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[A.C. No. 5438. March 10, 2004]

DAN JOEL V. LIM*and RICHARD C. TAN, complainants, vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO

BARCELONA, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

On May 9, 2001, Dan Joel V. Lim and Richard C. Tan ,[1]both businessmen,filed a complaint for alleged robbery or extortion and violation of the Anti-Graftand Corrupt Practices Act against Atty. Edilberto Barcelona, a lawyer formerlyemployed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The complaintwas simultaneously filed with this Court and the Integrated Bar of

thePhilippines.

[2]

Complainant Lim alleged that on the first week of August 2000, respondent

phoned him and introduced himself as a lawyer and chief ofthe Public Assistance Center, NLRC. Respondent informed him that hisemployees filed a labor complaint against him in his office and it was necessaryfor him to see and talk with respondent. From then on respondent would oftencall him. Respondent visited him in his office and told him to settle the case orelse his business, Top Gun Billiards, would be shut down. Lim recalled thaton August 14, 2000, at around 7:30 p.m., respondent again visited hisestablishment and told him to settle the case for P20,000.00.

In support of his allegations, Lim submitted a written complaint of Arnel E.Ditan and Pilipino Ubante; an endorsement letter dated August 2, 2000 of Atty.Jonathan F. Baligod of the Presidential Action Center; handwritten calling cardsof the respondent; and an affidavit of desistance executed by Ditan and Ubante.

In their joint affidavit, Ditan and Ubante confirmed the filing of theircomplaint against their employer, Lim, and that after some dialogue, theaforenamed employees executed an affidavit datedAugust 8, 2000 withdrawingtheir complaint. According to Ditan and Ubante, they met the respondent in TopGun Billiards where the latter often played billiards. One day, respondent gavethem a letter and asked them to sign it. Since they were busy at that time, theysigned it without reading and understanding its contents. Their employer, Lim,

asked what it was about and they told him that they were just made to sign adocument without their understanding it. They added, they did not have anycomplaint against their employer. Despite such withdrawal, respondent stillcalled Lim threatening the latter that he would pursue the case, have hisestablishment closed and he would be jailed if he did not come upwith P20,000.00 as settlement. In the evening of August 14, 2000, respondentreiterated his demand for P20,000.00, again with the threat of closure of thebilliard center and putting Lim in jail.

Complainant Lim said that after his meeting with respondent, he agreed togive the amount but did not fix any date when payment would be made,whereupon, respondent gave notice that he would drop in at around 7:00 in theevening, on August 16, 2000, to pick up the money.

Aurora Cruz y Libunao, owner of the carinderia adjacent to Top GunBilliards, stated in her sworn statement as well as court testimony that she metrespondent when he ate in her carinderia. She recalled that the respondent toldher that he would shut down the billiard business if the owner would not talk tohim. She also recounted that on August 14, 2000, at around 8:30 p.m., she sawon the second floor of the pool house, the respondent and Lim talking. After a

while, the respondent came down and passed by her carinderia. The respondentthen informed her that he and Lim talked about the P20,000.00 whichrespondent would give to his alleged boss in Malacaang. During the hearing,she also recalled seeing Lim hand money to respondent who in turn put the cashin his attach case and immediately thereafter, she saw three men arrestrespondent.[3]

Notably, almost nine months before the filing of his complaint, or on August14, 2000, complainant Lim personally submitted a letter to the NBI requestingthe NBI to investigate respondent Atty. Edilberto Barcelona.[4]According to theNBI report, after due investigation, it decided to conduct an entrapmentoperation. On August 15, 2000, Special Investigator Marvin de Jemil, sent nine

five hundred peso bills and five one hundred peso bills for fluorescent powderdusting to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division. Further, the NBI reported thatthru the NBI Identification and Records Division, it found no record of suchperson named Edilberto Barcelona.

The NBI report also stated that on August 16, 2000, Lim informed the NBIoperatives that at around 7:00 p.m. respondent would drop by his pool house tocollect the money. At around 6:30 p.m., the operatives went to the pool houseand strategically positioned themselves and posed as pool players. At about 7:20p.m., respondent arrived, sat on a plastic chair and talked to complainant Lim. Ataround 7:30 p.m., Lim handed the marked money to the respondent who, in turn,
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received it. While respondent was counting the money and about to place itinside his bag, he was immediately arrested. The respondent initially resisted andtried to create scandal but was later pacified.

The NBI averred that the respondent was informed of his constitutionalrights and was brought to the NBI office where he was booked andfingerprinted. In his fingerprint chart, the respondent indicated that he was agovernment lawyer and assigned at the office of the

Chief, Public Assistance Center, NLRC, Banawe, Quezon City. He showed hisidentification card. Later he was brought to the Forensic Chemistry Division forultraviolet examination. The certification issued by Forensic Chemist Loren G.Janobas stated that there were yellow fluorescent specks and smudges on theback and palm of the left and right hand of the respondent. On August 17, 2000,the NBI turned over respondent to the City Prosecutor of Manila who eventuallyindicted him for robbery/extortion.[5]

