Owning Adaptation and Factsheet [Climate Funding]

O x f a m i s a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e d e r a t i o n o f f o u r t e e n o r g a n i z a t i o n s w o r k i n g t o g e t h e r i n 9 9 c o u n t r i e s t o f i n d l a s t i n g s o l u t i o n s t o p o v e r t y a n d i n j u s t i c e .

To g e t h e r w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s a n d l o c a l g r o u p s i n t h e s e c o u n t r i e s , O x f a m s a v e s l i v e s , h e l p s p e o p l e o v e r -c o m e p o v e r t y a n d f i g h t s f o r s o c i a l j u s t i c e .

Owning Adaptation Country-level governance of climate adaptation finance

146 Oxfam Briefing Paper 13 June 2011

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Sticky Note

146 Oxfam Briefing Paper 13 June 2011

Owning adaptation Country-level governance of climate adaptation finance

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The safe water and sanitation for communities in south-west Bangladesh project. Golam Rabban/Oxfam.

As financing for climate change adaptation in developing countries begins to flow, it is essential that the governance of funding at the global and country level be shaped so that the needs of the most vulnerable can be met. The core issue is country-level ownership of adaptation finance. Providers of adaptation finance must put developing countries in the driver’s seat, while the countries themselves must exercise leadership and respond to the needs of those most affected by climate change. Most importantly, civil society and vulnerable communities must be able to steer and hold accountable the way in which adaptation finance is used.

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Summary Vulnerable communities across the world are already feeling the effects of a changing climate. These communities are urgently in need of assistance aimed at building resilience and at undertaking climate change adaptation efforts as a matter of survival and in order to maintain livelihoods.

However, even as financing for climate change adaptation begins to flow to developing countries, it is not yet clear if the funding will respond to those immediate and pressing needs; and whether these funds can succeed in reaching the most vulnerable remains a critical unanswered question.

This represents a new and different challenge from past development issues; climate change adaptation finance should not be considered aid in the traditional sense. However, many lessons learned regarding development and aid effectiveness are relevant.

In order for adaptation funding to be effective and reach those who need it most, developing countries themselves need to own and be invested in the process, with a focus on developing country-led adaptation strategies.

Country ownership in the context of climate change adaptation finance entails a strong role for governments in developing countries. However, governments also have an obligation to create the necessary national governance structures and ensure accountability to civil society and to its citizens, especially the most vulnerable.

Climate change adaptation finance is still at a formative stage and can be shaped such that developing countries and, above all, vulnerable communities, can guide the ways in which it is used. This represents a significant window of opportunity.

There are currently a number of channels of adaptation finance for which this is critical, while the new global Green Climate Fund, in particular, has the potential to build a new approach for managing climate finance at the global and national levels.

This is not a simple or easy task. Oxfam has looked at the ways in which adaptation finance has begun to be implemented in a number of countries. It is clear that both international providers of finance and national governments will need to undertake significant course corrections.

• Adaptation finance is often channelled around governments, through multiple and uncoordinated channels, and without alignment with national adaptation or development plans or investment aimed at enhancing national capacity;

• At the national level, while governments are beginning to put in place structures and initial strategies to handle adaptation finance,

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there is often still a lack of clearly identified leadership or adequate coordination and coherence across governments. Added to this, the lack of capacity in many developing countries hampers these efforts;

• Most importantly, the participation and accountability of civil society and vulnerable communities, particularly of women, have yet to be achieved in most countries.

Despite these initial shortcomings, there is an opportunity to create an approach to adaptation finance that is genuinely owned by developing countries.

What is needed is for providers of adaptation finance, particularly within the framework of the Green Climate Fund, to make countries the drivers for the use of funding. Country governments must then step up to lead and create national processes that are responsive to the needs of their most vulnerable communities.

Providers of adaptation finance must put developing countries in the driver's seat • Adaptation finance should be channeled through a national entity

chosen by the government and on the basis of a national adaptation strategy designed through a participatory, country-driven process;

• Adaptation finance should be harmonized and provided through a coherent channel; the major part of international adaptation resources should come through the new global Green Climate Fund;

• Countries must be provided with the necessary resources and capacity in order both to develop and to implement national adaptation strategies.

Developing countries should exercise leadership • Effective government leadership should be established for

adaptation planning and use of finance, and led by a clearly identified ministry or agency;

• An effective multi-ministerial and agency coordination process must be created to develop and oversee a national adaptation strategy that is coherent with the country’s development strategy.

Adaptation plans and funds must be accountable to the most vulnerable • Adaptation strategies and the use of funding must be developed and

implemented by countries with the full participation of vulnerable communities and civil society, and be transparent and accountable to them;

• Providers of finance, particularly through the Green Climate Fund, should help to ensure that country strategies are participatory and accountable, including providing the resources needed to fulfill that goal;

• Gender equality and women's leadership should be central to the development and implementation of national strategies.

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1 Governing adaptation finance – seizing the opportunity now A changing climate is a reality for sixty-three year old Nasima Begum of Azgar Munshir Khandi under Shariatpur District in Bangladesh. Flooding is a worsening annual phenomenon in her area, and the Meghna River has twice devoured her land. As a result, the land has become sandy and the crop it produces inadequate to provide for her six-member family. Cyclones add to the stress she faces. Yet Nasima’s region does not yet have a governance structure in place for the planning and implementation of climate adaptation programs to address the impacts she faces.1

Nasima’s experience is not unique. Across the world communities that are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change look to their governments to provide support. They may wonder if funding for climate change adaptation will be delivered in a way that meets their needs.

Adaptation – and adaptation finance – represents a different challenge from those faced in the past. Climate change is a new and growing reality facing developing countries, adding to other, already existing, development challenges. Moreover, the impacts of climate change are felt across a range of arenas from agriculture to infrastructure and health, thereby requiring a wide-ranging and multi-sectoral response.

Climate change adaptation demands a unique set of tools to address the impact of a global driver on highly-local contexts. Developing countries must understand the risk factors and potential responses across multiple locations, communities, and populations. That is why there is a more urgent need than ever before to involve communities and civil society.

All of this presents an opportunity for providers of finance and developing countries alike to create systems for governing adaptation funds that are both innovative and responsive to those on the frontlines of climate change. For those people, it is imperative that both providers of finance and developing countries fulfil their responsibilities.

The ghosts of development finance

At its heart, climate change adaptation finance should not be considered traditional development aid. The motivation for financing climate change adaptation stems from the obligations of industrialized countries that are responsible for the large majority of greenhouse emissions.

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Adaptation finance addresses climate change impacts that did not yet exist when commitments to development assistance were made in earlier decades. However, experiences with development finance can provide important lessons for adaptation finance, including, first and foremost, that countries themselves must own and be invested in the process of governing and funding climate change adaptation. Other relevant experiences from development finance include:

• Donor-imposed priorities are often not aligned with a country’s circumstances and could undermine national ownership and implementation;

• Complex and diverse funding processes, along with a lack of transparency and information sharing, are serious burdens for under-resourced and under-staffed governments in developing countries;2

• There are constraints to meaningful participation by and accountability to civil society and vulnerable groups.3

Against this background, the vital importance of a country-led approach to development assistance has become widely acknowledged and has been enshrined by the international community in the principles of the Accra Agenda for Action and its precursor, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In 2005, the Paris Declaration committed more than 100 governments and agencies to allowing developing countries to set their own strategies and improve their own institutions, and to ensuring that donor countries aligned their approaches with local systems.

The Accra meeting enhanced this platform in 2008 with an acknowledgement that active participation of civil-society organizations was necessary for strengthening country ownership, and that citizen engagement was a central component of government accountability.4

Experience has demonstrated the value of putting developing countries in a lead role. While doing so may not be workable in some contexts, as in fragile states, country leadership has proven to be highly effective in many cases. A 2005 independent review commissioned by the OECD showed that in seven developing countries where financing was provided as support through countries’ national budgets, the countries had stepped-up pro-poor spending and scaled-up social service delivery.5

Experience has also shown the importance of pairing leadership by country governments with accountability to civil society and vulnerable groups. A key finding of consultations on the Hyogo Framework for Action, the international agreement on building resilience to disasters, was that disaster strategies needed to be reoriented in order to support a ‘proactive and systematic deepening of engagement with at-risk communities, including participation of most vulnerable groups.’6

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria embodies a similar view. It has gone further than most other global funding bodies

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in recognizing that ‘only through a country-driven, coordinated, and multi-sector approach involving all relevant partners will additional resources have a significant impact’.7 (See Box 4.)

Emerging questions

As the basis for this briefing paper, Oxfam examined how a number of developing countries were grappling with the governance of adaptation finance.8 Oxfam conducted research and interviews in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Nepal, the Philippines, Tajikistan, and Viet Nam, supplemented by analysis in additional African and Latin American countries.

