Pacific Review - A Harmonized Southeast Asia-Explanatory Typologies of ASEAN Countries' Strategies...

For Peer Review Only

A Harmonized Southeast Asia? Explanatory Typologies of

ASEAN Countries Strategies to the Rise of China

Journal: The Pacific Review

Manuscript ID: RPRE-2011-0112

Manuscript Type: Original Article

Keywords: Southeast Asia, China, Explanatory Typology, Hedging, Bandwagoning,

Balancing

URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpre Email: [email protected]

The Pacific Review

For Peer Review OnlyA Harmonized Southeast Asia?

Explanatory Typologies of ASEAN Countries Strategies to the Rise of China

August 26, 2011

Abstract

In the face of a rising China, some scholars have argued that ASEAN countries will

choose to either bandwagon with or balance against China, while others believe they

will respond with a more moderate policy known as hedging. In considering these

options, ASEAN countries must take into account their individual interests within the

economic and security structure of this region. In this research, we argue that each

ASEAN country confronts divergent sets of security and economic relations with

China, which play a major role in shaping their policy responses. We can characterize

their responses into four quadrants. Each cell can be categorized in terms of a high or

low degree of threat perception (HT or LT) from China, as well as a positive or

negative economic expectation (PE or NE) with China. We thus hypothesize that

ASEAN countries in the HT-NE situation will balance against China; those in the

LT-PE situation will bandwagon with China; those in the HT-PE or LT-NE situations

will hedge against China. Hypotheses will be tested by investigating two cases,

Vietnam-China (NE-HT) and Cambodia-China (PE-LT) relations.

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War and the rise of China have changed the international

landscape. For East Asian countries, fear from the threat from communist ideology

has largely dissipated to the extent that communism is no longer the primary concern

around which policymaking decisions are made. International geopolitics, once

defined by the clash of competing superpowers during the Cold War, has changed, and

the need to rely on building security alliance with the U.S. for geopolitical survival

has more or less abated. In the present situation, however, the rise of China regionally

and globally presents a new, dynamic, and potentially volatile variable in the East

Asian geopolitical arena. For relatively weaker East Asian nations, the question of

how best to avoid an outright conflict within a changing regional power structure has

become an important issue.

In this article, we discuss how Southeast Asian states will respond to a rising

China, whose ascendance may be viewed both as a promising opportunity and a

potential danger. Despite a litany of literature published on this topic, many are

plagued with shortcomings we identify as being less relevant, overgeneralized,

static and outdated. These works generally suffer two drawbacks. First, though

they pertinently describe patterns of foreign policy behaviors, many fail to identify the

causes behind such behaviors. This obscures the different independent variables that

may cause Southeast Asian countries to adopt different policy options toward China.

The second shortcoming in the existing literature stems from the treatment of

policymaking as a dichotomy rather than a continuum. In this framework, Southeast

Asian states are portrayed as pursuing a static strategy instead of a dynamic one that

constantly evolves in a changing regional landscape. We believe Southeast Asian

states policies toward China are dynamic, varying among countries and across

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different periods of time.

In this paper, we introduce an analytical spectrum that characterizes how

Southeast Asian countries are likely to perceive China based on the interaction of two

theories: balance of threat and trade expectation. We argue that these perceptions

will influence the types of policies that these countries will employ against China,

which include soft-balancing, hedging, and bandwagoning. As political

climates and situations fluctuate over time, so will the strategies used by different

players. We hypothesize that Southeast Asian countries perceiving a high level of

threat from China (HT) and expecting a negative economic relationship (NE) will

view Beijing as an undesirable regional neighbor, and therefore more likely to choose

the soft-balancing strategy. On the other hand, if these countries perceive a low level

of threat (LT) and expect a positive economic relationship (PE), they will find in

Beijing a more desirable neighbor, and are more likely to adopt a bandwagoning

strategy. Countries in situations between these two extremes (either a HT-PE or

LT-NE scenario) will choose a hedging strategy against China.

We will review past literatures on this topic and point out their shortcomings in

the next section. In section three, two major pillars for Southeast Asian states policies

toward China and relevant strategic choices are identified within a policy spectrum. In

addition, we will discuss the logic behind the analytical model. In section four, we

offer preliminary empirical evidence to support our theoretical framework by

discussing cases of Vietnam-China and Cambodia-China relations. The last section

concludes our studies.

Literature Review

Most literature on the reactions of Southeast Asian states to the rise of China can

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be divided into four categories. The first category tends to group Southeast Asian

countries as a unitary international actor embedded within the framework of the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and explains the individual

countries behaviors through the lens of observing the actions undertaken by ASEAN.

The second category examines Southeast Asian countries foreign policymaking as a

response to regional power structures; in this case, these countries are considered as

belonging to a group of secondary, or weaker, states within the international

system.1 These two categories seek to depict a general pattern that reflects interests

concentrated within either ASEAN or a group of secondary states.

The literature in the last two categories pay attention to foreign policy variations

among the different Southeast Asian countries, and refrain from treating Southeast

Asian countries as part of a larger, unitary international actor. The third category

discusses a range of policy choices that include strategies such as balancing,

accommodating, bandwagoning, or hedging. Such approach may overlook the

variation of policy choices among different countries.2 The fourth category also

1 M. Rajendran, Asean's Foreign Relations: The Shift to Collective Action (Kuala Lumpur: Arenabuku

sdn bhd., 1985). N. Ganesan, "Rethinking Asean as a Security Community in Southeast Asia," Asian

Affairs, an American Review 21, no. 4 (1995). Johan Saravanamuttu, "The Asean Model for Regional

Cooperation," in Asian Peace: Security and Governance in the Asia Pacific Region, ed. Majid

Tehranian (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999). Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, Reassessing

Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation

(Massachusetts: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2007). H.H. Michael Hsiao and

Alan Yang, "Transformations of Chinas Soft Power toward Asean," China Brief 8, no. 22 (2008).

Rodolfo C. Severino, The Asean Regional Forum (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

2009).

