P v Lacson ipad

7/27/2019 P v Lacson ipad

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONALPOLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO,STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A.ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR. CONRADOM. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON,respondent.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Fortun Narvasa & Salazar and Saguisag Carao & Associates for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 29, 2003 Resolution of this Courtwhich granted the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Respondent alleged that Sec8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (which took effect on December1, 2000) should be given not only prospective but also retroactive effect so as to barthe re-filing of the criminal cases against him which had since long been terminated,solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused.

In denying the motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court ruled, among others,that: (a) Section 8, Rule 117 cannot be applied retroactively to respondent's case for todo so would result in "absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and the

victims of crimes and their heirs"; and (b) respondent failed to comply with theessential pre-requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 particularly that of accused's "expressconsent" to the provisional dismissal. The Court directed the consolidation of thecriminal cases and ordered the re-raffling of the same to a special heinous court.

SYLLABUS

1.REMEDIAL LAW; REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SECTION 8, RULE 117THEREOF; APPLICATION; TIME BAR UNDER NEW RULE WAS FIXED FOR THE BENEFITOF THE STATE AND THE ACCUSED, NOT FOR THE ACCUSED ONLY. The Court is notmandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused.It must be noted that the new rule was approved by the Court not only to reinforce theconstitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case. The time-barunder the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued theadministration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and theaccused; not for the accused only. aSHAIC

2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO PROMULGATE


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RULES CARRIES WITH IT THE POWER TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO GIVE SAIDRULES PROSPECTIVE OR RETROACTIVE EFFECT. The Court approved Section 8pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution. Thisconstitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter alia, todetermine whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive effect. Moreover,

under Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules to actionspending before it if in its opinion their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the former procedure shall apply. DcTSHa

3.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES; SHOULD BECONSTRUED AS IS CONDUCIVE TO FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE, AND IN HARMONY WITHTHE PURPOSE OF THE LAW; CASE AT BAR. The absence of a provision in Section 8giving it prospective application only does not proscribe the prospective applicationthereof; nor does it imply that the Court intended the new rule to be given retroactiveand prospective effect. If the statutory purpose is clear, the provisions of the law shouldbe construed as is conducive to fairness and justice, and in harmony with the generalspirit and policy of the rule. It should be construed so as not to defeat but to carry outsuch end or purpose. A statute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it isapproved. To construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is tonullify or destroy the law. In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intendedthe new rule to be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of theCourt were otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended,namely, to give the State a period of two years from notice of the provisional dismissalof criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. It would be a denial of theState's right to due process and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply the new ruleretroactively in the present case as the respondent insists, considering that the criminal

cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 before thenew rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive application of the time-bar willresult in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs. ITcCaS

4.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL; EXPRESSCONSENT OF ACCUSED TO THE PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASE, A PRE-REQUISITE TO BAR A REVIVAL THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. When the respondentadmitted that he did not move for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 toQ-99-81689 in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, and that he didnot give his express consent to the provisional dismissal of the said cases, he in fact

admitted that one of the essential requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 was absent. Therespondent's contention that his admissions made in his pleadings and during thehearing in the CA cannot be used in the present case as they were made in the courseof a different proceeding does not hold water. It should be borne in mind that theproceedings before the Court was by way of an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, from the proceedings in the CA; as such, the present recourse isbut a mere continuation of the proceedings in the appellate court. This is not a new trial,but a review of proceedings which commenced from the trial court, which later passed


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through the CA. The respondent is bound by the judicial admissions he made in the CA,and such admissions so hold him in the proceedings before this Court. . . . While it maybe true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal case if it finds noprobable cause, absent the express consent of the accused to such provisional dismissal,the latter cannot thereafter invoke Section 8 to bar a revival thereof. AEIDTc

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,dissenting opinion:

1.REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; SUPREME COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS;RESOLUTION OF FACTUAL ISSUES REQUIRES SUBMISSION OF EVIDENCE BEFORE THETRIAL COURT; CASE AT BAR. Under the Constitution, this Court resolves "cases inwhich only an error or question of law is involved." It is therefore not a trier of facts.The Court itself in the April 1, 2003 Resolution summarized the facts to be resolved. . .The determination of whether or not the above rule applies in this case entails factualissues. Has the two-year period expired? Was the dismissal of the cases with theexpress consent of the accused? Was there notice to the offended party? By their very

nature, these questions justify a remand to the trial court. . . The facts to be resolvedrequires submission of evidence. They are material facts because proof of their actualityis needed to enable the Court to render judgment on the basic issues raised. Evidenceto prove the facts in issue have to be introduced in accordance with the principles of substantive law and the rules of pleading, practice and procedure. The facts are indispute because one party alleges their existence while the other denies them, bothwith some show of reason. If the unanimous judgment in 2002 is to be reversed by anew majority, a remand to ascertain these facts outlined is imperative. Facts have to beestablished by evidence, not by inferences, not by suppositions, and certainly not bythe augury of divination. Yet, the majority precisely proceeded to do it that way. If thefacts material to the Court's judgment were found by the new majority from the records,how could the unanimous Court have missed so many of these significant facts in 2002?If doubts are to be resolved and suppositions and fallacies avoided, every method of getting the truth through adversarial proceedings before a trial court must be explored.Let the Regional Trial Court which is a trier of facts do the job. HIEASa

2.POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; REFERS TO RIGHTS OFTHE ACCUSED WHICH SHOULD NOT BE WEIGHED AGAINST THE AWESOME POWERSOF THE STATE; PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THEREVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (RRCP) IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO THEPROTECTION OF A CITIZEN AGAINST OVERZEALOUS CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS. The new majority rules that the time bar [in Rule 117] should apply only prospectively.I find this decision disturbing if it is indicative of a novel approach to individual liberties.The Bill of Rights is a statement of the liberties of individuals protected againstexertions of government power. The ponencia seeks to protect the "rights" of the Stateagainst its citizens and invokes the Bill of Rights in the process. The Bill of Rights refersto fundamental individual rights and the guaranteed protection is against Governmentor any of its officials. It cannot be invoked against actions of private parties unlessprivate action is backed by government power. Government exercises powers not rights.


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When the Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, orproperty without due process of law," the "person" referred to is not the State. Whenwe mention in our decisions that the State also deserves due process, it is merely aquaint way of saying that the law and the rules should be followed if intended toprotect State interests. But never should the rights of a citizen be weighed against the

non-existent rights of the State which should be recognized and denominated as thepowers of the State. There is sometimes a balancing of individual rights against Statepower where public interest is involved. The individual is always at a terrificdisadvantage when a basic right is weighed against the awesome powers of a State.There is no need for balancing in this case. If the issue involved is protection of acitizen against overzealous criminal prosecutions the reason for ruling against himshould never be due process rights of the State. The Dissenting Opinion of Mr. JusticeReynato S. Puno in the April 1, 2003, with which I also concurred, discusses the originof the amended rule, its nuances and reasons for being, and the inflexibility of thepermanent time bar once the two-year period is reached. The Rule is intended toprotect the rights of the accused, not to make it easier for the Government to prosecutehim. Here, the Court wants us to allow the use of a protection for the citizen againstthat citizen. Its enactment becomes counter-productive. The extensive and learneddiscussion of the Honorable Chairman of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court is glossed over. It should be re-read. TIDcEH