While the provision of adaptation finance is still at an early stage, key questions have already surfaced with regard to country ownership. In many countries, adaptation planning and finance is linked institutionally with climate change mitigation, but adaptation efforts – and hence the emerging issues involving country ownership and adaptation – must stand on their own.

Country ownership in the context of climate change adaptation involves several interconnected elements, namely: the role of governments in channelling finance; the role of effective governments in developing and implementing successful strategies for the use of adaptation finance; and the role of civil society and communities in holding governments accountable for whether the most pressing climate change adaptation needs are met.

These key questions emerge:

• Are providers of finance putting developing countries in the driver’s seat?

• Are developing countries prepared to lead?

• Is adaptation funding accountable to those most in need?

These elements of adaptation finance are inherently linked; and the ultimate goal must be to enable those who are most vulnerable to climate change, together with their governments, to drive the way in which adaptation finance is used, and to ensure it meets their needs.

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2 Enabling country ownership Are providers of finance putting developing countries in the driver’s seat?

If adaptation finance is channelled in a way that circumvents, rather than strengthens, existing government structures and strategies, it can impede the development of government capacity and the critical task of building stronger engagement between citizens and their governments. Effective and participatory governance of adaptation finance depends in part on whether international finance promotes or impedes the development and implementation of country-led strategies.

Providers of finance often hesitate to cede too much control to country-led processes. This may be due to a lack of confidence in a government’s capability to administer funds efficiently or to address key accountability issues, and may be especially so in fragile states. However, in most countries, failing to take steps to build country ownership will only maintain the status quo and fail to build the capacity needed.

The evidence from a number of countries suggests that finance providers will only succeed in shifting this dynamic by developing new ways of funding and engaging with countries.

Box 1: The capacity-ownership trade-off

The question of country ownership, including government leadership, goes back to the age-old question of the chicken and the egg. Which comes first: ensuring government leadership or having a capable government?

Frequently, governments are not yet fully equipped to handle the task of developing national strategies, coordinating funding streams, and delivering finance where climate change adaptation is most needed. In many cases, ministries of environment are charged with playing the central leadership role on climate change adaptation. However, these ministries are often under-resourced and politically weak. As a result, many bilateral and multilateral providers of finance seek to provide funding in ways that work around these weak government institutions or ministries.

In some cases, there may need to be support that doesn’t flow through governments, for example in fragile states. However, in most cases, channelling funds around government structures will mean missing an opportunity to build the capacity of line ministries and effectively develop the government’s engagement with communities and civil society. The challenge is to avoid side-stepping the capacity and governance constraints of developing countries and, rather, to tackle them head-on.

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Channelling adaptation finance through national governments and aligning with country priorities

Country ownership is closely tied to the level of government control in how funds are spent. At one end of the spectrum, adaptation finance providers may earmark the funds according to their own priorities or bypass existing government structures altogether. At the other end, the allocation of incoming funds are given as budget support for a country and spent according to its priorities.

In a number of cases, adaptation funding has bypassed government structures or strategies.

• In Cambodia, many providers of finance have chosen to bypass the government completely, instead providing funding for climate change adaptation initiatives directly to international and national NGOs;9

• In Ethiopia, while none of the projects as originally conceived in the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) (see Appendix) were implemented, the Global Environment Facility along with Japan, Spain, Denmark, and the European Union stepped in to support specific climate change adaptation projects outside of those in the NAPA;10

• In Nepal, in order to improve coordination and alignment with the government, 14 international providers of finance signed a compact in 2009 with the Ministry of Environment. Despite this step, a lack of faith in the public financial management system resulted in a large proportion of funding being provided in the form of bilateral projects outside of the central budget.11

The role of international financial institutions, especially development banks, in providing climate finance has also frequently been at issue. These institutions have often operated in ways that were inconsistent with country-led leadership.

• In Nepal, the World Bank, within the framework of the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR) (see Appendix), rejected a request to channel PPCR funds through a trust fund that civil society believed could be an accessible and transparent arrangement. The PPCR initiated a process with little government input or alignment with Nepal’s NAPA, though it may end up funding some of the activities it spelled out;12

• In Bangladesh, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Bank worked to create a multi-donor trust fund led by the World Bank rather than by the national government. Public pressure ultimately led to a shift in the structure with the Government of Bangladesh taking over control of the fund (see Box 2).13

In some cases, the way in which climate funding is provided may undermine a country’s ability to assert its leadership and priorities.

• In Ethiopia, international deadlines for developing the country’s forestry mitigation programme initially drew away limited human resources from completion of the country’s adaptation plan;14

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• In Nepal, the PPCR has offered loans for adaptation programmes, which has led to strong opposition from civil society. Civil society groups expressed concern that vulnerable countries affected by climate change should not be put in a position of having to repay adaptation costs that should be borne by developed countries.15

Box 2: The Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund

When, in 2008, DFID pledged to fund for adaptation efforts in Bangladesh, it also played a central role in efforts to create a multi-donor trust fund for the country. Plans for the fund originally provided a central role for the World Bank, which would have served as co-chair of the management committee, facilitated daily operations of the fund, and monitored implementation.

Bangladesh’s civil society was deeply concerned about the World Bank’s role, which many groups saw as inappropriately interfering with country-led control of finances. In 2010, the government announced that the new Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund would be managed by the government and would also include civil society representation. The World Bank would serve mainly as a technical advisor to the Fund.

The Resilience Fund is intended to carry out the country’s Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan, which was revised and adopted in 2009. However, the Resilience Fund, with its international financing, will not be consolidated with Bangladesh’s own Climate Change Trust Fund, which is funded entirely with domestic Bangladesh financing. It remains to be seen if coherence can be achieved in this parallel structure.16

Enhancing capacity

A country’s progress in ensuring ownership and delivery of adaptation programmes to vulnerable groups can depend on the capacity of its government, its civil-society groups, and its communities to engage effectively with adaptation finance processes. In addition to the technical and financial knowledge of climate finance, governments are most in need of institutional and leadership development.

In many cases, however, adaptation finance processes have been carried out with external technical support arranged by providers of finance, rather than by national governments themselves. While these decisions by finance providers often reflect their own concerns about existing local capacity, this represents a missed opportunity to create greater capacity within country governments.

• In Tajikistan, representatives of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank indicated that their international staff had to lead the national PPCR process, owing to the limited capacity of government institutions and to the fact that the country’s climate change lead post remained vacant for several months at a critical time in the PPCR process;17

• In Nepal, the Ministry of Environment is mandated to serve as the lead agency and to channel funds, which could translate into an opportunity for building the capacity and enhancing the role of the staff at the Ministry in terms of handling such processes. However, DFID opted instead to support external consultants and to pilot the

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Local Adaptation Programme of Action outside central government structures by using a private consultancy firm and seven NGO partners.18

Box 3: Direct access to the Adaptation Fund

When the Adaptation Fund was created under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries insisted that it needed to provide ‘direct access’ for developing countries, given the concerns about the lack of country-led approaches as well as the proliferation of multiple funding streams and intermediary financial institutions in existing structures. Direct access has been viewed by developing countries as an extremely important shift in the way in which adaptation finance has been provided. To date, however, only three national implementing entities (NIEs) have been accredited by the Adaptation Fund Board as having the fiduciary and adaptation programming capacity to channel financing directly at the country level. While the Adaptation Fund model has been a critical step forward, the limited progress with NIEs points to the need to bolster the capacity of governments and institutions in developing countries.19

Harmonizing the priorities and processes of finance providers

In many developing countries, the array of funding streams can increase the burden on governments in terms of accessing and managing adaptation finance. Moreover, it can impede efforts aimed at coordinating national strategies and at implementing plans. This raises important questions about the ways in which multilateral and bilateral providers of finance organise themselves.

At times, bilateral and multilateral providers of finance set up and lead coordination processes in developing countries. This can facilitate exchanges of information on the priorities and approaches of various finance providers and, in the long term, can improve the coordination of funding streams and minimize the burden on governments in developing countries.

For example, in a move to increase coordination among providers of finance in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund was created to bring bilateral and multilateral finance providers together with the national government and civil society (see Box 2). Importantly, the Resilience Fund will be led by the national government after a protracted debate over its management. However, it remains separate nonetheless from that country’s own Climate Change Trust Fund, which is funded with domestic resources.20

While coordination efforts among finance providers can be helpful, they also have clear limitations. It is essential that such coordination does not replace efforts to put countries in the driver’s seat and to establish coordination mechanisms that are country-led.

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3 Building country leadership Are developing countries ready to lead?

In order to ensure that adaptation finance actually responds to the needs of those most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, developing countries must act assertively and establish ways to channel resources effectively.

This requires having a clear national strategy and implementation plan in place for climate change adaptation and resilience-building activities, as well as systems that can undertake adaptation programmes and handle financial procedures. Moreover, developing countries need to put in place processes that ensure full accountability to civil society and vulnerable communities.

