Paavola 2004_Abduction as a Logic and Methodology of Discovery

8/8/2019 Paavola 2004_Abduction as a Logic and Methodology of Discovery

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SAMI PAAVOLA

ABDUCTION AS A LOGIC AND METHODOLOGY OFDISCOVERY: THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIES

ABSTRACT. There are various classical argumentsagainst abduction as a logic

of discovery, especially that (1) abduction is too weak a mode of inference to be

of any use, and (2) in basic formulation of abduction the hypothesis is already

presupposed to be known, so it is not the way hypotheses are discovered in the

first place. In this paper I argue, by bringing forth the idea of strategies, that

these counter-arguments are weaker than may appear. The concept of strategies

suggests, inter alia, that many inferential moves are taken into account at the same

time. This is especially important in abductive reasoning, which is basically avery weak mode of inference. The importance of strategic thinking can already be

seen in Charles S. Peirces early treatments of the topic, and N.R. Hansons later

writings on abduction although they did not use the concept of strategies. On the

whole, I am arguing that the focus should be more on methodological processes,

and not only on validity considerations, which have dominated the discussion

about abduction.

KEY WORDS: abduction, logic of discovery, methodology, strategies

1. BASIC CRITICISM AGAINST ABDUCTION(AS A LOGIC OF DISCOVERY)

Abductive inference arouses increasing interest and methodological

discussion in various fields. In the philosophical context abduction

has, however, very often been subjected to severe criticism (see

e.g., Frankfurt, 1958; Nickles, 1980b; Kapitan, 1992). There are, so

to speak, various classical counter-arguments against abduction,

especially if abduction is presented as a logic of discovery. A basis

for these counter-arguments is the widely held view that discovery

is something that cannot be treated by conceptual or philosophical

means.

One basic way of formulating abduction is the one made already

by Charles S. Peirce (see Peirce, CP 5.189; Hanson, 1972, p. 86):

The surprising fact, C, is observed;

Foundation of Science 9: 267283, 2004.

2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.


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268 SAMI PAAVOLA

But if H [an explanatory hypothesis] were true, C would

be a matter of course,

Hence, there is reason to suspect that H is true.

So abduction can be understood as a mode of inference where

explanations are searched for (anomalous or suprising) phenomena.

But this kind of an inference can be criticized because it is too

permissive to be of much use. It seems to permit inferences to

all sorts of wild hypotheses (Frankfurt, 1958, p. 596; Nickles,

1980a, p. 24; Kapitan, 1992, p. 6). Peter Achinstein has presented

various, often cited, counter-examples in line with this criticism.

For example, the hypothesis that I will be paid one million dollars

if this paper is published, would explain (if it were true) why I

am writing this paper. But still, there is no reason to think that

I am about to come a millionaire (unfortunately so!). Or anotherAchinstein example: Let us suppose as an observed fact that I am

happy about some news I have just received. Then a hypothesis

could be proposed that I have just received the news that I have won

the Nobel Prize in literature (because it is reasonable to suppose

that anyone who hears the news about the Nobel Prize winning is

happy). But here again, the fact that I am happy, should give no

reason to believe that I have won the Nobel Prize. So, from the mere

fact that some hypothesis H, if it was true, would explain the data,

does not usually follow that there is reason to think that that H is true

(Achinstein, 1970, p. 92, 1971, p. 118, 1987, p. 413). It is to be noted

that Achinstein does not take into account that the fact observed

should somehow be surprising (Is it surprising that I am writing

this paper? Is it surprising that I am happy? In what sense are these

facts supposed to be surprising?). But still, Achinsteins argument

appears to be basically adequate. The problem with abduction is

that its basic formula seems to allow these kinds of inferences to all

sorts of wild and crazy hypotheses.

