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LEXSTAT FL. R. CIV. PRO. 1.110

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*** Rules current through changes received by March 18, 2010 ****** Annotations current through Mar. 2, 2010. ***

Florida Rules of Civil Procedure

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 (2010)

Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule

Rule 1.110. General Rules of Pleading

(a) Forms of Pleadings. --Forms of action and technical forms for seeking relief and of pleas, pleadings, or motionsare abolished.

(b) Claims for Relief. --A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim,crossclaim, or third-party claim, must state a cause of action and shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of thegrounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs nonew grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that the pleader isentitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader deems himself or herself entitled.Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded. Every complaint shall be considered to demandgeneral relief.

When filing an action for foreclosure of a mortgage on residential real property the complaint shall be verified.When verification of a document is required, the document filed shall include an oath, affirmation, or the followingstatement:

"Under penalty of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing, and the facts alleged therein are true and correctto the best of my knowledge and belief."

(c) The Answer. --In the answer a pleader shall state in short and plain terms the pleader's defenses to each claimasserted and shall admit or deny the averments on which the adverse party relies. If the defendant is without knowledge,the defendant shall so state and such statement shall operate as a denial. Denial shall fairly meet the substance of theaverments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part of an averment, the pleader shall specify somuch of it as is true and shall deny the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to controvert all of theaverments of the preceding pleading, the pleader may make denials as specific denials of designated averments or maygenerally deny all of the averments except such designated averments as the pleader expressly admits, but when thepleader does so intend to controvert all of its averments, including averments of the grounds upon which the court's

jurisdiction depends, the pleader may do so by general denial.

(d) Affirmative Defenses. --In pleading to a preceding pleading a party shall set forth affirmatively accord andsatisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, resjudicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmativedefense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court,on terms if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation. Affirmative defensesappearing on the face of a prior pleading may be asserted as grounds for a motion or defense under rule 1.140(b);provided this shall not limit amendments under rule 1.190 even if such ground is sustained.

(e) Effect of Failure to Deny. --Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other thanthose as to the amount of damages, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading towhich no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.

(f) Separate Statements. --All averments of claim or defense shall be made in consecutively numberedparagraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set ofcircumstances, and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all subsequent pleadings. Each claim founded upon aseparate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or defensewhen a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matter set forth.

(g) Joinder of Causes of Action; Consistency. --A pleader may set up in the same action as many claims or causesof action or defenses in the same right as the pleader has, and claims for relief may be stated in the alternative ifseparate items make up the cause of action, or if 2 or more causes of action are joined. A party may also set forth 2 ormore statements of a claim or defense alternatively, either in 1 count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When2 or more statements are made in the alternative and 1 of them, if made independently, would be sufficient, the pleadingis not made insufficient by the insufficiency of 1 or more of the alternative statements. A party may also state as manyseparate claims or defenses as that party has, regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or equitable groundsor both. All pleadings shall be construed so as to do substantial justice.

(h) Subsequent Pleadings. --When the nature of an action permits pleadings subsequent to final judgment and thejurisdiction of the court over the parties has not terminated, the initial pleading subsequent to final judgment shall bedesignated a supplemental complaint or petition. The action shall then proceed in the same manner and time as thoughthe supplemental complaint or petition were the initial pleading in the action, including the issuance of any neededprocess. This subdivision shall not apply to proceedings that may be initiated by motion under these rules.

HISTORY: Amended Feb. 11, 2010 (2010 Fla. LEXIS 180)

NOTES:COMITTEE NOTES

1971 Amendment. Subdivision (h) is added to cover a situation usually arising in divorce judgment modifications,supplemental declaratory relief actions, or trust supervision. When any subsequent proceeding results in a pleading inthe strict technical sense under rule 1.100(a), response by opposing parties will follow the same course as though thenew pleading were the initial pleading in the action. The time for answering and authority for defenses under rule 1.140will apply. The last sentence exempts post judgment motions under rules 1.480(c), 1.530, and 1.540, and similarproceedings from its purview.

CASE NOTES

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

1. Nursing home's denial of all of the facts alleged in an administrative complaint and moratorium order and itsstatement that all of the facts detailed in them were "untrue and warranted reversal," combined with its attachment andincorporation of these documents to its petition for administrative hearing, did not constitute substantial compliancewith Fla. Stat. § 120.54(5)(b)4 and with Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 28-106.201(2). Brookwood Extended Care Ctr. ofHomestead, L.L.P. v. Agency for Healthcare Admin., 870 So. 2d 834, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 12326, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D1869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2003).

2. Hearing officer's interlocutory order refusing to dismiss a disciplinary proceeding on the basis of the statute oflimitations was reviewable on appeal and not subject to collateral attack as a matter of right. Mullin v. State, Dep't ofAdministration, Div. of Administrative Hearings, 354 So. 2d 1216, 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1stDist. 1978), writ of certiorari denied by 359 So. 2d 1217, 1978 Fla. LEXIS 6368 (Fla. 1978).

3. Affirmative defense that debt had been discharged in bankruptcy did not preclude creditor's suit where the bankruptcycourt's final decree did not reflect that the unsecured debt had been discharged. Wellington-Hall, Ltd. v. ComprehensiveCommunities Corp., 321 So. 2d 124, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 15541 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1975).

4. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) provides that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief must contain a short and plainstatement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and theclaim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it; where wife sought judgment against her ex-husband for pastexpenses incurred on marital home (awarded wife in dissolution proceedings), and wife's petition did not contain astatement setting forth the basis for the court's jurisdiction, while it is true that a trial court has continuing jurisdiction tomodify child support but the final judgment of dissolution didn't require the husband to make capital improvements orrepairs on the marital home, the relief sought by the wife did not constitute an enforcement or modification of thedissolution proceedings and accordingly the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Fayson v. Fayson,482 So. 2d 523, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 6106, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1986).

5. When plaintiff filed her complaint in state court and alleged that her damages exceeded $ 15,000 and were less than $74,999, plaintiff met the requirements of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(1) by providing a short and plain statement of thegrounds upon which jurisdiction were based. Saberton v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 2005 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 29943 (M.D. Fla. 2005).

6. Based on procedural rules allowing one form of action and the joinder of legal and equitable claims under Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.110(g), a judge sitting as a trier of fact did not err in awarding punitive damages in a suit asserting ownershipinterests involving both legal and equitable claims. Glusman v. Lieberman, 285 So. 2d 29, 1973 Fla. App. LEXIS 6331(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1973).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

7. Insurer's removal of insured's claim of bad faith refusal to settle was untimely under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1446(b), so thatremand was required under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1447, because the insurer could have intelligently ascertained that the actionwas removable when filed where insurer had actual knowledge of diversity and amount in controversy, pursuant to 28U.S.C.S. § 1332, even though the state court complaint was not required to allege citizenship under Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(b). Bankston v. Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1380, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34645 (M.D. Fla. 2006).

8. Petitioner's bill of complaint for specific performance comported with the requirements set out in Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(b) and was sufficient on its face to state a cause of action against corporation, the transferee in a conveyance of aportion of the real property in dispute; dismissal of the cause by the trial court in anticipation of the assertion ofaffirmative defenses was in error. Hammonds v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 285 So. 2d 7, 1973 Fla. LEXIS 4173 (Fla.1973).

9. Where the defense of modification of an oral agreement regarding real estate broker commissions was not pleadedpursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), it was properly not considered in opposition to the broker's summary judgmentrequest, and testimony from an affidavit and averments in an affidavit in opposition to the summary judgment motionwere also properly not considered where they were based on the defense that had not been pleaded. BSP/Port Orange,LLC v. Water Mill Props., 969 So. 2d 1077, 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 16463, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D 2494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.5th Dist. 2007), review dismissed by 975 So. 2d 1134, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 182 (Fla. 2008).

10. Since the Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(k) statute of limitations defense was apparent from the face of the home buyers'counterclaim, it was permissible for the seller to move to dismiss rather than to assert the statute as an affirmativedefense under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). Swafford v. Schweitzer, 906 So. 2d 1194, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 11060, 30 Fla.L. Weekly D 1729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005).

11. In a case involving company's breach of contract claim against corporation, the trial court erred when it relied on adefense not raised by the pleadings to grant motion for involuntary dismissal. Boca Golf View, Ltd. v. Hughes Hall, Inc.,843 So. 2d 992, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 6180, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2003).

12. Insurer waived any application of the "other insurance" clause by failing to timely raise the issue in the trial courtwhere the "other insurance" clause of the policy was an affirmative defense, and the failure to plead it resulted inwaiver. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Coucher, 837 So. 2d 483, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 19237, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D 131(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2002).

13. Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense that must be specifically pleaded under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), ifnot pleaded, it is waived and cannot be considered by the trial court as the basis for granting summary judgment.Wolowitz v. Thoroughbred Motors, Inc., 765 So. 2d 920, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 10910, 25 Fla. L. Weekly D 2033 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2000).

14. Defendant department of transportation was not liable to pay plaintiff bank's moving and relocation expensesbecause plaintiff relocated before the original condemnation action was filed, and elements of estoppel were notestablished; plaintiff indicated that defendant was merely delaying the project, not terminating it, and could not,therefore, assert that defendant changed its position with regard to the condemnation of part of the property plaintiff wasleasing. DOT v. Firstmerit Bank, 711 So. 2d 1217, 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 5056, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D 1155 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 2d Dist. 1998).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

15. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) now provides that affirmative defenses including the statute of limitations, appearing on theface of a prior pleading may be asserted by motion. Elegele v. Harley Hotels, 689 So. 2d 1305, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS3066, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1997).

16. A malpractice complaint was not facially time-barred where it did not affirmatively and clearly show when clientsknew or should have known of law firm's negligent supervision of an attorney, but alleged only that the clients knewthat defendant had terminated the attorney on a date certain; where defendant had not raised the applicable limitationsperiod, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(a), was not raised as an affirmative defense pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), dismissalof the complaint was error. Jelenc v. Draper, 678 So. 2d 917, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 9115, 21 Fla. L. Weekly D 1945(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1996).

17. Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses that ordinarily mustbe pled in an answer or similar pleading; absent such pleading, the affirmative defense is waived. Palmer v. McCallion,645 So. 2d 131, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 11030, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D 2389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1994).

18. The term "prior pleading," as used in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), refers to one or more prior pleadings of the partyagainst whom the motion to dismiss is directed (a complaint, for example), and a party moving for dismissal cannot relyon its own pleadings as a "prior pleading." Palmer v. McCallion, 645 So. 2d 131, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 11030, 19 Fla.L. Weekly D 2389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1994).

19. Where a complaint and its attachment did not contain sufficient information from which the trial court could haveconcluded that the doctrine of merger barred plaintiffs' cause of action for breach of contract, the trial court hadimproperly converted defendant's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment in dismissing the claim withprejudice because Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) allowed defendant to raise an affirmative defense appearing on the face of acomplaint as a basis of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action; however, the trial court was confined toa review of the allegations of the complaint and could not consider defenses which did not appear on its face, and thecomplaint did not need to anticipate affirmative defenses. Conte v. R & A Food Servs., 644 So. 2d 133, 1994 Fla. App.LEXIS 9981, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D 2263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1994).

20. Under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), the defense of release is an affirmative defense which must be pled in a defendant'sanswer. Pontier v. Wolfson, 637 So. 2d 39, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 4553, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D 1092 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2d Dist. 1994).

21. Where attorney sued for malpractice did not file an answer containing affirmative defense of release, as wasrequired under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), the trial court erred by granting the attorney's motion to dismiss. Pontier v.Wolfson, 637 So. 2d 39, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 4553, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D 1092 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1994).

22. Under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), a defendant's attempt to raise a defense of preemption of a state law negligenceclaim by the Federal Aviation Act by way of a motion to dismiss, without having raised it in the answer, was improper;the court held that an affirmative defense must be raised in the responsive pleading before it could be considered in amotion to dismiss. Martin v. Eastern Airlines, 630 So. 2d 1206, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 149, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D 159(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1994).

23. Dismissal based on the doctrine of laches, of patient's complaint that alleged dental malpractice against the dentistwas reversed because laches was an affirmative defense, the burden of proof was on the party asserting laches, and suchburden needed to be proved by very clear and positive evidence pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b); affirmativedefenses appearing on the face of a prior pleading could have been asserted as grounds for a motion to dismiss underFla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), however, the dentist failed to bring attention to any portion of the patient's complaint thatshowed "clear and positive evidence" of laches on the face of the complaint. Kornaker v. Payor, 565 So. 2d 899, 1990Fla. App. LEXIS 6417, 15 Fla. L. Weekly D 2132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1990).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

24. When determining defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint based upon the statute of limitations underFla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) the court was confined to the allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint, andall allegations must be taken as true; as a general rule, the statute of limitations should be raised as an affirmativedefense in the answer, rather than as a ground for a motion to dismiss. Anderson v. Emro Marketing Co., 550 So. 2d531, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 5879, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1989).

25. Appellate court reversed an order of a trial court that dismissed with prejudice mortgage company's second amendedcomplaint that sought to enforce a foreign judgment where the court found that mortgage company's complaintsufficiently stated a cause of action and therefore should have survived the motion to dismiss; pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110 and 1.120, defendant should have filed an answer setting forth its affirmative defense that the foreign judgmentbeing sued upon was not recognizable as a final judgment, and the issues could then be drawn, litigated, and decided.Sovran Bank, N.A. v. Parsons, 547 So. 2d 1044, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4673, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1988 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 4th Dist. 1989), reversed by 655 So. 2d 220, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 5761, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D 1298 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 4th Dist. 1995).

26. Where an obligor purchased property from the obligees and executed a promissory note which provided that theobligee was responsible for special assessment liens and any pending liens against the property as of the date of closing,the obligee was entitled only to a set-off under the accelerated promissory note for the amount of the unsatisfied lienwhich the obligor had paid; the affirmative defense of failure of consideration could not be raised to excuse the obligor'sfailure to make two interest payments on the note because the defense had not been pleaded as was required under Fla.R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). Myrick v. Smith, 522 So. 2d 885, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 595, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 2d Dist. 1988).

27. Under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), defendant should have raised their statute of limitations defense in an answer, ratherthan filing a motion to dismiss. Alexander Hamilton Corp. v. Leeson, 508 So. 2d 513, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8662, 12Fla. L. Weekly 1436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1987).

28. Because sudden brake failure is an avoidance or affirmative defense to a claim of personal injuries caused by arear-ended automobile accident, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) requires sudden brake failure to be specially pled as anaffirmative defense. Ironman v. Rhoades, 493 So. 2d 1097, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 9591, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1943 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1986).