Tackling the challenges of adaptation planning and implementation is an essential task for country governments to undertake in order to be responsive to those in their countries who are hit hardest by climate change. This will require a high degree of country-driven engagement on adaptation that overlaps with, but is not identical to, a country’s process for handling adaptation finance.

While developed countries must provide the resources to help make these efforts possible, developing country governments need to be ready to translate potential into reality.

Leadership

Identifying and bolstering leadership at the national level constitutes a critical task for governments. Success in this can improve their ability to engage with providers of finance and to develop and oversee an effective adaptation strategy.

The specific institutions and structures within the government that play a leadership role vary according to each country’s circumstances (see Table 1). In many countries, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Nepal, and Viet Nam, environment ministries have inherited significant responsibility for climate change adaptation planning and implementation of finance.21

However, there are other ministries and agencies that can play leadership roles. For example, in Colombia, the lead candidate for managing climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction is the Risk Management Directorate under the Ministry of Interior and Justice, rather than the Ministry of Environment.22

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Table 1: Government institutions leading on climate change

Bangladesh The Ministry of Environment and Forests leads implementation of the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan23

Cambodia The Ministry of Environment is in charge of climate change24

Ethiopia The Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) is an independent regulatory and monitoring body charged with coordinating the Ethiopian government activities on climate change and reporting directly to the Prime Minister25

Nepal The Ministry of Environment serves as the Secretary of the Climate Change Council (CCC) formed under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister26

The Philippines The Climate Change Commission is charged with effecting policy integration and coordination across agencies27

Tajikistan The Deputy Prime Minister is the lead for the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR). The PPCR focal point is the Deputy Head of the Environment Department under the Office of the President28

Viet Nam The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment is the lead agency of the National Target Programme to Respond to Climate Change29

Choosing an institution to act as the lead agency can raise important issues of political profile and capacity. At times, the lack of institutional capacity within a country’s lead climate change agency, often an environment ministry, may stem from the central government’s lack of political will to delegate decision making authority effectively.

For example, in Ethiopia, the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) was only assigned to coordinate implementation of the country’s NAPA after the plan was already developed.30 The EPA was concerned that the NAPA’s project-focused approach was not the most appropriate way to strengthen resilience in the country and has since started development of a new National Adaptation Programme, which is meant to incorporate plans by ministries and regional states.

In many countries, the environment ministry is not ready to handle the tremendous task of managing adaptation finance processes without considerable capacity-building support and institutional development.

This is the case in Viet Nam, where the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) has limited coordination powers across the government;31 and in Nepal, where the National Capacity Self-Assessment, which was prepared for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, indicated that the Ministry of Environment lacked adequate technical and operational capacity.32

When ministries and agencies other than the environment ministry play a leading fiduciary, planning, or coordination role within government, the ministry of environment may often be best placed to handle monitoring and evaluation activities, or other complementary functions.

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However, allowing funds to circumvent existing government structures or default to coordination by powerful, ministries, such as the ministry of finance or planning, could skew the ways in which funds are spent. Even with a robust coordination process across the government, there is a risk that funds could subsequently be diverted by the distinct priorities of individual agencies.

Coordination

Climate change adaptation is a complex multi-sectoral challenge that requires the attention of several arms of the government working on issues from poverty to agriculture and health. While clear leadership is important, a range of agencies are needed to fully develop and then implement a comprehensive adaptation strategy.

As a result, governments face coordination challenges in terms of developing and approving national strategies, budget allocation among implementing ministries, and linking decision-making with the needs of local government.

In order to address these coordination challenges, some countries have established national coordination bodies, each tailored to the particular government structure. However, these efforts have not always solved the coordination quandary.

• In Bangladesh, the Climate Change Trust Fund oversees domestically-generated resources for adaptation and other climate programmes. The Trust Fund brings together the President’s office with key elements of the Ministry of Environment and Forests, other ministries, and civil society;33

• In Viet Nam, the National Target Programme to Respond to Climate Change, led by MONRE, has worked to establish effective coordination. However, the national coordination process provides few opportunities for lower levels of government to provide input. In contrast, the country’s national development plans are more decentralized than the climate planning process;34

• The coordination challenge is often evident when multiple agencies do not adequately act. In both Cambodia and Tajikistan, ministries outside of the lead agency were required to establish climate change units or focal points in order to implement a national process; however, their failure to do so created bottlenecks.35

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Box 4: Lessons from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria

The model for designing and overseeing finance at the country level was developed by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and provides some key lessons for climate adaptation finance. While they are far from perfect, the Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) are nonetheless an important model for carrying out country-led coordination with participation from civil society and affected communities.36

CCMs act as the primary in-country decision-making bodies for the Fund, identifying national priorities and coordinating the submission of a single ‘Coordinated Country Proposal’. CCMs include representatives from a broad range of stakeholders, taken from government, multilateral and bilateral funds, NGOs and community-based organizations, people living with the diseases covered by the Fund, and the private sector.

The inclusion of civil society, both within and outside of CCMs, has played an important role in increasing the capacity and effectiveness of the coordinating mechanisms.37 A recent review by the Global Fund itself found that average civil society representation was just over 40 per cent, which is the representation target set by the Global Fund.38 However, there are still key weaknesses with CCMs in many countries. Only half of the CCMs that were reviewed by the Global Fund met the target of 40 per cent for civil society representation. Representation ranged from as low as 17 per cent in Tajikistan, and was below 40 per cent in countries such as Cambodia and Ethiopia.39 Disparities within civil society have also been noted. In some countries, civil society participation has been dominated by networks and umbrella organizations headquartered in the capital.40 Participation by people living with HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria has historically been weak, though it has now reached 8 per cent of representatives. While a third of participants in CCMs are women,41 only 22 per cent of CCM chairs are women. Other challenges have also risen to the surface, including the potential for conflicts of interest, with lead implementing government ministries often chairing CCMs, and civil society representatives often dependent on government funding.

The Global Fund and the CCMs themselves have attempted to address some of these shortcomings in the following ways:

– Expanding capacity through the creation of full-time, dedicated secretariats in government ministries to support the work of CCMs, thereby improving their effectiveness;42

– Improving links between government and civil society by developing a system of ‘dual track financing’ through which at least one government and one non-government principal recipient are nominated to lead programme implementation;43 – Engaging affected populations, especially women. The Global Fund has adopted strategies aimed at promoting gender equality in its programmes.44

A Global Fund committee has also proposed new CCM guidelines that would explicitly require a transparent and documented process for review of funding applications, including engagement of key affected population groups and a transparent and documented process for the selection of non-government members through their own constituencies.

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Coherence

The ideal coordination tool used by governments is a national policy or strategy that articulates adaptation priorities and projects in response to the particular climate change impacts in that country. While a number of developing countries have built strategies, most continue to face difficulties in updating and implementing them, owing to a lack of capacity and coordination, and other constraints.

The effectiveness of a national climate change adaptation policy or strategy can often be measured by how well it is integrated with national development planning. When they are a central part of a country’s development plans, climate change issues are less likely to be sidelined by the country’s broader goals. Unfortunately, it is common for national disaster risk reduction strategies to be out of sync with national development plans.

Coherence between climate change and development planning has moved forward moderately in Bangladesh. The government requested that the Ministry of Planning integrate a chapter on climate change into its sixth Five-Year Plan, though adaptation is not mainstreamed throughout the plan.45

Viet Nam and Nepal have made progress in integrating adaptation into their national development strategies. While Viet Nam’s draft development plans include a focus on climate change adaptation, it is largely characterized as an environmental challenge.46 Nepal has integrated climate change and development planning through the government’s Three Year Plan, which also provides the mandate for the Ministry of Environment to coordinate all climate change activities.47

Some countries struggle to implement integration between climate change and development activities. Ethiopia’s government has articulated a clear vision that climate finance should align with its national strategy, the Five Year Plan, which is managed by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, and which represents Ethiopia’s preferred framework for development assistance. However, previous commitments by line ministries to implement work in their sectors and the lack of a clear monitoring framework for the ways in which climate finance is used for adaptation could lead to missed opportunities to integrate adaptation with the development plan.48

Other countries have yet to develop a national strategy. For example, Cambodia does not have a national climate change policy beyond its NAPA, thereby making it difficult to achieve coherence with the country’s National Strategic Development Plan.49

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4 Ensuring accountability

Is adaptation funding accountable to those who are most in need?

In order to achieve a truly country-led strategy, decision-making on adaptation finance must ultimately be accountable to those populations that are in greatest need of support. Indeed, those who are most affected by a changing climate have the right to be centrally involved in directing the use of adaptation funding.

If highly vulnerable communities and the broader civil society are not included as full participants in the development and implementation of national adaptation plans, there is a genuine risk that funds will be spent in ways that are misaligned with realities on the ground. Governments must play a central role in ensuring that processes are participatory and accountable, while international providers of finance must support this and not impede it.

Meaningful participation

Participation by vulnerable communities and civil society can be designed to enhance and deepen a country-led adaptation strategy, or it can occur as an afterthought or token gesture. Truly meaningful participation will result in inputs that are visible in the final outcome. Civil society and community-level participation in national climate finance decisions varies greatly from country to country. In a number of countries, civil society engagement has remained quite limited.

• In Cambodia, civil society groups that were consulted on the development of Cambodia’s NAPA were asked to react to a nearly-finalized project document, rather than invited to offer their input in at an earlier stage;50

• In Tajikistan, civil society participants were only invited to late consultation stages on the country’s NAPA and did not have advance access to relevant documentation;51

• In Bangladesh, the Ministry of Environment and Forests issued a request for project proposals without identifying or disclosing project criteria, which resulted in 3,700 projects being submitted. Subsequently, the media reported that 20 projects had been selected for implementation by the Climate Change Trust Fund, but this information was not made public by the government.52

In some cases, important steps have been taken towards meaningful participation, including the creation of formalized processes. What remains to be seen is how these efforts to promote civil society participation will fare, and how well they will incorporate the needs of vulnerable populations into adaptation planning and implementation.

• In Nepal, the NAPA process included wide consultations with vulnerable communities. Thematic working groups were led by

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government ministries and included a wide range of civil society representation, including NGOs and academics. These thematic working groups met with vulnerable communities throughout the country and incorporated their perspectives;53

• Civil society in Bangladesh holds two out of 17 membership seats on the board of the Climate Change Trust Fund. However, these two civil society representatives have a three-year term limit, while other members do not have a set term;54

• In Bangladesh, civil society organizations actively lobbied the government to revise the first draft of the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP). The first plan was subsequently rejected by a high-level government panel and replaced with a new strategy that incorporated some civil society perspectives;55

• In Ethiopia, a climate change forum outside the government has brought together representatives from government ministries with those from civil society (see Box 5). Although this is not a formal national planning or implementing body, it can help increase coordination and participation among different actors.56

Box 5: Climate Change Forum-Ethiopia (CCF-E)

The Climate Change Forum-Ethiopia (CCF-E) is a gathering of representatives acting in their individual capacity from government, civil society organizations, UN agencies, embassies, bilalateral and multilateral finance agencies, research and academic institutions, and the business community, which meets regularly to discuss national responses to climate change. When it was established, CCF-E was chaired by a state minister from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and hosted by Oxfam America. Currently an independent organization with a secretariat, CCF-E intends to support policy coordination among all stakeholders with national consultation, policy development, and as a clearing-house of climate change information and data.57 While not a formal body for national planning and implementation, the CCF-E may serve as a model for bringing together stakeholders to help steer adaptation efforts.

Reaching vulnerable communities A critical question in engaging civil society is who exactly the participants are. Civil society in developing countries —such as international and national NGOs, community-based organizations, the private sector, trade unions, women’s organizations, and academia—are by no means homogenous in their perspectives.

Moreover, while many civil-society organizations can provide a connection to and perspective on vulnerable groups, as well as links between governments and local communities, those based in capitals do not always adequately represent the interests of vulnerable local communities, especially those in rural areas, such as smallholder farmers. Indeed, the engagement of vulnerable communities and groups such as these has often been limited.

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• In Bangladesh, while women and men who work in fisheries are among the most vulnerable groups, they have not been included in the national climate change adaptation policy or in the country’s PPCR;58

• Official project documents for climate change adaptation plans in Cambodia have noted that there is a need to communicate with rural communities in order to gather information on their perceptions of the potential impacts and their suggestions on how to respond. However, there is no evidence of this level of consultation in practice.59

• By contrast, in Nepal, the NAPA process has been carried out in ways that incorporated local community viewpoints through a number of thematic working groups. The Local Adaptation Plan of Action initiative in Nepal may also provide important opportunities for vulnerable communities to shape adaptation plans in the country. However, it has not been linked so far to national processes.60

Participation models in other sectors, including for disaster risk reduction and AIDS, can provide important lessons for adaptation finance (see Box 6).

Box 6: A model for participation in El Salvador

In El Salvador, hands-on disaster reduction practices are combined with advocacy training to ensure that communities can raise their concerns with decision makers. This approach has allowed for more rapid and effective evacuations during emergencies; successful advocacy to local government for the construction of mitigation projects; as well as raised awareness at the local, municipal and national levels about the vulnerability of marginalized rural and urban communities.

More than 100 community civil protection committees have been formed that work at the local and municipal levels for disaster risk reduction. Each community has an emergency plan and risk map. Meanwhile, municipal committees, headed by the Mayor and with the participation of government bodies, NGOs, and community leaders, receive training and support. Community civil protection committees are linked with the municipal committee, thereby providing a mechanism for NGO partners and community leaders to work together with local government and also to advocate to these leaders. In turn, the municipal process is connected to the national civil protection system.61

Gender equality and women’s leadership

Vulnerability is determined not only by the physical impacts of a changing climate, but also by underlying social, economic, ethnic, and other circumstances that shape climate-related risks. 62 Among the groups that are most vulnerable to climate change impacts, women have largely been ignored by climate finance processes, though they are often best placed to contribute to community resilience-building and climate change adaptation.63

19

In all of the countries studied, climate change impacts were found to fall disproportionately on women and girls. In responding to this, some governments have identified women as a vulnerable group, while others have taken this one step further by recognizing the important leadership role played by women. However, this initial recognition has not yet translated into concrete gains for women.

• While Ethiopia’s NAPA notes that a gender approach needs to be integrated into all development activities, there are no specific recommendations in the plan;64

• In Bangladesh, BCCSAP includes women and children as the most vulnerable group in terms of food security, social protection, and health. However, the plan fails to address the root causes of these challenges through specifically gender-responsive measures;65

• The first joint PPCR mission to Tajikistan considered the needs and participation of vulnerable groups, including women. However, there was insufficient gender analysis in the resulting climate change adaptation planning, and the projects selected were not based on gender-differentiated needs.66

While gender-specific objectives, indicators, and data can be used to measure and ensure the delivery of finance to women and men, these are largely missing from national climate change strategies.

Ministries that handle women’s or gender affairs are often missing from the climate change decision-making process for various reasons, including a failure to invite them, limited operational scope and capacity, or a mandate that does not incorporate climate change. These institutions require support aimed at building their capacity to engage in climate change decision-making.

• In Nepal, the Women’s Ministry and the Women’s Commission have recently joined the multi-stakeholder framework that was formed as part of the development of Nepal’s NAPA, known as the Multi-stakeholder Climate Change Initiatives Coordination Committee;67

• While the Ministry of Women’s Affairs in Ethiopia plays a limited role on climate change, owing to their lack of capacity, the EPA has now started to include the Ministry in national climate change discussions; and it could play an important role in bringing forward climate change adaptation practices that are spearheaded by women.68

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5 Recommendations As international mechanisms for climate change adaptation funding, particularly the Green Climate Fund, gather pace, the flow of funds to developing countries poses both a real challenge and a significant opportunity. If seized, this can be the moment when adaptation finance is directed to countries in ways that respond to the needs of those who are hardest hit by a changing climate.

In order to leverage this opportunity, however, it is clear that important course corrections must be made both by providers of finance and by national governments. • Adaptation finance often bypasses governments through multiple

and uncoordinated channels, and without alignment with national adaptation or development plans, or investment in enhancing national capacity;

• At the national level, while governments are beginning to put in place structures and initial strategies to handle adaptation finance, there remains a lack of clearly identified leadership or adequate coordination and coherence across governments. The lack of capacity in many developing country contexts often undermines their efforts;

• Most importantly, real participation and accountability, involving civil society and vulnerable communities, has yet to be achieved in many developing countries. This is especially true for women.

The situation faced by those who are hardest hit by a changing climate demands a better course. A key milestone on that new course that must be reached urgently is the development and implementation of country-driven adaptation strategies, with plans that respond to the needs of those who are most vulnerable. Providers of adaptation finance and national governments can act now to make that a reality by taking action on the recommendations set forth below.

International providers of adaptation finance must put developing countries in the driver’s seat

Adaptation finance should be provided predictably, in line with a country-driven adaptation strategy or plan

In order to enable country leadership, international finance for climate change adaptation needs to be provided to fund a country’s priorities on the basis of a country-driven adaptation strategy or plan.

The development and implementation of a national adaptation strategy or plan must be led by the national government and must be based on a participatory and accountable process that ensures the needs of women are met.

Financing should be provided on a predictable, consistent basis to countries in order to enable effective planning and budgeting for the implementation of the adaptation strategy or plan. Specific details for all funding provided should be made transparent and public.

21

In order to minimize transaction costs and ensure coherence with a country’s adaptation strategy, finance should be harmonized and should come through a coherent, consolidated channel, with the Green Climate Fund providing the majority of adaptation finance.

International adaptation finance should be provided to a national entity

Funding should be provided to a national-level entity formed or led by the national government, such as a lead ministry or other institution chosen by the government. The Green Climate Fund should provide direct access to finance for such a national-level entity.

Whenever possible, adaptation funding should be provided as budget support to implement the national adaptation strategy.69

In some cases, there may need to be project-based or programme support until governments are able to channel funding through budget support, for example in fragile states or countries with inadequate mechanisms to tackle corruption.

Dedicated resources for capacity-building must be provided so countries can both develop and implement a national adaptation strategy or plan

In order to help ensure country ownership, providers of finance, particularly the Green Climate Fund, must deliver substantial resources aimed at building the capacity of both the government and civil society of developing countries.

Capacity-building will need to span technical and scientific competencies; ‘softer’ capacities, such as civil society and community engagement; and relevant infrastructure, including weather-monitoring capability.

Resources for capacity-building need to be provided in a rapid, up-front, and sustained manner, with a minimum level of support provided for developing and updating national strategies.

A separate pool of funds should be made available for civil society and community capacity-building. This support can be targeted at building skills to engage in developing national adaptation strategies, participating in program implementation, and undertaking monitoring and evaluation.

Developing countries should exercise leadership

Effective government leadership should be established for adaptation planning and use of finance, led by a clearly identified national entity

While governments must have flexibility in designing their own approaches, a lead national entity, such as a ministry, should be designated to coordinate adaptation finance.

22

This agency should have the authority and functionality to act as the primary channel of international finance for adaptation and oversee implementation of the national strategic framework on adaptation.

While countries may decide to consolidate adaptation and mitigation funding oversight in a single entity, a clearly designated level of resources and capacity should be established for adaptation finance.

An effective coordination process must be created to develop and oversee a national adaptation strategy

The lead entity for adaptation finance should form a consortium with all other relevant ministries and agencies to develop the national strategic framework, with citizen and stakeholder participation.

The national climate change adaptation strategy should be integrated with national development and poverty strategies; and the priorities need to be put forward by local government, civil society, local communities, and marginalized groups.

The strategy should be developed and overseen through a fully participatory and accountable process involving civil society and vulnerable communities. National parliaments should also be fully consulted and have a clear role in the development of a national adaptation strategy.

Adaptation plans and funds must be accountable to the most vulnerable

Strategies for adaptation and the use of funding must be developed and implemented by countries with the full participation of vulnerable communities and civil society, and must be transparent and accountable to them

Climate funding should prioritize and clearly provide resource allocations for those areas and populations most affected by climate-related risks and with the greatest need for building adaptive capacity due to vulnerability.

From the initial planning to the final evaluation, participation by civil society and vulnerable communities in the national adaptation strategy and in the use of funding should be transformative, rather than cosmetic, thereby resulting in inputs that are visible in the final outcome.

In order to help to achieve this, civil society and vulnerable communities must be fully represented in the process of designing a national adaptation strategy and in overseeing its implementation. This should include a transparent, participatory, and inclusive process for monitoring and evaluation.

Civil society organizations and direct representatives of local communities and marginalized groups should be actively supported such that they are able to hold their governments to account over

23

adaptation planning and spending. This should include support to establish – or assist, if such already exists - a national civil society network or coalition that liaises with and facilitates full participation in the government-led process.

Governments and finance providers should uphold the public right of access to information, through disclosure all relevant documents and the publication of regular and accessible public reports, which outline how funds are allocated and any other pertinent information.

Providers of finance should ensure that country strategies are developed with full participation and accountability, while also providing resources to enable that process

Arrangements for participation by civil society and vulnerable communities should be designed by governments and should reflect national circumstances. However, international finance providers, particularly the Green Climate Fund, should ensure that each country can meet a global set of principles for participation and accountability.

These principles would require stakeholder views to be reflected in strategy formulation and implementation. In order to make this participation possible, finance providers must cultivate substantial capacity in governments aimed at engaging stakeholders, through sustained financial and technical support to build the capacity of local and regional government offices leading on adaptation planning and priorities.

Gender equality and women’s leadership should be central to the development and implementation of national strategies

Women should be prioritized in climate funding, particularly given their greater vulnerability to climate-related risks and untapped potential in leading climate-related solutions. Gender-specific objectives and indicators should be core components of the national climate strategy. Women’s ministries and gender units within all ministries need to play a more central role in climate funding processes, and should establish climate change as a core element of their mandate. A systematic capacity-building process should be available to these departments and units, as well as to national women’s organizations and gender experts.

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Appendix National Adaptation Programmes of Action

Between 2004 and 2010, forty-five countries prepared and submitted National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) to the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). In line with a 2001 decision made by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), NAPAs are meant to identify priority activities that respond to a country’s urgent and immediate needs to adapt to climate change – those for which further delay would increase vulnerability and/or costs at a later stage. In December 2010, parties to the UNFCCC agreed on a new Adaptation Framework and a process to enable LDCs to formulate ’national adaptation plans‘, building on the NAPA process. http://unfccc.int/national_reports/napa/items/2719.php

The Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience

The World Bank’s Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) is part of the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF), a multi-donor trust fund within the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs). The objective of the PPCR is to build resilience to climate change by integrating adaptation into national development planning and policy. The program has invited nine countries and two regions (Caribbean and Pacific) to participate, and is intended to build on the NAPAs. The first design phase of funding supports capacity building, awareness raising, coordination and planning, and the second implementation phase provides technical assistance and a combination of grants and highly concessional loans to support investments in priority sectors. http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/ppcr

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Notes 1 Abed, S.I. (2011) Wither Happiness'. Kaisar Jahan Kony (with support from Oxfam), Dhaka, Bangladesh.

2 Oxfam (2010) ‘21st Century Aid: Recognising Success and Tackling Failure’, Briefing Paper 137, Oxfam.

3 Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (2008) ‘Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness: An Exploration of Experience and Good Practice’. See also the World Bank (2005) ‘Issues and Options for Improving Engagement Between the World Bank and Civil Society Organizations’, the World Bank, p. 26; and Christian Aid (2001) ‘Ignoring the Experts: Poor People’s Exclusion from Poverty Reduction Strategies’, Christian Aid.

4 The World Bank (2008) ‘Accra Agenda for Action’, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ACCRAEXT/Resources/4700790-1217425866038/AAA-4-SEPTEMBER-FINAL-16h00.pdf (last accessed 20 April 2011).

5 IDD and Associates (2006) ‘Evaluation of General Budget Support: Synthesis Report’, OECD/DAC, Birmingham, UK.

6 Global Network of Civil Society Organizations for Disaster Risk Reduction (2009) ‘Views from the Frontline: A Local Perspective of Progress Towards Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action’, http://www.globalnetwork-dr.org/images/reports/vflfullreport0609.pdf (last accessed 20 April 2011).

7 The Global Fund (2005) ‘Revised Guidelines on the Purpose, Structure, Composition and Funding of Country Coordinating Mechanisms and Requirements for Grant Eligibility’, para. 3.

8 Oxfam conducted preliminary research in Cambodia, Ethiopia, Nepal, Bangladesh, Viet Nam, Tajikistan, and the Philippines; global research on the UNFCCC National Adaptation Programmes of Action and the World Bank's Pilot Programme on Climate Resilience that included additional countries; and global research on the Country Coordinating Mechanisms of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

9 A.M. Kleymeyer (2011a) ‘Cambodia Country Brief’, internal research report.

10 A.M. Kleymeyer (2011b) ‘Ethiopia Country Brief’, internal research report.

11 K. Wiseman and R. Pandit Chhetri (2011) ‘Governance of Climate Change Adaptation Finance: Nepal’, Oxfam Research Report.

12 Ibid.

13 M Iqbal Ahmed (2010a) ‘Governance of Climate Change Financing: A Case Study on Policy and Practices in Bangladesh’, Oxfam Research Report.

14 Kleymeyer 2011b, op. cit.

15 Wiseman and Pandit Chhetri 2011, op. cit.

16 Ibid.

17 Oxfam (2011) ‘Climate Change Investment Through the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience in Tajikistan’, Oxfam Research Report.


19 Adaptation Fund (2010) ‘Report of the Twelfth Meeting of the Adaptation Fund Board’, http://www.adaptation-fund.org/system/files/AFB_12-Report.pdf (last accessed 20 April 2011).

20 Oxfam 2010a, op. cit.

21 See Oxfam 2010a, op. cit., for Bangladesh; Kleymeyer 2011a, op. cit., for Cambodia; Wiseman and Pandit Chhetri 2011, op. cit., for Nepal; and Oxfam (2010b), Adaptation, Finance, and Viet Nam Climate Policy, Oxfam Research Report, November 2010.

22The Risk Management Directorate (or DGR, the acronym used to refer to it in Colombia) is responsible for leading and coordinating the National System of Disaster Prevention and Response (SNPAD), for proposing national policies and strategies relating to risk management, for dissemination and monitoring of the related National Plan, for supporting relevant agencies that are part of the National System, for raising national and international resources for the National Calamities Fund as well as management of the same, among other responsibilities (see http://www.sigpad.gov.co/sigpad/paginas_detalle.aspx?idp=100). As part of its recommendations to help Colombia avoid another disaster caused by climate-related hazards like the one the country suffered in 2010-11, Oxfam is calling for the DGR to take a stronger role in developing and implementing the country's national adaptation policy and strategy (see: http://www.oxfam.org/es/policy/colombia-inundaciones-como-evitar-otro-desastre).


24 Kleymeyer 2011a, op. cit.



26

27 E. Santoalla (2010) ‘Climate Financing in the Philippines: A Scan of Governance Mechanisms, Practices and

Initiatives’, Oxfam Research Report.

28 Oxfam 2011, op. cit.

29 Oxfam 2010b, op. cit.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.



34 See Oxfam (2010b).

35 Kleymeyer 2011a, op. cit., for Cambodia; and Oxfam 2011, op. cit., for Tajikistan.

36 The Global Fund (undated) ‘Framework Document of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria’, http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/TGF_Framework.pdf (last accessed 20 April 2011).

37 The Global Fund (2008) ‘Country Coordinating Mechanisms: Oversight Practice’.

38 The Global Fund (2005) ‘Revised Guidelines on the Purpose, Structure, Composition and Funding of Country Coordinating Mechanisms and Requirements for Grant Eligibility’, para. 13.

39 The Global Fund (2008a) ‘Country Coordinating Mechanisms: Governance and Civil Society Participation’.

40 K. Nichols, African Services Committee, telephone interview with the authors.

41The Global Fund (2010) ‘CCM Gender Balance for QTR 2, 2010 - Global and Regional Perspectives’, http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/ccm/CCMgraphs/CCM%202010%20QTR%202%20Gender%20Balance%20Global%20and%20Regional.pdf (last accessed 20 April 2011).

42 The Global Fund 2008, op. cit.

43 The Global Fund (2010a) ‘Dual Track Financing Information Note’.

44 The Global Fund (2008b) ‘The Global Fund’s Strategy for Ensuring Gender Equality in the Response to HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (The Gender Equality Strategy)’.


46 Oxfam 2010b, op. cit.




50 Ibid.

51 Oxfam 2011, op. cit.




55 Ibid.


57 Ibid.




61 Oxfam (2011b) ‘Successful Capacity-Building Approaches: Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction’, unpublished report.

62 M.L. Parry et al.( 2007) ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. M. L. Parry et. al., Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

63 L. Schalatek (2009) ‘Gender and Climate Finance: Double Mainstreaming for Sustainable Development’, Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America.


27

65 Oxfam (2010a, op. cit.

66 See Oxfam 2011, op. cit.



69 Providing budget support to fulfil a national plan that involves a particular area of work is often characterized as ‘sectoral budget support’. It can also be ‘general budget support’, with an agreement to achieve certain benchmarks or objectives.

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© Oxfam International June 2011

This paper was written by Rebecca Pearl-Martinez. Oxfam acknowledges the assistance of David Waskow, Bert Maerten, Tim Gore, Senait Regassa, Le Kim Dung, Ziaul Hoque Mukta, Andy Baker, Sophoan Phean, Kalayaan Constantino, Prabin Man Singh, Edgardo Santoalla, and Kristina Gaerlan in its production. It is part of a series of papers written to inform public debate on development and humanitarian policy issues.

This publication is copyright but the text may be used free of charge for the purposes of advocacy, campaigning, education, and research, provided that the source is acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that all such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, permission must be secured and a fee may be charged. E-mail [email protected].

For further information on the issues raised in this paper please e-mail [email protected].

The information in this publication is correct at the time of going to press.

Published by Oxfam GB for Oxfam International under ISBN 978-1-84814-882-6 in June 2011. Oxfam GB, Oxfam House, John Smith Drive, Cowley, Oxford, OX4 2JY, UK.

Oxfam Oxfam is an international confederation of fifteen organizations working together in 98 countries to find lasting solutions to poverty and injustice: Oxfam America (www.oxfamamerica.org), Oxfam Australia (www.oxfam.org.au), Oxfam-in-Belgium (www.oxfamsol.be), Oxfam Canada (www.oxfam.ca), Oxfam France (www.oxfamfrance.org), Oxfam Germany (www.oxfam.de), Oxfam GB (www.oxfam.org.uk), Oxfam Hong Kong (www.oxfam.org.hk), Oxfam India (www.oxfamindia.org), Intermón Oxfam (www.intermonoxfam.org), Oxfam Ireland (www.oxfamireland.org), Oxfam Mexico (www.oxfammexico.org), Oxfam New Zealand (www.oxfam.org.nz), Oxfam Novib (www.oxfamnovib.nl), Oxfam Quebec (www.oxfam.qc.ca)

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Owning AdaptationFactsheet: Bangladesh

India

DemocraticRepublic of Congo

Ethiopia

Pakistan

Nigeria

Tanzania

Sudan

NigerMali

Angola

Thailand

Myanmar

Bhutan

Yemen

Zambia

South Africa

East Timor

Afghanistan

Russia

Mauritania

Mexico

Colombia

Peru

Chile

Brazil

Chad

UK

Malawi

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Liberia

Ghana

Eritrea

UgandaKenya

Mozambique

Zimbabwe

IsraelPalestine

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Armenia

Tajikistan

Nepal

Viet Nam

Dominican Republic

Jamaica

Guyana

Caribbean IslandsSt LuciaGrenadaSt VincentDominica

Bangladesh

Sri Lanka

The Philippines

I n d o n e s i a

Somaliland

Where Oxfam has a presence (and/or gives funding to partners of over £100,000)* *based on spending in the financial year 2005/06

Bolivia

Cuba

Ecuador

Burkina Faso

Somalia

China

Guatemala

El Salvador

Honduras

Nicaragua

Haiti

Albania

Rwanda

Cambodia

IntroductionForty per cent of Bangladesh’s population of 150 million live below the poverty line, and millions struggle with malnourishment and hunger. The Fourth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other scientific studies list the country as among those most vulnerable to climate change.

In the last 30 years, Bangladesh has experienced nearly 200 disasters related to drought, extreme temperature, floods, and storms, which killed 181,307 people, caused damages costing $16.4 billion, and destroyed the homes and livelihoods of more than 30 million. In November 2007, more than 4,000 people were killed and six million displaced or made homeless by Cyclone Sidr. When Cyclone Aila hit Bangladesh and India on 25 May 2009, it forced 400,000 people to leave their homes and communities. The reconstruction of the embankment took almost two years to make the area liveable again. As of 2011, Oxfam and other national and international organizations, as well as the government, continue to facilitate rehabilitation programmes in the area.

Sudden and unforeseen climate change-related hazards practically nullify development investments in poverty eradication before these can take root. The government has had to divert development financing to disaster relief, rehabilitation and safety net programmes.

Loss of livelihood and outward migration due to climate change1

Related Event Loss of Livelihood

(no. per year)

External Migration

(no. per year)

Frequency

Coastal and River Erosion

50,000–200,000

60,000 annual

Salinity 120,000 10,000–15,000 annual

Tidal Surge and Rough Sea

300,000–400,000

100,000–120,000

every three years

Water Logging 350,000 30,000 annual

1 A.U. Ahmed and S. Neelormi (2008), ‘Climate change, loss of livelihoods, and forced displacements in

Bangladesh’, http://www.csrlbd.org/pressrelease-/doc_download/22-climate-change-loss-of-livelihoods-

and-forced-displacement-in-bangladesh

Climate change in Bangladesh

The impact of climate change on the environment and people of Bangladesh includes increased:

• intensityandfrequencyofcyclonesandtidal surges due to temperature rise;

• altitudeandintensityoftidalsurges,frequencyofcoastalfloodsandwaterlogging, and increased salinity in the coastal region due to sea-level rise;

• magnitudeoffloods,flash-floods,andriver erosion;

• droughtduetolackofrainanderraticrainfall;

• uncertaintyinseasonalchanges.

Policy Instruments and Implementing ToolsMainstreaming adaptation into overall development planning and strategies is imperative, not only to make the country resilient to climate change-related hazards but also to accelerate achieving the poverty-reduction targets of the Millennium Development Goals and long-term sustainable economic development.

Bangladesh is one of the few countries that have successfully developed participatory disaster management. Since 2003, the Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) of the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MoFDM) has advanced government-wide and agency risk reduction efforts. The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), guided by the National Environment Council, which is chaired by the Prime Minister, tackles climate and environmental issues. Following recent structural changes, the MoEF’s Climate Change Unit (CCU) now coordinates other ministries to implement climate change-related projects and programmes.

The draft version of the sixth five-year development plan (2011–15) set 16 core targets – for economic growth, employment, poverty reduction, human resources development, gender balance and environmental protection. Along with higher per capita income, the government’s Vision 2021 manifesto projects a development scenario where citizens will have higher living standards, better education and social justice. It aims to ensureamoreequitablesocio-economicenvironmentandsustainabledevelopment through better protection from climate change and natural disasters.