3.REMEDIAL LAW; REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SECTION 8, RULE 117THEREOF; PURPOSE; SIMPLE JUSTICE DICTATES A RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OFTHE RULE FOR IT TO BE ENJOYED BY AN ACCUSED WHOSE TRIAL HAS DRAGGED FOR

YEARS WITH A RECENT ACCUSED. The amended rule is intended to prod theGovernment into a more faithful and accountable performance of duty, to avoid thetyrannical Damocles' sword hanging indefinitely over a person whom the Governmentwants to coerce into indeterminate submission, and to stop the malaise of publicofficers who are shiftless and lethargic and who are prodded into action only after thepassage of interminable time or when revenge or a desire to vex and oppress suddenlysurfaces. If the rule is a just rule, its objectives are salutary and if its enforcement willmean an enlargement of individual rights, why should a recent accused enjoy it to theexclusion of those with pending cases when it was enacted? Justice should be foreveryone especially those accused where prosecution and trial have dragged for yearsand years. A rule should not protect the incompetence or lethargy of Government

prosecutors. I submit that the new rule should be made retroactive. This interpretationis in line with simple justice. The statement of the majority that the due processprotections of the State and those of the individual should be equal is dangerous for aSupreme Court to utter. DTEIaC

4.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PROCEDURAL LAWS; APPLICATION; GENERALLY CONSTRUED AS APPLICABLE TO ACCRUED OR PENDING CAUSES OF ACTION AT THETIME OF THEIR PASSAGE; EXCEPTIONS; CASE AT BAR. Regardless of the


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characterization of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-9981689, I submit that Rule117, Section 8 should be given retroactive application, consistent with the principles of statutory construction of procedural rules. Procedural laws, by definition, prescribe rulesand forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress. They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to criminal law, procedural law as

distinguished from substantive law is that which provides or regulates the steps bywhich one who commits a crime is to be punished. In interpreting procedural rules, thisCourt, in the 1927 case of Hosana v. Diomano, laid down the rule that procedural ruleswill be construed as applicable to causes of action accrued, and actions pending andundetermined, at the time of their passage, unless: (1) such actions are expresslyexcepted; or (2) vested rights would be disturbed by giving them a retroactiveapplication. The causes of action in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 inwhich the Informations alleged essentially the same operative facts as those alleged inCriminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, with the primary difference thatrespondent is charged as a principal and no longer as an accessory had undoubtedlyalready accrued as of December 1, 2000, the effective date of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, whether the criminal actions in question were "pending", orthe causes of action had merely "accrued", the retroactive application of the RRCP iscalled for. Undoubtedly, there is no express exception to the retroactive application of Rule 117, Section 8. Thus, unless vested rights are disturbed, its retroactive applicationis clearly mandated. cHaADC

5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A PERSON HAS NO VESTED RIGHT IN ANY RULE OF LAW. On this point, it has been held that the retroactive application of procedural laws is notviolative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. This isbecause of the fundamental principle that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach

to nor arise from procedural laws. This is a principle that we have enunciated in a longline of cases. A person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitled him to insistthat it shall remain unchanged for his benefit. SIAEHC

6.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESSCONSTRUED AS PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS; APPLYING RULE 117, SECTION 8 OF THERRCP RETROACTIVELY IS NOT PROCEDURALLY UNFAIR; CASE AT BAR. Stripped toits basics, procedural due process is a matter of nothing more or less than proceduralfairness. There would be nothing procedurally unfair about giving a retroactiveapplication to, Rule 117, Section 8. Precisely, this Court is specifically empowered bythe Constitution to promulgate such rules of procedure and in the past we have had no

qualms about applying such rules of procedure retroactively, ruling firmly that no vestedrights are impaired even if the effect of the retroactive application of such rules wouldbe to divest a court or tribunal of its jurisdiction. In such instances, we have advised theparty-litigants that their rights have not been impaired. There is no cogent reason todepart from this principle even if, in this case, the People is one of the party-litigants.Departing from the fundamental principle in this case seems to be an instance of selective statutory construction to achieve the desire to attain a particular result. If anything, the fact that the People is one of the party-litigants should call for a more


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vigilant application of the Rules strictly against the People or the State and liberally infavor of the private individuals who might be benefited by the retroactive application of the procedural rule. Although it is true that the prosecutors would have no inkling, as of the provisional dismissal of the case on March 29, 1999, that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure would contain Rule 117, Section 8, they undoubtedly had notice as

of the effective date thereof on December 1, 2000. From that date, they had almostfour months in which to revive Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, hadthere been a need to do so. In cases involving purely private litigants, we have nothesitated in dismissing cases when a party or parties have not been vigilant inprotecting their rights. At the risk of being repetitive, there is no reason to depart fromthis principle simply because the State is a litigant. CaEIST

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.,Dissenting Opinion:

1.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES; STATUTES ANDRULES CANNOT PLACE ANY LIMITATION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO

SPEEDY TRIAL; CASE AT BAR. My first dissent rests mainly on the premise that thecircumstances surrounding respondent's case, i.e., the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.Q-99-81679 to 89 and their refiling two years after, effectively elicit a speedy trialanalysis or inquiry. The time interval between the dismissal of the initial charges andthe subsequent refiling thereof had crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from"presumptively prejudicial" delay, thus, before anything else, respondent's predicamentshould be weighed on the basis of the Constitutional provisions on speedy trial andspeedy disposition of cases. Section 8, Rule 117 must come second only. At this

juncture, it bears reiterating that statutes (and with more reason, rules) cannot beeffective to place any limitation on the constitutional right, and therefore they shouldnot be regarded as "definitions" of the constitutional provision, but merely asimplementing statutes passed pursuant to it. It is thus conceivable that theconstitutional provision may be violated although an implementing statute is not. Withthis Court's fixation on Section 8, Rule 117, it in effect missed the bigger picture.Respondent's repeated invocation of his constitutional right to speedy trial and speedydisposition of cases was drowned by arguments on the applicability of the rule onlyimplementing such right. Contrary to the express provision of Section 10, Rule 119 of the same Rules that "no provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing thesame shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of the right to speedy trialguaranteed by Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, Section 8, Rule 117effectively operates as a bar to respondent's bid for a speedy trial analysis or inquiry.

