Arab/Israeli Six-Day WarWhen the United Nations peacekeeping force withdrew from the Sinai in May 1967, its place was taken by the Egyptian army, threatening Israel. Rather than wait for an assault, Israel lashed out in a devastating series of raids against its Arab neighbours.

At the beginning of 1967 it was Vietnam that dominated the world’s news, and would continue to do so throughout the year, with one exception. That event occurred in June, when Israel unleashed its air force on its Arab neighbours.

If the Six-Day War was a remarkable demonstration of what could be achieved through the use of airpower when applied with precision and total conviction, then the war in Vietnam demonstrated how airpower could be relatively impotent when bridled with numerous restrictions and without a clear military objective.

Israel had devastated three powerful air arms in a matter of days, and it did not take long for US air forces to negate the North Vietnamese air force as a fighting power when they were eventually allowed to take on the MiGs in the air and on the ground. But the war in Vietnam seemed interminable to the troops who rode daily into combat in the world’s largest fleet of helicopters.

Below: In 1967 the undisputed master of the skies was the McDonnell F-4 Phantom II. It came of age during the year, becoming the master of the MiGs it faced routinely in the skies over North Vietnam.

While fast-jets fought it out in the skies of North Vietnam, the more mundane tasks of fighting Viet Cong forces in the South entailed the massive use of rotary-wing power.

Disaster struck the US Navy in 1967 when a Zuni rocket inadvertently launched aboard USS Forrestal. The resultant fire cost the lives of 134 sailors.

Photograph acknowledgements:

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All other photographs Aerospace Publishing Ltd

CONTENTSMilestones of Aviation

Arab-Israeli Six-Day War 01-06

Air PowerUS Army helicopters in Vietnam 07-11

Aircraft of the YearMcDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II 12-20

Air WarfareUS Navy’s air war continues in Vietnam 21-27

Aviation YearAviation News: Jan-Jun 28-30First Flights: Jan-Jun 31-32Japanese Aviation: Jan-December 33

Weird and WonderfulDornier 31 vertijet 34

jets at warPart 1

100of AircrAft

Years 1967 1967 06月June 1967

Below: The Egyptian air force was unpreprared for the onslaught, and many aircraft were caught in the open. Low-level strafing and bombing attacks by Israeli Mirages and Super Mystères claimed large numbers, such as this MiG-21.

Spearheading the Israeli air assault was the Dassault Mirage IIICJ, these aircraft being from No. 101 Squadron. The Israel Defence

Force/Air Force had three squadrons of these fighters , which was locally named Shahak.

Israel strikesThere was tension in the air. Egypt had expelled United Nations forces from the Sinai buffer zone between Egypt and Israel and had moved its armies forward. On 30 May Jordan joined Egypt and Syria in the alli-ance against Israel, and shortly after an Egyptian commando regiment flew to Jordan to threaten Israel from the east, while Syria massed its forces along the northern border. Iraq moved expeditionary forces into Jordan. In Israel the reserves

were mobilised and a plan was quickly drawn up, known as Opera-tion Moked (Focus). It became clear to the Israelis that, in the face of larger forces, a pre-emptive strike with complete surprise was the best course of action. It carried a high risk, but perhaps not as great a risk as sitting back and waiting. At 07.45 on the morning of 5 June, Opera-tion Moked was launched, the first bombs hitting Bir Tmada at the very moment designated as H-hour.

During the Six-Day War Dassault Mirage IIICJs flew 1,107 sorties, claiming 40 kills for nine losses. On many missions the aircraft flew an initial bombing attack before taking up combat air patrols to protect following fighter-bombers.