29. A claim filed beyond the time set forth in a statute of limitations is only barred if the statute of limitations is raisedas an affirmative defense or pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), if the defense appears on the face of the prior plea, byway of motion to dismiss. Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So. 2d 447, 1986 Fla. LEXIS2607, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 456 (Fla. 1986).

30. Affirmative defense of res judicata was successfully raised pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) where defendantraised the affirmative defense in the answer to the complaint and established the defense by reference to the exhibitsattached to the complaint, even though it was not specifically labeled an affirmative defense. Patterson v. Weathers, 476So. 2d 1294, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 15645, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1985).

31. Where defendant guarantor disputed the amount due on the guaranty but did not contend that the guaranty wasdischarged by reason of full payment, the guarantor did not have to plead, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.10(d), theaffirmative defense of payment in order to place the amount of damages in controversy. Marlar v. Quincy State Bank,463 So. 2d 1233, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 12461, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1985).

32. In a bank's action on a note and the debtor's counterclaim for abuse of process and malicious prosecution, pursuantto Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) the bank could not raise in cross- motions for summary judgment the affirmative defense of

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

advice of counsel where such defense was not raised in the pleadings. Gause v. First Bank of Marianna, 457 So. 2d 582,1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 15456, 9 Fla. L. Weekly 2186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1984).

33. Ex-employee's complaint against the estate of his former employer for malicious prosecution should not have beendismissed with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action because the complaint did not need to anticipate theaffirmative defense of probable cause to arrest the ex-employee; given Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), the affirmative defensethat probable cause existed should not have precluded the possibility of amendment of the complaint. Simonin v. Sims,456 So. 2d 499, 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 14912, 9 Fla. L. Weekly 1874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1984).

34. Trial court erred in granting the employers' motion to dismiss because the complaint did not contain allegationsregarding the affirmative defense of workers' compensation insurance coverage as required under Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(d). Moucha v. Burger King Corp., 450 So. 2d 335, 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 13403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist.1984).

35. Payment of a note was an affirmative defense that should have been pleaded under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d).Goldberger v. Regency Highland Condominium Ass'n, 452 So. 2d 583, 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 13082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.4th Dist. 1984).

36. Under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), statute of limitations and statute of frauds were affirmative defenses and were notproperly raised by motion to dismiss where the complaint did not affirmatively and clearly show the conclusiveapplicability of such defense to bar the action. Evans v. Parker, 440 So. 2d 640, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 24083 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1983).

37. In a suit by developers challenging homeowners' ability to change restrictive covenants governing the size of newhomes in a subdivision, where developers argued on appeal that the trial court should have denied summary judgment tohomeowners because changed circumstances and frustration of the original purpose of the 1976 restrictions relieveddevelopers from being bound thereto, this argument constituted an avoidance which had to be affirmatively pledpursuant to Fla. R. Civ.P. 1.110(d). Dorsey v. Bacon, 436 So. 2d 1017, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 20030 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1st Dist. 1983).

38. Suit by ex-wife seeking to domesticate a judgment for child support obtained against ex-husband in another statewas improperly dismissed for failure of the ex-wife to prove that the judgment was unsatisfied because the ex-husbandunder Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) had the burden to establish payment as an affirmative defense. Courtheoux v. George,410 So. 2d 532, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 19091 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1982).

39. Where an answer should have established res judicata or collateral estoppel, but failed to mention them, and theywere not appropriately and properly presented at trial, the issues were not raised by adequate pleading or proof, andreversible error was not demonstrated. Weiner v. Savage, 407 So. 2d 288, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 21894 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 4th Dist. 1981).

40. Term "prior pleading" as used in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) refers to one or more prior pleadings of the party againstwhom the motion to dismiss was directed, thus, the rule that the defense of res judicata could not be raised by motion todismiss except where the allegations of the complaint supported application of that defense. Tesher & Tesher, P.A. v.Cook, 386 So. 2d 1305, 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 16968 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1980).

41. Lessor's assertion that lessees' payment of rent under an illegal escalation clause was a waiver of the illegality had tobe raised as an affirmative defense to be pled and proved by the lessor. Goldenberg v. Dome Condominium Asso., 376So. 2d 37, 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 15962 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1979).

42. A general averment of lack of consideration made by debtor was sufficient to raise the defense of lack of

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

consideration. Howdeshell v. First Nat'l Bank, 369 So. 2d 432, 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 14407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist.1979).

43. On a motion to dismiss a complaint, the court must look solely to the allegations of the complaint; if the face of thecomplaint contains allegations which demonstrate the existence of an affirmative defense, then such defense may beconsidered under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d); otherwise, an affirmative defense may not be considered on a motion todismiss a complaint. Frank v. Campbell Property Management, Inc., 351 So. 2d 364, 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 16613 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1977).

44. Although plaintiffs failed to reply to defendant's affirmative defense, this merely denied, as opposed to avoided, theaffirmative defense under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(e); because the case was remanded, the court held that plaintiffs wereentitled to reply to the affirmative defense on remand as Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190 urged the allowance of liberal amendmentof pleadings. Lazar v. Allen, 347 So. 2d 457, 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 15898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1977).

45. In an employees' action to recover wages that should have been paid, the municipality's argument that budgetaryrestrictions required the lower salaries was an affirmative defense, and should therefore have been excluded from trialpursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). Kersey v. Riviera Beach, 337 So. 2d 995, 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 15519 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1976).

46. Affirmative defense that debt had been discharged in bankruptcy did not preclude creditor's suit where thebankruptcy court's final decree did not reflect that the unsecured debt had been discharged. Wellington-Hall, Ltd. v.Comprehensive Communities Corp., 321 So. 2d 124, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 15541 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1975).

47. The amendment to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) provided no comfort to defendants because the affirmative defenses didnot appear on the face of the complaint; therefore the exception, as provided in Rule 1.110(d), could not be successfullyrelied upon. Ecological Science Corp. v. Boca Ciega Sanitary Dist., 317 So. 2d 857, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 13852 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1975).

48. Rule of res judicata holds that a final judgment on the merits entered by a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar tofuture action by the plaintiff, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d); that rule specifies that res judicata is an affirmativedefense. Maloney v. Heftler Realty Co., 316 So. 2d 594, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 14176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist.1975).

49. Trial court erred in considering matters in addition to the complaint in ruling on the motion to dismiss filed pursuantto Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) and 1.140(b); affirmative defenses did not appear on face of complaint and therefore theyshould have been raised by pleading, rather than by motion. Temples v. Florida Industrial Constr. Co., 310 So. 2d 326,1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 13977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1975).

50. Principal could not collaterally attack default judgment via an independent action, when the release upon whichprincipal relied should have been raised as an affirmative defense, pursuant Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d); release did notapply to surety's claim because it pre-dated surety's claim. Sottile v. Gaines Constr. Co., 281 So. 2d 558, 1973 Fla. App.LEXIS 7724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1973), writ of certiorari denied by 289 So. 2d 737, 1974 Fla. LEXIS 4496 (Fla.1974).

51. Summary judgment was upheld where the record failed to disclose any proof supporting the affirmative defensealleged in defendant's amended answer; although plaintiffs did not reply as a matter of pleading, the defense wasnevertheless denied by operation of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(e), which provided that averments in a pleading to which noresponsive pleading was required or permitted were to be taken as denied or avoided. Ross v. Nelson, 273 So. 2d 790,1973 Fla. App. LEXIS 7325, 44 Oil & Gas Rep. 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1973).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

52. In an action to recover mortgage brokerage fees, the defendant's claim that the plaintiff was not a licensed brokerand that he was therefore not entitled to fees pursuant to former Fla. Stat. § 494.04(1) (repealed) and 494.08(5)(a), wasan affirmative defense pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), and evidence thereof was properly excluded at trial.Sonnenblick-Goldman of Miami Corp. v. Feldman, 266 So. 2d 48, 1972 Fla. App. LEXIS 6229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3dDist. 1972), writ of certiorari denied by 270 So. 2d 15, 1972 Fla. LEXIS 3138 (Fla. 1972).

53. Judgment on the pleading entered in favor of spouses in a creditor's bill complaint, on the grounds that the creditor'sfailure to file a reply to affirmative defences raised by the spouses was fatal, was reversed; the creditor was not requiredto file a reply to the affirmative defenses because they merely denied the allegations in the complaint and no new issuewould have been presented by a reply denying the affirmative defenses. Rausch-Livingston Real Estate, Inc. v. Dixon,260 So. 2d 290, 1972 Fla. App. LEXIS 6971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1972).

54. The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and estoppel byjudgment because substantively the evidence did not support the finding but also because defendant failed, under Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.110(d) to raise those defenses as affirmative defenses in its answer as required by the rule, as defendant raisedthem in its motion to dismiss the complaint. Daniel v. Department of Transp., 259 So. 2d 771, 1972 Fla. App. LEXIS7166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1972).

55. The trial court correctly denied putative father's motion for summary judgment in a paternity suit on the basis of thestatute of limitations because the statute of limitations did not appear on the face of the answer. B. B. S. v. R. C. B., 252So. 2d 837, 1971 Fla. App. LEXIS 6071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1971).

56. Mortgagors sued for acceleration and foreclosure for failing to make timely periodic mortgage payments werepermitted to raise the affirmative defense of making prepayments greater than the amounts due because the mortgagors'affirmative defense appeared on the face of the mortgagors' prior pleading. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Pringle, 216 So. 2d 468,1968 Fla. App. LEXIS 4701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1968).

57. Lessee who failed to allege payment in responsive pleadings to lessor's action for breach of lease was barred fromraising payment in opposition to lessor's motion for summary judgment under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). JenkinsTrucking, Inc. v. Emmons, 212 So. 2d 55, 1968 Fla. App. LEXIS 5245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1968), writ ofcertiorari denied by 218 So. 2d 173, 1968 Fla. LEXIS 3574 (Fla. 1968).

58. Where defendant never raised the Statute of Frauds as an affirmative defense in his answer, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ.P. 1.110, he waived his right to raise it. Sorensen v. Eshelman, 202 So. 2d 597, 1967 Fla. App. LEXIS 4303 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1967).

59. Two corporations' oral agreement to act as sureties on a debt incurred by a bankrupt corporation was not enforceableunder the statute of frauds because the corporations failed to plead the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense.Gordon International Advertising, Inc. v. Charlotte County Land & Title Co., 170 So. 2d 59, 1964 Fla. App. LEXIS3913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1964).

60. Administrator of a decedent's estate could not base a motion to dismiss a complaint that sought to enforce an oralagreement to devise real property on the ground that the oral agreement violated the statute of frauds even though theavailability of the defense as a bar to the action appeared on the face of the complaint, where the statute of frauds wasnot pled as an affirmative defense in the administrator's answer. Fletcher v. Williams, 153 So. 2d 759, 1963 Fla. App.LEXIS 3272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1963).

61. Defendant's efforts to raise the affirmative defense of failure of consideration to prevent the entry of the summaryjudgment was ineffective; the affirmative defense was not pleaded in the answer and there was no request to amend.Mark Leach Health Furniture Co. v. Thal, 143 So. 2d 64, 1962 Fla. App. LEXIS 3011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

1962).

62. Plaintiff's complaint to set aside a formal divorce decree, alleging fraud, was not barred by laches; however, thecomplaint was improperly dismissed because the issue was raised by motion and not in an answer. Volpicella v.Volpicella, 136 So. 2d 231, 1962 Fla. App. LEXIS 3560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1962), overruled in part by BocaBurger, Inc. v. Forum, 912 So. 2d 561, 2005 Fla. LEXIS 1449, 30 Fla. L. Weekly S 649 (Fla. 2005).

63. Affirmative defenses, the burden of proof of which rests upon a defendant, should be raised through an answer,rather than by motions to dismiss, for more definite statement, or to strike. Nunez v. Alford, 117 So. 2d 208, 1960 Fla.App. LEXIS 2652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1960).

64. Where the defendant in a civil action based upon contract filed a counterclaim which included an assertion of wantof consideration, the defense mistakenly included in the counterclaim was entitled to be treated as though it hadproperly been set forth in the answer as an affirmative defense. Mayflower, Inc. v. Suskind, 112 So. 2d 394, 1959 Fla.App. LEXIS 2935 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1959), writ of certiorari denied by 115 So. 2d 416, 1959 Fla. LEXIS 1391(Fla. 1959).

65. Although individual defendants raised by motion the 20 year statute of repose, defendants failed to affirmativelyplead the statute by answer and the cause was therefore remanded to permit amendment of the answer of defendants byadding the affirmative defense and to permit a traverse of same by plaintiff. Garrett v. Oak Hall Club, 112 So. 2d 603,1959 Fla. App. LEXIS 2955 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1959), quashed by 118 So. 2d 633, 1960 Fla. LEXIS 2570 (Fla.1960).

66. The defense of ratification and waiver was an affirmative defense and was required to be set up in the answer; it wasnot available upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Toffel v. Baugher, 111 So. 2d290, 1959 Fla. App. LEXIS 2844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1959).

67. Attorney deserved summary judgment in his suit to collect contingency fees automatically forwarded to him underan agreement with a law firm because the law firm admitted under oath every material allegation in the complaint, plusa work sheet that was offered into evidence resolved every factual issue in the attorney's favor; the law firm's affidavitstating that the parties had entered a new oral contract that discharged the contract sued upon was not consideredbecause the law firm waived that defense by failing to raise it in the firm's answer to the complaint. Fink v. Powsner,108 So. 2d 324, 1958 Fla. App. LEXIS 2226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1958), writ of certiorari dismissed by 114 So.2d 6, 1959 Fla. LEXIS 1582 (Fla. 1959).

68. In an action to establish ownership of the residence in which a mother and her daughter lived, as against thecorporation holding legal title, and to enjoin a pending landlord and tenant action by which the corporation sought toobtain possession, the trial court improperly dismissed the individuals' complaint where the corporation failed to assertits affirmative defenses on the face of the complaint, and those defenses could not properly be raised on a motion todismiss. Binz v. Helvetia Florida Enterprises, Inc., 104 So. 2d 124, 1958 Fla. App. LEXIS 2955 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3dDist. 1958).

69. Dismissal of a husband's divorce suit was improper because the wife raised the affirmative defense of res judicata ina motion to dismiss; the defense of res adjudicata was affirmative in nature and had to be plead in an answer. Chambersv. Chambers, 102 So. 2d 171, 1958 Fla. App. LEXIS 2807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1958).