Another basic criticism against abduction is that it cannot be

a logic of discovery because the hypothesis is already included

(or supposed to be known) in the premises (see above the second

premise) (e.g., Frankfurt, 1958, p. 594; Nickles, 1980a, p. 23;Hoffmann, 1999, pp. 278279). So it seems that the new idea is

not a result of abductive inference, and abduction can be at most

a logic for preliminary evaluation or appraisal of a hypothesis that


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ABDUCTION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIES 269

is already discovered by some other means (Schon, 1959, pp. 501

502; Kapitan, 1992, p. 2). In this sense abduction is often placed in

that phase of activity which is carried out after original discovery but

before final justification (e.g., Nickles, 1980a, pp. 1822; Laudan,1980, p. 174). This means if the idea is followed that the old

distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justi-

fication (see Reichenbach, 1938; Nickles, 1980a) is not enough, and

a third region is needed. The basic idea is that this third area can be

analysed by logical and conceptual means, although it is not a matter

of justification in proper sense yet. But the context of discovery in

genuine sense is still, according to this idea, something inexplicable,

or possibly a subject for empirical sciences but not for conceptual

analysis.

2. THE MEANING OF STRATEGIES IN ABDUCTION

I think that abduction can still be defended as a very promising

candidate for a logic of discovery if the meaning of strategies is

taken into account. Jaakko Hintikka has emphasized a distinction

between two sorts of rules in reasoning and logic (or in games in

general): the definitory rules and the strategic rules. Hintikka main-

tains that for the theory of logic and reasoning, especially at the

level of introductory textbooks and courses, the study of excellence

of reasoning is often forgotten, and the emphasis is on the avoidance

of mistakes in reasoning (e.g., Hintikka, 1999). According to him,

students are not taught how to reason well but to maintain their

logical virtue (i.e., to avoid logical fallacies and to learn what is and

what is not admissible and valid). The focus has been on definitory

rules of logic, and strategic rules have largely been neglected. The

definitory rules tell what are valid rules in particular system of logic.

By analogy: the definitory rules of chess tell what one is allowed to

do in chess (how chessmen may be moved etc.). But by knowing

only the definitory rules of chess one cannot say that one plays

chess well. Excellence in chess requires that one master strategic

rules extremely well. According to Hintikka, this same idea applies

to logic. No one is good in logic and reasoning by knowing only thedefinitory rules of logic, but by mastering well the strategic rules.

Strategies have, however, been a quite neglected topic in philos-

ophy of science. There are some exceptions. In the interrogative


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270 SAMI PAAVOLA

approach to inquiry, the meaning of strategies has been emphasized

(Hintikka, 1985, 1989; Jung, 1996). But usually the merits of infer-

ence are assessed by investigating whether the truth of the premises

guarantees or makes probable the truth of the conclusion. And thishas also been the basic way of evaluating abduction.

Hintikka has emphasized strategic aspects also in relationship to

abductive inference: the validity of an abductive inference is to

be judged by strategic principles rather than by definitory (move-

by-move) rules (Hintikka, 1998, p. 513). Hintikka himself does

not, however, treat abduction as a separate mode of inference in his

interrogative model of inquiry. In Hintikkas model the problem of

abduction is subsumed under a more general problem concerning

the nature of ampliative reasoning in general. In Hintikkas model,

abduction is closely related to a question-answer step in the process

of inquiry (ibid., pp. 519523).I suggest that abduction as a separate mode of inference can also

be defended by taking strategies into account much more seriously

than before (see also Magnani, 1999, pp. 235236). But what of

strategies mean in the area of reasoning? Strategy is in itself a very

complicated concept. Strategies are related to goal-directed activity,

where the ability to anticipate things, and to assess or choose

between different possibilities, are important (see e.g., Hintikka,

1989, 1999). One central point in strategic rules is that they cannot

normally be judged only in relationship to particular moves, but the

whole strategic situation must be taken into account (see Hintikka,1998, p. 513). This means that in strategies more than one step or

move can and must be taken into account at the same time. I am

not maintaining that this characterization does full justice to the

meaning of strategies in (abductive) inference, but it is surely one

essential point. And in abduction, strategies are especially important

because it is basically such a weak mode of inference. The force of

abductive inference is much strengthened if one takes into account

that the hypotheses are to be searched for in relationship to various

phenomena and background information and not just in order to

explain one, surprising phenomenon.

