Pakistan's Double Agenda: A Study of Islamabad's Post 9/11 Afghanistan Policy

Pakistan’s Double Agenda: A Study of Islamabad’s Post 9/11 Afghanistan Policy

By Mark Stokreef (s1466496)

MA Thesis IRIO (International Security)

E-mail: [email protected]

Supervisor: prof. dr. Jaap de Wilde

Date: August 2012

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Abstract

This study looks into Pakistan's double-faced Afghanistan policy after 9/11. Whereas Pakistan

supported the United States as a strategic ally in the war against international terrorism, the

government has also been very reluctant and apparently unable to engage the Taliban. The

application of a self-devised analytical framework for foreign policy – consisting of Regional

Security Complex Theory, neoclassical realism, and Robert Putnam's two-level game – has

proved to be very helpful to unravel the road leading to Pakistan’s double agenda. Firstly,

India and Afghanistan are identified as the dominant threats influencing Islamabad’s foreign

policy. Secondly, considering the state structure, the army is dominant in foreign policy

decision making and within the army ranks there is an institutionalized preference for the

usage of Islamic militant groups and low-intensity warfare to obtain strategic objectives. But

it must be noted that the lack of state power in the tribal areas also played a role in the failure

of the counterterrorism efforts. Thirdly, on the domestic level, the military regime of

Musharraf saw the separatist movements and secular political parties – the PPP and PML-N –

as more imminent threats to its power position than fundamentalist Islamic forces. Fourthly,

during US-Pakistani negotiations, the bogey of Islamic extremism was used a bargaining asset

in order to convince the Americans that too much pressure on the Pakistani government

would lead to the collapse of the state thereby endangering American regional strategic

interests. Moreover, it was justified to double-play the United States since in the past the

Americans were not unconditionally on the side of Pakistan Thus, the United States was

believed to be an unreliable ally. All this led to a policy of easing the United States, while

simultaneously continuing to keep the Taliban intact as foreign policy instrument.

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Contents

Chapter 1 – Introduction: Revealing a Janus-faced state ........................................................................................................... 4

Chapter 2 – The Methodology: Establishing a coherent framework for foreign policy behavior ............................................... 7

2.1. Short description of the three theories .......................................................................................................................... 9

Neoclassical realism .......................................................................................................................................................... 9

Regional Security Complex Theory ................................................................................................................................. 10

Two-level game............................................................................................................................................................... 12

2.2. The synthesized framework.......................................................................................................................................... 13

The international system ................................................................................................................................................ 13

State structure as intervening unit-level variable ........................................................................................................... 17

Perceptions as intervening variable ................................................................................................................................ 20

International negotiations as foreign policy instrument ................................................................................................ 23

Framework for foreign policy analysis (figure) ............................................................................................................... 27

Chapter 3 – The Pakistani security complex and the realist perception of the system ............................................................ 28

3.1. The Hobbesian perception of anarchy in the region .................................................................................................... 29

3.2. The security dynamics in the Afghan-Indian-Pakistan triangle ..................................................................................... 32

India—Pakistan ............................................................................................................................................................... 35

Afghanistan—Pakistan .................................................................................................................................................... 37

US—Pakistan .................................................................................................................................................................. 38

China—Pakistan .............................................................................................................................................................. 41

Iran—Pakistan ................................................................................................................................................................ 42

Afghan Taliban—Pakistan ............................................................................................................................................... 43

Al Qaeda—Pakistan ........................................................................................................................................................ 44

Security and arms control regimes ................................................................................................................................. 44

Chapter 4 – Pakistan’s state structure as intervening variable ................................................................................................ 46

4.1 The dominance of the army in national security decisions ........................................................................................... 47

4.2 Limited state power in tribal areas ................................................................................................................................ 52

4.3 The strategic mindset leading the foreign policy ........................................................................................................... 53

Chapter 5 – Musharraf the Janus-faced leader: Balancing the international and domestic threats ........................................ 60

5.1. International threats: India and Afghanistan ................................................................................................................ 62

5.2. Domestic threats: Separatism and the secular PPP and PML-N ................................................................................... 66

Chapter 6 – US-Pakistan negotiations ...................................................................................................................................... 73

6.1 State weakness and cost of no-agreement as bargaining chips .................................................................................... 74

6.2 Deception as technique for strategic purposes ............................................................................................................. 76

Chapter 7 – Conclusion............................................................................................................................................................. 78

The framework for Foreign Policy Analysis – Applied (figure) ........................................................................................ 81

Works Cited .............................................................................................................................................................................. 82

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Chapter 1 – Introduction: Revealing a Janus-faced state

On November 26th 2011 a NATO assault killing 24 Pakistani army personnel at the Salala

military checkpoint – located between Jalalabad and Peshawar close to the Afghan-Pakistan

border – sparked tremendous political upheaval in Pakistan. This unfortunate incident was just

one in a series of events between Pakistan and the United States in which the two declared

allies grew more distrustful to each other. After 9/11 Pakistan and the United States had

entered into a strategic alliance in which Pakistan gave the United States and NATO logistical

support and access to key intelligence in order to fight international terrorism in exchange for

massive military and economic aid. However, in recent years signs have come to surface

indicating that Pakistan had continued covert support to the Afghan Taliban forces by

providing them weapons, intelligence, and a sanctuary on Pakistani territory.1 American

officials have increasingly become aware of this and started to speak out that Pakistan is

playing a double game regarding its foreign policy in Afghanistan. For instance, during an

address to the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 22, 2011, American top

military official Admiral Mike Mullen stated: “In choosing to use violent extremism as an

instrument of policy, the government of Pakistan – and most especially the Pakistani Army

and ISI – jeopardizes not only the prospect of our strategic partnership, but also Pakistan's

opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence. […] By exporting

violence, they have eroded their internal security and their position in the region.”2 NATO

concerns about the increase of terrorist activities coming from the Pakistani side of the

Afghan-Pakistani border were also fed by statistics. During the period of 2003 to 2006, terror

attacks triplicated in the provinces surrounding Kabul, which is adjacent to the Pakistani

FATA province, while in the Afghan southeastern provinces of Oruzgan, Kandahar, and

Helmand the Taliban attacks multiplied by 11 times (see Figure 1 on the next page). In other

words, to say the least, the Pakistani government has played a dubious role in the failure of

NATO’s reconstruction of Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban regime.

1 Sam Collyns, “Afghanistan: Pakistan accused of backing Taliban,” BBC News South Asia, can be accessed through:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15445047 , visited on December 1, 2011. 2 Rob Crilly, “Mike Mullen: Pakistan is ‘exporting’ terror, The Telegraph, Sep. 22, 2011, can be accessed through

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8783139/Mike-Mullen-Pakistan-is-exporting-terror.html.

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Figure 1: Terrorist attacks in the provinces of Afghanistan, January 2002—mid-April 2007.3

Thus, accusations of Pakistani support to the Afghan insurgency strongly suggest that

the Pakistani government has consistently been double-playing the Americans. On the one

hand, the Pakistanis had been pleasing the United States through its role as a strategic ally

against Islamic terrorism. At the other hand, however, the Pakistani government has been

very reluctant to effectively engage in counterterrorism operations due to a complex set of

factors. Therefore the central question that will guide this study is: How did the Pakistani

government end up pursuing a double-faced Afghanistan policy? It is intriguing to find out

how Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghanistan policy was the product of an effort by the military

regime of Pervez Musharraf to consolidate its power position while balancing international

and domestic threats. Although a lot has been written about this topic, it was often written

from an American perspective. This study intends to elucidate the double agenda from a

Pakistani perspective.

3 Casey Alt, Joe Burgess, and Archie Tse, “Terrorism on the Rise”, New York Times Graphics, August 12, 2007, can be

accessed through: http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2007/08/12/world/20070812_AFGHAN_GRAPHIC.html.

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In order to answer this question Chapter 2 will start by unfolding the methodology

capable of explaining Pakistan’s government precarious position. This methodology has

foreign policy behavior as object of study, thereby taking neoclassical realism as point of

departure and adding insights of Regional Security Complex Theory and Robert Putnam’s

two-level game approach to the framework. Subsequently, the methodology will be applied to

the case of Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghanistan policy in the following chapters. Chapter 3 will

explain that the international system of South Asia is perceived by Pakistan as a realist region.

It will also draw attention to the main security dynamics relevant for the Pakistan’s post-9/11

Afghanistan policy such as the persisting patterns of enmity versus India and Afghanistan.

But also the troubled American-Pakistani relations will be brought to the fore. Chapter 4 will

then deal with the question how Pakistan’s state structure is affecting the Afghanistan policy.

The prominent role that the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) play in issues of

national security is essential in order to explain the double Afghanistan policy. The fifth

chapter will deal more specifically with the essential international and domestic threat

perceptions that guide Pakistan’s double agenda and how these threats are balanced against

each other. India, separatist movements and the major secular parties (PPP and PML-Q)

constituted the major threats in the eyes of the Musharraf regime, while – quite ironically –

the fundamentalist Islamic MMA alliance was used as a coalition partner and foreign policy

instrument. And finally, Chapter 6 will go into detail on how Pakistan has negotiated on the

international level with the United States. During negotiations, Musharraf’s regime skillfully

turned its vulnerability into a bargaining asset.

The analysis will be predominantly conducted by studying primary and secondary

sources. Primary sources include documents such as the most recent version of the Pakistani

constitution and official foreign policy statements. Secondary sources to elucidate all different

perspectives on the issue include extensive books and think tank reports—written by authors

from diverging nationalities and backgrounds. Articles from Pakistani newspapers like Dawn

will also be examined to get an advanced grasp of the role that the several domestic and

international factors play in foreign policy decisions.

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Chapter 2 – The Methodology: Establishing a coherent framework for

foreign policy behavior

This chapter aims to elaborate the methodology used for this study. In order to grasp the

factors and processes that lay behind Pakistan’s foreign security policy it is useful to design

an analytical tool that can trace the complex two-way dynamics of international and domestic

factors that influence it. Thus, the task of this chapter is to come up with a comprehensive

framework for foreign policy behavior that integrates international systemic and domestic

influencing components. Three theories lay the foundation of the methodology: firstly,

neoclassical realism forms the basis of the framework, completed by Regional Security

Complex Theory (RSCT) and Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory. With these theories,

three levels of analysis are combined: respectively, the international; the domestic; and the

individual level.

Even though existing international relations literature offers fruitful efforts for

explaining foreign policy behavior with approaches such as Innenpolitik and defensive

realism, their explanatory power is limited because they both lack either the international

domain or the domestic domain in their analyses. Innenpolitik theories view foreign policy as

being driven only by unit-level forces, thereby neglecting influence of the international

domain. Defensive realism, on the other hand, does the opposite since it argues that states are

part of the international system – consisting of unitary and rational states – which drives a

state’s behavior.4

Besides the need for incorporation of both domestic and international factors into the

framework for foreign policy analysis, it is notable to recognize that the world has changed

dramatically since the end of the Cold War and the intensification of globalization. For

instance, transnational nonstate actors are now playing a bigger role than before. Arguing this,

Jonathan Friedman has captured the features of the 21st century world by stating that we are

living in a world “where polarization, both vertical and horizontal, both class and ethnic, has

become rampant, and where violence has become more globalized and fragmented at the

same time, and is no longer a question of wars between states but of sub-state conflicts,

globally networked and financed, in which states have become one actor, increasingly

4 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, 51, no. 1 (October 1998), p. 149.

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privatized, amongst others.”5 However, the relative power of the state is still considered far

more important than nonstate actors in foreign policy analysis, since states are the actors that

make and implement it.

The integration of the theories into a single framework is a project that has the

capacity to keep the systemic and unit level factors of neoclassical realism intact while

considerably expanding explanatory power for distinct countries’ foreign policies. The basis

for the framework neoclassical realism builds on the systemic structure and introduces

unit-level intervening variables that affect the way systemic features are perceived and

constrain state behavior. Subsequently RSCT adds value by emphasizing the regional

prevalence and social construction of the international system. Although RSCT is not

designed for foreign policy as such, it has the ability to map out the international regional

structure, perceptions of it, and the influence of interstate rivalries that often carry an

ideological element in it. Conclusively, the two-level game approach fills in the gaps of

neoclassical realism and RSCT by offering a theory of international negotiations. The two-

level game is able to show the complex dynamics of the simultaneous pressures from

domestic and international dynamics during diplomatic negotiations between state leaders. By

having a focus on the individual level of foreign policy making, the two-level game approach

can explain how a state conducts negotiations as a Janus-faced entity. The synthesized

framework can thus work toward finding an answer to the question how the Pakistani

government manages to survive by simultaneously making compromises with the United

States and powerful domestic forces. All things considered, the hope is to construct a

framework that provides a more complete explanation for complex foreign policy driven by

internal and external factors.

In the remainder of this chapter a brief discussion of the three separate theories and

their theoretical claims will be presented. Subsequently, the theories will be decomposed in

order to arrange the relevant variables and processes at work in foreign policy making. The

analytical categories of the systemic features are first dealt with. Secondly, the state structure

as intervening variable is explained. Thirdly, it will be shown how the perceptional factors

affect policy making, and finally the two-level game of negotiation concludes the framework.

Eventually the framework will be put into a figure showing the causal logics capable of

explaining certain foreign policy outcomes.

5 Jonathan Friedman, Globalization, the State and Violence, Lanham: Altmira Press, 2003, p. ix.

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2.1. Short description of the three theories

Neoclassical realism

Since neoclassical realism is designed as a theory for foreign policy analysis, it makes sense

to let it serve as the central framework for the methodology of this study. When the theory

was conceptualized after the Cold War it gained significant popularity among IR scholars.6

Although there is no unified version of the theory, writers that are considered to be

neoclassical realist do share a set of assumptions. Neoclassical realism basically takes the

international system as setting the parameters and scope for state behavior and adds unit-level

variables such as state structure, leadership perceptions of relative distributions of power, and

perceptions of domestic threats to their approach. Thus, neoclassical realists share the

neorealist vision that a state’s foreign policy is “primarily formed by its place in the

international system and in particular by its relative power capabilities.”7 However, the

relative distribution of power does not express itself in foreign policy outcomes on a one-to-

one scale, because it has to be translated through intervening unit-level variables. Thus,

neoclassical realists diverge from neorealists because they are skeptical of the neorealist

notion that the international distribution of power alone can explain the behavior of states.

They emphasize that the systemic factors have to be translated through intervening variables

at the unit level.8 The causal logic of neoclassical realism thereby “places domestic politics as

an intervening variable between the distribution of power and foreign policy behavior.”9

This logic also implicates that states are not seen as unitary actors all over the world

with similar sets of interests. State strength differs from state to state and it is defined as the

ability of a state to mobilize and direct the resources at its deposal in the pursuit of particular

interests.10

In other words, different types of states possess different capacities to translate the

various elements of national power into state power. This helps to explain why different states

or a single state at different times, pursue distinct international strategies while facing similar

threats.11

Therefore, neoclassical realism hovers between determinism of neorealism and

6 John Baylis and Steve Smith, ed. The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003, p. 99.

7 Walter Carlsnaes, “Current Approaches in Foreign Policy Analysis, Approaches Based on a Structural Perspective,” from

Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage Publications, 2002. 8 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, 51, no. 1 (October 1998, 146.

9 Stephen M. Walt, “The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition,” in Ira Katnelson and Helen V. Milner, eds., Political

Science: State of the Discipline (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), p 211. 10

Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998, p. 5. 11

Steven E. Lobell et al. eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge UP: 2009, p. 40.

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voluntarism of classical realism by simultaneously attaching value to the systemic level, state

structure, and leadership perceptions as determinants of state behavior. Another important in

neoclassical realist thinking assumption is that the state, embodied in the Foreign Policy

Executive (FPE), is primarily committed to advancing the security or power of the entire

nation.12

Neoclassical realists believe that international anarchy and the distribution of power

condition the pursuit of security. They assume that “politics is a perpetual struggle among

different states for material power and security in a world of scarce resources and pervasive

uncertainty.”13

A point of criticism towards neoclassical realism is that the link between objective

material power capabilities and policymakers’ subjective assessment of these capabilities

stays a bit vague. It does not explain in great detail how this logic works. This gap of

explanatory deficit can be filled up by the behavioral approach of the two-level game which

accounts for the actual short term decisions in greater detail with the inclusion of individual

level and psychological factors. This is important because the inclusion of individual level

factors affects how political actors may perceive their own and other state’s capabilities and

how such perceptions are translated into foreign policy.14

Regional Security Complex Theory

Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is constructed as a framework to map out the

main security dynamics within regions of the world.15

RSCT diverged from the earlier

devised Classical Regional Complex Theory by also operationalizing the societal, economic,

and environmental sectors into the security debate besides the traditional political and military

sectors. Moreover, RSCT also opens up the space for nonstate actors. The definition of a

regional security complex (RSC) fully captures this more nuanced view by describing it as “a

set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so

interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from

one another.”16

This means that most of the security interaction is interdependent in a security

12

Steven E. Lobell et al. eds., Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009, p. 56. 13

Ibid., p. 4. 14

Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, 51, no. 1 (October 1998), 168. 15

Barry Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London: Lynne Riener Publishers, 1998; and Buzan and Waever, Regions and powers: The Structure of International Security, London: Cambridge UP, 2003. 16

Barry Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London: Lynne Riener Publishers, 1998, p. 201.

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complex. RSCT mixes materialist notions of security with ideational aspects. It looks at

distributions of power among territorial units and the social construction of patterns of amity

and enmity which together constitute a regional security complex.17

Moreover, the

constructivist method of the securitization theory is able to explain how actors perceive the

international system and how certain issues are securitized.

The main argument of RSCT is that the regional level of analysis is dominant for

international security affairs in comparison to the global, interregional, and national level. The

general picture of a RSC shows the conjunction of two levels: the interplay of global powers

at the system level, and clusters of close security interdependence at the regional level. Thus

RSCT distinguishes between the system level interplay of global powers, whose capabilities

enable them to transcend distance and penetrate in other regions, and the subsystem level

interplay of lesser powers whose main security environment is their local region. The premise

that “most threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones” explains the

dominance of the regional level.18

Regionalist dominance was strengthened after the Cold

War ended, since effectively ending systemic global bipolarity, the post-Cold War period led

to the reduction of superpower interference in regions all over the world. The United States

had fewer incentives to interfere in Third World regions because they no longer had to fight

proxy wars against its former rival the Soviet Union. As a result of this, local powers had

more space to maneuver relatively independent from interfering superpowers.19

Although

9/11 posited a renewed incentive for the United States to expand its interference by initiating

the War on Terror; this did not lead to a significant change in the systemic dominance of the

regionalist level in international politics.

17

Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1991, p. 211. 18

Barry Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers: 1998, p. 16. 19

Barry Buzan and Waever, Regions and powers: The Structure of International Security, London: Cambridge UP, 2003, p. 10.

