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The Ulama in Pakistani PoliticsMohamed Nawab bin Mohamed Osmanaa S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore

To cite this Article bin Mohamed Osman, Mohamed Nawab(2009) 'The Ulamain Pakistani Politics', South Asia: Journal ofSouth Asian Studies, 32: 2, 230 247

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and jurisprudence.3 Moreover the ulama are not thought to represent God; nor

are they treated as in any way divine. The authority that a particular scholar

may enjoy is a function of his formal and informal education and his social andscholastic networking and influence. In Islamic lands, the authority of the

ulama was recognised by the state (whether the caliph, sultan or amir) in return

for the scholars granting legitimisation for the ruler. The trade-off was that the

state employed the scholars in the legal courts and educational institutions, and

ceded to them control and regulation of sharia lawas well as the authority to

define what was orthodox and heretical. In return, the scholars generally

tolerated the often irreligious and lax conduct of the ruling class. This was the

pattern set under the Umayyads and consolidated by the Abbasids.4 However,

the potential for the ulama to withdraw their support or legitimisation has

always existed,5

even though it has rarely occurred.

A Brief History of the Ulama in the Indian Sub-Continent(later Pakistan)Kalim Bahadur noted that the ulama in the Indian sub-continent have usually

been content with an exalted position in the power structure as consultants on

religious matters.6 A quick study of the history of Islam in the sub-continent

will give credence to this argument. The ulama in India were often subservient

to Muslim rulers but remained influential on issues related to sharia, a crucial

part of the legal system for most of the Mughal period.7 Ira Lapidus observes

that the role of the Muslim ruler in India is always seen in accordance with how

he implements sharia.8 As such, Mughal emperors, with the exception of

Akbar, were sensitive to the ulama and often allowed them to control matters of

religion. The ulama consequently exercised considerable influence over the

running of religious affairs, and on Mughal policies. For example Alim Shaykh

Abdul Haqq (15711642) was influential at the court of Emperor Jahangir

3

It should be noted that while a general term, ulama, is used to represent someone trained in the religioussciences, strictly speaking an alim is an expert in theology. A fuqaha is an expert in jurisprudence and a

falasifah is a philosopher.4 See G.E. Von Grunebaum, Classical Islam: A History, 600 A.D. to 1258 A.D (New Brunswick, NJ:

Transaction Publishers, 2005), pp.6499.5 Some of the ulama did withdraw their support for the caliphs and openly challenged the system. For

instance, Imam Abu Hanifa (699767 CE) criticised the Abbasid rulers for their brutal suppression of the

opponents of their rule.6 Kalim Bahadur, The Rise of the MMA in Pakistan, in Ajay Darshan Behera and Joseph C. Mathew (eds),

Pakistan in a Changing Strategic Context (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2004), p.193.7 Muzaffar Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and Punjab, 170748 (Delhi: Oxford

University Press, 1986), p.114.8 Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.442.

THE ULAMA IN PAKISTANI POLITICS 231


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(15691627), encouraging him to limit the rights of non-Muslims.9 Serving the

state structure meant that the ulama were able to maintain a certain degree of

power and status while at the same time promoting the ideals of Islam.

The Ulamaand the Pakistan MovementThe struggle for the independence of India proved to be a turning point for the

ulama in South Asia. In the early twentieth century, they began to assert their

independence and press for a leadership position instead of simply latching on

to a political authority. Part of the reason the ulama decided to play a more

active role in politics was due to the perceived secular nature of the Muslim

leadership in India. Muhammad Ali Jinnah (18761948), leader of the Indian

Muslim League, was the man who most clearly articulated the idea of an IndianMuslim identity andthough a late convertafter 1940 advanced the cause of

Pakistan with vigour. As he told the Lahore session of the All-India Muslim

League in March 1940: Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religions,

philosophies, social customs and literature.10 However although Islam was

used by some League leaders as a motivating force to rally Muslims to the cause

of Pakistan, the state the League was committed to create would be secular, not

theocratic. Jinnah and his closest lieutenants were determined to make Pakistan

a constitutional democracy. Perhaps they saw no contradiction between an

Islamic state and a polity governed according to modern democratic principles?

At any rate, Pakistans Muslim League founders sought to fit Islam into their

contemporary constitutional design. Yet, there remained a key contradiction in

all of this between Islam as a rallying cry, and the expectation created amongst

the supporters of the Pakistan Movement that this new state would be governed

in accordance with the sharia.

Many ulama were opposed to Jinnah and felt that he aimed to secularise the

Muslims of India. Most fervent among them were the ulama of the Jamiat-e-

Ulama-e-Hind (JUH). The JUHs ultimate objective was the formation of an

Islamic state modelled after the Mughal Empire. Led by Mawlana HusainAhmad Madani (18791957), the JUH opposed the two-nation theory.11

9 During Emperor Jahangirs reign, the Rajput nobility, who had been important during the reign of Akbar,

were slowly supplanted by the Persian nobility. See M.L. Roy Choudhury, The State and Religion in Mughal

India (Calcutta: Indian Publicity Society, 1951), pp.1089. For the life and works of Shaykh Abdul Haqq, see

Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, Hawat-I-Shaikh Abdul Haqq Muhaddith Dehlawi (Delhi: 1953).10 Sailesh Kumar Bandopadhaya, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan (New

Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1991), p.177.11 Mawlana Madani was one of the foremost scholars of India and a fervent supporter of Indian nationalism.