2 For example, Landry Haryo Subianto, "New Direction for Southeast Asia's Regional Relations: An

Indonesian Perspective," in Southeast Asia in the New Century: An Asian Perspective, ed. Samuel C.Y.

Ku (Kaohsiung: National Sun Yat-Sen University, 2002). Vatthana Pholsena and Ruth Banomyong,

Laos: From Buffer State to Crossroads (Ching Mai: Meking Press, 2006). Robert Dayley and Clark D.

Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era (Singapore: Westview Press, 2010).

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recognizes the foreign policy variation among each Southeast Asian country, but pays

attention to the influence of different domestic factors, such as ideology, leadership, or

regime type, in foreign policymaking.3

In this section, we discuss these divergent perspectives and identify their

limitations. Afterwards, we briefly propose our idea to mitigate these identified

shortcomings and offer a theoretical framework based on a foreign policy continuum

characterized by two relevant conditions, which are threat perception and

expectation of economic relations.

ASEAN for Socializing China?

The first category of literature focuses primarily on how the regional institution

of ASEAN influences Chinas external behaviors, and how Southeast Asian countries

respond. Amitav Acharya suggests that a process-orientated ASEAN has successfully

created four crucial ideas in the region, which are cooperative security, open

regionalism, soft regionalism, and flexible consensus.4 These ideas can be

helpful in shaping a regional identity for its actors to abide by. Nikolas Busse praises

ASEAN members for abandoning the balance of power logic and successfully

establishing a regional code of conduct centered around the concepts of non-use of

force, non-interference, and informality in conflict management.5 China, as a

more proactive participant in ASEAN, consequently is expected to be socialized in

3 Recent literatures related, for example, Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Indonesia and the Muslin World:

Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007).

Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy (Singapore and

Thailand: ISEAS and Silkworm Books, 2010).

4 Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: From the 'Asean Way' to the 'Asia-Pacific

Way'?," The Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (1997).

5 Nikolas Busse, "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security," The Pacific Review 12, no. 1 (1999).

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informal principles desired by Southeast Asian countries. In Alice Bas words, China

...has moved from skeptic to observer to participant as a dialogue partner with

ASEAN and full membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other

regional arrangements.6 According to Rosemary Foot, the ARFs central purpose is

to manage transnational conflicts between Southeast Asia and China and envelop

China in this multilateral organization.7 According to these scholars, the utilization

of regional organizations remains the primary way in which Southeast Asian attempt

to engage and socialize China. In doing so, Southeast Asian countries can seek to

secure a mutually beneficial economic relationship and attempt to tame Chinas

aggressive posture in the South China Sea. From Chinas perspective, regional

organizations serve to reassure ASEAN states of Beijings peaceful regional ambitions

and win over their support, possibly at the expanse of U.S.-ASEAN relations.

Over the past decade, although China has become a proactive player in regional

institutions, some scholars have doubted the effectiveness of attempting to socialize

China according to the desires of ASEAN members. Ba wonders whether regional

institutions founded by less powerful states are able to socialize the most powerful

regional player. Her argument suggests a need to include the variable of power in the

study of Sino-ASEAN relations. Raising the question whos socializing whom?, she

points out the possibility of ASEAN members being socialized by China, rather than

the other way around.8

David Jones and Martin Smith argue that although ARF has helped to avoid

6 Alice D. Ba, "China and Asean: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-Century Asia," Asian Survey 43,

no. 4 (2003).

7 Rosemary Foot, "China in the Asean Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic

Modes of Thought," Asian Survey 38, no. 5 (1998).

8 Alice D. Ba, "Who's Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-Asean Relations," The

Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (2006).

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large-scale conflicts between China and other sovereign claimants to possessions in

the South China Sea, it has merely managed the problem, but not solved them. They

suggest that prolonging the dispute plays into Chinas hegemonic ambition of

returning the region to the historical tributary system where Southeast Asian countries

would obey Chinas mandate of heaven.9 To them, norms in ASEAN and other

regional institutions are merely ineffective rhetoric in the larger game of regional

diplomacy, which in reality is always dominated by power politics. ASEAN,

according to their perspective, is merely a platform for great powers to pursue their

interests. In March 2010, Chinese officials, bypassing regional institutions,

unilaterally told Washington that the South China Sea is its "core interest, which

raised alarm bells throughout Southeast Asia.10 This incident suggests that regional

frameworks have failed to socialize China into a desirable player and tame Chinas

aggressive postures in the region. Using ASEAN as a central factor in understanding

Southeast Asian countries reactions toward the rise of China might not be a relevant

approach since it not only fails to recognize regional power as an important factor in

foreign policy, but also neglects possible policy variation, determined by different

political and economic conditions, within each Southeast Asian country.

A Group of Secondary States?

Similar to Jones and Smiths argument that regional institutions are

epiphenomenal to great power politics, other experts suggest that Southeast Asia is

9 David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress: Asean and the

Evolving East Asian Regional Order," International Security 32, no. 1 (2007).

10 Wu Zhong, "A Daring Departure from Deng," Asia Times Online, August 6, 2010 2010.

.

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composed of ten secondary states sensitive to the variation of power structure,

rather than regional norms. The balance of power between the countries in the region

is the most critical factor in determining their foreign policies. In discussing the

responses of East Asian secondary states toward China, Robert Ross argues that South

Korea and Taiwan have increasingly developed an accommodating posture towards

China, while Japan and ASEAN states are joining with the U.S. to balance against it.11

But balancing is a strategy usually employed by great powers, i.e. China, India, Japan,

and the United States. David Kang sees Asias order as a hierarchical one where

China acts a dominant power and the surrounding countries are secondary states.

Kang argues that in the face of a powerful China, these secondary states have no

choice but to strive for friendly bilateral relations with Beijing, and such a hierarchical

order will be stable and peaceful.12

While these arguments suggest that secondary states will accommodate Chinas

interests, other scholars contend otherwise. In discussing the foreign policy options of

weaker states, Eric Labs observes that balancing against a powerful country is a far

more common behavior than accommodation, or also known as bandwagoning.

