Afghanistan–Pakistan relations

Introduction:

The people of Pakistan and Afghanistan are bound together by faith, common heritage and the shared values of love and peace. Relations between the two countries have been subject to various complexities over the past few decades, by issues related to the Durand Line, the 1978–present war, including water and the growing relations of India and Afghanistan. However, the two states are working together to find solutions to these problems. This includes possible defense cooperation and intelligence sharing as well as further enhancing the two-way trade and abolishment of visas for diplomats from the two nations.

Background:

It is regrettable fact of the history that from the time of Pakistan’s birth, Afghanistan has maintained an attitude of hostile neighbor and Pakistan has to live with it because neighbors cannot be changed. At the heart of Afghanistan’s indifferent attitude towards Pakistan were the issues of Durand Line and Pakhtoonistan. Both of the issues were based on Afghanistan’s ambitions of regaining control of NWFP and other areas which, for a brief period, were part of Ahmad Shah Abdeli’s conquered territories. Afghanistan was the only country around the world that opposed Pakistan’s entry in United Nation in September 1947.

Pak- Afghan relation:

Shortly after Pakistan was formed in 1947, Afghanistan crafted a two-fold strategy to destabilize the frontier regions of Pakistan, in an attempt to take advantage of Pakistan's post-independence instability. Firstly, it strongly aligned itself with Pakistan's rival, India, and also the USSR, which later invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Secondly, it politically and financially back secessionist politicians in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the 1960s.

Afghanistan's policies placed a severe strain upon Pakistan–Afghan relations in the 1960s, up until the 1970s, when the movement largely subsided as the population came to thoroughly identify with Pakistan; although, resentment against the Punjabi elite continued to develop. The Pashtun assimilation into the Pakistani state followed years of rising Pashtun influence in Pakistani politics and the nation's bureaucracy, culminating in Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Ishaq Khan– the Pashtuns, being placed as the presidential leader of Pakistan. The largest nationalist part of the time, the Awami National Party (ANP), dropped its secessionist agenda and openly embraced the Pakistani state, leaving only the small and relatively insignificant Pakhtunkhwa Millet Party to champion the cause of independence in relation to both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Despite the weaknesses of the early secessionist movement, this period in history continues to

negatively influence Pakistani-Afghan relations in the 21st century, in addition to the province's politics.

Challenges in Pak- Afghanistan Relations:

Pakistan and Afghanistan relations have never been smooth rather a painful experience of course. Pakistan’s resolve to promote closer fellowship and cooperation between Muslim countries especially with Afghanistan could not materialize in its true letter and spirit. With the sole exception of the four years of Taliban rule (1997-2001), successive governments in Kabul have displayed varying degrees of hostility towards Islamabad.

The most disturbing period with bitter experiences was the two spells of Sardar Daud, from 1947 to 1963 and from 1973 to 1978. He proved to be the champion of Paktoonistan issue and Durand Line controversy. His period of rule carries repeated incidences of border clashes, insurgents, sabotages, border closure, trade embargoes, burning of national flags and embassies, and severing of diplomatic relations etc. When Sardar Daud realized that stability across both sides of the borders is mandatory for peace and security in the region then it was too late. Excluding a long list of minor nature of irritants from this write up, few of the worth mentioning challenges are:

I. Durand Line Issue II. Pakhtoonistan Issue

III. Interference into each other’s internal affairsIV. Foreign hand and particularly Indian Factors

1) Durand Line Issue:

Durand Line is a historic fact of British legacy that kept hounding the Pak-Afghan relations for the last sixty two years or so. It is a de jure boundary line between Pakistan and Afghanistan, drawn as a result of a fully negotiated agreement on 12th November 1893 between British Government of India and the Afghanistan, and signed by Sir Mortimor Durand (British Foreign Secretary) and Afghanistan’s Amir Abul Rehman Khan. The agreement was subsequently reaffirmed by Number 1 the later Afghan rulers in their different agreements and treaties.

The legal acceptability of the line was doubted by the people and various governments of Afghanistan from time to time that fueled mistrust and suspicions against each other. Research finds that the issue is simple, clear and easy to understand interpret but roots to the continuity of the issue lie in lack of proper information and misunderstanding of related documents. The factual position of the issue is: The agreements/ treaty documents signed, ratified and endorsed by successive Afghan regimes negate the claim that the agreement was coerced or imposed by the British. It also refutes the baseless claim that the validity of agreement has expired after 100 years in 1993.