So if I am a researcher looking for a good explanatory hypothesisfor some anomalous phenomenon, I can (and must) try to constrain

and guide my search by taking into account that my explanation


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must explain or at least be consistent with, most other clues and

information that I have available concerning the subject matter. And

I try to anticipate that my explanation has some chance of survival

in subsequent tests and assessments. Usually I must also take intoaccount that the proposed explanation should not be totally uncon-

vincing, or if it seems to be that, I should have a good further

explanation for why this explanation still deserves attention. So, I

should have an explanation for my explanation (see Thagard and

Shelley, 1997). These are strategic principles where more than one

move can and should be taken into account simultaneously.

In Achinsteins counterexamples, one important reason why

those wild hypotheses are not reasonable (it is to be noted that the

term reasonable is just the right one here) is that they do not fit

well with other relevant information. Normally no one would pay

one million dollars for any academic paper (unfortunately again!),which rules out this hypothesis as strategically bad. And there is

no reason to think that I have won the Nobel Prize in literature

only because I am happy if this hypothesis does not fit at all

with other information concerning who I am and what I have done.

Strategically, it would be bad reasoning to suggest such implausible

hypotheses, if there were no good further reasons or backing for

these. A strategically good hypothesis takes also into account that

there is an explanation for my explanation (or at least explanation

why there cannot be any further explanation). Why someone would

pay me one million dollars for this paper? Why would someoneeven suggest a Nobel Prize for me? If there are no good answers for

these questions, there is no point in even suggesting these kinds of

hypotheses at the first place. Achinstein himself apparently notices

the situation: normally we take the relevant background informa-

tion into account, and we require further evidence for some odd

hypothesis in order to take it seriously (see Achinstein, 1970, p. 92,

1971, p. 118, 1987, p. 416). But what Achinstein is missing is the

idea that strategies are involved here.

The strategic viewpoint does not, however, rule out the possibility

of suggesting implausible hypotheses altogether. It is, for example,

possible to imagine such a course of events, where the one milliondollars hypothesis (or the Nobel Prize hypothesis) is the correct

one, because of some extraordinary circumstances. Especially if


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272 SAMI PAAVOLA

more conventional or plausible hypotheses have not worked out, it

might be a good strategy to try more implausible hypotheses. (In

Achinsteins one-million dollars example, if the situation were that,

for some reasons, it would be very surprising that I am giving thispresentation, and other explanations would not seem to work out,

it would be a good candidate hypothesis to think that someone is

paying me a lot of money for this.) What I am arguing is that in

strategies, the reasoner tries to anticipate the counter-arguments, and

to take into account all the relevant information, and this rules out

very wild hypotheses, except, when there is no other available, or

alternatively, when these are presented simply as wild guesses.

I will now give further consideration to the criticism that abduc-

tion cannot be the logic of discovery because the hypothesis or the

idea is already presupposed in the premises. To begin with, I am

not maintaining that abductive inference is an automatic means formaking discoveries.

I agree with N.R. Hanson, who emphasized that abductive infer-

ence is of a way of analysing conceptual issues in discoveries

rather than a manual or an algorithmic device for making these

discoveries (Hanson, 1961, pp. 2122). If abduction is to be

considered as the logic of discovery, the whole methodological

process must be taken into account; one must not just concentrate on

the form of the argument. In this sense, it is for example important to

think how these surprising facts (see the formulation of abduction

above) operate as clues in the search for explanations or hypotheses.From the point of view of the inquirer, the difficult part in abductive

search might be to find fruitful premises. But this does not mean that

abduction cannot analyse properly the logical form of discoveries.

Strategies are also involved here. Although the hypothesis is in

the premises, abduction can still be the logic of discovery because,

as Peirce wrote (Peirce, CP 5.181):

It is true that the different elements of the hypothesis were in our minds before;

but it is the idea of putting together what we had never before dreamed of putting

together which flashes the new suggestion before our contemplation.