Complainant Richard Tan, owner of Tai Hing Glass Supply, a co-signee in theherein complaint, executed a sworn statement dated August 16, 2000. In it healleged that he went to the Criminal Intelligence Division, Intelligence Service ofthe NBI to complain about respondent Barcelona. He said that sometime during

the last week of July, respondent called him, introduced himself and informedhim that one of his employees filed an illegal dismissal case against him. Heremembered that before respondents call, he had suspended an employee,Bryan Tellen, for leaving his workplace without permission. Tellen receivedseveral warning letters from him regarding his misdemeanors. Tan rememberedthat Tellen once hinted that he knew someone in the Department of Labor, whoturned out to be herein respondent, Atty. Barcelona. Before Tan sent hisaccountant, Ditas Guitierrez, to respondents office to represent him, he told herto bring a copy of Tellens suspension letter and to inform respondent that Tellenhad not been dismissed. When Guitierrez returned, she told him that respondentwanted him to pay his employee. She added that respondent did not give her anycopy of a formal complaint on the alleged illegal dismissal. After two days,according to Tan, respondent went to his office, showed him an identificationcard and gave him a handwritten calling card. Respondent told him to pay hisemployee P20,000.00 to P30,000.00, otherwise respondent would go onwith the filing of the illegal dismissal case. When he said he did not have thatkind of money, respondent lowered the amount to P15,000.00. Complainant Tanadded that when he gave respondent the money, the latter promised to takecare of the illegal dismissal complaint. On July 29, 2000, according to Tan,respondent came to see him again. Respondent appeared drunk and told Tan togo to the respondents office because a problem regarding the case arose. Tanstated that before respondent left, respondent invited his employees to a game

of billiards. Tan said he did not consent to the employees playing because theyhad work. On July 31, 2000, respondent went to him a third time and asked for anadditional P10,000.00 allegedly for his employee, Tellen, since the P15,000.00Tan gave earlier was for respondent only. After a few more visits by respondent,Tan finally told the respondent to show him the formal complaint and he wouldjust get himself a lawyer.[6]

The Joint Affidavit of Arrest, signed on August 17, 2000 by Agent Don R.

Hernandez, SI Felix O. Senora and SI Marvin de Jemil, cited complainant Tansallegations.[7]

Respondent Atty. Barcelona filed his Comment[8]on December 10, 2001,praying for the dismissal of the complaint against him. Respondent, in hisdefense, alleges that he normally played billiards at the Top Gun Billiard Centerwhere he would drop by from his office before going to his residence; that whencertain employees of the billiard center learned that he was a lawyer and Chief ofthe Public Assistance Center of the NLRC, they confided in him their grievanceagainst their employer, Lim, for alleged violation of labor laws, there respondentgave them assistance; that with the proper complaint and requireddocumentation accomplished, respondents office scheduled the case for a

dialogue-conference between the complaining workers and their employer; thaton instigation and coercion of complainant Lim, respondent became a victim oftheft, billiard hustling, swindling and syndicated gambling on August 9, 2000;that on or about August 9, 2000, respondent filed a complaint for theft ofcellphone and pack of cigarettes, billiard hustling, syndicated gambling, andswindling against Lim and his three workers, eventually docketed as I.S. No.38251 to 53.[9]

Respondents Comment narrated his version on how the money allegedlywas given to him. According to the respondent, on August 16, 2000, at about 3p.m., he received a phone call from complainant Lim informing him that IanGonvan,[10]one of the accused in I.S. No. 38251, admitted taking his cellphone and

was willing and ready to return it at around 7 p.m., at the Top Gun BilliardCenter. It was the birthday of his daughter that was why he took the day offfrom office. At about 7:30 p.m., he arrived at the billiard hall and there found Limwith one of his complaining workers, fixing the lamp of one of the billiard tables.He did not see Gonvan within the premises so he sat and watched the billiardgames going on while he waited. After about 15 minutes Lim sat beside him andtold him that Gonvan could no longer return the cellphone and instead Gonvanentrusted Lim with the equivalent value in cash. According to respondent, Limpersistently whispered to him to accept and count the wad of paper money Limpulled out. According to respondent, he consistently refused to touch themoney and he insisted, Gusto ko munang makaharap ang sinasabi mong si
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Gumban,[11]continuously refusing to accept, much less count, the offered wadof money. Respondent added that when Lim realized that he could not beprevailed upon to accept it, he placed and inserted the wad of money in the openside pocket of respondents shoulder bag that respondent normally carried,again pleading to respondent that he should count the money. Respondentadded that Lims behavior was rude and intimidating so much so that respondentprotested such rudeness. But respondent said while he was trying to retrievethe wad of money to throw it back to Lim, about five or seven burly men

accosted respondent and handcuffed him over his vehement protestations.[12]

On Tans complaint, respondent declared that he never demanded norreceived money from Tan, and Tans accusations are but a product of theformers fertile imagination as leverage because he actively assisted acomplaining worker of Tan.[13]Respondent added that a formal labor complainthas been filed against Tan.[14]

Eventually, we referred the complaint against Atty. Barcelona to theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report andrecommendation. Its report with recommendation is now before us. We shallnow proceed to the merits of the complaint.

Respondents version seeks to discredit the NBI report to the effect thatrespondent accepted the marked money which Lim handed to him. His version,however, fails to explain why he was found positive for yellow fluorescentspecks and smudges in his dorsal and palmar aspects of the left and right handsby the Forensic Department of the NBI.

Respondent claims that he continuously refused to accept, much less count,the offered wad of money. Because of such refusal, according to respondent,Lim inserted the wad of money in respondents shoulder bags open pocketwhile complainant Lim was still pleading to count the wad of money.

Respondent alleges that the alleged bribery or extortion is a mere

concoction of complainant and as leverage for the cases against Lim and Tan.

Based on the NBI report, this case appears to be an entrapmentoperation. Notably, Atty. Don Hernandez and his team of arresting officersconfirm the entrapment operation against respondent on the basis ofcomplainant Lims call for NBI assistance.

While respondent alleges that complainant Lim merely concocted a chargeof extortion against him in retaliation to a complaint for theft which he had filed,it may be noted that the complaint for theft was not directed against Lim butonly against his workers who were accused by respondent. Hence, there

appears to be no strong reason for Lim to resort to a counter-charge forextortion against respondent.