Instead of bandwagoning for hedging their bets, weak states fight by balancing

against a rising power.13 Aaron Friedberg similarly expects ASEAN states to

internally balance themselves against Chinas growing capability.14 Furthermore,

Gerald Segal suggests that judging from East Asias recent history, although China

seems to be an unrivaled player, concerted containment by other regional players is

11 Robert S. Ross, "Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in

East Asia," Security Studies 15, no. 3 (2006): 379-91.

12 David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," International

Security 27, no. 4 (2003).

13 Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (1992).

14 Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International

Security 18, no. 3 (1993/1994): 29-33.

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capable of moderating Chinas aggression.15

In light of the larger debates within the realist school of international relations

theory regarding whether weaker states are likely to bandwagon with the most

powerful state or join together to balance against it, scholars disagree on how

secondary states in Southeast Asia will respond to a rising China. These conflicting

opinions also highlight what we call the problem of relevance, in that the traditional

understanding of balancing and bandwagoning, which focus on formal military

alliances involving alliances and arms buildups, is now no longer as applicable as it

was before.16 Relying on old notions of international relations theory from the Cold

War era may lead one to incorrectly assess the complexities of contemporary

Southeast Asian affairs. Such an approach also downplays the domestic policy

variations among states and run the risk of overgeneralization.

Balancing, Bandwagoning, Hedging or Others

Over the past decade, many studies have attempted to redress the issues of

relevance and overgeneralization by refraining from both treating Southeast Asian

countries as a unitary actor and confining their assessment of their China policies to

the limited options of balancing or bandwagoning. Denny Roy argues that most

Southeast Asian countries neither balance against nor bandwagon with China. Rather,

their strategies can best be understood as hedging with different levels. Hedging, in

his understanding, is a policy that seeks positive relations with all great powers in the

regionsin this case, China and the U.S. In Roys words, Southeast Asian states

15 Gerald Segal, "East Asia and The "Constrainment" Of China," in East Asian Security, ed. Michael E.

Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).

16 T.V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005).

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prefer not to antagonize any of the external great powers unless one poses a direct

threat to a vital interest.17 For example, seeking modest level of defense cooperation

with Washington can serve as a hedge against a rising China.

Barry Eichengreen, Yeongseop Rhee, and Hui Tong investigated the economic

implications of Chinas growth to Asian countries, and found that whereas

high-income neighbors, such as Singapore, can enjoy economic benefits, low-income

countries, such as Vietnam, may be affected negatively.18 John Wong and Sarah Chan

also notice that Sino-ASEAN economic relationships are both competitive and

complementary. While Singapore and China can benefit from each other by

specializing in different sectors and industries, most developing countries in Southeast

Asia are competing for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the same sectors and

exporting products for similar markets.19 As such, the unique economic conditions in

each Southeast Asian country can affect their perception of China in very different

ways. Discussing Southeast Asias views on the rise of China, Evelyn Goh suggests

that it is useful to divide Southeast Asian countries into maritime and continental ones,

which the former are more reassured by wider geographical distance between them

and China, i.e. the stopping power of water, while the latter are more anxious of their

powerful continental neighbor.20 This would result in different perceptions of threat,

characterizing states with different geographical features and strategies to engage

17 Denny Roy, "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?," Contemporary Southeast

Asia 27, no. 2 (2005): 311-12.

18 Barry Eichengreen, Yeongseop Rhee, and Hui Tong, "China and the Exports of Other Asian

Countries," Review of World Economics 143, no. 2 (2007).

19 John Wong and Sarah Chan, "China-Asean Free Trade Agreement: Shaping Future Economic

Relations," Asian Survey 43, no. 3 (2003).

20 In Gohs classification, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore belong to the maritime

group; Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand belong to the continental group. Evelyn Goh,

"Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge," Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 4-5 (2007):

823-28.

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Beijing.

Although scholars have paid attention to the policy variations between states,

policy options are often treated as static and dichotomous, rather than dynamic and

continuous. For example, as a continental state that is in competition for foreign

economic advantages with China, Vietnam should see China as a grave threat and

consequently balance, or at least hedge, against Beijing. However, Vietnams policy

towards China has changed several times in the past two decades, suggesting that

Hanois response to China has been a dynamic one that is determined by altering

conditions.21 As a consequence, identifying the most relevant conditions and then

constructing a continuous policy spectrum would be a most helpful approach in

understanding Southeast Asian states responses to a rising China.

Domestic Factors

Domestic factors, such as ideology or regime type, sometimes play important

roles in shaping foreign policy. For example, while ideology has traditionally aligned

Vietnam with the socialist front, Carlyle Thayer has noted that the ambivalence in

Vietnam's China policy reflects the tension that occasionally arises when ideology and

national interest cannot be reconciled.22 On the other hand, ASEAN was established

by countries threatened by the spread of communism that sought close defense

cooperation with the U.S.

After the end of the Cold War, ideological conflicts between communist and

21 Alexander L. Vuving, "Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam's China Policy: A Changing Mixture of

Pathways," Asian Survey 46, no. 6 (2006).

22 Carlyle A. Thayer, "Sino-Vietnamese Relations: The Interplay of Ideology and National Interest,"

Asian Survey 34, no. 6 (1994).

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democratic camps became largely irrelevant and no longer constituted the most

critical pillar in the making of Southeast Asian states foreign policies. In less

autocratic Southeast Asian states, such as the Philippines, domestic politics is capable

of determining foreign policy. For instance, Renato De Castro argued that the

disappearance of the threat of communist ideology and the influence of a Philippines

Senate opposed to U.S. military bases were two major causes that drove away the U.S.

naval station in Subic Bay.23

Furthermore, the influence of domestic politics may be salient in investigating

how different types of regime affect foreign policies settings. Countries with similar

political institutions may be less willing to fight each other.24 From this perspective,

most Southeast Asian countries are more or less autocratic countries, which would

downplay the importance of domestic political factors. The most significant external

challenge confronting them may be the rise of China and how to position themselves

within the great power rivalry between China, India, Japan, and U.S. The salience of

domestic factors would decline as the competition among great powers in Asia

becomes more intense.