How I interpret this idea from the strategic viewpoint is that ahypothesis suggested can in itself be something old and even well

known (cf. Anderson, 1987, pp. 4748). But the way in which this

hypothesis is seen to fit with this particular problem in question


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and with other relevant information (besides the one anomalous

phenomenon) is crucial. And it is also essential that there is a

further explanation or clarification for this particular hypothesis. For

example, the idea of evolution was not new when Charles Darwinproposed it. It was widely admitted that it would have been a good

explanation for various phenomena, but the problem was that there

were no plausible explanations for how evolution operates more

specifically (and in fact there seemed to be lots of evidence which

was against the evolutionary hypothesis). As Darwin later recol-

lected his discovery and its relationship to the known facts (Darwin

in his autobiography: Barlow, 1958, pp. 118119):

It was evident that such facts as these [various important observations that he

had made on the famous voyage of the Beagle], as well as many others, could

be explained on the supposition that species gradually become modified; and

the subject haunted me. But it was equally evident that neither the action of the

surrounding conditions, nor the will of the organisms (especially in the case of

plants), could account for the innumerable cases in which organisms of every

kind are beautifully adapted to their habits of life. I had always been much

struck by such adaptations, and until these could be explained it seemed to me

almost useless to endeavour to prove by indirect evidence that species have been

modified.

And likewise many details in Darwins theory were not new, but

the real discovery and insight was that Darwin showed that these

ideas really work in this particular context. This is also how Howard

Gruber has described Darwins famous Malthusian insight (Gruber,1981, p. 42):

. . . his notebooks show that he had or almost had the same idea a number of times

before, during the fifteen months of deliberate effort leading up to the moment in

question. So the historic moment was in a sense a re-cognition of what he already

knew or almost knew.

So my point is, that the basic formula of abduction can still be an

essential part in the logic of discovery (even though the hypothesis

is in the premises) if the difficult part in discovery is the recognition

that the hypothesis really is a viable way of solving this particular

problem and that the hypothesis works more generally (and not onlyin relationship to one, particular anomalous phenomenon).

I am not maintaining that the importance of strategies in

discovery means that in (scientific) discovery the researchers always


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274 SAMI PAAVOLA

have their hypotheses already at their disposal and that the only

problem would be to strategically see, somehow, a connection

between moves in games of reasoning. Discovery means that some-

thing new is brought (or abducted!) to the particular situation. Butstrategies must be taken into account when aha-experiences or

insights are involved. An aha-experience means that the hypothesis

(or the solution) in question fits with those constraints and clues

that are involved in the problem situation in question, i.e., the

insight seems to take into account many counter-arguments and

moves in advance. It is not enough that the hypothesis explains only

some detached, anomalous phenomena (e.g., for Darwin the idea of

evolution and the Malthusian principle were important discoveries

only when these ideas could be integrated to the larger argument

concerning species, and not as separate and unconnected explana-

tions). It almost seems that the basis for the aha-experience is asituation where, first, various constraints and hints characterize the

situation and then some solution seems to fit with these constraints.

And this outlining of constraints and hints is, I submit, closely

related to strategic thinking, at least in the sense I use strategies

here. A good insight is also a good one strategically.

I think that strategies are also involved when it is said that

abductive inference starts from anomalous or somewhat surprising

phenomena. It might be asked, why it is so often emphasized

that abductive inference starts from surprising phenomena (but cf.

Hoffmann, 1999, p. 281)? It does not seem to affect to thevalidity

of inference if it starts from surprising or from non-surprising

phenomenon. I think that this is also a strategic rule, for the

following reasons: In difficult problems or in cases where something

new is required, it is a good strategy (or a worthwhile one) to start

from anomalous facts or from little details, and try with them to find

a solution or a hypothesis. This is at least a strategy that detectives

(or detective novels) recommend (the connection between abduc-

tion and the reasoning that detectives use is often noticed, see e.g.,

Eco and Sebeok, 1988; Niiniluoto, 1999b). This is also how Francis

Darwin described how (his father) Charles Darwin worked (Darwin,

1892, pp. 9495):

There was one quality of mind which seemed to be of special and extreme

advantage in leading him to make discoveries. It was the power of never letting


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exceptions pass unnoticed. Everybody notices a fact as an exception when it is

striking or frequent, but he had a special instinct for arresting an exception. A

point apparently slight and unconnected with his present work is passed over by

many a man almost unconsciously with some half-considered explanation, which

is in fact no explanation. It was just these things that he seized on to make a start

from.