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP concluded that it is highlyimprobable that the NBI could be misled by complainant Lim into conducting anentrapment operation against respondent, if there was no merit to his complaintagainst respondent. From a reading of the NBI Report as well as the documentsattached to said report, it is evident that the NBI considered the merits of Lims

complaint of extortion against respondent. Finding it worth pursuing, the NBIconducted an entrapment operation against respondent. On the basis of theentrapment operation conducted by the NBI, respondent was caught in the act,so to speak, of attempted extortion. Respondent was brought to the CityProsecutor of Manila for inquest and the appropriate complaint forRobbery/Extortion was filed against respondent.[15]

Based on its own evaluation and the NBI Report, the InvestigatingCommissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline recommended thesuspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of two years.[16]

In the final resolution dated September 27, 2003, the Board of Governors ofthe IBP imposed the penalty of disbarment for the reason that respondent in factattempted to extort money as Chief of the Public Assistance Center of the NLRCto threaten/coerce Lim and that no less than the NBI caught him in the act ofreceiving and counting the money extorted from Lim.[17]

The grounds for disbarment or suspension of an attorney are: (1) deceit; (2)malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyers oath;(6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfullyappearing as an attorney for a party without authority.[18]

The NBI found that respondents hands had yellow fluorescent specks andsmudges with which the money used for the entrapment of the respondent had

been powdered. We find no reason to doubt the NBI report. Also, we see nobasis to overturn the presumption that the NBI had done its duty regularly.

Respondent would make us believe that the specks and smudges of yellowfluorescent were in his hands because Lim offered him what was allegedly thepayment for the stolen cellphone by a certain Gonvan. Regrettably, there is nocorroboration from Gonvan nor anyone else on this matter. Thus, respondentsstory appears to us entirely self-serving.

We had held previously that if a lawyers misconduct in the discharge of hisofficial duties as government official is of such a character as to affect his
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qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, he may be disciplined as amember of the Bar on such ground.[19]More significantly, lawyers in governmentservice in the discharge of their official tasks have more restrictions than lawyersin private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned ina lawyer who holds a responsible public office. [20]Rule 1.02 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not counsel or abetactivities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legalsystem. Extortion by a government lawyer, an outright violation of the law, calls

for the corresponding grave sanctions. With the aforesaid rule a high standardof integrity is demanded of a government lawyer as compared to a privatepractitioner because the delinquency of a government lawyer erodes thepeoples trust and confidence in the government.

Needless to say, lawyers owe it to the court and to society not to stir uplitigations. Employees of the billiards hall, Ditan and Ubante, swore thatrespondent public officer encouraged complainant Lims workers to file a caseagainst the latter. Rule 1.03 of the same Code states that a lawyer shall not, forany corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay anymans cause.

Noteworthy, as an Attorney IV and Chief of the Public Assistance Center ofthe NLRC, respondent failed to observe prudence by hanging out and playing inthe billiard hall. By so doing, he exposed himself unnecessarily to certainelements and situations which could compromise his official position and hisstatus as a lawyer.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a nobleprofession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who arecompetent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all timesconduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large,with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfullyperform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A

violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer toadministrative sanctions which includes suspension and disbarment.[21]Moreimportantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as arequirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, theloss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.[22]

Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is notonly to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers, but also to safeguardthe administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from themisconduct of lawyers and to remove from the legal profession persons whoseutter disregard of the lawyers oath has proven them unfit to continue

discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.[23]Thesepronouncements gain practical significance in this case, considering thatrespondent is a senior lawyer of the NLRC. It bears stressing also thatgovernment lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, apublic trust. As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to theirprofessional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to bemagnified in the public eye.[24]

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed tocope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal profession.

InMontano v. IBP,[25]this Court said that only in a clear case of misconductthat seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer may disbarmentbe imposed as a penalty. In the instant case, the Court is convinced that theevidence against respondent is clear and convincing. He is administratively liablefor corrupt activity, deceit, and gross misconduct. As correctly held by the Boardof Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, he should not only besuspended from the practice of law but disbarred.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto Barcelona is foundadministratively guilty of corrupt activity, deceit, and gross misconduct and ishereby ordered DISBARRED. Let his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneyseffective immediately, and this resolution spread in his record in this Court andcirculated to all courts in the Philippines.

SECOND DIVISION
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LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO,Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. RODOLFO T. GALING,Respondent.

A.C. No. 6174

Present:

CARPIO,Chairperson,

BRION,PEREZ,

SERENO, andREYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

November 16, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

Before us for consideration is Resolution No. XVIII-2007-196[1]of the Board

of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the

complaint[2]for disbarment filed by Lydia Castro-Justo against Atty. Rodolfo T.

Galing.

Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the

services of respondent Atty. Galing in connection with dishonored checks issued

by Manila City Councilor Arlene W. Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid his professional

fees, the respondent drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa demanding payment of

the checks.[3] Respondent advised complainant to wait for the lapse of the

period indicated in the demand letter before filing her complaint.

On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for

estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City

Prosecutor of Manila.[4]

On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation[5]

filed byrespondent for and on behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases, and

the latters daughter Karen Torralba (Ms. Torralba). Further, on 8 August 2003,

respondent appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa before the prosecutor of Manila.

Complainant submits that by representing conflicting interests, respondent

violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In his Comment,[6]respondent denied the allegations against him. He

admitted that he drafted a demand letter for complainant but argued that it was

made only in deference to their long standing friendship and not by reason of a

professional engagement as professed by complainant. He denied receiving any

professional fee for the services he rendered. It was allegedly their

understanding that complainant would have to retain the services of another

lawyer. He alleged that complainant, based on that agreement, engaged the

services of Atty. Manuel A. Ao.

