Panel 71 Beyond Market and Hierarchies: Networking Asian Merchants and … · 2006-06-29 · 1...

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Panel 71 Beyond Market and Hierarchies: Networking Asian Merchants and MerchantHouses Since the 19th Century

XIV International Economic History Congress Helsinki 2006

Comparative perspectives on Indian merchants’ intra-regional networks:A review from the state and “big business”

Takashi OISHI : [email protected] City University of Foreign Studies (Japan)

Introduction: Niches on the intra-regional networksThis paper takes up the role of Indian merchants in the match export business fromJapan to India from the late nineteenth century to the second decade of twentiethcentury, and aims to analyze the characteristics of their business in comparativeperspectives of other players. More precisely, the paper concerns the enquiry into thecharacter of intra-regional networks of Indian merchants in comparison with tradingcompanies, manufacturers and other bigger players coming from Japan, Europe aswell as India. While scholars involved in the study on intra-regional networks ofindigenous Asian merchants successfully attempted to unearth the less-knownmovements of these merchants, they observed their dynamism or vitality withoutthorough critical examination in comparative analysis with other players. One shouldbe reminded of the possible “weakness” or the marginality of those Asian merchants’intra-regional networks in comparison with “big businesses” of manufacturing, tradeand plantation in the hands of European and Asian merchant houses, managingagencies, etc. We need to first admit that the quantitative scale or the ranges ofhandled economy these Asian merchants associated themselves was usually minor andmarginal in the overall economy in modern Asia. Moreover, intra-regional networksoften in the form of family business involved various fragility and risks. Only throughacknowledging these again, further research can be extended on the vitality of theirintra-regional networks, and on the niches of market carved out by them.1

Second point I am concerned in present paper is the relation between state andintra-regional networks. It has been recently stressed by the scholarship on Chinesemerchants that intra-regional networks shouldered by Chinese merchants were notalways detached or alienated from region or state, but on the contrary often

1 This point was strongly demonstrated by Claude Markovits and Rajeswary Brown,two senior scholars invited to an international workshop at Kyoto(Japan) on Indianmerchants in October 2005. The view reflects their recent monographs. RajeswaryAmpalavanar Brown, Chinese Big Business and the Wealth of Asian Nations, NewYork, 2000. Claude Markovits, The Global World of Indian Merchants, 1750-1947:Traders of Sind from Bukhara to Panama. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2000.

mailto:[email protected]

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inter-dependent with or even casually encouraged by it.2 So far, we undeniably tendedto enlarge the focus on the vitality of intra-regional networks which was likely tosurpass, or to be independent of, the state. We might locate the intra-regional networkseven outside the state. Following the above mentioned recent analysis, it is worthre-examining the intra-regional network of Indian merchants in connection with itspossible inter-association or inter-dependence with the state. Then, there may be apossibility to further find the aspects in which the intra-regional networks were evenmotivated by state. Shouldering the two tasks just mentioned above, this paper looks at the economyof match export from Japan to India. In concrete, it will compare the match exportbusiness on the intra-regional networks of Indian Muslim merchants with the “bigbusiness” under the initiative of Japanese major manufacturers and trading houses,the case of Mitsui/Nippon Match/Honda nexus as one of its example. In the former type,namely, intra-regional networks of Indian Muslim merchants, I will observe what Iname the “piles of small quantity trade,” which was carried on the numeroussegmented labels of matches. I compare its peculiarity with the “bulk trade” in thelatter, where the business was conducted on the selected major labels throughcontinuously generating the market trust in them. For the second task, I put focus onthe issue of match labels as the trademarks. This paper tries to argue that thetrademarks as the state institution worked as one of the fundamental tools by whichIndian merchants with intra-regional networks could somehow lessen, minimize andcasually overcome the disadvantage of capital scale. They took maximum advantage ofthe trademark system and the interests secured in it, and succeeded in the creation ofniches in the trade and market. In order to prove this, I will try to see the details oftrademark institution as well as actual registration of trademarks closely.3 The analysis in this paper requires label-wise observation of match exportbusiness. Therefore, it heavily draws information from the records of trademarks and

2 Scholars who stressed this view were Lin Man-houng and Liu Hong. They havepublished works relating this matter. Lin Man-houng captured the importance ofmultiple nationalities including the imperial Japanese one as the crucial base for theexpansion of Chinese merchants in South-East Asia. See, for example, “OverseasChinese Merchants and Multiple nationality: A Means for Reducing CommercialRisks(1895-1935)” in Modern Asian Studies 35(4), 2001. Liu Hong’s co-authored recentarticle in Tonani-Ajia Kenkyu (Journal Southeast Asian Studies), Kyoto University,also demonstrates this point. In addition, Kagotani’s recent work, an example beingone of the papers in the present panel, highlights the cordial relationship with theChinese and Indian merchants in textiles and the Japanese and British colonialempires even in the midst of increasing tension over trade since mid-1930s.3 For this purpose, I went through files of Shohyo Koho again, the official notificationof trademarks in Japan, which registered tens of thousand match labels in the periodunder this study. In addition, I depended on my personal collection of match labelswhich has been built-up for these several years. As I will mention in the paper, thelabels un-registered in the trademark registry or those bearing some kind of omissionor de-forme of description and design of labels usually shoulder crucial meaning.Therefore, examination on the real labels produced in the market is indispensable.

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the labels themselves. In addition, it is based on the records of exporters’ associationand trading/manufacturing companies, ranging from account books of labels, reportsfor the stake holders, proceedings of staff meeting, and etc.4

Structure of Match Trade between Japan and India

Before entering the analysis of match export business from Japan to India, I justbriefly touch on the chronological perspectives of match economy. Matches as one of thesignificant inventions in the mid-nineteenth century Europe was soon transplanted toJapan, and it soon became a primary export product to surrounding Asian markets.Especially in Hanshin(Osaka-Kobe) region in western part of Japan its manufactureflourished taking advantages of cheap labour, sufficient enterprising capital, dryclimate, Kobe port strategically suitable for Asian market, and etc. Indian domesticproduction was initiated in the 1890s, but had to wait for the substantial growth untilmid1920s, when the improvements of manufacturing technology partly contributed,but the introduction of high tariff against imported matches eventually stopped thein-flow of foreign matches. While the Indian market before the early 1910s wasdominated by European countries, especially Sweden, matches from Japan reachedIndia as early as the 1880s, and gradually increased its share. Partly thanks to theWorld War First, Japanese matches eventually monopolized Indian market, keepingits share at the level of 70 %, or even more than that, from mid-1910s to early 1920s. Inthis sense, the analysis of the matches exported from Japan to India during this periodeventually amounts to the examination of matches marketed in India during thattime.5

In addition, Muslim merchants, many of them hailing from western part ofIndia, substantially dominated the match trade between Japan and India. Thoughsome Japanese large scale manufacturers intervened into the business, the Muslim

4 One of the archive which benefited this purpose of study was Mitsui Bunko whichstores piles of company records left by various wings of business under House of Mitsuigroup from Edo period.5 Two monographs initiated the study on economic history of matches in modern India.See, Hans Modig, Swedish Match Interests in British India during the Inter-War Years,Stockholm, 1979. and Per Hilding, Technology in a Controlled Economy: MatchIndustry in India, Richmond: Curzon, 1992. A recent article of mine drew scholarshipon this issue into the study of matches which were imported from Japan and See,Takashi OISHI, “Indo-Japan Cooperative Ventures in Match Manufacturing in India:Muslim Merchant Networks in and beyond the Bengal Bay Region 1900-1930,” inInternational Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.1‚ No.1, Jan. 2004, Cambridge UniversityPress.

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merchants managed to reserve their business through constructing partnership withparticular Japanese manufacturers, and through taking advantage of their commercialnetworks over to India.6

Diversity and Hierarchy in manufacturers and merchants

Chart1: Structure of Match Trade between Japan and India

LargeScale

MediumScale

SmallScale

MitsuiHeadquarter

IndianMerchants

Mitsui(branch)

IndianImporters

IndianMerchants

Wholesalers /retailers



Bul

kTr

ade

Pile

s of

Sm

all

Qua

ntity

Exp

ort

Manufacturing Export Import Distribution

Japan India & other regions

Network ofFamily

The structure of match trade between Japan and India can be drawn in a chart

Chart 1 , which depicts the diversity as well as hierarchy of match trade and players

involved. The concept behind this chart was given by the analysis on the informationabout manufacturers as well as merchants, who conducted their business on variouslabels.