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Israeli base First attack

Egyptian base Third attack

Jordanian base captial

Syrian base city

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Abu Sawayr

BilbeisInshasCairo IAP

Helwan

Bani Suwayf

El Minya

Luxor

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to Tel Nof and Hatzor

to Tel Nov

to Ramat David

to Ramat David

El Mansourah

El-Arish

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Al Qusayr

Shayrat

Tiyas-T.4

al-Wallid

Dumayr

Tsaykal

Damascus IAPal-Mezzeh

Marj Real

MafraqAmman

Bir Gifgafa

Jabal Libni

Bir Al-Thamadah

To targets in southern Egypt

To target in northern Iraq

Kibrit

FayidAlmaza Cairo West

Konya

Adana

Diyarbakir

Mosul

Kirkuk

Hims

Izmir

Istanbul

Ankara

Tripoli

Baghdad

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Baku

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Hamadan

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Kerman

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Tehran

Babol

Krasnovodsk

Ashkhabad

Muscat

Abu Dhabi

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Kuwait

An Nasiriyah

Bushehr

Bandar Abbas

Jask

Shiraz

CAIRO

Elait

JERUSALEM

AMMAN

Aswân

Qena

Suez

Port Said

Tel Aviv

Ramat David

Hatzor

Tel Nof

BEIRUT

DAMASCUS

Mits’iwaAsmera

Suakin

KassalaKhartoum

San‘a

Al Hudaydah

Djibouti

Aden

Harer

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Gonder

Debre Mark’osBerbera

HargeysaBender Beyla

Al Mukalla

Tarim

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E G Y P T

S U D A N

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E R I T R E A

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S O M A L I A

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U N I T E D A R A BE M I R A T E S

Q A T A R

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K U W A I T

I R A Q

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I S R A E L

J O R D A N

S I N A I

I R A N

T U R K M E N I S T A N

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T U R K E Y

Following the Egyptian revolu-tion of 1952, the government of President Nasser moved away from its traditional arms purchases from the United Kingdom and turned instead to the Soviet Union. From 1955 large numbers of Soviet aircraft began to be delivered. In 1958 Egypt merged with Syria to form the United Arab Republic and, although Syria left the union in 1961, Egypt’s air force continued to use the UARAF name.

By 1967 the UARAF was the most powerful Arab air force, and had around 200 MiG-21s on strength. It also had a powerful

attack force of Tu-16 and Il-28 bombers, and the hard-hitting Su-7 fighter-bomber.

It is possible that Egypt lost as many as 338 aircraft during the conflict, of which most were destroyed or badly damaged during the two opening waves of attacks on Egyptian airfields. Although numbers of losses differ widely between Arab and Israeli accounts, some sources cite Egyptian losses as 94 MiG-17s, 29 MiG-19s, 104 MiG-21s, 14 Su-7s, 30 Tu-16s, 27 Il-28s, 30 Il-14s, eight An-12s, two Mi-4s and eight Mi-6s.

Israel committed nine squad-rons of front-line aircraft to the Six-Day War, all of which were of French origin. Leading the force were three units equipped with the Dassault Mirage IIICJ, assisted by units equipped with Dassault Ouragans, Mystère IVAs and Super Mystères. The

Sud-Ouest Vautour twin-engined night-fighter/attacker was also on strength. As well as these aircraft there was a squadron of Fouga Magister trainers that had been modified for light attack duties. Israel’s losses during the war have been quoted as 46 aircraft.

Egyptian Air Force

Israel’s fighters

mikoyan-Gurevich miG-17

Egypt had large numbers of MiG-17s. Compared to the Mirage III the type was slow but manoeuvrable, and proved to be a sturdy fighter-bomber.

dassault miraGe iiicJ

Capable of Mach 2, the Mirage III proved crucial to Israel’s success. In the air-to-air role it carried Rafael Shafrir and Matra R530 missiles, but could also carry a good bombload.

third-wave attacks

As well as targeting further Egyptian airfields, the third wave of attacks, which began at 12.15 on 5 June, included 67 sorties aimed at Syrian airfields, 48 against Jordan and one against H-3 airfield in western Iraq.

quick turn-round

The key to the initial assault was the rapid refuelling and rearming of Israeli aircraft, allowing three back-to-back waves of attacks to be under-taken in under five hours.

runway attack

A key weapon in the attack on the airfields were pachaute-retarded runway-cratering weapons, which were employed to devastating ef-fect to prevent Arab aircraft getting airborne.

runway spared

Although the aircraft at El Arish were attacked, the runway was deliberately left untouched so that it could form a base for Israeli transport aircraft.

fourth-wave attacks

In the evening of the first day Israel launched further raids to build on the earlier

successes. A number of aircraft returned to Egypt while others resumed the

onslaught at Iraq’s H-3.

Antagonism in the Middle East region had blazed into full-scale war in the late-

1940s and in 1956. Tension had been rising since early April 1967 with clashes over Syria’s Golan Heights. It was heightened further by the UN’s decision to withdraw its peacekeeping forces from the Egypt/Israel border on 17 May 1967. This encouraged Egypt to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping.