In this section, we have classified past literatures regarding Sino-Southeast Asian

relations into four categories and identified their limitations. Most of them suffer from

being less relevant, overgeneralized, static and outdated. In the next section,

we seek to mitigate these shortcomings by developing a theoretical framework that

first identifies the interplay of two major factors that concern Southeast Asian states

23 Renato Cruz De Castro, "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations: A Ghost from the Cold

War or an Alliance for the 21st Century?," Asian Survey 43, no. 6 (2003).

24 For democratic peace, see Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2,"

Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 4 (1983). For authoritarian peace, see Mark Peceny, Caroline C.

Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry, "Dictatorial Peace?," American Political Science Review 96, no. 01

(2002).

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the most. Using this analysis as a framework, we present a spectrum best capturing

Southeast Asians foreign policies toward China. Such an approach allows us to

understand how each Southeast Asian state will dynamically respond to a rising China

during different points of time.

Typologies of Strategies to the Rise of China

In this section, we identify and discuss two influential factors in determining

Southeast Asian states policies toward China. Next, we present policy options and

construct a policy spectrum which corresponds to the interplay of such factors.

Threat Perception and Expectation of Economic Relations

When analyzing the strategic options of any state, it is always crucial to identify

factors that concern it the most. Investigating Southeast Asian perspectives on the

challenges posed by a rising China, Goh pointed out that territorial disputes over

islands in the South China Sea, Sino-U.S. conflicts, Chinas regional domination, and

the economic benefits or costs of Chinas growth are factors that Southeast Asian

states worry about the most.25 She categorizes them into three dimensions: political,

military, and economic challenges. Similarly, we boil down these categories in a

broader way that includes only two factors: threat perception and the expectation of

economic relations.

The ideas behind the first pillar that constitutes the underlying basis of our policy

25 Goh, "Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge," 813-15.

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spectrum, threat perception, derive from the balance of threat theory. Stephen Walt,

studying the sources of alliances, argues that a great powers aggregate power,

geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions are the four

major sources of threats, which serve as a signal to surrounding states and influence to

their decisions over whether or not to ally with another state. When a powerful

country has a high aggregate value of those four factors, it will generally be perceived

as a grave threat that and trigger surrounding states to ally against it.26 Using Walts

theoretical framework, we find it useful in evaluating the extent to which each

Southeast Asian country feels threatened by China. Countries facing a higher threat

perception of China are likely to feel less secure, and as a result will seek ways to

check its aggressive postures. Countries that face a lower threat perception are more

reassured of the benefits of Chinas growth, and will worry less about suffering losses

from a powerful China.

Whereas Chinas growing economic and military strengths can be seen as a

potentially threatening posture, the maritime-continental divide27 mentioned earlier

may lead maritime Southeast Asian states to be more reassured by the larger

geographic distance, while continental states may perceive a higher threat because of

their proximity. But Chinas recently military excursions into disputed islands in the

South China Sea is also a signal to maritime states of its aggressive intentions.28 In

addition, Beijings unilateral decision to build dams in the upstream of Mekong River,

without approval from the Mekong River Commission (MRC), to secure the power of

26 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 1987).

27 Goh, "Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge," 823, 28.

28 For example, after Peoples Liberation Armys Navy (PLAN) was discovered doing construction on

Mischief Reef in 1995, Manila sensed the growing threat from Beijing and started to rethink the

possibility to revitalize its defense cooperation with U.S. See Castro, "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S.

Security Relations: A Ghost from the Cold War or an Alliance for the 21st Century?," 977-80.

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water distribution undoubtedly alerted member states of the MRC of a more

aggressive intention and resulted in a higher perception of threat from Beijing.29

It is important to note that different Southeast Asian states disputing over different

issues with China at different points of time will receive different levels of threat

perception emanated from China.

Aside from threat perception, Sino-Southeast Asian economic relations serves as

the other pillar of our policy spectrum. Whether a deeper and more open economic

relationship with China is beneficial or not to Southeast Asian states remains

controversial. A more relevant analysis should focus on the different domestic

economic conditions of each state. Thanks to the inception of the ASEAN-China Free

Trade Agreement, many Southeast Asian countries expect to attract more FDI and

export more products to China. Others, however, fear that future FDI will decrease,

accompanied by an increase in the trade deficit with China.30 These contrasting

expectations have been thoroughly discussed in disagreements among IR scholars

over the impact of interdependence on conflicts. Realists argue that greater

interdependence may lead to more conflict due to the increasing vulnerability of the

more dependent side. The vulnerable would be compelled to control what they depend

on.31 Liberals, on the other hand, argue that the interdependent relationship offers

absolute economic benefits to most involving parties, and therefore no incentive for

29 Marwaan Macan-Markar, "Mekong River's Development May Flow into Conflict " Asia Times,

March 26, 2002 2002.

30 For the variation of ASEAN-China frameworks impact on Southeast Asian states, see Eichengreen,

Rhee, and Tong, "China and the Exports of Other Asian Countries." Wong and Chan, "China-Asean

Free Trade Agreement: Shaping Future Economic Relations." John Ravenhill, "Is China an Economic

Threat to Southeast Asia?," Asian Survey 46, no. 5 (2006). Chia Siow Yue, "Asean-China Economic

Competition and Free Trade Area1," Asian Economic Papers 4, no. 1 (2005).

31 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1st ed. (Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

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conflict exists.32

In an attempt to mediate this discrepancy between realists and liberals, Dale

Copeland suggests a theory of trade expectation, which puts more weight on the

expectation of future impact from interdependence. Following along his work, we

recognize that for a state participating in an economically complex world, the

relationship of interdependence within a certain time period is less important than its

expectation of future economic situation.33 In the context of this paper, the

expectation of future economic impact on Southeast Asian countries is of greater

significance than the past or current situation. For example, should a Southeast Asian

country, currently competing with China on FDI inflows and export markets, expect

to suffer from higher unemployment rate soon, then the interdependent relationship

between them would be considered as a negative one that leads to a fear of losing

economic interests.34 As a consequence, China would be perceived as a less desirable

player in the region.