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Two-level game

In 1988 political scientist Robert Putnam developed a model for international negotiation

analysis.20

In his publication, Putnam argued that negotiations can be conceived as a two-level

game, meaning that negotiators simultaneously have to strike deals at the international and the

domestic table. At the international table (Level I), negotiators are attempting to bargain a

tentative agreement that is as favorable as possible to their domestic constituents. Whereas at

the domestic table (Level II), negotiators must secure ratification by its constituents in order

to get the agreement accepted. In this entire process, negotiators are thus strategically

positioned between the two political arenas in which they try to maneuver simultaneously

while keeping both sides satisfied.

Putnam has devised several concepts that make it possible to grasp the complex

dynamics of international negotiation. First of all, the success of a possible agreement

depends on the existence of a “win-set.” A win-set is defined as the set of all possible

international (Level I) agreements that would “win” (gain the necessary majority among its

constituents) when voted up or down.21

So a win-set is the overlap between perceptions of

acceptable outcomes at both levels of negotiation. Without that overlap, no final international

agreement is possible, either because the domestic constituency will not approve the

agreement made at the international level or because what is acceptable as defined by the

involved domestic actors proves unacceptable to other involved country or countries.22

Secondly, negotiators also rely on strategies and tactical skills in the pursuit of a

workable agreement. Diplomatic strategies and tactics are constrained by what other states

will accept and by what domestic constituencies will ratify. The outcome of international

negotiations may depend on the strategy a statesman chooses in order to influence his own

and his counterpart’s domestic political bodies.23

For instance, a statesman may misrepresent

his domestic win-set in order to bargain a better deal. Thus, there is a central role for the

statesman as strategic actor. This process can result in political moves that are rational for the

statesman himself but may look irrational to the others at the international table.

20

Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization Vol. 42, no. 3, Summer 1988, p. 427 21

Ibid., p. 436. 22

Brigid Starkey and Mark A. Boyer, International Negotiation in a Complex World, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999, p. 104. 23

Peter B. Evans, et al., Double Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 15

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2.2. The synthesized framework

The international system

The deconstruction and construction of the methodology for this study starts by uncovering

the systemic factors that set the parameters for international behavior of states. The systemic

pressures and systemic incentives are relevant because they shape the broad delineations and

general direction of foreign policy. As a point of departure it is important to determine how

states perceive the international system in which they operate and how the features of the

international system narrow down the foreign policy choices available to a certain state. The

features of the international system are the first influential factor on foreign policy choices. As

put by Gideon Rose: systemic factors are significantly limiting the options “of foreign policy

choices considered by a state’s leaders at a particular time.”24

These factors include anarchy,

regional security complexes, and the distribution of power conditioning the pursuit of

security. Securitization theory is a helpful instrument to see how the international actors have

defined and given meaning to the systemic features.

In this section, firstly attention will be drawn to the way in which systemic anarchy

and perceptions of anarchy are affecting state behavior. Whether states perceive each other as

friends or foes has a profound effect on the perception of anarchy and state behavior. A realist

perception of anarchy – resulting from mutual enemy role identities – is for example able to

accommodate interstate wars, not least because of the absence of a supranational authority

and the presence of pervasive uncertainty about other states’ intentions. In realist perceived

regions where raw power plays an important role, this perceived systemic uncertainty can be

countered by forging alliances according to balance-of-power logics. The current situation on

the North American continent provides a clear case of a region in which more Kantian

concepts of anarchy rule since Mexico, Canada, and the United States do not hold enemy

views of each other. This Kantian perception of anarchy effectively leads to a peaceful

situation without military build-ups along the border and minimal threats of violent interstate

conflict. The structure of the security complex will explain the essential security dynamics of

the region featuring the relative power distributions among the states, patterns of enmity and

amity, and the produced system polarity and alliances. The interference of great powers into

24

Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, 51, no. 1 (October 1998), p. 147.

14

regions is explained by the territorial overriding mechanism of penetration. Finally, although

being active in the margins, international institutions and security regimes are capable of

affecting the security dynamics in a region as well depending on the regional structures.

Table 1: Pillar 1 of the framework for foreign policy analysis

1. Anarchy as ordering principle

In order to know how states perceive the international system the principle of anarchy is the

first thing to look at. In essence, anarchy as an ordering principle means that there is no

overarching world government arbitrating when disputes between states take place. Yet the

neoclassical realist approach views anarchy as socially constructed by stating that “the world

states end up inhabiting […] is indeed partly of their own making.”25

That means the content

and connotation of anarchy depends on the perceptions from the actors. It also implicates that

anarchy is a variable and that perceptions of anarchy affect the regional structure. These

perceptions have grave consequences for the international behavior of states.

25

Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, 51, no. 1 (October 1998), p. 153.

The international system

Main features:

1. Anarchy as ordering principle:

Perceptions of anarchy rendering

self-help or friendly relations

2. Regional security complexes: Power

distributions among principal states

+ patterns of amity and enmity

regional system polarity and great

power interference

3. International institutions and security

regimes play a marginal role

15

The view of anarchy as a variable runs largely parallel to Alexander Wendt’s argument

that “anarchy is what states make of it.”26

Wendt devised three different types of socially

constructed international structures (Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian) that capture the

structures and role identities in which states can perceive other states as, respectively,

enemies, rivals, or friends.27

This typification is useful for explaining how states operate and

perceive others in certain regions. In a realist (Hobbesian) system structure, the use of

violence by enemies is then only limited by a lack of capabilities. Whereas when states view

each other as friends (Kantian), cooperation is more likely. In this way the system structures

function as a package of norms. Norms create expectations from other actors and prescribe

appropriate state behavior.28

Thus, the argument that perceptions of anarchy define

international relations means that states can act according to realist, or more liberal logics. For

example, South Asia can be characterized as a realist region since the principal states Pakistan

and India tend to perceive each other as threatening and share distrust about each other’s

intentions. These international structures are relatively durable and often reinforced by hostile

perceived actions of other states. However since it is socially constructed, on the long run a

Hobbesian structure can evolve into a Kantian structure if the states decide to change their

behavior by consistently striving for friendly relations and rapprochement, and if

subsequently the opposing states respond to it in the same manner.

Security turns into an important systemic concern when states attach the connotation

of pervasive uncertainty to the principle of international anarchy. In this way, the perception

of anarchy affects interest formation of states in such a way that military and political security

can be regarded as a priority over other issues. The anarchic international structure allows war

to occur because there is nothing to prevent it except for self-help measures such as military

deterrence and resorting to balance-of-power methods through alliances. Thus, perceptions of

anarchy offer the conditions to generate a self-help environment.

26

Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It”, International Organization, 1992, Vol. 46, No. 2. 27

Ibid., p. 247. 28

Annika Björkdahl, (2002), “Norms in International Relations: Some conceptual and methodological reflections,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 15 (1), 20.

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2. The regional security complexes (RSCs): Relative distributions of power, and patterns

of enmity and amity

Regional security complexes (RSCs) function as subsystems which “have structures of their

own and are durable rather than permanent features of the anarchy overall.”29

RSCs modify

and mediate the action and interaction of its units. The effect an RSC has is that it expresses

itself in regional system polarity and alliances which guide foreign policy to some extent.

Essentially, RSCs are formed by on the one hand the relative distribution of power among the

principal states, and on the other hand the patterns of enmity and amity. Thus, RSCs are not

just a mechanical reflection of the distribution of power, but the formation and operation of

RSCs hinges on systemic patterns of enmity and amity as well.

Distributions of power and shifts in relative power set the basic parameters for a

state’s grand strategy. The relative material power of states in a region is an important factor

that guides a state’s foreign policy, but it is not determinative and some autonomy is left for

acts of securitization by states. On the long run, reactions to shifts in material capabilities can

also come in the form of “exogenous shocks […] such as the unexpected escalation of a

crisis.”30

Shocks like these can make leaders mindful of the cumulative effect of long term

power shifts. Systemic threats are typically characterized by interstate rivalry such as in the

case of Pakistan and India. Competition occurs between the major regional players for

hegemony over the region. Perceptions of power distributions and threats will be further

explained in the section called Pillar 3: Perceptions of unit-level intervening variables.

Patterns of amity and enmity take the form of subglobal geographically coherent

patterns of security interdependence. These patterns are influenced by factors such as history,

culture, religion, and geography. The specific pattern of who fears who or likes whom is

generally not imported from the system level, but generated internally in the region by a

mixture of history, politics, and material conditions. Moreover, the patterns are “much stickier

than the relatively fluid movement of the distribution of power.”31

Interference of great powers from outside the region is explained by the mechanism of

penetration.32

This can also happen in the form of security alignments such as the US-Pakistan

29

Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1991, p. 209. 30

Steven E. Lobell et al. eds., Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge UP: 2009, p. 29. 31

Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1991,, p. 191. 32

Buzan and Waever, Regions and powers: The Structure of International Security, London: Cambridge UP, 2003, p. 46.

17

and China-Pakistan alliances. The concept of the insulator state accounts for states that are in

between two regional complexes, such as Afghanistan.

3. International institutions and security regimes

The influence of international institutions and security regimes on foreign policy depends

largely on the perception of the system. In Kantian systems international institutions and

regimes can be effective since states are more inclined to comply with them. In international

systems which are perceived as inhabited by Hobbesian actors institutions and regimes have

only marginal influence on foreign policy decisions, because they feel sovereignty and

territorial integrity can more adequate protected by enhancing material capabilities. Yet,

international organizations and co-operational regimes still have to potential to serve as a

platform in which states can settle minor discordances.

State structure as intervening unit-level variable

As argued in the previous section, the impact of relative power capabilities “is indirect and

complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the

unit level.”33

Unit-level variables constrain and facilitate the ability of all types of states to

respond to systemic imperatives. International imperatives are distilled through the domestic

political domain “which can lead to variations in the way states respond to common

international pressures.”34

Thus, the causal chain linking relative material power and foreign

policy outputs is one of extensive complexity. The intervening unit-level variables can be

divided into state structure, leaders’ relative power assessments and threat perceptions, and

pressure from domestic actors. This automatically means that the state is not seen as a unitary

actor but the “black box” is so to say opened up.

Before going further with the analytical concepts, it is useful to determine the

definition of the state and what is meant by it in the remaining chapters. A state is defined as a

set of institutions, placed within a geographically bounded territory that at least claims a

33

Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, 51, no. 1 (October 1998), 146 34

Steven E. Lobell et al. eds., Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge UP: 2009, p. 173

18

monopoly on legitimate rule within that defined territory.35

In terms of foreign policy making,

the state is viewed as epitomized by a foreign policy executive (FPE) which consists of the

head of government, plus the ministers and officials charged with the devising of foreign

policy.36

The terms state and FPE will be interchangeable used in this study meaning the

same thing.

State structure is the first factor that has an intervening effect between the international

system and the foreign policy outcomes. Imperatives from the international system have to be

translated through the medium of state power into foreign policies. Thus, state structure “is a

variable that severely affects policy decisions.”37

For instance, the more the elements of the

state structure constrain the freedom of the FPE, the more the autonomy of the FPE is limited

in its ability to respond in kind to perceived shifts in power distributions. In this way state

strength may limit the efficiency of responses by states to systemic imperatives like external

material threats. However, when there is a high degree of external vulnerability, that can give

far greater autonomy to the FPE and extractive capacity than when the degree of external

threat would be lower.38

State strength is defined as the ability of a state to mobilize and extract resources from

society.39

Mobilization of resources works through the control over economic activities and

35

Steven E. Lobell et al. eds., Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge UP, p. 25 36

Ibid., p. 25. 37

Peter B. Evans, et al. Eds. Double Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 4. 38

Steven E. Lobell et al. eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge UP: 2009, p. 211. 39

Ibid., p. 38.

State structure / state power

The ability to mobilize and extract

resources depends on:

Political institutions

State-supported nationalism and

ideology


19

reallocation of resources. And resource attraction refers to the conversion of societal wealth

into military power through taxation, requisition, and expropriation.40

The first analytical

components of state power are the politico-military institution of the state, and the second set

of components is the state-supported nationalism and ideology. Domestic political institutions

like the legislature, the constitution, or political bodies such as the military can have impact

on security policy choices. In general, “the more influential actors will be those that can veto

government policies, or those that can help shape the definition of national interests.”41

The

assignment of tasks and responsibilities concerning security issues is often arranged in the

constitution. For instance, in Pakistan the military has the constitutional right to veto in those

matters.42

The decision making environment in which these institutions operate with the state

administration helps to better understand how policy decisions are constituted.43

Institutional

arrangements affect the ability of FPEs to extract and mobilize resources from society. The

second set of determinants of state power is state-sponsored nationalism and ideology. The

ability to mobilize and extract resources is affected by how leaders use these nationalism and

ideology as instruments for that purpose. Doing so, leaders are attempting to raise and

maintain support for national security strategies.44

State-sponsored nationalism tends to

enlarge social cohesion and the tendency of people to identify with the state and state

nationalism can subsequently facilitate leaders’ attempts to mobilize and extract resources for

national security strategies. In consequence the state-society relationship is enhanced.

40

Michael Mastonduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, “Towards a Realist Theory of State Action”, International Studies Quarterly, 1989, vol. 33, p. 458. 41


M. R. Kazimi, A Concise History of Pakistan, New York: Oxford UP (2009), p. 253. 43


Ibid., p. 217.

20

Perceptions as intervening variable

1. Leaders’ perceptions of distributions of power and threats

The leaders of the state, interchangeable called the Foreign Policy Executive, operates at the

intersection of domestic and international politics. Therefore, the FPE is portrayed as “Janus-

faced” in the complex threat identification model.45

Those leaders focus on the systemic

balance of power where states compete with each other, and are also concerned with the

domestic balance of power where substate groups compete for power.46

Deriving from this

logic state leaders can act on one level, while the objective is to influence the outcome on

another level.47

Put differently, “it is possible that the interpretation of international threats

may have a lot to do with the composition of the governing coalition.”48

In this way, foreign

policy behavior can be severely influenced and constrained. Please note that in order to

deduce national interests and make threat assessments the FPE usually has better access to

intelligence about other countries’ capabilities and intentions. Yet in reality decision makers

carry out their work in contexts of clouded rationality and imperfect information.

States are the primary actors to define and perceive material power distributions and

security threats. Shifts in the regional distribution of power can lead to new opportunities and

45

Steven E. Lobell et al. eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009, p. 43. 46

Ibid., p. 46. 47

Ibid., p. 51 48

Ibid., p. 172

Perceptions

1. Perceptions of distributions of power

(balance of power); threat perceptions

(assessments of other states’ intentions);

Domestic threat perceptions;

Private policy preferences of leaders

2. Pressure by domestic actors (opposition

parties, interest groups, media, public

opinion)


21

threats for states. However, it is hard to test material power, since different elements of power

possess different utilities at different times, and “the relations to material resources can be

capricious [because] signals get confused among allies, rivals, and domestic audiences.”49

Hence foreign policy makers do not balance against aggregate shifts in material power alone,

but they also define threats based on specific components of another state’s power.50

Put

simply, different components of power pose different threats to other states. Specific

components might include shifts in territory, population, ideology, industry, land-based

military, or naval and air power.51

This social construction of security leads to say that

“security is what actors make of it.”52

Stephen Walt adds to this line of thought by stating that

states do not balance against power, but against threats. Thereby Walt also refers to

“perceived intentions” located in domestic political factors of another state.53

This means that

the threat to a government does not need to stem from a physically foreign military menace

per se, but a threat may just as well be derived from the ideology of a foreign state. For

instance, because of Iran’s anti-Israeli public statements, Israel has more reason to feel

threatened by Iran’s nuclear weapon ambitions than let’s say Chili.

Systemic polarity does not tell the whole story about foreign policy motivations.

Threats can be derived from the domestic sphere as well. Whereas the systemic level

represents the threat perceptions of relative distributions of power and other states’ intentions,

the domestic level shows that threats may come from domestic separatist groups or internal

factions within the political system such as the military. In the latter case, the leaders may be

more preoccupied with regime survival rather than survival of the state. The FPE may have a

considerable domestic political impetus, such as preserving its own power seat, which could

change policy decisions significantly. When leaders feel their grip to power is sliding away

they may be more reactive to domestic pressures and hence may pursue more jeopardous

foreign policies in order to stay in power. The diversionary war theory carries the same

argument by contending that leaders do not only wage war for internationally strategic

reasons. For domestically threatened leaders fearing a coup d’état may start a war in order to

tighten their hold on power.54

For instance, an interstate conflict can divert attention and

49

William Curti Wohlforth, Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 306-307. 50


Ibid., p. 55. 52

Barry Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 1998; and Barry Buzan, and Waever, Regions and Powers, 2003, p. 48. 53

Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 265-266 54

Steven E. Lobell et al. eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009, p. 52.

22

create domestic solidarity because of the “rally-around-the-flag” effect.55

This effect can

expand power of the state over society and be intended to weaken domestic opposition. Such

domestic strategic intentions are likely to play a part in the content and conduct of foreign

policies.

2. The influence of other domestic factors

Although usually the politico-military institutions are habitually in charge of national security

matters, the influence of domestic substate actors can still be significant. The FPE is often

forced in the position where it needs to bargain with domestic actors in order to secure the

procurement of important national security goods to implement policy.56

Political parties,

government coalition partners, the legislation, interest groups, and media and public opinion

are examples of such actors. Although domestic actors do exert significant influence over

foreign policy issues, their influence is usually greater over other areas of policy making

because security policy making is often reserved to the FPE which has better access to secret

information on national security.

55


Ibid., p. 27.

23

International negotiations as foreign policy instrument

International negotiations as a two-level game can account for external and internal dynamics

influencing foreign policy making. It explains how a negotiating side can use political

developments in the domestic sphere as bargaining assets on the international negotiation

table.

Two-Level Game

International negotiations can be conceived as a two-level game. The FPE, in this case the

negotiator, is “Janus-faced” in the sense that he simultaneously has to play the cards on the

international and the domestic table.57

He is forced to balance and mediate between

international and domestic pressures in this process. By forming coalitions, domestic groups

put pressure on the government to take on favorable policies. And internationally, negotiators

try to maximize the ability to please domestic pressure and they want to minimize the

detrimental consequences of foreign actions.58

In this tricky situation, negotiators “face

distinctive opportunities and strategic dilemmas.”59

When negotiators are working out a

tentative agreement during the negotiations on the international level, they already know that

the agreement needs to be ratified by their constituents on the domestic level. So in order to

find a workable agreement, the win-sets of both levels need to overlap. A win-set for the

domestic level consists of all possible international agreements that would gain a majority

57

Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, et al., Double Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkely: University of California Press, 1993, p. 15. 58

Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization vol. 42, no. 3, Summer 1988, 434. 59

Ibid., p. 459.