First, I look at the variety and hierarchy of manufacturers (Table1). The tablewas prepared by the compilation of data on match manufacturing units for Hyogoprefecture which included Kobe municipality and Osaka prefecture, and the data wassupplemented by the Japanese nation-wide coverage for picking up some influentialmanufacturers in other regions.7 In Japan, as the manufacturing units of matches in

6 In the mid 1920s the partnership and network grew into ventures of matchproduction in India jointly managed by Japanese capital and technology and Indianmarketing. Oishi, op.cit.7 Hyogo prefecture, Hyogo-ken Tokei-sho(Statistics of Hyogo Prefecture), KobeMunicipality, Kobe-shi Kogyo Jinmei-roku(Directory of Industries and Industrialists inKobe City) ; Noshomu-sho, Japan Govt., Kojo Tsuran(Directory of Factories), annual.

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general, there were roughly three kinds of players in accordance with the productionscale. In the mid-1910s, more precisely in 1918 at the time of enumeration of data,there were four large scale manufacturing companies on top of the hierarchy, whichemployed more than one thousand workers in large scale production facilities. Theywere, namely, Toyo Match, Nippon Match, Chuo Match and Teikoku Match. They alltook the form of joint stock companies or other types of formal corporations, andheadquarters were located either in Kobe town or Osaka city. Concerning the middlescale manufacturers, we can identify about twenty five units which employed onehundred to five hundred persons. Akin to the larger scale ones mentioned above, mostof them were located either in Kobe town or partly in Osaka city. However some ofthese middle scale factories were located in the outskirts or totally outside of Kobetown in places like Akashi, Aboshi and Himeji. In addition, several units were found inlocal towns outside Hyogo Prefecture like in Nagoya, Toyama, and Hiroshima etc. Bythe mid-1910s flocks of still smaller scale manufacturing units could be seen in Kobeand its surrounding regions within Hyogo Prefecture. Number of registered laborersgreatly varied from a few to dozens. The number of these small units amounted to 170,which included units whose functions were confined to some parts of manufacturingprocess, like to splints production or printing labels. Most of them were privatelyowned and managed.8

Among the manufacturers summarized above, large-scale units and some ofmiddle scale units undertook the export business by themselves, but the rest did orcould not due to the lack of capital or other types of resources required for the directexport. Naturally, there was sufficient room for other players to concentrate on themanagement of export or the trading between Japan and India. Mitsui Bussan, thetrade section of House of Mitsui group, participated in the match export business sincemid-1890s, trying to use its branches in Singapore, Bombay, Calcutta, etc, effectively.Moreover, it tried to cooperate with selected major manufacturers encouraging them tochoose Mitsui’s channel for export, and at the same time took in smallermanufacturers under its umbrella.

8 This hierarchy seen among the match manufacturers was initially ascertained by theauthor through the compilation of data of various factories located in Hyogo, Osakaand other prefectures. The process of compilation and analysis was combined in mypaper presented to the Kyoto workshop. See, Takashi OISHI, “Networks of Indianmerchants in East Asia and beyond: business, family and community at work,” a paperread at an international workshop “Networks and Empires: IndianMigrants/Merchants in East Asia and Beyond” organized by the project “Empires andNetworks: Regional Economic Order in Asia” Kyoto University, Japan, Oct 7-8, 2005,33pp

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Table1: Hierarchy of match manufacturing units in 1918ScaleCategory Name of Factories in English No. of

Factories Engine Male Female Total

Toyo Match Co.,Ltd. Factory 13 253 1,100 3,979 5,079Nippon Match Manufacturing Co.,Ltd. Factory 11 85 632 1,887 2,519Chuo Match Co.,Ltd. Factory 9 48 517 1,325 1,842Teikoku Match Co.,Ltd. Factory 14 33 396 857 1,253Aboshi Match Joint-stock Co.) 2 11 192 272 464Kobayashi Kichiemon Match Manufacturing 2 8 115 279 394Doi Shoten First Factory (Joint Stock Co.) 3 11 141 245 386Otani Eikichi Match Factory 4 n.a. 108 236 344Noda Partnership Co. 2 14 95 146 241Yoneya Fusakichi Match Manufacturing 1 1 45 183 228Harima Kisaburo Match Manufacturing 2 13 51 163 214Mizoguchi Kohachiro Match Manufacturing 2 n.a. 81 126 207Kotani Match Manufacturing 2 n.a. 52 153 205Tawara Ryuzo Match Factory 1 n.a. 172 30 202Ekishin-sha (Todoroki Kenji ) 2 5 54 126 180Yamamoto Match Manufacturing 1 1 70 110 180Shinmei Joint-stock Co. Dainich Factory 1 6 29 147 176Takasaka Match Factory 1 20 53 113 166Nisshin Partnership Co. 1 8 55 107 162Matsutani Shigeichi Match Factory 2 3 44 116 160Nippon Kamijiku Match Manufacturing (Joint-stock Co.) Susano-choFactory 1 3 34 114 148

Mori Tokitaro Benei Manufacturing 2 5 42 100 142Kobe Match Manufacturing 1 7 46 95 141Takamatsu Yasaburo Match Factory 1 2 39 96 135Mita Kikumatsu Match Factory 2 n.a. 40 89 129Shinban-sha Joint-stock Co. Hayashizaki Factory 1 n.a. 34 88 122Hata Ginbei Match Factory 1 n.a. 29 92 121Sanyo Match Co.,Ltd. Matokata Factory 1 5 30 90 120Morii Umetaro Daini Nichishinsha 1 4 25 82 107Toyokawa Junichi Taisho Match Manufacturing 1 6 42 63 105Katsuno Shinji Match Manufacturing n.a. 30 69 99Meisui Joint-stock Co. 11 22 71 93Morii Match Hachio Factory n.a. 35 54 89Omigishi Match Manufacturing n.a. 29 59 88Osaka Match Denko Col. Ltd. Second Factory n.a. 32 55 87Nakajima Masajiro Match Factory n.a. 22 62 84Sansui Joint Stock Co. Factory n.a. 45 35 80Nakai Match Manufacturing 5 22 55 77Kondo Match Manufacturing n.a. 35 40 75Takaoka Match Co. Ltd. Factory 3 25 47 72Akamatsu Shigesuke Match Factory 1 2 25 40 65Ishihara Hirokichi Match Factory n.a. 22 43 65Soseisha Match Manufacturing n.a. 20 45 65Tsurunari Joint Stock Co. Factory n.a. 17 38 55Eiraku Taichiro Seisuisho 2 16 31 47Tanaka Takeji Match Factory n.a. 11 32 43Matsuda Match Manufacturing n.a. 12 29 41Kogyogumi Co.,Ltd. First Factory 1 9 30 39Yamamoto Match Factory 2 0 11 28 39

Small Scale Other smallerones omitted:

about 150 units

Large Scale

Medium Scale

On the other hand, Indian merchants stationing themselves in Kobe-Osakaintervened in the export business by offering their intra-regional networks over toSouth Asia as well as South-East Asia which stood on the networks of their familymembers or personal connections often linked to the community they belonged. As Imentioned above many of them were Muslims originally from western part of India,and belonged to particular sect or community including Bohra and Khoja.9 They wereparticularly successful in collecting the match products for export from medium scaleas well as from smaller scale Japanese manufacturers, who hardly had prospects tomake proper tie-ups with the distributors in India.