For more on his life, ideas and works, see Syed Mohammad Mian, The Prisoners of Malta (Delhi: Manak,

2005).

232 SOUTH ASIA


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Indeed Madani argued that faith was universal and could not be contained

within national boundaries. Yet somewhat inconsistently, he also contended

that Muslims should be loyal to the nation of their birthalong with their non-Muslim fellow citizens.12 To underline the point, he cited the example of the

Covenant of Medina, which he claimed was a charter for Muslims and non-

Muslims to co-exist in a peaceful manner. Thus Madani opposed the idea of a

separate state for Indias Muslims. A majority of JUH leaders and workers too

opposed the Leagues project and considered the demand for Pakistan a British

conspiracy to divide India.13

The position of the JUH ulama was hotly criticised, however, by other Muslim

intellectuals such as Muhammad Iqbal (18771938) and Mawlana Mawdudi

(19031979).14

The writings of Mawdudi refuted the idea of compositenationalism and promoted instead that of a separate and ideological Muslim

nationhood.15 Mawdudi believed that Madani had been carried away by his

hatred for the British and had twisted history and facts. He refuted Madanis

assertion that Muslims and Jews constituted a single nation under the

Covenant of Medina. Mawdudi expounded the view that the Covenant bought

an alliance between Jews and Muslims for a period of time, but that immunity

for the Jews and other non-Muslims was revoked upon the Prophets conquest

of Mecca.16 Mawdudi also felt that the life-tracks of the Hindu and Muslim

communities paralleled each other and therefore could never be merged.17

However, Mawdudi too was opposed to the leadership of the Pakistan

Movement. While he did not explicitly oppose the formation of a separate

nation for the Muslims in India or the Indian Muslim League, Mawdudi felt

that the heterogeneous nature of a League that included many Muslims who

12 Abdus Sattar Ghazali, Islamic Pakistan: Illusions and Reality (Islamabad: National Book Club, 1996). See

also the discussion on nationhood and qawmiyyat, equated by the ulama with the modern concept of the

territorial nation, in Hussein Ahmad Madani, Composite Nationalism and Islam (New Delhi: Manohar,

2005), pp.55100.13 Sayyid Pirzada, The Politics of the Jamiat-e-ulama-e-Islam (JUI) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),

p.4.14 Muhammad Iqbal is one of the most celebrated Muslim thinkers and was one of the first Muslim

politicians to call for the formation of a separate Muslim state in the Indian sub-continent. For his biography,

see Javed Iqbal, Zinda Rood (Lahore: Sang-E-Maal, 1992). Mawlana Mawdudi was one of the most

influential Muslim thinkers of India. He was the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami and became its first leader.

After the establishment of Pakistan, he demanded an Islamic state in Pakistan. Mawdudi authored a number

of works and journals. Among the most authoritative biographies of Mawdudi are Syed Asad Gilani,

Mawdudi: Thought and Movement (Lahore: Farooq Hassan Gilani, 1978); and Syed Reza Vali Nasr, Mawdudi

and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).15 Ghazali, Islamic Pakistan: Illusions and Reality.16 Abul Ala Mawdudi, Tahrik-i-Azadi-I-Hind awr Musalaman (Lahore: Islamic Publishers, 1964), pp.30425.17 Safia Amir, Muslim Nationhood in India: Perceptions of Seven Eminent Thinkers (New Delhi: Kanishka

Publishers, 2000), p.225.



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were secularists, communists and socialists would hinder efforts in forming a

true Islamic state.18

A small but significant number of Deobandi ulama though supported the

Muslim League scheme. Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanwi (18631943) of the JUH

was one. Disappointed with the attitude of the Madani-led faction, Thanwi

argued that supporting the League was the only lawful course for Muslims in

India.19 His intervention led to a four-day conference in Calcutta in August

1945 where the All-India Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (AIJUI, later the JUI) was

formed under the leadership of Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani

(18871949).20 The JUI favoured the establishment of a state approximating

that presided over by the four Righteously Guided Caliphs of the seventh

century. And the ulama of the Barelvi orientation also sent their support to thePakistan Movement,21 in 1945 forming the Jamhuriyah-i-Islamiyah to urge

Indian Muslims to get behind it.22 The ulamas politics during this period were

thus essentially defined by their position on Pakistan. Although attitudes were

mixed, enough ulama backed the Pakistan Movement to give it religious

legitimacy.23 Interestingly, both sides claimed the positions they took up were

intended to defend the health of Islam in the Indian sub-continent.

TheUlama

in Pakistani Politics after Independence, 194778Upon the inception of Pakistan in 1947, many North Indian ulama, such asMawdudi and Uthmani, joined the mass migration of Muslims to the new state.

Even some JUH leaders who were opposed to the idea of Pakistan moved there.