At the end of May a renewed Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian defence agreement was signed and led to the formation of the United Arab Republic Air Force (UARAF). This was equipped with the latest Soviet combat aircraft: MiG-19 and -21 fighters, Su-7 ground-attack aircraft, and Il-28 and Tu-16 bombers. The main problems suffered by the Arab air force were the poor serviceability of its aircraft (20 per cent were non-operational), and the chronic shortage of qualified aircrew. Only 125 of its approximately 500 pilots could fly MiG-21s or MiG-19s, and there was no reserve pool of pilots.

Pre-emptive strikeEgyptian Air Marshal Sidki and his military staff feared a pre-emptive Israeli attack in early June, and ordered an advanced state of alert. President Nasser, however, was convinced that there would be no war. He over-ruled them, and the Arab forces relaxed their posture.

Shortly after dawn on 5 June, 40 Israe-li Mirage IIICJs and Super Mystères flew west, followed by two more waves, 120 in all. As usual, the Israeli aircraft dipped

below the search height of Egyptian radars. Since they had been doing this regularly on training exercises, no action was taken and the Egyptian dawn fighter patrols were stood down. However, this time, the Israeli fighters turned south to cross the Egyptian coast, undetected.

At 08.45 (Cairo time), when UARAF dawn patrols had landed and most senior officers were between home and office, the airfields at Bir Tmada, El Ar-ish, Uir Gifgafa, Cairo West, Jebel Libni, Lair Thamada, Abu Sueir, Kabrit, Beni Sueif, Inchas and Fayid, were all struck. Ten flights, each of four aircraft, made one bombing and several strafing passes, followed at 10-minute intervals by the second and third waves. An exception-ally efficient turnaround time back in Is-rael meant that eight waves attacked for 80 minutes. A 10-minute lull was then followed by a further 80-minute blitz. Only 12 IDF aircraft were held back to defend Israeli skies during this assault. Sixty Fouga Magister trainers, converted for ground attack, were meanwhile com-mitted to support the Israeli army and took no part in these raids.

During this three-hour assault more than 300 UARAF aircraft were destroyed or damaged, mostly on the ground.

The big Tu-16 bombers were considered vital targets by the Israel Defence Force, because of their ability to fire large stand-off air-to-ground missiles capable of reaching Israeli towns and cities. The entire force of two squadrons of Tu-16s was destroyed. Israeli losses for these raids were 19 aircraft.

In the air, the UARAF lost four un-armed trainers near Imbaba – the first casualties of the war – and one MiG-21 as it took off from Abu Sueir. Another MiG-21 was destroyed as it attempted to land on the cratered runway after driving off four IAF Super Mystères. Three surviving MiG-21s lifted off from Inchas at 08.56 in the minutes between Israeli assaults. Ground control had collapsed, but over Cairo West they shot down an Ouragan that crashed, perhaps intentionally, into a parked Tu-16. At Abu Sueir another MiG-21 managed to take off at 10.01 and brought down a Mystère just beyond the airfield perim-eter. The last two serviceable MiG-21s were then destroyed as they tried to get

Operation MokedIsrael’s plan was simple: to send out its fighters to obliterate the Egyptian air force and then, if necessary, to tackle the other, weaker Arab air forces. The plan relied on total surprise so that the aircraft could be caught at their most vulnerable. To help achieve this, double agents that had been placed in the Egyptian high com-mand reassured their ‘leaders’ that no attack would be forthcom-ing from Israel. The scale of the attack was a high-risk strategy for Israel: it left virtually nothing in reserve should a counter-attack take place.

In the intense ground war that erupted in the Sinai peninsula the Egyptian MiG-17 fighter-bombers could have played a major part, but most were destroyed in the opening IDF attacks.

Although it could not expect to survive in the face of a fully operational Egyptian air defence environment, the Dassault Ouragan was used for bombing raids after the initial Mirage and Super Mystère attacks had achieved air superiority.

Armed with Shafrir missiles, the Super Mystère was a useful back-up to the Mirage in the air-to-air role, but was of most use as a fighter-bomber.

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into the air minutes later, both hit by the same Mirage III.