9 More information about Muslim merchants involved in match business can be seenin the latter of this paper as well as in my previous writing. These two particularcommunities mentioned here are Shia sects, which consolidated itself under singlereligious leader. The communities tend to keep endogamous tendency.Anthoropological description about Bohra can be supplied in

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Labels of two polar strategies: “bulk trade” and “piles of small quantity trade”

“Bulk trade” The structure of match manufacturing as well as exporters inevitably affectedthe variety of match trade as well as the types of labels which constituted the basicunits of practical export dealings. To put it shortly, as the following evidences will show,the bigger manufacturers, a handful of them cooperating with Mitsui, tended to exportmatches in bulk on selected “standard” labels. On the contrary, medium and smallermanufacturers, often in collaboration with Indian merchant networks, tried to carveout niches in the market through continuously replacing labels with noveldesigns/motifs. Though the scale of trade on a label at one transaction was rathersmall, they made piles of this small quantity transaction to finally realize substantialshare in the overall trade between Japan and India.

This polarized state of two opposite strategies in correspondence to thehierarchy of manufacturers and exporters can be suggested by the comparativeanalysis on two sources. First source is an unpublished export register for the year1918 recorded by Nihon Macchi Dogyo Kumiai Rengokai, a business association formatches at that time. It quotes about 190 labels on which matches were exported fromJapan, and it also records the destination(s) and the quantity (boxes) of matches foreach label. 10. 68 among 190 were in some way connected with South Asian marketwhich here included Burma. Due to the restraint of space I show below only thirtyselected labels which were mainly, though not exclusively, directed to South Asianmarket. The numbers attached to each label pictures(Figure1) and the numbers in theleft column of the table(Table2) correspond to each other.

10 Nihon Macchi Dogyo Kumiai Rengokai, “Taisho 7-nen-cyu 5 man gurosu ijo noyushutsu macchi syohyo-betsu chosa-hyo”(an unpublished register: A register on thelabels of exported matches which exceeded 50000 grosses by the label). As far as Iknow about the historical sources on match export from Japan, precise data on thelabel-wise

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Figure1:Major standard labels in the bulk trade to South Asia in 1918 (Abridgedversion)

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Table2: Export quantity: label-wise data corresponding to Figure 1(Abridged version)

No.Owner ofTrademark

ManufactureMainDestination

No. ofBoxes

No. ofGross

No. ofGrossper Box

Kind ofMatch

1Chuo MatchCo.,Ltd.

Chuo Match Co.,Ltd.,AZUMA Shigeshichi

India 845 55,225 65.36 Safety

2Chuo MatchCo.,Ltd.


India 2,161 114,800 53.12 Safety

3Chuo MatchCo.,Ltd.


India 862 72,775 84.43 Safety

4 N.F.AbdulaliISAYAMA Tokutaro andother four persons

India USA

Australia5,774 374,950 64.94 Safety

5Teikoku MatchCo.,Ltd.

Teikoku Match Co.,Ltd.and other a few persons

India Jawa



Teikoku Match Co.,Ltd.and other a few persons

India Jawa


7ISHIMARUZenjiro

AKAMATSU, NAKAI Calcutta

Bombay721 67,975 94.28 Safety

8YOSHIDASadashichi

YOSHIDA Sadashichi Bombay

Calcutta654 62,900 96.18 Safety

9KOBAYASHIKichiemon

KOBAYASHI Kichiemon Bombay

Calcutta1,125 100,000 88.89

Sulphurmatch

10Nippon MatchManufacturingCo.,Ltd.

Nippon MatchManufacturing Co.,Ltd. Calcutta Jawa 1,359 109,775 80.78 Safety


Nippon MatchManufacturing Co.,Ltd. Calcutta Jawa 2,351 184,100 78.31 Safety


Nippon MatchManufacturing Co.,Ltd.

Calcutta

Taiwan1,410 70,500 50.00 Safety



Calcutta

Rangoon1,745 87,250 50.00 Safety

11



Calcutta 1,875 136,850 72.99 Safety





Nippon MatchManufacturing Co.,Ltd. Calcutta Korea 4,087 209,600 51.28 Safety

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Nippon MatchManufacturingCo.,Ltd., MitsuiBussan Co., Ltd.

Nippon MatchManufacturing Co.,Ltd.,Mitsui Bussan Co., Ltd.

Taiwan

Manila

China Calcutta

25,183 1,259,200 50.00 Safety

18Toyo MatchCo.,Ltd.

Toyo Match Co.,Ltd. Calcutta

Colombo1,653 87,650 53.02 Safety

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Nippon MatchManufacturingCo.,Ltd., MitsuiBussan Co., Ltd.

Nippon MatchManufacturing Co.,Ltd.,Mitsui Bussan Co., Ltd.


20Toyo MatchCo.,Ltd.

Toyo Match Co.,Ltd.

Calcutta

Manila

Xiamen(Amoi)

1,502 75,100 50.00 Safety

21Toyo MatchCo.,Ltd. Toyo Match Co.,Ltd. Calcutta Port

Said2,120 206,750 97.52 Safety

22Chuo MatchCo.,Ltd.

Chuo MatchCo.,Ltd.,Nippon KamijikuMatch Manufacturing(Joint-stock Co.)

Calcutta Jawa 1,060 101,000 95.28 Safety


Chuo Match Co.,Ltd.,Koeki Joint-stock Co.

Korea Hong

Kong Calcutta1,560 93,150 59.71 Safety


Chuo Match Co.,Ltd.,Koeki Joint-stock Co.

Calcutta Port

Said1,252 106,350 84.94 Safety

25Takaoka MatchCo.,Ltd.

Takaoka Match Co.,Ltd. Calcutta 1,341 75,950 56.64 Safety

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26 H.N. FutehallyAKAMATSU Kinsukeand other two persons Korea Calcutta 1,030 71,375 69.30 Safety

27 H.N. Futehally AKAMATSU Kinsuke Calcutta 781 71,600 91.68 Safety


Teikoku Match Co.,Ltd.,YASUDA Asakichi

Calcutta 673 51,225 76.11 Safety


Teikoku Match Co.,Ltd.,and other a few persons

Rangoon

Calcutta

Australia

869 51,025 58.72 Safety


Teikoku MatchCo.,Ltd.,IZUMIGAWAKoji

Calcutta 780 78,000 100.00 Safety

An important matter especially to our concern is that the export registerselectively compiled those labels whose quantity of label-wise export in that yearexceeded fifty thousand grosses, a substantial quantity for the amount of export on asingle kind of label.11 The reverse side of the fact is naturally that the registerexcludes other minor labels whose label-wise export did not reach the quantity. Inshort, this data concerns the former type of business strategy mentioned above,namely what I call the “bulk trade” on selected standard labels. As you see in Table2,many of these labels were not directed solely to South Asia but to multiple destinationslike China, South East Asia or even including USA. In terms of designs and motifs itcan be said that many of these adopted unspecific general character, which would nottouch on social taboo or which would not alienate minority consumers. The examples ofthese standard general labels are animals like lion, deer, lark, horse, elephant,physical materials like balls, wheels, ship/boat, cycles, scissors, etc. In addition, thislist of standard major labels includes labels (as in the case of label no.17 and 20) whichhad established their status as the standard originally in the Chinese market andtherefore, naturally adopted Chinese traditional motifs of good fortunes like bat. Itseems that manufacturers expected that they would gain popularity even in otherregions like India. In terms of share of this kind of trade in the total export of matchesfrom Japan, the “bulk trade” recorded in this source occupied roughly 70 % of the totalin that year.12 Since it seems that this “bulk trade” tended to leave wider room of

11 One gross consists of twelve packages which hold twelve matchboxes each.12 This share can be calculated out by making comparison between the quantityrecorded in the source and the official statistics recorded by Government, such asDai-Nippon Gaikoku Boeki Nenpyo(Stratistical Tables on the trade of JapaneseEmpire). In concrete, the total of grosses which appear in this source data was28,044,137, and the grand total amount of match export from Japan in the same yearwas 39,467,420 grosses.

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markets to Asia where other minor players including Indian merchants intervened, itcan be estimated that this type of trade captured roughly 50 % of the export to Asia orSouth Asia.

“Piles of small quantity trade” The first source seen in the form of Figure1/Table2 above contained very few

Indian merchants’ names, such exceptional examples being no. 4, 26 and 27. Labelsmarketed in what I call the “piles of small quantity trade” on the part of Indianmerchants and Japanese smaller manufacturers scarcely appear in the export registrywhich compiled major standard labels. An impressive proof, however, can be culled outfrom a different mode of sources, namely trademarks of matches that were registeredat Japan Patent Office at that time(see Chart 2 and Chart3).