The government has earmarked more than $10 billion in investments for the period 2007 to 2015 to make Bangladesh less vulnerable to natural disasters. Despite this effort, the direct annual cost of natural disasters over the last 10 years is estimated to be between 0.5 and 1 per cent of GDP.2 (The social safety net budget is 2.1 to 2.8 per cent of GDP.) The first phase of the Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP), successfully implemented by the MoFDM, cost about $26 million.

National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA)

• DevelopedundertheLeast-DevelopedCountryFund(LDCF)/GlobalEnvironment Facility (GEF) initiative with the participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) as well as UN institutions.

• Focusedonthreeparticulareffectsofclimatechange:increasingsea-levelrise,changingrainfallpatterns;andincreasesinthefrequencyand intensity of extreme events.

• Identified15immediateandurgentprojectsthatwilladdressthecountry’s vulnerability to climate change in the original plan and 18 specific projects in the revised plan. So far, only one of the 15 projects has been supported by LDCF/GEF.

Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP)

• EstablishedBangladeshasthefirstoftheleastdevelopedcountriestofinalise a national strategy and action plan on climate change.

• Aimstobuildaclimate-resilienteconomyandsocietythroughadaptation to climate change as well as mitigation for a low-carbon development path.

2 World Bank (2010), Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change Study (EACC): Bangladesh.

• Recommendsprojectsundersixmainpillars–foodsecurity,social safety and health; comprehensive disaster management; infrastructure, research and knowledge; management, mitigation and low carbon development; and capacity building.

Both the government and CSOs have been active in international conventions and organisations to increase pressure for more stringent and legally binding agreements on climate change. CSOs are part of official government delegations and take similar positions, including on higher emission-reduction targets and stricter warming limitations to within 1.5°C.

On several occasions the prime minister has expressed her intension to invest heavily in the re-excavation of rivers and canals (to reduce vulnerability to floods and increase irrigation facility during dry season), and in income opportunities in areas where crop failure is more likely to occur. Between 2007 and 2010, the government invested significantly to build more than 1,000 new shelters to save lives during cyclonic storm surges.

Financing Mechanisms and IssuesClimate change adaptation financing has become a critical issue in discussions about national development financing. Donor-supported projects, often financed by loans from multilateral financing agencies such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, focus mostly on infrastructure and lack community consultation, transparency, accountability, and the appropriate monitoring and evaluation. These loans are tied-in with numerous conditions, which, in most cases, reduce a country’s policy space secured under different multilateral agreements.

Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF)

The controversial Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) proposed in 2008 was to be chaired by the World Bank and its secretariat based in the World Bank office in Dhaka. However, criticism of the MDTF by the Campaign for Sustainable Rural Livelihoods (CSRL) and a section ofthegovernment,combinedwithuncertainandinadequatefinance,provoked the government to finance climate change adaptation initiatives from internal resources. This led to the establishment of the BCCTF to fund the BCCSAP. In mid-2010, the government allocated an initial $110 million to the fund for 2009–10, and another $110 million for the succeeding year.

As designed, two-thirds of BCCTF will be spent on projects and programmes. The remaining one-third would be kept as a fixed deposit, with the interest earned to be spent on projects recommended by a technical committee and approved by a board of trustees.

In 2009–10, an open-ended call for applications for financing under the BCCTF was issued where both government and non-government organisations (NGOs) could apply for adaptation and mitigation projects for a maximum period of two years. A maximum $3.57 million was assigned for government projects, while the allocation for NGOs is yet to be finalised.

Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF)

As a result of strong opposition from the CSRL and a section of the government, the MDTF evolved into the BCCRF in May 2010. The government put in place an innovative mechanism to channel $110 million or more in grant funds to millions of Bangladeshis in order to build their resilience to the effects of climate change. BCCRF was established

Other Policies, Programmes and Mechanisms

• Vision20021,PerspectivePlan,andSixthFive-Year Plan

• StandingOrderonDisasterManagement

• NationalWaterManagementPlan

• ClimateChangeUnit(CCU)undertheMinistry of Environment and Forests, which coordinates focal points in all ministries

• CoastalZonePolicyandCoastalDevelopment Strategy

• NationalDisasterManagementPlan(2010–15)

with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the government and five development partners. The Fund will support the implementation of the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) 2009.

The Fund will be managed and implemented by the government, with initial contributions from Denmark ($1.6 million), the European Union ($10.4 million), Sweden ($11.5 million) and the UK ($86.7 million). The World Bank will provide technical support for a short period of time and ensurethatduediligencerequirementsaremet.

The Fund will have a two-tiered governance structure, consisting of a governing council and a management committee, both of which will be chaired by the government, and include representatives from line ministries, development partners and civil society.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

1. Policy coherence

Although the government seems to have taken climate change seriously, the BCCSAP needs to be coherent and consistent with other national development policies and strategies. Mainstreaming climate change in national development programmes will be critical to successful climate change adaptation and mitigation.

To achieve Vision 2021, the government drafted a perspective plan and is preparing the Sixth Five-Year Plan. A committee has been formed at the Ministry of Planning to mainstream climate change into this national planning document.

The government’s adoption of food security as a major investment plan for the next five years is commendable. However, the existing agriculture policy is not streamlined with the climate change strategies, particularly, that of adaptation of agriculture to climate change. Moreover, the newly finalisedfoodsecuritypolicyassignsinadequateattentiontoclimatechange. Before making any investment on food security, agriculture and climate change adaptation, a comprehensive strategy has to be in place so that related investments and initiatives complement each other. This, inturn,requiresextensiveresearchandconsultationaswellaspolicyadvocacy at the national level.

Although the Prime Minister has articulated a general policy direction that Bangladesh will not receive loans, and only grants, for climate change adaptation programmes, bureaucrats at the Ministry of Finance have ignored this. Moreover, instead of focusing on adaptation, the MoEF is investing its own resource for mitigation and low carbon development path, contrary to the directions set forth by the BCCSAP.

2. Participatory processes

CSOs and NGOs expressed concern about the original BCCSAP completed in 2008. Oxfam contributed significantly to redefining a climate change action plan through the CSRL, which conducted extensive advocacy at national and international levels for the revision of the original BCCSAP. As a result, the 2008 BCCSAP was reviewed by a committee convened by the newly-elected government and a revised document was prepared and endorsed in 2009. The review process addressed the strategic part of the document, while the programmes remain to be finalised following a consultative process involving all relevant stakeholders.

www.oxfam.org© Oxfam International, June 2011

Oxfam International is a confederation of fifteen organisations working together in ninety-eight countries to find lasting solutions to poverty and injustice.

The revised BCCSAP is expected to provide guidance to future climate change action programmes in Bangladesh.

3. Transparent fund management

Following multilateral negotiations on climate finance, more funds are expected. As well as regular development financing, two separate climate financing channels have been established. The government should ensure transparency and accountability in the use of these funds. As a first step, it needs to introduce specific selection criteria for the projects and programmes granted climate change funding. The government must be careful to follow the strategic guidelines set out in the BCCSAP. Any misappropriation of funds will discourage further bilateral and multilateral interest in financing climate change adaptation and mitigation in Bangladesh.

4. Multi-level monitoring and evaluation (M&E)

In the process of climate financing, the government needs to ensure improved M&E so that spending addresses the concerns of the poorest communities, who must be consulted in order to formulate better adaptation plans and modalities for small-scale projects. As adaptation projects become more participatory, there should be room also for participatory M&E, including supervision and surveillance by local communities. However, since the government’s capital investment plans cannot be monitored in the same way, a strong independent body could be formed and given the mandate to ensure transparency and accountability on behalf of the state.

More information on this issue can be found in Oxfam’s new briefing paper, Owning adaptation: Country-level governance of climate adaptation finance. To download your free copy of Owning adaptation, please go to www.oxfam.org.uk/publications.

As financing for climate change adaptation gathers pace, it has become fundamentally important to identify how it flows into developing countries. This is a major opportunity to shape the governance of funding at the national level so that the needs of the most vulnerable can be met. The core issue is country-level ownership of adaptation finance.Consequently,providersofadaptationfinance must put developing countries in the driver’s seat, and the countries themselves must exercise leadership and respond to the needs of those most affected by climate change. Most importantly, civil society and vulnerable communities must be able to steer and hold accountable the way in which adaptation finance is used.

