paper I.docx

7/25/2019 paper I.docx

1/14

A critique of french conventionalism

introduction

A lot can be said that disqualies this thesis. For the purpose of this paper,

however, it should suce to

In order to stay with our subject, I will content myself by merely pointing out that

y aim is two defend! disqualify

y main purpose is

y aim will be twofold

ore specicaly, I would li"e to present a

oreover!furthermore

#espite dupuys, it$s not all that clear why

%hile this may seem plausible at rst, it really isn$t all that clear why&

'rl(an is not very clear on this matter, but

obscure

As )obel puts it

'r in 'rl(ans terminology

*ased on underlying conception of rationality

As stated earlier

+ommon cause gedachte van -od

/it"omst gedrag

*u this presupposes that we assume From the onset, a which we refuted

In turn

Introduction


2/14

In this paper, I want to a critique of the French conventionalist school of

economics.

0he main focus hereby will be their ideas on money.

In order to ma"e an informed judgment on this matter, it is necessary to inquire

further into the nature of neoclassical use value by specifying its denition and

e1amining its place in the neoclassical 2or marginalist3 edice as a whole. 0his

will be our aim in the ne1t sections.

Value as substance

According to French conventionalism, e1change can solely ta"e place if the

e1changed goods are equivalent to one another. 0he very notion of equivalence

presupposes commensurability, in other words the e1istence of a generali4ed

measure of value. 0his measure is supplied by the establishment of a currency

unit, which allows one to objectively compare the value of di5erent goods by

simply loo"ing at their prices.

6owever, this doesn$t solve the problem at hand for theorists who advocate what

)obel designates as the 7real8 approach of economical value, or in 'rl(ans

terminology theories of substance value. 0he dening characteristic of such an

approach is that goods are uniquely perceived as physical objects.9 A currency

unit, however, is 7social through and through in that it proceeds from the prince

and from the law.8:

6ence, 7real8 theorists cannot content themselves with this 7rst level of

objectivity8, the objectivity of monetary prices.; 0hey are thus compelled to give

a deeper foundation economical value, which is only e1pressed by the prices of

goods.

For this purpose, they resort to a theory of value which identies economical

value with a single characteristic that all economic goods possess inherently,that

is:without any reference to economical subjects. 0he fact that all economic

goods derive their value from one and the same objective quality guarantees

their commensurability, despite their obvious heterogenity.

)obel distinguishes between two "inds of real theories, depending on the nature

of the substance they posit. 'n the one hand, objective theories of wor" value.

'n the other hand, subjective theories of use value associated with the now

dominant neoclassical paradigm.

9

: )obel

; )obel


3/14

0he french conventionalists mainly concern themselves with the subjective

variant, Sobel dominant paradigma.rinciples of Hconomics

of the signicance that command of each concrete unit; of the

available quantities of these goods has for our lives and wellbeing,

thus causing it to attain value for us.< Must as a penetrating

investigation of mental processes ma"es the cognition of e1ternal

things appear to be merely our consciousness of the impressions

made by the e1ternal things upon our persons, and thus, in the

nal analysis, merely the cognition of states of our own persons, so

too, in the nal analysis, is the importance that we attribute to

things of the e1ternal world only an out=ow of the importance to

us of our continued e1istence and development 2life and wellbeing3.

Kalue is therefore nothing inherent in goods, no property of

them, but merely the importance that we rst attribute to the satisfaction

of our needs, that is, to our lives and wellbeing, and in

consequence carry over to economic goods as the e1clusive causes

of the satisfaction of our needs.


11/14

Indeed, decline

6e is very clear about its subjective nature

%hen I discussed the nature of value, I observed that value is nothing inherent in

goods and that it is not a property of goods. *ut neither is value an independent

thing. 0here is no reason why a good may not have value to one economi4ing

individual but no value to another individual under di5erent circumstances.

'mge"eerd productionunits eerst meest ecINnte

#atgene wat gedrag bepaald waarde

B overduidelij" niet substantieel

+arl enger benadru"t dit citaten

OB 'rl(an vaste voor"euren B "an verschuiven over curves, maar curves 4elf

niet

/seful #istinction in enger between utility and value

Bin engers terminologie nut blijft onveranderd

maar 4elfs indien utiliteit blijft onveranderd vraagcurves veranderen niet, maar

liggen wel nog steeds verschillend

B nog steeds subjective measure of value

B niet substantieel

? 4ijn voor"euren wel onveranderlij"

'o"

admittedly

ut voor alle mensen 4elfde

aar van 4odra er ruil is 2uitgangspunt3

Euil value veranderd! utility niet


12/14

aar oo" in omge"eerde richting

B value individu

/tility for us& o", maar is niet wat gedrag van mensen stuurt

B niet e1change ver"laren

0o any B is accorded the status of economic good.

economical value as a relation between an object and aparticulareconomic

subject

enger denes use value as t

Inconsistent with its most basic premiss.

%hen I discussed the nature of value, I observed that

value is nothing inherent in goods and that it is not a property of goods. *ut

neither is value an independent thing. 0here is no reason

why a good may not have value to one economi4ing individual

but no value to another individual under di5erent circumstances.

0he measure of value is entirely subjective in nature, and

for this reason a good can have great value to one economi4ing

individual, little value to another, and no value at all to a third,

depending upon the di5erences in their requirements and available

amounts. %hat one person disdains or values lightly is appreciated

by another, and what one person abandons is often pic"ed

up by another. %hile one economi4ing individual esteems equally

a given amount of one good and a greater amount of another good,

we frequently observe just the opposite evaluations with another

economi4ing individual.

6ence not only the nature but also the measure of value is

subjective. -oods always have value to certain economi4ing

individuals and this value is also determined only by these individuals.

0he value an economi4ing individual attributes to a good is


13/14

equal to the importance of the particular satisfaction that depends

on his command of the good.P

0he value of goods arises from their relationship to our needs,

and is not inherent in the goods themselves. %ith changes in this

relationship, value arises and disappears.Q

Kalue is thus nothing inherent in goods, no property of them, nor an independent

thing e1isting by itself. It is a judgment economi4ing men ma"e about the

importance of the goods at their disposal for the maintenance of their lives and

wellbeing. 6ence value does not e1ist outside the consciousness of men.R

2;3 %e come now to the third, and most important, cause of

changes in the economic center of gravity of the value of goods.

I refer to increases in the quantities of goods at the disposal of

economi4ing individuals.

H1ogeen gegeven voor"euren

B substantie

Eedenering utiliteit verward met value

B 4olang voor"euren veranderen

aar commensurabiliteit

aar dan nog nut voor allemaal 4elfde of iets dergelij"s

P 9


14/14

1aragraaf over aardebegrip

Verschillen in aardering* condition of e.change

paper I.docx

Documents

Transcript of paper I.docx