Chart2: Match label registration at Japan Patent Office13

0100200300400500600700800

1899

1901

1903

1905

1907

1909

1911

1913

1915

OthersIndian

Chart3: Match label registration by the name of Indian merchants14

13 Compiled and calculated by the author from the accumulated data of trademarkswhich can be traced in the issues of Shohyo Koho (Trademark RegistrationNotifications).14 Same as Chart3. This same chart was first presented in one of my publication. See,OISHI,“Indo-Japan Cooperative Ventures….” Calculation here omits numbers of“associated trademarks”.

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Regist rat ion of match trade labels by Indian merchants

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1899

1900

1901

1902

1903

1904

1905

1906

1907

1908

1909

1910

1911

1912

1913

1914

1915

Year

Num

ber

TataE. PabhaneyN. FutehallyN.F. AbdolallyM.H. HirjeeM.A.KadarM.M.IbrahimjeeSethC.B.MehtaM.F. MehtaKarmaly Maraly SomjeeD.A.QadirPeer MuhammadMohamed Ibrahim

The Chart 2 summarizes the overall trend of match labels registered astrademarks. Chart3 traces the merchant-wise number of match trademarks. Thoughmany Japanese manufacturers involved with match production and trade in Japannaturally appeared as the registrants in the register, the numbers of trademarksregistered by them did not necessarily overwhelm as in the case of Figure1/Table2.Moreover, as you can see in the latter part of this paper on Mitsui/Naoki/Honda nexus,the numbers of trademarks on the part of each large scale players remained low atleast until the early 1910s. As a general trend, the so-called bulk trade shouldered byJapanese large scale players substantially dominated the match export business in theoverall quantitative scale, the number of trademarks registered by them did not showthe same dominant performance. As I explained, since the bulk trade targeted to sellmatches on the selected standard labels, they did not need to have many trademarksregistered. On the other hand, “piles of small quantity trade,” which Indian merchantsundertook often in collaboration with Japanese smaller manufacturers, hardly cameinto light of such sources on major “standard” labels on bulk trade, but insteadimprinted their strong existence in a rather different quarter, namely the trademarkregister.15

Halfway between the two polesHere I further attach the third group of sources for understanding the strategy of

medium Japanese manufacturers as well as their partnership with Indian merchants.It seems they were strategically taking somewhat halfway position between “bulktrade” and “piles of small quantity trade,” continuously associating themselves with

15 Of course, another type of hard evidence is the real match labels which surviveduntil today often in the hands of amateur collectors and their descendants in India aswell as in Japan.

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particular selected motifs on the one hand and actively setting up newly designedmotifs on the other at the same time.

Figure2 shows some of the labels issued by K. Harima, a private firm based inKobe, which can be ranked in the upper medium scale manufacturer. In fact, we canfind its name in the seventh position in the range of medium scale factories in Table1.It succeeded in spreading their products in Southeast Asia and also India, standingitself on the strategy of halfway between “bulk trade” and “piles of small quantitytrade.” They had many labels registered as the trademarks and continuously threw innew ones in the market, but their way of inputting labels in the market was not sointensive as in the case of Indian Muslim merchants in the mid-1910s seen above. Thedesigns of labels were not so general as the ones in the case of the “standard” labels on“bulk trade” strategy, but not so specific as the ones in the case of “piles of smallquantity trade.” Many of them were vaguely schemed to fit the market of South-eastAsia and South Asia, adopting motifs peculiar in the regions, namely elephant, lion,mosque(musjid), Buddha, palm tree etc. In addition, as we can acknowledge in thebottom part of Figure2, the firm was very active to partnership with particular Indianmerchants for cultivating market there. The labels adopting elephant as their motifswere kind of brothers standing on almost same design. The only difference is that theleft one adds the small name of an Indian Muslim merchant, A.M. Essabhoy. This caseshows that Harima and Essabhoy constructed somewhat ritualistic partnership on thelabels, and stepped into the sharing of responsibility in generating trust on thosealmost same labels.

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Figure2: Labels issued by K.Harima

Figure3 is another source to know about the positioning of halfway between “bulktrade” and “piles of small quantity trade”, which was taken by Japanese medium scalemanufacturers. The labels are the excerpts from shohyo mihon-cho, the register oflabel specimen, issued by Aboshi Match for the guide to customers. The company,located in western part of Hyogo prefecture, ranked itself in the top among mediumscale units in Table1. As you can see in the figures, their labels were not so general butnot so specific. Moreover, the company also adopted partial collaboration with Indianmerchants. These trends are almost same as the case of K. Harima’s, except thatHarima targeted a specific Indian merchant, namely Essabhoy, as the very steadybusiness partner for years, Aboshi tended to welcome not a single Indian and Chinesemerchants as co-sharer of labels. Though Adamjee Haji Dawood16 was one of the

16 Though originally coming from western part of India, his company was based inRangoon as well as Calcutta. In the mid 1920s it would venture into large scalemanufacturing of matches in British Burma, and made a substantial success. After thePartition, it shifted substantial portions of its capital to Pakistan and enlarged the

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Indian merchants whom Aboshi welcome, the relation between the two was not sosteady or tight. Harima-Essabhoy partnership endured on almost one-on-one tightrelationship, and culminated into a joint venture in India17, the Aboshi-Adamjee wasone of the multiple relations for each other, and was in fact to end with establishmentof match factory in Rangoon on the part of Adamjee.

Figure3: Labels issued by Aboshi: excerpts from its specimen book

As I suggested above, a specific mode of export style which I call the “piles ofsmall quantity trade” played the pivotal role for the Indian as well as Japanese“minor” players to secure niches of market in rivalry with Japanese bigger players. Thestrategy furnished them with a tool to compete with the “standard” labels which majorJapanese players built up. Moreover, as Chart2 and Chart3 suggest, the registration oftrademarks or the trademark institution itself constituted the important clue in the“piles of small quantity trade.” In the next section, we will look at how and why theinstitution offered by the state benefited those originally minor or marginal players.

kinds of business to become one of the influential business groups.17 Oishi, op.cit. 2004

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: Intra-regional networks in association with the state

Trademark institutions in comparative perspectives

Before going into the details of trademark institution in modern Japan, we needto understand its historical background in comparative framework with that of othercountries including India and UK. First of all, we need to keep in mind an academically less acknowledged factconcerning trademarks in India. It is only during the World War Second that theformal trademark system was securely established in British India through thepassing of Trade Marks Act, 1940( 5 of 1940). Even in the 1910s, which we are nowconcerned with, it was possible, though not obligatory by any means, to registersymbols or designs as some sort of merchandise marks to the colonial authorities, butthere was no system under state institution to guarantee exclusive commodity right inassociation with particular symbol/design. If the applicant desired such exclusive right,the person or the company was required, besides registration, to effectively attain thepublicity concerning the use of a particular symbol/design through some sorts of medialike newspaper, which was naturally extremely difficult in practical sense. Thus, theoverall situation around this quasi-“trademark” system up to the year 1940 inevitablycurtailed serious ambiguity, and it was eventually impossible to secure proper right fora particular symbol/design. Naturally, this matter was one of the grave concerns forJapanese exporters marketing their products in India. 18

We may here understand this lack of formal trademark system in British Indiathrough two aspects. For one thing, colonial authorities in British India virtuallyabandoned the task of keeping public order and righteousness, possibly due to the costof administration which might have been entailed, and also due to immenselycomplicated jobs which would have been caused in the concrete procedure of admittingand denying particular design/symbols. For second, this institutional fragility causedby the indifference on the part of colonial authorities surely worked to benefitestablished European companies who could distinguish their product not necessarilythrough labels but through more or less established quality and their functions, andthus found less inconveniences. Indian merchants, on the other hand, in the lack ofproper means to create or secure minimum degree of public trust in the market for

18 Careful study is awaited for this particular aspect of ambiguity concerning thetrademark system in British India. Repeated reports from Japan consulate in Bombayand Calcutta touched on this situation and complaints coming from importer ofJapanese goods, who casually faced the infringement on supposed trademark rightattached to their commodities. See for example, Kenzo Ito,“Indian market and theprotection of trade marks” from Calcutta, 22 Oct. 1925 in Japan Govt., Foreign Office,Nikkan Kaigai Shoho, No.639. Another type of contemporary description abouttrademarks in British India can be observed in some kind of business guide forpractical purpose. See, for example, Osaka City, Industry Promotion Section,Toyo-shokoku no Genko Shyohyo Jyorei to sono Toroku Tetsuzuki (Regulations theRegistration rules of trademarks currently in use in the East), Osaka, 1933.