HDcaAI 2.CRIMINAL LAW; REVISED PENAL CODE; PENAL LAWS ARE GIVEN RETROACTIVEEFFECT WHEN FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED; SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISEDRULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY; CASE ATBAR. Settled in our jurisprudence is the principle that when a new law will beadvantageous to the accused, the same shall be given retroactive effect. (As providedin Article 22 of our Revised Penal Code). Favorabiliab sunt amplianda, adiosa


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restrigenda. (Penal laws that are favorable to the accused are given retroactiveeffect) . . . This article is of Spanish origin and is based on Latin principles, thus, in theinterpretation thereof, this Court must have recourse to Spanish or Latin jurisprudence.That the term "penal laws" or "leyes penales" as employed in Article 22, relates not onlyto laws prescribing penalties but also to limitations upon the bringing of penal actions,

was pronounced in the early case of People vs. Parel. Thus, to justify the retroactiveapplication of Section 8, Rule 117 on the basis of Article 22 is in order. Considering itsgenesis and its underlying principles, there is no doubt that whenever a new statutedealing with crimes establishes conditions more lenient or favorable to the accused, thestatute becomes retroactive and the accused must receive the benefits of the newcondition. As long as this provision so remains in force, it is of general application to allpenal statutes, past, present, future and furnishes the rule for determining to whatextent they are retroactive or merely prospective. And unless a penal or criminal statute,expressly or by necessary implication, provides that it shall not be regarded asretroactive, it becomes subject to the rule laid down by that article. Evidently, by rulingagainst the retroactive application of Section 8, Rule 117, the majority casts aside oneof most basic principles in our legal system. EDHTAI

3.REMEDIAL LAW; REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SECTION 8, RULE 117THEREOF; NEW RULE TO BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION TO REMEDY THEINJUSTICE TO THE ACCUSED CAUSED BY A SUSPENDED PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL;CASE AT BAR. Section 8, Rule 117 was introduced owing to the many instanceswhere police agencies have refused to issue clearances, for purposes of employment ortravel abroad, to persons having pending cases, on the ground that the dismissal of such cases by the court was merely provisional, notwithstanding the fact that suchprovisional dismissal, more often than not, had been done five or ten years ago.Obviously, Section 8, Rule was introduced not so much for the interest of the State butprecisely for the protection of the accused against protracted prosecution. This Court'sCommittee on Revision of the Rules of Court clearly saw the prejudice to the rights of the accused caused by a suspended provisional dismissal of this case . Hence, if we areto follow the majority's line of reasoning that Section 8, Rule 117 "must be readaccording to its spirit or intent", then the logical conclusion is the retroactive applicationof the rule. Certainly, it is the construction that will advance the object and secure thebenefits intended. This Court, in setting a limit to the State's right to re-prosecute, hasrecognized the injustice and the evil accompanying suspended provisional dismissals. It

has impliedly acknowledged that the situation sought to remedied is unjust andundesirable. Now, is it not inconsistent for this Court to suspend the application of thenew rule to respondent's case just because the rule was passed after the provisionaldismissal of his case? Note that the situation sought to be remedied is present inrespondent's case. To my mind, if this Court will refuse to extend the benefit of the newrule to respondent, it will be guilty of an inconsistency in view of its implied admissionthat the situation sought to be remedied has caused injustice to respondent. ADEaHT


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4.ID.; SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO 7-74; CASE PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED WHENREFILED SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE BRANCH TO WHICH THE ORIGINAL CASEPERTAINED; CASE AT BAR. Finally, I find the re-raffling of respondent's cases to aspecial heinous court unnecessary. Supreme Court Circular No. 7-74 expressly providesthat "when a case is dismissed for any cause or reason whatsoever and the same is re-

filed, it shall not be included in the raffle anymore but shall be assigned to the branchto which the original case pertained. If, by mistake or otherwise, such case is raffledand assigned to another branch, the latter must transfer the case to the branch towhich it originally belonged, in which event another case shall be assigned by raffle asreplacement.'' Considering that a provisional dismissal of a criminal case does notterminate it, it is more consistent with the majority's theory that Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 be simply referred back to the branch to which they originally belonged.acHDTE

R E S O L U T I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J p:

Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to wit: (a) OmnibusMotion; 1 (b) Motion for Reconsideration; 2 (c) Supplement to Motion forReconsideration; 3 (d) Motion To Set for Oral Arguments. 4

The Omnibus Motion

The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 29, 2003 Resolution of this Court

which granted the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The respondent thereafterprays to allow Associate Justices Renato C. Corona, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez,Conchita C. Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna to voluntary inhibitthemselves or, absent their consent, rule that such inhibition is in order and to recusethem from further deliberating, discussing or, in any manner, participating in theresolution of the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement to Motion forReconsideration. The respondent points out that the aforenamed members of the Courtwere appointed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after the February 19, 2002 oralarguments and after the case at bar was submitted for the decision of the Court. Heasserts that although A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC 5 specifically provides that it applies only tothe divisions of the Court, it should likewise apply to this case, in light of the April 1,2003 Resolution of this Court which set aside its Resolution dated May 28, 2002, apartfrom the constitutional issues raised by the respondent in his motion for reconsiderationand its supplement. As such, according to the respondent, the instant case should beunloaded by Justice Callejo, Sr. and re-raffled to any other member of the Court.

The Court resolves to deny the respondent's motion for lack of merit.

The records show that as early as May 24, 2002, the respondent filed an urgent motion


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for the recusation of Justices Renato C. Corona and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez for thereason that they were appointed to the Court after the February 19, 2002 oralarguments and did not participate in the integral portions of the proceedings. JusticesCorona and Austria-Martinez refused to inhibit themselves and decided to participate inthe deliberation on the petition. 6 On March 18, 2003, the respondent filed a motionwith the Court for the recusation of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. on account of hisvoluntary inhibition when the case was pending before the Court of Appeals.

On March 25, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the respondent's Motiondated March 18, 2003. The respondent thereafter filed his motion for reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court in which he prayed, inter alia, for the inhibitionof Justice Callejo, Sr. under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC and that the case be re-raffled toanother member of the Court who had actually participated in the deliberation and therendition of its May 28, 2002 Resolution. The respondent likewise sought the inhibitionof Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna, again for the reason that theywere appointed to the Court after the oral arguments on February 19, 2002 and afterthe case had already been submitted for decision.

On April 29, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the aforesaid motions of therespondent. 7 The Court ruled that A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC is applicable only to casesassigned to the divisions of the Court:

The respondent's reliance on Supreme Court Circular No. 99-8-09misplaced. As admitted by the respondent, the said circular isapplicable only to motions for reconsideration in cases assigned tothe Divisions of the Court. For cases assigned to the Court En Banc,the policy of the Court had always been and still is, if the ponente

is no longer with the Court, his replacement will act upon themotion for reconsideration of a party and participate in thedeliberations thereof. This is the reason why Justice Callejo, Sr.who had replaced retired Justice De Leon, prepared the draft of the

April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court. 8

The Court also ruled that there was no need for its newest members to inhibitthemselves from participating in the deliberation of the respondent's Motion forReconsideration:

Although Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.,

and Adolfo S. Azcuna were not yet members of the Court duringthe February 18, 2002 9 oral arguments before the Court,nonetheless they were not disqualified to participate in thedeliberations on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of theMay 28, 2002 Resolution of the Court or of the instant motion forreconsideration. Neither is Justice Callejo, Sr. disqualified toprepare the resolution of the Court on the motion forreconsideration of the respondent. When the Court deliberated on


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petitioners' motion for reconsideration, Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Adolfo S. Azcuna were alreadymembers of the Court.

It bears stressing that transcripts of stenographic notes taken

during the February 18, 2002 hearing and oral arguments of theparties are parts of the records of this case. Said transcripts areavailable to the parties or to any member of the Court. Likewise,

Attys. Rene A.V. Saguisag and Felix Carao, Jr. may not yet havebeen the counsel of the respondent on February 18, 2002 but byreading the said transcripts and the records of this case they areinformed of what transpired during the hearing and oral argumentsof the parties. 10

It is thus clear that the grounds cited by the respondent in his omnibus motion hadalready been passed upon and resolved by this Court. The respondent did not make

any new substantial arguments in his motion to warrant a reconsideration of theaforesaid resolutions.