70. Trial court erred in dismissing complaint of executrix for damages and an accounting against an insurance companybecause the company's assertion of res judicata and latches should have been raised in its answer and not in a motion todismiss. Braz v. Professional Ins. Corp., 101 So. 2d 594, 1958 Fla. App. LEXIS 2715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1958).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

71. Wife was not entitled to prevail on a motion to dismiss the husband's complaint for divorce because the rule doesnot include estoppel by judgment or res judicata as grounds for a motion to dismiss, as pleaded by the wife in hermotion; furthermore, the husband did not have notice that at the hearing on the motion to dismiss he would be calledupon to defend against the evidence on the affirmative defense of res judicata raised by the wife in the motion, ratherthan as an affirmative defense in an answer. Stone v. Stone, 97 So. 2d 352, 1957 Fla. App. LEXIS 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 3d Dist. 1957).

72. In an action on a promissory note, the inconsistency of the debtor's two affirmative defenses of joint venture andusury was not a valid objection and did not support dismissal on the pleading. Griffin v. Kelly, 92 So. 2d 515, 1957 Fla.LEXIS 3655 (Fla. 1957).

73. In an action seeking an injunction and other equitable relief, land owner alleged she had riparian rights and thatdefendant's boat docks encroached upon her rights in her complaint and complaint was improperly dismissed because itstated in substance a cause of action under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(6), but failed to state a cause of action by short andplain statements of the ultimate facts as required by Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2). Feller v. Eau Gallie Yacht Basin, Inc.,397 So. 2d 1155, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 19108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1981).

74. In response to creditor's complaint, debtor omitted any reference to a paragraph in creditor's complaint whereindebtor agreed to pay creditor's attorney fees and, therefore, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P 1. 110(e), the effect was to admitto the paragraph and render proof unnecessary; consequently denial of an award of attorney fees to creditor wasreversed because the pleadings were closed on the subject of attorney fees. Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. Trude, 508 So.2d 1327, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8995, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1987).

75. Junior lienor's general denial under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(c) of that count of a complaint in a foreclosure action thatstated that the mortgage had been executed and delivered by the owner of the property did not create a duty in titlecompany to defend insured against the debtor in default on mortgage, because junior leinor presented only generaldenial without triggering specific defenses covered by policy. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Fourth CommerceProperties Corp., 487 So. 2d 1051, 1986 Fla. LEXIS 2069, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 183 (Fla. 1986).

76. In negligence action for slip and fall injuries, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(c) required a defensive pleader to specify whatwas true and what was denied, and where evidence at trial showed defendant was, admittedly, the owner of the store,there was a waiver and estoppel from asserting a general denial of liability that would support a directed verdict that itwas not the responsible party because it was a prehistoric tactic to leap from ambush with a claim of a failure of proofonly after plaintiffs had rested. Sobel v. Jefferson Stores, Inc., 459 So. 2d 433, 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 15897, 9 Fla. L.Weekly 2452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1984).

77. Summary judgment should not have been awarded to insurer in light of insured's statement in her answer to insurer'scounterclaim that she was without knowledge of a brochure having been furnished by insurer, because Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(c) provided that a statement in an answer that a pleader was without knowledge operated as a denial. Lustig v.Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 406 So. 2d 543, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 21690 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1981).

78. Although plaintiffs failed to reply to defendant's affirmative defense, this merely denied, as opposed to avoided, theaffirmative defense under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(e); because the case was remanded, the court held that plaintiffs wereentitled to reply to the affirmative defense on remand as Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190 urged the allowance of liberal amendmentof pleadings. Lazar v. Allen, 347 So. 2d 457, 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 15898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1977).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

79. Judgment on the pleadings entered in favor of spouses in a creditor's bill complaint filed by a creditor, on thegrounds that the creditor's failure to file a reply to affirmative defenses raised by the spouses was fatal, was reversed;the creditor was not required to file a reply to the affirmative defenses because they merely denied the allegations in thecomplaint and no new issue would have been presented by a reply denying the affirmative defenses. American Salvage& Jobbing Co. v. Salomon, 295 So. 2d 710, 1974 Fla. App. LEXIS 7156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1974).

80. Judgment on the pleading entered in favor of spouses in a creditor's bill complaint, on the grounds that the creditor'sfailure to file a reply to affirmative defences raised by the spouses was fatal, was reversed; the creditor was not requiredto file a reply to the affirmative defenses because they merely denied the allegations in the complaint and no new issuewould have been presented by a reply denying the affirmative defenses. Rausch-Livingston Real Estate, Inc. v. Dixon,260 So. 2d 290, 1972 Fla. App. LEXIS 6971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1972).

81. Appeals court disagreed with the trial court that an Attorney General's complaint, filed pursuant to Fla. Stat. §501.204(1) on behalf of various small businesses, failed to state a claim for relief, as the trial court: (1) erroneouslywent beyond the factual allegations contained in said complaint; (2) prematurely made findings; (3) relied on lawoutside of the Act, upon which relief was based; and (4) neglected to find that count one of the complaint was factuallysound. Office of the AG, Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Commerce Commer. Leasing, LLC, 946 So. 2d 1253, 2007 Fla. App.LEXIS 887, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2007).

82. Despite finding that the trial court correctly dismissed the second count of complaint filed pursuant to the FloridaDeceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (Act) on behalf of various small businesses, which alleged that the equipmentrental agreements at issue were for the provision of future consumer services in violation of Fla. Admin. Code Ann. R.2-18.002, remand was still ordered, as said dismissal should not have been with prejudice. Office of the AG, Dep't ofLegal Affairs v. Commerce Commer. Leasing, LLC, 946 So. 2d 1253, 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 887, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2007).

83. Negligence complaint was erroneously dismissed for failure to state a cause of action because it alleged that aprescription that was allegedly negligently filled was (1) unreasonable on its face, because it was over four months old,(2) prescribed a medication which could cause death if not used by someone on a certain regimen, and (3) because italleged that the pharmacist should have warned the patient of the prescription's dangers and/or consulted with herphysician, and did not. Dee v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 878 So. 2d 426, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 9171, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D1545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2004).

84. When a pleading may be read alternatively in a way to state a particular claim, yet also in still another way not tostate the claim, the only effect of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g) is to require that the appellate courts read it to state the claim.Gouveia v. Phillips, 823 So. 2d 215, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 10842, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D 1751 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4thDist. 2002).

85. Petition for mandamus relief failed to contain a short and plain statement that respondent city had a clear legal dutyto perform a zoning inspection or hear petitioner's zoning appeals, or that petitioner had an entitlement to respondent'sperformance of such duty, and so did not state a claim for relief in conformance with Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2). RHSCorp. v. City of Boynton Beach, 736 So. 2d 1211, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 6793, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 4th Dist. 1999).

86. Subcontractor's claims against contractor for promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and fraud in the inducementshould not have been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action under Fla. R. Cir. P. 1.110(b), but claim based onquantum meruit was properly dismissed because of a failure to plead that subcontractor provided any goods or services.W.R. Townsend Contr., Inc. v. Jensen Civ. Constr., Inc., 728 So. 2d 297, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 1504, 24 Fla. L. Weekly

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

D 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1999).

87. Dismissal of employee and his wife's amended complaint against employer for failure to state a claim was reversedwhere the amended complaint complied with Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 and sufficiently stated a cause of action. Dunnell v.Malone & Hyde, Inc., 425 So. 2d 646, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 18544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1983).

88. In an action seeking an injunction and other equitable relief, land owner alleged she had riparian rights and thatdefendant's boat docks encroached upon her rights in her complaint and complaint was improperly dismissed because itstated in substance a cause of action under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(6), but failed to state a cause of action by short andplain statements of the ultimate facts as required by Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2). Feller v. Eau Gallie Yacht Basin, Inc.,397 So. 2d 1155, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 19108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1981).

89. Trial court erred in dismissing residents' complaint as to their entitlement to injunctive relief; allegations of aviolation of a specific setback restriction, combined with an assertion of the binding nature of such restriction and thedetrimental effect of its continued violation, were more than sufficient to state a cause of action pursuant to Fla. R. Civ.P. 1.110. Watson v. Buchanan, 344 So. 2d 644, 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 15441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1977).

90. Where an amended complaint alleged that plaintiff builder constructed a 100-unit apartment complex for defendantdeveloper for a basic contract price of $1,100,400, that during construction, extra expenses were incurred at the requestor with the authorization of, defendant builder and lender, that plaintiff signed an FHA cost certification with theunderstanding that the defendants would pay the balance owing on the construction contract, but that it was never paid,that defendant lender negligently released the final loan funds to developer knowing that there was a dispute over thesefunds, that a defendant director of the developer, with intent to defraud, embezzled the funds in conspiracy with otherdirectors of developer, and that the three directors paid themselves with the money and left plaintiff's claim unsatisfied,the amended complaint, contained facts sufficient under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) to indicate that a cause of action foractual and punitive damages existed. Snead Constr. Corp. v. Parkway East, Inc., 324 So. 2d 206, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS19068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1975).

91. The affirmative defense of statute of limitations was properly asserted in a motion to dismiss for failure to state acause of action even though it did not appear in the answer because it was stated in the amended complaint and thesecond amended complaint; the requirement that an affirmative defense be stated on the face of a prior pleading wastherefore satisfied. Timmins v. Firestone, 283 So. 2d 63, 1973 Fla. App. LEXIS 6589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist.1973).

92. Complaint alleging cause of action for gross negligence was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action underFla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) because plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to make it fairly appear that the defendant'scourse of conduct was of a gross, willful, and wanton character. Tramill v. Summerlin, 276 So. 2d 173, 1973 Fla. App.LEXIS 6879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1973), quashed by 290 So. 2d 53, 1973 Fla. LEXIS 3971 (Fla. 1973).

93. It was a fundamental principle of pleading under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 that the complaint, to have been sufficient,must have alleged ultimate facts as distinguished from legal conclusions which, if proved, would have established acause of action for which relief could have been granted; when the amended third-party complaint alleged no facts fromwhich the legal conclusion urged by the third-party defendant could have been drawn, it was properly dismissed.Maiden v. Carter, 234 So. 2d 168, 1970 Fla. App. LEXIS 6499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1970).

94. Plaintiff's complaint seeking damages for the breach of an alleged written contract between himself and insurancecompany, although inartfully drawn, sufficiently alleged a breach of a written agreement or could have been soamended to state a cause of action and so should not have been dismissed pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g). Cook v.Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co., 221 So. 2d 18, 1969 Fla. App. LEXIS 5889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1969).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

95. The defense of ratification and waiver was an affirmative defense and was required to be set up in the answer; it wasnot available upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Toffel v. Baugher, 111 So. 2d290, 1959 Fla. App. LEXIS 2844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1959).

96. Where a party challenged a chancery court's jurisdiction for failure to transfer the case for jury trial, the challengefailed; a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action admitted all matters well pleaded and served only to testthe sufficiency of the pleadings. Ganaway v. Henderson, 103 So. 2d 693, 1958 Fla. App. LEXIS 2914 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 1st Dist. 1958).

97. Complaint by a real estate salesman seeking an accounting and the imposition of a resulting trust on proceedsreceived from the sale of certain property was dismissed as failing to state a cause for equitable relief where thecomplaint failed to allege any specific sum for any distinct interest in or aliquot part of any of the land involved, and thesalesman did not obligate himself by agreement to pay the same; furthermore, the complaint failed to allege theexistence of a joint venture because there were neither allegations of joint adventure, joint control, nor a duty thesalesman's part to share in any losses that the parties could have sustained. Revell v. Crews, 97 So. 2d 336, 1957 Fla.App. LEXIS 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1957), writ of certiorari denied by 101 So. 2d 817, 1958 Fla. LEXIS 1689(Fla. 1958).

98. Plaintiff's complaint sufficiently set forth the facts upon which plaintiff relied and informed the defendant of thenature of the cause against him; defendant was apprised of the exact nature of the negligent act charged against it,therefore, the trial court improperly dismissed plaintiff's complaint. Arnold v. Miami Beach Kennel Club, Inc., 88 So. 2d617, 1956 Fla. LEXIS 3844 (Fla. 1956).

99. Trial court erred in dismissing a corporation's case against guarantors seeking payment under a contract guarantybecause the guarantors failed to follow the procedures set forth in the Uniform Out-of-Country Foreign JudgmentRecognition Act to have a Venezuelan judgment rejecting the corporation's claims recognized in Florida. Garnac GrainCo. v. Mejia, 962 So. 2d 408, 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 12746, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D 1963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist.2007).

100. Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), affirmative defenses appearing on the face of a prior pleading may be assertedas grounds for a motion to dismiss under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b); accordingly, a complaint may be dismissed if itsallegations show the existence of an affirmative defense to the claims asserted in the complaint. O'Halloran v.PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 969 So. 2d 1039, 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 6784, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 2d Dist. 2007).

101. Nursing home's denial of all of the facts alleged in an administrative complaint and moratorium order and itsstatement that all of the facts detailed in them were "untrue and warranted reversal," combined with its attachment andincorporation of these documents to its petition for administrative hearing, did not constitute substantial compliancewith Fla. Stat. § 120.54(5)(b)4 and with Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 28-106.201(2). Brookwood Extended Care Ctr. ofHomestead, L.L.P. v. Agency for Healthcare Admin., 870 So. 2d 834, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 12326, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D1869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2003).

102. Where a complaint and its attachment did not contain sufficient information from which the trial court could haveconcluded that the doctrine of merger barred plaintiffs' cause of action for breach of contract, the trial court hadimproperly converted defendant's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment in dismissing the claim withprejudice because Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) allowed defendant to raise an affirmative defense appearing on the face of acomplaint as a basis of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action; however, the trial court was confined toa review of the allegations of the complaint and could not consider defenses which did not appear on its face, and the

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

complaint did not need to anticipate affirmative defenses. Conte v. R & A Food Servs., 644 So. 2d 133, 1994 Fla. App.LEXIS 9981, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D 2263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1994).

103. Under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), a defendant's attempt to raise a defense of preemption of a state law negligenceclaim by the Federal Aviation Act by way of a motion to dismiss, without having raised it in the answer, was improper;the court held that an affirmative defense must be raised in the responsive pleading before it could be considered in amotion to dismiss. Martin v. Eastern Airlines, 630 So. 2d 1206, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 149, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D 159(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1994).

104. Where the statute of limitations defense appeared on the face of a complaint in an action for damages arising out ofan automobile accident, the defendant was entitled to raise the defense of statute of limitations by a motion to dismissunder Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), and was not limited to raising it by answering and pleading an affirmative defense.General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thornberry, 629 So. 2d 292, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 12527, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D 4(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1993).

105. Dismissal based on the doctrine of laches, of patient's complaint that alleged dental malpractice against the dentistwas reversed because laches was an affirmative defense, the burden of proof was on the party asserting laches, and suchburden needed to be proved by very clear and positive evidence pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b); affirmativedefenses appearing on the face of a prior pleading could have been asserted as grounds for a motion to dismiss underFla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), however, the dentist failed to bring attention to any portion of the patient's complaint thatshowed "clear and positive evidence" of laches on the face of the complaint. Kornaker v. Payor, 565 So. 2d 899, 1990Fla. App. LEXIS 6417, 15 Fla. L. Weekly D 2132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1990).

106. Trial court erred in denying home buyer's motion to elect a remedy and voluntarily dismiss their breach ofwarranty suit against a home builder because the buyers had adequately pled an alternate theory and remedy under Fla.R. App. P. 1.110(g). Feinberg v. Naile, 561 So. 2d 1307, 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 3804, 15 Fla. L. Weekly D 1467 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1990).

107. Appellate court reversed an order of a trial court that dismissed with prejudice mortgage company's secondamended complaint that sought to enforce a foreign judgment where the court found that mortgage company's complaintsufficiently stated a cause of action and therefore should have survived the motion to dismiss; pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110 and 1.120, defendant should have filed an answer setting forth its affirmative defense that the foreign judgmentbeing sued upon was not recognizable as a final judgment, and the issues could then be drawn, litigated, and decided.Sovran Bank, N.A. v. Parsons, 547 So. 2d 1044, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4673, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1988 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 4th Dist. 1989), reversed by 655 So. 2d 220, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 5761, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D 1298 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 4th Dist. 1995).

108. Under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), defendant should have raised their statute of limitations defense in an answer,rather than filing a motion to dismiss. Alexander Hamilton Corp. v. Leeson, 508 So. 2d 513, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS8662, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1987).

109. A claim filed beyond the time set forth in a statute of limitations is only barred if the statute of limitations is raisedas an affirmative defense or pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), if the defense appears on the face of the prior plea, byway of motion to dismiss. Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So. 2d 447, 1986 Fla. LEXIS2607, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 456 (Fla. 1986).

110. Discharged employee's complaint set forth sufficient facts to state a cause of action on counts of libel, fraud, andbreach of an oral contract sufficient under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) because he alleged a letter by his employer that waslibel per se, because he alleged statements by his employer regarding the terms of his employment that were to knownto be false by the employer at the time they were made, and because it alleged that the employer had agreed to increase

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

his salary. Perry v. Cosgrove, 464 So. 2d 664, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 12625, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 608, 11 Media L. Rep.(BNA) 1931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1985).

111. Trial court erred in granting the employers' motion to dismiss because the complaint did not contain allegationsregarding the affirmative defense of workers' compensation insurance coverage as required under Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(d). Moucha v. Burger King Corp., 450 So. 2d 335, 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 13403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist.1984).

112. Trial court acted improperly when it considered matters outside the complaint and granted a motion to dismiss; thecomplaint did not reveal the existence of the prior adjudication of the parties' rights in property so as to permit the courtto consider res judicata pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). Vaswani v. Ganobsek, 402 So. 2d 1350, 1981 Fla. App.LEXIS 20958 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1981).

113. Term "prior pleading" as used in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) refers to one or more prior pleadings of the party againstwhom the motion to dismiss was directed, thus, the rule that the defense of res judicata could not be raised by motion todismiss except where the allegations of the complaint supported application of that defense. Tesher & Tesher, P.A. v.Cook, 386 So. 2d 1305, 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 16968 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1980).

114. On a motion to dismiss a complaint, the court must look solely to the allegations of the complaint; if the face of thecomplaint contains allegations which demonstrate the existence of an affirmative defense, then such defense may beconsidered under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d); otherwise, an affirmative defense may not be considered on a motion todismiss a complaint. Frank v. Campbell Property Management, Inc., 351 So. 2d 364, 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 16613 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1977).

115. Order dismissing an amended complaint was reversed because when the plaintiff alleged that a sale was made tohim in violation of the Florida Securities law, the plaintiff's demand for relief was clear, rescission; thus, the plaintiff'scomplaint was sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Fla. R. Civ.P. 1.110. Haygood v. Adams Drugs, Inc., 346 So. 2d 612, 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 15714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist.1977).

116. Movie theater, its manager and owner could not dismiss licensing corporations' breach of contract complaint formisjoinder of parties under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g), where each licensing corporation had the same type of movielicensing contract that provided for a percentage of the gross admission as consideration therefore, all of the counts inthe complaint related to the identical time period, and the same auditor conducted the audit of the records which gaverise to the complaint. Carbonell v. American International Pictures, Inc., 313 So. 2d 417, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 14810(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1975).

117. Trial court erred in considering matters in addition to the complaint in ruling on the motion to dismiss filedpursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) and 1.140(b); affirmative defenses did not appear on face of complaint and thereforethey should have been raised by pleading, rather than by motion. Temples v. Florida Industrial Constr. Co., 310 So. 2d326, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 13977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1975).

118. On an action for unjust enrichment based upon plaintiff's expenditure of labor and material, the trial court properlydismissed the action because of the failure of the pleader to comply with the applicable statute; however, the order ofdismissal should have granted plaintiff leave to amend. L. C. Morris, Inc. v. Allison, 277 So. 2d 28, 1973 Fla. App.LEXIS 6682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1973).

119. The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and estoppel byjudgment because substantively the evidence did not support the finding but also because defendant failed, under Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.110(d) to raise those defenses as affirmative defenses in its answer as required by the rule, as defendant raised

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

them in its motion to dismiss the complaint. Daniel v. Department of Transp., 259 So. 2d 771, 1972 Fla. App. LEXIS7166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1972).

120. Trial court erred in denying beneficiary's motion to dismiss trustees' complaint to construe no contest clausebecause the complaint did not allege sufficient ultimate facts, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110. Railey v. Skaggs, 212So. 2d 86, 1968 Fla. App. LEXIS 5265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1968).

121. Although plaintiffs continually filed pleadings that were lengthy and inartfully drawn, disregarded the provisionsof Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.8(f), it was not sufficient to sustain a motion to dismiss, and upon consideration of defendant'smotion to strike the chancellor could in his discretion require the plaintiffs to eliminate the dross contained in thethirteen-page amended complaint, or to recast their initial complaint. Cook v. Katiba, 152 So. 2d 504, 1963 Fla. App.LEXIS 3626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1963).


123. When the sanction of striking pleadings was employed in an action involving a car accident, the sanction did notoperate to invalidate those pleadings that contained admissions that were of an advantage to the party seeking thesanctions because the effect of striking the pleadings caused all of the allegations in the complaint to be undenied andthus admitted pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(e). Heimer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 400 So. 2d 771, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS20025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1981).


125. Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense that must be specifically pleaded under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), ifnot pleaded, it is waived and cannot be considered by the trial court as the basis for granting summary judgment.Wolowitz v. Thoroughbred Motors, Inc., 765 So. 2d 920, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 10910, 25 Fla. L. Weekly D 2033 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2000).


127. Principal could not collaterally attack default judgment via an independent action, when the release upon whichprincipal relied should have been raised as an affirmative defense, pursuant Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d); release did not

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

apply to surety's claim because it pre-dated surety's claim. Sottile v. Gaines Constr. Co., 281 So. 2d 558, 1973 Fla. App.LEXIS 7724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1973), writ of certiorari denied by 289 So. 2d 737, 1974 Fla. LEXIS 4496 (Fla.1974).

128. Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), where it did not affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint that anaction was barred by the statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11, defendant who had not asserted the statute oflimitations defense in his answer could not raise the defense by motion under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b). Williams v.Covell, 236 So. 2d 447, 1970 Fla. App. LEXIS 6319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1970).

129. Where defendant never raised the Statute of Frauds as an affirmative defense in his answer, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ.P. 1.110, he waived his right to raise it. Sorensen v. Eshelman, 202 So. 2d 597, 1967 Fla. App. LEXIS 4303 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1967).

130. The defense of ratification and waiver was an affirmative defense and was required to be set up in the answer; itwas not available upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Toffel v. Baugher, 111 So.2d 290, 1959 Fla. App. LEXIS 2844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1959).

131. Attorney deserved summary judgment in his suit to collect contingency fees automatically forwarded to him underan agreement with a law firm because the law firm admitted under oath every material allegation in the complaint, plusa work sheet that was offered into evidence resolved every factual issue in the attorney's favor; the law firm's affidavitstating that the parties had entered a new oral contract that discharged the contract sued upon was not consideredbecause the law firm waived that defense by failing to raise it in the firm's answer to the complaint. Fink v. Powsner,108 So. 2d 324, 1958 Fla. App. LEXIS 2226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1958), writ of certiorari dismissed by 114 So.2d 6, 1959 Fla. LEXIS 1582 (Fla. 1959).


133. Broker failed to state a cause of action for legal malpractice against a law firm in a third-party complaint as hefailed to show that he was among those intended to benefit from the firm's advice to a principal, who allegedlyconducted a Ponzi scheme; the broker did not allege the ultimate facts, as required by Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2)supporting his legal conclusions by stating that the firm negligently advised the principal, negligently made statementsto state regulators, and negligently drafted documents. Horowitz v. Laske, 855 So. 2d 169, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 12847,28 Fla. L. Weekly D 2052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2003).

134. Dismissal of appellant lessee's complaint affirmed because appellant failed to comply with Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)and failed to alleged the elements of the claims. Cash v. Airport Mini-Storage, 782 So. 2d 983, 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS5146, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2001).

135. Under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g), a plaintiff is allowed to plead, in the alternative, claims against both a governmentagency and an individual employee, despite the fact that under Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a), these claims are mutuallyexclusive; either the agency or the employee can be liable, but not both. Johnson v. State Dep't of Health &Rehabilitative Servs., 695 So. 2d 927, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 7257, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D 1554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2dDist. 1997).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

136. Trial court erred by ordering plaintiffs, who sought inconsistent remedies, to elect a remedy prior to discovery,prior to defendant's answer, prior to a pretrial conference, and prior to the taking of evidence; plaintiffs could properlyelect their remedy prior to judgment. Cordell v. World Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 223, 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15862 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1978).

137. Even though plaintiffs' prayer did not pray for establishment of constructive trust, every complaint does pray forgeneral relief, and the exact form of the prayer for relief is not controlling pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b). Davidsonv. Lely Estates, Inc., 330 So. 2d 528, 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 15035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1976).

138. Injured worker's complaint, alleging negligent design and breach of implied warranty of fitness aftermanufacturer's snap tie broke and caused a scaffolding to collapse, stated a cause of action under the rule; the trial courttherefore did not err in refusing to dismiss the complaint. Gates & Sons, Inc. v. Brock, 199 So. 2d 291, 1967 Fla. App.LEXIS 4855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1967), writ of certiorari denied by 204 So. 2d 328, 1967 Fla. LEXIS 3315 (Fla.1967).

139. Dismissal of the beneficiaries' fifth amended complaint, with prejudice, for their failure to comply with Fla. R. Civ.P. 1.110(b) was improper as the trial court failed to set forth its Kozel factor analysis; the over three-year duration of thesuit and the 35-page length of the complaint were not dispositive, despite the trial court's prior warning that thebeneficiaries had only one more chance to amend. Rohlwing v. Myakka River Real Props., 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 8387,29 Fla. L. Weekly D 1425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. June 16 2004), opinion withdrawn by 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS14151, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D 2151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Sept. 24, 2004), substituted opinion at 884 So. 2d 402,2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 14150, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D 2151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004).

140. Where trial court dismissed minor appellant's third amended complaint, which asserted claims for breach of duty asan univited licensee and attractive nuisance as a trespasser in suit for damages, resulting from injuries sustained onappellee's property, the court reversed and held that Fla. R. Civ. P 1.110(g) permitted the alternative claims in one countor in separate counts, regardless of consistency. Mueller v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 620 So. 2d 789, 1993Fla. App. LEXIS 5956, 18 Fla. L. Weekly D 1364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1993), review denied by 629 So. 2d 135,1993 Fla. LEXIS 1831 (Fla. 1993).


142. Where plaintiff's second amended complaint contained counts and allegations that were both moot and prolix, incontravention of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2), and where plaintiff not only failed to eliminate those matters from thesecond amended complaint as required by a prior order of the trial court, but also added additional allegations, the trialcourt had the authority to dismiss the complaint upon its discretion, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b). LutheranSenior Citizens' Found. v. Schumacher, 355 So. 2d 861, 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist.1978), writ of certiorari denied by 361 So. 2d 833, 1978 Fla. LEXIS 6556 (Fla. 1978).

143. Although plaintiffs failed to reply to defendant's affirmative defense, this merely denied, as opposed to avoided,the affirmative defense under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(e); because the case was remanded, the court held that plaintiffswere entitled to reply to the affirmative defense on remand as Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190 urged the allowance of liberalamendment of pleadings. Lazar v. Allen, 347 So. 2d 457, 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 15898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

1977).

144. Where an amended complaint alleged that plaintiff builder constructed a 100-unit apartment complex for defendantdeveloper for a basic contract price of $1,100,400, that during construction, extra expenses were incurred at the requestor with the authorization of, defendant builder and lender, that plaintiff signed an FHA cost certification with theunderstanding that the defendants would pay the balance owing on the construction contract, but that it was never paid,that defendant lender negligently released the final loan funds to developer knowing that there was a dispute over thesefunds, that a defendant director of the developer, with intent to defraud, embezzled the funds in conspiracy with otherdirectors of developer, and that the three directors paid themselves with the money and left plaintiff's claim unsatisfied,the amended complaint, contained facts sufficient under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) to indicate that a cause of action foractual and punitive damages existed. Snead Constr. Corp. v. Parkway East, Inc., 324 So. 2d 206, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS19068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1975).


146. Under Fla. R. Crim. P. 1.110, it was not improper for the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint with prejudicewhere plaintiffs had twice been granted leave to amend their pleadings and where the trial court had attempted toprovide plaintiffs with some direction regarding acceptable pleading standards, but plaintiffs still failed to set forth ashort and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing entitlement to relief. Barrett v. City of Margate, 743 So. 2d1160, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 13744, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D 2398 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1999), review denied by2000 Fla. LEXIS 1767 (Fla. Aug. 29, 2000).

147. Petitioner, who sought pursuant to a final marital dissolution judgment to obtain approval from the trial courtbefore removing the couple's children from the state, was required by Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(h) to file a supplementalpetition, but no new or additional filing fee was required, because the trial court had retained jurisdiction over theaction. Hagins v. McNeal, 647 So. 2d 1052, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 13104, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.5th Dist. 1994).

148. To comport generally with the requirements of the rule, a complaint needs only to state facts sufficient to indicatethat a cause of action exists and does not need to anticipate affirmative defenses. Cohen v. American Home AssuranceCo., 367 So. 2d 677, 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 14457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1979), writ of certiorari denied by 378So. 2d 342, 1979 Fla. LEXIS 5866 (Fla. 1979).

149. Because complaint stated time of accident and because allegations of negligence made by an injured studentagainst architects and engineers were sufficient, the complaint should not have been dismissed under Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(d). Erwine v. Gamble, Pownal & Gilroy, Architects & Engineers, 343 So. 2d 859, 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 15792(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1976).

150. On an action for unjust enrichment based upon plaintiff's expenditure of labor and material, the trial court properlydismissed the action because of the failure of the pleader to comply with the applicable statute; however, the order ofdismissal should have granted plaintiff leave to amend. L. C. Morris, Inc. v. Allison, 277 So. 2d 28, 1973 Fla. App.LEXIS 6682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1973).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

151. In an action for negligence and personal injuries, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because thecomplaint adequately apprised the defendants of the substance of the claim and the special damages and left thedefendants with a fair chance to meet the proofs and prepare a defense under the applicable statute and Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(b). Byrum v. Williams, 276 So. 2d 836, 1973 Fla. App. LEXIS 6985 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1973).

152. If a complaint states a cause of action, that complaint should be sustained against a motion to dismiss, even thoughthe complaint alleges additional matters, so long as those matters do not destroy the cause of action. Rudman v. Baine,133 So. 2d 760, 1961 Fla. App. LEXIS 2662, 15 Oil & Gas Rep. 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1961).

153. Although a buyer's assignor was not entitled to specific performance on a contract for the sale of land more thanone year after the sellers cancelled the contract due to late filing, the complaint was considered a prayer for generalrelief under the statute and the case was remanded to determine if the deposit should be returned. Shirley v. Lake ButlerCorp., 123 So. 2d 267, 1960 Fla. App. LEXIS 2406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1960).

154. Directed verdict entered in favor of a funeral service was reversed and the case was remanded because the parents,in their amended count for negligence, properly alleged willful and wanton conduct and sought noneconomic damages;because they were not required under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) to fashion a count for gross negligence or tortiousinterference with a dead body, separate and apart from the negligence count, their negligence action fell outside of theimpact rule for purposes of noneconomic damages. Brady v. SCI Funeral Servs. of Fla., Inc., 948 So. 2d 976, 2007 Fla.App. LEXIS 2353, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2007).

155. Appellant seller's counterclaim should not have been dismissed with prejudice because Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d)provided that when a party mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim, the trial court could have treated thepleading as if it was given proper designation. Coble v. Lekanidis, 372 So. 2d 506, 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 15173 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1979).

156. Property owner was precluded from relitigating the issue of damages for loss of access to owner's lots in an inversecondemnation suit when the issue was raised in owner's answer to a former condemnation suit of an adjoining lot, eventhough the owner did not raise the issue of damages as a counterclaim; the failure to designate the pleading as acounterclaim did not lessen the claim. Block v. Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority, 313 So. 2d 75, 1975Fla. App. LEXIS 14873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1975).

157. While it was true that defendants filed a counterclaim wherein it was stated that the parties orally agreed on haycutting operations for third parties, it was also true that in their answer, defendants denied those allegations that madereference to the baling of hay. Because defendants could state as many separate claims or defenses as they hadirrespective of consistency and regardless of whether the claim was based on legal or equitable grounds, defendantscould both deny plaintiff's action and seek relief by counterclaim; the assertion of a counterclaim did not operate as anadmission of plaintiff's claim. Ogden v. Groves, 241 So. 2d 756, 1970 Fla. App. LEXIS 5501 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1stDist. 1970).

158. Where a trial court did not grant a driver's motion to set off PIP benefits until the court's hearing on his motion toset aside the final judgment, set-off was not asserted before trial, and no evidence regarding the benefits was presentedto the jury, the trial court erred in granting the driver set-off for PIP benefits. Felgenhauer v. Bonds, 891 So. 2d 1043,2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 13448, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D 2049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

159. Computer lessee's complaint against computer manufacturer met the requirements of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)because it contained sufficient allegations to state a cause of action for fraud; lessee alleged that it advised manufacturerthat it wanted a new system, that manufacturer never advised it that any part of the system was not new, and that anexternal inspection did not reveal that the system was not new. C & J Sapp Publishing Co. v. Tandy Corp., 585 So. 2d290, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 3604, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1991).

160. The rule of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.120(c) that requires a denial to be pled with particularity is applicable only to ageneral allegation of the performance of conditions precedent; where there are allegations of specific facts, Fla. R. Civ.P. 1.110(c) permits the response by way of a simple denial. Mariner Village, Ltd. v. American States Ins. Co., 344 So.2d 1337, 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 15555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1977).

161. Plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded their microbe shift negligence theory and thus could not recover upon it. Thegeneralized allegations, legal conclusions, and description of injuries that plaintiffs relied on as evidence that theyadequately pleaded their microbe shift negligence theory was misplaced. Agrofollajes v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &Co., 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 19621, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D 2578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. Dec. 16 2009).

162. In order to state a cause of action based on an insurance policy, the complaint need not negate the application ofeach and every exclusion contained in the policy; this rule is based on the requirement of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) that apleading that sets forth a claim for relief contain a short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that thepleader is entitled to relief. Florida Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 763 So. 2d 429, 2000 Fla.App. LEXIS 7031, 25 Fla. L. Weekly D 1410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2000).

163. Plaintiffs' complaint complied with the requirements of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2) where plaintiffs alleged anon-discretionary legal duty owed to them by defendant city, a breach of that legal duty by failing to provide wheelchairaccess to its building, an injury legally caused by the breach, and damages as a result of that injury; defendant's dutyarose from the statutory requirements for wheelchair accessibility governing the extensive renovation and reopening ofa building for public use. Meyers v. City of Jacksonville, 754 So. 2d 198, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 4489, 25 Fla. L. WeeklyD 998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2000).


165. Claim for replevin of a dredge and other related equipment should not have been dismissed from plaintiff'smulti-count complaint because under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g), plaintiff could assert inconsistent claims within a singlepleading and was given the opportunity to amend the replevin count. Innovative Material Sys. v. Santa Rosa Utils., 721So. 2d 1233, 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 15968, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1998).

166. In Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b), the word "prayer" was changed to "demand." In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of CivilProcedure, 682 So. 2d 105, 1996 Fla. LEXIS 1864, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S 489 (Fla. 1996).

167. In order to do substantial justice under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g), the letter a pro se defendant sent to the court in acivil negligence case wherein defendant asked for an attorney, had to be treated as a motion for the appointment ofcounsel, not as an answer, and the request for counsel to contest plaintiffs' case could not be construed as an admissionof liability under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(e). Martinez v. Fraxedas, 678 So. 2d 489, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 8849, 21 Fla. L.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

Weekly D 1903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1996).

168. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g) allowed plaintiffs to seek alternate remedies where they sought to foreclose a mortgageand also to reestablish the mortgage because the rule permitted parties to state as many claims as they had, regardless ofconsistency. Costello v. Adams, 654 So. 2d 601, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 4390, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D 1001, 20 Fla. L.Weekly D 1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1995).

169. Trial court properly refused to permit the jury to consider whether the physician was liable for the coveringphysician's alleged negligence because the patient's parents failed to allege the physician's vicarious liability in thecomplaint as required under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2). Goldschmidt v. Holman, 571 So. 2d 422, 1990 Fla. LEXIS1671, 15 Fla. L. Weekly S 615 (Fla. 1990).

170. Dismissal of amended complaint alleging that an automobile manufactured by defendant malfunctioned duringnormal operation causing plaintiff's injuries was improper because it complied with the pleading standard set forth inFla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2) that required a short and plain statement of ultimate facts showing that the pleader wasentitled to relief. Cunningham v. General Motors Corp., 561 So. 2d 656, 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 3299, 15 Fla. L. WeeklyD 1329, CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. P12460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1990).

171. Complaint, which alleged breach of contract and tortious interference with contract, that was in narrative form wasin violation of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) because the complaint was required to contain a short and plain statement of thegrounds of the claim. Dewitt v. Rossi, 559 So. 2d 659, 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 1833, 15 Fla. L. Weekly D 777 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1990), review denied by 574 So. 2d 140, 1990 Fla. LEXIS 1565 (Fla. 1990).

172. Complaint, which did not set forth averments of claims of breach of contract and tortious interference withcontract, was in violation of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(f). Dewitt v. Rossi, 559 So. 2d 659, 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 1833, 15Fla. L. Weekly D 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1990), review denied by 574 So. 2d 140, 1990 Fla. LEXIS 1565 (Fla.1990).

173. Although plaintiff's complaint for tortious interference with a business relationship included far more details thannecessary, the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint when it complied with the basic premise of Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(b). Thomas v. Pridgen, 549 So. 2d 1195, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 5750, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1st Dist. 1989).

174. In an action brought by an employee who was kidnapped from her place of work and raped, the court found thatthe allegations in her complaint, which alleged gross negligence on the part of her supervisors, were completelyinsufficient to allege such wanton or reckless conduct as would evince reckless disregard of human life or of the safetyor welfare of others; Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2) required a complaint to be pleaded with sufficient particularity so thatthe trial judge, in reviewing the ultimate facts alleged, could rule as a matter of law whether or not the facts allegedwere sufficient to state a cause of action. Beckler v. Hoffman, 550 So. 2d 68, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4944, 14 Fla. L.Weekly 2067, 14 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1989).

175. In order to state a cause of action, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) required a complaint to contain a short and plainstatement as to the ultimate facts, which indicate that the pleader was entitled to relief; in determining whether acomplaint stated a cause of action, the court must assume that all of the facts alleged in the complaint are true and mustdraw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. Thompson v. Martin, 530 So. 2d 495, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS3895, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 2066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988).

176. Where a complaint alleged that plaintiff had employed a law firm to probate a will, that plaintiff had dealtexclusively with defendant, an attorney acting on behalf of the firm, and that defendant negligently performed legalservices, the complaint met the requirements of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) and sufficiently stated a cause of action for

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

legal malpractice; trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on grounds that it lacked a direct and positive allegationthat plaintiff employed the attorney, rather than the law firm. Nickolauson v. Rhyne, 529 So. 2d 365, 1988 Fla. App.LEXIS 3704, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 1926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988).

177. In a wrongful death action, the personal representatives of decedent's estate stated a cause of action in theirconvoluted second amended complaint and although it violated Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110, which called for short and plainstatements of the ultimate facts, the court remanded to allow them another opportunity to amend and properly plead thecounts alleging gross negligence. Gerentine v. Coastal Sec. Systems, 529 So. 2d 1191, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 3163, 13Fla. L. Weekly 1738 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1988).

178. In response to creditor's complaint, debtor omitted any reference to a paragraph in creditor's complaint whereindebtor agreed to pay creditor's attorney fees and, therefore, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P 1. 110(e), the effect was to admitto the paragraph and render proof unnecessary; consequently denial of an award of attorney fees to creditor wasreversed because the pleadings were closed on the subject of attorney fees. Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. Trude, 508 So.2d 1327, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8995, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1987).

179. There is no requirement that a motion for summary judgment under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(b) be preceded by ananswer presenting the affirmative defense under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) and this conclusion is consistent with Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.140(b) which permits certain defenses to be made by motion prior to the filing of a responsive pleading; therequirement in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b) that every defense in law or fact be asserted in the responsive pleading isqualified by the caveat "if one is required," and when a suit is disposed of by summary judgment there is no requirementthat a responsive pleading be filed. Coral Ridge Properties, Inc. v. Playa Del Mar Asso., 505 So. 2d 414, 1987 Fla.LEXIS 1699, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 146 (Fla. 1987).

180. Pro se plaintiff who deluged the trial court with excessive, repetitive, verbose and unnecessary pleadings inviolation of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 was, nonetheless, entitled to plead a statutory cause of action that he had set forth withsufficient particularity. Kreager v. Sunset Colony Joint Venture, 501 So. 2d 691, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 6488, 12 Fla. L.Weekly 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1987).

181. Because a partner's complaint informed the other partner of specific instances of wrongdoing and presented triableissues bearing on the moving party's right to an accounting because it alleged that a partnership existed and thatcompensation was based on a percentage of the partnership's profits, the factual allegations met the requirements of Fla.R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2), and thus, the trial court erred when it dismissed the action. Dyson v. Dyson, 483 So. 2d 546, 1986Fla. App. LEXIS 6555, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1986).

182. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) provides that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief must contain a short and plainstatement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and theclaim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it; where wife sought judgment against her ex-husband for pastexpenses incurred on marital home (awarded wife in dissolution proceedings), and wife's petition did not contain astatement setting forth the basis for the court's jurisdiction, while it is true that a trial court has continuing jurisdiction tomodify child support but the final judgment of dissolution didn't require the husband to make capital improvements orrepairs on the marital home, the relief sought by the wife did not constitute an enforcement or modification of thedissolution proceedings and accordingly the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Fayson v. Fayson,482 So. 2d 523, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 6106, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1986).

183. Trial court gave undue weight to the presumption of legitimacy at the pleading stage of a paternity complaint andalso required undue specificity in the factual allegations of the complaint, considering the privilege of alternativepleading available under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b). Holliman v. Green, 439 So. 2d 955, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 22486(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1983).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

184. Where defendant failed to object at the pleading stage that plaintiff violated Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(f), which requiredplaintiff to state separate causes of action in separate counts, defendant could not contend on appeal that plaintiff'sclaims could not be considered. All Florida Premiun Finance Co. v. Flagship Bank of Jacksonville, 422 So. 2d 87, 1982Fla. App. LEXIS 21707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1982).

185. Allegation that a parent company established a subsidiary as a mere instrumentality and a sham was a sufficientallegation of ultimate facts under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) to state a cause of action against the parent corporation for theacts of its subsidiary. Vantage View, Inc. v. Bali East Dev. Corp., 421 So. 2d 728, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 22082 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1982).