19

their products, had to rely on some other means.Trademark system available in Japan should be situated in the

above-mentioned context. Amazing number of trademarks registered in Japan on thepart of Indian merchants as we have traced in Charts 2&3 was a reverse side of thesituation in India. It can be understood that Indian merchants on the intra-regionalnetworks did not confine themselves in the range of institutions available in India, butrather tried to secure compensatory alternative available in Japan. As the players whotried to carve out niches in the trade by overcoming comparatively lesser capital,human resources and technology, it was natural, in a sense, to depend on some sort ofinstitutions available, which would realize their strategy of “piles of small quantitytrade.”

This desperate attempt on the part of Indian merchants can be noticed moreclearly when we take into account the fact that the matches and their labels for sale inIndia had no definite requirement or necessity to be registered in Japan19. As the

specific cases in the part of this present paper suggest, exclusive right for the use of

particular design/motif was made available within Japan and within the accumulatedtrademarks labels registered at Japan Patent Office. To be precise, practical right forthe exclusive use of a particular design/motif could be effectively secured only when itwas registered in the country where it was exported for sale,20 and, at the same time,when some kind of exporters’ association in Japan, control the label wise export ofmatches to prevent the unregistered labels from being exported. In fact, influentialplayers, like Mitsui, did get some of their labels registered in China and othercountries. Moreover, from the late 1880s Japanese influential manufacturers tried toenforce all manufacturers to register their labels as trademarks without exceptionwhile attempting to bring all such labels under control of single umbrella body. Theformer type of attempt, however, could not be practically successful in terms ofmatches directed to India where trademark institution was nominal or un-established.Moreover, the latter attempt was not successful since Japanesemanufacturers/exporters could not generate same views on the regulation of labels,and smaller manufacturers in Kobe/Osaka and players outside Kobe/Osakaoccasionally let unregistered labels creep in for export. 21

Under circumstances stated above, it was eventually impossible for

19 This point, namely the ambiguity of trademark registration put on the exportedgoods, was pointed out years ago, but was afterwards neglected with hardly anyserious research. See, Tokkyocho, Kogyo Shoyu-ken Seido 100nen-shi, Jo-kan(Hundred Years of Industrial Property Rights, 1st volume), Tokyo, 1984, p.133.20 This aspect can be ascertained by the repeated recommendation on the part ofJapan Patent Office itself, which advised Japanese manufacturers/exporters toregister their trademarks also in foreign market. I did locate this kind of a case,namely registration of same trademark jointly registered in Japan as well as in eitherHong Kong or China, in the registry of Mistui Bussan.21 The appendix of this essay itself had a background of such an undertaking. For themovement to amalgamate match manufacturing business into one body, see Anon,Macchi-nenshi(Chronicle of Matches: mimeo), passim, especially parts on the yearslike Meiji 24.

20

merchants to establish legally exclusive right for the usage of particular labels on thematches exported to India. But still, because of the very uncertainty they became eagerto maximize the certainty within legally possible range. Registration of matchtrademarks at Japan Patent Office on the part of the Indian merchants reflected theirstrategically voluntary stances to try to associate themselves with the state and itsinstitution. As we will see below, though the effect of trademark registration wassurely imperfect, various advantages were expected in joining it especially inconnection with “piles of small quantity trade.”

Advantages found in the institutional details of trademarks

For the analysis on the precise ways in which Indian merchants associatedthemselves with the trademark institution through various maneuvers of match labels,we need to elaborate on some more details of Japanese trademark regulations. In fact,as we will see below, their behavior of trademark registration was foremost theresponse to its institutional framework. Those Indian merchants, most of themMuslims, strategically depended on as well as manipulated the institutionalframeworks to derive maximum benefits. Main features of trademarks especially concerning match labels for export canbe traced in a chronological flow prepared by the author.22

Chronology on the trademark system of Japan 1884: Enactment of trademark law.

First-to-file principle(sengan-shugi ) established as basic

assumption1888: Actual use of trademark in the market within six months after registration

made obligatory Prohibition of certain designs and symbols started

Transfer joto of already registered trademark started

1892: Joint name registration(renmei-toroku ) started

1896: Foreigners permitted as the registrars if they stayed in Japan or securedan agent in Japan

1909: Persons not necessarily involved with manufacturing, but with marketingalone and any sorts of handling formally allowed as registrars

Associated trademark started(rengo-shohyo ): Registration of

similar designs, which were not allowed to be registered by otherapplicants, thereby made possible as rengo-shohyo by the originalholder of particular trademark.

22 Manily based on Tokkyocho, op.cit.

21

Colour limitation(chakushoku-gentei ) introduced

First-to-file principle on egalitarian basis Since a full paper would be required to follow-up above-mentioned features ofJapanese trademark systems, I briefly mention the outlines.23 Japan adopted thefirst-to-file principle not first-to-prior user system as introduced in U.K. in 1875. Insuch countries as U.K. where commercialization had already proceeded with numerousmarks and signs accumulated with eventual use in the market, first-to-prior usesystem was preferred. It was thought that first-to-file principle would cause confusionamong established use of various marks and symbols.

On the other hand, the first-to-file principle involved its own institutional risk ofcausing an anomaly, namely that numerous registrations would be deliberatelypiled-in to try to build up a kind of preoccupancy on the source of motifs and designsregardless of scant or no intention/background of practical commercial use. Preventivemeasures against this were introduced, for example, by making its actual commercialuse within six months after the registration obligatory in 1888. Overall tendency,however, was that the first-to-file principle worked to benefit smaller players or latecomers in the market in the sense that they could secure pivot of vested commercialinterests with minimum costs in the form of trademark registration. An important factto note here is that in this setting of state institution the scale of capital on the part ofregistrar hardly influenced the ability or the capacity of trademark registration, sincethe fee for registration of single trademark was rather minor.24 Minimum egalitarianassumption secured in the state institution of trademarks greatly mattered in thiscontext.

Proliferation and grouping under “associated trademark” / “colour limitation”Above-mentioned implication was to be further stressed in the years after 1909

when new institutions of “associated trademark” and “colour limitation” wereintroduced. Considering the finiteness of resources for the motifs/designs on the

trademark labels, “associated trademark”( rengo shohyo was introduced to

enable the persons who had already registered a label of particular design to registersimilar, though not exactly the same, label based on the same motif. In this context,other persons were not allowed to do the same thing. In institutional terms oftrademarks, “associated trademark” was a new to have furnished a kind ofarrangement in the principle of “special distinctiveness” as the basis which had beensecured among each trademark. As its practical result, on the other hand, this newsystem motivated registrars to rush to register many similar labels based on particular

23 Many monographs exist for the history of trademarks in Japan, but a comparativeperspective can be supplied by Makoto Amino, Shohyo-ho no Sho-mondai(Issues onTrademark Laws), 2vols, 1978-1983, Tokyo.24 In the 1910s the registration fee for one trademark was three Japanese Yen, and itcost one Yen for the extension after the expiry of single effective period.

22

design/motif as the “associated trademarks.” Various postures of animal/person/god orthe combination of a particular animal and another animal were soon adopted as suchcore motifs of “associated trademark”, and some kind of trademark groupings

mushroomed up around them. Moreover, “colour limitation( chakushoku

gentei)” adopted in the same year supplied the registrars with variations of color in thesame design as the base of new trademarks, and thus also worked as a supplementarysource to mold group(s) of “associated trademarks”.

