would re
gard it as
no
worse
w he n b ec au se h e
is
about
to die
he ha s
not in to l oo k f or wa rd
to no t even th e pleasures o r lo ok in g ba ck
ward. He would still
have
ye ar s to look
backward
to. If we
ha d this a ttitude
to time
that would change o ur att itud e to ageing
and
death.
These
remarks overlook those many atti
tudes of ours which involve o ur p lan s or
projects.
Since we
can t
affect
th e
past look
in g
backwards
cannot
be just
l ike looking
forwards. But that s no t what affects u s m os t
when
we
think we have
nothing
to look
f or wa rd to.
That
is an attitude no t to th e
fulfilment of our plans bu t to ou r experi
e nc es . E ve n a fte r ou r death
our plans may
be fulfilled. What disturbs us is that
shall no t exist.
Cogito We
traditionally
close
these interviews
by
asking
ou r
in terviewees about their
extracurricular
activities.
Parfit
have
1
t hi nk o nl y o ne d is ti nc ti ve
activity: a rc hi te ct ur al p ho to gr ap hy in
colour. My subjects are Venice
in
all weath-
ers an d Oxford an d S t P etersburg in mist
an d
snow.