The MiG-19s and -21s at Hurghada flew north to help, but were jumped by 16 Mirages as they tried to land at Abu Sueir at 10.30. Four went down at once but in the dogfight that followed neither side scored addi-tional victories. Nevertheless, all the MiGs were destroyed, either in wheels-up landings alongside shattered runways or when they ran out of fuel. The only airfield whose run-ways were not damaged was El Arish. Here the IAF relied on cannon-fire and a guided bomb similar to the American Bullpup to pick off parked aircraft. Only one Egyptian aircraft now remained in the air: the Ilyushin Il-14 transport carrying Air Marshal Sidki and most of the Egyptian high command had been flying over the battle zone since before the attack began. By keep-ing the enemy’s top brass in this ‘limbo’, alive but out of action, the Israelis virtually paralysed Egypt’s capacity to respond.

The eastern frontWithin hours, Israel’s other Arab neigh-bours had entered the fray in response to the attack on Egypt. Jordanian long-range artillery cratered at least one run-way at Ramat David during the morn-ing. The Israelis had, however, already moved against Jerusalem by the time the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) made its first move, an airstrike on Natanya and Kfar Sirkin by 16 Hunters.

At 14.30 (Tel Aviv time) the IDF turned its attention from the UARAF to the RJAF, attacking Mafraq and Amman

air bases and a strategic radar site at Ajlun. All but one of Jordan’s 18 Hunter fighters were destroyed on the ground for the loss of one Israeli aircraft. The re-maining Hunter was also damaged and two aircrew were killed, so King Hussein told his surviving Hunter pilots to place themselves under IrAF command at the Iraqi air base of H-3. Other Jordanian targets attacked by the IDF on this first day of the war included Iraqi and Pal-estinian units moving westwards from Mafraq, defensive positions around Jerusalem, the Jordanian HQ at Jericho, a relief column east of the Mount of Olives and the royal palace in Amman.

The Syrian Air Force was also on the IDF’s target list for 5 June. At 11.45 (Tel Aviv time) 12 SAF MiG-21s bombed the Haifa oil refinery and strafed Mahanay-im airfield. Just over an hour later came the IDF’s massive response, with strikes on the SAF bases at Damascus followed by others on Marj Rial, Dumayr and Seikal. The more distant airfield at T-4 was not struck until mid-afternoon, shortly after three Israeli aircraft had also attacked the Iraqi base at H-3. Although

the SAF was not as badly damaged as the UARAF or RJAF, it did lose two-thirds of its front-line strength.

During the afternoon the IDF returned to Egypt, ranging farther afield to hit Mansura, Cairo International, Helwan, Al Minya, Bilbeis, Herghada, Luxor and Ras Banas airfields in the deep south and 23 radar sites.

Days two and threeThe second day, 6 June, saw the IDF put most of its effort into supporting the Israeli army in Sinai and on the West Bank. A strike against artillery positions west of Rafah had already enabled the Israelis to successfully break through the main Egyptian defences. That night, a helicopter-borne commando attack using S-58s was made behind Jordanian lines east of Jerusalem. Another heli-copter-borne attack preceded the fall of Egypt’s vital Abu Agheila position near the Sinai border. Close-support attacks were made at Gaza and Bir Lahfan on 6 June, but by early morning the entire Egyptian army was already withdrawing from Sinai.

Seeing the Egyptians in full retreat, the Israelis sent a rapid force through the crumbling enemy lines to seize the Mitla and Gidi Passes. This manoeuvre succeeded and trapped a large part of the Egyptian army east of the moun-tains. Here it was ruthlessly bombed by the IDF, which destroyed thousands of vehicles in front of the Mitla Pass alone.

The UARAF then threw what strength it had left into a desperate attempt to break the Israeli hold on the passes. During the night of 5/6 June the UARAF managed to put together a scratch force of 50 aircraft by repairing damaged aircraft and hurriedly assembling crated equipment. The biggest blow had been to the pilot pool, over 70 of whom had been killed, with a further 200 wound-ed. The first sign that the UARAF still existed came at 05.36 on 6 June, when two MiG-21s were sent against an Israeli column near Bir Lahfan. Both were shot down. The same fate befell a pair of Su-

7s that ran the IDF gauntlet as far as El Arish at 06.00. Egyptian Su-7s and MiG-21s twice tried to shoot down IDF helicop-ters. These attacks were pin-pricks compared with the pounding that the Egyptian army was receiving from the IDF.