Taking these two factors into account, we can say that a higher threat perception

and negative economic expectation will make Chinas presence in Southeast Asia

undesirable. On the other hand, a lower threat perception and positive economic

expectation will make China a more acceptable partner. Since this interplay of these

32 Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State : Commerce and Conquest in the Modern

World (New York: Basic Books, 1986). Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and

Interdependence : World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

33 Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,"

International Security 20, no. 4 (1996).

34 For Indonesia, ASEAN plus framework raise the awareness of endangering domestic sectors. See

Deddy Saleh, "Indonesia's Fta Policy and Its Perspectives on an East Asian Fta," in East Asian

Economic Regionalism: Feasibilities and Challenges, ed. Choong Yong Ahn, Richard E. Baldwin, and

Inkyo Cheong (Netherlands: Springer, 2005); Anis Chowdhury, "Indonesia's Hesitance with Afta and

Afta Plus: A Political Economy Explanation," in FTA, Regional Integration and Development (Pusan

National University, Busan, South Korea2007).

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two factors varies across different countries and time periods, we can construct a

spectrum of the desirability of China (from the perspective of Southeast Asian states),

ranging from the most undesirable to the most desirable. A figure capturing this idea

is shown in Figure 1. This spectrum later will correspond to possible policy options.

From Soft-Balancing to Bandwagoning for Profit

Given that China presents different options and challenges for each Southeast

Asian state, their response to its presence will vary. According to the prevailing

literature on this matter, these states will either balance against China by allying with

Washington, hedge against China by means of maintaining defensive pacts with both

Beijing and Washington, or bandwagon with China.35 These policy options can be

seen as a set of fluid, flexible strategies that take into account changes in the

geopolitical situation. States are likely to choose the balancing strategy when China is

considered threatening, adopt the bandwagon strategy when Chinas posture is seen as

more favorable, and hedge if their assessment of China is somewhere in between.

Given that each Southeast Asian country will choose different strategies in response to

different situations during different periods, we do not believe that any particular

single strategy is enough to explain each states policymaking.

It is necessary to clearly define the terms balancing, bandwagoning, and

hedging in our framework. According to IR scholars, a balancing strategy refers

to the balance of power. Naturally, power is important for states to survive. For great

35 For balancing strategy, see Ross, "Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation

and Balancing in East Asia." For hedging strategy, see Roy, "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or

Bandwagoning?." Ann Marie Murphy, "Beyond Balancing and Bandwagoning: Thailand's Response to

China's Rise," Asian Security 6, no. 1 (2010). For bandwagoning, see Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The

Need for New Analytical Frameworks."

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powers, they need enough material power to survive a war with others. Weaker states

can choose to ally with powerful sides in order to seek protection. Maintaining a

balance of power is considered to promote stability, since equal power distribution

between different alliances will raise the cost of war and decrease the likelihood of an

easy victory.36 As we have mentioned, however, while survival has historically been

the main motivation for weaker states to balance against a rising power, this threat has

largely diminished in the post-Cold War era.37 In Southeast Asia, the shared norm of

non-interference has been embraced, rendering actual territorial invasions less likely.

Today, diplomacy replaced military as an alternate means to resolve disputes.38

Not only in Southeast Asia, but around the world, the reliance on military

alliance as a strategy to hard balance against others is becoming an increasingly rare

occurrence. Instead, states are more likely to adopt a soft balancing strategy to

contain perceived threats. Soft balancing involves the formation of limited diplomatic

coalitions or entities through upgrading existing alliances. Examples of soft balancing

include coalitions in international organizations and joint military exercises. Roy uses

a similar concept called low-intensity balancing to describe that, rather than

forming formal military alliance with Washington, some Southeast Asian countries

have been trying to bring more U.S. military power back in Asia to constrain China.39

Such strategies include containing China through forming diplomatic coalitions in

international organizations to check Chinas ambitions, or bringing other great powers,

36 For the argument of war being least likely if power is distributed equally and its counterargument,

see Wagners discussion in R. Harrison Wagner, "Peace, War, and the Balance of Power," American

Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994).

37 Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," 54-55.

38 Robin Ramcharan, "Asean and Non-Interference: A Principle Maintained," Contemporary Southeast

Asia 22, no. 1 (2000).

39 Roy also called this soft balancing. See Roy, "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or

Bandwagoning?."

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such as India, Japan, or U.S., into the region by mean of holding joint military

exercises or hosting military bases for them.

In contrary to the strategy of balancing against a perceived threat, bandwagoning,

or cooperation in hopes of seeking protection or other benefits, is another commonly

discussed behavior when states confront grave threats.40 According to most IR

scholars, this involves forming military alliances with the potential threat. In our

discussion, bandwagoning refers to Southeast Asian countries seeking military

alliances with China, whether to appease Beijings aggression or share spoils from

potential future conflicts. The end of the Cold War, however, has made this logic less

relevant since international wars between great powers seem less likely to occur,

especially in East Asia.

Some scholars propose that bandwagoning is more about gaining interests than

ensuring survival. When a great power emerges as a revisionist one, it would attract

weaker states that seek benefits from joining the revisionist group. Bandwagoning

exists as a choice for weak states to respond to a threat, rather than a part of that threat;

therefore, bandwagoning should be more relevant if understood as a way to profit, not

survive.41 Here we adopt the interpretation that bandwagoning, for Southeast Asian

countries, is to seek intensive defense and economic cooperation with China at the

expense of cooperating with other major powers42 for the sake of securing

40 For discussions of balancing vs. bandwagoning, see Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and

the Balance of World Power," International Security 9, no. 4 (1985): 4-8. Roy, "Southeast Asia and

China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?," 306-08. Robert G. Kaufman, "to Balance or to Bandwagon?

Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (1992): 419-24. David C. Kang,

"Between Balancing and Bandwagoning: South Korea's Response to China," Journal of East Asian

Studies 9, no. 1 (2009): 5-9.

41 For this interpretation, see Schwellers balance of interests theory. Randall L. Schweller,

"Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1

(1994).