3. STRATEGIES IN PEIRCES AND HANSONS TREATMENT OFABDUCTION: METHODEUTIC FOR ABDUCTION

Charles Peirces seminal writings concerning abduction already

contained many strategic insights, although he did not label them

as such (Hintikka, 1998, pp. 512516). Peirce made a distinction

between three areas of logic: (Speculative) Grammar, Critic, and

Methodeutic. Peirce characterized this trivium in various waysduring his long career, so it is not possible to interpret this distinc-

tion in exact terms or unequivocally (see e.g., Peirce, CP 1.559,

CP 1.444, CP 2.93). Especially the third area, Methodeutic, leaves

room for various interpretations (in many writings he called it e.g.,

Speculative Rhetoric) (Liszka, 1996). In Grammar the nature and

meanings of signs are studied; in Critic arguments are classified and

the validity and the force of arguments are studied (see Peirce, CP

1.191). Methodeutic, however, studies the methods that ought to be

pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application

of truth (ibid.), and the principles of the production of valuable

courses of research and exposition (Peirce, EP2, p. 272).

In order to develop further the model of abductive inference, all

these three Peircean areas of logic (Grammar, Critic, Methodeutic)

are salient. According to Peirce, Critic is important in abduction

although it is a very weak mode of inference (Peirce, CP 5.188):

. . . abduction, although it is very little hampered by logical rules, nevertheless is

logical inference, asserting its conclusion only problematically or conjecturally, it

is true, but nevertheless having a perfectly definite logical form.

The area of Grammar should also be developed further in order to

better understand the nature of abductive inference. For example, thespecial role of iconic and perceptual elements in abductive infer-

ence is, I think, part of Grammar (see Peirce, CP 2.96; Shelley,

1996; Thagard and Shelley, 1997). But what is important from the


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point of view of this paper is that, in abductive inference, the role

of Methodeutic can be seen as especially significant because, in

Peirces words, Of the different classes of arguments, abductions

are the only ones in which after they have been admitted to be just,it still remains to inquire whether they are advantageous (Peirce,

HP, p. 1035).

I maintain that according to the Peircean distinction of these three

areas of logic, strategies would belong to Methodeutic. Methodeutic

studies the process of inquiry and the way in which inquiry is carried

on, and strategies are part of it. As Peirce in his time emphasized

Methodeutic in reasoning, Hintikka, in recent decades has empha-

sized the need for strategic rules and study of fruitful methods of

logical reasoning.

There are also other concepts and ideas in Peirces writings

(besides Methodeutic) where the issue of strategies comes to thefore. Hintikka has suggested that in Peirces concept ofhabitthere

lurks . . . a strategic rule trying to get out (Hintikka, 1998, p. 515).

Peirce also emphasized the notion of the economy of research,

which is very closely related to strategic principles (Peirce, CP

7.220). According to Peirce various sorts of economical (broadly

interpreted) factors should guide the choice of the hypotheses, for

example, caution, which takes into account what will happen if

the hypothesis suggested does not work out. One example of this

economical caution is the game of twenty questions where the idea

is to guess what object someone is thinking by making good ques-tions (ibid.). Only such questions are allowed as can be answered by

Yes or No (this limitation makes the game intriguing; there would

be no game if you were allowed to ask the object thought of right

away). The success in this game is based on skilful questions that

break up the search area most efficiently. I think it is quite clear

that this is the same as saying that the success is based on good

strategies.

Peirce himself often maintained that we humans must have some

sort of an instinct that guides our guesses (see e.g., Peirce, CP

2.753; CP 5.1724). Peirces argument was that a human could not

arrive at his or her theories by pure chance. There are an infinitenumber of theories that could be suggested if there is nothing that

helps us. According to Peirce our abductive guesses are not totally


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haphazard or blind because we have an instinct for making these

guesses. But this explanation raises several questions. Is there any

evidence that we humans have this kind of a guessing instinct?

How would it operate? There is some plausibility to the Peirceanidea that evolution has moulded us to guess such hypotheses about

physical and psychical life, which have been important for our

survival. But how could this guessing instinct help humans to

discover modern scientific theories which are often counter-intuitive

and against a common sense way of understanding things? Peirce

himself admitted that this instinct explanation is not very plausible

when one considers the genesis of very complicated theories by

which we penetrate further and further from the surface of nature

(Peirce, CP 7.508; see also Peirce, CP 7.606). It is also problematic

to combine this instinct explanation with the idea that abduction is a

third mode ofinference. It seems that if the crucial element in abduc-tion is the guessing instinct there is not much room for abductive

reasoning. There are various suggestions how instinct and inference

can be combined in a Peircean scheme (e.g., Fann, 1970; Anderson,

1987) but still it is a quite problematic how this combining could

satisfactorily be done.