186. Where a third amended complaint consisted of more than 100 paragraphs en masse without an attempt to set forthseparate claims, had annexed to it and incorporated by reference 59 pages of exhibits, contained vitriolic andintemperate remarks castigating the medical community, and failed to comply with prior orders of the court with respectto proper pleading, the pleading was prolix contrary to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b), duplicitous contrary to Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(f), scandalous and impertinent and subject to a motion to strike under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(f). Buckner v. LowerFlorida Keys Hospital Dist., 403 So. 2d 1025, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 20716 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1981).

187. Order dismissing an amended complaint was reversed because when the plaintiff alleged that a sale was made tohim in violation of the Florida Securities law, the plaintiff's demand for relief was clear, rescission; thus, the plaintiff'scomplaint was sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Fla. R. Civ.P. 1.110. Haygood v. Adams Drugs, Inc., 346 So. 2d 612, 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 15714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist.1977).


189. Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action that alleged legal liability where plaintiff's decedent was killed in a trafficaccident after a road was reopened to traffic in its preconstruction state; although a contractor repairing a highway hadan affirmative duty to warn motorists of a change in existing traffic patterns, this duty arose where a hazard was created,not where a hazard was removed. Wells v. Brown, 303 So. 2d 395, 1974 Fla. App. LEXIS 8310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2dDist. 1974).

190. It is not necessary, nor desirable, that a plaintiff allege evidence in a complaint; aside from allegations as tojurisdiction and demand for judgment for relief, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 only requires a short and plain statement of theultimate facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; if the complaint contains sufficient allegations to inform thedefendant of the charges of wrongdoing, which constitutes the real basis for the plaintiff's complaint so that thedefendant may intelligently answer, it should be held sufficient. Thomas v. Rollins, 298 So. 2d 186, 1974 Fla. App.LEXIS 8860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1974).

191. Because plaintiff insureds' initial complaint was sufficient to entitle plaintiffs to declaratory relief under Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.110 and plaintiffs' amended complaints were sufficient to state cause of action against defendant insurers,complaints were improperly dismissed. Dawson v. Blue Cross Asso., 293 So. 2d 90, 1974 Fla. App. LEXIS 7581 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1974).

192. Petitioner's bill of complaint for specific performance comported with the requirements set out in Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(b) and was sufficient on its face to state a cause of action against corporation, the transferee in a conveyance of aportion of the real property in dispute; dismissal of the cause by the trial court in anticipation of the assertion ofaffirmative defenses was in error. Hammonds v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 285 So. 2d 7, 1973 Fla. LEXIS 4173 (Fla.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

1973).

193. Trial court erred when it dismissed appellant corporation's third amended complaint because the complaint stated acause of action and consisted of a short statement of facts as required by Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b). Holiday DinnerTheatres of America, Inc. v. Bartke, 281 So. 2d 376, 1973 Fla. App. LEXIS 7658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1973).


195. Hotel's second amended complaint stated a cause of action in satisfaction of the requirements of Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110 where it alleged that an agreement was made between hotel and two patrons whereby hotel would furnish certaingoods and services for a political campaign benefit dinner in return for an agreed upon rate of consideration per platefrom a fund that was to subsequently materialize; that hotel furnished such goods and services and the fund in questiondid materialize; but that patrons had not fulfilled their obligation by full payment of the agreed consideration, and thatset forth a prayer for relief as the amount of damages sought. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Walters, 246 So. 2d 563,1971 Fla. LEXIS 3868 (Fla. 1971).

196. Although tenant's complaint sought only specific performance of a lease agreement, the trial court properlyawarded damages for breach of an agreement to execute a lease because this was shown by the evidence even though itwas not claimed in tenant's complaint. Super Service Products Corp. v. North Store Corp., 214 So. 2d 664, 1968 Fla.App. LEXIS 5029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1968).

197. In a negligence action stemming from an airplane crash, the trial court erred by dismissing a gasoline tank sellerfrom the action because the injured party had not pled sufficient to sustain a negligence action. Starkey v. MiamiAviation Corp., 214 So. 2d 738, 1968 Fla. App. LEXIS 5037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1968).

198. A mobile home resident's action against the trailer park operator, which stemmed from injuries she suffered in aslip and fall accident in an unoccupied and unlocked cottage in trailer park, was properly dismissed because theallegations of the mobile home resident's subjective belief of an implied invitation to enter the unoccupied and unlockedcottage lacked factual support. Doyle v. Flex, 210 So. 2d 493, 1968 Fla. App. LEXIS 5584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist.1968).

199. In an action for damages, dismissal of a seller's complaint was inappropriate because, under the pleadingrequirements of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b), the seller's complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action where a depositreceipt agreement fell within an exception to the rule that preliminary agreements merged into a deed upon delivery.Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31, 1967 Fla. App. LEXIS 4078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1967).

200. Trial court should have denied the motion of the oil company to dismiss the automobile driver's complaint on atheory of negligence for alleged obstruction of a public right-of-way by an iron grease rack because the total contextualimport of the complaint was clear and understandable enough to inform the oil company of the nature of the causeagainst it and so to sufficiently state a cause of action for negligence. Tims v. Orange State Oil Co., 161 So. 2d 844,1964 Fla. App. LEXIS 4580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1964).

201. Supply company's complaint against a construction company for goods sold, to which was attached a full statementof account, was sufficient. Naples Builders Supply Co. v. Clutter Constr. Corp., 152 So. 2d 478, 1963 Fla. App. LEXIS3618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1963).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110


203. If a complaint states a cause of action, that complaint should be sustained against a motion to dismiss, even thoughthe complaint alleges additional matters, so long as those matters do not destroy the cause of action. Rudman v. Baine,133 So. 2d 760, 1961 Fla. App. LEXIS 2662, 15 Oil & Gas Rep. 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1961).

204. Summary judgment in favor of a contractor in a breach of contract action was improper because the subcontractorhad the right to file a general denial, and the evidence raised a genuine issue as to a material fact. Patton v. Carlson, 132So. 2d 793, 1961 Fla. App. LEXIS 2555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1961).

205. Complaint alleging that police officers had negligently entered and searched the claimant's home, thereby violatingthe claimant's privacy and inflicting mental distress sufficiently pleaded a cause of action under Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(b);allegations of the infliction of direct, personal injury were not restricted exclusively to a traumatic physicalinjury and Florida recognized the right to privacy. Thompson v. Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105, 1961 Fla. App. LEXIS2737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1961), writ of certiorari denied by 147 So. 2d 530, 1962 Fla. LEXIS 3147 (Fla. 1962).

206. Where there were no allegations of fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression, no cause of action for punitivedamages had been stated as was required under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b); the allegations of the complaint simply allegedthat the police officers had negligently entered and searched the claimant's home, thereby violating the claimant'sprivacy and inflicting mental distress. Thompson v. Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105, 1961 Fla. App. LEXIS 2737 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1961), writ of certiorari denied by 147 So. 2d 530, 1962 Fla. LEXIS 3147 (Fla. 1962).

207. Complaint of an employee, who had been shot and wounded during an attempted robbery of a service station, wasproperly dismissed on the ground that the allegations of the complaint were inadequate under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 tocharge the employer with negligence that proximately resulted in the employee's injury; the complaint failed to averwhat reasonable measures the employer should have taken to protect the employee and what exceptional circumstancesor conditions created a foreseeable danger that would have given rise to a duty by the employer to protect the employee.Murray v. Osenton, 126 So. 2d 603, 1961 Fla. App. LEXIS 2906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1961).

208. Although a buyer's assignor was not entitled to specific performance on a contract for the sale of land more thanone year after the sellers cancelled the contract due to late filing, the complaint was considered a prayer for generalrelief under the statute and the case was remanded to determine if the deposit should be returned. Shirley v. Lake ButlerCorp., 123 So. 2d 267, 1960 Fla. App. LEXIS 2406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1960).

209. In a breach of an oral contract action, defendant's motion for directed verdict was erroneously granted by the trialcourt because plaintiff's amended complaint alleged ultimate facts sufficient to make out a case for breach of contract.Goldsmith v. Sorrento Holding Corp., 119 So. 2d 808, 1960 Fla. App. LEXIS 2488, 40 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P66487 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1960).

210. Complaint might have been found lacking in particulars, had it been timely attacked, but it was sufficient, afterdecree pro confesso, to sustain the entry of a final decree. Wallace Bros. v. Yates, 117 So. 2d 202, 1960 Fla. App. LEXIS2649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1960).

211. While the sufficiency of a complaint may be raised upon appeal after entry of a decree pro confesso, its allegationsare sufficient upon which to base a final decree in the absence of motion to attack it that has been timely filed. WallaceBros. v. Yates, 117 So. 2d 202, 1960 Fla. App. LEXIS 2649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1960).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

212. Property owner's complaint averring that the property owner was the owner of certain lands and had been in theactual, exclusive, uninterrupted and hostile possession of said lands for a period of 42 years prior to the filing of thecomplaint, and seeking an injunction against a town, mayor, and councilmen, precluding the taking of the property for astreet, the complaint, although brief, met the requirements of the rule and had the necessary allegations to justifyappropriate relief if the property owner could support the complaint with sufficient and competent proof. Anderson v.Groveland, 113 So. 2d 569, 1959 Fla. App. LEXIS 2632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1959).

213. In a husband's petition for modification of child support, the trial court in Florida retained jurisdiction to modify itsoriginal child support award so that no new service of process was needed under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(h) and the noticeof the proceedings given to the wife by regular and certified mail was sufficient where she did not even claim that shehad no notice or opportunity to defend against the petition for modification. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 472 So. 2d 1317, 1985Fla. App. LEXIS 14387, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1985).

214. Timely proceedings to increase the amount of alimony awarded by a judgment in a dissolution of marriage actionwere supplemental to the judgment and were merely a continuation of the original proceedings; however, because thecourt did not reserve or retain jurisdiction to award permanent alimony in the future, the wife was required to proceedunder Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(h), which required new service of process. Stickney v. Stickney, 377 So. 2d 187, 1979 Fla.App. LEXIS 16132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1979), writ of certiorari denied by 386 So. 2d 642, 1980 Fla. LEXIS5429 (Fla. 1980).

215. Department of Insurance proceeded against accounting firm in nine separate capacities including itself, courtappointed receiver of the Insurance Exchange of the Americas, and court appointed receiver of seven different insurancesyndicates; trial court properly held that, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g), Department of Insurance had to elect onecapacity in which it wished to proceed for this action and dismissed the other claims relating to the other eightcapacities without prejudice. Department of Ins. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 570 So. 2d 369, 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 8561, 15Fla. L. Weekly D 2772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1990), review denied by 582 So. 2d 622, 1991 Fla. LEXIS 860 (Fla.1991).

216. Under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g), a plaintiff is allowed to plead, in the alternative, claims against both a governmentagency and an individual employee, despite the fact that under Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a), these claims are mutuallyexclusive; either the agency or the employee can be liable, but not both. Johnson v. State Dep't of Health &Rehabilitative Servs., 695 So. 2d 927, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 7257, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D 1554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2dDist. 1997).

217. Where trial court dismissed minor appellant's third amended complaint, which asserted claims for breach of duty asan univited licensee and attractive nuisance as a trespasser in suit for damages, resulting from injuries sustained onappellee's property, the court reversed and held that Fla. R. Civ. P 1.110(g) permitted the alternative claims in one countor in separate counts, regardless of consistency. Mueller v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 620 So. 2d 789, 1993Fla. App. LEXIS 5956, 18 Fla. L. Weekly D 1364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1993), review denied by 629 So. 2d 135,1993 Fla. LEXIS 1831 (Fla. 1993).

218. Movie theater, its manager and owner could not dismiss licensing corporations' breach of contract complaint for

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

misjoinder of parties under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g), where each licensing corporation had the same type of movielicensing contract that provided for a percentage of the gross admission as consideration therefore, all of the counts inthe complaint related to the identical time period, and the same auditor conducted the audit of the records which gaverise to the complaint. Carbonell v. American International Pictures, Inc., 313 So. 2d 417, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 14810(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1975).

219. Where two brothers were injured in the same automobile accident, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g) did not permit an actionbased on the death of one brother to be joined in a single lawsuit with an action based on the other brother's personalinjuries because the separate actions were not brought in the same right. Pages v. Dominguez, 652 So. 2d 864, 1995 Fla.App. LEXIS 2251, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1995).

220. In purchaser's action for civil theft, replevin and conversion against a financier regarding the sale of a machine, thetrial court erred by requiring a pre-trial election of remedies by the purchaser, since Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 permitted ajoinder of counts even if they were inconsistent. Monco of Orlando, Inc. v. ITT Industrial Credit Corp., 458 So. 2d 332,1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 15326, 9 Fla. L. Weekly 2111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1984).

221. Based on procedural rules allowing one form of action and the joinder of legal and equitable claims under Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.110(g), a judge sitting as a trier of fact did not err in awarding punitive damages in a suit asserting ownershipinterests involving both legal and equitable claims. Glusman v. Lieberman, 285 So. 2d 29, 1973 Fla. App. LEXIS 6331(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1973).

222. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g) forbade the joinder of causes which arose out of separate rights. Horowitz v. UnitedInvestors Corp., 227 So. 2d 719, 1969 Fla. App. LEXIS 5168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1969), writ of certioraridenied by 237 So. 2d 180, 1970 Fla. LEXIS 3227 (Fla. 1970).

223. In an action for replevin where the defendant counterclaimed for damages due to hold-over after expiration of alease, the counterclaim was properly dismissed because replevin and ejectment actions may not be joined. NationalLeasing Corp. v. Bombay Hotel, Inc., 159 So. 2d 111, 1963 Fla. App. LEXIS 3030 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1963).

224. Entry of judgment without prejudice that permitted a party to relitigate certain issues was incompatible with therule allowing for joinder of causes of action; trial court should have disposed of all issues to avoid piecemeal litigation.Carol Management Corp. v. Maxwell Co., 156 So. 2d 773, 1963 Fla. App. LEXIS 3190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist.1963), writ of certiorari denied by 165 So. 2d 176, 1964 Fla. LEXIS 2741 (Fla. 1964).

225. Trial court did not grant summary judgment on the ground of inconsistency of the claims pleaded; accordingly, theappellate court, on appeal of the award of summary judgment and reversal of the summary judgment order, found that atthat point in the proceedings, the trial court could not, when the case was remanded for further proceedings, determinethe inconsistency of the breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims which were pleaded. Barbara G. Banks, P.A. v.Thomas D. Lardin, P.A., 938 So. 2d 571, 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 15509, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D 2412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.4th Dist. 2006), review denied by 959 So. 2d 718, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 1061 (Fla. 2007).