42 Great powers mentioned here are India, Japan and United States.

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opportunities elsewhere.43 When Chinese actions are perceived as more desirable,

Southeast Asian states will be more prone to choose a bandwagoning strategy.

Between the strategies of soft-balancing and bandwagoning for profit, playing

safe is another policy option for Southeast Asian States in dealing with China.

Potential regional institutions capable of resolving controversies are still in the

making in East Asia; therefore, for weaker players like the Southeast Asian countries,

there is great uncertainty ahead. Choosing to side exclusively with China, India, Japan,

or the U.S. may be unwise and unnecessarily risky. On the other hand, developing a

strategy to maintain an equal relationship with all the great powers may be the most

rational choice. For example, states can maintain a modest level of defense

cooperation with Washington while still militarily and economically engaging China

in a positive way. This strategy is typically called hedging.44

A hedging strategy offers more flexibility for countries dealing with uncertainty.

Maintaining equal distance with major powers would serve secondary states interests,

especially when current Sino-U.S. relationship in East Asia is stable but competitive.45

However, should threats from China become more severe or economic benefits less

favorable, an initial hedging state might turn to side with other powers to constrain

China. On the other hand, if the threat from China diminishes and economic benefits

become more favorable, a hedging state may lean more and more toward China, to the

point of adopting a bandwagoning strategy to seek greater profits from closer

relations.

43 For a bandwagon for profit case, see Murphy, "Beyond Balancing and Bandwagoning: Thailand's

Response to China's Rise."

44 Roy, "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?."

45 Gaye Christoffersen, "The Role of East Asia in Sino-American Relations," Asian Survey 42, no. 3

(2002). Shannon Tow, "Southeast Asia in the Sino-U.S. Strategic Balance," Contemporary Southeast

Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs 26, no. 3 (2004).

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Here we hypothesize that if a Southeast Asian state perceives higher threats and

expects to suffer economically from cooperation with China (an HT-NE undesirable

China), it is more likely to choose a soft balancing strategy; if it foresees lower

threats and expects to benefit economically from cooperating with China (a LT-PE

desirable China), it is more likely to choose a bandwagoning strategy; if it perceives

higher threats but expects to benefit economically from cooperating with China, or

perceives lower threats but expects to suffer economically from cooperation with

China, it is more likely to choose a hedging strategy. We demonstrate this theory

with a policy spectrum, ranging from soft-balancing, hedging to bandwagoning, in

Figure 1.

In the next section, we use two cases, Sino-Vietnam and Sino-Thailand relations,

to test our hypothesis.

Empirical Evidences from Vietnam and Cambodia

Southeast Asia is of great geo-economic and geo-political interest to China.

Much of Chinas trade and oil from the Middle East, for example, passes through this

region. Moreover, ASEAN member states are regarded by China as an ally in their

fight to resist Western pressure on issues such as domestic political liberalization and

human rights.46 Clearly, looking beyond the border and securing national interests in

the region by harmonizing Southeast Asia is in line with Beijings grand, publicized

strategy of peaceful ascendancy and peaceful development.

In this section, we will examine Vietnam-China and Cambodia-China relations

as evidences to support the explanatory typologies described in the previous section.

46 Jian Yang, "China's Security Strategy and Policies," in Asian Security Reassessed, ed. Stephen

Hoadley and Jrgen Rland (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).

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In the case of Vietnam-China relations, we argue that Vietnam has long regarded

China as a security threat due to the ongoing territorial dispute in the South China Sea.

Although both sides are working on promoting sub-regional economic and local

infrastructure development, the territorial dispute, and the conflict over export

competition, remains at the forefront of Vietnams posture toward China. Its

soft-balancing strategy, therefore, is to ally with the United States bilaterally and to

enmesh China in a multilateral framework based on regional consensus and norms.

On the other side, the case of Cambodia-China relations has all the characteristics of a

win-win partnership. We argue that there is no direct security conflict between China

and Cambodia since Cambodia is not involved in the South China Sea dispute. And as

the bilateral trade between the two countries increases rapidly, Cambodia expects, and

also needs, to maintain the political coalition with Beijing to attract more investments

and foreign aid from China. The bandwagoning strategy, so to speak, seems to be its

most rational policy.

Vietnams Balancing Strategy against China (HT-NE Type)

A rising power may spell troubles for its neighbors. Accordingly, Chinas rapid

economic growth and the expansion of military capability have caused much alarm to

its Southeast Asian neighbors in the 1990s and early 2000s.47 Some ASEAN

countries have pursued balancing or bandwagoning strategies to deal with Beijing,

while others, such as Malaysia and Singapore, followed a hedging policy.48 As

discussed, the balancing strategy is the policy based on a grave sense of security and

47 Ravenhill, "Is China an Economic Threat to Southeast Asia?."

48 Kuik Cheng-Chwee, "The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising

China," Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 2 (2008).

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economic threats,49 and our review of Vietnam-China relation demonstrates such a

case supporting the HT-NE type of China-ASEAN relations.

While Vietnam and China are both communist countries with a similar

authoritarian regime type, this factor alone cannot eliminate Vietnams perception of

China as a potentially threatening neighbor. Factions among Vietnamese policy

communities have debated different policies toward China for years. Some who

support maintaining a positive relationship with China anticipate that goodwill

diplomacy will attract more Chinese investment and boost mutual trade. Others

worried about Chinas military presence and economic dominance in the region prefer

a more hostile stance to Beijing. In effect, Vietnams threat perception towards China

is mainly derived from security interests and negative expectation of economic

interests.

Vietnam has encountered several threats from China on the economic front, most

notably trade deficit, unemployment issue, and infrastructure development related to

national security. In recent years, bilateral trade volume between Vietnam and China

has been growing substantially, with annual growth around 30%. Chinas southern

provinces, such as Guangxi, pursues sub-regional strategies supported by Beijing and

Indochinese ASEAN countries, and Vietnam is its primary partner in Indochinese

peninsula. But it is estimated that Vietnams trade deficit towards China has

significantly increased from US$ 0.2 billion in 2001 to US$ 12.6 billion in 2010.50

The exchange of Vietnams raw material (iron and coal) for Chinas high-price

products (steel and mechanic equipment) is one of the reasons for this increasing trade

deficit, which is also leading to the decline in Vietnams market share of domestic

49 Ravenhill, "Is China an Economic Threat to Southeast Asia?."

50 Trade statistics comes from The Council of Taiwanese Chambers of Commerce in Vietnam,

http://www.ctcvn.org/yncj-nry.aspx?sn=2811 (accessed on 2011/3/7)

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products. The current situation in bilateral trade between Vietnam and China, as well

as the surging deficit, will inevitably exacerbate the negative interdependence

relationship and raise Hanois threat perception of China.

In addition to the deficit issue, unemployment has become another point of

contention in their economic relationship. As we conduct field work at the

Vietnam-China border in Guangxi province, current sub-regional development

strategies pursued by both sides are fostering a closer local-to-local partnership. For

example, Vietnamese commodities are easily seen in Fangcheng in China, while many

of the factories and power stations in the northern provinces of Vietnam were built

with Chinese funding. Chinas investment was expected to provide employment

opportunities for local Vietnamese. However, some Chinese companies that have

established factories in Vietnam, such as the power stations in Halphong, hire only

Chinese migrant workers, thus making Vietnamese labor become less competitive. In

this regard, foreign investment projects like this has threatened local labor markets

and has also resulted in fostering a negative image towards Chinese economic

expansion initiatives. From Vietnams perspective, future economic relationship with

China is not expected to be desirable.

A third feature of the negative interdependence between China and Vietnam is

related to local infrastructure investment projects. In recent years, Vietnam planned to

build a 1,570 km high-speed rail throughout Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. Several

countries such as Japan, Korea, and China, have expressed their interest and

willingness to invest in this project. If the cost and technology are considered, Japan

and China are the most competitive candidates. Japan, the number one creditor of

Vietnam with US$ 8.4 billion, has the most advanced Shinkansen technology. China,

on the other hand, has initiated a new building scheme at the lowest cost while it has

offered to develop a high-speed rail link between Ho Chi Minh City and Phnom Penh,

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the capital of Cambodia.51 Consequently, Vietnam rejected Chinas proposal and

chose Japans plans. It was said that the decision to choose Japans proposal instead of

Chinas was made on account of its high-speed rail technology. However, domestic

critics revealed that this decision was made based on Vietnams national security

concern. They argued that Vietnamese political elites were worried potential border

skirmishes and tensions over disputed territory between two states. They fear that if

war broke out, the high-speed rail built by China may be a critical infrastructure that

can be used to transport and supply troops and aid in a swift invasion of Vietnam.

Clearly, China is still regarded as a potential foreign invader to Vietnam.

Much of the perception of China as a threat is related to the South China Sea

dispute. On March 5th 2011, Vietnam protested a military drill conducted by China

drilling in the Spratlys, arguing that the PLAs anti-piracy exercise intruded upon

Vietnamese territory.52 This is not a unique incident, as the South China Sea and

surrounding archipelago have been problematic military flashpoints for decades.

Understandably, Beijings assertive claim over this region is problematic in the eyes

of the ASEAN countries. Among them, Vietnam has been the most active state in

working on a multilateral process of dispute resolution, especially during its ASEAN

chairmanship in 2010. Vietnam vigorously publicizes and internationalizes the South

China Sea disputes on almost all the major occasions related to ASEAN meetings, and

is constantly seeking for possibilities to work with potential allies to balance Chinas

rising influence in the region.53

51 According to the blueprint of Beijing-Shanghai high-speed rail, this 1,318 km rail construction

project will cost RMB 221 billion while Japanese proposal is expected to cost RMB 380 billion.

52 China Post, "Vietnam Protests China's Spratly Military Exercises," March 5, 2011 2011. (accessed

on 2011/3/9)

53 The Hanoist, "Vietnam Hedges Its China Risk," Asia Times, June 30, 2010 2010. (accessed on

2011/3/7)

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For example, during the summer of 2010, disputes between the U.S. and China

in the ARF meeting centered on South China Sea issues, where U.S. Secretary of

State Hillary Clinton noted that the maritime security was a pivotal issue.54 No

parties reached an agreement after the meeting; however, the debates have triggered

subsequent confrontations between China and its neighbors. In August 2010, U.S.

bilateral cooperation with Vietnam on this ongoing dispute led to a joint military

exercises in the region. The joint training, which also involved the super-carrier USS

George Washington, focused on non-combat operations, and was the first military

exercise conducted by the U.S. and Vietnam, who only a few decades ago were

enemies.55 This military exercise, which also included naval drills by U.S. and South

Korean troops in the Yellow Sea, infuriated Beijing.56 It is clear that Vietnam, with its

increasing emphasis on economic dynamism, emerging markets, and national security,

has successfully gained support from the U.S. to counterbalance Chinas claims and

military presence in South China Sea. Thus, negative economic expectation and high

threat perception have led Vietnam to adopt a soft-balancing strategy against China.

Cambodias Bandwagoning Stance with China (LT-PE Type)

54 Bloomberg Businessweek, "U.S. Signals to China It Won't Keep out of South Sea," July 23, 2010.

(accessed on 2010/12/2).

55 Voice of America, "Us, Vietnam to Launch Unprecedented Naval Exercises," August 10 2010.

(accessed on 2010/12/2)

56 Hannah Beech, "Asia's New Cold War," Time, October 3, 2010. (accessed on 2010/12/2)

; Alan Mascarenhas,

"China's Navy Is Worrying Its Neighbors," Newsweek, August 1, 2010. (accessed on 2011/3/2).

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Since bandwagoning is more about weak states deferential or subordinate

response to a potential threat or an existing hegemon, it begins within an asymmetric

power structure and may lead to asymmetric exchange between a strong state and a

weak one. The relationship between Cambodia, a small ASEAN member state, a

powerful China is a good example how the bandwagon strategy works to the benefit

of both sides.

