PACU VS SEC OF EDUCATION

95 Phil. 806 – Political Law – Civic EfficiencyThe Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of  Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary mustexercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools.  The Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.

MARIANO VS COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners contend that Sec. 2, 51, and 52 of RA 7854 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: Sec. 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, as required by Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, in relation to Sec. 7 and 450 of the LGC; Sec. 51 attempts to alter or restart the "three-consecutive term" limit for local elective officials; Sec. 52 increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (not what is provided for in Art. VI, Sec. 5(4), Consti), not expressed in the title of the bill, and survey is 450,000 people only.Issue: WON Sec. 52, RA 7854 is unconstitutional.

Ruling: Negative. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as a charter of a new city.

MONTESCLAROS VS COMELEC

Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age limitation set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of  age for membership in the SK.Issue:Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction imputable to respondents.

Held:The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners.  Under the same law, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections was held to be applicable on the July 15 2002 election. It’s constitutionality not having been assailed in the first place.

The Court ruled that petitioners had no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit, that the petition presented no actual justiciable controversy, that petitioners did not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents.

LACSON VS PEREZ

FACTS:On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an armed mob assaulting and

attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of

rebellion in NCR. She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" followed.

Aggrieved, 4 related petitions were filed before the Court. The case at bar is for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction). Petitioners assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by PGMA and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law.

On May 6, 2001, PGMA ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the "rebellion."

ISSUE:Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest against the petitioners.

HELD:No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless

arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion." Petitioners' contention that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The prayer for prohibition and mandamus is improper at this time.

As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave the country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.

Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative up to this very day.

Petition is DISMISSED. However, respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting for and in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.

DAVID VS ARROYO

489 SCRA 160 – Political Law – The Executive Branch – Presidential Proclamation 1017 – Take Care Clause – Take Over Power – Calling Out Power

Bill of Rights – Freedom of Speech – OverbreadthIn February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5

(GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress.  Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;Resolution by the SC   on the Factual Basis of its declaration The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.  Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.   Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events.  Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.   However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth TheoryFirst and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct.  It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that

‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power DoctrineOn the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017.  The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers.  From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.Resolution by the SC on the Take Care DoctrinePursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081).  The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’  Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.  Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’  To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power DoctrineThe president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:(1) There must be a war or other emergency.(2)   The delegation must be for a limited period only.(3)  The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.(4)  The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law DeclarationThe SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

JOYA VS PCGG

Requisites for exercise of judicial review: (1) that the question must be raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be an actual case or controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

LEGAL STANDING: a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.

EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayer's Suits REQUISITES FOR MANDAMUS: a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only

when the public right to beenforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.

WHEN TAXPAYER SUIT MAY PROSPER: A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.

ACTUAL CONTROVERSY: one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into a Consignment Agreement with Christie’s of New York, selling 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Prior to the auction sale, COA questioned the Consignment Agreement, there was already opposition to the auction sale. Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with Christie’s of New York for the sale of the artworks

RULING:

On jurisdiction of the Court to   exercise   judicial review

The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or

governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.

Standing of Petitioners

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.

EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayer’s Suit:

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing the preservation and disposition of national and important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law inviolation of the Constitution.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On

this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.

Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were taken from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties — the true owners thereof — whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.

Requisites for a Mandamus Suit

Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this Court laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.

When a Taxpayer's Suit may prosper

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

Actual Controversy

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims

susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date — 11 January 1991 — which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.

At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. We find however that there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.

CHREA VS CHR

1. RA  8522 or the General Appropriations Act of 1998 provided special provisions applicable to all Constitutional Offices.

2. The Commission on Human Rights through then its Chair, Aurora P. Navarette – Recina and Commissioner Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo and Jorge R. Coquia upgraded or raised the salaries (A98-0555 October 1998) reclassified selection positions (Resolution No. A98-047 September, 1998) and collapsed vacant positions (A98-062 November 1998) without the approval of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)

3. The petitioners Commission on Human Rights Employees Association (CHREA) through its then President Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr. filed a petition before the Court of Appeals alleging that they have locus standi because the reorganization demoralizes the rank and file employees and will only benefit those in top positions; but, the Court of Appeals (CA) exempted the CHR from the Salary Standardization Law.

 

Issue: Whether the fiscal autonomy enjoyed the CHR emp0wers them to reclassify, adjust salaries and collapse vacant positions without the approval of DBM?

Held:

No. The Supreme Court held that the duty of DBM is to ascertain that the proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives be given in adherence to the policies and guidelines in accordance with applicable laws. The mandate of the DBM under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Section 4, Chapter 1, Title XVII to wit: shall assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the NationalBudget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications. Furthermore, Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy.

AIWA VS ROMULO

Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) vs. Romulo

G.R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005

Facts:

The Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its Affiliated Unions filed a petition for Supreme Court to exercise its power of judicial review to declare Executive Order No. 185 unconstitutional.