Here, again, players using the “piles of small quantity trade” took greatadvantage in riding on these institutional aspects. Their strategy to create niches ofmarket/consumers through securing varieties of match labels was realized onlythrough effective utilization of these institutional rules. Charts 2&3 shown above arevirtually an outcome of such strategic behaviour on the part of Indian merchants.Though the number of match labels registered as trademarks generally increased after1909, and the rate of increase seen in the number of registration on the part of Indianmerchants clearly surpassed that of other registrars, and the increasing trend amongIndians was kept endured. Though other players, mainly the Japanese manufacturers,also rushed to set up new “associated” and “colour limited” trademarks, and theirmovement was comparatively striking only in two three years after 1909. It wasundeniably Indian merchants who derived bigger and lasting advantages from the newinstitutional aspects.

I take the example from a case in Abdulali, a Indian Muslim merchant based inKobe. As one of the late-comers into the export business of matches from Japan, he hadto initially buy-in an already registered trademark from another precedent player.

After the registration of as the “associate trademark” of , however, he could

continue to proliferate similar type of label design taking maximum advantage of“associated trademark” / “colour limitation”.

Figure4 : Modulation of “The Lark” in the case of Abdulali in the 1910s

: A bird motif originally registered by O.S.K. & Co., a Japanese

manufacturing company. This was transferred/bought-in to Abdulali.

Initial registration of “The Lark” was enabled in the form of associated

trade mark of

: Subsequent development of Abdulali’s “The Lark”, with

trademarks linked as “associated trademarks” with one another

including . The proliferation also depended on colour limitation as

in the case of and .

23

Benefit of “special distinctiveness” As was suggested above, the registration activity of Indian merchants was notfree from regulations and restraints. The major restrictive factor which regulated theunregulated proliferation was the supposed “special distinctiveness” (tokubetsu

kencho-sei ) as the condition of motif/design for trademark. Difference of

motifs/designs had to be clearly reserved between each trademark except in the case of“associated trademark”. It seems as the numbers of trademarks increased to use awaymajor motifs/designs, it became difficult for the registrars/applicants to find or create“specially distinctive” labels, and it became equally difficult for the Patent Office tojudge/control the distinctiveness.25 In the situation under this absolute limitedness ofsource for design/motifs, comparative advantage could be secured in the side of Indianmerchants. They could mobilize social, cultural and even political idioms from India,which Japanese players found it difficult to set up or use in a proper way.

In fact, as we see in Figure5, many of match labels registered by Indianmerchants in mid1910s stressed the “Indian-ness” by adopting motifs from Indiancultural and social backgrounds.

Figure5: Trademarks registered by Indian merchants: motifs adopted from India

25 Restrictive and controlling functions were practically applied on each design/motifat the time of application for trademarks through examination at the Patent Office,and even after registration the legality of each trademark is to be judged whenever anappeal against it was filed up by other registrar. The former procedure was called

shinsa , and the latter shinpan .

24

Anonymity Though not clearly mentioned in the regulation of trademarks, trademarks andits labels did not need to accompany the names of registrars, and this fact greatlyworked as the advantage for Indian merchants on the strategy of “piles of smallquantity trade”. Though pioneer Indian merchants in the match trade from the late1880s and a handful of exceptional Indian players did mention their names on thelabels, majority of Indian merchants omitted their names. For example, among variousIndian merchants listed in the Chart 3, early comers like Tata and M.F. Mehta, andM.A. Kadar among the late comers almost always printed their names. But, rest othersincluding Futehally, M.H.Hirjee, N.F. Abdulally, did not. Samples seen in Figure5 alsolack the names.

In the ordinary logic of market, exposure of seller’s name would surely securecredibility and trust in the market, and lessen the risk of imitation/plagiarism on thepart of other merchants. But, in reality, anonymous labels without mentioning theirnames were often adopted by Indian merchants for their matches. Though thebackgrounds of this anonymity have to be enquired not only in economic terms but alsowith socio-political perspectives,26 the essential economic background was that labelswithout mentioning the manufacturers or distributors could escape from possiblecomplaints or bad fame about quality of matches from consumers and dealers.

26 Takashi OISHI, “The Political Configurations of Match Label Designs in ModernIndia: Merchants’ Network, State and Nationalism”, A paper read at an internationalworkshop “Elites in Asian History: Social Network and Cultural Representation”,February 18-19, 2006, Institute of Oriental Culture, The University of Tokyo, 23pp.

25

Matches on the “piles of small quantity trade” put less importance on the endurance ofparticular labels, but instead strategically keep on throwing in novel design labels.They naturally did not find it vital to long maintain the market trust in associationwith their names.

All in all, the trademark system in Japan and the way of its developmentundeniably contained factors to benefit smaller players and latecomers in the matchmarket in the sense that trademark labels, once secured, could be used to cultivatesegmented niches in the market along with the strategy of “piles of small quantitytrade”.

A comparative perspective from the “big business”: Mitsui/Naoki/Honda nexus

In this part of paper I take up the case of what I call the Mitsui/Naoki/Hondanexus as an example of “big business” in the match business extending from Japan.This nexus, in some sense, representatively adopted what I mentioned the “bulk trade”on the major standard labels. We can trace their label-wise movement also in Figure 1and Table1, that is, labels numbered 10 to 17, 19 and 21 which were either solelymanaged by Nippon Match Manufacturing Co. Ltd or jointly shouldered by NipponMatch and Mitsui Bussan. In addition, as the Chart 4 shows, the nexus was doingbusiness on really wide geographical range.

Chart 4: Marketing of Nippon Match Mfg Co. Ltd27

27 The Chart is based on the data which can be traced in the business reports meantfor the stock holders of the company. The term of finance is not usual year or half-yearstarting from January, but two terms starting from June and December respectively.

26

0100002000030000400005000060000700008000090000

100000

1912 12-1913 5

1913 6-11

1913 12-1914 5

1914 6-11

Year month

Mar

kete

d qu

antit

y: b

oxes

domest ic

other foreign

India

Bangkok

Singapore inc Rangoon

Jawa

Malay

Taiwan

Hong Kong

Shanghai

Manchuria&North China

Korea

Thus, the nexus had ostensible similarity with Indian merchants put focus in thispaper in the sense that both built up intra-regional business activities. But, the waysin which they set up the intra-regional machinery to create and maintain the economicprofit greatly varied. The difference between the two is what the rest part of this paperis attempting to carve out.

Formation of Mitsui/Naoki/Honda nexus

The beginning of this nexus dates back to the year 1895 when Mitsui Bussan decidedto initiate business of match trading through taking advantage of branches already setup in Asia, especially that in Singapore. The origin of this match business on the partof Mitsui was from the very beginning closely linked with the intention and actual trialto overcome the intervention of foreign merchants in the trade between Japan andSoutheast Asia and South Asia. Chinese, Indian as well as European merchants hadlong dominated the match trade in this region, and the Mitsui’s new movementintended to create new way of trade with no or minimum presence of such foreignmerchants. Such movement for “direct export(jiki-yushutu)” to try to bypass foreignmerchants had started earlier than this among Japanese manufacturers as well aspolitical and ideological circles,28 but the practical as well as substantial measures on

28 For more details of jiki-yushutsu movement in connection with matches especiallyamong political and ideological circles, Takashi OISHI, “Intra-regional Network andNation: A Historical Examination of Indian Muslim Merchants”, in Nobuko Nagasaki(ed), Democracy and Development in South Asia: East Asian Comparative Perspectives,Ryukoku University, Kyoto, 2005, 133-156pp. The movement of jiki-yushutsu did notremain within matches, but instead involved many other products which had beendominated by foreign merchants. Naoto Kagotani described the cases of dried seafood

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the part of major players in the export trade was then initiated by Mitsui.29

Mitsui’s venture of match business assumed the reliable manufacturing unitswhich could supply it with sufficient as well as qualified matches. Initial step taken byMitsui in this connection was to make contract with particular influentialmanufacturers by which Mitsui could shoulder the export as well as marketing ofselected influential labels in exclusive manner. This contract usually accompanied theprocedure of re-writing the name of registrar listed in trademark of those labels. Forexample, in the year 1902, Mitsui conducted such procedures of name

amalgamation( kyoyu kamei) based on ioint name registration(renmei-toroku)

30 in as many as seventeen cases/labels(see Chart5). In concrete, Mitsui joined in thename of co-registrar in the case of five labels which had been registered solely byMasanosuke Naoki, an influential manufacture based in Kobe. Similar procedures ofname amalgamation were taken for those labels originally owned by Honda of Kobeand Kametaro Doi of Osaka.