Regarding the case of Cambodia-China relations, it has all the trappings of a

win-win partnership. Although Cambodia scholars usually publicize that their

government does not regards China as either a friend, foe, threat, or guarantor,57 it is

evident that the Cambodian Royal Government champions a pro-China policy on

political and economic issues. In effect, Cambodia is maintaining a close relationship

with China because it needs support in domestic politics, security arrangements, and

economic development. Economically speaking, Chinas impressive market and

economic growth is a great promise and stimulus to Cambodia, where domestic

market has been rather weak, and which highly desires foreign investments from

China. On the political front, Cambodia seeks to take advantage of Chinas powerful

influence in international affairs to gain more prestige and influence against another

neighboring power, Thailand, especially in light of the ongoing Thailand-Cambodia

border dispute.

Economically, Cambodia has benefited from China, which has been its most

important aid provider and critical investor since the 2000s. In 2007 and 2008, for

example, Beijing poured US $600 million and USD$260 million, respectively, in

Cambodia, most of which were used to construct roads, highways, and local irrigation

57 Sisowath Doung Chanto, "Cambodia," in Betwixt and Between: Southeast Asian Strategic Relations

with the U.S. And China, ed. Evelyn Goh, Idss Monograph No. 7 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and

Strategic Studies, 2005), 83.

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systems. In 2010, China also provided US $300 million in loans and US $15 million

in foreign aid to Phnom Penh. It is estimated that Beijing has contributed more than

1,500 km worth of roads and bridges in Cambodia. A new and solid domestic

transportation network is anticipated to boost economic growth in Cambodia and

promote the growth of trade volumes. In 2009, the total bilateral trade volume

between Cambodia and China was US $791 million, and the number now amounts to

US $1.12 billion, reflecting a growth rate of 41.5%.58 In December 2010, both sides

have pledged to increase trade volume to US $2.5 billion by 2015. In effect, just as in

other ASEAN countries, trade cooperation has been regarded as pattern cooperation

for Cambodia-China relations.

As the bilateral trade figures rapidly increase, Cambodia seeks to maintain a

comprehensive partnership with Beijing to attract more investments and foreign aid

from China. To accomplish this, the bandwagoning strategy appears to be the most

rational policy option. While Cambodia is promoting its local economy by

establishing 22 economic zones, the Royal Government continues to ask for Chinas

support to invest in key areas. For example, the development of the Sihanoukville

Special Economic Zone has received investments by a collaborative effort by the

Cambodia International Investment Group Co. Ltd. and the Taihu Cambodia

International Economic Cooperation Zone Investment Co. Ltd, a state-owned

enterprises in China approved by Ministry of Commerce.59 For China, the investment

58 People's Daily, "Chinese Vice Commerce Minister Praises China-Cambodia Cooperation," February

22, 2011. (accessed on 2011/3/10).

59 Invest in Cambodia, "Special Economic Zones." (accessed on 2011/3/7).

; Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone,

"Introduction of Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone." (accessed on 2011/3/7). Chinese Chamber of

Commerce in Cambodia, "Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone (Ssez) Investment Policies."

(accessed on 2011/3/10). .

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project clearly underscores its commitment to the core values of its going out

strategy. For Cambodia, the development of local industries in areas such as textile

and clothing, machinery and electronics, and high-tech products is highly desirable.

As these examples show, foreign aid, bilateral trade and new investment projects are

the pillars behind Phnom Penhs pro-China policy.

Along with its beneficial economic relationship with China, Cambodia does not

see a threat in Beijing. Generally speaking, unlike other ASEAN countries, Cambodia

does not have any significant disputes with China, except for the environmental

degradation and water dispute in the lower Mekong River basin resulting from the

Chinas dam construction project in upper stream of the river, which runs through its

southern provinces. Although the members of Mekong River Commission, which

includes Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, have criticized Chinas dam

construction project for retaining water and draining the downstream region of

water,60 this issue has yet to damage the amity and cooperation between Cambodia

and China.

Since there has yet to be any significant conflicts between China and Cambodia,

the Cambodian government, shortly after its membership in ASEAN, has sought to

work with China and improve its bilateral relation with Beijing politically and

strategically. Since then, China has become Cambodias main protector by providing

military aid and security guarantees.61 In the recent case of Thailand-Cambodia

border dispute, China holds a key to the territorial dispute. As mentioned above,

China offers military assistance to Cambodia, such as supplying weapons that are sent

to the front lines to in this conflict. Such relationship is kind of a reply to Chinas

60 Huw Pohlner, "Water, Leadership and Geopolitics in Continental Asia," East Asia Forum Quarterly

2, no. 3 (2010): 6-7.

61 Dayley and Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era, 270-71.

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investment policy in Indochinese Peninsula, an action which redirects attention of

those countries who has depended in trade, economics and politics on Thailand so

much and so much and for so long. Because Cambodia is rather small in scale if

compared to Thailand, Cambodia hopes strongly to publicize its border dispute to the

international community. As a result, Cambodia has adopted an increasingly

submissive posture to China, which, despite acting neutral in the eyes of the public,

has actively supported Cambodian development.

Conclusion

In this paper, we investigate the interplay of Sino-Southeast Asian countries

economic and security relations by introducing the theories of trade expectation and

balance, which help explain divergent Southeast Asian countries responses to a rising

China. From the cases of Vietnam-China and Cambodia-China relations, we offer

empirical evidences that correspond to explanatory typologies. Countries that perceive

a grave sense of threat and expect to suffer economically from cooperation with China,

such as Vietnam, will choose a soft balancing strategy; countries such as Cambodia,

which perceives a low sense of threat and expects to benefit economically from

cooperation with China, is more likely to choose a bandwagoning strategy.

With the global academia and policy communities focusing on the rise of China,

it is understandable that small states appear to be mere peripheral players in the East

Asian power structure. However, when investigating the typology of small states

responses to this rising power, we may find that they are more likely to leverage their

importance in the power game, which may lead to a further theorizing process of

future ASEAN-China relations.

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Figure 1. A Spectrum of the Desirability of China

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