International negotiations as

a two-level game

1. Domestic coalition building for

ratification and domestic preferences

2. Bargaining strategies / tactics

3. Private policy preferences of negotiators

4. International pressure (reverberation)


24

among the domestic constituents when ratification is endeavored.60

If ratification fails it can

lead to the collapse of negotiation. It is important for all parties that all actors that participate

in the negotiations have to take an agreement home that will be ratified. Therefore, the

negotiator “attempts to build a package that will be acceptable both to the other side and to his

bureaucracy.”61

The most important factors that determine the size of a win-set and bargaining

strategies are domestic coalitions and preferences, domestic institutions, and negotiators’

private policy preferences. Concerning the domestic coalitions and preferences, the size of the

win-set depends on the cost of ‘no-agreement’ following the hypothesis that the lower the cost

of ‘no-agreement’, the smaller the win-set is. Another aspect of the domestic coalitions

affecting the win-set is the relative size of isolationists versus internationalists within the

constituents and their preferences. If preferences among the constituents are heterogeneous, as

in an internally divided government, it is more likely that an international deal can be

arranged, because international negotiators from other states may also try to look for allies at

the opponent’s domestic table. Governments may seek to expand another state’s win-set by

offering foreign aid or establishing contact with opposition parties. Thus heterogeneous

preferences at the domestic level may improve the likeliness of an international agreement.

Moreover, if a domestic win-set is perceived to be small it may be a tactical bargaining

advantage for the negotiator, because he can use the prospect of rejected ratification to

enhance the agreement. Following the same logic, when domestic political preferences are

homogeneous with a relatively big perceived win-set, then there is chance he will be pushed

around more by fellow international negotiators.62

The second set of determinants of the win-set is domestic political institutions.

Ratification procedures affect the win-set size. Here two-level game joins up with the state

structure as an intervening variable. The greater the autonomy of the negotiators from their

domestic constituents, the larger the likelihood of achieving international agreements is.

Paradoxically, the stronger the state is in terms of autonomy from domestic pressure, the

weaker its international bargaining position. For instance, because of the “effective veto

power of a small group, many worthy agreements have been rejected, and many treaties are

60

Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, Summer 1988, p. 436 61

Ibid., p. 434. 62

Ibid., p. 440.

25

never considered for ratification.”63

In this case, a domestic weak position of a government

may be used for bargaining strategy. A tiny win-set can be a bargaining advantage if a

negotiator argues that a proposal would never get accepted at home.64

It is assumed that

perfect information about the size of a win-set does not exist. Thus, negotiators operate in a

world of blurred rationality. For instance, uncertainty about domestic politics and the win-set

can be both a strategic bargaining device and an obstacle in international negotiations.

Usually, negotiators know more about their own domestic win-set than the opponent knows.

A lack of information about another’s domestic win-set can be exploited by the negotiator by

threatening that a tentative agreement will be rejected during the domestic ratification phase.

So a negotiator can deliberately misrepresent its domestic politics in order to improve its

bargaining position.

Thirdly, the chief negotiator can play role independent from the state it represents in

negotiations. In some cases a negotiator has private preferences and motivations autonomous

from his constituency. He may want to enhance his personal standing on the domestic level by

increasing his political resources or minimize political losses. Moreover, a “chief negotiator

whose political standing at home is high can more easily win ratification of his foreign

initiatives.”65

Reverberation entails that foreign pressure aims to expand domestic win-sets

and thereby facilitates agreement. Foreign pressure can be used by a government to pursue

domestic goals. One form of foreign pressure is the use of international side-payments to

attract marginal supporters is a well-known practice in negotiations.66

Side-payments function

to facilitate the ratification process. For instance, this foreign pressure can be exerted by

wooing opinion leaders, offering foreign aid to friendly but unstable governments.67

The hope

is then to expand the win-set of the other by relaxing constraints that might otherwise prevent

the government from cooperation with their governments.68

However, international pressure

may also create a domestic backlash. The chance of domestic backlash is especially present if

the source of foreign pressure is perceived as an adversary rather than ally by domestic

audiences. If public opinion is mobilized and the attitude of political groups is changed, then

63

Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organizatio, vol. 42, no. 3, Summer 1988, p. 448. 64

Ibid., p. 440 65

Ibid., p. 451. 66

Ibid., p. 450 67

Ibid., p. 454. 68

Ibid., p. 454.

26

it can lead to a shift in domestic politics that changes the possible compromises and give-and-

take policies.69

69

Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, vol. 42, vol. 3, Summer 1988 , p. 455.

27

Framework for foreign policy analysis (figure)

28

Chapter 3 – The Pakistani security complex and the realist perception

of the system

The first step in studying Pakistan’s foreign policy is determining how the international

system is perceived by Pakistan and the actors involved in the region. The central argument is

that the international structure of the region primarily functions according to Hobbesian (i.e.

realist) logics. Depending on the patterns of enmity or amity and relative material

distributions, states perceive each other as enemies or friends through socially constructed

role identities. The bottom line is that a Hobbesian perception of anarchy combined with

enemy role identities leads states to perceive military power of enemies as threatening to its

national security. Consequently this paves the way for an international environment in which

power politics prevails and states resort to self-help. Secondly, it is important to find out the

most relevant actors and relationships in the regional security complex surrounding Afghan-

Pakistani area. Therefore the major security dynamics on the global, interregional, and

regional, and domestic level in the Pakistani-Afghan area will be set out. Pakistan, India,

Afghanistan, the United States, and China are considered to be the most vital actors that form

the regional security complex. Especially, the Indian-Pakistani rivalry in the complex is

relevant because indirectly it gives ample substance to Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. As

neighbor on the western border, Afghanistan is also viewed as important to Pakistan’s

national security. Therefore Pakistan mainly responds to perceived threats posed by India and

The international system in the

region surrounding Pakistan

1. Anarchy as ordering principle:

Perceptions of anarchy rendering a

self-help environment

2 Afghan-Pakistani-Indian Security

Complex: Power distributions out of

balance; patterns of enmity Indian-

Pakistani bipolarity; and US interference

3 Security regimes NPT and CBTB not

signed by Pakistan and India; and

SAARC is not influential on security

issues

29

Afghanistan. In addition to states, substate militant groups such as the Afghan Taliban, Al-

Qaeda, and the Haqqani Network play a prominent role in the security dynamics connected to

Pakistan.

3.1. The Hobbesian perception of anarchy in the region

Anarchy is the central concept determining the characteristics of the international structure.

The way anarchy is perceived depends on inter-subjective understandings by states and how

states perceive the Self and the Other through socially constructed role identities. These

identity formations are capable of producing different understandings of threats from a single

issue. It explains, for example, why Indian nuclear weapon capability is perceived as more of

a threat to Pakistan than for example to Russia. Enemy role identities indicate “a distinct

posture of orientation of the Self toward the Other with respect to the use of violence.”70

Almost needlessly to say, states will respond sooner with force to enemies than to friends. The

South Asian region is primarily dominated by enemy role identities between India and

Pakistan and can be marked as Hobbesian international structure. The Pakistan-India rivalry

has been the dominant shaping force for the Hobbesian international system in South Asia.

This perception of South Asia as a Hobbesian system has severe implications for Pakistan’s

foreign policy because the system functions as package of norms. The most important realist

norms in South Asia are defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and

acceptance of military conflict as a way to resolve disputes. However, the South Asian realist

structure gives also space for bilateral cooperation as can be seen in the case between Pakistan

and China that have constructed friendly role identities. Thus various perceptions of anarchy

represent various social structures. This shows that through the social construction of role

identities and actual behavior forms of international structures are produced and reproduced

by states. Hence the Wendtian argument “Anarchy is what states make of it.”71

The Afghanistan-Pakistan-India triangle is primarily guided by a Hobbesian

perception of anarchy because of the enemy role identities (Self and Other) between these

countries. Historical, cultural, and ideological ideas of identities of the Self and Other are

essential for understanding the perception of anarchy. The identity roles of the Self and the

70

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 258. 71

Alexander Wendt (1992), “Anarchy is What States Make of It”, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 395.

30

Other are constructed through ideological splits and historical skirmishes. Pakistan’s effort to

establish Islam as state ideology was important for strengthening its national identity. In order

to establish national identity, the Islam has been used as an instrument to stir up the perceived

threat of the Hindu-dominated India. This made sense because Pakistan was founded as a

Muslim state for all Muslims in South Asia, whereas India was meant to be a secular state

open to a diverse set of religious groups, yet dominated by a Hindu majority. India’s secular,

federal constitution led many Pakistanis to believe that India was striving for reuniting the

Indian subcontinent. On the other hand, Pakistan’s utterances in its constitution of being a

homeland for Muslims added to the Indian fears that their “own fractious patchwork of ethnic

groups and religions would break apart.”72

A good example of an event in which enemy role

identities and the Hobbesian anarchy were apparent and reinforced was the war of 1971 and

the subsequent secession of Bangladesh. In that war, India supported Bangladesh in its

struggle for independence and this reaffirmed Pakistan’s belief that India posed a threat to

Pakistan’s national survival. Reversely, India was confirmed in its belief that Pakistan formed

a threat to India’s internal peace and stability as Bengal refugees were streaming into their

country.

The Hobbesian perception of anarchy as a “state of war of all against all”73

renders

realist norms which are produced and reproduced by states. Norms can be defined as “inter-

subjective understandings that constitute actors’ interests and identities, and create

expectations as well as prescribe what appropriate behavior ought to be,” yet those norms do

not directly determine outcomes.74

The most important norms that these states share are the

following: survival and national security as primary state interest; preservation of principles

of sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-interference by foreign powers in domestic affairs;

there is a pervasive uncertainty of other states’ intentions; material and military power

capabilities are vital for defending national security; and balancing against dominant powers

is a good way to guard national security. To recap, Pakistan’s foreign policies were in general

centered on preservation of national sovereignty, survival, relative material and military

capabilities, and forming strategic external alliances in order to balance against perceived

threats.

72

Barry Buzan and Waever, Regions and powers: The Structure of International Security, London: Cambridge UP, 2003, p. 102. 73

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1651), 86. 74

Annika Björkdahl, (2002), “Norms in International Relations: Some conceptual and methodological reflections,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 15 (1), 20

31

Sovereignty and non-interference remain guiding principles for securitization in South

Asia. In the media, the Pakistani government refers to American drone strikes against terrorist

objectives on Pakistani territory as violation of its sovereignty. Earlier in 2012 for instance,

after a US drone strike in North Waziristan that killed at least 10 people, the Pakistani Foreign

Office issued a statement declaring that the drone strikes “violate Pakistan’s sovereignty [and]

territorial integrity.”75

Though in March 2012, prior to this drone attack, the Pakistani

parliament had approved a call for an end to drone strikes on Pakistani territory.

The realist perception of anarchy has also demonstrated itself firmly in the prevailing

fixation on material power. The states within the system attach great value to the distribution

of power within the system because they see it as only varying variable that ultimately

determines international outcomes. The perception of the regional distribution of power is

important for understanding foreign policy decisions. Pakistan has an interest in empowering

its relative military capability, because it expects India and Afghanistan to hold hostile

intentions. In 2011 for instance, Pervez Musharraf claimed that India still formed an

existential threat to his country and blamed it for Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon

program. Musharraf explained that “the orientation of 90 per cent of Indian troops is against

Pakistan. We cannot ever ignore India, which poses an existential threat to Pakistan.”76

Therefore, Pakistani build-up of a defensive structure and weaponry is an appropriate and

expected method in order to deter Afghanistan and India from violating its sovereignty and

endangering its independence.

Building up a defensive structure as protection against superior military capabilities

and preserving the balance-of-power to enhance national security can also be done by entering

into alliances. Pakistan’s sense of regional insecurity is primarily driven by their concerns

about India’s and Afghanistan’s ambitions in the region. To secure its own territory and

balance against Indian military superiority and deter India attack from using outright violence,

Pakistan has formed a long-standing alliance with China and a strategic alliance with the

United States. The United States has been an important external supporter that prevented the

Pakistani government from collapsing, and secured its survival in relation to the India threat.

The US has predominantly been sending amounts of military and economic assistance. The

US-Pakistani alliance can be seen as an alliance of convenience as opposed to an alliance of

75

DawnNews, “US drone attacks violate Pakistan’s territorial integrity: FO”, DawnNews Agencies, May 5th

2012, can be accessed through http://dawn.com/2012/05/05/us-drone-attacks-violate-pakistans-territorial-integrity-fo/. 76 Press Trust of India, “India is an ‘existential threat to Pakistan, says Musharraf”, March 26, 2011, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/india-is-an-existential-threat-to-pakistan-says-musharraf-94374 .

32

conviction. Balance-of-power thinking still prevails in Pakistan’s foreign policy as Pakistani

navy admiral Asif Sandhila stated in February 2012 that Pakistan’s navy was “taking

measures to restore the strategic balance” in the South Asian region.77

Thus the region

continues to be dominated by realist power politics since it still is “largely a story of

securitizations about military power, weapons, and political status.”78

3.2. The security dynamics in the Afghan-Indian-Pakistan triangle

Outlining the security complex of South Asia considerably enables one to understand the

national security position of Pakistan. By applying RSCT, the major participants and security

relations between those actors can be sketched in a playing field consisting of the entire

security complex. It is crucial to reveal the security interaction between all players in the

Afghan-Pakistan security complex in order to explain Pakistan’s foreign policy decisions.79

Essential to the formation of regional security complexes are patterns of enmity and amity as

well as relative distributions of power. The systemic Indian-Pakistani rivalry and Pakistan’s

strategic alliance with the United States exemplify the most important security dynamics

shaping Pakistan’s post-9/11 Afghanistan policy. Moreover, the covert usage of the Afghan

Taliban as policy instrument to counter Indian influence in Afghanistan must be borne in

mind because all connections between the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Taliban

had not been cut off after 9/11.

The Afghanistan War is the context in which interests of global, regional, and

domestic security complexes have crossed each other. Starting at the regional level, India and

Afghanistan are identified as the essential actors that share a high degree of security

interdependence. With these countries Pakistan has developed patterns of enmity. Conflicting

territorial claims and disputes since Pakistan’s inception have contributed to the threat

perceptions between the countries. As a result the Pakistani state views itself as flanked by

two potential countries that pose a threat to its survival.80

At the global and interregional level,

77 Ansari Usman, “Experts Way of Pakistan Nuke Claims: Few Details Available on Naval Strike Capability”, May 26, 2012, accessible through: http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120526/DEFREG03/305260001/Experts-Wary-Pakistan-Nuke-Claims?odyssey=tab%7Ctopnews%7Ctext%7CFRONTPAGE. 78

Buzan and Waever, Regions and powers: The Structure of International Security, London: Cambridge UP, 2003, p. 124. 79

The definition of a regional security complex is “group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that

their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.” See Buzan, 1991, p. 190. 80

Barnet Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Statemate”, United States Institute of Peace,

Special Report, 176, 2006, p. 7.

33

the US (NATO), and China are pinpointed as influential actors. The US-Pakistan cooperation

is immersed by mutual distrust, whereas China and Pakistan have developed sincere friendly

ties. On the substate level, the army, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Pakistani

Taliban, and militant groups like Al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network play an important part

in the security dynamics. Even though the levels of analysis overlap and interact with each

other, RSCT argues that the regional level remains dominant and most persisting, because

“threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones.”81

Thus the concerns about

India and Afghanistan occupies the mindset of Pakistan’s foreign policy decision makers the

most because they perceive those states as most threatening to its national security. Finally,

though South Asia may be characterized as functioning according to realist logics, regional

cooperation is not completely absent. For instance, the South Asian Association for Regional

Cooperation (SAARC) shows efforts for more benign relations in particular on economic,

social, and cultural issues. However, in reality organizations such as SAARC remain

relatively irrelevant compared to traditional politico-military security structures.

The table below presents an overview summarizing the main security interdependent

relationships and its main features that affect Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghanistan policy directly

or indirectly. And on the next page, a map of Pakistan shows how the country is embedded in

a security complex marked by hostile perceived powers (India and Afghanistan), a distrustful

perceived power with which it shares an strategic alliance (the United States), and a benign

security relationship (China). It should be noted that Iran is not considered part of the security

complex, because being part of the Middle Eastern security complex it is more concerned

with its own complex and therefore affected Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghanistan policy

considerably less than India and Afghanistan.

Table 1: Security interdependence related to Pakistan's post 9/11 Afghanistan policy

Relationship Features (bilateral structure; ideational patterns; socially constructed role

identities; nature of mutual interests)

India-Pakistan (rivalry): Hobbesian structure; patterns of enmity; enemy identity roles; opposite interests

perceive each other as threat to territorial integrity and state survival; opposing

interests

Afghanistan-Pakistan

(rivalry):

Hobbesian structure; patterns of enmity; enemy identity roles; perceive each other

as threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity; opposing interests

US-Pakistan (‘strategic Hybrid structure (Hobbesian and Kantian); mix patterns of enmity and amity;

81

Barry Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London: Lynne Rienner Press, 1998, p. 201.

34

alliance of convenience’): identity roles of capricious and potentially treacherous allies; diverging interests

China-Pakistan (strategic

alliance):

Kantian structure; patterns of amity; identity roles of friends; common interests

Afghan Taliban-Pakistan: Hybrid structure (Hobbesian and Lockean); mixed patterns of enmity and amity;

officially enemies, yet secret cooperative substate structure with substate ISI

elements

Al Qaeda-Pakistan Hobbesian structure; patterns of enmity, yet they share a history of cooperation

which still exists in elements of the military/ISI

Figure 2: Pakistan and the region surrounding the country Source: Cartographic Research Laboratory – University of Alabama, “Asia”, 2012, can be accessed through http://alabamamaps.ua.edu/contemporarymaps/world/asia/index2.html.

35

India—Pakistan

India and Pakistan share substantive patterns of security interdependence and durable

relations of enmity. Though both countries support the War on Terror on paper, this does not

imply that they are friends. On the contrary, they are both very distrustful of each other’s

intentions. Mutual constructions as enemies are institutionalized in the international system

and persist in political decision making bodies up until today. The interstate relations have

been liable to conflict because military power came to be perceived as threatening because of

the patterns of enmity. Historical clashes and securitization of each other as threats during the

last 65 years have firmly built bilateral hostility and distrust into both countries’ foreign

policies. Nowadays Pakistan still views India’s military build-up as an existential threat, but

in the last two decades India has increasingly shifted its security focus towards China.82

Cautious attempts for dialogues and normalization of relations, for instance through the South

Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 2003 and 2004, therefore prove to be a

long and fickle process. Incidents such as the Mumbai attacks executed by the Pakistani

terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba in 2008 – widely believed to be backed by Pakistan –

complicated efforts for rapprochement as it fed previously existing distrust.

The patterns of enmity between the two countries are primarily can be traced back to

their hostile history—the violent struggle for independence in 1947 and the three wars in

1965, 1971, and 1999. The forming of two separate states out of former British India

embodied a weighty ideological component. In the days leading up to independence the two

biggest political parties of British India were the Muslim League (striving for Pakistan’s

partition) and the Hindu-dominated Congress Party (not in favor of partition). The Muslim

League was afraid the Muslim population would be crushed in Hindu-dominated British India

and therefore called argued for a two-state solution. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, leader of the

Muslim League and founder of Pakistan, emphasized the threat that Muslims would be

marginalized under the Hindu rule in order to pave the way for an independent Pakistani state.

One of many examples of the artificially exaggerated securitization acts of the Hindu threat

against Muslims was Direct Action Day. It was a political statement by Ali Jinnah calling for

a protest against a united India which led to instigated religious killings between Muslims and

Hindus in Calcutta on August 16, 1946.83

Events like these functioned as a catalyst of

82

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947-2004”, Pildat Briefing Paper, 2004, p. 23. 83

Claude Markovits, “Case Study: The Calcutta Riots of 1946”, MassViolence.org, November 2007, can be accessed through: http://www.massviolence.org/The-Calcutta-Riots-of-1946?decoupe_recherche=Partition&artpage=1#outil_sommaire_0.

36

religious violence, mutual threat perceptions, and polarization. The actual partition itself in

1947 was also accompanied by massive killings and tremendous forced migrations of

religious groups. Adding to Pakistani fears were the Indian leaders’ calls for reunification in

the 1950s and 1960s. In 1964, the Pakistani newspaper Dawn captured the central role that the

Indian threat played for the foreign policy by observing that “the main concern of Muslim

Pakistan is the containment of militarist and militant Hinduism.”84

Illustrative for the Indian-Pakistani hostility is the border issue over Jammu and

Kashmir. It has been a huge stumbling block in efforts for normalization of Indian-Pakistani

relations. In Pakistan the perception prevails that India had illegally seized Muslim dominated

Kashmir. Conversely, Pakistan added to India’s sense of insecurity by giving militant groups

a safe haven for training camps on Pakistani territory and supplied extremist propaganda. As

India and Pakistan never reached a permanent arrangement on Kashmir it remained a delicate

and contentious issue entering into the 21st century. In May 2002 the two states have been

engaged in a military standoff at the brink of war over the issue of Kashmir. An outright war

was just narrowly averted due to diplomatic intervention by the US, UK, and EU.85

The

mutual threat perceptions also seem to translate themselves into the Afghanistan conflict.

India has a history of actively supporting the Northern Alliance and Hamid Karzai. The

Northern Alliance was engaged in a civil war against the Taliban in the late 1990s. Because

Pakistan is afraid of strategic encirclement by India, it has reason to perceive Afghanistan

ruled by Karzai as a strategic threat. India’s enhanced presence in Central Asia through

established air bases in Tajikistan only fed the Pakistani fear of being encircled by India.

Pakistan has more reasons to be concerned about India. Looking at the material

distribution of power India greatly exceeds Pakistan. The Indian population (1.2 billion)

comprises of 75% of the total population in South Asia, whereas Pakistan (174 million)

accounts only for 11%. India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is $1727 billion and for

Pakistan it is a meager $177 billion, which is almost ten times smaller.86

And, most

importantly, the military expenditure of India ($46 billion) is more than eight times the size of

the Pakistani one ($5.66 billion).87

Therefore, keeping the patterns of enmity in mind, it is

84

Khalid Bin Sayeed, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Pakistani Fears and Interests”, Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 3, (March 1964), p. 746. 85

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947-2004”, Pildat Briefing Paper, 2004, p. 23 86

World Bank, “Pakistan at a Glance”, and “India at a Glance”, World Development Indications, 2010. Can be accessed through: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/pak_aag.pdf and http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/ind_aag.pdf. 87

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Index Database”, figures from 2010, can be

accessed through http://milexdata.sipri.org/.

37

logical that every expansion of military capabilities by India adds to Pakistan’s sense of

insecurity. Responding to that Pakistan tries to develop its military capabilities as well. For

example, Pakistan has achieved a certain degree of parity by acquiring its status as nuclear

weapon state a few weeks after India did in May 1998. Pakistan translated its acquisition of

nuclear weapons in typically realist terms as restoring the balance-of-power in South Asia.

The development and testing of conventional missiles with increasingly long-distance

capabilities exemplify Pakistan’s wish to uphold the bipolar structure as well. For instance, in

April 2012 India launched a missile with a 5000 km range—a so-called intercontinental

ballistic missile (IBM). Within a few days, Pakistan’s military fired an upgraded nuclear-

capable missile known as a Hatf 1V Shaheen 1A in a tit-for-tat manner.88

Due to the long

history of enmity, conflicts leading to abiding distrust, and India’s regional dominance in

terms of material capabilities, it is no surprise that the threat that India posed has played a

central role in the foreign policy decisions of Pakistan.

Afghanistan—Pakistan

Afghanistan fulfills a role of insulator between the regions of South Asia, Central Asia, and

the Middle East. In the 19th

century, it functioned as a buffer zone between the regional

powers of the time – Britain, Russia, and Persia.89

However, because of its intense security

dynamics with both Pakistan and India, Afghanistan is considered to be part of South Asia for

this study. Marking the incorporation into the South Asian security complex of Afghanistan is

its membership in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 2007.90

Yet, Afghanistan and Pakistan share a history of tensions. Afghan leaders added to Pakistani

security concerns by making irredentist claims on Pakistani territory since the 1950s. The

border Afghan-Pakistani border – the Durand Line – has not been recognized as legitimate

and therefore Kabul has repeatedly made claims on the North West Frontier Province

(NWFP) and Baluchistan and called for the right of self-determination for Pashtuns living in

Pakistan.91

Adding to the distrust was the Afghan-Indian alliance that was formed in 1947 in

which India decided to support the Afghan territorial claims. However, Afghanistan’s material

88

Amanda Hodge, “Pakistan fires back in missile tit-for-tat”, The Australian, April 26, 2012, can be accessed through: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/pakistan-fires-back-in-missile-tit-for-tat/story-e6frg6so-1226338267886. 89

Melanie Hanif, “Indian Involvement in Afghanistan in the Context of the South Asian Security System”, Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 16. 90

India Review, “A Publication of the embassy of India,” Kabul, vol. 3, no. 5, 2007, p. 1. 91

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947-2004”, Pildat Briefing Paper, 2004, p. 10.

38

power itself did not pose a significant threat to its eastern neighbor. That is to say in 2010 its

population consisted of 34 million people; the GDP was a mere $14 billion; and the military

expenditure was a sheer $576 million.92

The country was and still is preoccupied with its

internal stability and development of basic human needs. Regarding the regional dynamics,

Pakistan was mainly concerned with the territorial integrity of its western border and not

interested in overextending its material capabilities across the border.

The covert operations aimed at destabilizing the Karzai regime in Afghanistan are not

particularly surprising regarding the close ties between Karzai and India. Despite the ousting

of the Taliban from Kabul during Operation Enduring Freedom in late 2001, the ISI

continued its policy of secretly supporting Taliban elements in the Afghan-Pakistani region.

Consequently Afghanistan accused Pakistan of bolstering the Afghan Talibani insurgency

aimed at maintaining control over internal affairs in Afghanistan.93

Accordingly, Hamid

Karzai believes that remnants of the former Mujahideen, Taliban, and militant groups like Al-

Qaeda were actively supported by Pakistani institutions.

US—Pakistan

Looking at the global level, the United States is the only one actor that has the capacity and

the political will to exert persisting influence in the South Asian security complex. The US-

Pakistan relations are primarily structured by patterns of relations at the global level. After

9/11, the two states entered into a strategic alliance as part of the American-led War on

Terror. It was important for the United States to force Pakistan into this alliance because

Pakistan’s geostrategic position was vital to hunt down Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in

Afghanistan. The United States successfully turned the war against terrorism into a priority on

the security agenda by defining it as an inescapable threat to global security. Among other

things, this securitization was done through the United Nations Security Council Resolution

1373 (2001) that stated “the need to combat by all means […] threats to international peace

and security caused by terrorist acts.”94

The Bush administration pressured the Pakistani

92

World Bank, “Pakistan at a Glance”, and “India at a Glance”, World Development Indications, 2010. can be accessed through: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/afg_aag.pdf, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Index Database”, figures from 2010, can be accessed through http://milexdata.sipri.org/. 93

Heidi Kjaernet and Torjesen, Stina, “Afghanistan and Regional Instability: A Risk Assessment”, NUPI Report, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2008, p. 9. 94

United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1373 (2001)”, September 28, 2001.

39

leader Musharraf into an alliance by using the rhetoric of “you are either with us or against

us.”95

The United States as a political enemy and the prospect of India taking over the role of

American ally in case Pakistan would turn the American offer down was not considered in

Pakistan’s national interest. Therefore, in return for enormous amounts of material assistance,

president Musharraf decided to abandon its policy of supporting the Taliban and tolerating Al-

Qaeda militants.

The post-9/11 US-Pakistan alliance was based on US military and economic support

to Pakistan, while Pakistan would support the US with intelligence and logistical support for

fighting global terrorist threats. Pakistan opened up its airspace to US aircrafts for military

operations in Afghanistan, and granted permission to the US to use three small airports in

Sindh and Baluchistan for logistical, communication and emergency support. The military and

intelligence agencies of the United States and Pakistan shared intelligence on terrorist groups

and their activities. From the viewpoint of Pakistan, the US assistance could help to

counterbalance Indian supremacy. Moreover, the Americans dropped some of the sanctions

that were issued after the nuclear tests of 1998. In August 2002, in Islamabad, the US

actualized an agreement of economic assistance by restructuring a $3 billion debt.96

All

military and economic sanctions imposed on Pakistan by the Pressler, Glenn, and Symington

Amendments had been dismantled by the Bush administration as well.97

In 2006 Pakistan was

the largest recipient of US arms in the world due to an arms deal worth $3.5 billion.

The US-Pakistan alliance has faced severe difficulties and is immersed by a sense of

mutual distrust caused by the diverging strategic motivations. The Bush administration

viewed Al-Qaeda and the Taliban as a threat to its security, while Pakistan had an interest to

defend itself against India.98

It was not until June 2003 that Pakistan sent troops to the tribal

areas thereby periodically launching operations against ex-Afghan militants in the tribal areas.

It raised doubts about Pakistan’s commitment for the War on Terror and Hamid Karzai’s

Afghan government. Also, NATO’s timetable to retreat the majority of its troops from

Afghanistan in 2014 confirmed the Pakistani military’s “conviction that sooner or later the US

and its allies would abandon Afghanistan, leaving Pakistan to confront a situation inimical to

95

Ijaz Khan, Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Making: A Study of Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Afghan Policy Change, New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 2007, p. 59. 96

Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan Debt Schedule Agreed,” Financial Times, August 24–25, 2002, 3. 97

Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster, Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2011, p. 8. 98

International Institute for Strategic Studies, “US and Pakistan: a Troubled Relationship”, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 18, Comment 1, January 2012.

40

its strategic interests.”99

The post-2014 period would highly possible leave either a stable

Afghanistan dominated by India and rendering Pakistan vulnerable to strategic encirclement

or result in a destabilizing internal chaos generating refugee flows. In an effort to take away

distrust about America’s commitment on the strategic alliance, US Secretary of State Colin

Powell declared Pakistan to be a major non-NATO ally in 2004. This status as non-NATO

ally rendered Pakistan an advantageous treatment for defense related consultations and

procurement of weapons.100

The distrust and distinct interests laid the foundation for the post 9/11 Pakistani

behavior which was characterized by a secret support and maintaining cordial relations with

the Afghan Taliban and simultaneously outwardly declaring support for the US-led coalition

and fighting Taliban insurgency. Due to incidents such as the death of Osama Bin Laden

during an American Navy Seals operation in the garrison town of Abottabad and the

unfortunate killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers by NATO forces on the Pakistani-Afghan border

in November 2011 the American-Pakistani relationship reached rock bottom. The killing of

Bin Laden was perceived as a humiliation and violation of sovereignty for Pakistan since the

Pakistani military was not involved in the raid and they had not been able “to detect or deter

the American helicopters carrying the SEALs.”101

Adding to the growing distrust, the US did

not issue a formal apology for the death of the Pakistani soldiers in the NATO strike on the

border of November 2011.102

On the other hand, Bin Laden’s sheltering close to a Pakistani

military stronghold contributed to the US perception that Pakistan was an unreliable ally in

fighting Islamic terrorism.

The distrust between the US and Pakistan is not a new phenomenon. During the Cold

War, Pakistan and the United States have been engaged in bilateral strategic cooperative ties

twice, though it never showed signs of long-term enduring commitment and trust. In

particular when the Pakistani army was in power, close US-Pakistan security ties were

initiated. Yet the ties were not marked by common strategic objectives as the Americans

decided to break up the ties in after the alliances in 1971 and 1990. The United States

99

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, “US and Pakistan: a Troubled Relationship”, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 18, Comment 1, January 2012. 100


The International Institute for Strategic Studies, “US and Pakistan: a Troubled Relationship”, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 18, Comment 1, January 2012. 102

Helene Cooper, and Mazzetti, Mark, “Obama Refrains From a Formal ‘I’m Sorry’ to Pakistan”, New York Times, November 30, 2011, can be accessed through: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/world/middleeast/for-pakistan-no-formal-remorse-yet-from-obama.html?_r=1.

41

imposed a number of military material embargos and economic sanctions as a sign of

rejecting Pakistan’s aggression and nuclear weapon ambitions. Moreover, the US

rapprochement for a strategic partnership with India in the 1990s – covering economic ties,

political dialogue, and military exchanges – further upset Pakistan.103

This was exemplified

by the fact that India became the largest recipient of US development and food aid in South

Asia.104

The gap in strategic objectives widened even more so due to Pakistani supportive

policy towards the Taliban regime and its acquisition of nuclear weapons in the period of

1994-2000. All things considered, the US-Pakistan relations have been consistently

characterized by a sense of distrust and lack of shared strategic interests.

China—Pakistan

The alliance between China and Pakistan is marked by cooperation on the basis of common

strategic objectives. China’s strategy is aimed at maintaining the bipolar balance of power in

South Asia in order to secure China’s hegemony on the Asian continent. Through

strengthening Pakistan economically and militarily, China expects India to remain

preoccupied with Pakistan as the biggest threat, thereby making India less interested in

penetrating the East Asian region for influence. Following this strategy, China consistently

stood on Pakistan’s side. In April 2012, the Chinese Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang

confirmed the friendly relations by saying: “No matter what changes take place at the

international level, we will uphold Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”105

The

Pakistan-China alliance is also apparent in the Chinese assistance to Pakistan through ballistic

missile and nuclear weapon programs. Within diplomatic spheres, it was widely believed that

Pakistan had received “ring magnets [from China] used in uranium-enrichment, M-11

missiles, blueprints and equipment for missile factories, and medium-range missile

components along with numerous conventional weapon systems.”106

Earlier this year,

103

Ashley Tellis, “The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. Success in Engaging India and Pakistan”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, no. 4, 2008, p. 151. 104


The Express Tribune Agencies, “Boao forum for Asia: Gilani says China’s enemy is our enemy”, The Express Tribune, April 2, 2012, can be accessed through: http://tribune.com.pk/story/358540/boao-forum-for-asia-gilani-says-chinas-enemy-is-our-enemy/. 106

US Department of Defense, “Proliferation threat and response.”, Washington, 1997; and US Department of State, “Report on nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia”, Washington, 1998.

42

Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani reaffirmed that they “consider China’s security as are own

security.”107

Pakistan made the initial move for developing cordial security and economic relations

by being the first Muslim country to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in

January 1950.108

Thereby it contributed to the construction of friendly role identities and

patterns of amity. This recognition of the PRC was followed by several agreements on trade,

border settlements, and international political support within the UN in the 1960s.109

Moreover, in the 1970s China became the “main source of weapon procurement for

Pakistan.”110

As Pakistan became increasingly dissatisfied with the US as on-and-off ally and

due to the imposition of American sanctions in 1990s, Beijing turned out to be a more reliable

strategic ally. As China had an interest to exterminate the religious inspired terrorism

emanating from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s policy after 9/11 to the support the War on Terror

was well received. Yet China’s priority focus on India has led China to refrain from

criticizing Pakistan’s dubious ties with the Taliban.

Iran—Pakistan

The Iranian-Pakistani relations did not play a huge role for Pakistan’s security perception,

because both countries are part of separate regional security complexes and the shared

patterns of enmity have a marginal effect on Pakistan’s foreign policy. While they share a

border and different Muslim denominations (Iran is dominated by Shi’ites, and Pakistan is

primarily Sunni), this did not have significant consequences for Pakistan’s post 9/11

Afghanistan policy. In fact, Iran seems to be more preoccupied with developments in the in

the Middle Eastern security complex and views the American military presence in

Afghanistan as a threat.111

However, it should be noted that Iran was opposed to Pakistan’s

support of the Taliban in the pre-9/11 period.112

Therefore Iran developed close geopolitical

relations with India to counter the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s. Illustrative for the close

107

The Express Tribune Agencies, “Boao forum for Asia: Gilani says China’s enemy is our enemy”, The Express Tribune, April 2, 2012, can be accessed through: http://tribune.com.pk/story/358540/boao-forum-for-asia-gilani-says-chinas-enemy-is-our-enemy/. 108

Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, Washington: Brookings Institution, 2004. 109

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947-2004”, Pildat Briefing Paper, 2004, p. 14. 110

Ibid., p. 17. 111

Buzan and Waever, Regions and powers: The Structure of International Security, London: Cambridge UP, 2003, p. 110. 112

Ijaz Khan, Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Making: A Study of Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Afghan Policy Change,

New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 2007, p. 53.

43

Iranian-Indian relations is “the signing of a defense cooperation agreement between them in

January 2003.”113

This agreement granted India the use of bases in Iran in case of war

between India and Pakistan, which only adds to the Pakistani sense of regional insecurity.

Afghan Taliban—Pakistan

The Afghan Taliban and Pakistan share a history of cooperation and patterns of amity. The

years prior to the American-led ousting of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, Pakistan

and the Taliban were engaged in a strategic partnership. Pakistan was concerned with the

Indian influence in Afghanistan and therefore had an interest to support an Afghan regime

that wanted to keep India out. The Taliban Islam-fundamentalist group served as a foreign

policy tool Thus to create a “strategic depth”114

against India. Moreover, supporting the

Taliban functioned as a way to ease separatist pressure posed by Pashtun nationalists in the

western parts of Pakistan. When the Taliban moved to the surface in the fall of 1994 in

Kandahar, Pakistani foreign decision makers facilitated the Taliban efforts to take over Kabul

which eventually occurred in September 1996. Pakistan was only one of the few countries to

recognize the Taliban government in May 1997.115

The Afghan Taliban was an ally to the

Pakistani government, and the ISI maintained contact with the Taliban as a military partner.

According to Steve Coll, an American reporter for the New York Times, the ISI provided

guns, money, fuel, and infrastructure support to the Taliban in the second half of the 1990s

until 2001.116

Reversely, the Taliban provided logistical support, training, and other bases that

the ISI was allowed to use for training and supporting the Kashmir rebellion against India.

Yet with the ousting of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in the months after

9/11, the Afghan Taliban was termed as an enemy in the War on Terror by the Musharraf

regime. In reality, Pakistan has not proven itself to be able to exterminate the Afghan Taliban

which nowadays has its headquarters in Quetta — capital of the Balochistan province.

113

Ijaz Khan, Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Making: A Study of Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Afghan Policy Change,

New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 2007, p. 74 114

I.P. Khosla, “India and Afghanistan”, in Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Atish Sinha and Madhup

Mohta, New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007, p. 541. 115

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947-2004”, Pildat Briefing Paper, 2004, p. 25, 116

Steve Coll,“Return of the Taliban (Interview)”, Frontline July 20, 2006, can be accessed through: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/interviews/coll.html.

44

Al Qaeda—Pakistan

The Pakistani army and the ISI maintained close relationships with Al Qaeda prior to 2001.

Al Qaeda – founded in Afghanistan in 1989 – received “active and covert support of serving

and retired intelligence officials.”117

Since the War on Terror, the Pakistani government

designated Al Qaeda as enemy, and vice versa. The policy of Pakistan stated that it wanted to

obliterate Al Qaeda’s presence in Pakistan.118

In contrast to the Taliban, the Pakistani

government is believed to be sincere in their commitment to get rid of Al Qaeda from its

territory because Al Qaeda can be relatively easy been replaced as proxy forces in Kashmir by

Pakistani Islamic groups.

Security and arms control regimes

International security regimes and arms control regimes play a marginal role in the South

Asian region that is dominated by a traditionally realist mindset among the policy makers.

Pakistan refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty (CTBT), and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) unless India did so first.119

Moreover, after 9/11 the Bush administration decided to release the pressure on Pakistan and

India to sign these treaties and gave priority to the War on Terror. The South Asian

Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), an organization mainly aimed at stimulating

economic cooperation and cultural understanding, was devised to function as a platform

contributing to regional understanding.120

The SAARC has thus far not substantially taken

away the Indian-Pakistan distrust. Yet if the process will keep heading in the direction of

peaceful relations, then on the long term it can contribute to normalization of Indian-Pakistani

relations. A positive note can be made about the future of the security regimes affecting South

Asia, because that India has given its word to enter into a MTCR membership that was

117

Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, Washington: Brookings, 2004. p. 191. 118


Ibid., p. 50. 120

SAARC, “Article 1”, Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, founded in 1985, can be accessed through http://www.saarc-sec.org/SAARC-Charter/5/.

45

indicated by American president Obama during a visit to India in November 2010.121

Signs

such as these can be interpreted as a possible change on the long term from a Hobbesian

structure in the direction of a more Kantian structure of international relations in South Asia.

121

Al Jazeera Agencies, “Obamca seeks expanded India-US trade”, Al Jazeera, November 7, 2010, can be accessed through http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2010/11/2010116132349390763.html.

46

Chapter 4 – Pakistan’s state structure as intervening variable

Worrying accounts stating that “political factions sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda

gained strength in the territories [of Baluchistan, the FATA, and the NWFP] after 2001”122

have raised questions about how Pakistan’s state structure affects Musharraf’s ability to

implement the counterterrorism policy. Adding to the concerns about Pakistan’s double

agenda was the covert transfer of key Taliban leaders – including Mullah Omar – from Kabul

to Pakistan after the Taliban regime collapsed in Kabul as a result of joint US and Northern

Alliance military operations in late 2001.123

Besides Taliban fighters, Al Qaeda elements were

also not hindered to take refuge inside Pakistan, especially in the FATA province. One of the

problems is that in the western provinces the government’s power is limited and Islamist

militant groups have controlled large territories during the last decade.124

A closer look at the

army and the ISI also exposes a lack of commitment on the side of the Pakistanis in engaging

the Islamic terrorists. Moreover, the failure to use Islam as a way to mobilize support from the

local population for the counterterrorist also contributed to the stuttering counterterrorism

performance.

The domestic state structure is the first intervening unit-level variable capable of

explaining why Pakistan seems unable to cope with the Taliban and other Islamist insurgents

on the Afghan-Pakistan border. The state structure constrains and facilitates the ability of

122

M. Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 3., p. 61. 123

Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance,” Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008, p. 8. 124

Frederick W. Kagan, “The Two-Front War: Pakistan is finally doing its part. Now we need to do ours.” The Weekly Standard, Vol. 15, No. 8, November 9, 2009, can be accessed through: http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/017/152sczju.asp.

State structure / state power

The ability to mobilize and extract

resources depends on:

The army and the ISI; and the civilian

bureaucracy (Cabinet and parliament)

Islam as a state-supported device to

rally support around policy

47

Pakistan to mobilize and extract resources from society for the global War on Terror. In this

chapter first an argument will be made explaining that the army and the notorious ISI are the

major domestic political institution affecting and thus Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. The

civilian bureaucracy is often bypassed by the military leadership in decisions on national

security. Secondly, the prevalent strategic way of thinking among the political decision

makers – in particular the military leadership – expresses itself by on the one hand entering

into the strategic alliance with the United States, and on the other hand the pragmatic use of

substate militant groups to defend national interests. In this pursuit of national security, Islam

plays dominant role as state-supported ideology to rally public support around its policies,

thereby enhancing state power. Yet, the Pakistani government has had difficulty to secure the

much needed support among subordinate levels of the military the intelligence agency ISI in

order to execute counterterrorism actions, mainly because Islamist elements perceive the

Pakistani counterterrorism efforts as anti-Islamic. Besides, the local populace in the tribal

areas has a deep standing disdain for the central government and Pakistani army thereby

further complicating Pakistan’s ability to successfully carry out these operations. While

analyzing the role of the domestic institutions, it is important to keep in mind that the military

rule of Musharraf lasted from 1999 until 2008, and the civilian government has been in power

since 2008.

4.1 The dominance of the army in national security decisions

Pakistan’s state structure has unique characteristics. In spite of efforts by civilian governments

to take control over national security, the military has established itself as the most important

actor shaping Pakistan’s foreign and security policy. The army has kept exerting control over

national security policy after the military rule of Musharraf (1999-2008) under the civilian

rule of president Ali Asif Zardari (2008-…). The main reasons for the dominance of the

military in foreign policy shaping are threefold. Firstly, the civilian political institutions failed

to develop themselves into a solid establishment because of army reigns for well over three

decades since 1947. Secondly, the army regards itself to be the guardian of the state and Islam

as state ideology, which gives it leverage and justifies the army’s dominance regarding

national security. And thirdly, through the Constitution of 1973 the division of power over

national security and foreign policy is arranged. The constitution provides for dominant

48

influence of the military in foreign policy issues. Yet constitutional constraints on the political

power of the military have often been disregarded at times in which the army deemed it

inconvenient.125

During its 65 year long history as an independent state, Pakistan has not been able to

build up strong civilian institutions for governance. Even during tenures of civilian rule,

civilian authorities failed to establish a stable and mature political base to sustain civilian

governance and control the national security policy.126

Indeed, civilian governments were

often more preoccupied with short term tactical politics trying to cling on to power rather than

building a political superstructure to sustain civilian governance.127

In this process, the

civilian sector gradually ceded ground to the military in political and national security

decisions. And as a result, the gap between the civilian and the military sector had widened

considerably in favor of the latter.

The three periods in which the army governed Pakistan and the military dominance at

times of civilian governance contributed heavily to the faltering development of civilian

governmental institutions. In the course of time, the army has increasingly managed to present

itself as the guardian of Pakistan’s borders and the Islamic ideological identity of Pakistan. It

still thinks of itself as having the “only true professional ability to handle national security or

the national interest.”128

The military wanted to be seen as the best instrument to secure

survival of the Pakistani state. The strong external threat perceptions posed by India have

facilitated the military’s justification for taking control over national security. Immediately

after the inception of Pakistan in 1947, the army was given a prominent role as guardian of

the Pakistani state. The violent partition in 1947, the reluctance of India to deliver Pakistan’s

allotted share of military stores, India’s unrightfully occupation of Kashmir, India’s forceful

and involuntary annexation of the princely state of Hyderabad, and the lost war of 1971 in

East Pakistan (Bangladesh) are factors that heavily influenced the Pakistani army’s legacy and

justified the army’s controlling position in national security.129

Besides India, Afghanistan

also posited a threat to the national security and sovereignty of Pakistan as it made claims on

Pakistani territory. Thus, the hostile perceived environment around Pakistan led to a situation

125

Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2004, p. 97. 126

Shuja Nawaz, “Special Report: Who Controls Pakistan’s Security Forces?”, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, December 2011, can be accessed through: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR%20297.pdf, p. 2 127

Ibid., p. 2. 128

Ibid., p. 129. 129

Ibid., p. 101.

49

in which security issues became the dominant focus for Pakistan’s foreign policy agenda

thereby facilitating the army’s grip on foreign policy.

An important extension piece of the military is the Pakistani intelligence agency – the

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) – which got space to develop itself into a significant power

factor due to the weakly developed civilian institutional framework and military regimes in

Pakistan. The ISI is mainly concerned with operations that deal with military matters at home

and abroad and it has taken on a dominant role in the foreign policy process.130

It emerged as

an important agency during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s and has

remained a powerful political force – with growing operational autonomy – since that time.131

As a way to generate public support and national unity to defend against external

threats, Islam played an important role. However, in the last decade the army is increasingly

experiencing difficulties to project itself as savior of the Islamic ideology of Pakistan since

they officially are engaging in counterterrorist operations targeting Islamist militant groups in

the tribal areas. Support from public opinion is decreasing as polls show that “just 44 percent

of urban Pakistanis favored sending the Pakistan Army to the tribal areas to pursue and

capture Al Qaeda fighters, and only 48 percent would allow the Pakistan Army to act against

Taliban insurgents who have crossed over from Afghanistan.”132

The Constitution of 1973 prescribes the legal framework that arranges the division of

tasks between the civilian authority and the army concerning national security. Based on the

constitution, the army has a prominent role and the civilian parliament plays a quite limited

role in foreign policy making as the latter has no effective supervising role on the military. All

the parliament can do is adopting non-binding resolutions and hold hearings through the

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs on foreign policy issues.133

Next to that, Article 199

stipulates that the military’s execution of the national security agenda cannot be challenged in

high courts.134

Moreover, the military has the right to veto civilian decisions concerned with

130

Shuja Nawaz, “Special Report: Who Controls Pakistan’s Security Forces?”, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, December 2011, can be accessed through: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR%20297.pdf,, p. 4. 131


World Public Opinion Poll, “Less than Half of Pakistani Public Supports Attacking Al Qaeda, Cracking Down on Fundamentalists”, World Public Opinion.org, October 31, 2007, can be accessed through: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brasiapacificra/424.php?nid=&id=&pnt=424. 133


Shuja Nawaz, “Special Report: Who Controls Pakistan’s Security Forces?”, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, December 2011, can be accessed through: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR%20297.pdf, p. 5.

50

national security.135

Yet, the constitution constrains the military’s political power as well and

brings civilians into the game as well. Article 47 prescribes that the president is expected to

act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet, headed by the prime minister.136

Besides

this, Article 16 of the constitution’s Rules of Business declares that “all proposals involving

negotiations with foreign countries … [such as] treaties and agreements [...] shall be brought

before the Cabinet.”137

However, since president Musharraf also held the position of prime

minister from October 1999 until November 2002, this gave him essentially giving much

more power to take unilateral decisions in foreign policy making.

It is worthwhile noting that the constitutional power ascribed to the Cabinet is not

practiced to its full extent, because the military leaders – sometimes receiving political

support from the Supreme Court – do not always comply with the constitution’s articles. For

instance, though the Constitution of 1973 prescribes that the military overthrow by General

Musharraf in 1999 was unconstitutional, this was neglected by the Supreme Court that gave

Musharraf the chance to appeal to the Doctrine of Necessity to legally justify his overthrow.138

Thus, the influence of the parliament was undermined and obstructed due to the military take-

over of Musharraf in 1999. During the military rule of Mushurraf – especially when he

exercised the double function of the presidency and prime ministry – the parliament was left

off-side and could not develop itself into a mature and solidly functioning institution

controlling the national security policy. In fact, the military had effectively taken control of

the federal ministries. It went so far that the autonomy of the “Foreign Office and Defence

Ministry was completely neutralized.”139

On issues of strategic importance for Pakistan,

military rulers felt more comfortable to cooperate with the ISI because of its military links,

rather than cooperating with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ISI also tended to

undermine and bypass the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of its easy access and short

communication channels to the military rulers. It reports directly to the chief of army staff.

135

Kazimi, M.R, A Concise History of Pakistan, New York: Oxford UP (2009), p. 253. 136

Javid Husain, “The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan,” Pakistani Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2004, can be accessed through http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FP/TheProcessofForeignPolicyFormulationinPakistan.pdf, p. 6. 137

Ibid., p. 6. 138

Shuja Nawaz, “Special Report: Who Controls Pakistan’s Security Forces?”, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, December 2011, can be accessed through: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR%20297.pdf, p. 2. 139

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “National Security Council: A Debate on Institutions and Processes for Decision-Making on Security Issues”, Pakistani Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, April 2012, can be accessed through: http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/CMR/NaionalSecurityCouncil-debateonInstitutionsandprocessesfordecisionmakingonsecurityissues.pdf, p. 23.

51

An important legal institution for Pakistan’s security affairs is the National Security

Council Law (NSC) implemented in 2004. It is designed as a constitutional mechanism to

bring the civilian and military sector together for consultation on national security matters.

Yet the “recommendations of the NSC are not binding on the government or the

parliament.”140

It comprised of thirteen members ranging from civilian officials (such as the

Prime Minister, Chairman of the Senate; and the speaker of the National Assembly) to

military leaders (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee; Chiefs of the Army, the Navy,

and the Air Force) to the four provincial Chief Ministers. The NSC intended to institutionalize

the military and civilian role in the process of decision making on security issues. However,

the NSC was often bypassed as consultative body because president Musharraf often made

key decisions on national security in consultation with his army and civilian advisers.141

Furthermore, since 2008 the NSC has not organized any meetings anymore, so its influence

has become marginalized. In 2008 Musharraf’s military regime was replaced by the civilian

government of president Asif Ali Zardari. Since that time the role of the civilian government

and the parliament in security policies have steadily but slowly gained some strength in

relation to the military and the ISI. In April 2010, the parliament passed the 18th

Constitutional Amendment which revoked many presidential powers gathered by under

military regimes—including the power to dismiss elected governments and appoint army

chiefs. Governance was decentralized and devolved to regions, while parliament was

strengthened and many of the constrained presidential powers were transferred to prime

minister Gilani. President Zardari, Prime Minister Gilani, and Army Chief Kayani now

convene separately or collectively in non-formal meetings to discuss foreign policy and

security management. The last years have also shown an increase in army briefings on

security issues to the parliament, civilian leaders, and civilian national security committees

such as the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and the National Assembly’s Standing

Committee on Defence.142

140

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “National Security Council: A Debate on Institutions and Processes for Decision-Making on Security Issues”, Pakistani Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, April 2012, can be accessed through: http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/CMR/NaionalSecurityCouncil-debateonInstitutionsandprocessesfordecisionmakingonsecurityissues.pdf, p. 22. 141

Ibid., p.21. 142

Ibid., p. 23-24.

52

4.2 Limited state power in tribal areas

The lack of support among the population in the tribal regions and the rugged territory poses a

structural problem in carrying out counterterrorism activities by the Pakistani army. The

Pakistani national government has relatively low authority and tribes enjoy semi-autonomy in

the tribal areas close to the Afghan border. The tribal areas are not governed by Pakistani laws

and national political institutions, but the relationship between the Pakistani state and the

tribal areas is regulated through formal treaties between the local tribes and the federal

government in Islamabad.143

The tribal areas thus possess exclusive responsibility for the

management of their internal affairs. Historically, local tribal militias have not been inclined

to obey central authority. This difficult relationship between the federal government and the

local tribes combined with the inhospitable terrain expresses itself in the problematic way for

Pakistani military to obtain intelligence from the FATA. The first reason for this is that since

the 1980s new religious leaders (maulvis) gradually replaced the traditional authorities

(federal political agents and maliks / elders). Those maulvis viewed the protection of the

Taliban and Al Qaeda elements in FATA as “politico-religious obligation.” 144

The religious

maulvis were not inclined to help the military when it was searching for Islamist terrorists and

thus they denied the Pakistani state access to information required to capture or kill the

Taliban and Al Qaeda. Moreover, the anti-Americanism and perception of the

counterterrorism operations as a war against Islam has contributed to the protection of Taliban

and Al Qaeda terrorists in the FATA. Exemplary for the weak power of the Pakistani state

was the insertion of the Pakistani Army forces into the FATA in 2002. It resulted in social

disruptions undermining counterterrorism effectiveness and it eroded the power sharing

compact between the FATA and the Pakistani state. Local inhabitants have distrust for the

army, because most of the army personnel come from non-Pashtun Punjabi areas. Therefore

the army is viewed as an unwelcome intruder and it can hardly count on cooperation of the

local population in counterterrorist efforts as the locals often are inclined to tip the terrorists

when army forces were spotted in the area.145

The Frontier Corps, the Pakistani paramilitary force deployed in the tribal areas,

illustrates the influence of pro-Taliban factions within the military. It is so closely tied to the

FATA population that it is unable to properly carry out counterterrorism operations. Many of

143

Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance,” Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008, p. 23 144

Ibid., p. 24 145

Ibid., p. 26

53

the members within the Frontier Corps sympathize with Islamic militants, they are suspicious

of the intentions of the United States and the Pakistani state, and on top of that they are poorly

trained and equipped.146

Because of their affinity with the local militants, these paramilitary

forces are not motivated to eliminate the terrorists in the region. All things considered, the

central government of Pakistan and operational capabilities against Islamic elements in the

tribal regions seem to be limited due to the opposition of the locals, the harsh territorial

features, and the pro-Taliban elements within the army.

4.3 The strategic mindset leading the foreign policy

The strategic mindset within the military leadership allows for a policy that is based both on a

short term strategic alliance with the US and simultaneously keeping Taliban intact as a

potential strategic partner to defend the national security of Pakistan on the long term against

the Indian threat of encirclement. The basis of Pakistan’s foreign policy strategy was formed

in the 1950s when the army and its civilian allies had settled on a strategy based on the

existential threat posed by India. Kashmir served as a moral and strategic battleground

symbolizing the fear of India. The US-Pakistani alliance provides Pakistan material assistance

to balance against the Indian hegemony in South Asia and to fight against separatist

movements in Balochistan, while the military’s view of covert low-intensity warfare through

the use of proxy militants was seen as an adequate tool to preserve the national interests

against the threat of India and a potential hostile government in Afghanistan. The Islam

functioned to legitimize the army’s practice of using radical Islamic groups as political tools

against India’s Hindu threat. Under these circumstances, the emergence of the ISI as an

increasingly influential factor was stimulated. However, the distrust towards the United States

as reliable ally is also integrated in the Pakistani strategic culture. In the eyes of a substantial

part within the military, the American were seen as treacherous since it had cut off military

assistance in 1971 and 1990, and it has developed a benign relation with India in the 1990s.