What Mitsui put primary importance in the next step for taking more effectiveand direct control over manufacturing/production was the intervention into the capital,namely finance. Mitsui collaborated with Naoki to found the Nippon MatchManufacturing Co. Ltd in 1907, and successfully entered into the holders of stockslisted there as well as in the managing staffs. In addition, during this process the newcompany merged with another influential manufacturer Yoshitomo Honda of Kobe. Forexample, n the year of 1912 the Nippon Match listed M Naoki as the chief executive,Ichitaro Honda as managing director, Goshima a person from Mitsui Bussan as alsomanaging director. The composition of the listed stock holders were as follows in thelatter part of 1912(See Chart6)31.

Chart5: Label registration behaviour of Mitsui/Naoki/Honda nexus32

and textiles. See relevant pages in his, Ajia kokusai tsûshô chitsujo to kindai nihon (inJapanese: The international trade order in Asia and modern Japan). Nagoya: Nagoyadaigaku shuppankai, 2000.29 More than thirty years ago the study on this Mitsui’s involvement with matchbusiness was initiated by an article. Since that time, however, this has not been longneglected and without developing into so far neglected analysis on foreign merchantsand foreign markets. See Yamashita Noboru, Keiseiki nihon shihonshugi ni okerumatchi kôgyô to mitsui bussan (in Japanese: Match Industry and the Mitsui Bussanduring the Formative Period of Japanese Capitalism). Mitsui Bunko Ronsô , no.6,1972.30 This was initiated in 1892. See the chronological table in part of this paper.31 Source is same as for Chart4.32 Compilation of the data seen in the series of Syohyo Koho(Trademark Notifications)

28

0102030405060708090

100

1900

1902

1904

1906

1908

1910

1912

1914

1916

year

num

ber o

f reg

istra

tion/

trans

fer

Transfer (Joto) among three

Amalgamation of name(KyoyuKamei) among threeTransfer(Joto) from others

Registration without theirname on labelRegistration with their name(s)on the label

Masanosuke Naoki 5000Ichitaro Honda 3150Mitsui Bussan 2100Saburo Naoki 2000other Naoki family members 1850rest others 4050

Total 20000

Chart6: Stock holders of Nippon Match inlatter part of 1912

Along with this inter-locking of finance as well as human staffs, merger oftrademarks into Nippon Match from either Naoki or Honda was conducted as we can

trace its movement in the “transfer( joto) among three” in Chart5.

Four types of generalness set up on the “standard” label

As you can trace in the Table2 in the first part of this paper, each label on thebulk trade handled by major manufacturers as well as Mitsui tended to be destined tomultiple regions. This is also the case with labels marketed by Nippon Match. As youcan see in the Table2, labels handled by it, namely No.10, 11,12, 13, 16, 17, 21, weredirected not only to a part of Indian market but also marketed in South East Asia, EastAsia and even Middle East.

Standard labels marketed in the bulk trade of major manufacturers weresupposed to be equipped with general character which would be accepted by majorityof people in a specific market, and would not strongly alienate specific element(s) ofpeople in connection with social/religious taboo or sense of impurity. Here lay some

29

kind of necessity to adopt fruits like strawberry as in No.11, and some animals likeelephant(No.13), peacock(No.12) and deer(No.16). Some other typical motifs whichwere adopted by this Mitsui/Naoki/Honda nexus include pineapple, lemon, carnationflower, lion, cat, umbrella, violin. I show some of them as the example.

Figure6: fruit, animal, physical material

Second type of standard label was a kind of invention based on the show-up ofmultiple motifs. No.10 of Figure1 and Table 2 can be a typical example. This showed upfour motifs, namely Pyramid, a possibly Hindu saint(yogi or sadu) with stick, anelephant and particular type of Buddhism towers seen in Japan, all situated in asquare of the central part of label. Dressed with such a showcase displaying these fourmotifs representing regions or civilizations the label was supposed to have acquiredthe general character expected for the standard label.

Figure7: Showcase of four civilization

We can trace third type of standard label in the Japanese motif such as Japaneselady with kimono, and Bonsai plant of sakura, lily, bamboo grass etc.(See, Figure ) In asense, this type with Japanese motif once eventually abandoned the effort to search forthe generalness mentioned above, but it seems it paradoxically acquired it, since thelabel could avoid the question of whether a particular motif suited to specific marketbecause of the very Japanese-ness. Moreover, the Japanese-ness instead could work toincite exoticism among possible consumers.

30

Figure8 : Japanese motif

The fourth type of generalness could be reserved by the use of words, not motifs offigures and alike. This type often adopted words and short phrases which try toconvince the consumers the superior quality of product. In a sense, the bulk trade onthe major standard labels assumed the superior quality of those selected brands ofmatches. Therefore, it was expected to use any methods other than motifs to attractand convince the consumers. We can choose out many labels registered by NipponMatch, which put motifs in the margin and word(s) and phrases in the center. Theexamples of phrases used here are: “Qualified,” “Superior,” “Market Trust”“Impregnated,” “Damp proof,” etc. In fact, one of the influential labels of Naoki andlater Nippon Match was “The Best” whose variations always set the “The Best” in thecenter with rather bigger fonts, and on the contrary push aside elephant’s face andother motifs in the margin.

Figure 9 : Words and phrases

The “standard” label strategy and its crisis: Name value or the anonymity

The bulk trade on “standard” label assumed the deliberate choice of limited number oflabels on which manufacturers and exporters concentrated to make marketing drive.Otherwise, trust and attention generated in the brands of matches could have beendispersed, and their matches might have fallen in a difficult position in the rivalry ofmarket. Therefore, it was always indispensable for the players on the strategy of bulktrade like Mitsui/Naoki/Honda nexus to let the market trust converged on theirselected labels. It seems that this strategy was not initially self-conscious, and thereseems to have been try and error as to what kind of label strategy to be taken. Forexample, not sure about the efficiency of bulk trade strategy on limited standard labels

31

Mitsui Bussan once tried to throw in many new labels. And then, only after facing thedispersion of trust and attention it consciously commenced into the bulk trade strategy.In this context, an evidence records the concrete situation around such strategy. Iquote the statement of head of Singapore branch at a meeting in 1907.

When this branch started the dealing of matches, it initially concentrated on

Naoki’s “Best” and “Double Elephant”( ) thinking that bringing-in various

new labels would cause some confusion on our development in this section. AfterNaoki’s “Best” acquired popularity in Rangoon market we started to throw inmany new labels supposing that small quantity of dealings on various labels invarious agencies would be bundled into a big business. Then, however, wereversed the policy, and depended on the concentrated business using one or twoinfluential agencies. 33

Its behaviour to screen labels in a careful manner can also be traced in Chart 5. As isshown there, the numbers of new labels annually registered by Nippon Match wascontrolled to remain at the level below ten until 1908.