The petitioners contended that EO 185 violated their rights and interests as labor unions and as taxpayers. By the said EO, the administrative supervision over the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel including the executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

Claiming that the issues does not pose an actual case or controversy, respondents contend that the petitioners have not specifically cited how EO No. 185 has prejudiced or threatened to prejudice their rights and existence as labor unions and as taxpayers. Furthermore, they argued that the petitioners lacked legal standing to challenge the validity of said EO, not even in their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are exempt from paying taxes.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to assail the validity of EO 185.

Ration Decidendi:

Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged." Since petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury due to EO No. 185, it cannot be said that the aforementioned EO will prejudice their rights and interests. Only NLRC personnel, the subject of the Secretary of Labor’s disciplinary authority, have a direct and specific interest in this issue.

In their capacity as taxpayers, petitioners also do not have legal standing on this issue since there is no mention of an established disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The challenging of EO 185’s constitutionality have to wait for the proper party in a proper case before the court may intervene and entertain.

KMU LABOR CENTER VS GARCIA

Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Secretary Oscar M. Orbos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando that will allow provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year to be implemented on August 6, 1990. The Memo read as “is the liberalization of regulations in the transport sector and to move away gradually from regulatory policies and make progress towards greater reliance to market forces:” Chairman Fernando informed Sec. Orbos that the Memo is not legally feasible and recommended for further studies because (1) under Public Service Act rates should be approved by public service operators; there should be publication and notice especially to affected sectors; and  a public hearing be held; (2) it was untimely due to an earthquake happened on July 16; (3) it will trigger upward adjustment in bus fares especially in trips bound for Northern Luzon; and (4) DOTC should consider reforms that will be uplifting after the earthquake. On December 5, 1990 the Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase. On December 14, 1990 LTFRB released a fare schedule based on a straight computation. On March 30, 1992 DOTC Sec. Pete Nicomedes Prado issued Department Order No 92-587 defining the framework on the regulation of transport services. Then on October 8, 1992 DOTC Sec. Jose B. Garcia issued a memorandum to LTFRB for the swift action on the adoption of the rules and procedures to implement Department Order No. 92-587 that laid down the deregulation and other liberalization policies for the transport sector. LTFRB issued on February 17, 1993

On March 16, 1994. Kilusang Mayo Uno anchors its claim on two (2) grounds. First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a proposed transport service without having to prove public necessity is illegal for being violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court and petitions before the LTFRB.

LTFRB dismissed because of lack of merit.

The Court, on June 20, 1994, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining, prohibiting and preventing respondents from implementing the bus fare rate increase as well as the questioned orders and memorandum circulars. This meant that provincial bus fares were rolled back to the levels duly authorized by the LTFRB prior to March 16, 1994. A moratorium was likewise enforced on the issuance of franchises for the operation of buses, jeepneys, and taxicabs.

DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. and the LTFRB asseverate that the petitioner does not have the standing to maintain the instant suit. They further claim that it is within DOTC and LTFRB’s authority to set a fare range scheme and establish a presumption of public need in applications for certificates of public convenience.

 

ISSUE:

Are the petitioners have the right to petition of this case?

Whether or not the fare adjustment is constitutional?

HELD:

(1)    YES. KMU has a locus standi (or  ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party’s participation in the case) which is inherent in the Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

 

NO. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged administrative issuances and orders, namely: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum CircularNo. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid insofar as they affect provisions therein (a) delegating to provincial bus and jeepney operators the authority to increase or decrease the duly prescribed transportation fares; and (b) creating a presumption of public need for a service in favor of the applicant for a certificate of public convenience and placing the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service to the oppositor. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June 20, 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT insofar as it enjoined the bus fare rate increase granted under the provisions of the aforementioned administrative circulars, memoranda and/or orders declared invalid.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS CA

Facts: The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 RA 8042 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law.

Peitioner claims that great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are unjust and unconstitutional.

On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a period of only twenty (20) days therefrom. After the petitioners filed their comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil.

filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption thereof eleven (11) other corporations which it alleged were its members and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No. 8042.

The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. 5 According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal protection clause, as well as Article II, Section 12 6 and Article XV, Sections 1 7 and 3(3) of the Constitution. 8 As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have the right to seek employment abroad.

According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.

According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid classification. Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and due process and to the "equality of the person." It is understandable for the law to prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed and registered recruiters is unconstitutional.

The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was also pointed out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment.

The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8, 9 and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, Article III of the Constitution 10 prohibiting ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder. This is because the provisions presume that a licensed and registered recruitment agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage, upon a finding that it committed any of the prohibited acts under the law. Furthermore, officials, employees and their relatives are presumed guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage upon such finding that they committed any of

the said prohibited acts.

The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1) within which a labor arbiter should decide a money claim is relatively short, and could deprive licensed and registered recruiters of their right to due process. The period within which the summons and the complaint would be served on foreign employees and, thereafter, the filing of the answer to the complaint would take more than 90 days. This would thereby shift on local licensed and authorized recruiters the burden of proving the defense of foreign employers.