To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by

complainant against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was based

not on the demand letter he drafted but on the demand letter prepared by Atty.

Manuel A. Ao.
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Respondent contended that he is a close friend of the opposing parties in

the criminal cases. He further contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa

are likewise long time friends, as in fact, they are comares for more than 30

years since complainant is the godmother of Ms. Torralba .[7] Respondent

claimed that it is in this light that he accommodated Ms. Koa and her daughters

request that they be represented by him in the cases filed against them bycomplainant and complainants daughter. He maintained that the filing of the

Motion for Consolidation which is a non-adversarial pleading does not evidence

the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between him and Ms. Koa and Ms.

Torralba. Likewise, his appearance in the joint proceedings should only be

construed as an effort on his part to assume the role of a moderator or arbiter of

the parties.

He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help

the parties achieve an out of court settlement and possible reconciliation. He

reported that his efforts proved fruitful insofar as he had caused Ms. Koa to pay

complainant the amount of P50,000.00 in settlement of one of the two checks

subject of I.S. No. 03G-19484-86.

Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make

good the other checks caused a lot of consternation on the part of complainant.

This allegedly led her to vent her ire on respondent and file the instant

administrative case for conflict of interest.

In a resolution dated 19 October 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP

adopted and approved with modification the findings of its Investigating

Commissioner. They found respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility by representing conflicting interests and

for his daring audacity and for the pronounced malignancy of his act. It was

recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year

with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with

more severely.[8]

We agree with the Report and Recommendation of the InvestigatingCommissioner,[9]as adopted by the Board of Governors of the IBP.

It was established that in April 2003, respondent was approached by

complainant regarding the dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor

Koa.

It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was

filed by respondent in I.S. No. 03G-19484-86 entitled Lydia Justo vs. Arlene Koa

and I.S. No. 03G-19582-84 entitled Lani C. Justo vs. Karen

Torralba. Respondent stated that the movants in these cases are mother and

daughter while complainants are likewise mother and daughter and that these

cases arose out from the same transaction. Thus, movants and complainants will

be adducing the same sets of evidence and witnesses.

Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him

and complainant because there was no professional fee paid for the services he

rendered. Moreover, he argued that he drafted the demand letter only as a

personal favor to complainant who is a close friend.

We are not persuaded. A lawyer-client re lationship can exist

notwithstanding the close friendship between complainant and respondent. The

relationship was established the moment complainant sought legal advice from
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respondent regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting the demand letter

respondent further affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter

was not utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that respondent was not

eventually engaged by complainant to represent her in the criminal cases is of no

moment. As observed by the Investigating Commissioner, by referring to

complainant Justo as my client in the demand letter sent to the defaultingdebtor[10], respondent admitted the existence of the lawyer-client

relationship. Such admission effectively estopped him from claiming otherwise.

Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate

respondent from liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt

lawyers from complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases with

conflicting interests. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-

client relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the

professional relationship.[11] We held in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta[12]that it is not

necessary that any retainer be paid, promised or charged; neither is it material

that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his

service had been sought.[13]

Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [a]

lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all

concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.Respondent was therefore

bound to refrain from representing parties with conflicting interests in a

controversy. By doing so, without showing any proof that he had obtained the

written consent of the conflicting parties, respondent should be sanctioned.

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on

principles of public policy and good taste.[14] In the course of the lawyer-client

relationship, the lawyer learns of the facts connected with the clients case,

including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of the relationship

is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[15]

It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but

also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then canlitigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of

paramount importance in the administration of justice.[16]

The case of Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat[17]is instructive on this concept, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer representsinconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The testis whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty

to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it forthe other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, thisargument will be opposed by him when he argues for the otherclient.[18] This rule covers not only cases in which confidentialcommunications have been confided, but also those in which noconfidence has been bestowed or will be used.[19] Also, there isconflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer willrequire the attorney to perform an act which will injuriouslyaffect his first client in any matter in which he represents himand also whether he will be called upon in his new relation touse against his first client any knowledge acquired through theirconnection.[20]Another test of the inconsistency of interests iswhether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent anattorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelityand loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness ordouble dealing in the performance thereof.[21]

The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Ao who

was eventually engaged by complainant will not exonerate him from the clear

violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The take- over
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of a clients cause of action by another lawyer does not give the former lawyer

the right to represent the opposing party. It is not only malpractice but also

constitutes a violation of the confidence resulting from the attorney-client

relationship.

Considering that this is respondents first infraction, the disbarment soughtin the complaint is deemed to be too severe. As recommended by the Board of

Governors of the IBP, the suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is

warranted.

Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from

the practice of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the

same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty. Let copies of this

Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office

of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this Decision to

respondents record as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme CourtManila

SECOND DIVISION

ROGELIO F. ESTAVILLO, A.C. No. 6899

Complainant,

- versus -

ATTYS. GEMMO G. GUILLERMO and ERME S. LABAYOG,

Respondents.

Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

BRION,

PEREZ,

SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

November 16, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:


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We review Resolution No. XIX-2011-503,[1]passed on June 26, 2011 by the

Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), granting the

motion for reconsideration of Attys. Gemmo G. Guillermo and Erme S. Labayog

(respondents), thereby lowering the penalty of suspension from the practice of

law for three (3) months against the two lawyers (imposed in Resolution No.

XVIII-2009-07[2]) to REPRIMAND. The respondents were penalized for violation

of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Case

On September 6, 2005, Rogelio F. Estavillo (complainant) filed an affidavit-

complaint[3]with the Office of the Bar Confidant, charging the respondents

with gross negligence. The complainant and his son, Dexter, engaged the

services of the respondents in Civil Case No. 3183[4]for Forcible Entry and

Damages, filed against them by Teresita A. Guerrero with the Municipal Trial

Court in Cities (MTCC), Laoag City.