This distrust of the United States came to the fore as an increasing share of the military

personnel held Islamist and anti-American ideas and expressed itself into a Pakistani political

establishment not willing to become totally dependent on Washington. Therefore, keeping the

146

Hassan Abbas, “Transforming Pakistan’s Frontier Corps,” Terrorism Monitor, vol. 5, no. 6, (March 29, 2007), can be

accessed through:

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1056&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=182&no_

cache=1.

54

option open to use the Taliban as a strategic ally against Indian influence in Afghanistan, the

Pakistani military had an interest not to exterminate the Taliban.

Pakistan’s obsession with the threat posed by India is thoroughly institutionalized in

the military organization and reflects the strategic thinking of the officer corps. Up until

today, the presentation of India as a threat remains the prevailing focus for the military

schools. The construction of India as a threat to Muslim Pakistan functioned as ideological

justification for the military to have a prominent role in Pakistan’s security policy making and

protecting Pakistan’s sovereignty.147

This threat perception is visible in Pakistan’s most

important state-sponsored military schools – the Staff College and the National Defence

College – that keep offering “their students a stereotyped, reductionist theory of Indian

motives and strategy.”148

Thus, the military’s educational system has produced officers that

stick to old patterns of thinking about national security and foreign policy. The military

officers carry a strategic tunnel vision.149

Motivated by the Indian-Pakistani rivalry, the

military stepped into an alliance with the US in order to compete with India to achieve a

material balance-of-power and a regional status quo.

Besides the military’s focus on India, the Pakistani military is also aware of the

domestic threats of certain militant groups that have popped up during the last two decades.

Pakistan’s segmented counterterrorism policy makes distinctions between militant groups.

Especially Deobandi, Shia, and anti-nationalist Sunni groups like for instance Lashkar-e-

Jhangvi are targeted by Pakistani counterterrorism operations whereas the Taliban was

spared.150

The War on Terror was proved to be convenient to president Musharraf, because it

provided US military material assistance to engage these militant groups that challenged the

national authority of the Pakistani state. Pakistan had in 2008 deployed more than 85,000

troops along the Afghanistan-Pakistani border and a significant part of that force engaged in

counterterrorism operations in the border area.151

It had secured major victories against anti-

national sectarian terrorist groups and inflicted heavy losses on Al Qaeda, yet Pakistan was

more reluctant to eliminate Talibani and Jihadi terrorist elements that were operating from

147

Ayesha Sadiqua Afgha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-1999, Lahore: Meel Productions, 2003, p. 56. 148

Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2004, p. 107 149

Ibid., p. 128. 150


Ibid., p. 10

55

FATA against Afghanistan and India.152

Thus, the Taliban was on purpose kept alive, because

Pakistan viewed them as useful instruments for executing its policy of strategic depth against

India. India’s growing influence and reconstruction efforts inside Afghanistan, the souring of

the Afghan-Pakistani relations, and the prospect of a NATO exit were enough reason to fear a

hostile territory on its western border on the long term. Therefore the desire to thwart a

hostile-perceived Afghanistan made Pakistan decide to keep on protecting and nourishing the

Taliban after 9/11.153

The dominant focus on India has a severe impact on Pakistan’s operational

performance for the counterterrorism efforts in the FATA. The intelligence capabilities of the

ISI are hampered and Pakistan’s infantry is primarily prepared for conventional interstate war.

Strategic signals and communications intelligence (SIGINT and COMINT) – the interception,

analysis, and collection of communication waves – are largely directed towards targeting

India.154

Thus, targeting the Taliban and Al Qaeda is not the priority for the ISI compared to

India. The military’s focus on India has also affected the infantry as it is prepared to engage in

conventional warfare against India. The Pakistani army’s infantry lack of training for

counterterrorism operations therefore resulted in less effective when dealing with militants

than what could have been the case if trained otherwise.155

On top of unpreparedness to

engage in specific counterterrorist operations, the rugged terrain of the FATA constitutes yet

another challenge for counterterrorist operations. It is virtually impossible for outsiders to

monitor any terrorist movements because many of the settlements are isolated in the hard

passable terrain. It is very difficult to advance on and attack terrorist elements in a stealthy

way because of the isolated setting of many FATA settlements. Moreover, because of

Pakistan’s conventional weapon arsenal – including mortars, antitank guided missiles, field

artillery, helicopter- and aircraft-fired cannon and ballistic rockets156

– used for

counterterrorism, a lot of collateral damage was inflicted on the population in the tribal areas

as well. The collateral damage only exacerbated local antagonism versus the Pakistani army

152

International Crisis Group, “Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan’s Failure to Tackle Extremism”, ICG Asoa Report no. 73, Islamabad/Brussels: January 16, 2004, can be accessed through: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/073%20Unfulfilled%20Promises%20Pakistans%20Failure%20to%20Tackle%20Extremism.pdf, p. ii. 153

Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game”, Survival, Vol. 49, no. 1, can be accessed through: http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/rdenever/USNatSecandForeignPol/Jones_DangerousGame.pdf, pp. 15-32. 154

Desmond Ball, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in South Asia: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Canberra: Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies, 1996, p. 41. 155

Moeed Yusuf and Anit Mukherjee, “Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: Learning from India,”

AEI National Security Outlook, September 2007, can be accessed through: http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-

policy/regional/asia/counterinsurgency-in-pakistan/. 156

Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance,” Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008, p. 29.

56

and certainly did not win the local support for counterterrorism operations, while support for

terrorist factions received an impuls.

The 2008 Waziristan peace accords finely illustrated the problems of the Pakistani

government to cope with terrorist elements in the FATA. The Pakistani government and the

pro-Taliban local groups in South and North Waziristan signed a peace treaty that led the

government forces to retreat and in return the local inhabitants “were tasked with preventing

cross-border movement of terrorists into Afghanistan and further attacks on Pakistani civilian

and military targets.”157

Yet, in reality the radical Islamist elements within the territory took

advantage of the absence of Pakistani military forces by recruiting, training, and rearming the

terrorists for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.158

Many strategic analysts interpreted

these peace accords as reaffirming the Pakistani practices of double playing the Americans.

The appliance of low-intensity covert warfare as a means to pursue national security

has been firmly established in Pakistan’s foreign policy culture. Both the military and civil

bureaucracy have viewed religious militant groups as useful foreign policy tools and have not

refrained from providing them covert support.159

Pakistan’s resort to use proxy forces for

strategic means originates from the Cold War when the US was providing military expertise

in the 1950s and 1960s. Influenced by the American experience in Vietnam with guerilla

warfare, Pakistan undertook a study to guerilla tactics and covert war. The Pakistani army

realized that they could use tactical guerilla elements against India by developing proxy

insurgent forces as a second line of defense in for instance Kashmir.160

In the 1980s, the

successful dispelling of Soviet forces from Afghanistan by guerrilla proxy forces convinced

Pakistani military command of the potential of low-intensity guerilla and covert warfare

tactics as useful strategic instruments.161

In this case, Afghan mujahedeen forces – receiving

logistical help, training, and weapons from ISI and the CIA – were able to dispel the

communist regime in Kabul. Reflecting the Pakistani comfort with using Islamic militants for

national security causes, the ties between the ISI and the Taliban became even stronger during

the 1990s.

157


M. Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 3., p.

62. 159

Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p. 88. 160


Ibid., p. 105.

57

The sparing of the Taliban in the anti-terrorism operations immediately after 9/11 can

be partially explained by that Pakistani military commanders were not ready to physically

eliminate the forces they had themselves nurtured. The ISI officers that were tasked with

managing the cooperative relationship with the Taliban in the 1990s form an obstacle in the

proper conduct of exterminating the Taliban. Some of those officers find it hard to turn

against their former allies.162

Among Afghan and American diplomats, the ISI operatives are

widely perceived as responsible for sabotaging the fight against Taliban on Pakistani territory.

In the years 2001-2004, evidence was collected by the American and NATO intelligence

officers showing a “systematic and pervasive system of ISI collusion. By 2004 they had

confirmed reports of the ISI running training camps for Taliban recruits north of Quetta, funds

and arms shipments arriving from the Gulf countries, and shopping sprees in Quetta and

Karachi in which the Taliban bought hundreds of motorbikes, pickup trucks, and satellite

phones.”163

The belief that some ISI officers have been undermining counterterrorism policies is

based on three factors. Firstly, the ISI has substantial space to move in its operations because

of the nature of its activities in the covert field such as “recruitment of agents from diverse

sources to include those with unsavory backgrounds.”164

Secondly, because the

implementation of many ISI operations is regulated by “directive control” as opposed to

“detailed control,” ISI field officers have the flexibility to carry out the strategic goals without

the need to get prior permission from their superiors.165

As a result, officers had the chance to

secretly disregard leadership commands for personal ideological reasons without fearing

reprisals from the government. This allowed ISI officers to use their discretion concerning the

undermining or support of counterterrorist operations without being accountable to the Chief

of Army Staff. And thirdly, the Pakistani government – the Musharraf regime in particular –

managed the ISI primarily through the annunciation of broadly defined policies. These

policies were interpreted by ISI subordinates and subsequently implemented in their personal

manner.

162


Ahmed Rashed, Descent into Chaos: Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Threat to Global Security, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 220. 164


Ibid., p. 18.

58

The effects of Islamic convictions within the military are gradually changing. In

general, the army leadership is still quite secular; most young officers are driven by political

and cultural motivations instead of ideological ones.166

However, the proportion of elements

within the army sharing an Islamist orientation is growing. The period of when Muhammad

Zia-ul-Haq was the chief of the army staff (1978-1988) marked the rise of Islamic radical

body of thought in the army as he put a larger emphasis on Islam. The military had taken the

lead in creating a Pakistani national identity based on Islam and this political commitment to

Islamic causes “gradually evolved into a strategic commitment to the Jihadi ideology.”167

Several senior officers close to former president Musharraf pointed out that “Zia opened the

door to intolerant bigots and fanatics.”168

Some young officers influenced by Zia’s emphasis

on Islam ideology are now still active in the senior rankings of the military force. Even though

today the military apparatus is not completely dominated by officers with radical Islamic

ideas, the current trend shows an increase in the influence of Islam orthodox ideas among

junior level officers.169

Younger officers reflect the larger society that is growing more

Islamic and anti-American. Nowadays officers are more before drawn from rural towns and

cities where people have a more anti-Western sentiment. They believe that Muslims are

subjected to discrimination and Western military oppression throughout the world.170

A large

number of military officials have assimilated to Islamist beliefs and therefore they are more

inclined to feel sympathetic and supportive to the Jihadi fighters in Afghanistan.

In sum, the domestic structure has enabled the military’s autonomy to exert a decisive

role in the making of security policy due to the weaknesses and discontinuity of the civilian

and political institutions. The military justified its dominant position by presenting itself as

the savior of the state because of the perceived external vulnerability to India and

Afghanistan. Islam was used as an ideological tool to rally support around the foreign policy

that was directed against the threat of Hindu-dominated India. The secret support of Islamist

proxy forces was institutionalized and still seen as useful tool in foreign policy. Yet, it is

increasingly to gather support through the Islam as instrument for the counterterrorism

operations in the tribal areas because the anti-American local population as well as elements

within the military and the ISI view those operations as anti-Islam. Thus, the Pakistani

166


Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p. 16. 168

Ibid., p. 108. 169

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Rumblings in the Army,” Daily Times, September 8, 2003. 170

Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2004, p. 117.

59

government was playing a dangerous double game by publicly supporting the War on Terror

and only selectively engaging Islamist terrorists inside Pakistan. The resignation of the

Musharraf regime can be partly elucidated by the increased domestic opposition towards anti-

terrorist campaign.

60

Chapter 5 – Musharraf the Janus-faced leader: Balancing the

international and domestic threats

Irrespective of heading a civilian or military government, being president of Pakistan is never

an easy job. Governing a highly unstable country surrounded by regional and domestic threats

has proved a challenging task for every president since the inception of Pakistan. Pervez

Musharraf’s presidency was no exception after he assumed power through a bloodless

military coup in 1999. Explaining the unvarnished nature of governing Pakistan, he said the

presidency is “labeled by some as one of the most difficult jobs in the world.”171

Musharraf

saw himself in an increasingly predicament entangled between domestic and external threats.

Indeed, Pakistan’s role as an ally in the American War on Terror posed a tremendous

challenge to Musharraf’s regime survival at home as he had to deal with domestic opposition

from the secular and Islamist political parties as well as hostile anti-American public opinion.

Although Musharraf personally and the small circle of top military decision-makers were in

favor of eliminating religious extremism, he was forced to turn to a compromised and

ambivalent Afghanistan policy in order to mitigate domestic threats to the regime’s survival.

Exemplary for the resistance against the support in War on Terror were the several

assassination attempts from Islamist forces directed to Musharraf that took place in 2002 and

2003. These attempts were blamed on Muslim militants, and it raised questions about whether

“some police or army officials [were] assisting the attackers.”172

Internationally, Musharraf

171

Carin Zissis, “Judgment Time for Musharraf,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2007, can be accessed through http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/judgment-time-musharraf/p12890. 172

Salmon Masood, “Pakistan Leader Escaped Attempt at Assassination,” The New York Times, December 26, 2003, can be accessed through http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/26/world/pakistani-leader-escapes-attempt-at-assassination.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.

Threat perceptions

1. International threat perceptions: India and

the Afghan Karzai-government.

2. Domestic threat perceptions: PPP and

PML-Q; separatist movements in

Balochistan and NWFP; and Islamist

militants.

Private policy preferences of Musharraf:

In favor of US-Pakistani alliance.

61

had to adopt a sufficiently firm stance in the counterterrorism operations on the Afghan

border to meet American demands thereby securing material US assistance. In other words, as

Musharraf was caught up between these opposite pressures, he was engaged in a highly

ambivalent Afghanistan policy that comprised of simultaneously appeasing the United States

as well as Islamist groupings—most notably the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).

In order to determine how president Musharraf was able to stay in power for the

period of 2001-2008, it is necessary to identify the international and domestic threat

perceptions and pressures and how was dealt with those threats. Musharraf, being a typical

Janus-faced leader, operated simultaneously on the intersection of domestic and international

politics. On the international level Musharraf was concerned with upholding the regional

systemic balance of power vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. As discussed in the previous

chapters, these two states formed the major international threats to Pakistan but the alliance

with the US functioned as balancing against these threats. Musharraf thus deemed it essential

to cherish the American material support for Pakistan’s survival. On the domestic level he

managed to balance against the secular political parties of the Pakistani People’s Party (PPP)

led by Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistani Muslim League led by Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) by

forging a coalition between his own Pakistani Muslim League-Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q) and

the Islamist Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) in the period of 2002-2005. As a result of the

military’s alliance with the MMA, Musharraf’s international promises to destroy religious

extremism and terrorism were gravely compromised. Helping Musharraf’s hold to power, the

MMA gave support to the 17th

constitutional amendment that enlarged the military’s national

power in return for MMA governance in the NWFP and Balochistan. Besides the political

parties, the Supreme Court also formed a power bloc pressuring Musharraf. In particular the

unconstitutional measures that Musharraf took in order to stay in power antagonized the

opposition parties and population to the point that his position was no longer tenable. In 2005,

the MMA decided to drop its support because suspension of the chief justice Ifitikhar

Muhammad Chaudry and other judges from office by Musharraf was considered to be an

unconstitutional act. Having lost domestic legitimization – also connected to the lost elections

in February 2008 – Musharraf resigned in 2008 as he faced an impeachment on charges of

violation and gross misconduct drawn up by the governing coalition.173

173

“Pakistan’s Musharraf steps down,” BBC, 18 August 2008, can be accessed through http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7567451.stm.

62

5.1. International threats: India and Afghanistan

The Al Qaeda attacks on 9/11 and the subsequent war in Afghanistan made Pakistan a key

strategic player in the region. The most obvious and fastest way for Americans and its

equipment to enter Afghanistan was through Pakistan. Therefore negotiations for a strategic

partnership were initiated by the United States. Under increasing international pressure to stop

supporting the Taliban and because of the material benefits provided by the Americans,

Musharraf decided to support the global war against terrorism. Regional threat perceptions are

capable to explain a large part for Pakistan’s double agenda of simultaneously fighting a war

on terrorism while tolerating the Taliban on its soil. The American material assistance

functioned primarily as a way to neutralize the perceived threats posed by India and

Afghanistan. Pakistan intended to uphold the South Asian status quo that had been getting

closer to the tipping point in favor of India because of the intensive Indian material growth

since the 1990s. To maintain influence in Afghanistan in order to strategic encirclement by

India and to protect Pakistani territory, Pakistan intended to keep the Taliban available as

foreign policy instrument. The interpretation of the NATO forces only having short term

commitment in Afghanistan contributed to the Pakistani decision to keep the Taliban intact as

a strategic asset.

As explained in Chapter 3 of this study, the perception of the Indian threat runs deep

through the veins of Pakistani decision makers. The shared history of violence and

antagonism keeps feeding Pakistani geostrategic fears of a possible encirclement by a hostile

Afghanistan. Pakistan views a friendly perceived Afghan government as a “strategic depth”

against India. Yet, since Karzai’s government was engaged in close cooperation with New

Delhi, Pakistan’s paranoia of being encircled by India was only further increased. After 9/11

the Indian government supported Afghanistan by providing millions of dollars of financial

assistance; political advice was given to Afghan presidential candidates during the 2004

elections; and the construction of a road in Afghanistan was executed by the Indian state-

owned Border Roads Organisation. Especially the Indian road construction was feeding

Pakistan’s threat perceptions because its publicly acknowledged mission is to “support the

[Indian] armed forces [and] meet their strategic needs by committed, dedicated and cost-

effective development and substance of the infrastructure.”174

Furthermore, the establishment

of Indian consulates in Herat, Jalalabad, and Kandahar did not raise enthusiasm inside

174

Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game”, Survival, March 2007, vol. 49, no. 1, p. 17.