Pakistan is the successor nation on the north western part of the Indian subcontinent. After partition of the sub continent, British Governments of different times with stand to their pre-partition position on Durand Line as a willingly negotiated and internationally accepted border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The permanency and legality of the Durand Line was also validated by the Lord Home, British foreign secretary, in the British parliament on November 3, 1953. Under international law and the international legal regime, Afghanistan’s objections to the Durand Line are unlikely to hold grounds. Ironically, during its rule in Kabul the Taliban refused to endorse the Durand Line despite pressure from Islamabad. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has also resisted, calling it

"a line of hatred that raised a wall between the two brothers."

2) Pakhtoonistan Issue:

Pakistan's Afghan policy has always been predominantly influenced by its ideology and earnest desire for closer ties with all countries of the Muslim world. Afghanistan was not an exception to it, rather it occupied more important place in Pakistan’s foreign policy due to its location, commonality of its ethnically Pakhtoon population and socio-cultural history. On the contrary, Afghanistan never accepted Pakistan with all its territorial manifestations as it claimed Pakhtoon areas of NWFP and Balochistan as an integral part of state of Afghanistan that were forcefully annexed by British India. The central theme of Afghanistan’s argument made in favor was that the Pakhtoons living across the Durand Line are one nation and the Durand line arbitrarily splits the nation into two. Afghanistan failed to realize that the Durand line was not an arbitrarily drawn but a physically drawn and accepted border since 1893. The border follows physical geo-political features of tribal boundaries.

The interesting phenomenon of the Pakhtoonistan issue was that it was applicable only on the union of Pakhtoon with Afghanistan and not Afghanistan based Pakhtoon with NWFP. The Afghan concept of Pakhtoonistan consisted of only those Pakhtoon who live in Pakistan. Whenever the idea of holding a plebiscite for a united Pakhtoon land was put forward the Afghan government always reacted angrily and rejected the idea. Instead of helping new born Pakistan to secure and maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity against the heavy odds of unjust partition Afghanistan challenged Pakistan’s right to rule over its Pakhtoon areas as a successor state of the British India.

3) Encouraging Insurgents for Across Border Activities:

It has already been discussed above that Afghan government not only supported the Pakhtoon uprisings but also instigated, housed, equipped, and armed Baloch insurgents to surrender Pakistan before Afghanistan’s demands of Durand Line and Pakhtoonistan issue. Sardar Daud era as Defence minister and Prime Minister, from 1947 to 1963 is replicated with number of incidences of Afghanistan’s involvement in internal disturbance in Pakistan. Faqir of Appi’s arm

resistance in Waziristan and Balochie’s uprising in Kalat in 1948-49 are extreme examples in this regard.

On the other hand, India’s and Russia’s support for the Northern Alliance arose from its desire to establish an anti-Taliban, anti-Pakistan government in Afghanistan. Taliban’s gains led to Russia supplying arms while India began “airlifting non-military supplies” to the Northern Alliance troops via Iran. In early 2001, the United States also joined the triad of India, Russia and Iran as their fourth partner in aiding Northern Alliance in their bid to change Taliban regime. The blame game of involving each others internal affairs is on the turf again. Afghanistan is accusing unobstructed flow of militants infiltrating from Pakistani side of the border to Afghanistan. Afghanistan has also failed to satisfy Pakistan on its counter accusations that many Indian consulates in Afghanistan appear to be indulging in undesirable activities against Pakistan. Compared to Pakistani efforts, the Afghan efforts are not only negligible but extremely limited

4) Foreign hand and particularly Indian Factors:

Pakistan sees India’s growing influence, particularly its consular presence in Afghanistan, as a threat. Shortly after the fall of the Taliban, India reestablished several consulates. While India has legitimate consular interests in Afghanistan—Hindu and Sikh populations, commercial relations, and aid programs—there is some speculation by Pakistan that India has also been using these consulates as a cover for its intelligence agencies to carry out covert operations. Islamabad believes India’s involvement in Afghanistan.