Nicholas Rescher has suggested that Peirces somewhat myster-

ious capacity of instinct should be replaced by a methodology of

inquiry (Rescher, 1995, pp. 321323; Hoffmann, 1999, p. 297). The

idea is that scientific inquiry and discovery is not blind because

methodsand

methodologygive rational principles that guide theprocesses of inquiry. Methods themselves, according to Rescher,

have emerged through evolutionary trial-and-error process. I am

not trying to evaluate Reschers solution comprehensively, but I

think that Rescher is making a very important point here. Scien-

tists need not start from scratch because methods and methodologies

that have proven to be successful are guiding inquiry. But it seems

that Reschers solution cannot be the whole story. If methods and

methodology are supposedly reached by trial-and-error, are we not

facing again the same problem that was supposed to be solved (this

is one version of the classical Meno paradox)? Are these methods

found by pure chance in evolutionary way? Is this possible? Andif so, is there some kind of an agreement what these successful

methods nowadays are? If they guide scientific inquiry in contrast


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to instincts, should we not know them explicitly? And even if we

could characterize these methodologies in general terms, is there

any guarantee that they work in particular cases?

What I have tried to argue has some similarities to Rescherssolution. There is no need to abandon the idea that we humans might

have some abilities that can be called instincts and which help us

when we are trying to discover something new. But these abductive

instincts cannot be the fundamental basis for abductive inference. In

order to understand abductive reasoning better, the focus should be

more on methodological processes. But unlike Rescher, I dont think

that the most important feature of methodology is that it is moulded

by evolutionary process.

The focus on strategies means that inquiry is seen as a kind of a

problem solving process where the inquirer uses the best inquiry

strategies possible. The use of strategies explains why inquiry isnot purely blind, even when something new is discovered. The

inquirer must try to take into account all the information that is

relevant to his or her subject area. Strategically, and from the

point of view of the inquirer, it would be bad reasoning to suggest

very wild hypotheses, or hypotheses based on pure chance; it

is wise to take into account existing knowledge. It is true that

new (especially revolutionary) discoveries often mean that some

parts of this existing knowledge must be abandoned. But even then

the inquirer must be able to combine the new ideas with existing

knowledge or constraints, (or to be able to show that the existingknowledge is in some ways inadequate). These constraints can be

negative, in a sense that they inhibit new ideas, but they can also

be positive in suggesting methods, theories, information and so on

which must be taken into account and which might give clues how

to solve the problems in question. This idea is similar to the role of

normal science or paradigms in Thomas Kuhns famous model

of scientific growth (Kuhn, 1970). Paradigms are not automatic

ways of solving problems, but they give good suggestions for how

to conduct inquiry. This is the reason why inquiry does not always

have to start from scratch. Kuhn does not extend the idea to revolu-

tionary situations where paradigms themselves change. But even inrevolutionary situations, existing knowledge constrains and guides

the search for new information and discoveries.


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I think that Norwood Russell Hansons old ideas concerning

abduction should also be seen from a strategic angle. Hanson was

already a proponent of the idea of the logic of discovery in the 1950s

and 1960s when these subjects were not popular in philosophy ofscience (Hanson, 1961, 1972). Hansons formulations have been

criticized as inadequate for the logic of discovery (see e.g., Nickles,

1980b). My suggestion is that this criticism has been concerned

more with the validity of abduction (with Critic in Peircean

terms), and Hanson himself was more interested in abduction as

a part of methodological processes of inquiry (i.e., Methodeutic).

Hanson explicitly criticized the logic of the finished research

reports; he put the emphasis on processes of discovery and main-

tained that these processes can be analysed by conceptual means

(Hanson, 1961, pp. 2022).

In his writings concerning abduction, Hanson distinguished threeingredients in the logic of discovery (Hanson, 1965, pp. 4765).