63

Pakistan as the Pakistani government accused India of using those consulates for terrorist

activities directed at fomenting separatist movements in Balochistan.175

In 2003, president

Musharraf reiterated the fear for India’s intentions: “India’s motivation in Afghanistan is very

clear, nothing further than upsetting Pakistan. Why should they have consulates in Jalalabad

and Kandahar, what is their interest? There is no interest other than disturbing Pakistan, doing

something against Pakistan.”176

An anonymous Pakistani official even claimed that Pakistan

had collected “all required information about the involvement of India in fomenting unrest in

North and South Waziristan [suggesting that] the Indian consulates in Southern Afghanistan

have been supplying money as well as arms and ammunition to the militants that has added to

the trouble and violence in the tribal belt.”177

The Karzai government in Afghanistan has been perceived as threatening to Pakistani

interests not only because of its close relationship with India. But both states have accused

each other of intermingling in their own domestic affairs. Afghanistan had repeatedly blamed

Pakistan for fueling the Afghan insurgency thereby destabilizing the Afghan government as

president Karzai claimed that Pakistan was training militants and sending them over the

border into Afghan territory.178

On the other hand, the government in Islamabad has alleged

Kabul for supporting the separatist groups based in Balochistan and Waziristan.179

The border disagreement of the Durand Line180

also remains an issue of contention up

until today. Kabul does not accept the existing border as legitimate because it wants the

Pashtun tribes on the Pakistani side of the border to be incorporated into Afghanistan. Starting

in the 1950s, the idea of an independent Pashtun state had been used as an instrument against

Pakistani influence inside Afghanistan.181

This Afghan strategy of promoting an independent

Pashtunistan threatened the Pakistani territorial integrity because half of the Pashtun

population lives inside Pakistan. Reminiscent of the secession Bangladesh in 1971, this threat

is still taken very seriously. Karzai has kept the Pakistani fears intact by stating that he does

not accept the Durand Line as border demarcation, because “it had raised a wall between the

175

Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game”, Survival, March 2007, vol. 49, no. 1., p. 17. 176

Ahmed Rashed, Descent into Chaos: Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Threat to Global Security, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 220. 177

Frédéric Grare, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era”, Carnegie Papers, No. 82, October 2006, can be accessed through: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp72_grare_final.pdf, p. 12. 178

Ibid., p. 2. 179

Ibid., p. 3. 180

The Durand Line is the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan that was established after the 1893 Durand Line Agreement between the colonial British India and the former Afghan Amir to demarcate the spheres of influence. 181

Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4, Spring 2008, p. 68.

64

two [Pashtun] brothers.”182

Afghanistan thus wishes to incorporate Pashtun areas on the

Pakistani side of the Durand Line into its own territory. Yet, the Afghan claim on part of

Pashtun territories of the NWFP has of course been unacceptable for Pakistan, because it

would jeopardize the very existence of the Pakistani state. As a way to exert pressure on the

Afghan government to force it to sign an agreement of respecting the Durand Line as

international border, Pakistan lets its influence be felt by interfering in the Afghan domestic

situation through the use of Talibani militants. Pakistan wants to leave the message to the

international community that no settlement of the Afghan government can be reached without

taking Islamabad’s interests into consideration.183

Put differently, Pakistan does not wish to be

marginalized as a power in the region.

Whereas the long term Pakistani interests are aimed at maintaining influence regarding

Afghanistan and preventing India from strategically surrounding Pakistan, Islamabad also had

a strong interest in appeasing the US and keeping the American material assistance flowing.

Therefore, to preserve and reassert its strategic value to the United States it was vital to

engage in the counterterrorism operations in the western provinces in order to keep up the

appearances that Pakistan was doing its part of the deal. Moreover, a strategic in the alliance

with the United States was considered to be more in the interest of Islamabad rather than

engaging a hostile Washington cancelling the assistance. Islamabad had devised a two-sided

counterterrorism strategy of selectively engaging terrorist groups. The Pakistani military

systematically went after foreign terrorist elements such as Al Qaeda and certain domestic

terrorist groups such as the Sunni Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Shia Tehrik-e-Jafria—groups

that were responsible for internal sectarian violence. On the other hand however, the military

largely disregarded the Taliban leadership and the terrorist affiliations operating against India

in Kashmir. In the weeks following 9/11, the Pakistani military had deliberately kept the

Miran Shah and Mirali routes in Waziristan open for terrorists seeking refuge on Pakistani

territory. Only a few Al Qaeda forces were captured and delivered to the US.184

One Pakistan

journalist aptly worded this strategy saying that the Pakistani government “plunges into action

when they know they can lay their hands on a foreign militant but they are still reluctant to

proceed against the Taliban.”185

182

Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4, Spring 2008, p. 74 183


Ibid., p. 6. 185

Intikhab Amir, “Waziristan: No Man’s Land”, The Herald (Pakistan), April 2006, p. 78.

65

As the United States increasingly grew aware of the spoiling Pakistani activities,

Washington put more pressure on the Pakistanis to meet their antiterrorism promises.

Reluctantly the Pakistani government sent regular army troops into South Waziristan to hold

back Taliban and Al Qaeda elements fleeing from the US-led operation Anaconda in

southeastern Afghanistan.186

Pakistan claimed it was doing everything possible to eliminate

the cross border Islamist terrorism located in the tribal areas. To convince the international

community of Pakistan’s efforts in fighting religious extremism, Musharraf took symbolical

measures against Al Qaeda and some other militant groups. For instance, under the 1997

Anti-Terrorism Act, the government banned groups such as the Islami-Tehreek-e-Pakistan,

Millat-Islamia, and Khuddam-ul-Islam, however their leaders were never prosecuted and

these terrorist organizations were allowed to continue operating under new names with the

same leadership. To appease the United States, Pakistan also handed over some 500 foreign

terrorists affiliated to Al Qaeda – including the notorious leader Khalid Sheikh Mohammed –

in the period 2002-2003 after major formations from the Army XI Corps and the Special

Services Groups were sent into FATA.187

The army also was eager to exaggerate the body

counts and the arrested foreign terrorists as to fool the Americans.188

Still reality showed that

the military operations had failed to put a halt to foreign militants as explained by retired Lt.

General Asad Durrani in 2006: “The situation is much worse than it was when the military

entered the tribal areas … [and] … part of the Pakistani authorities [fail] to even recognize

failure.”189

For instance, according to the Pakistani government the peace deal in North and

South Waziristan that the Pakistani government struck with the Islamist militants in 2006 led

to the retreat of the Pakistani military forces in return for pledges of the tribal leaders to stop

giving refuge to the Taliban. However, the Taliban actually strengthened its control over

Waziristan due to the army retreat.190

To keep American assistance flowing, Musharraf also claimed he was the only

“indispensable man” that would fight against religious extremism and the only person that

186


International Crisis Group, “Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan’s Failure to Tackle Extremism”, ICG Asia Report, no. 73, 16 January 2004, can be accessed through: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/073%20Unfulfilled%20Promises%20Pakistans%20Failure%20to%20Tackle%20Extremism.pdf, p. 3 188

International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants”, Asia Report no. 125, 11 December 2006, can be accessed through: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/125_pakistans_tribal_areas___appeasing_the_militants.ashx , p. 16. 189

Ibid., p. 17. 190

190

Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4, Spring 2008, p. 56.

66

would be able to curb Islamist terrorist activities.191

Musharraf’s international standing and

material power was efficaciously strengthened through this U-turn in its foreign policy. He

portrayed himself as a secular president stimulating moderate Islam in order to legitimize his

presidency on the international level. Musharraf argued that the alternative to military power

– a civilian presidency – would surely lead Pakistan to abandon counterterrorism operations

and radical Islamists would then gain more political influence endangering Western interests.

By hinting that the Pakistani government could decide to unleash the Islamist forces against

the NATO coalition forces if international pressures on Pakistan went too far, the Musharraf

regime was to a large extent successful in securing American support. When during the 2002

national elections the Islamist parties won a large part of the votes partly in the NWFP and

Balochistan, the military exploited the fear of Islamism by convincing the US that the military

was the only institution that could prevent the country from slipping away into a Taliban-style

society.192

As explained by Afrasiyab Khatak, a former chairman of the Human Rights

Commission in Pakistan, the “phenomenal rise of [religious parties] in the October 2002

elections [were] a part of political plans of the military; without the threat of religious

extremism, the military would have lost its utility for Western powers.”193

When in 2003 the

military and the MMA formed an alliance, Musharraf justified its domestic alliance with the

MMA as a method to moderate the behavior of the Islamist mullahs through democratic

channels. Arguing that the army alone was capable of containing the Islamist threat,

Musharraf hoped to draw support of the international society for his style of limited

democracy was in the interest of the West. Thus, the electoral gains of the radical Islamist

MMA and the prospect of an unstable right wing Islamist civilian government were effectivelt

used by the military government as a means for leverage.

5.2. Domestic threats: Separatism and the secular PPP and PML-N

On the domestic level, Musharraf identified three groups of existential threats to the state and

his regime. First of all, the separatist movements in Balochistan and the Pashtun areas formed

191

Corey Flintoff and Scott Neuman, “Musharraf Resignation Ends Nine-Year Reign”, National Public Radio, August 18, 2008, can be accessed through http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14052677. 192

Frédéric Grare, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era”, Carnegie Papers, No. 82, October 2006, can be accessed through: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp72_grare_final.pdf, p. 6 193

International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants”, Asia Report no. 125, 11 December 2006, can be accessed through: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/125_pakistans_tribal_areas___appeasing_the_militants.ashx , p. 17.

67

a threat. Secondly, the mainstream secular political parties – the Pakistani People’s Party

(PPP) and the Pakistani Muslim League-Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) – were perceived as

threatening to the regime. And thirdly, the Islamists political movements, most notably the

MMA (Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal), constituted a potential threat, yet Musharraf used the

MMA to form a coalition of convenience against to balance against the threats of the

separatist groups and secular parties. Through the MMA-military alliance and using ordnance

provided by Washington Musharraf intended to neutralize the combination of threats posed by

separatist movements, the opposition parties in the parliament, and the Islamists factions

around the country. The military regime applied Islam as a counterweight to the demands of

the secular mainstream parties and separatist factions which were striving for opening up the

state system to a wider section of society. The emphasis on Islam as national religion

functioned to cut the secular parties out of power. The rigged electoral gains of the MMA and

PML-Q provided enough backing for the military regime to stay in power and leaving the

separatist and secular parties are helpless bystanders. An important policy effect was that the

military made concessions to the MMA that gave the Islamists more space to pursue religious

extremist policies in the NWFP and Balochistan, while in return the MMA provided support

in the parliament to the 17th

amendment of the Constitution designed to enhance the military’s

grip on power. Besides that alliance, the military also concluded peace deals with militant

groups in the NWFP in order to appease the Islamists.

In Balochistan, ethnic separatist movements have since 1973 been fighting for

autonomy, self-determination and resource allocation. Shortly before the Balochi insurgency

started, major natural gas and mineral reserves were discovered in Balochistan and Islamabad

decided to withdraw the authority of the sadars (local chiefs) to govern their own population

and the central government moved to take control over the Balochi territories.194

In the last

decade, the insurgency has erupted repeatedly with guerilla-style attacks on central

government targets. The Pakistani government responded by pursuing a course of massive

military suppression against the Balochi insurgency thereby making use of military equipment

supplied by the Americans.195

Besides the Balochi insurgency, the Pakistani military

government was also concerned with the Pashtun nationalists in the eastern border provinces.

The Pashtun separatists, represented by the Awami National Party (ANP), continue to agitate

194

Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4, Spring 2008, p. 49. 195

Magnus Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2007, p. 74.

68

for the creation a new Pashtun province to be called Pashtunkhwa196

that would incorporate

the NWFP, the FATA, Punjab’s Attock and Mianwali Districts, and northeastern

Balochistan.197

However, these ambitions were thwarted through the huge electoral win of the

MMA in 2002 leading to a MMA government in the NWFP and a government shared by the

PML-Q and the MMA in Balochistan. The success of the religious right effectively ended

separatist threats to split up Pakistan.

The PPP and the PML-N are also perceived as grave threats to the survival of

Musharraf’s power seat. The military and the PML-N share a history of tension. PML-N

leader Nawaz Sharif was president until the military coup in 1999. Leading up to the military

coup, Nawaz Sharif had dismissed Musharraf as army chief while he was out of the country.

And when Musharraf was returning to Pakistan by plane, Nawaz Sharif denied the plane

permission to land as he already feared a coup. Yet, generals loyal to Musharraf toppled

Nawaz Sharif’s government and allowed Musharraf to land and take over the presidency.198

Expressing their rivalry and profound disagreements over how to govern Pakistan, Musharraf

had accused the Sharif government of “creating dissention in the ranks of the armed forces of

Pakistan” during an address to the nation on October 17, 1999 a few days after the coup.199

Furthermore illustrating the rivalry between the PPP and the Musharraf’s regime was the fact

that Benazir Bhutto faced charges of corruption and been placed under house arrest in 2007.

Quite paradoxically, is however, that although Musharraf, Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif all

shared views of moderation and taking actions against religious extremism, the military

regime still did not wish to cooperate with the PPP and PML-N which shared those moderate

views, but Musharraf forged a coalition with the fundamentalist MMA alliance.

The fundamentalist MMA parties were heavily opposed to Musharraf’s pro-American

policies for religious motivations. The religious right had been accusing the Pakistani

government of being too submissive to the US and they considered fighting a war against

Islamic militants as a betrayal. However, Musharraf decided to follow the tradition of former

president Zia-ul-Haq by using the Islamist parties as coalition partners in order to legitimize

and reinforce the regime’s power position. The democratic elections of 2002 and the creation

of the PML-Q by Musharraf before those elections were meant to render his regime an extra

196

Pashtunkhwa means “Land of the Pashtuns” 197

Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4, Spring 2008, p. 69. 198

Corey Flintoff and Scott Neuman, “Musharraf Resignation Ends Nine-Year Reign”, National Public Radio, August 18, 2008, can be accessed through http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14052677. 199

Claude Rakisits, “Pakistan’s Musharraf: Playing a balancing act”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, can be accessed through: http://www.geopoliticalassessments.com/ASPI_Paper_on_Musharraf.pdf, p. 2.

69

veneer of legitimacy. The MMA was an Islamic coalition that was formed in January 2002 by

six Islamist and primarily Pashtun political parties in the NWFP and Balochistan. This

coalition vowed to Islamize state and society through Taliban-style policies. It consisted of

five Sunni organizations—the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Maulana Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F),

the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Sami ul-Haq faction, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, the Jamiat-i-

Islami, and the Jamiat-al-Hadith—along with one Shia group, Tehrik-i-Islami.200

By forging

an alliance between the PML-Q and the MMA, the military hoped to channel popular

resentment against the counterterrorism operations. The MMA was so to say “the pressure

valve through which public frustration over contradictions in army policies could be released

without risking true unrest because the MMA ultimately wanted to maintain the benefits of

working with the government.”201

The military-MMA alliance served as a way to preserve Musharraf’s hold on power by

rendering legal backing to his presidency. Through the support of the MMA in December

2003, Musharraf was able to get a two-third majority to push the 17th

amendment of the

Constitution through parliament thereby effectively sidelining the PPP and PML-N. The

agreement between governmental alliance explicitly stated: “The MMA will support the

amendment to legalize the ongoing term of the president.”202

The amendment incorporated the

Legal Framework Order (LFO) into the Constitution. The LFO as a package of constitutional

amendments aimed at institutionalizing the military’s political dominance and control.

Musharraf had made the deal to simultaneously hold on the position of army chief and

president of Pakistan until January 2005 after which he would cede his position as Chief of

Army Staff, and stay in power as president until 2007. It gave Musharraf the power to dismiss

elected prime ministers, the National Assembly, and provincial governments, and it validated

all unconstitutional steps taken by Musharraf since 12 October 1999.203

Musharraf further

legitimized his power position by holding a Presidential Referendum in April 2002 that

elected him as President of Pakistan.204

However, in September 2004 he proclaimed that for

200

Frédéric Grare, “Islam, Militarism, and the 2007-2008 Elections in Paksitan”, Carnegie Papers, South Asia Project, No. 70, August 2006, can be accessed through: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_CP_70_fnl2.pdf, p. 3. 201

Ibid., p. 4. 202

Kamran Aziz Khan, “17th Constitutional Amendment & Its Aftermath: The Role of Muttahidda Majlis-i-Amal (MMA)”, Pakistan Vision, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 108. 203

International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military”, ICG Asia Report, no. 49, 20 March 2003, can be accessed through: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/Pakistan%20The%20Mullahs%20and%20the%20Military, p. 2. 204

Kamran Aziz Khan, “17th Constitutional Amendment & Its Aftermath: The Role of Muttahidda Majlis-i-Amal (MMA)”, Pakistan Vision, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 108.

70

the reason of ‘state necessity’ he could not give up his double function and therefore retained

in power both as president and Chief of Army Staff after 2005.205

Musharraf had to make concessions to the MMA and the religious right mullahs that

had a serious effect on the counterterrorism policies. In return for the MMA’s support for the

LFO and Musharraf’s double function, the central government promised not to interfere with

matters related to madrassas206

in Balochistan and the NWFP. In June 2003, the pro-military

PML-Q leader Chaudry Shujaat Hussain even admitted that the government had accepted ten

MMA demands for Islamization in addition to pledges of the government to provide funding

for 8,000 madrassas.207

This had a serious negative effect on counterterrorist efforts, because

the MMA madrassas were responsible for the providing of Taliban manpower and other

Islamic terrorist groups. The military government had no intention to execute an intense

counterterrorism policy that would upset the coalition with the MMA. The MMA’s provincial

control led to a significant increase in the attacks on NATO coalition troops inside

Afghanistan conducted by militants from the Pakistani Pashtun areas, because the Talibani

insurgents were offered refuge in Pakistan without substantial repercussions from the

Pakistani government.208

Thus, the reluctance of the military to meddle in the mullah’s

traditional spheres of influence facilitated the rise of religious extremism in the eastern

provinces of Pakistan.

Widespread reports indicate that the secularist and separatist supporters were

systematically obstructed and intimidated by the military during the 2002 general elections.

The military regime had rigged the elections in the favor of the Islamist parties in order to

exaggerate the people’s support for religious extremism. For instance, the MMA was allowed

to organize political rallies, whereas the PML-N and the PPP were not given that

possibility.209

What is more, the military regime was involved in rigging the 2002 elections

thereby manipulating the elections results to the advantage of the MMA and PML-Q. As

shown in the table below, while the MMA received 11.1% and the PML-N 11.2% of the total

vote, in the National Assembly this was translated into 53 seats for the MMA and a mere 14

205

Claude Rakisits, “Pakistan’s Musharraf: Playing a balancing act”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, can be accessed through: http://www.geopoliticalassessments.com/ASPI_Paper_on_Musharraf.pdf, p. 2-3. 206

A madrassa is an Islamic religious school; in the NWFP the madrassas often teach radical Islam and many Islamic terrorists are recruited there. Interview with Vali Nasr, “Madrassas: Saudi Time Bomb?”, PBS Frontine , October 25, 2001, can be accessed through: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/analyses/madrassas.html. 207

International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military”, ICG Asia Report, no. 49, 20 March 2003, can be accessed through: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/Pakistan%20The%20Mullahs%20and%20the%20Military, p. 16 208

Ibid., p. 4. 209

Frédéric Grare, “Islam, Militarism, and the 2007-2008 Elections in Paksitan”, Carnegie Papers, South Asia Project, No. 70, August 2006, can be accessed through: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_CP_70_fnl2.pdf, p. 5.

71

seats for the PML-N. Similarly, the 25% of the total votes for the PPP were converted into 62

seats, while the 24.8% of the pro-military PML-Q gave it 77 seats in the National Assembly.

Table 2: Breakdown of voting and seats in the Pakistan General Election of 2002.