Besides, the respondent sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and AdolfoS. Azcuna only after they had already concurred in the Court's Resolution dated April 1,2003. Case law has it that a motion for disqualification must be denied when filed aftera member of the Court has already given an opinion on the merits of the case, therationale being that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of theCourt, only to raise an objection of this sort after a decision has been rendered. 11

The Motion to Set the Case for Oral Arguments

The Court denies the motion of the respondent. The parties have already extensivelydiscussed the issues involved in the case. The respondent's motion for reconsiderationconsists of no less than a hundred pages, excluding the supplement to his motion forreconsideration and his reply to the petitioners' comment on his motion. There is nolonger a need to set the instant case for oral arguments. HDTSCc

The Issue as to the Application of the Time-bar under Section 8, Rule 117 of the RevisedRules of Criminal Procedure Whether Prospective or Retroactive

The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Courtand thereafter reinstate its Resolution of May 28, 2002.

He asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicialpractice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure (RRCP) should be applied prospectively and retroactively withoutreservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. Heasserts that case law on the retroactive application of penal laws should likewise applyto criminal procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The respondent insists that


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Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce theconstitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. It is primarily acheck on the State to prosecute criminal cases diligently and continuously, lest it losesits right to prosecute the accused anew. The respondent argues that since Section 8 isindubitably a rule of procedure, there can be no other conclusion: the rule should have

retroactive application, absent any provision therein that it should be appliedprospectively. Accordingly, prospective application thereof would in effect give thepetitioners more than two years from March 29, 1999 within which to revive thecriminal cases, thus violating the respondent's right to due process and equal protectionof the law.

The respondent asserts that Section 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused. In this case, the State had been given more than sufficient opportunityto prosecute the respondent anew after the March 29, 1999 dismissal of the cases bythen Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. and even before the RRCP took effect on December 1,2000. According to the respondent, the petitioners filed the Informations with the RTCin Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in violation of his right to a speedy trial, and that such filing was designed to derail his bid for theSenate.

In their comment on the respondent's motions, the petitioners assert that theprospective application of Section 8 is in keeping with Section 5(5), Article VIII of the1987 Constitution, which provides in part that the rules of procedure which the Courtmay promulgate shall not diminish, increase or modify substantial rights. While Section8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equallyimportant right of the State to public justice. If such right to public justice is taken away,then Section 8 can no longer be said to be a procedural rule. According to thepetitioners, if a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the saidrule may not be given a retroactive application. They contend that the right of theaccused to a speedy trial or disposition of the criminal cases applies only to outstandingand pending cases and not to cases already dismissed. The petitioners assert that the"refiling of the cases" under Section 8 should be taken to mean as the filing of thecriminal complaint with the appropriate office for the purpose of conducting apreliminary investigation, and not the actual filing of the criminal complaint orinformation in court for trial. Furthermore, according to the petitioners, the offendedparties must be given notices of the motion for provisional dismissal of the cases underSection 8 since the provision so expressly states. Thus, if the requisite notices to the

heirs of the deceased would be taken into consideration, the two-year period had notyet even commenced to run.

In his consolidated reply to the comment of the petitioners, the respondent asserts thatthe State is proscribed from refiling a criminal case if it can be shown that the delayresulted in a violation of the right of the accused to due process. In this case, there wasan inordinate delay in the revival of the cases, considering that the witnesses in thecriminal cases for the State in March 1999 are the same witnesses in 2001. The State


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had reasonable opportunity to refile the cases before the two-year bar but failed to doso because of negligence; and perhaps institutional indolence. Contrary to thepetitioners' contention, the respondent posits that the revival of the cases contemplatedin Section 8 refers to the filing of the Informations or complaints in court for trial. Theoperational act then is the refiling of the Informations with the RTC, which was done

only on June 6, 2001, clearly beyond the two-year bar.

The Court finds the respondent's contentions to be without merit.

First. The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5,paragraph 5 of the Constitution which reads:

(5)Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure inall courts, the admission to the practice of law, theIntegrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensiveprocedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall beuniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall notdiminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shallremain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it isfavorable to the accused. It must be noted that the new rule was approved by theCourt not only to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedydisposition of the case. The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to

excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for thebenefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court emphasizedin its assailed resolution that:

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it hasfixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminalcases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of theaccused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to theperiods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, infixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and

those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and theaccused. It took into account the substantial rights of both theState and of the accused to due process. The Court believed thatthe time limit is a reasonable period for the State to reviveprovisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused andnotice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Courtmust: be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly


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short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. 12

In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims, the Court, in the interest of justice, may make the rule prospective where the exigencies of the situation make therule prospective. The retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a rule is not automatically

determined by the provision of the Constitution on which the dictate is based. Eachconstitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its ownbackground or precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and theway in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved. 13

Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a statute. 14 Toparaphrase the United States Supreme Court per Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the Court indefining the limits of adherence may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relating forward. 15

The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5,paragraph 5 of the Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate rules carrieswith it the power, inter alia, to determine whether to give the said rules prospective orretroactive effect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Court may notapply the rules to actions pending before it if in its opinion their application would notbe feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the former procedure shall apply.16

The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective application only does notproscribe the prospective application thereof; nor does it imply that the Court intendedthe new rule to be given retroactive and prospective effect. If the statutory purpose isclear, the provisions of the law should be construed as is conducive to fairness and

justice, and in harmony with the general spirit and policy of the rule. It should beconstrued so as not to defeat but to carry out such end or purpose. 17 A statutederives its vitality from the purpose for which it is approved. To construe it in a mannerthat disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law. 18 In Cometa v.Court of Appeals, 19 this Court ruled that "the spirit rather than the letter of the statutedetermines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit orintent." 20 While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, wenevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so,we defer not to the "letter that killeth" but to the "spirit that vivifieth, to give effect tothe lawmaker's will." 21

In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be appliedprospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, itwould defeat the very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the State aperiod of two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with theexpress consent of the accused. It would be a denial of the State's right to due processand a travesty of justice for the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the presentcase as the respondent insists, considering that the criminal cases were provisionallydismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on


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December 1, 2000. A retroactive application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjustand oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.

Consider this scenario: the trial court (RTC) provisionally dismissed a criminal case withthe express consent of the accused in 1997. The prosecution had the right to revive thecase within the prescriptive period, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, asamended. On December 1, 2000, the time-bar rule under Section 8 took effect, theprosecution was unable to revive the criminal case before then.

If the time-bar fixed in Section 8 were to be applied retroactively, this would mean thatthe State would be barred from reviving the case for failure to comply with the saidtime-bar, which was yet to be approved by the Court three years after the provisionaldismissal of the criminal case. In contrast, if the same case was dismissed provisionallyin December 2000, the State had the right to revive the same within the time-bar. Infine, to so hold would imply that the State was presumed to foresee and anticipate thatthree years after 1997, the Court would approve and amend the RRCP. The State wouldthus be sanctioned for its failure to comply with a rule yet to be approved by the Court.It must be stressed that the institution and prosecution of criminal cases are governedby existing rules and not by rules yet to exist. It would be the apex of injustice to holdthat Section 8 had a platonic or ideal existence before it was approved by the Court.The past cannot be erased by a capricious retroactive application of the new rule.

