Paras v Comelec

6
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996 DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. R E S O L U T I O N FRANCISCO, J.: Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. 1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval. 2 In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply. 3 Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13,

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Transcript of Paras v Comelec

  • Republic of the Philippines

    SUPREME COURT

    Manila

    EN BANC

    G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996

    DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,

    vs.

    COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

    R E S O L U T I O N

    FRANCISCO, J.:

    Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won

    during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay

    was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public

    respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled

    the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13,

    1995. 1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25%

    requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of

    petitioner's opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this

    time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before

    the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil

    Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting

    a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required

    petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for

    misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval. 2

    In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall

    election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for

    injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the

    Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In

    view of the Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that

    of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner

    thereafter filed a reply. 3

    Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,

    otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place

    within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year

    immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13,

  • 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by

    Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In

    support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621,

    where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that

    as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four

    months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.

    The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

    Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

    (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to

    office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

    [Emphasis added]

    It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with

    reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the

    other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 The evident intent

    of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of

    office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when

    such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of

    his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local

    election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local

    Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people

    before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every

    three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local

    election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted

    rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

    In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature

    intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing

    in the enactment of a statute. 5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a

    statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,

    emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or

    nugatory. 6

    It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in

    harmony with the Constitution. 7 Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government

    Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional

    mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which

    shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted

    through a system of decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and

    referendum . . . ."

  • Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot

    countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

    We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its

    purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that

    killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth". . . 8

    The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in

    this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.

    Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government

    unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall

    election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the

    proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The

    electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer

    tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in

    keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as

    one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be

    recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

    Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under

    Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay

    office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May

    1997. 9

    ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The

    temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election

    should be as it is hereby made permanent.

    SO ORDERED.

    Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,

    Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

    Separate Opinions

    DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

  • I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia.

    However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be considered a "regular

    local election" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

    The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of elective local

    officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The elective national

    officials are the President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local

    officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of

    cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities,

    punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional

    officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective

    officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides:

    Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

    xxx xxx xxx

    (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and

    qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over

    all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or

    involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

    A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by

    those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are

    registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V

    of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he

    can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the

    Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).

    Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local

    Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a

    regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be

    considered a regular election (whether national or local).

    Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth organization, and although fully

    recognized in the Local Government Code and vested with certain powers and functions, its

    elective officials have not attained the status of local elective officials. So, in Mercado vs. Board

    of Election Supervisors (243 SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that although the SK Chairman

    is an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay an elective body that fact does not make him "an elective barangay official," since the law specifically provides who comprise the

    elective officials of the sangguniang barangay, viz., the punong barangay and the seven (7)

    regular sangguniang barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the right

    of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution, who are likewise registered voters of the

    barangay. This shows further that the SK election is not a regular local election for purposes of

    recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code.

  • Separate Opinions

    DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

    I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia.

    However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be considered a "regular

    local election" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

    The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of elective local

    officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The elective national

    officials are the President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local

    officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of

    cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities,

    punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional

    officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective

    officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides:

    Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

    xxx xxx xxx

    (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and

    qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over

    all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or

    involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

    A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by

    those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are

    registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V

    of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he

    can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the

    Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).

    Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local

    Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a

    regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be

    considered a regular election (whether national or local).

    Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth organization, and although fully

    recognized in the Local Government Code and vested with certain powers and functions, its

    elective officials have not attained the status of local elective officials. So, in Mercado vs. Board

    of Election Supervisors (243 SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that although the SK Chairman

    is an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay an elective body that fact does not make him "an elective barangay official," since the law specifically provides who comprise the

  • elective officials of the sangguniang barangay, viz., the punong barangay and the seven (7)

    regular sangguniang barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the right

    of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution, who are likewise registered voters of the

    barangay. This shows further that the SK election is not a regular local election for purposes of

    recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code.

    Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

    Footnotes

    1 COMELEC Resolution No. 95-3345, September 5, 1995.

    2 RTC, Cabanatuan City, Order dated December 20, 1995; Rollo, p. 28.

    3 Rollo, pp. 64-66.

    4 Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 464, 467.

    5 Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617, 627.

    6 Id. at p. 628.

    7 PLDT v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674.

    8 People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163, 167.

    9 Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 5; See: Evardorne v. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464.