The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law are unconstitutional: SEC. 9. Venue. — A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this Act.

In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, that (a) the respondent has no cause of action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the rules implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State.

In opposition to the respondent's plea for injunctive relief, the petitioners averred that: As earlier shown, the amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit for failure of petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that the assailed law is unconstitutional, apart from the defect and impropriety of the petition.

On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page decision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said decision.

Issue: The core issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and the writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of only P50,000; and

Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it.

Held: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the appellate court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated August 21, 1995 in Civil

Case No. Q-95-24401 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by it in the said case on August 24, 1995 are NULLIFIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio: The matter of whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction or not is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, if the court commits grave abuse of its discretion in issuing the said writ amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified via a writ of certiorari and prohibition.

The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.

To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor.

Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes does not automatically render them unconstitutional, so the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of certain laws on the statute books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying out the important and necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution.

One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond reasonable doubt (Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748). All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This presumption of constitutionality is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoin upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments (Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516 [1991]).

In view of petitioner's standing The petitioners contend that the respondent has no locus standi. It is a non-stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the action. Although the respondent filed the petition in the Regional Trial Court in behalf of licensed and registered recruitment agencies, it failed to adduce in evidence a certified copy of its Articles of Incorporation and the resolutions of the said members authorizing it to represent the said agencies in the proceedings. Neither is the suit of the respondent a class suit so as to vest in it a personality to assail Rep. Act No. 8042; the respondent is

service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to represent are profit-oriented.

The petition is meritorious. The respondent has locus standi to file the petition in the RTC in representation of the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies impleaded in the amended petition. The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. 16 An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.

We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized for the purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and development of the manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and international levels; providing, creating and exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general membership; enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino workers; and, to act as the representative of any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein.

In view of standing in behalf of unskilled workers However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. We note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies it claimed to represent, the respondent failed to comply with Section 2 of Rule 63 20 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which the respondent filed the suit are specifically named in the petition, the amended petition is deemed amended to avoid multiplicity of suits.

In view of retroactivity In People v. Diaz, 24 we held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is but an amendment of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law because it is not applied retroactively.

In view of equal protection clause  In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade.

Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory

measures because they abridge the freedom to contract.

The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.

In view of the VALIDITY of Sec. 6 of RA 8042 The validity of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 which provides that employees of recruitment agencies may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment has been upheld in People v. Chowdury: An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.

By its rulings, the Court thereby affirmed the validity of the assailed penal and procedural provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042, including the imposable penalties therefor. Until the Court, by final judgment, declares that the said provisions are unconstitutional, the enforcement of the said provisions cannot be enjoined.

Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and their officers and employees and their relatives employed in government agencies charged with the enforcement of the law for illegal recruitment and imposing life imprisonment for those who commit large scale illegal recruitment is not offensive to the Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if, after trial, the prosecution is able to prove all the elements of the crime charged.

The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and registered recruitment agencies would close shop and stop business operations because of the assailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. The respondent even failed to adduce any evidence to prove irreparable injury because of the enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042. Its fear or apprehension that, because of time constraints, its members would have to defend foreign employees in cases before the Labor Arbiter is based on speculations. Even if true, such inconvenience or difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.

Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that led to the enactment of The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at affording greater protection to overseas Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on existing laws in the recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment.

By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans any evidence, the trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed them to continue

victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain employment abroad as overseas workers, and blocked the attainment of the salutary policies 52 embedded in Rep. Act No. 8042.

The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction. It is for this reason that the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION VS COMELEC

FACTS:Petitioners were participating bidders questioning the identity and eligibility of the awarded contractor Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) where the competing bidder is Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI) as signed by Mr. Willy Yu of the latter. Private respondent claims that MPEI is the lead partner tied up with other companies like SK C&C, WeSolv, Election.com and ePLDT. Respondent COMELEC obtained copies of Memorandum of Agreements and Teaming Agreements.ISSUE:Whether or not there was an existence of a consortium.

RULING:NO. There was no documentary or other basis for Comelec to conclude that a consortium had actually been formed amongst MPEI, SK C&C and WeSolv, along with Election.com and ePLDT. The president of MPEI signing for allegedly in behalf of MPC without any further proof, did not by itself prove the existence of the consortium.  It did not show that MPEI or its president have been duly pre-authorized by the other members of the putative consortium to represent them, to bid on their collective behalf and, more important, to commit them jointly and severally to the bid undertakings.  The letter is purely self-serving and uncorroborated.

TOLENTINO VS COMELEC

41 SCRA 702 – Political Law – Amendment to the Constitution – Doctrine of Proper SubmissionThe Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning only the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper submission to the people. Such is not allowed.The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that the entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a proper “frame of reference” in arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the

“Doctrine of Submission” which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.