In holding that the petitioners had until December 1, 2002 within which to revive thecriminal cases provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999, this Courtexplained, thus:

The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-barretroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run onMarch 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases isinconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of givingthe State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, theState had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge

Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000.If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would

have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have twoyears from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 withinwhich to revive the cases. This is in consonance with theintendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus preventinjustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive,


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injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.

The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 22 should beexcluded in the computation of the two-year period because therule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State

could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot evenbe argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminalcases against respondent or that it was negligent for not revivingthem within the two-year period under the new rule. As the UnitedStates Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v.People, 351 US 12 (1956):

We should not indulge in the fiction that the law nowannounced has always been the law and, therefore, thatthose who did not avail themselves of it waived theirrights . . .

The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of boththe State and the accused. It should not be emasculated andreduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bartherein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so wouldcause an "injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely affectthe administration of justice in general and of criminal laws inparticular. 23

Further quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter's opinion in Griffin v. People, 24 he said, "it ismuch more conducive to law's self-respect to recognize candidly the considerations that

give prospective content to a new pronouncement of law. That this is consonant withthe spirit of our law and justified by those considerations of reason which shoulddominate the law has been luminously expounded by Mr. Justice Cardozo shortly beforehe came here and in an opinion which he wrote for the Court."

Parenthetically, the respondent himself admitted in his motion for reconsideration thatJudge Agnir, Jr. could not have been expected to comply with the notice requirementunder the new rule when it yet had to exist:

99.Respondent submits that the records are still in the same stateof inadequacy and incompletion. This however is not strangeconsidering that Section 8, Rule 117 had not existed on March 29,1999, when the criminal cases were dismissed, and then Judge

Agnir did not have its text to guide his actions. How could the good judge have complied with the mandate of Section 8, Rule 117 whenit yet had to exist? 25

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable toactions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to


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that extent, procedural laws are retroactive. 26 Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had long been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. before the new rule took effecton December 1, 2000. When the petitioners filed the Informations in Criminal CasesNos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 had long since been terminated. The two-year bar in the new rule should not

be reckoned from the March 29, 1999 dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 toQ-99-81689 but from December 1, 2000 when the new rule took effect. While it is truethat the Court applied Section 8 of Rule 110 27 of the RRCP retroactively, it did so onlyto cases still pending with this Court and not to cases already terminated with finality.

The records show that after the requisite preliminary investigation conducted by thepetitioners in accordance with existing rules, eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos.01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed with the RTC on June 6, 2001, very well within thetime-bar therefor. The respondent cannot argue that his right to due process and to aspeedy disposition of the cases as enshrined in the Constitution had been violated. 28

The respondent's plaint that he was being singled out by the prospective application of the new rule simply because before the Court issued its April 1, 2003 Resolution, heannounced his candidacy for the presidency of the Republic for the 2004 elections hasno factual basis whatsoever. 29 The bare and irrefutable fact is that it was in this casewhere the issue of the retroactive/prospective application of the new rule was firstraised before the Court. The ruling of the Court in its April 1, 2003 Resolution and itsruling today would be the same, regardless of who the party or parties involved are,whether a senator of the Republic or an ordinary citizen. cHITCS

The respondent's contention that the prospective application of the new rule woulddeny him due process and would violate the equal protection of laws is barren of merit.

It proceeds from an erroneous assumption that the new rule was approved by theCourt solely for his benefit, in derogation of the right of the State to due process. Thenew rule was approved by the Court to enhance the right of due process of both theState and the accused. The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases as much asthe accused.

Due process has never been and perhaps can never be precisely defined. It is not atechnical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.The phrase expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness, a requisite whosemeaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty. 30 In determining whatfundamental fairness consists of in a particular situation, relevant precedents must beconsidered and the interests that are at stake; private interests, as well as the interestsof the government must be assessed. In this case, in holding that the new rule hasprospective and not retroactive application, the Court took into consideration not onlythe interests of the respondent but all other accused, whatever their station in life maybe. The interest of the State in the speedy, impartial and inexpensive disposition of criminal cases was likewise considered. aTSEcA

The Respondent Failed to Comply with the Essential Prerequisites of Section 8, Rule 117


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of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

The respondent argues that the issue involved in the Court of Appeals is entirelydifferent from the issue involved in the present recourse; hence, any admissions hemade in the court below are not judicial admissions in this case. He asserts that theissue involved in the CA was whether or not he was placed in double jeopardy when hewas charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 despite thedismissal of Criminals Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; whereas the issue in thisCourt is whether the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 wasbarred by Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP. The respondent avers that the proceedingsin the appellate court are different from those in this Court.

The respondent posits that this Court erred in giving considerable weight to theadmissions he made in his pleadings and during the proceedings in the CA. He stressesthat judicial admissions may only be used against a party if such admissions are (a)made in the course of the proceedings in the same case; and (b) made regarding arelevant fact pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 and Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence. He contends that contrary to the ruling of the Court, when he filed his motionfor the judicial determination of probable cause in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 toQ-99-81689, he thereby prayed for the dismissal of the said cases. His motion carriedwith it, at the very least, the prayer for the dismissal of the criminal cases. Absent afinding of probable cause, Judge Agnir, Jr. had no recourse but to dismiss the criminalcases. Moreover, the respondent avers that his motion included the general prayer "forsuch other reliefs as may be equitable in the premises." The respondent also points outthat the public prosecutor agreed to the averments in his motion as the latter did noteven file any motion for the reconsideration of Judge Agnir, Jr.'s order dismissing thecases.

The respondent further contends that the Court is not a trier of facts. It has no meansto ascertain or verify as true the contrasting claims of the parties on the factual issues,a function best left to the trial court as the trier of facts. He posits that there is a needfor the case to be remanded to the RTC to enable him to present evidence on whetheror not Judge Agnir, Jr. complied with the notice requirements of Section 8. Echoing theMay 28, 2002 ruling of this Court, the respondent contends that it is not fair to expectthe element of notice under Section 8 to be litigated before Judge Agnir, Jr., for thesaid rule was not yet in existence at the time he filed his motion for a determination of

probable cause. The respondent avers that the requirement for notices to the offended parties underSection 8 is a formal and not an essential requisite. In criminal cases, the offendedparty is the State and the role of the private complainant is limited to the determinationof the civil liability of the accused. According to the respondent, notice to theprosecution provides sufficient safeguard for the private complainant to recover on thecivil liability of the accused based on the delicts; after all, the prosecution of the offense


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is under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.

The contentions of the respondent have no merit.

First. The issue posed by the respondent in the CA and in this Court are the same. Torecall, in Civil Case No. 01-100933, 31 the respondent 32 sought injunctive relief fromthe RTC of Manila on his claim that in conducting a preliminary investigation in CriminalCases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, the petitioners thereby placed him in double

jeopardy under Section 7, Rule 117 of the RRCP. 33 When the RTC denied his plea forinjunctive relief, the respondent filed his petition for certiorari in the CA, again invokinghis right against double jeopardy, praying that:

13.Inasmuch as the case subject of the "preliminary investigation"was dismissed for the reasons mentioned, there currently exists nocomplaint upon which a valid investigation can be had in light of the clear provisions of Rule 110 which requires the existence of a"sworn written statement charging a person with an offense" asbasis for the commencement of a preliminary investigation underRule 112.