There are several ways to read India’s current engagement with Afghanistan. Since the overthrow of the Taliban, India has invested heavily in renewing its ties with Afghanistan. At present, India is the largest regional donor to Afghanistan’s reconstruction, having offered more than 1.2-billion (US) since 2001. This can be seen as a contribution toward greater regional stability.

India has been involved in various reconstruction and capacity-building projects, including major infrastructure development initiatives; women’s employability programs; medical missions; children’s health and school feeding program delivery; and training for civil servants, police, and diplomats. India has also strengthened its economic ties with Afghanistan to the extent permitted by the transit limitations between the two countries. Such involvement has contributed greatly to a positive public perception of India in some regions of Afghanistan.

One of India’s major infrastructure initiatives has been to construct a highway linking Afghanistan’s ring road to Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf. This highway could effectively reduce, if not eliminate, Afghanistan’s current dependence, as a land-locked state, on Pakistan for sea access.

5) China interest:

There are clear indications that China has enhanced its role in Afghanistan and is making efforts at bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table. It realises that as US forces withdraw, insurgency in Afghanistan would step up, which could then link up with their own East Turkistan Islamic Movement creating unrest in its Xinjiang province. The recent visit of the Taliban leader to China is an indication of the importance of the emerging role of China in the vacuum created by the departure of the bulk of US forces. Beijing would, however, never involve itself militarily in Afghanistan but would like to play an important role in its economic development and political stability. China has invested nearly $4 billion in Aynak copper mines and other geological projects and is providing $300 million of annual assistance. Interestingly, China’s industrial appetite for raw materials is so great that it has invested across the globe spanning Latin America, Africa, Australia and Central Asia.

Trade Agreement and Peshawar-Kabul motorway:

In July 2010, a Memorandum of understanding (MoU) was reached between Pakistan and Afghanistan for the Afghan-Pak Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), which was observed by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The two states also signed a MoU for the construction of rail tracks in Afghanistan to connect with Pakistan Railways (PR), which has been in the making since at least 2005. In October 2010, the landmark APTTA agreement was signed by Pakistani Commerce Minister Makhdoom Amin Fahim and Anwar ul-HaqAhady, Afghan Ministry of Commerce. The ceremony was attended by Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a number of foreign ambassadors, Afghan parliamentarians and senior officials.The APTTA allows Afghan trucks to drive inside Pakistan to the Wagah border with India, including to the port cities of Karachi and Gwadar.

In November 2010, the two states formed a joint chamber of commerce to expande trade relations and solve the problems traders face. The (APTTA) agreement has taken effect after several Afghan trucks delivered fruits from Afghanistan to the Wagah border with India in June 2011. The APTTA is intended to improve trade between the two countries but Pakistan often delays Afghan-bound containers, especially after the 2011 NATO attack in Pakistan.

In July 2012, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to extend APTTA to Tajikistan in what will be the first step for the establishment of a North-South trade corridor. The proposed agreement will provide facilities to Tajikistan to use Pakistan’s Gwadar and Karachi ports for its imports and exports while Pakistan will enjoy trade with Tajikistan under terms similar to the transit arrangement with Afghanistan. Trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan is expected to reach 5 billion by 2015. Afghanistan's economy is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. A 2012 World Bank report added, “In contrast, Afghanistan’s economy grew robustly by about 11 percent mostly due to a good harvest.”

Current Pak-Afghan relation:

Afghanistan, being a landlocked country, has suffered from an inherent insecurity against Pakistan and has tried to countervail it by getting closer to New Delhi.India is using every opportunity to spoil these improved relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan since the swearing-in of Ashraf Ghani as president.

During his two-day visit to Pakistan in November 2014, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s gestures to forget about past acrimonies and to promote robust ties between the two countries appeared to be reflective of his sincere desire to move forward. President Ashraf Ghani’s trip to the military headquarters in Rawalpindi along with his high-ranking delegation, comprising high-ranking generals and other senior Afghan security officials, was significant. He lauded Pakistan’s sacrifices in the war on terror and laid a floral wreath at the martyrs’ monument. He expressed his government’s interest in “bolstering security and defence ties with Pakistan, including cooperation in training and border management” President Ashraf Ghani has assured that Afghanistan will not allow its soil to be used against Pakistan and in return has got an assurance from Pakistan that it will crack down on militants without any distinction.

Conclusion: