Ozan ERÖZDEN, Proceedings of the International Conference on the EU

8/14/2019 Ozan ERZDEN, Proceedings of the International Conference on the EU

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Proceeding of the International Conference on the

EU ENLARGEMENTTOWARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

Decemcer 15th

, 2005

AUDITORIUM

YTU Auditorium / Yildiz Campus

Yildiz - Besiktas

Edited by

Dr. Ozan ERZDEN

Joint Conference Series No.4

Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV)

Y.T.U Department of Political Science and International Relations


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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

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mission from the Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV).

The findings interpretations and conclusions expressed in this publication ar

entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the

Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV). Texts are as originally sub-

mitted.

Copyright

Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV)

Citation.

Dr. Ozan ERZDEN, Proceedings of the International Conference on the EU

Enlargement towards South-East Europe, December 15 th, Istanbul.

Istanbul: OBIV, 2005

Available FromFoundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV)

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Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV).

Yildiz Technical University

Department of Political Science and International Relations

EU ENLARGEMENT

TOWARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

December 15th, 2005

AUDITORIUM

YTU Auditorium / Yildiz CampusYildiz - Besiktas


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EU ENLARGEMENTTOWARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

December 15th, 2005

ProgrammeWelcome Addresses and Opening Remarks

10.00-10.10

Prof. Dr. Fulya ATACAN

(Head of DPSIR / YTU)

10.10-10.20

Ambassador Gner ZTEK

(Chairman of OBIV)

I.SESSION

ChairpersonProf.Dr. Haldun GLALP

(DPSIR / YTU)

10.30-12.30

11.15-11.30 Coffee Break

II.SESSION

Chairperson

Dr. Cengiz ARIN

(DPSIR / YTU)

14.30-17.00

15.30-15.45 Coffee Break


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I.SESSION

10.30-13.00

Chairperson

Prof.Dr. Haldun GLALP

(DPSIR / YTU)

South-East Europes Integration to Europe as a Problem of Physics:

Newton Mechanics vs. Quantum Mechanices

Dr.Ozan ERZDEN

(DPSIR / YTU)

Romanias Road to EU-Integration: Accession in 2007?

Dr. Anneli Ute GABANYI(German Institute for International and Security Affairs)

Being the Model Balkan Student? Exporting the EU to Bulgaria

Dr.Emilian KAVALSKI

(Lougborough University)

EUs step child:

Turkey as candidate country; Examples of double standards

Prof.Dr. Cengiz AKTAR

(Bahesehir University)


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II.SESSION

14.30-17.00

ChairpersonDr. Cengiz ARIN

(DPSIR / YTU)

Crotias long journey back to Europe, Challenges on the way to EU membership

Dr.Martin MAYER

(Advisor to the Commission Delegation Zagreb)

Challenges and Perspectives of Serbia and Montenegro in the

Accession to the European Union

Prof.Dr. Jovan TEOKAREVIC

(Belgrade University)

Constitutional Change and Resistance in EU Accession Process of TurkeyAssoc.Prof.Dr. Bertil Emrah DER

(University of Istanbul)

The Republic Of Macedonias

Way to The EU

Prof. Biljana GABER

(Ph.D.University St. Cyril and Methodius Skopje, R. Macedonia)

Perceptions of Europe in the Czech Republic and Albania:

A Comparative Look at Intellectual Discourse

Dr. Eno TRIMEV

(Albanian Institute for International Studies)


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CONTRIBUTORS

Dr.Ozan ERZDEN,

(DPSIR / YTU)...........................................................................................................

Dr. Anneli Ute GABANYI,

(German Institute for International and Security Affairs)..........................................

Dr.Emilian KAVALSKI,

(Lougborough University)...........................................................................................

Prof.Dr. Cengiz AKTAR,

(Bahesehir University) ..............................................................................................

Dr.Martin MAYER,

(Advisor to the Commission Delegation Zagreb)........................................................

Prof.Dr. Jovan TEOKAREVIC,

(Belgrade University).................................................................................................

Assoc.Prof.Dr. Bertil Emrah DER,

(University of Istanbul) ..............................................................................................

Prof.Biljana GABER,

(Ph.D.University St. Cyril and Methodius Skopje, R. Macedonias)............................

Dr. Eno TRIMEV,

(Albanian Institute for International Studies)...............................................................


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CONTRIBUTORS ................................................................................................................12

WELCOMING REMARKS, ..................................................................................................15

Prof. Dr. Fulya ATACAN...........................................................................................................

OPENING REMARKS , ........................................................................................................17

Gner ZTEK.......................................................................................................................

EU ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS THE BALKANS AS A PROBLEM OF PHYSICS: UANTUM

MECHANICS VS. NEWTONIAN MECHANICS, ..................................................................21

Dr.Ozan ERZDEN..................................................................................................................

ROMANIAS EU ACCESSION: 2007 OR 2008? OR: SHOULD ROMANIA PAY FOR SPILTEU MILK?, ............................................................................................................................29

Dr. Anneli Ute GABANYI...........................................................................................................

BEING THE MODEL BALKAN STUDENT? EXPORTING THE EU TO BULGARIA , ....... 39

Dr.Emilian KAVALSKI..........................................................................................................

LA DCISION DE CONFORMIT AUX CRITRES POLITIQUES DE COPENHAGUE:

VALUATION TECHNIQUE OU VOLONT POLITIQUE?,...............................................53

Prof.Dr.Cengiz AKTAR..............................................................................................................

CROATIAS LONG JOURNEY BACK TO EUROPE: CHALLENGES ON THE WAY TO EU

MEMBERSHIP, ....................................................................................................................61

Dr.Martin MAYER......................................................................................................................

BALKAN COUNTRIES AND EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION: IS THE PACE OF

RAPPROCHEMENT FROM 2005 SUSTAINABLE?, .............................................................71

Jovan TEOKAREVIC..........................................................................................................

CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND RESISTANCE IN TURKEY'S EUROPEAN

UNION ACCESSION PROCESS , ....................................................................................................89

Assoc.Prof.Dr. Bertil Emrah DER......................................................................... ....

THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIAS WAY TO THE EU, ........................................................103

Prof.Biljana GABER.......................................................................................................

ALBANIAN AND CZECH VISUALIZATIONS OF EUROPE: THE ALBANIAN

COMMITMENT TO THE EUROPEAN IDEA, ....................................................................109

Eno TRIMEV..........................................................................................................................

CONTENTS


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WELCOMING REMARKS

Prof. Dr. Fulya ATACAN*

Ladies and Gentlemen, distinguished guests:

It gives me great pleasure to be with you today to open the Conference on EUEnlargement towards South-East Europe. This Conference is the tangible outcome

of an initiative taken jointly by the Department of Political Science & International

Relations and the Foundation of Middle East and Balkan Studies. Dr. Ozan Erzden

worked very hard with Ambassador Gner ztek to ensure that the initiative took

shape.

I am delighted to see all participants here and thank you for accepting our invi-

tation.

On this occasion I would like to thank those from the Department who organized

this Conference. My gratitude goes to Dr. Erzden, Research Assistants Aye Kollu

and Yetkin Bakavak from the Department and to Ambassador ztek and his staff

from OBV for their efficiency.

Fondat ion for Middle Eas t and Balkan Studies 15

EU ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

December 15th, 2005 stanbul

*Prof Dr. Fulya ATACAN, YTU / DPSIR


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The EU has successfully grown from six to 25 members. Bulgaria and Romania

are expected to join in 2007 and Croatia will probably gain membership between

2008 and 2010. 2015-2020 is the projected time for Turkey's full membership. As

you know Turkey's EU membership has become a matter of major significance andconsiderable controversy in recent years.

It is clear that the EU has tended to enlarge along regional lines adding groups of

nearby nations. The EU is presently very interested in the integration of the Balkan

states, namely Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and

Albania. However France and the United Kingdom have shifted their positions

regarding these states. I am sure we will have an opportunity to discuss these mat-

ters in detail.

I hope that this will be an informative, inspiring and fruitful meeting for all those

who participate.

Allow me to wish you every success in the Conference.

Thank you.

Prof. Dr. Fulya Atacan

EU Enlargement Towards South-East Europe16

Fulya ATACAN

** *


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OPENING REMARKS

Gner ZTEK*

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a pleasure for me to welcome you all to the Conference on EU Enlargement

towards South-East Europe, which is jointly organized by the Foundation for

Middle-East and Balkan Studies and Yildiz Technical University. We will discuss

different aspects of the enlargement process throughout the day.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, a new political geography of Europe has

emerged. The Iron Curtains artificial division of Europe ceased to exist and the

classical geographical terms Western, Central and Eastern Europe have resur-

faced. Within this context, the Balkans, which has played a significant role in

European and World history, has become an integral part of Europe. The political

center of gravity has begun to shift from Western Europe to Central and Eastern

Fondation for Middle East and Balkan Studies 17


December 15th, 2005 Istanbul

*Ambasador (Rtd.), Director of Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies - OBV


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Europe.

The end of the Cold War had an important impact on the Balkans and on

Southeastern Europe. The countries involved were faced with important problemssuch as the transition from totalitarian regimes to democracy and from centralized,

state-ruled economies to free market economies with vast freedom and opportuni-

ties. However, due to a lack of democratic and political traditions, backgrounds and

proper infrastructure, these vast freedoms, particularly in the West Balkans,

inflamed national feelings and awakened old enmities leading to bloody clashes and

serious separatism.

Aggressive nationalistic raids beyond borders not only caused partition within

countries and the region, but they reached the dimension of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic

clashes resulted in the collapse of already fragile and weak economies based on out-

dated technologies. These economic difficulties forced masses to immigrate.

Presently, in most parts of the Balkan region, especially in the South-East Balkans,

security is almost assured.

The entire area faced an important challenge: the modernization and reorganiza-

tion of the state. What we are witnessing today is all the countries of the region try-

ing to complete transition of their political, social and economic structures in order

to build a democratic political system and a free market economy in multiethnic and

multicultural states. To develop a culture of region-wide reconciliation, good neigh-

borhood relations and close cooperation in all fields is a pre-condition for peace and

stability; there is no alternative.

The level of individual well-being and prosperity in the Balkan nations has a

direct impact on the security and stability of the region. In turn, as the region is an

important element in the overall security of the continent, stability and security in

Europe as a whole cannot be achieved and sustained if this part of the continent isdragged into economic and social turmoil.


Gner ZTEK


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The enlargement process towards the South-East Balkans is a new, historic step

of great importance and is an encouragement to carry out the necessary political,

social and economic reforms to promote democracy, the rule of law, and to create azone of lasting peace, stability, prosperity and freedom. There is no doubt that the

more integrated Europe is the more effective and better equipped it becomes to over-

come conflicts. Thus the enlargement process is a two-way street beneficial to both

parties. However, the key element of success lies in the determination of the regions

countries to complete their programs of reforms and to meticulously commit them-

selves to respect for human rights and the protection of minorities.

It is high time for the Euro-Atlantic and European institutions to embrace the

region with a vision of projecting lasting peace, stability and prosperity and, at the

same time, to cultivate the diverse historical heritages as constitutive elements of

European culture and civilization. This will speed the process of democratization

and reform for the establishment of basic universal standards of human and minor-

ity rights in cultural, educational, linguistic and other fields.

For the first time in history, the Balkans, with its eastern and western regions, are

willingly getting together around Europe and Euro-Atlantic organizations with the

purpose of achieving more democracy, peace and stability. It is a chance not to be

missed for both parties.

The time is right for the word Balkans to be freed from its negative connota-

tions and to come to stand for such positive things as mutual respect and peace-

ful cohabitation. The various peoples of the region should spare no effort to avoid

the falling again into balkanization.

I am certain that this day in Istanbul will bring forth fruitful discussions and will

help us all to understand better the EU Enlargement towards South-East Europe andits consequences.


OPENING REMARKS


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With these thoughts in mind, I wish you all every success in your deliberations.

Thank you for your attention.


Gner ZTEK

** *


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EU ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS THE BALKANS AS APROBLEM OF PHYSICS:

QUANTUM MECHANICS VS. NEWTONIANMECHANICS

Dr. Ozan ERZDEN*

Dear Participants,

In this, the first presentation of the conference, EU Enlargement towards the

Balkans, my main aim is to draw a conceptual framework concerning the issues

that my colleagues in two of todays consecutive panels will discuss in detail. While

doing so, I intend to take a multidisciplinary stance. As you know, political science

is a scientific branch that welcomes a multidisciplinary approach. In my presenta-

tion, I will test the limits of this multidisciplinary tolerance by drawing on one of the

basic scientific branches, physics. You, the participants, are the ones who will assess

my success or failure at this.

As you might already know, in physics the main principles of dynamics for large


* Department of Political Science & International Relations, Yildiz Technical University, Istanbul




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objects, such as planets, and for atomic and sub-atomic particles differ from each

other. Within the terminology of political science, we can consider these two

domains as different entities governed by different legal systems. Big objects, in

their movements, obey Newtons laws of motion and laws of universal gravitation,while sub-atomic particles are governed by the laws of quantum physics. In princi-

ple, by applying Newtons laws, one gets precise results, meaning that as long as one

has enough data, one can precisely determine or calculate the current and future

position of an object. Quantum physics, on the other hand, is ruled by uncertainty.

Called the Uncertainty Principle, this notion means that the position and the veloc-

ity of an object cannot be simultaneously measured exactly, even in theory.

According to this principle, the very concepts of precise position and precise veloc-

ity together have no meaning in nature. Instead, only a series of probabilities may

indicate the possible results of an interaction between atomic and subatomic parti-

cles. Such a scientific concept, which requires uncertainty, is extremely strange for

minds shaped by the idea that science, especially applied sciences, brings exact

results. Hence, even the founder of Relativity Theory, Albert Einstein, furiously

objected to the uncertainty principle with the assertion that God does not play dice

with the universe.

So you do not think you mistakenly came to a conference on theoretical physics,

I will end my deliberations on Newtonian mechanics and quantum physics and I will

talk on the current relationship between the Balkans and the European Union (EU).

At this stage, I invite you to imagine the EU, especially the one of 15 states as it

was before May 2004, as a separate universe a universe that has its own laws that

determine with exactitude the results of physical and legal acts of objects and sub-

jects appertaining to that universe. Let us call these laws acquis communautaire

and add the Copenhagen Criteria to them. In this universe, everything, even sizes

applicable to agricultural products, is defined by treaties, regulations, directives or

decisions. Everything in this universe is conceived to ensure the greatest possible

stability.


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Now, let us look at the Balkans. Can we consider the Balkans a universe on its

own? My personal answer to this question is positive. Nevertheless, to avoid any

possible misunderstanding, I would like first to make clear what I understand by the

term Balkans. When I say Balkans, I do not mean a geographical entity in which

each community is the natural enemy of the neighbouring one. The term Balkan

that I use does not bear the pejorative meaning crystallized in the term of balkaniza-

tion. Neither do I intend to enter a polemic on whether those who Balkanized the

entire planet in the First and Second World Wars could reproach the peoples of the

Balkans. Deferring to Maria Todorovas valuable book Imagining the Balkans,

when I say Balkans, I mean both a geographical entity and a mental state that is

physically situated in Europe but considers itself (and is also considered) outside of

Europe. I think in this sense, one would not be greatly mistaken if one defines the

Balkans as a separate universe whose dynamics are governed by laws different from

the ones ruling the universe of Europe or, more concretely, the EU.

A number of eminent scholars from different branches of social science devel-

oped comprehensive analytic tools using theories such as network theories or social

communication theories to discover the laws governing Balkan politics and soci-

eties. Here, I am not going to repeat them in detail. Nevertheless, I will point out

some issues that are of interest to this conference since we are here to discuss the

rapprochementof these two universes.

From the political scientists point of view, the first issue to consider for all

Balkan societies is stability, in fact the lack of it. In the Balkans, the end of the Cold

War in the last decade of the twentieth century marked the beginning of a disinte-

gration process that brought back on the agenda, inter alia, the applicability of

some, so to say, nineteenth-century ideas on the role of states and borders. In the first

years of the new millennium, this disintegration process reached such an extent that

today nobody is able to say the exact number of states that exist in the region.

Todays political map of South Eastern Europe consists of a patchwork of sovereign

states, international protectorates, semi-sovereign sub-state entities or provinces,


EU ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS THE BALKANS AS A PROBLEM OF PHYSICS:QUANTUM MECHANICS VS. NEWTONIAN MECHANICS


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alongside fragile confederations or federation-like political formations. Thus, polit-

ical schemes defined on state structures dating from a century ago are less and less

applicable in the region.

Such a nebula of diversified categories of political organisation, however,

reflects unanimity when the aim is to gain access to an integrating political body,

namely the EU. It should be noted that, as I will elaborate later, this is not a single

direction interest. Although reluctance for the absorption of the whole Balkans with-

in the Union is growing in some EU member capital cities, the EUs central bodies

in Brussels are still eager to extend limits of the Union to the region. I sincerely

believe and I strongly hope that, despite recent discouraging declarations from the

French and United Kingdom governments, the EU Council summit in Brussels to be

held the day after this conference will send, by extending candidate status to

Macedonia as the European Commission recommended, a clear signal to the west-

ern Balkans that the promise of Europeanization is real.

The antagonism between disintegrating and integrating forces that plays a role

over political developments in the Balkans can be seen in the general methodologi-

cal lines that shape scholarly work that analyses post-Cold War developments in the

region. Up to the end of 1990s, the mushrooming literature on nation- and state-

building in the contemporary Balkans was overwhelmingly couched in the classical

theoretical schemes of transition to democracy and insisted on the pathological

character of nationalism in the region. The new trend in recent years is, however, to

emphasize the so-called crisis of statehood. In this framework, the capacity and

coherence of bureaucratic structures are analysed in depth. Such an approach

reflects the presupposition that lack of administrative capacity is one of the main

obstacles to socio-economic advancement, which is a view Brussels technocrats

largely share.

On the other hand, as the messenger of a brand new research paradigm, one

observes the emergence of more recent studies based on an alternative approach that


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questions the view that state building in the Balkans can be reduced to EU-guided

reform of public administration. In other words, this approach does not take it for

granted that perspective EU membership has been the main engine for the far-reach-

ing reform processes throughout the region over the past ten years that has put all

countries on track for membership. Nevertheless, even within this approach one can

note that the EU accession process or incentive is a factor in the analysis.

Thus, as policy level approaches and scholarly work point out, the relation

between these two distinct universes, i.e. the EU and the Balkans, is a highly asym-

metric one. One of the universes (the EU) openly tells the other (the Balkans) that

if it starts to apply the others laws of dynamics, they may merge. My colleagues

who are going to present papers today will discuss in detail what each Balkan state

has done and what remains to be done. Thus, I do not intent to discuss this subject

in my presentation. Nevertheless, I would like to discuss the basic assumption of this

approach, i.e. whether the EU as a dynamic universe is as predictable as it presents

itself to be. In other words, does the EU reflect the stability that it claims is ensured

in its ranks and that it requires potential newcomers to achieve?

Let us consider the EU, for a moment, as a stabile and predictable entity as far as

its inner structure is concerned. The external politics of the Union, however, has

never been a clearly defined line. This means, in exact terms, that the EU has never

had an external policy line of its own, except for its strong stand in support of the

International Criminal Court in the face of US attempts to undermine the very basis

of this institution. Instead, the national interests of the member states, and especial-

ly those of the strongest ones, still prevail. This failure was clearly seen first when

the EU (then the EC) was called to take control of the crisis that broke in former

Yugoslavia. The region, especially the countries that emerged from the former

Yugoslavia are still facing the enduring effects of this shock.

This lack of a well-defined external policy line affects, as witnessed in recent

years, the EUs enlargement policies, which are situated in the grey zone between




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the Unions external and internal affairs. As mentioned above, despite the European

Commissions efforts to keep the Unions position vis--vis the future enlargement

process as stable as possible, member states internal political concerns affect this

standpoint, causing unpredictability. The disturbances encountered at the Unionslast summit over the decision on the start of accession talks with Turkey and Croatia

are among the best examples of this instability. There are strong indications that the

EU member states will increasingly enrich the accession criteria for South East

European making their EU membership perspective more and more unforeseeable.

Finally yet importantly, the defeat of the EU draft constitution in referenda in

France and Holland make the inner integration of the new 25 / 27-strong Union far

less stable than it used to be. This blow to a more unified and better functioning

organisation is again a victory for national particularism over the supranationalism

embodied in the idea of a Union equipped with a constitution.

In the light of the above, I argue that the EU integration process is now much less

one-sided than before. The idea of a closed EU universe administered under the

principle of predictability and stability has proved itself for some time, especially

since the end of the Cold War, is a fiction. It is inconceivable that the EU will turn

this fiction into a reality by stopping its enlargement towards the Balkans. On the

other hand, it is also inconceivable that Europe will become Europe without one of

its components, namely the Balkans. Thus, the enlargement towards its South East

is the destiny of a Union claiming to be European.

Now let us for a moment again return to the world of physics. As I mentioned

before, physics currently treats big objects and small atomic particles as if they

belong to separate universes. Nevertheless, in reality these two different types of

material are part of the same universe, situated inseparably next to each other. Thus,

the major issue for current theoretical physics is to provide a unified theoretical

framework that encompasses laws of dynamics valid for both big and small objects.

Without it, it is impossible for physicists to explain the rules of dynamics for the


Ozan ERZDEN


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whole universe.

In our universe of politics, maybe this task should be taken into consideration

seriously. Europe and the Balkans are not separate universes but inseparable parts of

the same political entity. Maybe it is high time for the EU to recover from the dream

that it is a strongly stable unit and to allow the Balkan states into its ranks to formu-

late together softer and more realistic ways of multicultural, democratic and peace-

ful cohabitation.

To make my standpoint clear, I emphasize that this is not a plea for the EU to

abolish all criteria for joining the Union. This does even not mean that the criteria

should not be scrutinised even more closely than before. It is completely under-

standable that the EU has learned some lessons from the last two rounds of enlarge-

ment. Nevertheless, those EU politicians who feel they were too lenient in giving

the green light to countries joining the Union should consider the fact that the unity

of Europe should be built up on basic principles considered universal and not on cal-

culations over petty issues such as the percentage of vote to be obtained in the fol-

lowing elections. What I would like to underline here is that the EU should behave

fairly and equitably towards both itself and future members by not demanding some-

thing that it does not itself possess. Finally, yet importantly, the EU must demon-

strate its trustworthiness by not renouncing its own words for the sake of internal

politics in some member states.



** *


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ROMANIAS EU ACCESSION: 2007 OR 2008? OR:SHOULD ROMANIA PAY FOR SPILT EU MILK?

Anneli Ute GABANY*

In this presentation I will present a brief outline of Romanias road to EuropeanUnion integration starting from its privileged relations with European Community

member states up to the difficult conclusion of its accession negotiations in

December. The final part of this paper pleas for the EU to take a rational decision in

favour of Romanias accession in January 2007.

From Vanguard to Laggard in EU-Integration.

On 14 December 2004, Romania was the last of the 10 Eastern and Central

European countries to conclude accession talks with the EU. This is paradoxical

considering that it had was the first Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

(Comecon, or CMEA) country to engage in formalized trade cooperation with the

EU in the early 1970s after it had started reorienting its foreign policy towards

Western Europe and the US in the early 1960s. In 1974, Romania signed a prefer-


* Dr. Anneli Utan GABANY, German Institute for International and Security Affairs

EU ENLARGEMENT T OWARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPEDecember 15

th, 2005 Istanbul


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ence agreement with the EC and, in 1980, it concluded a comprehensive agreement

on industrial products with the EC.

In 1982, under the impact of Polands political, economic and financial crisis,Romania defaulted on its hard currency debt with western financial institutions.

Constrained to repay its debt Romania, was forced to impose hard austerity meas-

ures on the population. Moreover, the EU stopped negotiations on a new trade agree-

ment with Romania. In 1990, Romania was the last former communist East

European country to establish diplomatic relations with the EU. In 1991, Bucharest

signed a trade and cooperation agreement and, in 1993, an association (Europe)

agreement with the EU. On 22 June 1995, Romania was the fourth former commu-

nist East European state to apply for EU membership.

In December 1997, at the European Councils Luxemburg summit, the EU grant-

ed Romania candidate status but did not include it in the group of countries with

which the EU started accession negotiations. It was only two years later, at the

Helsinki summit meeting in December 1999, that the EU decided to enter accessionnegotiations with all candidate countries, except for Turkey. However, no precise

date was fixed for Romanias (and Bulgarias) accession owing to these countries

reform backlog and because the current EU budget was insufficient to cope with the

integration of all candidate countries before 2007.

Romanias accession negotiations started on 15 February 2000. On 1 January

2002, visa restrictions for Romanian citizens to the Schengen space were lifted. In

December 2003, the European Council meeting in Brussels officially decided that

accession negotiations with Romania (and Bulgaria) were to end in 2004 and fixed

the date of accession of the two South European countries at 1 January 2007.

Difficult accession negotiations

However, accession negotiations turned out to be rather difficult, with Romania


Anneli Ute GABANY


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lagging behind Bulgaria in its efforts to close the 31 negotiation chapters. While

Bulgaria succeeded in closing negotiations at the June 2005 EU summit in Dublin,

Romania only succeeded on 14 December of the same year due to problems with

Chapters 3 (freedom of services), 21 (regional policy), 22 (environment), 6 (compe-tition) and 24 (justice and home affairs). The reasons for Romania lagging behind

were manifold: the size of the country, its bad reputation with the European

Commission owing to its perceived unreliability and, most importantly, Romanias

lack of support in the European Parliament. Romania fell victim to the power strug-

gle between the European Parliament and the European Commission, on the one

hand, and the partisan criticism of European Parliaments conservative and liberal

members of the performance of Romanias social democratic government, on the

other. An additional factor in the final stage of its accession negotiations was the

appointment of a new European Commission which was far more critical of

Romania than its predecessor. Pressed by countries such as Finland and Hungary,

which had long opposed the timely integration of Romania, the Commission did not

recommend the conclusion of negotiations with Bucharest. Eventually, a compro-

mise was found which imposed a severe monitoring process and an additional andparticularly harsh safeguard clause in the Romania (and Bulgaria) Accession Treaty,

which was signed on 25 April 2005. The Treaty contains three types of safeguard

clauses. A first set of three clauses that was included in prior accession treaties refers

to the post-accession period. Such clauses can be triggered during the first three

years after accession if a member state encounters difficulties adjusting to the EU

internal market or meeting EU standards in the field of justice and home affairs. The

decision on whether to revert to these clauses must be by unanimous vote of the

European Council.

When Bulgaria concluded accession talks with the EU in June 2004 the

Commission imposed an additional clause and, half a year later, also on Romania.

Other than the general post-accession clauses, this new clause refers to the period

leading up to accession. It stipulates that, if Bulgaria or Romania turns out to beunprepared for accession in one of several important fields, the European Council


ROMANIA'S EU ACCESSION: 2007 OR 2008? OR: SHOULD ROMANIAPAY FOR SPILT EU MILK?


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can propose a years delay on the accession date 1 January 2008 instead of 1

January 2007. This decision would be by unanimous voting of the European

Council.

Moreover, another so-called super-safeguard clause was introduced when

Romania belatedly concluded its accession negotiations and it applies to this coun-

try only. It stipulates that if Romania proves unready for accession in one or more of

eleven specifically outlined areas, the EC can delay Romanias accession by one

year through a qualified majority vote. These special problem areas are listed in the

additional protocol to the Accession Treaty: four of these special problem areas

belong to the Chapter on Competition, and seven to Justice and Home affairs, in par-

ticular to frontier security, the reform of the judiciary, and the fight against corrup-

tion and international crime. The problems confronting Romania in the field of bor-

der security are largely due to the length of Romanias frontiers and to the size of

financial and human resources needed to fulfil the Schengen Acquis. Out of the

2,508 km of Romanias external borders 1,457 km will form the future external

border of the EU after Romanias accession. This status will not change for quitesome time owing to the fact that neither the Federal Republic of Serbia and

Montenegro (to the South East) nor Ukraine and Moldova (to the North and East)

have a realistic chance of joining the EU in the near future, if at all. In order to abide

by European legislation on border management, Romania introduced visa for trav-

ellers from Russia, the Ukraine, and Serbia-Montenegro. The Schengen regulation

with regard to Moldova will be introduced once Romania actually joints the EU.

The struggle against corruption is a decisive criterion for measuring Romanias

ability to join the EU in 2007. In Romania, corruption is a structural problem result-

ing primarily from the weakness of the public administration and of the judiciary.

The European Commission expects Romania to enhance the struggle against corrup-

tion in general and high-level corruption in particular, to implement existing legisla-

tion in this field and to strengthen the independence of the anti-corruption adminis-tration. Romanian citizens display a high degree of awareness of corruption as the


Anneli Ute GABANY


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main impediment on their countrys road to accession. Once they have joined the

EU, they expect the EUs institutions to assist them in their struggle against corrupt

dignitaries at home. The issue of corruption played a decisive role during the 2004

parliamentary and presidential elections. However, after winning the presidentialelections and after forming the new government, the battle against corruption degen-

erated into a power struggle between the Prime Minister, Mr C?lin Popescu

T?riceanu, and the President, Mr Traian B?sescu, and their respective parties. While

the EU Commission appreciated Romanias progress on imposing European legal

standards, misusing the struggle against corruption poses a danger to Romanias

overall goal of joining the EU on 1 January 2007.

Eurofatigue Endangers Romanias Timely Accession

However, the main factor that threatens to delay Romanias accession for a year

is an external one. Following Romanias (and Bulgarias) signing of the Accession

Treaty in April 2005, the political climate in EU member states underwent a drastic

change. The public mood in the EU-25 was particularly affected by:

The failure in France and the Netherlands of the referenda on the

Constitutional Treaty

The temporary breakdown of negotiations on the European Unions

financial framework for 2007-2014, and

The unpopular decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey.

As a result, governments and parliaments in several EU member states consid-

ered giving in to this negative trend in popular opinion and paying tribute the low

degree of acceptance of Romania and Bulgarias EU membership by delaying these

countries accession for a year. The European Commission, which was to decide onthe Romania and Bulgaria safeguard clauses in its 25 October 2005 comprehensive




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Monitoring Report, postponed its recommendation to grant these two countries

another six months to fulfil their commitments. By doing so, the Commission was

able to maintain pressure on the Romanian (and Bulgarian) government by extend-

ing the period when EU conditionality still worked. The Commissions carrot-and-stick strategy is based on the continuation of a severe monitoring process on the one

hand and a more intense support of the Union through peer reviews, twinning proj-

ects, seminars, etc. The Commission pledged to issue its recommendation on

whether or not to delay Romanias accession in April or May 2006. The final deci-

sion was to be taken by the European Council during its June summit. Another mon-

itoring report should be published in the fall of 2006.

While the problems confronting the EU countries after the outbreak of the ratifi-

cation and budget crisis this summer are real, it is questionable whether imposing a

delay on Romanias accession would solve their internal problems. It is, however,

equally doubtful whether such a decision would be beneficial for Romania.

Opponents of Romanias accession in 2007 argue that a longer preparation time

would offer Romania more time to better prepare for the challenges of EU member-ship. However, in the light of the specific conditions outlined in the Accession

Treaty, this expectation will most certainly prove wrong. To put it bluntly: one-year

conditionality is no conditionality. Since accession as such has been agreed in the

Treaty, the EU lacks forceful means of further influencing the reform process in this

country beyond 2008. Therefore, any problem arising after accession could be bet-

ter addressed with Romania inside, and not outside, the EU.

However, delaying the accession date by a year could prove counterproductive

both for the EU and for Romania. The EU is increasingly interested in playing an

important role in the regional context and beyond. Moreover, by delaying

Romanias accession by one year just to calm certain national constituencies in the

EU represents a deviation from the EUs fundamental principles of solidarity and

equal treatment. Applying a different treatment to Romania (and Bulgaria) wouldnot enhance the image of the EU as a reliable value-based organization, considering


Anneli Ute GABANY


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that these two countries are part and parcel of the same wave of EU enlargement and

have explicitly been promised equal treatment with the ten other accession coun-

tries. This is why the EU should be particularly intent on projecting the image of an

organization whose foreign policy is predictable and reliable. Any indication of theEU reneging on its principles and promises will undoubtedly send negative signals

to regions such as the Western Balkans or the countries of the EU Eastern neighbour-

hood. Romanias geo-strategic importance as a missing link between the two arch-

es of instability cannot be overestimated. Stabilizing these areas, furthering democ-

racy, introducing good governance in these countries and drawing them closer to the

EU is a major strategic task serving the Ems best interest. All this should be con-

sidered when it comes to sacrificing the two South East European countries to pay

for the EU milk spilt this summer.

Delaying Romanias Accession to the EU Would Be Counterproductive

Those who argue appeasing disenchanted voters in the old EU member coun-

tries by delaying Romanias EU accession by a year would not hurt Romania arewrong. The contrary is true.

A delay in accession would be a severe blow for the Romanian pop-

ulation that, because of its West-European linguistic and cultural iden-

tity, has supported EU integration to a consistently high degree. The

Romanian people, hard pressed by a legacy of economic mismanage-

ment, would be severely demoralized.

Moreover, a delay in accession could stir domestic instability as it

would certainly be interpreted as a failure of government policy and

could even lead to its overthrow, with dire consequences for the coun-

trys reform efforts.

In the economic field, a years delay in accession would entail both




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direct and indirect economic losses for Romania. The direct losses

would amount to about euro2 billion in cash-flow facilities and pay-

ments from the EU structural fund. Romania would also incur indirect

economic losses that, according to an estimate by Vasile Pusca?,Romanias former chief EU negotiator, would be about euro10 billion.

Summing up, a number of questions arise:

Does the EU need to solve its complex crisis and improve its communication

strategy vis--vis its national constituencies? The answer is decidedly yes!

Will a delay in Romanias accession date solve these EU problems? The answer

is decidedly no!

No, it would be neither logical nor fair to change the rules of the game before the

current game with 12 participants is over.

No, it would not be fair for the EU to treat Romania with greater severity than

Bulgaria for the only reason that, for various reasons, Bulgaria enjoyed a better pub-

lic image in 2004 than Romania but was identified as the true problem candidate in

the October 2005 comprehensive monitoring report. Since the special safeguard

clause applicable exclusively to Romania allows for a delay whereas the simple

safeguard clause applicable to Bulgaria (and Romania) is practically impossible to

activate for procedural reasons, EU politicians would be well advised to allow for a

timely accession of the two South East European countries.

But: Yes, the EU should draw lessons from its inconsequent negotiation policy in

the case of the EU 12. Future enlargement rounds should abide to the criteria

(respect for conditionality and accession according to individual performance),

which the EU proclaimed but did not hitherto respect.


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And: Yes, the EU should go about consolidating its conceptual basis no matter in

what form.

Yes, the EU should quickly solve its budget crisis, and

Yes, the EU should engage in a long-term and large-scale effort at communicat-

ing EU ideals and policies to the national member constituencies. This will be in the

interest of the old and the new EU members and of Europe as a whole.



** *


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BEING THE MODEL BALKAN STUDENT?

EXPORTING THE EU TO BULGARIA

Emilian KAVALSKI*

I am often asked where Europes ultimate borders lie. My answer is

that the map of Europe is defined in the mind, not just on the ground.

Geography sets the frame, but fundamentally it is values that make the

borders of Europe. Enlargement is a matter of extending the zone of

European values, the most fundamental of which are liberty and soli-

darity, tolerance and human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

Olli Rehn (2005b: 2)

The words of Olli Rehn (especially in light of the October 2005 Luxemburg

European Council) seem to confirm the membership prospect (albeit distant) of cur-

rent and prospective candidates for EU-membership. It has also to be acknowledged

that Mr. Rehn is not merely the EU Commissioner on Enlargement, but de facto the

EUs Commissioner on the Balkans as all current and (possible) prospective candi-


* Dr.Emilian KAVALSKI, Loughborough University

EU ENLARGEMENT TO WARDS SOUTH-EAST EUROPE



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dates are from the region. In this context, Brussels has tended to give Bulgaria as an

example that is to be emulated by its neighbors. In fact, Mr. Rehns predecessor in

the Enlargement Office, Gunter Verheugen, set up the country as a model for the

Balkans, by declaring that Bulgaria is not part of the Balkan problems it is partof their solution! Hence, the EUs assistance is an investment in the future of the

country. Bulgaria is already starting to pay back for this support by developing the

foundations of a strong economy and a strong market, and also, one should not for-

get, by its political stability, which is a major factor for the stability of the Balkan

region.

In this context, this paper reviews the process and progress of Bulgarias bid for

EU-membership and also relates Sofias experience to that of the Balkans as a

whole. At the same time, it identifies some problems with the EUs strategy of

exporting the rules and practices of its zone of peace to the region. In particular, the

paper focuses on the persistence of the elite-society cleavage, which underwrites the

failure of successive governments to create the conditions for sustainable social,

political and economic transformation and development.

In order to illuminate its inferences, this paper briefly sketches the EUs agency

in the Balkans as a background for its involvement in Bulgaria and subsequently

reviews the export of its rules and standards to the country. Finally, this study looks

at some of the problems and prospects for the EU integration of Bulgaria, which

might be of relevance to candidates such as Turkey which are currently embark-

ing on the accession trail.

EU Approaches to the Balkans:

This paper makes two complementary claims as regards the EUs role: FIRST:

that the process of Bulgarias accession is intimately linked to the EUs approaches

to the Balkans; and SECOND: that the EUs role in the region altered qualitatively

as a result of the Kosovo crisis (Kavalski, 2005). As a report by the EU Institute for


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fairly successfully with the challenge of ethnic conflict after restoring the rights of

its large Turkish minority in the winter of 1989-90, its economic performance, how-

ever, was far more unconvincing. Successive governments failed to carry out criti-

cally important structural reforms to launch privatization, cut subsidies to loss-mak-ing enterprises, consolidate the ailing banking sector and stabilize the national cur-

rency. In this context, it can safely be claimed that in contrast to CEE states,

Bulgaria wasted the greater part of the 1990s as reforms lacked a sense of purpose

and nervous governments sought to spare the population the pain of restructuring but

instead condemned the majority of the people to a deterioration in living standards.

Domestically, this had the effect of portraying the EU (as well as the accession

process) in very abstract terms, polarizing public opinion on the issue along party

lines, and, ultimately introducing the possibility of experimenting with an indige-

nous Bulgarian way of reform. Yet, by the winter of 1996/97 as a result of gross

economic mismanagement and criminal privatization, the Bulgarian way had led

to hyperinflation and a visible slump in living standards (Dimitrov, 2001: 82). The

concomitant deterioration in almost all spheres of social, economic and political life

led to the removal of the then Socialist government and ushered in pro-reform-mind-

ed and clearly pro-EU politicians. The former Bulgarian President, Petar Stoyanov

insisted that:

most of the period between 1989 and 1997 we only had the pretence of

reform. We deluded ourselves that we could survive without great sac-

rifices, but things kept getting tougher and we got deeper and deeper

into debt. 1997 marked the turning point when we shed our illusions.

(Financial Times, 1997).

As a result of this shedding of illusions, Bulgaria adopted its first National

Strategy for Accession in March 1998 (Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2001: 84). It is

within this changing domestic environment that the Kosovo conflict occurred and

altered the EUs awareness of its own agency not only in Bulgaria, but also in the

Balkans as well. As the then Commissioner for External relations, Hans van der


Emilian KAVALSKI


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Broek (1999: 1) explained:

Over the last ten years, the Union has gone through many changes and

is reaching the third phase in its geopolitical re-definition. The first

stage was the 1989 fall of the Berlin wall, which led to German re-uni-

fication and the start of the enlargement process to the east. The second

phase came in 1992 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there-

by fundamentally changing the dynamics within the European conti-

nent. We are now entering the third phase, which is the stabilization of

the Balkans and their integration into the process of European Union

enlargement.

As already suggested, the 1999 developments in Kosovo gave a tangible per-

spective to the accession of Bulgaria. Despite its inclusion in the initiatives for CEE

states (under the PHARE programme), the country was not on the agenda for open-

ing accession negotiations according to the conclusions of the Vienna European

Council in December 1998 (00300/1/98). This decision was underwritten by the per-

ception that Bulgaria was too slow to conform to the accession criteria. However,

the volatility of the so-called Western Balkans underlined the need to recognize their

efforts in order to ensure the continued attractiveness of EU membership and sup-

port for the sanctions (and military campaign) against Serbia/Montenegro.

At first, this recognition came in the form of a very explicit Statement of the

EU on Bulgaria and Romania on 26 April 1999 (EIS). On the one hand, this

Statement noted the contribution of Romania and Bulgaria, two associate States, to

stability in the wider region. On the other, it recognized that this situation imposes

heavy burdens on these countries. Therefore, their governments are to be com-

mended for their positive responses by underlying the special relationship [the

EU] enjoys with Romania and Bulgaria.

The initial endorsement which followed was the establishment of an Instrument


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for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) on 21 June 1999. According to the

division of ISPA funds, Bulgaria was earmarked as the third largest beneficiary

nearly 11% (COM(2001)616: 9). Simultaneously, it was also granted access to

SAPARD (agricultural aid) funds. The next step, which the EU undertook was toupgrade the special relationship it had with Bulgaria, by noting its eligibility for

negotiations on membership. As Romano Prodi (1999) suggested at the time, this

softening of the Copenhagen criteria towards Bulgaria (and Romania) was intended

to prevent:

the countries concerned, having already made great efforts and sacri-

fices [from becoming] disillusioned and turn their backs on us. Their

economic policies will begin to diverge and a historic opportunity will

have been lost perhaps forever. In the changed political landscape,

especially in the Balkan region, some countries may also let slip the

progress they have made towards democracy and human rights, and the

EU will have seriously failed the people of those countries.

This stance, in turn, allowed EU institutions to demand compliance from Sofias

elites. This process also underwrites the Europeanization of Bulgarian decision-

making. The regional significance of the country has been reflected in (and also sup-

ported by) the fact that since 2003 over 40% of all FDI in the Balkans has been in

Bulgaria (Focus, 2 April 2005).

The Post-1999 Europeanization of Bulgaria

An assessment of post-1999 conditioning of Bulgaria is best evidenced by com-

parison with the 1997 Opinion on Bulgaria. As the European Commission conclud-

ed, Bulgaria has neither transposed nor taken on the essential elements of the

acquis It is therefore uncertain whether Bulgaria will be in a position to assume

the obligations of membership in the medium term (DOC/97/11: 122). From this

perspective, Bulgarias achievement of the status of a candidate country two years


Emilian KAVALSKI


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later in December 1999, the accelerated completion of its negotiations with the EU

on 15 June 2004 and the signing of its Accession Treaty on 25 April 2005 underlie

the effectiveness of post-1999 instruments. The Foreign Minister Solomon Passi has

insisted this points to the countrys transition from a national Bulgaria to a

European Bulgaria, whose policy-practice reflects the values of peace and democra-

cy (Focus, 22 December 2004).

The two-main instruments of the EU-driven elite-socialisation of Bulgaria are

the Accession Partnership and the instruments for assistance: PHARE,

SAPARD and ISPA (Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2001: 83-84). The purpose of the

Accession Partnership, which the EU signed with Bulgaria on 10 December 1999,

was to provide Sofia with a number of policy instruments which will be used to

enhance the speed of [its] preparation for membership (EC, 1999a: 2). The prem-

ise of the EUs involvement was that the Bulgarian government had a weak capac-

ity to formulate and coordinate policy (EC, 1999b: 57).

In order to correct this, pre-accession assistance was increased. Whereas for the

1990-1999 period PHARE assistance has averaged 93 million per year (Dimitrova

and Dragneva, 2001: 83), from 2000 to 2004 Bulgarias allocation under PHARE

nearly doubled to 178 million annually (SEC(2004)1199: 7). Together with ISPA

and SAPARD, the EUs financial leverage in the country for the period 1999-2005

rang to the tune of 1.7 billion. The projection is that this sum would rise from 564

million in 2006 to some 1.6 billion by 2009 (EIS, 30 November 2005). As one

Bulgarian diplomat acknowledged, such assistance has encouraged Sofia to bring

its policy-making in line with EU-standards. Furthermore, the European

Commission declared in 2002 that Bulgaria IS a functioning market economy,

with economist remaining upbeat about the countrys macroeconomic record, cur-

rently projected to grow by 5% for the next four or five years.

Sofia has maintained throughout that its performance and compliance with EU

demands derives from the contractual nature of its relations with the EU. As the




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Deputy Foreign Minister, Gergana Grancharova has insisted the accelerated com-

pletion of the accession negotiations confirms that the assessment is premised on the

individual merits of each candidate country and not on the principle of group

enlargement (Focus, 17 June 2004). Such perceptions of the requirement of domes-tic congruence of Bulgarian elites have been confirmed by Olli Rehn, the

Commissioner on Enlargement who insisted that it is according to its own merits

that Bulgaria will be judged and I am convinced that it will win the qualification

match for the premier league of the Member States of the EU (Focus, 18 March

2005). Hence, policy-makers in Sofia have become increasingly worried that the

widening gap between Bulgaria and Romania might have a negative impact on the

countrys accession. In order to prevent a postponement scenario and having to wait

for Bucharest to catch up, Sofia has used every occasion to insist on the EUs

upholding the principle of differentiation.

The socializing impact of the EU has been facilitated by the lack of alternative

centers of normative attraction for Bulgaria. As Foreign Minister Passi emphatical-

ly declared: The European Union is our promised land! (Focus, 9 July 2003). The

former Head of the Bulgarian Mission to the EU, Antoinette Primatarova points that

this conviction derives from the fact that the EU has already proven that it can

deliver in terms of prosperity through enforcing the principles of democracy, rule of

law and a market economy (Open Society News, 2002: 7). Hence, Sofias

Europeanization has been ensured by the broad political support for EU accession

and as the Bulgarian Minister of European Affairs maintains there is no political

formation, which would be opposed to the countrys entry into the EU (Focus, 23

January 2004). Thus, one commentator insisted that the case of Bulgaria indicates

that the EU is capable of increasing the prospect of economic development by mak-

ing the countries attractive for foreign investment, while binding the decision-mak-

ing to a system of politics that awards domestic democratic practice, by eschewing

illiberal political sentiments (Bojkov, 2004: 511). Such inference, however should

not blind one to the problems accompanying Sofias conditioning by Brussels.


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Problems: Elite-Society Cleavage

The paradox of the Bulgarian post-communist transition seems to be that on the

one hand it has succeeded to introduce relatively stable political institutions, which,

however, have not been able to address central popular concerns. An explanation for

such development can be found in the EU approach to the country, which aims to

condition Bulgarias decision-making practice, but so far has failed to spill over into

societal attitudes. As a result, the values promoted by the EU in elite policy-making

still remain abstract concepts rather than tangible points of reference for the major-

ity of Bulgarian citizens. The bottom line is the different premise for evaluating post-

communist developments: (a) accession priorities and macroeconomic stability for

the elites; and (b) the rising insecurity and decline in economic well-being for the

majority of citizens.

This point is important as it underscores a phenomenon, which affects the

Europeanization not only of Bulgaria, but the entire Balkan region a normative

elite-society cleavage. Its existence stems from the very logic of the post-1999

accession conditionality. As indicated, the EU targets state-elites with the aim of

institutionalizing a framework of policy-making. The objective of such elite-social-

ization is to promote congruence between Sofias decision-makers and Brussels. At

the same time, the expectation on behalf of the EU is that such elite-socialization

around promoted practices will trickle down to the publics as well. Such a dynamic

is premised on the history of Euro-Atlantic integration, itself. However, this study

contends that the prevailing emphasis on elite-socialization leads to the institution-

alization of a normative elite-society cleavage. Thus, the Bulgarian civil service for

instance has more experience of the EU than other sections of society (Primatarova,

2005: 1). Although in the short- to medium-term such a phenomenon is not likely to

have any negative effects on the Europeanization of the country, its persistence in

the long-term can (potentially) have detrimental effects on the establishment of

path-dependent policy-making.




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The essence of this normative divergence is that Sofias political elites are mov-

ing in the direction of justifying their decision-making according to a rationale out

of step with that of society at large. Gallagher (2005: 188) reasons that the condi-

tioning of communist times and the fact that the democratic era has resulted in fail-ing living standards for most citizens has instilled a powerful distrust of politics. In

this respect, Bulgarian decision-makers increasingly perceive their policy-making

reality from the context of Brussels demands, while the overwhelming majority of

society perceives their environment from the framework of their surrounding cir-

cumstances characterized by insecurity and dissatisfaction with their conditions of

existence. The low income level, low living standards and high unemployment rep-

resent the main points of concern. Bulgaria underwent historical changes during the

1990s, yet the political and economic transformations proved to be very slow and

did not yield the result the population had hoped for. The macroeconomic growth of

the recent period has not been sufficient to narrow the income gap between Bulgaria

and the EU member states. Average per capita income in Bulgaria is still low, stand-

ing at 25% of the EU average (in purchasing power terms) or around 2,200. At the

same time only 15% of all households in the country have an adequate income to

cover the costs and needs sufficient to ensure their living standards. Thus, the evo-

cation of closer ties with the EU is reflected in the popular dissatisfaction with the

deteriorating conditions of existence.

Such persistent elite-society cleavage poses some issues for the path-depend-

ence of the Europeanization process. As Karl Deutsch (1953: 171-72) maintains,

populations which perceive that they lack direct participation in the decision-mak-

ing process, often fall prey to mobilization by opportune leaders or rabble-rousers.

For instance, the government of Prime Minister Ivan Kostov lost the June 2001 elec-

tions because of its emphasis on compliance with EU-conditions rather than domes-

tic pressures. Thus, despite saving Bulgaria from economic disaster, Kostovs gov-

ernment which The Economist(22 November 2003) called the most successful

reformist government Southeastern Europe had seen fell victim to its inability to

involve the society at large in the transformation process (Barany, 2002: 149). In this


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respect, the arrival of the former king on the Bulgarian political horizon in 2001, the

emergence at the 2005 parliamentary elections of the freshly-formed neo-fascist

front Attack as the fourth largest political formation (out of seven) to be represent-

ed in the National Assembly (Focus, 27 June 2005) are instances of these sugges-

tions. As already suggested such normative discrepancy between societies and elites

is not expected to impede the export of the EU-rules to Bulgaria in the short- to

medium-term. However, its persistence in the long-term can pose problems for the

institutionalization of the European zone of peace not only in Bulgaria, but also in

the Balkans. Therefore, in a recent analysis, Freedom House classified Bulgarias

political institutionalization of its democratic process as far from consolidated.

Perhaps rather harshly, but not too far off the mark, Freedom Houses survey insists

that on this reckoning, the country is closer to the levels of democratization in states

like Serbia or Albania than Hungary or Poland.

CONCLUSION

This paper claims that Bulgarias Europeanisation has been plagued by the

unwillingness of governing elites in the beginning of the transition to pay the short-

term political cost of domestic transformation. They committed to democratic insti-

tutions but undertook only partial economic reforms. The societal demand for socio-

economic change was very weak and failed to produce stable reformist majorities

during parliamentary elections. As a result, partial reforms and abuse of office for

narrow political and personal gains became commonplace. The reform gaps provid-

ed ample opportunities for clientelism and corruption which proved more difficult

to displace in the later transition years than to reform the socialist-era institutions in

the early 1990s

The issue that Bulgaria is facing now is no longer related to the dilemma enter

or not. Instead the problem is that EU-membership is not treated as a process but

as an aim in itself. The conclusion from the process of Sofia Europeanization is that

the main strategy for conducting social and economic policy in Bulgaria has been




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primarily based on entering the EUand not on achieving best economic perform-

ance and consensus-politics of social responsibility. This is because there is a firm

perception that transition ends with integration into the EU. What has emerged is

the conviction that membership seals the process of transition to democracy and amarket economy. It is this perspective that the aim justifies the means that makes

problematic (mainly politically) a possible postponement of the accession process

(even if the General Safeguard Clause the Accession Treaty has to be signed by all

25 Member States, and so far none of the big MS (apart from Italy) have done that).

On the positive side, there are already Bulgarian commentators who insist that

although politically detrimental, a postponement of accession might have a positive

impact on the economy, not least in terms of getting ready for the pressures of the

common market. Also, others have pointed out that the longer Bulgaria waits, the

more the EU will be reshaped by the demands of the countries that joined in 2004.

Each year will make it a more diverse and broadminded club, in which Bulgaria and

other prospective members such as Turkey should feel more at home.

At any rate, the case of Bulgaria is a possible model for a fairly successful

accession process. Yet in terms of emulation, it sets a number of practices that

should be avoided mainly, the sidelining of public concerns and also the presenta-

tion of the accession process as an aim in itself. In this context, perhaps Bulgaria fol-

lows the suggestion of the 1961 Nobel literature laureate, Ivo Andric that in the

Balkans the expected does happen, but more often than not it happens in unexpect-

ed ways.

According to the 2001 census, 4.6% (about 350,000) identified themselves as

Roma and 9.4% (about 750,000) as of Turkish origin. Still the economic problems

faced by the Turkish minority are along the societal division line and do not coin-

cide with ethnic affiliation. Furthermore, the MRF has somewhat purposefully tried

to ostracize the members of the Turkish minority by keeping them marginalized in

agricultural occupational patterns and preventing altering the local economy.


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This paper is a modification of a larger project that should be published in a

book form by the end of 2006 by I.B.Tauris. My claim there is that the EU (as well

as NATO) involvement in the Balkans is not so much about the promotion of

democracy, market practices, etc. but that it is about the promotion of order, in par-

ticular one defined by peaceful international interactions. Hence, conditioning of

domestic practices (i.e. congruence) aims at impacting the processes of foreign-pol-

icy-making by creating more transparent and predictable patterns of decision-taking.



*

* *


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LA DCISION DE CONFORMIT AUXCRITRES POLITIQUES DE COPENHAGUE:

VALUATION TECHNIQUE OU VOLONTPOLITIQUE?

Dr. Cengiz AKTAR*

Comment fonctionne le processus dcisionnel de l'Union europenne concernant

les tapes de la pr-adhsion des pays candidats et en particulier l'tape dcisive de

l'ouverture des ngociations? Nous savons que c'est sur la foi de l'avis et la

recommendation de la Commission europenne que les dirigeants politiques de

l'Union prennent les dcisions, entre autres, d'ouvrir les ngociations d'adhsion

avec les pays candidats. Aprs avoir brivement voqu les conditions dans lesquelles l'actuel systme s'est mis en branle nous voudrions nous interroger sur le

poids de l'valuation technique et de la recommendation faites par la Commission

pour l'ouverture des ngociations. Nous voudrions savoir s'il existe des repers

objectifs qui s'appliquent chaque candidat pour ce qui est de la conformit ces

mmes critres. Ceci, afin de comprendre la logique des dcisions prises par les

dirigeants politiques des 15.

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* Cengiz AKTAR, Universite de Bahesehir




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Contrairement aux critres conomiques qui sont aisment quantifiables les

critres politiques semblent, aprs tout, tre sans limites; tout comme la dmocratie.

"Open ended" on dirait en anglais. En d'autres termes, il n'existe pas vraiment un

acquis communautaire politique, comme il en existe un pour l'agriculture ou pour lamonnaie unique, part une dfinition trs large de la conditionnalit politique. Mais

du coup, ces critres ne deviennent-ils pas extensibles souhait? Peut-on dsigner

objectivement un optimum acceptable pour accorder le satisfecit en matire de

conformit? Ou au contraire n'y a t-il pas lieu de penser que la dcision en matire

de conformit politique pour l'ouverture des ngociations est, ceteris paribus,

purement et simplement politique et non point technique?

Afin d'tayer notre propos nous allons nous baser sur des exemples concrets en

rapport avec les processus de pr-adhsion de la Bulgarie, la Lettonie, la Rpublique

Tchque et de la Roumanie. Nous allons, dans le mme but, voquer le sort des

communauts tziganes vivant dans les pays candidats.

Voyons d'abord comment le systme s'est mis en place.

Lorsque l'on a dcid en dcembre 1997 Luxembourg que les six premiers

candidats pouvaient entamer la phase des ngociations, la Commission tait en

quelque sorte prise au dpourvu. En effet ni Bruxelles ni dans les squelletiques

reprsentations dans les pays concerns, les structures en place ne rpondaient aux

besoins, qu'il s'agisse de la conceptualisation ou d'appui technique. C'est au fil des

annes que s'est forme la mcanique de la pr-adhsion et il ne serait pas exagr

d'affirmer qu'on a souvent avanc par ttonnement.

---------------------------------------------------------------

Les critres de Copenhague

"L'adhsion requiert de la part du pays candidat qu'il ait des institutions stables

garantissant la dmocratie, la primaut du droit, les droits de l'homme, le respect desminorits et leur protection, l'existence d'une conomie de march viable ainsi que


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la capacit de faire face la pression concurrentielle et aux forces du march

l'intrieur de l'Union. L'adhsion prsuppose la capacit du pays candidat en

assumer les obligations, et notamment souscrire aux objectifs de l'union politique,

conomique et montaire."

C'est que, lorsque les services de la Commission ont t rendus responsables des

divers aspects de la phase prparatoire pour les candidats, ils n'avaient comme

repre que l'nonc des critres de Copenhague et les vagues d'largissement

passes des annes 70,80 et 90 ne correspondaient pas ce que l'on se prparait

mettre en place. Ceci ni en termes politiques ni en matire technique.

Les services de la Commission n'avaient pas vraiment l'habitude de mener des

oprations de cette envergure l' tranger, tant du point de vue diplomatique que du

point de vue technique ; on manquait d'exprience pour faire du 'capacity building'

et du 'institution building' sur des sujets aussi varis que les tlcommunications, la

pche en haute mer, les droits des minorits ou encore l'environnement. En fait il

n'existait simplement pas de mmoire institutionnelle pour aider comprendre lesdonnes politiques, conomiques et sociales des pays candidats et ainsi de pouvoir

agir en fonction de ces donnes.

C'est dans un tel environnement que les structures se sont tablies et une certaine

mcanique s'est mise en route. Et videmment, dans la longue squence qui va de la

cration du G-24 (du nom des 24 pays membres de l'OCDE) tabli au sein de la

Commission au tout dbut des annes 1990 pour soutenir les rformes dans les pays

ex-communistes au sommet d'Acropole du 16 avril 2003 qui a consacr l'adhsion

des 10 premiers membres parmi les candidats en place, les degrs de prparation des

pays ont considrablement vari. Alors que l'Hongrie et la Pologne par exemple, ont

fait la connaissance des mcanismes europens ds le dbut des annes 1990, la

Lithuanie et la Bulgarie n'ont vraiment commenc leur appentissage qu'en 1999, c-

-d presque 10 ans plus tard. Or la Lithuanie va devenir membre en mme temps quela Pologne. C'est que les 15 ont dcid de donner un coup d'acclrateur au

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processus d'largissement partir de 1999, anne qui va srement rester dans les

annales.

La Commission clarifie et arrte sa position sur sa stratgie d'adhsion et lasoumet au Conseil d'Helsinki de dcembre 1999 qui l'entrine. Voil comment elle

voyait les choses en octobre 1999 dans son Document d'ensemble (pp.28-30): "la

Commission estime que le moment est venu d'insuffler une nouvelle dynamique au

processus d'largissement et de donner un signal fort de sa dtermination le faire

avancer aussi rapidement que possible, ce qui renforcera la confiance des pays

candidats dans leurs perspectives d'adhsion. C'est pourquoi la Commission propose

l'adoption d'une stratgie d'ouverture et de conduite des ngociations d'adhsion qui

garantisse que celles-ci progressent paralllement l'tat de prparation des pays

candidats l'adhsion."

Elle passe dans ces termes en revue les diverses options:

"(a) poursuivre strictement dans la ligne adopte par les Conseils europens deLuxembourg et de Cologne, savoir de ne recommander l'ouverture de ngociations

qu'avec les pays ayant suffisamment progress dans leur prparation l'adhsion

pour tre en mesure de satisfaire moyenne chance aux conditions auxquelles elle

est surbordonne. Cette formule a l'avantage de maintenir la mthodologie objective

tablie par le Conseil europen, applique un certain nombre des candidats actuels

et garantissant que chacun des pays invits entamer des ngociations ait atteint le

mme niveau minimal de prparation;

(b) recommander l'ouverture de ngociations avec tous les pays qui satisfont aux

critres politiques de Copenhague. Cette option a l'avantage de reconnatre la

ncessit, largement ressentie, d'imprimer un nouvel lan au processus

d'largissement, compte tenu des mutations spectaculaires que subit le paysage

politique europen par suite principalement de la crise de la rgion des Balkans.Cette crise a soulign la contribution fondamentale que le modle d'intgration


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europen a apporte et doit continuer d'apporter pour garantir la paix et la prosprit

en Europe.L'ouverture des ngociations avec tous les pays candidats qui satisfont

aux critres politiques de Copenhague, associe l'laboration d'une stratgie

renforce l'gard d'autres pays europens donnerait un signal puissant de ladtermination de l'UE de faire face ses responsabilits, dans la ligne de la

dclaration du Conseil europen de dc

Ozan ERÖZDEN, Proceedings of the International Conference on the EU

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