In particular, the complainant charged the respondents for their failure

to file an answer in the civil case within the period fixed by the Rules of Court, as

required by the summons dated March 18, 2005[5]which commanded:

You are hereby required to enter your appearance in

the above-entitled case within ten (10) days after the service of

the summons upon you, exclusive of the day of such service,

and to answer the complaint served upon you within the period

fixed by the Rules of Court. If you fail to appear within the

aforesaid period, the plaintiff will take judgment against you by

default and demand from this Court the relief prayed for in said

complaint.

The MTCC noted that the summons was served on the Estavillos

on March 18, 2005, leaving them until March 28, 2005 within which to file their

answer to the complaint. The respondents filed the answer only on April 4, 2005,

or seven (7) days beyond the ten (10)-day period under the Rules. For this

reason, the court, upon Guerreros motion, issued an order striking the answer

from the records.[6]

The complainant further claimed that the respondents did not inform

him or his son of scheduled hearings and incidents related to the civil case,

notably the following:
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1) the April 15, 2005 hearing on Guerreros motion to strike out

the pleading (answer) filed by the respondents, as well as the

motion to cite them for indirect contempt;

2) the Order dated March 28, 2005[7]with a writ of preliminary

prohibitory and mandatory injunction, ordering them; to

demolish the fence they built on the disputed property; to

refrain from demolishing or continuing with the demolition of

Guerreros house; and to refrain from continuing with the

construction of the fence on the property in dispute;

3) the Motion to Allow Plaintiff to Adduce Evidence in Support of

her Prayer for Damages, with notice of hearing on May 20,

2005;[8]the hearing was held without the appearance of either

of the respondents; and

4) the Order dated May 31, 2005,[9]directing the complainant

and his son to solidarily pay Guerrero P20,000.00 as actualdamages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,P20,000.00 as

exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorneys fee,

and P3,060.00 as cost of suit.

Still further, the complainant bewailed that at 5:00 p.m. on June 24,

2005, as he and his son were waiting at the respondents law office, Atty.

Guillermo finally arrived; they told the lawyer about their discovery of the May 31,

2005 order; when they asked him why they were not advised of the judgment,

Atty. Guillermo just answered, We have plenty of work.[10]Taken aback by

Atty. Guillermos response and attitude, they left the law office enraged and

confused. The same indifferent treatment was shown to them by Atty. Labayog

who undertook to show them the draft of the notice of appeal of the May 31,2005 order. Instead of Atty. Labayog, a new member of the law firm, a certain

Atty. Janapin, came and could only say that she was sorry for what had

happened.

As required by the Court,[11]the respondents submitted their Comment to

the complaint[12]where they vehemently denied the complainants allegations

that they had been grossly negligent. They alleged that the complainant

conferred with Atty. Guillermo regarding the civil case. They learned that

Guerrero, the plaintiff, is the former owner of the property in dispute and is

residing at a house built on the property. The Estavillos acquired the property

and they wanted to get rid of Guerrero. One way of doing it, they thought, was

to build a fence on the lot, thereby substantially reducing Guerreros passageway

and destroying Guerreros house. Thus, Guerrero prayed for a temporary

restraining order and a writ of preliminary and/or prohibitory injunction.

To the respondents mind, Guerreros case was actually

for possession despite its title for Forcible Entry based on the allegations of

the complainant. They, therefore, waited for the order of the court, before they

filed the answer to the complaint. They relied on Section 4, par. 2 of the 1991

Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which provides that if no ground for
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dismissal is found by the court, it shall forthwith issue summons stating that the

summary procedure under the Rule shall apply. Unfortunately, the court did not

issue any order so they presumed that the regular rules apply and that the time

to file an answer is fifteen (15) days. This notwithstanding, they vehemently

opposed Guerreros motion to strike out the answer, but the court ruled in

Guerreros favor and struck out the answer they filed in behalf of the Estavillos.

The respondents further maintained that contrary to the complainants

allegations, they represented the complainant and his son in all stages of the

proceedings, except at one hearing when Guillermo had an emergency meeting

in connection with a different case. They also denied that they were not

providing updates on the case; the complainants son, Dexter, had been regularly

going to the law office to get feedbacks on the progress of the case.

The respondents took exception to the complainants claim that Atty.

Guillermo said We have plenty of work[13]in justifying the loss of the civil case,

for what he told the complainant on one occasion was not all cases are won,

and our only remedy left is appeal.[14]They indeed filed the appeal which

adequately and exhaustively discussed the complainants position in the case. It

just so happened that the court decided in Guerreros favor.
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The IBP Proceedings

On February 22, 2006,[15]the Court referred the complaint to the IBP for

investigation, report and recommendation.

In a Report and Recommendation dated November 11,

2008,[16]Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. of the IBP Commission on Bar

Discipline recommended that the respondents be suspended from the practice

of law for three (3) months for violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

The relevant portions of Commissioner Magpayos report state:

After a judicious study of the records, it appears to the

undersigned that the respondents composing the law office of

Guillermo & Labayog did not meet the standard of diligence

required by the situation relative to the civil complaint and the

summons received by their client. When they accepted the

complainants case, the clients presented to them the copy of

the summons issued by the Clerk of Court.

The summons dated 18 March 2005 specifically states:

You are hereby required to enter your appearance in the

above-entitled case within ten (10) days after the service of the

summons upon you, exclusive of the day of such service, and to

answer the complaint served upon you within the period fixed

by the Rules of Court. (Exh. 3)

The complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 3183 is for:

Forcible Entry and damages with prayer of the issuance of a

temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary mandatory

and/or prohibitory injunction.