For petitioner, the investigation covers exactly the same offensesover which he had been duly arraigned and a plea validly enteredbefore the Sandiganbayan (in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 57)before its remand to the QC RTC. Hence, to proceed therewith onsimilar charges will put him in jeopardy of being twice punishedtherefor (Article III, 21, Constitution). 34

The respondent (petitioner therein) contended that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 by Judge Agnir, Jr. amounted to a judgment of acquittal;hence, he could no longer be charged and prosecuted anew for the same offensewithout violating his right against double jeopardy. However, the respondent filed asecond amended petition wherein he invoked for the first time Section 8 of Rule 117 of the RRCP:

(e)the new criminal cases for Murder filed by respondents againstpetitioner and the other accused on June 6, 2001 (docketed asCriminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112) and pending beforerespondent Judge Yadao (Annex B) is dismissible on its face asthey involve exactly the same accused, facts, and offenses whichhad previously been dismissed by the QC RTC in Criminal CasesNos. Q-99-81679 to 89 on March 29, 1999, hence, can no longerbe revived two (2) years after such dismissal in accordance withthe clear provisions of Section 8, Rule 117. 35

Indeed, the CA granted the respondent's petition based on Section 8, Rule 117 of theRRCP. In this case, the respondent invoked the same rule and the Constitution. Thus,


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during the oral arguments in this Court, the respondent, through counsel, admitted thathe was indeed invoking Section 8 anew and the provisions of the Constitution on double

jeopardy:

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

You are saying that Sen. Lacson can no longer be prosecutedforever for that crime, for the killing of the 11 in 1995?

ATTY. FORTUN:

That is my submission, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Let us see your reason for it?

ATTY. FORTUN: 36

First, are you saying that double jeopardy applies or not?

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:37

Allow me to qualify the effects of double jeopardy occur withpermanent dismissal that is my submission.

ATTY. FORTUN: 38

No, no, I am not talking of the effects, I am talking of the doctrine,you are not invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Your Honor, double jeopardy does not apply Section 8, 117 they,are (interrupted)

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

That is right.

ATTY. FORTUN:

They are two different claims. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

That is what I am trying to rule out so that we do not have todiscuss it.

ATTY. FORTUN:


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Very well, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

You are not invoking double jeopardy?

ATTY. FORTUN:

As I mentioned we are saying that the effects of a permanentdismissal vest the effects (interrupted)

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

No, I am not talking of the effects, I am asking about theapplication, you are not asking the Court to apply thedoctrine of double jeopardy to prevent a prosecution of Mr.Lacson?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Because the element of double jeopardy cannot apply 8, 117.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

So, the answer is yes?

ATTY. FORTUN:

No, Your Honor, we were saying that precisely a permanentdismissal vests the rights of double jeopardy upon theaccused who invokes it.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

What you are saying is the effects, I am not asking about theeffects, I will ask that later.

ATTY. FORTUN:

They are two different (interrupted)

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Later, I am asking about doctrines. Since you are not invoking thedoctrine of double jeopardy you are resting your case winor lose, sink or sail on the application of 8, 117?

ATTY. FORTUN:

On the constitutional right of the accused under Section 16 of


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Article 3 which is speedy disposition of cases whichimplemented 8, 117, that is our arguments in this bar.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Are you not resting on 8,117?

ATTY. FORTUN:

That and the constitutional provision, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

So, you are resting on 8,117?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Not exclusive, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

And the Constitution?

ATTY. FORTUN:

The Constitution which gave life to 8,117.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

To speedy disposition?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Can a Court, let us see your theory then your theory rest on twoprovisions: first, the Rules of Court 8,117 and Second, theConstitution on speedy disposition?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor. 39 Second. The respondent's answers to the questions of Madame Justice Josefina Salongaduring the hearing in the CA where he admitted, through counsel, that he gave noexpress conformity to the dismissal of the cases by Judge Agnir, Jr., were in relation toSection 8 of Rule 117 and not to Section 7 of Rule 117 on double jeopardy, thus:

JUSTICE SALONGA:


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Do we get it from you that it is your stand that this is applicable tothe case at bar?

ATTY. FORTUN:

It is my submission, that it is, Your Honor. In addition, of course, tomy proposition that Mr. Lacson is covered by the rule ondouble jeopardy as well, because he had already beenarraigned before the Sandiganbayan prior to the casebeing remanded to the RTC.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

You are referring to those cases which were dismissed by the RTCof Quezon City.

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court wasprovisional in nature?

ATTY. FORTUN:

It was in that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted atthe onset was simply a judicial determination of probable

cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir,[Jr.] upon the presentation by the parties of theirwitnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn theiraffidavits, made one further conclusion that not only wasthis case lacking in probable cause for purposes of theissuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justifyproceeding to trial.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be

provisionally dismissed except [if] it is with the expressconformity of the accused.

ATTY. FORTUN:

That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:


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And with notice to the offended party.

ATTY. FORTUN:

That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?

ATTY. FORTUN:

There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order,or any statement which would normally be required by theCourt on pre-trial or on other matters, including otherprovisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminalcourts, Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be

very careful on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact,they ask the accused to come forward, and the judgehimself or herself explains the implications of a provisionaldismissal. 40

The respondent, through counsel, even admitted that despite his plea for equitablerelief in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause in the RTC, he did notagree to a provisional dismissal of the cases. The respondent insisted that the onlyrelief he prayed for before Judge Agnir, Jr. was that warrants for his arrest be withheldpending a finding of probable cause. He asserted that the judge did not even requirehim to agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases:

JUSTICE ROSARIO:

You were present during the proceedings?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE ROSARIO:

You represented the petitioner in this case?

ATTY. FORTUN:

That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sortwhich the good Judge Agnir, [Jr.] who is mostknowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeingto the provisional dismissal of the case.


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JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion fora judicial determination of probable cause?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there isno probable cause what should the Court do?

ATTY. FORTUN:

That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayerthat we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particularmotion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, itsaid: "Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a

judicial determination of probable cause pursuant toSection 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted, andfor this purpose, an order be issued directing theprosecution to present private complainants and theirwitnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and(2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld,or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this incident."

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

There is no general prayer for any further relief?

ATTY. FORTUN:

There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Don't you surmise Judge Agnir, [Jr.] now a member of this Court,precisely addressed your prayer for just and equitablerelief to dismiss the case because what would be the neteffect of a situation where there is no warrant of arrestbeing issued without dismissing the case?

ATTY. FORTUN:


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Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice,but what is plain is we did not agree to the provisionaldismissal, neither were we asked to sign any assent to theprovisional dismissal.

JUSTICE GUERRERO: If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal, did you not file

any motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir,[Jr.] that the case should be dismissed?

ATTY. FORTUN:

I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time thatmy client had already been arraigned, and thearraignment was valid as far as I was concerned. So, thedismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefitme, and therefore I did not take any further step inaddition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matterfurther because it probably could prejudice the interest of my client.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Continue. 41

In his memorandum, in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, therespondent declared in no uncertain terms that:

Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaringthe Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The recordswere remanded to the QC RTC. Upon raffle, the case was assignedto Branch 91. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for

judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked thatwarrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for thedismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSG's claim.42

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 4.Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, madeby a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, doesnot require proof. The admission may be contradicted only byshowing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no suchadmission was made.