In reality, however, another strategy in the opposite relation with it, namely, the“piles of small quantity trade”, gradually exerted its influence on the market, and iteven forced the bulk trade strategy to make substantial concessions andtransformation. This incessant process of infighting and interaction between the twocan be also noticed in Chart 4 and Chart5. In fact, Chart 4 does not fail to expose thedecline of marketing results on the part of Nippon Match, and one of the areas it facedan acute decline was India. This makes a serious gap with the fact that this periodfrom the year 1912 to 14 saw a striking increase of match flow from Japan to India.This can be safely explained both by the rise of quality of Japanese matches and by therise of marketing power in the matches handled by Indian merchants. 34 Moreover, aswe can follow in the Charts 2 and 3, it is this period that the numbers of matchtrademarks registered by Indian merchants saw a drastic increase. In short, duringthese relevant years, namely just before and during the War, Indian merchantsstressed the strategy of “piles of small quantity trade”, and somehow succeeded inaccumulating the niches of market. The crisis of bulk trade on standard labels in this period can be vividly traced inChart5, which records the transition of new trademark registration on the part of

33 “Shiten-cho simon-kaigi giji-roku in meiji 40 nen 7gatsu”(Proceedings of the branchhead meeting in July 19070) in Mitsui Bunko Archives.34 It is often described in conventional manner that Japanese goods found the marketin Asia due to the retreat of European goods during World War . At least in the case ofmatches, however, the reality is that major increase of export from Japan to India hadalready started before that. See, Oishi, “Indo-Japan Cooperative Ventures in MatchManufacturing in India” International Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.1‚ No.1, January2004. pp 49-55

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Nippon Match. The annual numbers of new trademarks controlled as to remain belowten saw a major increase in 1909. This part of increase in 1909, 1910 and 1911 wasparallel to that of overall trend of match trademarks seen in Chart 2. As I stated in

section of this paper, the increase was caused by the introduction of “associated

trademark” and “colour limitation”, and in this sense, remained within some sort ofexpectable range. The increase of new registrations even after 1912, however, cannotbe fully explained by it. For one thing, construction of variation group on specificmotifs still continued making use of those two institutional rules. For second, thenumber of anonymous labels, namely “registration without their name on label” in theChart, which had started to increase in 1908, saw much more drastic rise after 1910.The latter type of anonymous label was scarcely accompanied by either “associatedtrademark” or “colour limitation.”

In short, the striking increase of registration on the part of Nippon Match in the1910s was an unavoidable response to the preceding as well as on-going proliferation ofmatch trademarks initiated by Indian merchants. As we saw in Chart 3 Indianmerchants had started to register as many as sixty new labels in annual basis, andwere in the swift process of building up “piles of small quantity trade,” carving outsegmented markets. Here, Japanese major manufacturers and exporters like NipponMatch and Mitsui could not totally neglect the erosion of market’s share, and thereforehad to approach down to “piles of small quantity trade” by setting up numerable labelsby themselves. In this “degenerating” process to “piles of small quantity trade,” theanonymity pointed out in the second part of this paper was unavoidable adopted.

Concluding remarksSince the appearance of a few important works35, acute academic attention has beendirected to the intra-Asian trade, or to the economy in bridge with multiple Asianareas in modern era. After scholarship has successfully revealed the quantitative aswell as qualitative importance of such trade/economy, growing focus has been directedto the role of indigenous Asian merchants and their intra-regional networks. 36

Existing scholarship, however, has not fully examined the structure or the function ofsuch intra-regional networks shouldered by indigenous Asian merchants. What I triedto do in this paper concerns why such indigenous merchants, though absolutely minorin the scale of capital, human resources and so on, managed to carve out niches ofmarket in rivalry with commodity brought from other routes like Europe, or withcommodity from the same origin like Japan which were handled by other big players,typically Japanese or European companies. Moreover, this question inevitably leads to

35 Among others, a few senior Japanese scholars like Takeshi Hamashita, KaoruSugihara, Sinya Sugiyama and a few others, made a striking contribution by openingthis aspect of discussion.36 Members of our panel, here in Helsinki, almost represent the authors of importantwritings about this topic.

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the question of exactly what the niches we find were comprised of, and what kind ofqualitative, not quantitative, difference the niches were furnished with. Thoroughoutthis paper, I pushed forward the contrast of two polar trades, namely “piles of smallquantity trade” on the segmented numerous labels on the one hand, and the “bulktrade” on the selected standard labels on the other. Here, what I tried to put furtherstress is that niches was not something which existed as they were, but somethingwhich Asian merchants somehow invented through incessant effort to differentiatetheir products from those of other capitalists. In the case of matches, maneuver oftrademark institution was the primary clue in that institutional power could bemobilized at low cost to secure buds for constructing segmented interests on labels.Another implication of this argument is that intra-regional networks of Asianmerchants were not by any means detached from state, but inextricably interlockedwith it. Though their motives rarely overlapped with the state, various infrastructuresthe state set up occasionally benefited in some unexpected manners.

Primary SourcesVarious match labels: author’s private collectionPapers of Mistui Bussan: at Mitsui Bunko Archives.Papers of Nippon Match Ltd.: reports for the stock holders of the companyPapers of Aboshi Match: Shohyo mihon-cho, a register of label specimen.Anon, Macchi-nenshi(Chronicle of Matches: mimeo), n.d.Kobe Municipality, Kobe-shi Kogyo Jinmei-roku(Directory of Industries andIndustrialists in Kobe City)Japan Patent Office, Shohyo Koho(Trademark Registration Notifications).Hyogo Prefecture, Hyogo-ken Tokei-sho(Statistics of Hyogo Prefecture), annual.Japan Govt., Noshomu-sho., Kojo Tsuran(Directory of Factories), annual.Japan Govt.,Dai-Nippon Gaikoku Boeki Nenpyo(Stratistical Tables on the trade ofJapanese Empire).Nihon Macchi Dogyo Kumiai Rengokai, “Taisho 7-nen-cyu 5 man gurosu ijo noyushutsu macchi syohyo-betsu chosa-hyo”(an unpublished register: A register on thelabels of exported matches which exceeded 50000 grosses by the label).Nikkan Kaigai Shoho, No.639.: Kenzo Ito,“Indian market and the protection of trademarks” from Calcutta, 22 Oct. 1925 in Japan Govt., Foreign Office,Osaka City, Industry Promotion Section, Toyo-shokoku no Genko Shyohyo Jyorei tosono Toroku Tetsuzuki (Regulations the Registration rules of trademarks currently inuse in the East), Osaka, 1933.

ReferenceMakoto Amino, Shohyo-ho no Sho-mondai(Issues on Trademark Laws), 2vols,1978-1983, Tokyo.Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown, Chinese Big Business and the Wealth of AsianNations, New York, 2000.

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Per Hilding, Technology in a Controlled Economy: Match Industry in India, Richmond:Curzon, 1992.Naoto Kagotani, Ajia Kokusai Tsûshô Chitsujo to Kindai Nihon (in Japanese: Theinternational trade order in Asia and modern Japan). Nagoya: Nagoya daigakushuppankai, 2000.Lin Man-houng “Overseas Chinese Merchants and Multiple nationality: A Means forReducing Commercial Risks(1895-1935)” in Modern Asian Studies 35(4), 2001.Claude Markovits, The Global World of Indian Merchants, 1750-1947: Traders of Sindfrom Bukhara to Panama. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.Hans Modig, Swedish Match Interests in British India during the Inter-War Years,Stockholm, 1979.Takashi OISHI, “Indo-Japan Cooperative Ventures in Match Manufacturing in India:Muslim Merchant Networks in and beyond the Bengal Bay Region 1900-1930,” inInternational Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.1‚ No.1, Jan. 2004, Cambridge UniversityPress.Takashi OISHI, “Intra-regional Network and Nation: A Historical Examination ofIndian Muslim Merchants”, in Nobuko Nagasaki (ed), Democracy and Development inSouth Asia: East Asian Comparative Perspectives, Ryukoku University, Kyoto, 2005,133-156pp.Takashi OISHI, “Networks and Empires: Indian Migrants/Merchants in East Asia andBeyond” organized by the project “Empires and Networks: Regional Economic Order inAsia” Kyoto University, Japan, Oct 7-8, 2005, 33ppTakashi OISHI, “The Political Configurations of Match Label Designs in Modern India:Merchants’ Network, State and Nationalism”, A paper read at an internationalworkshop “Elites in Asian History: Social Network and Cultural Representation”,February 18-19, 2006, Institute of Oriental Culture, The University of Tokyo, 23pp.Tokkyocho, Kogyo Shoyu-ken Seido 100nen-shi, Jo-kan (Hundred Years of IndustrialProperty Rights, 1st volume), Tokyo, 1984Noboru Yamashita, Keiseiki nihon shihonshugi ni okeru matchi kôgyô to mitsuibussan (in Japanese: Match Industry and the Mitsui Bussan during the FormativePeriod of Japanese Capitalism). Mitsui Bunko Ronsô , no.6, 1972.

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