During the night of 5/6 June the Iraqis and Jordanians had joined forces to rein-force the defences of H-3. At dawn on 6 June, an IrAF Tu-16 bombed the Natan-ya industrial complex in Israel but was brought down by ground fire. Not long afterwards the IDF struck again at H-3. This time it met fierce resistance from defending fighters flown by both Iraqis and Jordanians. Nine Israeli aircraft were

claimed, while the IDF admitted the loss of two. The Israelis also brought down one of a pair of Lebanese reconnaissance Hunters over Galilee. Throughout 6 and 7 June the IDF blasted Jordanian posi-tions across the West Bank. Israel also reported eight air battles on the eastern front between 6 and 9 June, mostly over

Jordan’s first air arm, the Arab Legion Air Force, had been established with British assis-tance in 1950. It was renamed the Royal Jordanian Air Force in 1955 and later re-equipped with Hawker Hunters. These scored a victory over an Israeli Mirage during a skirmish in 1964. In the Six-Day War Hunters destroyed an Israeli Nord Noratlas trans-port at Sirkin on 5 June before

a counter-attack by the IDF that afternoon, which decimated the force on the ground. Jordanian

pilots then began flying Iraqi Hunters with some success. Dur-ing an attack on the Iraqi airfield

at H-3, Jordanian pilots shot down at least one Israeli Mirage and two Vautours for no loss.

Syria’s air force grew in the 1950s with Soviet assistance, and by 1967 was equipped with a range of MiG aircraft, including the Mach-2 MiG-21. Bomber forces were centred on the Il-28 ‘Beagle’. During the Israeli attacks 32 MiG-21s, 16 MiG-17s, two Il-28s, four Mi-4s and two Mi-6s were lost.

Iraq was not a front-line state, but its air force made signifi-cant contributions to the Arab air effort, including an attempt to bomb Israel with a Tu-16 ‘Badger’ bomber,

although this aircraft was shot down. Other losses included 12 MiG-21s, two MiG-17s, five Hunters and two Il-28s. Iraqi aircraft initially operated from the base at H-3, established in the country’s western desert close to the border with Jordan, but subsequently moved further east to Habbani-yah to be further from Israel.

The backbone of the Royal Jordanian Air Force was the Hawker Hunter, and 21 are thought to have been lost in the Six-Day War, plus five Iraqi and one Lebanese machine.

Royal Jordanian Air Force

Syrian and Iraqi Air ForcesA Mirage IIICJ flies high over Israel. Post-war research suggests that the Mirage showed no great superiority over the MiG-21 in air combat, with

scores roughly equal.

A Mirage IIICJ streams its ’chute on landing back at base. During the opening morning of the Six-Day War Israeli groundcrew managed twice to get the returning aircraft back in the air – fully fuelled and armed – in less than eight minutes.

mikoyan-Gurevich miG-19

The MiG-19 was used by both Egypt and Syria, and was a potent fighter-bomber. Its cannon were a particularly effective weapon.

Right: The best fighter that the Arab air forces could muster was the MiG-21. The few that managed to get airborne after the Israeli onslaught gave a good account of themselves, although never seriously threatened Israel’s air superiority.

Iraq received a large force of Hunters from Britain, comprising 16 F.Mk 6s, 22 F.Mk 59s, 18 F.Mk 59As and four F.Mk 59Bs, plus a number of trainers and FR.Mk 10 reconnaissance aircraft. They were used on fighter patrols alongside Iraq’s MiG-21F-13s.

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H-3, where, by the end of the war, one Royal Jordanian air force Hunter pilot. Captain Ihsan Shurdom, had claimed one Mirage, two Mystères and a Sud-Ouest Vautour.

The UARAF kept up small-scale but increasingly effective strikes for the rest of the war in Sinai, although it could not alter the outcome. At dawn on 7 June four MiG-19s hit an Israeli column on the Mediterranean coastal road, though three aircraft soon went down to an IDF standing patrol. Additional UARAF and Egyptian naval attacks in this sector certainly slowed the Israeli advance. The Israeli air force shot down a solitary Il-28 and a MiG at El Arish. Flights of MiG-l7s sent against the Mitla Pass and southern Sinai suffered severe losses, but were sometimes able to hit back. A Super Mystère fell to MiG-17s east of Ismailia.