It behooves or is incumbent upon respondent[s] to be

knowledgeable of the periods within which to file a pleading. In

this particular [instance], Rule 70, governing forcible entry and

unlawful detainer cases which is incorporated in the 1997 Rules

of Civil Procedure[,] has been in effect for almost eight (8) years

when this complaint was instituted by plaintiff Guerrero against

respondents clients. It is the bounden duty of counsel in theactive practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme

Court and changes in the law (De Roy v. Court of Appeals, 157

SCRA 757).

It was the finding of the MTCC that as appearing in the

record, the defendants filed their Answer only on April 4, 2005

or 7 days beyond the ten (10) day period given (order dated

April 28, 2005).

Thus, it is plain that respondents who argued that the

reglementary period is fifteen days, and not ten days, were still

late in submitting the defendants answer within fifteen days.[17]


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Commissioner Magpayo, however, found no solid evidence to support the

complainants other accusations. He cited as a case in point the hearing ofMay

20, 2005permitting Guerrero, the plaintiff, to present ex-parte evidence. As the

term of the courts directive implies, the hearing was supposed to be attended

by the plaintiff alone, without the defendants presence, for the purpose of

adducing evidence to prove damages. The absence of an answer (the Estavillosanswer having been stricken off the record) facilitated the allowance of the ex-

parte evidence of Guerrero.

Commissioner Magpayo opined that to the credit of the respondents, they

put up a fight, however futile, in defense of the complainants case , as shown in

the TSN of the hearings of March 22,[18]April 15[19]and May 6,

2005.[20]Unfortunately, it was really a losing case because the answer to the

complaint was filed late or beyond the reglementary period of 10 days prescribed

under the Rules of Court.[21]
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The IBP Board of Governors Ruling and Related Incidents

On February 19, 2009, the IBP Board of Governors passed a

Resolution[22]adopting and approving Commissioner Magpayos

recommendation.

On July 9, 2009, the respondents moved for reconsideration of the IBP

resolution, insisting that they were not liable for gross negligence. They argued

that they filed all the required pleadings for the Estavillos the answer,

oppositions, appeals and memoranda. Except for one oral argument where Atty.

Guillermo had a previous commitment elsewhere (which happened to be the

time of the plaintiffsex-parte presentation of evidence), they religiously

attended to all the hearings. They maintained that if there had been negligence

at all, it was not gross as it was brought about by the difficult appreciation of the

Rules. They further argued that the penalty of suspension for their negligence, if

any, is not in accord with jurisprudence.

On August 26, 2009, Guerrero filed a comment on the motion forreconsideration, asking for its denial, contending that [t]he hackneyed

reasoning of respondents that the trial court should have issued an order fixing

the period to file an answer is a subterfuge, if not a lame excuse, for their gross

negligence and lack of fidelity in handling their clients case.[23]

On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed the Resolution under

review, Resolution No. XIX-2011-503.[24]To reiterate, it modified its Resolution No.

XVIII-2009-07 dated February 19, 2009, lowering the recommended penalty of

suspension for three (3) months against the respondents to REPRIMAND.

The Courts Ruling

The original sanction recommended by Commissioner Magpayo against the

respondents, principally for their failure to file an answer for the Estavillos in the

civil case,was a three-month suspension from the practice of law. The

recommendation already took into account the presence of mitigating

circumstances, although Commissioner Magpayo failed to elaborate on what

these mitigating circumstances were.

In asking for a penalty lighter than the three-month suspension

imposed, the respondents contend that they did everything required by their

clients defense, except for the answer to the complaint which was

filed beyond the reglementary period. Nonetheless, they submit that if therehad been any negligence at all, it was not gross as it was due to a difficult

appreciation of the Rules. In any event, they submit that their clients really had a

losing case and there was nothing they could do about it. They further argue that

the recommended penalty is not in accord with jurisprudence.
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Under Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, A LAWYER

SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Pursuant to

Rule 18.03 cited by the complainant, A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter

entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him

liable.

After a review of the facts, we find no reason to reduce the originally

recommended penalty of suspension for three months against the respondents

for their mishandling of the Estavillos civil case. Although they filed the answer,

it could no longer serve its purpose as it was filed late (i.e., seven days beyond

the required ten [10]-day period), as found by the court.[25]As a consequence,

the answer was stricken off the record[26]to the detriment of the complainant

and his son.

The respondents attempted to justify the late filing of the answer by

claiming that, to their mind, the civil case was actually for possession,

notwithstanding that its title is forforcible entry. They thus waited for an order

from the court pursuant to Section 4 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary

Procedure which provides that If no ground for dismissal is found it shall

forthwith issue summons which shall state that the summary procedure under

this Rule shall apply. They did not receive a court order so they presumed that

the regular rules apply, under which, the answer shall be filed within fifteen (15)

days.

We do not find the respondents stance acceptable as it bet rays a lack of

the necessary competence and diligence required by the Code of Professional

Responsibility in responding to the courts summons for the Estavillos tomake

an appearance in the case and to file an answer to the complaint . The

respondents, especially Atty. Guillermo who was supposed to be the lead

counsel for the Estavillos, misappreciated the urgency and the importance of thecourts summons. They mistakenly assumed that the court would issue an order

of dismissal. They waited and when no order issued from the court, they again

incorrectly assumed that the regular rules apply without seeking a clarification

from the court or ascertaining exactly when the answer should be filed. With this

rationalization, they then shifted the blame for their failure to file the answer on

time to the court. We cannot allow this kind of response in the handling of cases

as the terms of the Rules of Court are sufficiently clear in their requirements to

the average lawyer. The terms of the summons were also clear; as the court aptly

stated:

In the summons issued, specific instruction was given to

the defendants that within ten (10) days after service, they are

required to enter their appearance and to answer the complaint

within the period fixed by the Rules of Court. The period fixed

by the Rules of Court is ten (10) days and not fifteen (15) days as

averred by the defendants. The defendants, however, failed.[27]

Thus, the respondents had in fact been negligent, or worse, had failed to

exercise the required competence and diligence in filing the Estavillos answer to

the complaint.