A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party or his or her attorney,in the course of judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact from the field of


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controversy. It is a voluntary concession of fact by a party or a party's attorney duringsuch judicial proceedings, including admissions in pleadings made by a party. 43 It mayoccur at any point during the litigation process. An admission in open court is a judicialadmission. 44 A judicial admission binds the client even if made by his counsel. 45 Asdeclared by this Court:

. . . [I]n fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel orof attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agentof his client. When such admissions are made . . . for the purposeof dispensing with proof of some fact, . . . they bind the client,whether made during, or even after the trial." 46

When the respondent admitted that he did not move for the dismissal of Criminal CasesNos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion for a judicial determination of probablecause, and that he did not give his express consent to the provisional dismissal of thesaid cases, he in fact admitted that one of the essential requisites of Section 8, Rule

117 was absent. The respondent's contention that his admissions made in his pleadings and during thehearing in the CA cannot be used in the present case as they were made in the courseof a different proceeding does not hold water. It should be borne in mind that theproceedings before the Court was by way of an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, from the proceedings in the CA; as such, the present recourse isbut a mere continuation of the proceedings in the appellate court. This is not a new trial,but a review of proceedings which commenced from the trial court, which later passedthrough the CA. The respondent is bound by the judicial admissions he made in the CA,and such admissions so hold him in the proceedings before this Court. As categorically

stated in Habecker v. Clark Equipment Company: 47 . . . [J]udicial admissions on issues of fact, including those made bycounsel on behalf of a client during a trial, are binding "for thepurpose of the case . . . including appeals."

While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal case if itfinds no probable cause, absent the express consent of the accused to such provisionaldismissal, the latter cannot thereafter invoke Section 8 to bar a revival thereof. Neithermay the accused do so simply because the public prosecutor did not object to a motionof the accused for a judicial determination of probable cause or file a motion for the

reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the case. Even a cursory reading of therespondent's motion for a judicial determination of probable cause will show that itcontained no allegation that there was no probable cause for the issuance of a warrantfor the respondent's arrest as a prayer for the dismissal of the cases. The respondentwas only asking the court to determine whether or not there was probable cause forthe issuance of a warrant for his arrest and in the meantime, to hold in abeyance theissuance of the said warrant. Case law has it that a prayer for equitable relief is of noavail, unless the petition states facts which will authorize the court to grant such relief.


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48 A court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide question except aspresented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is resolved or decided beyondthem is coram non judice and void. 49

Third. There is no need for the Court to remand the instant case to the trial court to

enable the respondent to adduce post facto evidence that the requisite notices underSection 8 had been complied with by Judge Agnir, Jr. The Court has thoroughlyexamined the voluminous records from the Sandiganbayan and the RTC 50 and foundno proof that the requisite notices were even served on all the heirs of the victims. Therespondent himself admitted that, as held by this Court, in its May 28, 2002 Resolution,"Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have complied with the mandate under Section 8 becausesaid rule had yet to exist." 51

One final matter. The records show that Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112were assigned, through the customary raffle of cases, to Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City, the same branch which dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 99-81679 to 99-

81689. 52 In the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court, the Presiding Judge of Branch81 of the RTC of Quezon City was directed to try and decide Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with reasonable dispatch. The Court notes, however, that in

Administrative Order No. 104-96 it designated six branches of the RTC of Quezon City53 as special courts, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes under Rep. Act No.7659. Since the accused in the said cases are charged with murder, which under Rep.

Act No. 7659, is classified as a heinous crime, the above cases should be consolidatedand re-raffled by the Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City to a branch thereof designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Panfilo M. Lacson's Omnibus Motion

and Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The respondent's Motion forReconsideration and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive Judgeof the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATECriminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatchto one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City designated as aspecial court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Moralesand Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

Puno, J ., maintains his dissent.

Vitug, J ., maintains his dissent and reiterate his opinion on the Court's resolution of 28May 2002.

Carpio and Tinga, JJ ., took no part.

Corona, J ., is on leave.


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Separate Opinions

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting :

This is to reiterate my dissent to the unbelievable about-face by the Court in the April 1,2003 Resolution confirmed and renewed in its latest Resolution.

The reasons for this continuing dissent are basically similar to those expressed in threeDissenting Opinions to the April 1, 2003 Resolution. 1 Nothing has changed in thehistory of the charges against Senator Panfilo M. Lacson except the disturbing andunusual ruling of this Court now.

If the charges against Senator Lacson are to be relentlessly pursued, the pursuit mustbe done in a constitutional and fair manner. It is the use of legal short-cuts, painedreasoning and the hasty procedure after several years of inaction which constrain this

dissent. If Senator Lacson is to be found guilty of participation in multiple murder, itshould be only after due process is followed.

The new majority Resolution is a volte-face, a complete turn-around from the previouslyunanimous judgment dated May 28, 2002. SECcAI

The 2002 Resolution of the Court remanded the Government's petition to the RegionalTrial Court of Quezon City to ascertain important factual issues. The Resolution wasconcluded beyond doubt or ambiguity without any dissenting vote.

The issues sought to be revived were all resolved two years ago. What the Courtunanimously retired should be allowed to rest. Instead, the Court now wants to allowthe use of the strong arm of the law to oppressively prosecute and persecute.

If the petitioners can show strong compelling reasons, newly discovered, or somedeeply held convictions based on a genuine sense of justice or irresistible considerationsof equity, I could concur to ignore established procedure.

Unfortunately, all I can discern here is allowing the use of the strong arm of the law tooppressively prosecute a public officer whom the powers-that-be detest and whom theyseek to render completely ineffective. 2

In the April 1, 2003 Resolution, I concurred with Mme. Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez who, like me, started her long judicial career as a municipal trial judge and,later, judge of a regional trial court. I agreed with the conclusion that the petitioner'sright to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases were violated and the filing of newinformations constitute persecution. I concurred that in the prosecution of an accusedhe must not be perceived as an intractable enemy, and that the over-eagerness toprosecute respondent is a clear example of persecution.


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There is nothing in the pleadings after our dissent to the April 1, 2003 Resolution or inthe discussions of the respondent's motion for reconsideration that shows our May 28,2002 Resolution was wrong or that the Court was correcting an injustice when itsuddenly reversed itself.

Respondent stresses the need for compliance with the rule of law, the primacy of theConstitution over acts of State, and the independence of the judiciary. Whenrespondent urges the Court to remember that it is not a trier of facts, he raises afundamental threshold question. It involves the application of what has been describedas an immutable principle of justice, 3 the essence of ordered liberty, 4 so rooted in thetraditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, 5 a canon of civilized decency, 6 a guarantee against the oppressions and usurpations of royalprerogatives, 7 and a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason and obedience to thedictates of justice. 8 He is asking for due process.

Under the Constitution, this Court resolves "cases in which only an error or question of

law is involved." 9 It is therefore not a trier of facts. The Court itself in the April 1, 2003 Resolution summarized the facts to be resolved:

1.Whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the expressconsent of the accused;

2.Whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offendedparty;

3.Whether the two-year period to revive it has already lapsed;

4.Whether there is any justification for the filing of the casesbeyond the two year period;

5.Whether notices to the offended parties were given before thecases were dismissed by then Judge Agnir;

6.Whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by therelatives of the three other victims; and

7.Whether the multiple murder cases against respondent are beingrevived within or beyond the two-year bar. 10

The facts to be resolved requires submission of evidence. They are material factsbecause proof of their actuality is needed to enable the Court to render judgment onthe basic issues raised. Evidence to prove the facts in issue have to be introduced inaccordance with the principles of substantive law and the rules of pleading, practice andprocedure. The facts are in dispute because one party alleges their existence while theother denies them, both with some show of reason. 11 If the unanimous judgment in2002 is to be reversed by a new majority, a remand to ascertain these facts outlined isimperative.