The final daysBy 8 June Algerian volunteers were reportedly flying alongside the Egyp-tians, who were also now joined by men from UARAF units in Yemen. Despite this upsurge of Egyptian air activity, IDF combat successes declined, only nine UARAF aircraft being claimed on 8 June. During the day the Israelis severely damaged the USS Liberty, an American intelligence-gathering ship, in a still-unexplained air and sea attack. The war in Sinai was, however, virtually over and Egypt accepted a UN ceasefire at 04.35

on 9 June.Now the IDF geared

itself up for another campaign, this time against Syria. Fol-lowing frequent IDF attacks on the Golan defences, and find-ing itself alone since Egypt and Jordan had been defeated, Syria accepted a UN ceasefire on the evening of 8 June. Israel, however, did not. At 11.30 on 9 June an all-out attack was launched against the Golan Heights. Fighting was at first bitter but, after protesting vehemently to the UN, the Syrian government withdrew its forces to defend its capital. Air combat was mini-mal, although SAF and UARAF units brought down a Mystère and possibly a Vautour near Damascus. Other Israeli aircraft were hit by anti-aircraft fire. The IAF, although claiming 12 SAF aircraft in air combat during the Six-Day War, was more concerned with supporting its army and to seize the Golan Heights and the town of Qunaytra before the final UN ceasefire at 06.30 on 10 June.

The so-called Six-Day War was over, and Israel had won a resounding victory. Although claims were inflated for propa-ganda, it seems that the Israeli Defence Force had destroyed more than 300 UARAF aircraft (approximately 60 in air combat), 29 Royal Jordanian Air Force

aircraft, 61 Syrian Air Force aircraft, 23 IrAF aircraft and one Lebanese machine. This had been achieved for the loss of at least 45 aircraft and probably more, about 12 of them in air combat, plus 20 pilots killed and 13 captured.

A lasting peace had failed to be im-posed in the region, however. There was to be no short-term reconciliation be-tween Arab and Jew; both sides simply set about rebuilding their forces before embarking on the next – inevitable – confrontation.

Two days after the opening air assault Israel launched a ground offensive to occupy the Sinai peninsula. It was launched on three fronts, the northern of-fensive moving into the Gaza Strip. The central and southern fronts attacked the Egyptians at Abu-Ageila from all sides, a force of paratroops having been inserted by helicopter behind the Egyptian positions, which came under heavy attack from the air. Large armoured battles took place, leading to heavy losses among the Egyptian tanks.

Although many of the Egyptian units remained intact and could have tried to resist Israeli attempts to reach the Suez Canal, defeats at Abu-Ageila had led to the order to

withdraw from the Sinai completely. As the Egyptians began to withdraw, Israeli forces under Ariel Sharon set up positions in the Mitla Pass through which the Egyp-tians would have to retreat. The Gidi Pass was similarly blocked. Harried by other Israeli forces and relentlessly at-tacked from the air, the Egyptian army was decimated as it was forced into the two passes. Many soldiers died and many surren-

dered to Israeli forces. The occupation of the Sinai

was completed on 8 June as the last outposts were overtaken,

including the occupation of Sharm el-Sheikh by paratroops who were landed by Israeli Navy patrol boats.

Israel’s assault on the Sinai

Known locally as the Tzukit, the Fouga Magister was impressed into use as a light attacker with 147 Squadron. Its main area of operation was in the West Bank fighting where several were lost to groundfire.

sikorksy s-58

During the Sinai campaign the IDF’s trans-port assets were called into play. The main helicopter transports were the Sikorsky S-58 and Sud-Est Super Frelon. S-58s were used to transport paratroops during the Battle of Abu-Ageila. Fixed-wing transport was provid-ed by the Nord Noratlas.

Standing in front of an Ouragan, Israel Defence Force/Air Force personnel display a war trophy some time after the war. The success of the pre-emptive air strikes provided an umbrella of air superiority under which Israeli ground forces could make rapid gains.

See AiRcRAft DAtA cARDSSectiON 07 cARD 09Dassault Ouragan

SectiON 07 cARD 11Dassault Super Mystére

SectiON 07 cARD 13Dassault Mirage IIICJ

SectiON 07 cARD 24Hawker Hunter FGA.Mk 9

SectiON 07 cARD 38Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-17

SectiON 07 cARD 40Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-19

SectiON 07 cARD 41Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21

SectiON 17 cARD 54Sikorsky S-58

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