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Under the circumstances of the case, the respondents penalty cannot be

further mitigated without committing an unfairness against the complainant and

his son. We remind the respondents and the IBP Board of Governors of what we

said in Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez:[28]

Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to

him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render

him liable. Every case a lawyer

accepts deserves his full attention, skill and competence,

regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee

or for free. He must constantly keep in mind that his actions or

omissions or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client.

Thus, he is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of

law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has

the right to expect not just a good amount of professional

learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the

clients cause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Board of Governors Resolution No. XIX-2011-503 of June 26, 2011 is SET ASIDE,

and its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-07 dated February 19, 2009 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-05-1900. January 28, 2005]

SHIRLEY LORIA TOLEDO and ROSIE LORIA DAJAC, complainants, vs. JUDGEALFREDO E. KALLOS, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

For our resolution is the verified complaint, written in the vernacular anddated 21 August 2002, of siblings Shirley Loria Toledo and Rosie Loria Dajacagainst respondent Judge Alfredo E. Kallos, Presiding Judge of the Regional TrialCourt (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 10, for violation of the Code of JudicialConduct, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Article 1491 (5) of the CivilCode.

Prior to his appointment as a judge in March 1995,[1]Judge Kallos wascomplainants counsel of record in Civil Case No. 4879 filed with the RTC ofLegazpi City, Branch 4, involving the recovery of hereditary shares withdamages. On 25 March 1979, a judgment was rendered ordering the defendantsto, among other things, turn over to herein complainants, the plaintiffs therein,the possession and ownership of the total area of 4,514 square meters of lot2082 Albay Cadastre. On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court ofAppeals and became final and executory on 16 December 1985.[2]

Several years thereafter, or in February 2002, the respondent filed in the

same action, Civil Case No. 4879, before the RTC of Legazpi, Branch 4, anOmnibus Motion[3]praying, inter alia, for the issuance an order constituting in hisfavor an attorneys lien to the extent of one -third over the lot awarded in favorof the complainants representing his attorneys fee. He based his motion on awritten contingency agreement on attorneys fees for professional servicesrendered whereby he is entitled to one-third share of what would be awarded tothe complainants. He claimed that this agreement had already beenimplemented when one of the three (3) lots levied upon by the sheriff toanswer for the award of damages was given to (him) as his one-third share whilethe other two lots went to the plaintiffs as their two- third share [as]evidenced by the Definite Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. T-
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77728, T-77458 and T-77459. However, he misplaced a copy of said writtenagreement.

In the meantime, or on 5 September 2002, the complainants filed beforethis Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, the subject verifiedcomplaint. Here, complainants pray for three things. First, they pray for an orderdirecting the respondent to stop demanding his 1/3 share attorneys fees. They assert that the respondent has no basis for his claim because he failed toshow in court proof of the alleged written contingency fee agreement. They alsobelie respondents insistence in his Omnibus Motion that the said agreement hadalready been implemented when, on execution, one of three lots levied upon bythe sheriff was given to him as his 1/3 share. They emphasize that all the lotslevied by the sheriff were given to them. However, the respondent forcedthem to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale on 16 January 1990 involving a parcel ofland valued in the document at P10,000, but actually worth more than P500,000,in payment of his attorneys fees. While they did not want to sign the documentbecause respondent appeared in their case only during execution, they wereconstrained to do so for fear that something adverse might happen to their case,as the respondent so warned them. The latter told them that they would nothave won the case were it not for his services.

The complainants thus seek, as their second prayer, the recovery of theproperty involved in said Deed of Absolute Sale. They argue that pursuant toArticle 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from buying their clientsproperties when the same are still the object of litigation. To prove that therespondent was still their counsel when the sale took place, the complainantsattached to their complaint the Motion to Terminate Services dated 23 June1994, which was based on respondents being remiss in his duties andresponsibilities as their lawyer, and the Order of the court dated 29 June 1994,approving the termination.

Third, the complainants pray for the removal of the respondent from his

position as RTC judge for his alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge.

In his Comment dated 25 November 2002, the respondent denies theallegations against him and asserts that he is only claiming what is due him. Hevehemently denies that he appeared in the case only during the execution stage,pointing to the Minutes of Hearing and the Order, both dated 05 October 1973,which show that he entered his appearance as counsel for the complainants asearly as 5 October 1973, or two months after the complaint was filed. Hecontinuously handled the case from then on, as shown by copies of the minutesof the hearings and orders issued by the RTC, until a favorable judgment wasrendered on 25 March 1979 and the subject properties were levied upon on

execution to satisfy the judgment. He insists that he was never remiss in theperformance of his duties and responsibilities as complainants counsel.

The respondent further alleges that the existence of the agreement onattorneys fees was admitted by complainant Shirley Loria Toledo as evidencedby the order issued by the court on 01 March 2002, which states that Ms. Toledocame to the court informally informing it that she had a copy of the contract onattorneys fees.[4]

As regards the Deed of Absolute Sale, respondent admits that he was stillcomplainants lawyer when the lot was transferred in his name. The lot was givento him by the complainants and their mother, pursuant to their writtencontingency agreement, as his 1/3 share in the three parcels of land levied uponby the sheriff to settle the accrued rentals awarded in the second paragraph ofthe dispositive portion of the decision. He did not pay for it. The figureappearing on the document was written only to facilitate the transaction. Henever compelled the complainants and their mother to sell to him the parcel ofland. Neither did he tell them that nothing would happen to their case withouthim.