Once relocated, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (JUI),

and even some ulama who had become members of the League pushed for the

adoption of an Islamic constitution.24 The JUI also actively promoted the cause

18 Mawdudi, Tahrik-i-Azadi-I-Hind awr Musalaman, pp.223.19 Pirzada, The Politics of the Jamiat-e-ulama-e-Islam (JUI), p.5.20

Ibid., p.10.21 The Barelvi ulama believe in a Sufistic form of Islam. The name Barelvi originates from the groups place of

origin in Bareilly, Utter Pradesh, India. For more on the Barelvi ulamas views on the Pakistan Movement,

see Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement,

18701920 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.30228.22 Ishtiaq Hussein Quireshi, Ulama in Politics (Karachi: Maaref Limited, 1974), p.366.23 Ian Talbot notes that the support the ulama of the Barelvi school and the pirs (saints) gave to the Pakistan

Movement was instrumental in the formation of Pakistan. See Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan

Movement (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.968.24 The All-India Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (AIJUI) was renamed Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam after the formation

of Pakistan. The party split into three factions in the 1990s and was renamed again according to the names of

its three leaders. Mawlana Fazul Rehman led the JUI(F), Mawlana Sami-ul-Haq the JUI(S) and Mawlana

Ajmal Qadri the JUI(A).

234 SOUTH ASIA


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of Islamic education. Meanwhile a new Barelvi party, the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-

Pakistan (JUP), was formed to ensure that Muslims of that persuasion

were represented politically in the new state, although the JUP toofocused heavily on Islamic education.25 While these parties were initially

willing to work together towards their common goal of an Islamic constitution,

sectarian and political differences began to surface once the constitution had

been achieved.

Establishing an Islamic ConstitutionThe Jamaat-e-Islami ulama led the campaign for an Islamic constitution.26 The

JI believed that Pakistan had been designated as an Islamic state and should

therefore be governed by the rules of Islam, which meant both an Islamicconstitution and sharia.27 But the new Pakistan government was unsettled by

the agitation of the JI leaders, and clamped down on the organisation. JI

newspapers and journals such as Tarjumanul Quran and Tasnim were closed

and several leaders of the JI, including Mawdudi, were apprehended.28 In

response the ulama groups banded together to demand that Islam be accorded a

proper place in the polity. Even Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani lent his

support to the plan.

The Pakistan government was put in a fix: to object to the demand made by the

ulama might be seen as an objection to Islam itself. While it procrastinated, the

JI went from strength to strength in the forum of public opinion. Emboldened,

the JI joined with Mawlana Zafar Ahmad Thanwi, the eminent scholar Sayyid

Sulaiman Nadwi, members of the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam, and 31 other

prominent ulama to demand an Islamic state. Specifically, they furnished the

government with a list of 22 principles for the state to follow.29 This campaign

bore fruit when the final draft of the constitution, published in 1956, named the

state the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and declared that no law repugnant to

25 Similarly to the JUI, the JUP also split into five factions: the Sunni Tehreek; Dawat-e-Islami; Punjab Sunni

Tehreek; Jamaat-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat; and Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz-e-Namoos-e-Risalat. The main focus of discussion

for this section will be on the JI and the JUI(F), the two most important ulama groups in Pakistan.26 Jamaat-e-Islami is an Islamic party formed by Mawlana Mawdudi. It is currently a political party that aims

to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan. See Seyyed Reza Vali Nasr, The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution: The

Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), p.123.27 Interview with Syed Munawwar Hassan, Secretary-General of the Jamaat-e-Islami, interview by author,

tape recording, Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, Mansoorah, Multan Road, Lahore, 25 December 2004.28 Jamaat-e-Islami, Rudaad-I-Jamaat-e-Islami (Proceedings of the Jamaat-e-Islami), Vol.6 (Lahore: Jamaat-E-

Islami, 1992), pp.1334.29 Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961),

pp.2167.



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the teachings of the Quran and the Hadith could be passed.30 The ulamas

strategy of collaboration and dissent had prevented the government from

manipulating Islam for its own ends. Instead, it had allowed the ulama to setthe terms of the public debate and define the role of Islam within the new state.

Another aspect of the ulamas political position during this period was their

strong rejection of military rule and the promotion of democracy. While

Mawdudi and many ulama rejected democracy as a Western practice, they

believed that democracy allowed humans complete freedom to augment and

change laws even if those laws were based on shariawhich they saw as the law

of God.31 Moreover Mawdudi saw in democracy a convenient means to achieve

his Islamic state. In 1958 the Pakistani military under General Ayub Khan

staged a coup that overthrew the Pakistan Muslim League government. Toundermine the military, the JI joined the Combined Opposition Parties (COPs),

a political grouping that comprised various secular parties linked to Fatima

Jinnah, the sister of Mohamed Ali Jinnah. The COPs opposed Ayub Khan in

the 1963 presidential elections.32 Then in 1967 Mawdudi set up a further

alliance of opposition parties under the banner of the Democratic Action

Committee (DAC). At a series of mass meetings and gatherings culminating in

a roundtable conference convened in March 1969, the DAC called for Ayub

Khans resignation. Shortly after the end of the conference, Ayub Khan did

indeed resign, prompting the JI to claim the credit.

The JIs opposition to military rule and its call for a return to democracy

strongly improved its public standing. Even some Pakistanis of secular

disposition were willing to lend it a helping hand to get rid of the government.

At the same time the JI mollified its critics by soft-pedalling on potentially

divisive issues. After Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took power following the elections of

1970 and Pakistans civil war, JI ulama continued to oppose the government,

but during this period other ulama in the JUI were more vocal on the Islamic

front.

The 1970 election marked an important turning point for the ulama in the JUI,

who won seven seats in the provincial assembly of the North West Frontier

Province (NWFP) and went on to form a coalition government there in

partnership with the nationalist National Awami Party (NAP). JUI head Mufti

30 For more on the Islamic provisions in the Pakistani constitution, see G.W. Choudhary, Constitutional

Development in Pakistan (London: Longman Group, 1969), pp.1023.31 Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi, Islamic Law and Constitution (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960), p.260.32 Vali Nasr, The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution, p.155.