226. Where land purchasers filed suit against a corporation and sought a class designation, the trial court improperlydeferred ruling on the class question, where the purchasers had entered into different contracts with the corporation andthere was no community of interest between the land purchasers. Osceola Groves, Inc. v. Wiley, 78 So. 2d 700, 1955

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

Fla. LEXIS 3386 (Fla. 1955), limited by Cordell v. World Ins. Co., 355 So. 2d 479, 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15351 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1978).

227. Trial court did not err in setting a dispute between a lessor and lessee for a trial on damages, pursuant to Fla. Stat.§ 86.061 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b), even though lessee did not specifically ask for damages in its declaratory action.Vista Centre Venture v. Unlike Anything, Inc., 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 4783, 17 Fla. L. Weekly D 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 5th Dist. May 1 1992), opinion withdrawn by, substituted opinion at 603 So. 2d 576, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 7764,17 Fla. L. Weekly D 1724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1992).

228. Trial court's dismissal of a complaint filed against two banks for separate acts of negligence was reversed becauseaffirmative defenses on the face of prior pleadings did not constitute grounds for dismissal pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(d). Lurie v. Barnett Bank, N.A., 661 So. 2d 30, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 12563, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D 87 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1994).

229. Since the trial court's orders of dismissal of the beneficiaries' fifth amended complaint contained nothing fromwhich the appellate court could determine that the necessary factors were considered, the matter had to be remanded forthe trial court to determine if those factors existed. Rohlwing v. Myakka River Real Props., Inc., 884 So. 2d 402, 2004Fla. App. LEXIS 14150, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D 2151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004).


231. Dismissal of amended complaint alleging that an automobile manufactured by defendant malfunctioned duringnormal operation causing plaintiff's injuries was improper because it complied with the pleading standard set forth inFla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2) that required a short and plain statement of ultimate facts showing that the pleader wasentitled to relief. Cunningham v. General Motors Corp., 561 So. 2d 656, 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 3299, 15 Fla. L. WeeklyD 1329, CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. P12460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1990).

232. When determining defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint based upon the statute of limitations underFla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) the court was confined to the allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint, andall allegations must be taken as true; as a general rule, the statute of limitations should be raised as an affirmativedefense in the answer, rather than as a ground for a motion to dismiss. Anderson v. Emro Marketing Co., 550 So. 2d531, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 5879, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1989).

233. Order dismissing plaintiff's complaint was erroneous because plaintiff was entitled to pursue her lawsuit becausethe defenses should not have been considered on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action because theydid not appear on the face of the complaint pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). Burch v. Brinkley, 382 So. 2d 440, 1980Fla. App. LEXIS 16391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1980).

234. Appellant seller's counterclaim should not have been dismissed with prejudice because Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d)provided that when a party mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim, the trial court could have treated thepleading as if it was given proper designation. Coble v. Lekanidis, 372 So. 2d 506, 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 15173 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1979).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

235. Where plaintiff's second amended complaint contained counts and allegations that were both moot and prolix, incontravention of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2), and where plaintiff not only failed to eliminate those matters from thesecond amended complaint as required by a prior order of the trial court, but also added additional allegations, the trialcourt had the authority to dismiss the complaint upon its discretion, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b). LutheranSenior Citizens' Found. v. Schumacher, 355 So. 2d 861, 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist.1978), writ of certiorari denied by 361 So. 2d 833, 1978 Fla. LEXIS 6556 (Fla. 1978).

236. Complaint alleging that police officers had negligently entered and searched the claimant's home, thereby violatingthe claimant's privacy and inflicting mental distress sufficiently pleaded a cause of action under Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(b);allegations of the infliction of direct, personal injury were not restricted exclusively to a traumatic physicalinjury and Florida recognized the right to privacy. Thompson v. Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105, 1961 Fla. App. LEXIS2737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1961), writ of certiorari denied by 147 So. 2d 530, 1962 Fla. LEXIS 3147 (Fla. 1962).

237. Where there were no allegations of fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression, no cause of action for punitivedamages had been stated as was required under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b); the allegations of the complaint simply allegedthat the police officers had negligently entered and searched the claimant's home, thereby violating the claimant'sprivacy and inflicting mental distress. Thompson v. Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105, 1961 Fla. App. LEXIS 2737 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1961), writ of certiorari denied by 147 So. 2d 530, 1962 Fla. LEXIS 3147 (Fla. 1962).

238. A complaint alleging the existence of a joint venture, without alleging the plaintiff's contributions or obligationswas insufficient to state a claim. Kislak v. Kreedian, 95 So. 2d 510, 1957 Fla. LEXIS 3471 (Fla. 1957).

239. Under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110, plaintiff's failure to reply to defendant's affirmative defense was not an admission, andthe trial court should not have entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant. Reno v. Adventist HealthSystems/Sunbelt, Inc., 516 So. 2d 63, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 11306, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist.1987).

240. Motion for judgment on the pleadings was improperly used in case where the issue of "custom and usage" wasbrought in by defendant's answer and was a new matter, since no responsive pleading was required such new matter wasconsidered automatically denied under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(e); in passing on defendant's motion for judgment on thepleadings, the allegations of the answer which were denied must be taken as false as this would operate to defeat themotion since the burden of proof in regard to the affirmative defense was upon defendant. Kendall Flying School, Inc. v.Robertson, 225 So. 2d 344, 1969 Fla. App. LEXIS 5411 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1969).

241. In an action for the balance of purchase price due to the plaintiff, where the purchaser plead embezzelment by theescrow agent of the balance of the purchase price, the facts plead by defendant may have been sufficient in law toconstitute a defense, but were deemed denied and thus admitted as being false for purposes of the motion for judgmenton the pleadings; it was error for the trial court to grant judgment on the pleadings when it could not be said as a matterof law that the complaint did not state a cause of action. Greater Miami Tel. Answering Service v. A-1 AnsweringService, 141 So. 2d 619, 1962 Fla. App. LEXIS 3272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1962).

242. There is no requirement that a motion for summary judgment under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(b) be preceded by ananswer presenting the affirmative defense under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) and this conclusion is consistent with Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.140(b) which permits certain defenses to be made by motion prior to the filing of a responsive pleading; therequirement in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b) that every defense in law or fact be asserted in the responsive pleading is

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

qualified by the caveat "if one is required," and when a suit is disposed of by summary judgment there is no requirementthat a responsive pleading be filed. Coral Ridge Properties, Inc. v. Playa Del Mar Asso., 505 So. 2d 414, 1987 Fla.LEXIS 1699, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 146 (Fla. 1987).

243. The court found that insured's affirmative defense was properly considered by the trial court in its motion fordismissal; the court found that the dismissal with prejudice was correct because the complaint and the exclusionestablished, as a matter of law pursuant to 1.110(d), that victim was incapable of stating a cause of action for theenforcement of a judgment against insured. Posigian v. American Reliance Ins. Co., 549 So. 2d 751, 1989 Fla. App.LEXIS 5408, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1989).


245. Fla. Stat. § 682.13 limits the grounds for overturning an arbitration award and requires that the effort to overturnthe award be initiated promptly and the statute requires a petition to vacate state the grounds therefor; the automaticdenial provision of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(e) does not satisfy the requirements of Fla. Stat. § 682.13. Haskell v. ForestLand & Timber Co., 408 So. 2d 811, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 18966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1982).

246. Because a tenant's complaint was sufficient under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.130(a), (b) and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), tosupport the issues of whether the common area maintenance was properly calculated and because the landlord neverpleaded the affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel, the trial court erred in granting the landlord's motion in limine.Louie's Oyster, Inc. v. Villaggio Di Las Olas, Inc., 915 So. 2d 220, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 17257, 30 Fla. L. Weekly D2509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005).


248. Passenger sued vehicle operator and her husband for negligence in the collision of the vehicle with vehicle inwhich passenger was riding; allegations of liability in the alternative is provided for in the rule. Ringler v. McVeigh, 109So. 2d 606, 1959 Fla. App. LEXIS 3105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1959).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

249. Federal judgment in plaintiff's state action did not collaterally estop the state action pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(d) because the issues were not identical to the one involved in the federal action. All Pro Sports Camp v. WaltDisney Co., 727 So. 2d 363, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 2184, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D 572, Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P27875 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1999).

250. Dismissal of an ex-husbands suit based on res judicata was improper where the ex-wife filed a motion to dismissbased on a prior dissolution proceeding between the parties because under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), 1.140(b), theaffirmative defense of res judicata could not be raised in a motion to dismiss unless the allegations of a prior pleading inthe case demonstrated its existence, and the ex-wife had failed to request that the court take judicial notice under Fla.Stat. § 90.201 et seq. Livingston v. Spires, 481 So. 2d 87, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 5885, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 162 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1986).

251. Rule of res judicata holds that a final judgment on the merits entered by a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar tofuture action by the plaintiff, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d); that rule specifies that res judicata is an affirmativedefense. Maloney v. Heftler Realty Co., 316 So. 2d 594, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 14176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist.1975).


253. Dismissal of a husband's divorce suit was improper because the wife raised the affirmative defense of res judicatain a motion to dismiss; the defense of res adjudicata was affirmative in nature and had to be plead in an answer.Chambers v. Chambers, 102 So. 2d 171, 1958 Fla. App. LEXIS 2807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1958).


255. Hearing officer's interlocutory order refusing to dismiss a disciplinary proceeding on the basis of the statute oflimitations was reviewable on appeal and not subject to collateral attack as a matter of right. Mullin v. State, Dep't ofAdministration, Div. of Administrative Hearings, 354 So. 2d 1216, 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1stDist. 1978), writ of certiorari denied by 359 So. 2d 1217, 1978 Fla. LEXIS 6368 (Fla. 1978).


Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

257. When a pleading may be read alternatively in a way to state a particular claim, yet also in still another way not tostate the claim, the only effect of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g) is to require that the appellate courts read it to state the claim.Gouveia v. Phillips, 823 So. 2d 215, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 10842, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D 1751 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4thDist. 2002).

258. Discharged employee's complaint set forth sufficient facts to state a cause of action on counts of libel, fraud, andbreach of an oral contract sufficient under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) because he alleged a letter by his employer that waslibel per se, because he alleged statements by his employer regarding the terms of his employment that were to knownto be false by the employer at the time they were made, and because it alleged that the employer had agreed to increasehis salary. Perry v. Cosgrove, 464 So. 2d 664, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 12625, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 608, 11 Media L. Rep.(BNA) 1931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1985).

259. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(f) requires parties to give their opponents notice of what is going to be tried; an assertion ofadditional claims on the day of trial for special assessments made after the condominium lien being tried deprived thecondominium owner of due process. George v. Beach Club Villas Condo. Assoc., 833 So. 2d 816, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS17559, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D 2567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2002).

260. Discharged employee's complaint set forth sufficient facts to state a cause of action on counts of libel, fraud, andbreach of an oral contract sufficient under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) because he alleged a letter by his employer that waslibel per se, because he alleged statements by his employer regarding the terms of his employment that were to knownto be false by the employer at the time they were made, and because it alleged that the employer had agreed to increasehis salary. Perry v. Cosgrove, 464 So. 2d 664, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 12625, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 608, 11 Media L. Rep.(BNA) 1931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1985).

261. Because there were several factual issues arising out of the borrowers' Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) affirmative defensesthat remained to be resolved, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the lenders based on the parolevidence rule in Fla. Stat. § 687.0304(2) and in striking the borrowers' affirmative defenses. Pavolini v. Williams, 915So. 2d 251, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 18925, 30 Fla. L. Weekly D 2713 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2005).

262. Lessor's assertion that lessees' payment of rent under an illegal escalation clause was a waiver of the illegality hadto be raised as an affirmative defense to be pled and proved by the lessor. Goldenberg v. Dome Condominium Asso.,376 So. 2d 37, 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 15962 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1979).

263. Trial court erred by ordering plaintiffs, who sought inconsistent remedies, to elect a remedy prior to discovery,prior to defendant's answer, prior to a pretrial conference, and prior to the taking of evidence; plaintiffs could properlyelect their remedy prior to judgment. Cordell v. World Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 223, 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15862 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1978).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

264. Two corporations' oral agreement to act as sureties on a debt incurred by a bankrupt corporation was notenforceable under the statute of frauds because the corporations failed to plead the statute of frauds as an affirmativedefense. Gordon International Advertising, Inc. v. Charlotte County Land & Title Co., 170 So. 2d 59, 1964 Fla. App.LEXIS 3913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1964).

265. Where defendant guarantor disputed the amount due on the guaranty but did not contend that the guaranty wasdischarged by reason of full payment, the guarantor did not have to plead, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.10(d), theaffirmative defense of payment in order to place the amount of damages in controversy. Marlar v. Quincy State Bank,463 So. 2d 1233, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 12461, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1985).

266. Even though plaintiffs' prayer did not pray for establishment of constructive trust, every complaint does pray forgeneral relief, and the exact form of the prayer for relief is not controlling pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b). Davidsonv. Lely Estates, Inc., 330 So. 2d 528, 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 15035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1976).

267. Trial court erred in denying beneficiary's motion to dismiss trustees' complaint to construe no contest clausebecause the complaint did not allege sufficient ultimate facts, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110. Railey v. Skaggs, 212So. 2d 86, 1968 Fla. App. LEXIS 5265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1968).

268. Grant of a motion to dismiss a franchisor's claims was reversed since the trial court erred by going beyond the fourcorners of the complaint and taking judicial notice of the federal complaint when ruling on the motion to dismiss. PapaJohn's Int'l, Inc. v. Cosentino, 916 So. 2d 977, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 20274, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D 73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.4th Dist. 2005).

269. Trial court did not commit reversible error in entertaining a motion for modification of child custody instead of apetition for modification of child custody because the failure to follow Fla. Fam. L.R.P. 12.110 did not create per sereversible error on appeal; Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(h) was not slavishly applied and the former wife waived the benefit ofthat rule. Kruger v. Kruger, 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 5508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. Apr. 16 2008), opinion withdrawnby, dismissed by 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 6062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. Apr. 29, 2008).

270. Because the former wife agreed to try the matter of a change of custody before a general magistrate and only raisedthe procedural deficiency in exceptions filed after suffering an adverse magistrate's decision on the merits, she waivedher right to insist upon compliance with Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.110 by the former husband. Cuartas v. Cuartas, 951 So.2d 980, 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 3735, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2007).