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Facts have to be established by evidence, not by inferences, not by suppositions, andcertainly not by the augury of divination. Yet, the majority precisely proceeded to do itthat way.

If the facts material to the Court's judgment were found by the new majority from the

records, how could the unanimous Court have missed so many of these significant factsin 2002?

If doubts are to be resolved and suppositions and fallacies avoided, every method of getting the truth through adversarial proceedings before a trial court must be explored.Let the Regional Trial Court which is a trier of facts do the job.

If, for instance, the Court suddenly discovers that there has been no trial, not even apre-trial in the almost two decades a case has been pending; if the questions raised arecomplicated, complex and tricky; if there is no evidence in the records, no transcripts of stenographic notes and no exhibits; the Court would have to refer the factual issues toa trial court. It should not arrive at a summary judgment based on the pleadings beforeit. This is what the new majority has done.

A key factual issue is the applicability to the cases against respondent of the rule onprovisional dismissal found in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 8 of Rule117 thereof provides:

Provisional Dismissal A case shall not be provisionally dismissedexcept with the express consent of the accused and with notice tothe offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment

not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shallbecome permanent one (1) year after the issuance of the orderwithout the case having been reviewed. With respect to offensespunishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, theirprovisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years afterissuance of the order without the case having been revised.

The determination of whether or not the above rule applies in this case entails factualissues. Has the two-year period expired? Was the dismissal of the cases with theexpress consent of the accused? Was there notice to the offended party? By their verynature, these questions justify a remand to the trial court.

The new majority first tackles the application of the two-year time bar in Rule 117 tothis case. The criminal cases were dismissed by then Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. onMarch 29, 1999. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect the following yearon December 1, 2000. If the new rule is not applied retroactively, would the old rule,where there was no time bar, apply?

The new majority rules that the time bar should apply only prospectively. I find this


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decision disturbing if it is indicative of a novel approach to individual liberties. The Bill of Rights is a statement of the liberties of individuals protected against exertions of government power. The ponencia seeks to protect the "rights" of the State against itscitizens and invokes the Bill of Rights in the process.

The Bill of Rights refers to fundamental individual rights and the guaranteed protectionis against Government or any of its officials. It cannot be invoked against actions of private parties unless private action is backed by government power.

Government exercises powers not rights. When the Constitution provides that "noperson shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," 13 the"person" referred to is not the State. When we mention in our decisions that the Statealso deserves due process, it is merely a quaint way of saying that the law and the rulesshould be followed if intended to protect State interests. But never should the rights of a citizen be weighed against the non-existent rights of the State which should berecognized and denominated as the powers of the State.

There is sometimes a balancing of individual rights against State power where publicinterest is involved. The individual is always at a terrific disadvantage when a basic rightis weighed against the awesome powers of a State. There is no need for balancing inthis case.

If the issue involved is protection of a citizen against overzealous criminal prosecutions,the reason for ruling against him should never be due process rights of the State. TheDissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in the April 1, 2003, with which I alsoconcurred, discusses the origin of the amended rule, its nuances and reasons for being,and the inflexibility of the permanent time bar once the two-year period is reached. The

Rule is intended to protect the rights of the accused, not to make it easier for theGovernment to prosecute him. Here, the Court wants us to allow the use of a protectionfor the citizen against that citizen. Its enactment becomes counter-productive. Theextensive and learned discussion of the Honorable Chairman of the Committee on theRevision of the Rules of Court is glossed over. It should be re-read.

The amended rule is intended to prod the Government into a more faithful andaccountable performance of duty, to avoid the tyrannical Damocles' sword hangingindefinitely over a person whom the Government wants to coerce into indeterminatesubmission, and to stop the malaise of public officers who are shiftless and lethargicand who are prodded into action only after the passage of interminable time or when

revenge or a desire to vex and oppress suddenly surfaces. If the rule is a just rule, if its objectives are salutary and if its enforcement will mean anenlargement of individual rights, why should a recent accused enjoy it to the exclusionof those with pending cases when it was enacted? Justice should be for everyoneespecially those accused where prosecution and trial have dragged for years and years.

A rule should not protect the incompetence or lethargy of Government prosecutors.


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I submit that the new rule should be made retroactive. This interpretation is in line withsimple justice. The statement of the majority that the due process protections of theState and those of the individual should be equal is dangerous for a Supreme Court to

utter. With all due respect, the justifications in the ponencia display an insensitivity toindividual liberties. The spirited defense of the powers of the State in the context of individual freedoms is bewildering to say the least. It is hoped that such a cavalierapproach to the Bill of Rights is a passing aberration and that the Court will again standfirmly as the constitutional bulwark against State power and oppression. The Courtshould not remain silent and, more important, should take a firm stand when a citizen isharassed and persecuted by the formidable powers of Government.

The statement that the ruling of the Court in 2003 and any ruling today would be thesame, regardless of who the parties involved are, whether a Senator, presidentiable, oran ordinary citizen is, in the light of our judgment in this case, is not believable.

The bedrock issue underlying all aspects of the about-face decision sought to bereconsidered involves the correct approach to the Bill of Rights. If the interpretation of the amended rule shows a back-sliding of the Court's traditional approach to individualliberty, that interpretation must be avoided. The history of the due process clause goesback to the beginning of the era of enlightenment. It traces the step-by-step wrestingof rights from absolution and monarchy. There is no monarchy today but claims of authority against liberty are vested in State power. The ponencia unwittingly dilutes aguarantee of liberty against a misinterpretation of State power.

In the resolution of whether the rule should be applied retroactively, we must divorcethe issue from the various personalities involved, and focus simply on the principles of interpretation that have governed this Court since its inception.

The ponencia declares that there is no express requirement for the revised rule to begiven retroactive application. It states that under Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, theRules shall not be applied "to actions pending before it if in its opinion their applicationwould not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the former procedureshall apply." 12 Rule 144, for ready reference, provides:

These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1964. They shall governall cases brought after they take effect, and also all furtherproceedings in cases then pending, except to the extent that in theopinion of the court their application would not be feasible or wouldwork injustice, in which event the former procedure would apply.(emphasis supplied.)

In the same breath, the ponencia expresses that "[s]tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the


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time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent, procedural laws are retroactive."13 Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 are then characterized as havingbeen long dismissed before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. Theponencia goes on to state that:

[w]hen the petitioners filed the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos.01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had long since been terminated. The two-year bar in the new rule should not be reckoned from the March 29,1999 dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689but from December 1, 2000 when the new rule took effect. While itis true that the Court applied Section 8 of Rule 110 of the RRCPretroactively, it did so only to cases still pending with this Court andnot to cases already terminated with finality. (Citations omitted,emphasis supplied.) 14

There is a fundamental inconsistency in the foregoing statements. If one were to applyRule 144, as the ponencia has done, this would mean characterizing Criminal Cases Nos.Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 as being pending proceedings as of the effective date of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure, since this is what a plain reading of Rule 144would require. This would go completely against the statement of the same ponenciathat characterizes Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-

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