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Mahmud became the new chief minister of the province. Although brief,33 JUI

rule in the NWFP made plenty of waves. As soon as he became chief minister

Mahmud launched a programme of Islamisation, establishing a board ofulamato bring the laws into accordance with the Quran and Sunnah. As a result, a

number of new Islamic laws were enacted. Later, the ulama cooperated with the

military under the banner of the Pakistan National Alliance to overthrow the

hostile Bhutto government at the centre.34

The big breakthrough for the ulama however came when General Zia-ul-Haq

staged a successful coup against Bhutto in 1978. During Zias rule the JI built

up a harmonious working relationship with the military regime despite the

latters initial rhetoric of promoting democracy. The bases for that cooperation

were Zias support for Islamisation, and his Afghan policy. Yet the accession toinfluence cost the JI much of the support and legitimacy it had earlier gained

among the Pakistani populace.

The emergence of General Zia-ul-Haq posed a serious dilemma to the JI. The

general, a long-time supporter of the party, was a devout Muslim and had a

personal respect for Mawlana Mawdudi. Zia had even given copies of

Mawdudis Tafhimul Quran (Understanding the Quran) as prizes to soldiers

who had won a debate organised by the Army Education School.35 Zia had

intimated in fact that one of the key aims of his coup was to open the way

for an Islamisation drive. But his praetorian coup ran against the tenets of

an Islamic polity as well as those of the democratic political order that

Mawdudi had advocated in the past. Still the JI was prepared to work with Zia

to Islamise Pakistan. In line with that goal, four JI leaders accepted minister-

ships, and another a judge-ship of the federal sharia court, an appellate bench

with powers of judicial review.36 Additionally, two of its supporters were

appointed members of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), a constitutional

body that had the job of formulating recommendations leading to the

introduction of an Islamic penal code and the Islamisation of the economic

system.

33 The NWFP government was dismissed after a few weeks by the president acting on the advice of Prime

Minister Bhutto. See Pirzada, Jamiat-e-ulama-e-Islam , p.67. See also Pakistan: The Mullahs and the

Military, in International Crisis Group Asia Report, No.49 (20 March 2003), pp.615, for a comprehensive

overview of the ulamas politics in post-independence Pakistan.34 For more on the Pakistan National Alliance, see Anwar H. Syed, Pakistan in 1976. Business as Usual, in

Asian Survey, Vol.XVII, no.2 (Feb. 1977), pp.18190.35 Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993),

p.281.36 Vali Nasr, The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution, p.45.



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The relationship between the JI and Zia was sealed when the Soviet Union

invaded Afghanistan in 1979. The JI had been privy to Pakistans Afghan

policy following the communist coup there in 1977. Leading Afghan resistanceleaders such as Burhanuddin Rabbani approached Qazi Hussein Ahmad, then

the JI party chief in the NWFP, for assistance in fighting the communists. The

JI leaders met the Pakistani generals to formulate a policy.37 When the

Afghanistan War broke out, Zia took the JI into his confidence and used its

religious backing to legitimate the war as a jihad. The war thus opened the inner

sanctum of the government to the party. As well it gave the party access to

some of the funds and arms flowing to the mujahidin and provided JI members

and the members of its student wing, the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba, with military

training.38 The party also used its new governmental connections to secure

more support for its client groups in Kashmir such as the Harakat-ul-Mujahidin and the Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir.39

The Afghanistan War also provided an opportunity for Zia to work closely

with the other prominent ulama party, the JUI. For Zia, the JUI was useful as it

had strong support among the Pathans of the NWFP and Baluchistan. And its

chain ofmadrasahs in those regions provided a fertile recruiting ground for the

war in Afghanistan. With the exception of those in the JUP, all Pakistan ulama

publicly supported the Zia regime. However as his rule neared its end, some of

the ulama began to desert Zia in favour of the opposition.

The period between 1977 and 1985 can be seen one of mixed failure and success

for the ulama. At an ideological level, it saw many of their Islamic demands,

such as the promulgation of sharia law and greater state-initiated Islamisation,

implemented. The Afghanistan War also proved a boon because it exposed the

mujahidin to the ulamas religious and political influence, boosted the ulamas

image in Islamic revivalist circles, and gave them a greater pan-Islamic image.40

But perhaps the most important gain for the ulama during that period was the

close relationship they managed to build up with key elements in the Pakistani

army. On the debit side, their association with the ruling regime cost the ulamamuch public support. People gravitated to secular non-Islamist parties such as

the Pakistan Peoples Party, the PPP, the Pakistan Muslim League, the

37 Interview with Qazi Hussein Ahmad, Ameer Jamaat-e-Islami, interview by author, tape recording, House

130, St 14 Sector E 7 Islamabad, 31 December 2004.38 Vali Nasr, The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution, p.195.39 Interview with Mansoor Jaafar, Jamaat-e-Islami worker, interview by author, tape recording, Jamaat-e-

Islami Pakistan, Mansoorah, Multan Road, Lahore, 2 January 2005.40 Seyyed Reza Vali Nasr, Islamic Opposition to the Islamic State: The Jamaat-e-Islami, 197788, in

International Middle East Studies, Vol.XXV, no.2 (May 1993), p.269.

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PML(N) and the Mohajir Qaumi Movement. Over the next two decades, the

ulamas influence steadily declined as the PPP, led by Benazir Bhutto, and the

PML(N), led by Nawaz Sharif, dominated the political scene.

The Ulama in Decline, 198599In particular the ulamas involvement with Zia-ul-Haq had several important

consequences. As John Esposito has argued, the co-opting of Islamist groups

by governments has often handicapped such groups and led to them losing their

political clout with the masses.41 This certainly happened in Pakistan, as can be

seen from the 1985 legislative elections sanctioned by the military regime. The

JI managed to win only 10 out of the 68 seats that it contested in the National

Assembly.42

Significantly, many of the JI leaders closely associated with Ziasregime were defeated. The ulama in the JUI(F) boycotted the elections. Even

so, their political support fell.

With Zias death in 1988, the JI ulama tried to salvage something from the

wreckage, joining the Islami Jumhuri Ittihad (Islamic Democratic Alliance) or

IDA, led by Zias close aide, Nawaz Sharif.43 But in the event the IDA was

beaten by the PPP and the JI once again found itself in opposition. Moreover

having managed to win only eight seats its influence within the coalition

declined. And the JUI(F) too was reduced to eight seats in the new assembly.

Consequently when Nawaz Sharif regained office in 1990after Bhuttos

government was sackedthe JI remained on the periphery of power, and

Sharif ignored the partys demands to have its leader in parliament made

chairman of the Accounts Committee. In the 1993 elections things went from

bad to worse. The JI decided to contest on its own ticket but managed to secure

only three seats. Meanwhile the JUI(F) employed alliance politics in pursuit of

a larger political space for itself. Realising that it would not obtain any real

power on its own, the JUI(F) took advantage of the PPPs desperation for

coalition partners to secure several important parliamentary positions,

41 Esposito was writing in relation to the Muslim Youth Assembly of Malaysia (ABIM) and how it had

suffered after founding members such as Anwar Ibrahim and Siddiq Fadhil left the group to join the

Malaysian government. See John Esposito and John Voll, Islam and Democracy (London: Oxford University

Press, 1987), p.190.42 Report on the General Elections, 1985, Vol.3 (Islamabad: Election Commission of Pakistan, n.d.).43 Under the Zia regime, Nawaz Sharif was the chief minister of the state of Punjab from 1985. Following the

death of Zia, Sharifs party, the Pakistan Muslim League, won the largest number of seats in the state of

Punjab, allowing him to be appointed chief minister. He became prime minister in 1990 following the general

elections called after the sacking of Benazir Bhutto. His government was thrown out of office in 1993 where

he lost the prime ministership to Benazir once again. In 1997, following the elections, he became prime

minister. He was deposed from power in 1999 by the military coup led by General Musharraf.



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including that of chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee on

Foreign Affairs, handed to Mawlana Fazlur Rehman. However this tactic

proved only a short-term palliative. By 1997 the JUI(F) had broken with thePPP and was focusing on building up its support in the madrasahs.

The continuing exclusion of the ulama from political power led them to look for

other instruments of support. Both the JI and the JUI(F) put a lot of effort into

establishing new Islamic schools. Between 1988 and 2002, the number of

madrasahs linked to the JUI(F) and the JUI(S) increased from 1,840 to 7,000,

while madrasahs linked to the JI increased from 96 to 500.44 (Earlier, under Zia-

ul-Haq, the ulama had been given free rein to expand Islamic education in

Pakistan.45)

The focus on madrasahs had its roots in the desire of the ulama to support two

of their key projects, Afghanistan and Kashmir. As mentioned earlier, many

madrasahs were vital recruiting grounds for the Afghanistan War. However,

with the end of the war in 1988, the ulama began to focus their energy on

ensuring that the faction they supported in Afghanistan would end up in

control of Kabul. In 1992 the Afghanistan government of Dr. Najibullah finally

collapsed. The JI insisted that the new government in Afghanistan must include

leaders of the Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan and the Hizb-e-Islami, two of its

client groups.46 However the Nawaz Sharif government refused to accom-

modate this demand and instead chose to recognise the government headed by

Sibghatullah Mojaddedi of the Afghanistan National Liberation Front.47

Meanwhile the ulama from the JUI(F) increased their influence in Afghanistan

through the Taliban, many of whom had been educated in madrasahs run by

the party.48 Fortuitously the JUI(F) was, at this point, part of a coalition

government led by Benazir Bhutto. With the support of the Inter-Services

Intelligence agency (ISI), the JUI(F) convinced Bhutto to back a plan to aid the

Taliban insurgency on the understanding that a Taliban government in Kabul

would be amenable to the construction of a trans-Afghanistan pipeline to carry

oil from the Central Asian Muslim republics to Pakistan. Important to thisvision, too, was the fact that numbers of Central Asian students who had

44 Ali Riaz, Global Jihad, Sectarianisms and the Madrassahs in Pakistan, IDSS Working Paper No 85, p.18

[http://www.idss.edu.sg/publications/workingpapers.asp?selYear2005&selTheme7].45 For more on the expansion of Islamic education under Zia, see Pakistan: Madrasahs, Extremism and the

Military, International Crisis Group Asia Report, No.36 (29 July 2002), pp.1011.46 Khurram Murad, Defeat in the 1993 Elections: Reasons and Aspects, Jasarat (11 November 1993), p. 27.47 For more on Mojaddedi, see his official website at www.mojaddedi.org/index.html.48 In fact, the word Taliban is the plural of talib or student in Urdu.

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elections. The alliance was called the Muttahida Majlisi Amal (MMA). The

JIs involvement was instrumental, since it was open to all Muslims, which

meant that members of different sects such as Barelvis, Deobandis and Shia

54

were represented in it.55 This gave the religious factions a neutral ground on

which to discuss policy issues. Soon the JI offices became the unofficial

secretariat of the alliance, and subsequently its chief, Qazi Hussein Ahmad,

was appointed as MMA secretary-general. On election day the MMA walked

away with 46 national assembly seats and 80 in the provincial assemblies,

making it the third largest group in the parliament.56 The Pakistan Muslim

League (Q), a party cobbled together by Musharraf from the remnants of

Nawaz Sharifs PML(N), with 77 seats, was approached to form a

government but it was well short of an overall majority. It needed a coalition

partner. The MMA was the obvious choice. A deal was struck, giving theulama a key strategic position at the centre of Pakistani politics. In addition,

the MMA took power in its own right in the NWFP and became a key

member of the coalition government formed in Baluchistan. Yet another

important aspect of the MMAs victory was the influence it acquired in the

senate. All four provinces of Pakistan have equal representation in the upper

house at the national level. Due to its huge majority in the NWFP assembly,

the MMA picked up more than one-third of all senate seats, much more than

any other group. This gave the party veto over the law-making process of the

country.57 Flushed with its victory, the MMA immediately demanded that

Musharraf step down as Pakistani president.

The rise of the ulama in Pakistani politics a year after the terrorist attacks in the

United States on 11 September 2001 validates the perception that Islamism is

now a force to be reckoned with in Pakistan and that the military may be the

54 The different Islamic parties in Pakistan often reflected a particular sectarian tendency. The Deobandis

were represented by the JUI(F) and the JUI(S), the Barelvis by the JUP, the Wahhabis (or Ahle-Hadith, as

they are known in the sub-continent) by the Jamiat-e-Ahle-Hadith, and the Shia by the Tehreek-e-Jafari. TheAhle-Hadith movement, stressing pure Wahhabi Islam, found support among some of the ulama in Pakistan

in the 1970s who decided to form an Islamic party. The Shia in Pakistan belong mostly to the Ithna Asharite

(Twelver) branch of the sect. Although other Shia sects such as the Ismailis exist in the northern areas of

Pakistan, they are less organised than the Twelver Shia, who are more politically active and formed

organisations and parties to secure political influence. For more on the Shia, see Muhammad Qasim Zaman,

Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shii and Sunni Identities, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol.32,

no.3 (July 1988), pp.6949.55 Interview with Qazi Hussein Ahmed.56 District Reporter, Musharaf and the Religious Parties, Dawn (11 April 2002). The Pakistan Peoples Party

was second largest with 63 seats.57 Farooq Tanwir, Religious Parties and Politics in Pakistan, in International Journal for Comparative

Sociology, Vol.XXXXIII, no.3 (Dec. 2002), pp.2545.

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only institution able to prevent the country from going down the path of a

Taliban-style Islamic revolution.58 But the army has itself become close to the

religious parties. Some observers suggest that it was the military, acting behindthe scenes, which really cobbled together the religious alliance. One might add

that it was the MMAs votes in parliament in 2003 that gave General

Musharraf the two-thirds majority he needed to change the constitution,

thereby legitimising his coup and the scores of ordinances he had issued since

seizing power.59 However, cautious of the militarys proven tendency to hang

on to power, the JI ulama asked the army to progressively implement a

democratic constitution based on sharia.60

The Ulamas Ascent to PowerHolding an absolute majority, the MMA moved quickly to implement its

Islamic agenda in the NWFP province. As a first step, it got up an assembly

resolution calling on the provincial government to ban bank interest and

reinstate Friday as a weekly holiday. It then set up a stacked committee which

duly recommended the enforcement of Islamic hudud punishments, including

stoning and the amputation of limbs, and the introduction of the death penalty

for blasphemy and the consumption of liquor.61 The next step was a bill passed

on 2 June 2003, to implement sharia in the province. This was followed by

directives to bureaucrats to pray five times a day and follow sharia law, curbs

on the sale of music and videos, the destruction of posters featuring women and

advertising Western products, and the imposition of a complete ban on

alcohol.62 Meanwhile, the MMAs madrasah-educated cadres were encouraged

by the government to help police the new laws through vigilantism and

violence. Thus religious leaders in the Bajaur agency threatened to raise a

lashkar (soldier) to wipe out elements spreading obscenity and un-Islamic

culture.63 Finally the MMA government strengthened the clout of the sharia

court by appointing ulama aligned to the party to it.

58

Frederick Grare, Islam, Militarism and the 20072008 Elections in Pakistan, Carnegie Papers, South AsiaProject, No.70 (August 2006), p.3 [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?faview&

id18553&progzgp&projzsa].59 Musharraf needed to change the constitution so that he could simultaneously hold the position of army

chief and president of the country. The 1973 Pakistan Constitution did not allow for this. Twenty-nine other

amendments were also made, leading to an expansion of Musharrafs power. See Hussein Haqqani, Pakistan

between Mosque and Military (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2006), pp.25960.60 Abdul Rashid Moten, Revolution to Revolution: Jamaat-e-Islami in the Politics of Pakistan (Kuala Lumpur:

Islamic Book Trust, 2002), p.169.61 Back to Friday as Holiday, Friday Times (3 Mar. 2003) [www.thefridaytimes.com/nuggets.htm, accessed

12 May 2005].62 Interview with Syed Munawwar Hassan, Lahore, 25 December 2004.63 Anwarullah Khan, Video Shops Given a Week to Close, Dawn (Karachi) (29 Dec. 2002).

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18553&prog=zgp&proj=zsahttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18553&prog=zgp&proj=zsahttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18553&prog=zgp&proj=zsahttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18553&prog=zgp&proj=zsahttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18553&prog=zgp&proj=zsahttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18553&prog=zgp&proj=zsahttp://www.thefridaytimes.com/nuggets.htmhttp://www.thefridaytimes.com/nuggets.htmhttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18553&prog=zgp&proj=zsahttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18553&prog=zgp&proj=zsahttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18553&prog=zgp&proj=zsahttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18553&prog=zgp&proj=zsahttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18553&prog=zgp&proj=zsahttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18553&prog=zgp&proj=zsa


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The Ulamaand the MilitaryThe common assumption is that the ulama are beholden to the military.64 But

the reality is more complex. The ulama are these days able to hold their ownwhen dealing with military regimes because they have successfully infiltratedthe

army, especially in the lower rungs. For the ulama, the religious indoctrination

of the army is part of their long-term strategy to gain control of the country

through a soft Islamic revolution.65 As Hassan Askari-Rizvi notes, as early as

the 1970s many officers began to display an attraction to JI ideology and the

teachings of Mawlana Mawdudi.66 This was especially the case within the ISI.

Senior ISI officers such as Hamid Gul and Javed Nasir came to support a policy

of subjecting army personnel to religious indoctrination.67 By the 1980s new

recruits were being asked to swear an oath of allegiance on the Quran and were

being regularly examined on their knowledge of the tenets of Islam.68

Sami ul-Haq, the chancellor of Darul Uloom Haqqani madrasah and a former leader of

one of the MMAs component parties, noted in an interview in 2004 that the

US had assessed Pakistans army wrongly, and that the army was now

Islamic.69 It is not an understatement. The rank and file of the Pakistani

military have become radicalised. As for its officers, some at least now answer

to the mullahs bidding. Thus while the popular assumption has been that the

ulama are pawns of the military, in reality the ulama have acted independently.

They utilise their relationship with the Pakistani military and elements of the

government to their benefit, but when they think the government is not acting

to further the interests of Islam they are quite happy to join peripheral groups

in agitating against the government. Indeed leading ulama in the JI and the

JUI(F) have tolerated lesser ulama within their ranks launching violent attacks

against government leaders and establishments.70 A case in point was the 2004

64 See Grare, Islam, Militarism and the 20072008 Elections in Pakistan; Bahadur, The Rise of the MMA in

Pakistan; and Moten, Revolution to Revolution: Jamaat-e-Islami in the Politics of Pakistan .65 The more prominent Jamaat leaders did not state explicitly their strategy of trying to gain control of the

army but maintained that their efforts at dawah within the army has given birth to an army that is closer to

God. The Jamaat leaders I spoke to in Peshawar and Mardan indicated this strategy openly. Interviews with

Jamaat leaders in January 2005.66 Hassan-Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (Lahore: Sang-e-Maal Publications, 2002),

p.246.67 Interview with Qazi Hussein Ahmed.68 Conversation with an ISI officer in Lahore.69 See Jessica Stern, Meeting with the Muj, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.XXXXXVII, no.1 (Jan./

Feb. 2001), p.43. Mawlana Ilyas Khan from the Laskhar-e-Toiba also alluded to this during my interview

with him. Interview with Mawlana Ilyas Khan, member of Lashkar-e-Toiba, interview by author, tape

recording, Muridke, 2 January 2005.70 Seyyed Vali Nasr identifies a similar trend between Shia ulama. He cites the example in Iraq of Moqteda

Al-Sadr and Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, who have been playing what he described as a Bad Guy, Good Guy

game. See Seyyed Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future (New York:

Norton, 2006).

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attempt by members of Jaish-e Muhammad to kill Shaukat Aziz, the then-

prime minister, an operation spearheaded by a peripheral alim, Maulvi Imtiaz

Ahmed.

71

Since the Jaish-e Muhammad and Maulvi both have close links withthe JUI(F), it is likely that the latter was aware of, and may have even initiated,

the attempted assassination. Violence is part of the ulamas strategy of sending

a clear message to the government that if Islamisation is slowed or blocked,

they will seek to bring it down.72

The Ulamaand KashmirThere is no doubt that the Pakistani ulama have become closely linked to the

army. The JI has long been in the forefront of Kashmiri resistance to Indian

rule. Indeed the JI is an invaluable proxy of the Pakistani state in this respectbecause it is the only separatist outfit in Kashmir that demands unification of

the valley with Pakistan.73 The JIs main tactic is to increase unrest in Indian

Kashmir and then convince international public opinion through its offshoots

in Europe and North America that Delhi is engaged in the violation of human

rights.74 However by the late 1990s, the influence of the JI-supported groups

had begun to wane, and other groups linked to the JUI(F), such as Harakat ul-

Ansar (HUA) and Jaish-e-Mohammed, gradually took their place at the centre

of the resistance movement. Thus in late December 1999 the HUA hijacked an

Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar and used the resulting leverage to secure the

release of Mawlana Masood Azhar, its leader, and two other militants being

held in Indian jails. Azhar quickly returned to Pakistan, where he was

permitted to stage a huge rally in Karachi on 5 January 2000 attended by his

gun-toting followers.75

And the ulama have also from time to time mobilised sympathisers in India,

including the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), to further their cause.