271. Petitioner, who sought pursuant to a final marital dissolution judgment to obtain approval from the trial courtbefore removing the couple's children from the state, was required by Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(h) to file a supplementalpetition, but no new or additional filing fee was required, because the trial court had retained jurisdiction over theaction. Hagins v. McNeal, 647 So. 2d 1052, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 13104, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

5th Dist. 1994).

272. Motion for continuance was improperly denied by a trial court where the husband, a resident of another state, wasserved with a petition to modify final judgments of dissolution pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(h), and the notice ofhearing was received only 17 days before the scheduled hearing date, which was inadequate for the husband to obtainlocal counsel, make arrangements to attend the hearing, respond to a request to produce filed only 5 days before thescheduled hearing, respond to the petition, and prepare his defense. Young v. Young, 431 So. 2d 233, 1983 Fla. App.LEXIS 19266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1983).

273. Timely proceedings to increase the amount of alimony awarded by a judgment in a dissolution of marriage actionwere supplemental to the judgment and were merely a continuation of the original proceedings; however, because thecourt did not reserve or retain jurisdiction to award permanent alimony in the future, the wife was required to proceedunder Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(h), which required new service of process. Stickney v. Stickney, 377 So. 2d 187, 1979 Fla.App. LEXIS 16132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1979), writ of certiorari denied by 386 So. 2d 642, 1980 Fla. LEXIS5429 (Fla. 1980).

274. Trial court gave undue weight to the presumption of legitimacy at the pleading stage of a paternity complaint andalso required undue specificity in the factual allegations of the complaint, considering the privilege of alternativepleading available under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b). Holliman v. Green, 439 So. 2d 955, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 22486(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1983).

275. Where the statute of limitations defense appeared on the face of a complaint in an action for damages arising out ofan automobile accident, the defendant was entitled to raise the defense of statute of limitations by a motion to dismissunder Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), and was not limited to raising it by answering and pleading an affirmative defense.General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thornberry, 629 So. 2d 292, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 12527, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D 4(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1993).

276. Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), where it did not affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint that anaction was barred by the statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11, defendant who had not asserted the statute oflimitations defense in his answer could not raise the defense by motion under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b). Williams v.Covell, 236 So. 2d 447, 1970 Fla. App. LEXIS 6319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1970).

277. Because the complaint sufficiently alleged the equitable grounds of fraudulent concealment for statute oflimitations established by Fla. Stat. § 768.28 was toiled in a claim against the state for the negligent failure to superviseand monitor a child's foster care placement, it was error to dismiss the complaint with prejudice pursuant to Fla. R. Civ.P. 1.110(d). S.A.P. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 704 So. 2d 583, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 10279, 22Fla. L. Weekly D 2095 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1997).

278. Although the immunity claim of the county official was presented in his motion to dismiss the civil rightscomplaint against him, it was nonetheless a defense that could be adjudicated as a matter of law under Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(d) because the facts supporting the defense of qualified immunity were clear from the complaint and the ruleprovided that affirmative defenses appearing on the face of a prior pleading could be asserted as grounds for a motion ordefense. Junior v. Reed, 693 So. 2d 586, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 1383, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

Dist. 1997).


280. Because plaintiff insureds' initial complaint was sufficient to entitle plaintiffs to declaratory relief under Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.110 and plaintiffs' amended complaints were sufficient to state cause of action against defendant insurers,complaints were improperly dismissed. Dawson v. Blue Cross Asso., 293 So. 2d 90, 1974 Fla. App. LEXIS 7581 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1974).

281. Insurer waived any application of the "other insurance" clause by failing to timely raise the issue in the trial courtwhere the "other insurance" clause of the policy was an affirmative defense, and the failure to plead it resulted inwaiver. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Coucher, 837 So. 2d 483, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 19237, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D 131(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2002).

282. Where a trial court did not grant a driver's motion to set off PIP benefits until the court's hearing on his motion toset aside the final judgment, set-off was not asserted before trial, and no evidence regarding the benefits was presentedto the jury, the trial court erred in granting the driver set-off for PIP benefits. Felgenhauer v. Bonds, 891 So. 2d 1043,2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 13448, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D 2049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004).

283. In an action for breach of an insurance policy, the trial court improperly granted insurance company judgment onthe pleadings, as insured was covered under the "drive other automobiles" clause of the insurance contract, whichextended coverage to insured when he was engaged in infrequent and casual use of an automobile. Walters v.Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 161 So. 2d 225, 1964 Fla. App. LEXIS 4509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1964).

284. Appellant employer had the burden to prove the affirmative defense raised under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) thatset-off on damages mitigated the damages suffered by wrongfully discharged appellee employees. Juvenile DiabetesResearch Foundation v. Rievman, 370 So. 2d 33, 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 14882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1979).

285. In an action to recover mortgage brokerage fees, the defendant's claim that the plaintiff was not a licensed brokerand that he was therefore not entitled to fees pursuant to former Fla. Stat. § 494.04(1) (repealed) and 494.08(5)(a), wasan affirmative defense pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), and evidence thereof was properly excluded at trial.Sonnenblick-Goldman of Miami Corp. v. Feldman, 266 So. 2d 48, 1972 Fla. App. LEXIS 6229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3dDist. 1972), writ of certiorari denied by 270 So. 2d 15, 1972 Fla. LEXIS 3138 (Fla. 1972).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

286. An amended complaint filed by a plaintiff to set aside a deed given by his ward, prior to her adjudication ofincompetency, to the defendant, her grandson, was a proper joinder of causes of action where the complaint alleged boththe ward's incompetency and the grandson's undue influence. Mather-Smith v. Fairchild, 135 So. 2d 233, 1961 Fla.App. LEXIS 2404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1961).


288. Mortgagors sued for acceleration and foreclosure for failing to make timely periodic mortgage payments werepermitted to raise the affirmative defense of making prepayments greater than the amounts due because the mortgagors'affirmative defense appeared on the face of the mortgagors' prior pleading. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Pringle, 216 So. 2d 468,1968 Fla. App. LEXIS 4701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1968).

289. Where the validity of the prior encumbrance was recognized in the answer and no effort was made in the pleadingto challenge the amounts which would be paid for principal, interest, fees, and costs, although calculation of these itemswould have necessarily affected the surplus available for the judgment, the reviewing court held it was a waste of timeand money to order a retrial of the case. M. D. Futch, Inc. v. Miller, 154 Fla. 27, 16 So. 2d 338, 1944 Fla. LEXIS 604(1944).

290. Trial court erred in dismissing residents' complaint as to their entitlement to injunctive relief; allegations of aviolation of a specific setback restriction, combined with an assertion of the binding nature of such restriction and thedetrimental effect of its continued violation, were more than sufficient to state a cause of action pursuant to Fla. R. Civ.P. 1.110. Watson v. Buchanan, 344 So. 2d 644, 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 15441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1977).

291. A party may set up alternatively, in the same action, two or more causes of action pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P.1.110(b) but the pleader must, at some appropriate time before the jury is instructed, make an election where he is notentitled to recover damages on both causes of action. Erp v. Carroll, 438 So. 2d 31, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 24288 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1983).


Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110


294. Broker's claim in his third-party complaint against a law firm under the wrongful act doctrine, which the brokeracknowledged was not an independent cause of action, failed as the broker failed to allege a factual basis for his legalmalpractice claim as required by Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2). Horowitz v. Laske, 855 So. 2d 169, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS12847, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D 2052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2003).

295. Where a complaint alleged that plaintiff had employed a law firm to probate a will, that plaintiff had dealtexclusively with defendant, an attorney acting on behalf of the firm, and that defendant negligently performed legalservices, the complaint met the requirements of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) and sufficiently stated a cause of action forlegal malpractice; trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on grounds that it lacked a direct and positive allegationthat plaintiff employed the attorney, rather than the law firm. Nickolauson v. Rhyne, 529 So. 2d 365, 1988 Fla. App.LEXIS 3704, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 1926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988).



298. A malpractice complaint was not facially time-barred where it did not affirmatively and clearly show when clientsknew or should have known of law firm's negligent supervision of an attorney, but alleged only that the clients knewthat defendant had terminated the attorney on a date certain; where defendant had not raised the applicable limitationsperiod, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(a), was not raised as an affirmative defense pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), dismissalof the complaint was error. Jelenc v. Draper, 678 So. 2d 917, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 9115, 21 Fla. L. Weekly D 1945(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1996).

299. Trial court improperly dismissed a visitor's negligence count against a sheriff arising from an incident in which,while a deputy was executing a search warrant, the visitor, who was not the subject of the warrant, was shot by bulletfrom the deputy's gun; the visitor adequately alleged the existence of a special relationship arising when the officer'sconduct in enforcing the law created a foreseeable zone of risk. However, the visitor failed to make sufficient specificallegations to determine whether the act at issue involved the exercise of a planning function for purposes of sovereign

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

immunity. Labance v. Dawsy, 14 So. 3d 1256, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 8686, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D 1362 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 5th Dist. 2009).

300. Trial court improperly dismissed a visitor's negligence count against a sheriff arising from an incident in which,while a deputy was executing a search warrant, the visitor, who was not the subject of the warrant, was shot by bulletfrom the deputy's gun; the visitor adequately alleged the existence of a special relationship arising when the officer'sconduct in enforcing the law created a foreseeable zone of risk. However, the visitor failed to make sufficient specificallegations to determine whether the act at issue involved the exercise of a planning function for purposes of sovereignimmunity. Labance v. Dawsy, 14 So. 3d 1256, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 8686, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D 1362 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 5th Dist. 2009).

301. Complaint of a victim sufficiently alleged gross negligence where it alleged, inter alia, that the driver of the car inwhich she was a guest suddenly and without any signal or warning made a left-hand turn across a wet, slippery,two-laned, paved, and well-travelled highway directly in front of an oncoming pick-up truck. Richardson v. Sams, 166So. 2d 468, 1964 Fla. App. LEXIS 3975 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1964).

302. Allegation that a parent company established a subsidiary as a mere instrumentality and a sham was a sufficientallegation of ultimate facts under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b) to state a cause of action against the parent corporation for theacts of its subsidiary. Vantage View, Inc. v. Bali East Dev. Corp., 421 So. 2d 728, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 22082 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1982).

303. 1-4 Florida Family Law § 4.03, Chapter 4 Separate Maintenance, Initiating Proceedings.

304. 1-11 Florida Family Law § 11.10, Chapter 11 Intrafamily Suits, Actions in Tort.

305. 1-20 Florida Family Law § 20.40, Chapter 20 Prenuptial Agreements, Prenuptial Agreements Enforced onDissolution.

306. 1-22 Florida Family Law § 22.40, Chapter 22 Postnuptial Agreements, Postnuptial Agreements Enforced onDissolution.

307. 1-31 Florida Family Law § 31.120, A Substantive Law, Requesting Alimony in Pleading.

308. 2-32 Florida Family Law § 32.40, A Substantive Law, In Marital Dissolution Action.

309. 2-34 Florida Family Law § 34.120, A Substantive Law, Pleadings.

310. 2-36 Florida Family Law § 36.13, A Substantive Law, Pleadings.

311. 2-37 Florida Family Law § 37.21, A Substantive Law, Jurisdiction to Award.

312. 2-50 Florida Family Law § 50.15, B Procedure, Overview of Dissolution Proceeding.

313. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.01, B Procedure, Nature and Purpose of Pleadings.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

314. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.02, B Procedure, Types of Pleadings in an Action for Dissolution.

315. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.03, B Procedure, Pleading Strategies.

316. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.04, B Procedure, Rules Applicable to Pleadings in General.

317. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.06, B Procedure, Commencement.

318. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.07, B Procedure, Statement of Jurisdiction.

319. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.08, B Procedure, Allegations to Support Claims in Petition or Counterpetition.

320. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.09, B Procedure, Allegations in Answer.

321. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.10, B Procedure, Signature.

322. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.15, B Procedure, Amended Pleadings.

323. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.100, B Procedure, General Pleading Considerations.

324. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.102, B Procedure, Defensive Considerations.

325. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.103, B Procedure, Amended Pleadings.

326. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.110, B Procedure, Preparing Petition.

327. 3-53 Florida Family Law § 53.111, B Procedure, Preparing Responsive Pleadings and Motions.

328. 3-54 Florida Family Law § 54.06, B Procedure, Procedure.

329. 3-54 Florida Family Law § 54.24, B Procedure, Procedure.

330. 3-56 Florida Family Law § 56.60, B Procedure, Enforcement of Agreements.

331. 4-60 Florida Family Law § 60.05, B Procedure, Proof of Valid Marriage.

332. 4-61 Florida Family Law § 61.40, B Procedure, Modification of Judgment.

333. 4-70 Florida Family Law § 70.24, C Enforcement, Civil Contempt.

334. 4-70 Florida Family Law § 70.111, C Enforcement, Respondent's Determinations.

335. 4-70 Florida Family Law § 70.134, C Enforcement, Complaint for Enforcement.

336. 4-70 Florida Family Law §70.150, C Enforcement, Execution.

337. 4-72 Florida Family Law § 72.16, C Enforcement, Writs of Attachment and Sequestration.

338. 4-72 Florida Family Law § 72.120, C Enforcement, Validity of Action and Available Defenses.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

339. 4-72 Florida Family Law § 72.220, C Enforcement, Response to Motion for Contempt.

340. 4-73 Florida Family Law § 73.12, C Enforcement, Defenses to Recognition.

341. 4-73 Florida Family Law § 73.20, C Enforcement, Suit to Establish Decree as Florida Judgment.

342. 4-73 Florida Family Law § 73.112, C Enforcement, Defensive Considerations.

343. 4-74 Florida Family Law § 74.22, C Enforcement, Enforcement of Foreign Custody Decree.

344. 4-80 Florida Family Law § 80.43, D Modification, Application for Modification.

345. 4-81 Florida Family Law § 81.05, D Modification, Initiation of Proceedings.

346. 4-82 Florida Family Law § 82.01, D Modification, Judicial Power to Modify Child Support Obligations.

347. 4-82 Florida Family Law § 82.03, D Modification, Practice and Procedure.

USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this group or subgroup.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110

Cited by the court as...

1. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110, 112 Citing References

2. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 (a), 24 Citing References

3. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 (b), 200 Citing References

4. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 (b) (1), 4 Citing References



7. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 (c), 37 Citing References

8. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 (d), 324 Citing References

9. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 (e), 64 Citing References

10. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 (f), 24 Citing References

11. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 (g), 110 Citing References

12. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 (h), 26 Citing References

13. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110 (l), 1 Citing Reference

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