Adding to these electoral manipulations, a two-third majority for the 17th

amendment to the

constitution was achieved by the military regime because of defection by a few PPP members

of parliament. These PPP defectors were rewarded with ministerial portfolios in the

government.210

Thus, the rigging of the elections shows how the electoral gains of the MMA

and PML-Q were manipulated and facilitated the MMA government in the NWFP and the

shared MMA and PML-Q government in Balochistan.

The peace deals of 2004 in the tribal areas are a good example of the influence that

the MMA’s rule had in the NWFP on Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy. As the Pakistani

counterterrorism operations in 2002 failed to exterminate pro-Taliban tribes in South and

North Waziristan, the MMA party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, led by Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F),

mediated the Shakai peace agreement in 2004. This peace deal arranged that the tribes were to

prevent cross-border movements of terrorists into Afghanistan and cease attacks against the

Pakistani army in exchange for the military to retreat from the FATA. Yet, these peace deals

were doomed to fail because of the tribes’ determination to protect their Islamist cohorts

against the Pakistani government and the United States which were viewed as greater threats.

With the MMA as mediator of the peace deal it was widely believed that it “had encouraged a

deal where the Taliban and Al Qaeda members could move around freely in the region.”211

Moreover, as the militants were allowed to make triumphant speeches after the deals were

stricken, the deal was interpreted as a victory for the Islamist movements and a defeat for the

210

Frédéric Grare, “Islam, Militarism, and the 2007-2008 Elections in Paksitan”, Carnegie Papers, South Asia Project, No. 70, August 2006, can be accessed through: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_CP_70_fnl2.pdf, p. 9. 211

Magnus Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2007, p. 77.

72

Pakistani army. As a matter of fact, the peace deals provided the insurgency the space to

recruit, train, and rearm for an intensified campaign in Afghanistan.212

All things considered, the US-Pakistani alliance provided the military regime of

Musharraf the means to enhance national security interests against India and Afghanistan, as

well as engaging separatist movements in Balochistan and the NWFP. Secondly, the alliance

with the MMA gave Musharraf the possibility to use Islam as a tool to counteract separatism,

while on the international level the electoral rise of the MMA was used to legitimize the

military’s hold on power. The failure of the Pakistani government to act against the pro-

Taliban militants can thus for a significant part be explained by the fact that the Pakistan’

strategic objectives are radically different from the American ones. Whereas Pakistan

perceived India, the Karzai government, and separatist movements as existential threats, the

United States was concerned with curtailing Taliban insurgents and international religious

terrorism. However, it was eventually on the domestic level that Musharraf’s grip on power

slipped away because the MMA dropped support in 2005, the majority of the parliament and

the Supreme Court turned against the president and forced him to resign in 2008. Somewhat

paradoxically, in the last few years the proliferation of fundamentalist militants and

Talibanization of Pakistan – raised and nurtured by the military – has gotten out of control

thereby starting to form an increasing threat to the Pakistan government as the Pakistani

government loses more and more ground to the Islamists militants such as the Pakistani

Taliban.

212

Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan—Conflicted Ally in the War on Terror”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief 56, December 2007, can be accessed through: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb56_tellis_pakistan_final.pdf, p. 2

73

Chapter 6 – US-Pakistan negotiations

The finalizing chapter of this study deals with the negotiations between the United States and

Pakistan on the issue of Afghanistan and counterterrorism operations during the post 9/11

presidency of Pervez Musharraf. The negotiations played an accommodating role in creating

and maintaining Pakistan’s double agenda. Despite the divergent strategic objectives in the

region between the United States and Pakistan, the Pakistani negotiators managed to convince

the Americans to uphold the alliance and overcome their different strategic interests. The first

and most prominent negotiation tactic used by Pakistani officials was the weak and vulnerable

Pakistani state as bargaining chip in order to keep the perceived domestic win-set small. This

tactic consisted of exploiting the vulnerability of the central government in which the rise of

the religious right political parties was portrayed as bogey and anti-American public opinion

strengthened Pakistan’s negotiation position. By claiming that the fundamentalist Islamists

could potentially take over power in Pakistan if the military regime would collapse,

Musharraf presented the prospect of a no-agreement as so costly to American regional

interests that the United States backed off counterterrorism demands. Pakistani negotiators

also made a case in point about the perceived unreliability of the United States as an ally.

Moreover, American pressure on Pakistan to increase the Pakistani domestic win-set

backfired because the United States was viewed as adversary by a majority of the population.

The second characteristic asset of Pakistan’s negotiation toolkit is deception. Pakistani

negotiators have been inclined to tell their American interlocutors what they want to hear, yet

they know in advance that they cannot stick to the promises they made.

Pakistan’s approach to

negotiations

1. Weak state and cost of no-agreement as

bargaining assets to create the impression

of a small win-set

2. Deception for strategic purposes

74

6.1 State weakness and cost a no-agreement as bargaining chips

The weakness of the Pakistani state was used as a bargaining tool during negotiations.

Although it must be noted that the Pakistan’s army had a leading role in negotiations about

national security, Musharraf successfully used the fundamental Islamic political forces as

negotiation asset in the talks with the United States. He presented his government as not

having autonomy from domestic Islamist pressure in order to portray the domestic win-set as

small thereby giving Americans the impression that Pakistan was not able make large

concessions to US demands. Too much American pressure would push Pakistan over a cliff

into the hands of Islamists with devastating results for the United States.213

It was argued that

any American offer short of its Pakistan’s request would leave Islamabad unacceptably

vulnerable and force it to take unacceptable risks on behalf of the United States.214

Using this

argument, Pakistan successfully acquired a relatively large aid package while not totally

giving in to American demands regarding the counterterrorism efforts. Pakistani officials used

the argument that if they would fully engage in the counterterrorism operations the power

position of the central government would be further destabilized because the War on Terror

was seen as a fight against Muslims. They argued that killing members of the Afghan Taliban

would be like killing their own people, because the Taliban is primarily composed of Pashtuns

living in the Pakistani-Afghan border region. That would only strengthen popular support for

militants and weaken the state’s power.

Engaging in the War on Terror also meant that Musharraf had to take a U-turn in its

foreign policy through which Pakistan did the United States a favor and greatly endanger

itself by of the anti-American sentiments in the country. Therefore the military regime

expected to be rewarded for its policy change. The US embassy in Islamabad was aware of

Musharraf’s painful change towards Afghanistan and reported that he said that government of

Pakistan “was making substantial concessions in allowing use of its territory and that he

would pay a domestic price. His standing in Pakistan was certain to suffer. To counterbalance

that he needed to show that Pakistan was benefitting from his decisions.”215

Pakistan also

believed its stakes are higher for them than for the United States. Whereas India and

Afghanistan both pose existential threats to Pakistan, the Taliban is thought not be an

213

Howard B. Schaffer, and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011, p. 32. 214

Ibid., p. 67. 215

Thomas H. Kean, and Lee H. Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004, p. 331.

75

existential threat to the US. Pakistan argued that the perceived threat from India was still the

priority as they believed that India intended to encircle Pakistan through Afghanistan. Islamist

political opponents and opinion leaders stood ready to accuse the military government of

ceding to much political power to their archenemy India. This would only endanger the

central government’s power position. Musharraf managed to convince the US that it “owed

Pakistan for the risks it was taking—the guilt trip.”216

This resulted in generous aid and

concessions by the United States not to use Pakistan’s territory for stationing American

troops.

The cost of no-agreement was presented as a grave danger to the United States and

served a bargaining chip. The Pakistani government suggested that a reduction of the annual

aid package could damage its fragile economy thereby opening the way for further emergence

of Islamist forces potentially endangering American interests in the region.217

The rise of the

fundamentalist Islamic coalition known as the MMA in the 2002 elections served as a

bargaining asset for the Pakistani regime as it represented Pakistan’s domestic win-set as

smaller. Not only served the MMA as way to balance against the opposition parties of the PPP

and the PML-N, the Musharraf regime also formed a political cooperative relationship with

the MMA as an instrument to refrain from engaging in anti-Taliban military operations.

Pakistani negotiators would tell American counterparts that the domestic pressure of the

Islamic MMA had to be pleased in order for the regime to survive. As explained in the

previous chapter, the 2002 elections were rigged in order to exaggerate the popular support

for the MMA parties and the military regime presented itself as the one and only government

capable to channel the Islamic danger. The MMA worked as bogey representing a threat to

American regional interests leading the United States to back off demands that were not in

Pakistan’s interests. It helped Musharraf to refrain from engaging against Islamic terrorism

because the government argued that it could not follow through with the counterterrorist

operations because that only would give the fundamentalist parties more leverage. In this

light, Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capability was also used as a bargaining asset. The Pakistanis

hinted that a collapse of their government could potentially lead to nuclear weapons falling

under control of Islamist forces.

216


Ibid., p. 164.

76

Furthermore, using the lack of knowledge by American interlocutors about Pakistan’s

local press, the Pakistanis deliberately beefed up anti-American public sentiment as a means

to pressure the United States. The local press in Urdu language showed persistent conspiracy

stories that the United States was fighting a war against the Islam.218

Efforts by the United States to put pressure on the Pakistani government to do more in

the counterterrorism operations did not have the desired effect because of the anti-

Americanism within the population. A clear example of how American pressure backfired

was the Kerry-Lugar bill that was issued in October 2009. The bill was designed to triple US

economic assistance over a period of five years. Yet members of Congress added reports of

critical assessments about Pakistan’s counterterrorism performance and list of conditions for

which the United States had to certify Pakistan’s performance. This sparked an unexpected

anti-American reaction in Pakistan as the Pakistani political world and media were enraged

because they saw it as unacceptable and insulting.219

The Musharraf regime also exploited the prospect of a no-agreement by using its

geostrategic location as indispensable for the ISAF and NATO operations in Afghanistan.

Pakistan was aware of the fact that alternatives to NATO supply lines through the northern

supply route of Kazakhstan and Russia were many times more expensive than the routes that

ran through Pakistan. During the Musharraf regime, the Americans had not been looking into

the possibilities to diversify the supply lines through other countries than Pakistan.

6.2 Deception as technique for strategic purposes

There are also cultural differences between negotiation techniques of Pakistanis and

Americans. Pakistanis regard delicacy and strategic deception as necessary to protect national

security issues, whereas honesty and candor are highly valued by most Americans.220

This

expresses itself in strategic deception as part of Pakistan’s statecraft during negotiations with

the United States. American officials have noted that there is a strong tendency to tell an

interlocutor what he or she wants to hear. This is then seen as a sign of politeness instead of

218


Ibid., p. 174. 220

Ibid., p. 35.

77

politeness rather than lying.221

Moreover, Pakistani negotiators can hide behind the argument

that for Islam the use of lying and deception is permissible “when these are essential for the

defense of Muslim people.”222

For example, on one occasion Musharraf issued a statement

following a meeting with US ambassador Chamberlin that “Pakistan had been extending

cooperation to international efforts to combat terrorism in the past and will continue to do so.

I wish to assure President Bush and the US government our unstinted cooperation in the fight

against terrorism.”223

To reaffirm those words the regime arrested massive numbers of high-

visibility militants just before American leaders were visiting Pakistan in order to mitigate

American accusations of inadequate Pakistani efforts against the Taliban. However those

arrested militants were tacitly released later.224

Contributing to Pakistan’s tendency to deceive the Americans is the belief that the

United States sooner or later will break up the alliance as they had done before—the first time

was after the 1971 Civil War and the second time in 1990 as a result of applying the Pressler

Amendment. Adding to the perception of the United States as unreliable ally was the

American rapprochement to India in the 1990s. Pakistani negotiations have argued that the

United States falls short as an ally because of their shared history and the American ties with

India are seen as betrayal. Therefore the Pakistanis try to gain as much aid as possible out of

alliance as long as the Americans are not breaking it apart.

All in all, Musharraf was quite successful in maintaining the US-Pakistani alliance

with American assistance as a way to balance against the Indian threat while retaining mild

American demands regarding Pakistan’s weak counterterrorism performance. By emphasizing

that the highly unpopular War on Terror was America’s war rather than Pakistan’s war and

presenting the Islamic MMA as potential alternative to its regime, Musharraf managed to gain

good deals in the form of military and economic aid from the United States while easing

American pressure on Pakistan’s failing counterterrorism operations.

221

Howard B. Schaffer, and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011, Ibid., p. 39. 222

Ibid., p. 39. 223

Ibid., p.137. 224

Ibid., p. 141.

78

Chapter 7 – Conclusion

The methodology set out in this study has been an adequate instrument explaining the

complex road leading to Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghanistan policy. First of all, by recognizing

that the international system in South Asia was predominantly perceived in realist terms by

Pakistani decision makers the methodology could account for emphasis on material power

and distrust of neighboring countries. The Hobbesian bilateral structures between Pakistan

and India nurtured a Hobbesian perception of anarchy. More specifically, the social

construction of long-standing Pakistani-Indian enemy role identities were facilitated by the

violent partition after independence in 1947, the religious split between Muslims and Hindus,

and the subsequent wars over Kashmir and Bengal Pakistan. The realist perception of anarchy

paved the way for the foreign policy behavior in which regional distributions of power

mattered and a distrust of Indian and Afghan intentions prevailed. In effect, the political

leadership of Pakistan followed a policy of forming alliances with the United States and

China to balance against the threat posed by India. But Pakistan also resorted to self-help

practices like building up defensive military power and it slowly developed an interest in the

use of proxy militant groups to obtain national security objectives. Seeing the South Asian

region in realist terms also meant that international security regimes such as the Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were effectively

ignored because giving up military capabilities was not believed to enhance national security

vis-à-vis India.

Regarding the regional security complex, the Indian-Pakistani rivalry has been the

leading factor influencing Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. The Indian-Pakistani patterns of

enmity account for the apprehension of Indian military power as threatening to Pakistan. The

Afghan-Pakistani relationship was marked by a Hobbesian structure as well, because

Afghanistan refused to acknowledge the Durand Line as legitimate border, it made claims on

Pakistani areas populated by Pashtuns, and president Karzai was involved in close ties with

India. The US-Pakistani relationship, however, proved to be more complicated. The United

States – the only superpower capable to exercise its power all over the world – rushed into a

strategic alliance with Pakistan despite their strategic opposing interests. For Musharraf’s

military regime, the military and economic aid was very welcome to balance against India

thereby preventing to be overrun. The United States, on the other hand, relied on Pakistan’s

geostrategic location in order to eliminate the threat of Al Qaeda and the Taliban based in

Afghanistan. Yet the divergent strategic interests and the distrust that originated from

79

Islamabad’s covert nuclear weapon program and Washington’s past decisions to disrupt their

assistance had led the two allies to watch each other as potentially treacherous. The perception

of the United States as unreliable ally certainly added to Pakistan’s decision to double-play

the Americans as the Pakistani establishment thought it could not totally depend on the United

States for defense against India. Besides the interstate relations, it is necessary to bear in mind

that, through the ISI, Pakistan had built up covert relations of amity with the Afghan Taliban

which had been used as a foreign policy instrument against Indian influence in Afghanistan.

All things considered, totally in line with the argument set out by RSCT, the conclusion can

be drawn that regional security dynamics prevailed over global level concerns.

Pakistan’s state structure accounts for a large deal of the failing efforts of the Pakistani

central government to take action against Islamic militants. The army and its intelligence

agency – the ISI – are the political institutions determining decisions on issues concerning

national security such as the counterterrorism operations. Even during the presidency of Ali

Asif Zardari’s civilian government the army stayed in control of national security issues,

practically side-lining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The strategic thinking in the army is

very much dominated by the institutionalized obsession with India and it reflects a strong

interest in irregular low-intensity warfare to achieve strategic goals. Since the 1980s Islamist

groups have functioned as strategic instruments for asymmetrical warfare against threats

posed by India. Therefore the army has been quite reserved in trying to eradicate the Afghan

Taliban. In particular officials within ISI, which had developed close ties with Talibani

militants, were hesitant to treat their former strategic Islamic allies as enemies. Moreover, as

United States was believed to be unreliable, many army officials anticipated that the US-

Pakistani alliance would be broken up sooner or later leaving a hostile Afghan government

behind. For that future scenario it was necessary to keep the Taliban employable as strategic

partner. The national ideology of Islam had been used by Pakistan to create unity and recruit

Islamic militant groups for covert operations against India. Adding to the failure of the

Pakistani army to engage Islamic militants in the eastern provinces was the fact that the War

on Terror had been perceived as an American and anti-Islamic undertaking without popular

support. Moreover, historically the tribal regions are heavily opposed influence of the central

government because it is dominated by the Punjabi elite and the mountainous areas make it

hard to hunt down militants by a military trained for conventional warfare. The Pakistani

government was not able to use Islam as way to mobilize support for counterterrorism

80

operations. Thus, the Pakistani state saw itself confronted power with limits of its central

power in the tribal areas.

The way that the Musharraf regime assessed the international and domestic threats

sheds a light on how the double agenda for the post 9/11 Afghanistan policy was formed.

Musharraf was tasked with balancing threat perceptions coming from international and

domestic politics. Musharraf successfully portrayed the fundamentalist MMA coalition as

threatening American interests in the region. Since Islamabad feared to be strategically

encircled through Afghanistan falling under the Indian influence, it was deemed essential for

Pakistan to receive American military assistance. The decision to form a political cooperative

relationship with the MMA persuaded the Americans that Musharraf was the person most

suitable to channel Islamic threat thereby neutralizing American pressure urging Pakistan to

do more against Islamic terrorism. On the domestic level after the 2002 elections, the

Musharraf regime entered into an domestic alliance with the MMA to balance against the

secular opposition parties—the PPP of Benazir Bhutto and the PML led by Nawaz Sharif. The

PPP and PML-N had accused Musharraf of having ascended to power unconstitutionally in

1999 and violating earlier promises to step down from office. The Musharraf regime also

identified separatist movements in Balochistan and NWFP such as the Awami National Party

as existential threats. The military assistance provided by the United States was deliberately

used to fight against the separatist groups thus preventing the collapse of the Pakistani

government.

During the negotiations with the Americans, the Pakistanis have been able to skillfully

use bargaining tactics to keep the American aid flowing while persuading the Americans to

back off troublesome demands to its enhance counterterrorism performance. The Musharraf

regime exploited the weak Pakistani state as bargaining chip by claiming that too much

American pressure would result in a collapse of the government leaving Pakistan vulnerable

to a fundamentalist Islamic take-over. President Musharraf “insisted that only the army could

control the fundamentalists.”225

The prospect of a no-agreement was expected to be

devastating to American interests—not least because of the American fear of nuclear weapons

falling into the hands of Islamic radicals. Considering the fragile future of Afghanistan and

the continuing threat of Islamic terrorism, Pakistan’s role in the region certainly may under no

circumstances be trivialized.

225

Ahmed Rashed, Descent into Chaos: Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Threat to Global Security, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 220.

81

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Pakistan's Double Agenda: A Study of Islamabad's Post 9/11 Afghanistan Policy

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