The existence of these links was uncovered in late 2002 when Maharashtra

police seized 30 compact discs containing speeches of Azhar, now chief of

Jaish-e Mohammad, along with clippings of communal riots in Gujarat, from

71 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), p.236.72 Interview with Khalid Rahman, Director-General, Institute of Policy Studies, Nasr Chambers, Block 19,

Markaz F-7, Islamabad, 31 December 2004.73 Since 1947 a branch of the Jamaat-e-Islami has existed in Kashmir. It is independent from the Jamaat in

Pakistan but is linked to it ideologically. The Jamaat-e-Islami came under greater influence from the

Pakistani JI after the Kashmiri uprising in 1989. See Grare, Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent, p.83.74 Ibid.75 Zahid Hussain, Freed Militant Surfaces, ABC News.com [http://web.archive.org/web/20000901092056/

http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/militants000105.html].

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the SIMI offices in Aurangabad.76 The subsequent arrest of Sayeed Shah

Hasseb Raza and Amil Pervez, senior members of the SIMI, has also confirmed

links between the SIMI and Pakistani Islamist groups.

77

Investigating officersbelieved that the duo were in Kolkata to carry out subversive activities and

recruit youth for jihadi activities.78 After the formation of the MMA, rivalry

between the JI and the JUI(F) ceased, meaning that the military cannot use one

group of ulama against another. This has given the ulama more political

leverage vis-a`-vis the army.

Controlling the Tribal AreasThe ulama are extremely influential and powerful in the Federally Administered

Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.79

The JUI(F) in particular has significantsupport in the region due to its predominantly Pashtun leadership.80

Accordingly, the government has increasingly turned to the JUI(F) to help it

try to pacify the local tribes. This policy paid off for Islamabad in 2006, when a

deal was struck with a leading local militant, Mujahideen Shura, through the

good offices of JUI(F) parliamentarian Mawlana Merajuddin Qureshi.81 The

deal promised an amnesty and financial incentives in return for pledges to

renounce violence, and to the surrender of Al-Qaeda and other foreign

militants.82 In North Waziristan, a similar agreement was reached, again with

the assistance of the JUI(F), when Mawlana Fazlur Rehmans mediation

produced a month-long ceasefire by the Mujahidin Shura there on 25 June

2006.83

Ironically, these deals have led to the further Talibanisation of the Northern

Areas. However, the Talibanisation trend has not limited itself to the FATA

region. It is, in fact, extending to the urban centres, as is evident from the recent

tension created by the Red Mosque clerics in Islamabad. In March 2007 these

clerics launched an anti-vice campaign, demanding that the government impose

76 For more on the SIMI, see www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/simi.htm.77 Times of India (4 Mar. 2002); and Animesh Roul, Students Islamic Movement of India: A Profile, in

Terrorism Monitor, Vol.4, no.7 (6 April 2006), pp.910.78 Hassan Abbas, Profiles of Pakistans Seven Tribal Agencies, in Terrorism Monitor, Vol.4, no.20 (19 Oct.

2006).79 Ibid.80 Seyyed Reza Vali Nasr, Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan, in Middle East Journal,

Vol.58 (Spring 2004), pp.195209.81 Dawn (30 Sept. 2006).82 Dawn (21 June 2004). For more on the crisis, see Pakistans Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,

International Crisis Group Asia Report, No.125 (11 Dec. 2006).83 Ibid., p.18.

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sharia law and Islamic rule in Islamabad. As part of their strategy in the

campaign, the Red Mosques students have launched anti-vice squads, taking

upon themselves the responsibility for vandalising music and CD stores andalso threatening the owners to switch to alternative businesses.

True, in other parts of Pakistan, such as the regions of Punjab and Sindh, the

ulamas influence is more limited. This is due to the strong Sufi tradition that

governs Islam in these areas. However, there are signs that the ulama are

gearing up to support clandestine activities in Pakistani urban centres too, such

as Karachi and Lahore. The government through its weakness and vacillation

has inadvertently empowered a new generation of Pakistani militants linked to

the Taliban while strengthening their patrons, the Pakistani ulama.

Present and Future ProspectsBoth within and outside the electoral system, the ulama will remain an

important element in Pakistani politics. Similar to the engagement they forged

with the Musharraf regime, the ulama will continue to wield influence in the

military, in tribal areas and among militants in India and Afghanistan; and they

will continue to use that leverage to undermine any Pakistani government

unwilling to accede to their Islamisation agenda. They have, in this sense,

emerged as the true inheritors of the Pakistani political system. The common

factor in the policies pursued by Pakistani governments over the last two

decades has been an increasing emphasis on promoting conformity with

religious values through the introduction of rigid Islamic laws.84 These laws

and policies are largely the legacy of ulama activism.

84 For a comprehensive overview of these policies, see Ghazali, Islamic Pakistan.


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