Finally, the respondent asserts that his claim for attorneys fees is still being

litigated in Civil Case No. 4879. Thus, the instant complaint is premature.

In their Rejoinder dated 7 January 2003, the complainants insist that there isno basis for respondents claim for attorneys fees for the following reasons: (1)the respondent failed to present the agreement on attorneys fees; (2)attorneys fees were not awarded by the RTC or the Court of Appeals; and (3)Civil Case No. 4879 is in its execution stage.

After evaluating the pleadings submitted by the parties, the CourtAdministrator found[5]that respondent was, indeed, complainants counsel inCivil Case No. 4879, and he should therefore be compensated for his services.The act of demanding payment for his attorneys fees is not a ground for

administrative liability. However, he can be allowed only fair and reasonableattorneys fees under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As tothis, the Court Administrator stated:

On the question of whether respondent violated Article 1491(5) of the CivilCode, the Court Administrator found that this may be fairly resolved in aninvestigation, there being a factual dispute, and recommended that thecomplaint be referred to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals pursuant toSection 3, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. On the basis of this recommendation,we referred the matter to Associate Justice Jose Mendoza of the Court ofAppeals for investigation, report, and recommendation.
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In his Report,[6]Justice Mendoza found that the respondent indeedrepresented the complainants in Civil Case No. 4879. Like the CourtAdministrator, he expresses the view that the act of demanding attorneys feesfor services rendered is not a ground for administrative sanction. He finds thatwhen the respondent made the demand, he did so as a lawyer who obtained afavorable judgment for his client, and not as a judge. As a lawyer, it is but justthat he be fairly compensated for his services. And his filing of a claim forattorneys fees in Civil Case No. 4879 was an appropriate legal remedy.

Considering the pendency of such claim, Justice Mendoza recommends thesuspension of the determination of the instant administrative complaint until therendition of a final judicial ruling on the matter of respondents attorneys fees;thus:

As the said issue is still being litigated in the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.4879, it is the view of the undersigned that the complaint is still premature.

In other words, the complaint is not yet ripe for administrative evaluation. Thehearing on the matter being conducted by the court below should be allowed torun its course as that court is the appropriate forum for a ruling on the dispute.

To make a determination at this time on whether the respondent violatedArticle 1491 (A) would be to preempt the lower court in its resolution of theissue. Any recommendation by the undersigned in this administrative case andsubsequent resolution by the Honorable Supreme Court on the matter wouldcertainly affect or influence the thinking of the trial court before which thematter is pending. In such a case, it will be unfair to either party. At any rate, theparty who would feel aggrieved might still elevate the decision to the highercourts.

This recommendation is not without precedent. In the case of Spouses De Leon

v. Hon. Bonifacio, Adm. Case No. 4467, October 10, 1997, the then Deputy CourtAdministrator, Hon. Reynaldo Suarez, recommended the dismissal of the case forbeing judicial in nature or, at least, premature.

In this case, the respondent is not being charged for his acts or decisions as ajudge. Rather, he has been charged for dealing with the property of h is clientwhich is prohibited by law. Nevertheless, the principle is the same, in that, thematter is still judicial in nature.

We agree with Justice Mendoza.

It is fundamental that a claim for attorneys fees may be asserted either inthe very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in aseparate action.[7]The respondent chose to file his claim for attorneys fees inthe same case in which he served as counsel for the complainants. Asmentioned, this is a proper remedy under our jurisdiction and is preferred to anindependent action as it avoids multiplicity of suits. Besides, the right to recoverattorneys fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counselhave been rendered. Moreover, the court trying the case is to a certain degreealready familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyers services[8]and is in abetter position to decide the question of fees.

Undisputably, respondents claim for attorneys fees is under litigation. Wefind in the records an Order dated 7 January 2004 issued in Civil Case No. 4879which granted respondents prayer for 1/3 share of attorneys fees in theproceeds of litigation as claimed in his Omnibus Motion dated 14 February 2002.This Order is the subject of a motion for reconsideration by the complainants, asstated in respondents Manifestation dated 24 January 2004 [9]filed in theinvestigation proceedings conducted by Justice Mendoza. Also part of the

records is respondents Affidavit dated 1 December 2003, filed in the sameinvestigation proceedings, alluding to the complainants filing of a Petition forCertiorari and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.80090, seeking to reverse the Order of the trial court denying complainantsMotion to Dismiss respondents Omnibus Motion.

We, therefore, find no cogent reason for us to resolve complainants firsttwo issues raised in the verified complaint, for they are inextricably inherent inthe claim of the respondent in his Omnibus Motion, which is pending judicialdetermination. Since respondents claim for attorneys fees in the main case hasnot yet become final, the objection of prematurity obtains, as a contrary holdingmay be preemptive of a final judicial determination of factual and evidentiary

matters inherent in the claim.[10]

Clearly, the reliefs asked by the complainants arejudicial in nature.[11] And, if only for an orderly administration of justice, theproceedings in Civil Case No. 4879 should be allowed to continue and take itscourse, and the claim of the respondent judicially settled first.

But while we give deference to the wisdom of the trial court to initiallydecide respondents claim for attorneys fees, we deem it appropriate toreiterate certain principles governing the payment of attorneys fees and impartour observations on the instant claim. Foremost of these principles is that the actof demanding attorneys fees for services rendered is not a ground for anadministrative sanction. On the contrary, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
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Responsibility allows lawyers to charge fair and reasonable fees. As long as alawyer honestly and in good faith serves and represents the interest of the client,he should have a reasonable compensation for his service.[12]

Lawyers are thus as much entitled to judicial protection

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