It is reasoning which

1) proceeds retroductively, from an anomaly to

2) the delineation of a kindof explanatory H which

3) fits into an organized pattern of concepts (ibid., p. 50).

I think that these points can be seen as strategic principles although

Hanson himself did not develop these ideas explicitly in this way.

The starting point in anomalies (point 1) can be seen as a strategic

principle (see the end of chapter 2. above). Hanson also pointed

out that abduction does not mean that some particularhypothesis isfound straight away. An important phase in the process of discovery

might be that the type of the solution is delineated before the solution

is acquired (point 2) (Hanson, 1961; Niiniluoto, 1999a, pp. S440

S441). This is strategic thinking: the constraints and hints that

help in hypothesis finding are taken into account. And the goal in

abductive inference (at least in most cases) is to find an overall

pattern into which all evidence and clues fit (point 3), and this phase

especially requires that various inferential moves be put together

skilfully and by taking various clues and constraints into account

(a paradigmatic case is detective stories, but this is in itself a verygeneral model).


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4. CONCLUSION: A LOGIC AND METHODOLOGY OF DISCOVERY

Various approaches in the philosophy of science nowadays

emphasize the need to find a model for inquiry that is not strictlylogical, at least in the old sense (i.e., in the sense that formal logic

has been usually understood in the last century) but one that is not

purely relativistic or historicistic either (see e.g., Pera, 1994; Jung,

1996; Thagard, 2000; Aliseda, 2001). This need arises especially

from an aim to understand processes of discovery and knowledge

formation and not just finished products (Sintonen, 1996; Aliseda,

1997). Philosophy of science and logic have for long concen-

trated on analysing the structure of finished products, e.g., what

is an explanation, and not processes of inquiry, e.g., how good

explanations are searched for and found (Aliseda, 2001). There

have been some notable exceptions, e.g., N.R. Hanson, but usuallythese processes were literally defined to be something that cannot

be analysed by conceptual means, or by philosophical models.

Thomas Nickles has made a distinction between heuristic

appraisal and epistemic appraisal in methodology (Nickles,

1989). Epistemic appraisal is the standard way of doing things in the

philosophy of science. It is a retrospective, justificatory assessment

of scientific results. Heuristic appraisal means that the promising-

ness, or fertility of scientific proposals or problems is being

assessed. It can be maintained that this is at least as important, if

not more important than epistemic appraisal. Nowadays heuristical

aspects are often emphasized when rationality of discovery is

searched for (Jung, 1996; Magnani, 1999, pp. 235236; Aliseda,

2001).

The friends of discovery have for long emphasized that the

concept of rationality must be broadened if the context of discovery

is to be taken into account (Nickles, 1980b). There is a new

opportunity for this broadening when new conceptual means are

developed, i.e., conceptual means that try to capture processes of

inquiry and discovery (see e.g., Hintikka, 1985, 1998; Sintonen,

1996; Jung, 1996; Aliseda, 1997, 2001). The basic point is that even

though old models of formal and symbolic logic are not adequate,it is possible to develop new formal models and tools that are more

appropriate for this (see also Thagard, 2000). In this sense there is

no need to leave the context of discovery only to psychologists


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or to empirical scientists, for there are also conceptual and logical

issues involved here.

The point in this paper has been that the logical apparatus should

be broadened at least in two dimensions from the standard way.Deductive logic is not enough, and the model of abductive infer-

ence is especially needed in order to understand the processes of

discovery. But abduction in itself is not enough. Besides validity

considerations (which are in themselves important in abduction)

there is the art of using (abductive) reasoning. This concerns the area

of Methodeutic (in Peircean terms); an area especially important

in abductive reasoning. It seems that this is in some sense a return

to a pre-Fregean sense of logic, where the boundaries between

logic and methodology are quite vague (Aliseda, 2001); bound-

aries between logic and psychology must also be drawn anew (see

Thagard, 2000). In any case, this shift to focus more on processes ofinquiry necessitates a re-consideration of abductive strategies.

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http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/Articles/Pages/%7FAbductive.html.

Department of Psychology

Centre for Research on Networked Learning and

Knowledge Building

University of Helsinki

Finland

E-mail: [email protected]


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