For more information on climate finance governance in Bangladesh, please contact Ziaul Hoque Mukta ([email protected])

Owning AdaptationFactsheet: Cambodia

India


Ethiopia

Pakistan

Nigeria

Tanzania

Sudan

NigerMali

Angola

Thailand

Myanmar

Bhutan

Yemen

Zambia

South Africa

East Timor

Afghanistan

Russia

Mauritania

Mexico

Colombia

Peru

Chile

Brazil

Chad

UK

Malawi

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Liberia

Ghana

Eritrea

UgandaKenya

Mozambique

Zimbabwe

IsraelPalestine

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Armenia

Tajikistan

Nepal

Cambodia

Viet Nam

Dominican Republic

Jamaica

Guyana


Bangladesh

Sri Lanka

The Philippines

I n d o n e s i a

Somaliland


Bolivia

Cuba

Ecuador

Burkina Faso

Somalia

China

Guatemala

El Salvador

Honduras

Nicaragua

Haiti

Albania

Rwanda

IntroductionCambodia is amongst the least developed countries in the world, and following years of political and social upheaval, faces significant socio-economic challenges. Nearly 70 per cent of the population survives on less than $2 a day and 30 per cent live below the national poverty threshold of $0.46–0.63 a day. Development needs are acute, affecting all sectors and regions.

Cambodia has been identified as one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change. In addition to the expected increase in frequency of climate hazards like cyclones, droughts, floods, and landslides, the country’s adaptive capacity was evaluated to be among the lowest of all Southeast Asian countries.1

Policy Instruments and Implementing ToolsCambodia began implementing climate activities in 1999 with the Climate Change Enabling Activity Project, funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). As a least developed country, it qualified for assistance from the GEF to complete its First National Communication in 2002, and from the Least Developed Countries Fund to produce its National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) in 2007. The Second National Communication is expected in 2011. The purpose of the National Communications and NAPA were to assist with national policy development, awareness raising, and project identification.

Budget and resource limitations have impinged on policy development and project implementation. The Ministry of Environment (MoE) is the official focal point for climate change at the national government level. But, while the MoE has achieved a higher profile since it was put in charge of climate change, no additional resources accompanied the restructuring. Ministries are required to establish climate change units, yet many have not. In principle, under the process of decentralisation adopted by the government since 2002, policy from the national level should be carried out at the local level, yet there are no formal climate change focal points at the sub-national level or any relationship between national and local government processes.

Cambodia has recognised the need for national policy development on climate change, and discussions on a Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (CCSAP) are ongoing. The National Committee on Climate Change (NCCC) is tasked with developing this national policy, as well as integrating climate change into relevant policies, strategies, legal instruments, plans, and programmes. The NCCC was also supposed to establish a climate change technical team to provide technical advice; however, due to delays in setting up the technical team, a climate change department now plays this role.

1 This is based on a three-tiered evaluation of the country. For more information see the Climate Change

Vulnerability Mapping for Southeast Asia (2009), www.eepsea.org

The impact of climate change in Cambodia

• Moresevereandfrequentfloodsanddroughts will damage agriculture, particularly rice production.

• Changesinrainfallpatternswillaffecttheavailability of surface and ground water, including drinking water and water for irrigation.

• Unpredictablewaterflows–intermsofseasonality, timing and duration will affect sensitive wetland ecosystems as well as the productivity of fisheries.

• Cambodiaalreadyhasthehighestfatalityrate from malaria in Asia, with an average of 800 deaths per year. Changing climatic conditions will further spread vector-borne diseases such as malaria, disproportionately affecting the health of poor and marginalised communities.

The climate change department functions under the direct guidance of the MoE and NCCC. It addresses four technical issues: the country’s greenhouse gas inventory; mitigation; vulnerability and adaptation; and implementation. The vulnerability and adaptation unit carries out activities in co-ordination with international development partners.

The government has yet to convene a technical working group on climate change. As a result, the topic of climate change has not been discussed thoroughly and has been subsumed under the responsibilities of the environment working group.

Cambodia has also developed a National Green Growth Roadmap, which includes an array of climate-related strategies and programmes to mainstream low-carbon and environmentally-sound development practices into key sector activities. The Roadmap adopts a ‘holistic approach to development [that] will help the country improve resilience and decrease vulnerability to climate change’.2

The activities specified in the Roadmap include primarily those aimed at mitigation, such as renewable energy, low-carbon investments, and green industries. It also has a number of adaptation-related activities, such as forest management, sustainable agriculture, water-resource management and irrigation, and transportation and infrastructure management.

Cambodia has many other institutional mechanisms and processes to enable co-ordinated governance and policy integration. The country’s development objectives are outlined in the Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity, and Efficiency adopted in July 2004, as well as in the NSDP. Both documents stress the need to reduce poverty and improve agricultural productivity through the expansion of irrigation and the management of water resources to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters. Yet, public expenditure in agriculture, water, and rural development made up less than five per cent of the 2009 national budget.3

The Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum is the highest level for political dialogue and review of National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) and and implementation of the plan. As part of the Forum, the Government-Development Partner Co-ordination Committee, chaired by the government, meets two to three times a year for high-level political and technical discussions. Climate change is a key priority in the NSDP for 2010–13. All concerned ministries and agencies are required to integrate the priority projects identified in the programme into their plans and work.

Funding Mechanisms and IssuesThe funding mechanisms available include budget support, basket funds, multi-donor trust funds, sector-specific funds, international project funds, bilateral funds, and a wide variety of loans. The question is how to best approach climate adaptation financing. Some adaption needs require large infrastructure investments, while others need community-based approaches rolled-out across the country.

The NSDP is envisioned as a guide for resource allocation, including Official Development Assistance (ODA). ODA, in theory, complements government financing and provides critical infrastructure development and services. It is a major vehicle for achieving Cambodia’s Millennium Development Goals.

2 National Green Growth Road Map, Royal Government of Cambodia (2009)

3 Annual expenditure by MAFF and MoWRAM was about 4.8 percent per year during the period 2006-

2009’, NGO Forum (2010)

In 2008, Cambodia received ODA of $742.81 million – nearly 84.7 per cent of government expenditure. However, a recent UNDP study found that ODA to environment and conservation in Cambodia had decreased between 2004 and 2008 from $19.6 million to $7.6 million. A stated priority of the NSDP is to develop a National Strategy and Action Plan for Climate Change. However, the procedure, timeline, and resources for this are unclear.

The Council for the Development of Cambodia is a high-level institution tasked with coordinating development partner assistance; its database shows all partners, activities, sectors, funding levels, and other detailed information. The database has recently integrated a climate change filter, although this function is not yet fully applicable and therefore does not provide a full picture.

Development partners have made pledges of $96 million for climate change over the next five years. Most of the climate-change projects and programmes in the country have been sourced by development partners or international NGOs, rather than applied for directly by the government or local organisations. This raises the issue of country ownership of these initiatives, which is critical for effective project implementation and requires close attention, as increasing levels of climate-change financing begin to enter the country.

Commune councils have been identified by many as an entry point for working with government at the local-level, as well as for partnerships with civil society groups. Working at the community level is a challenge for the government, and requires increased capacity building, awareness raising, and information dissemination. A possible way of providing sustainable local-level financing is through ‘commune investment plans’. At present, communes receive around $5,000 base funding; the rest comes from civil society groups and development partners. A strategy to connect climate financing to these investment plans will help align activities along national plans while strengthening government capacity.

Two Parallel Funds

Cambodian Climate Change Alliance (CCCA)

The CCCA is a UNDP trust fund for adaption and capacity building, due to be handed over to the government in 2012. The intention is for the CCCA to be country-driven, while project selection is government-determined. Many civil society groups are concerned, however, that it will simply use non-government parties as contractors depending on need.

Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience (SPCR) (developed through the Pilot Project for Climate Resilience (PPCR))

The SPCR is a programme funded by the PPCR, which was managed in Cambodia initially by the World Bank and, more recently, by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Phase one, ongoing but significantly behind schedule, provided $1.5 million to facilitate the development of a cross-sectoral approach to climate resilience. The program will last for two years and has no clear provision for continuation or sustainability, in this way it reflects the ‘fast-start financing’ dynamic that donors concerned with climate change. Phase two, valued at nearly $105 million (approximately 50 per cent as grant and 50 per cent as concessional loan), includes some support for policy reform and institutional capacity-building, but the majority of the funds will be used to ‘climate proof’ ADB projects. There is a concern that, in terms of effectiveness, these funds should be directed towards the communities already recognized as most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, rather than ADB

Suggested Climate Change Financing Modals

• CivilSocietyandPro-PoorMarkets(CSPPM) is a two-year, $7.5 million programme which uses partnership grants to boost citizens’ influence in local decision-making regarding the exploitation of natural resources. It helps ensure that local communities are the chief beneficiaries of local resources, and that those resources are managed sustainably.

• TheWorldFishCenterisworkingwithcommunities and government for ‘soft’ adaptation needs such as knowledge, capacity, and information. But knowledge and capacity building are long-term results that demand time. The project’s strategy is to broker links between government and civil society. After this, the next step is brokering coalitions of partners to provide a broader and better range of capacities.

priority projects, especially where, arguably, climate change action and responses should already have been integrated into the ADB projects.

At an earlier stage of the PPCR/SPCR development, a World Bank consultancy engaged with civil society groups to develop recommendations for civil society participation whereby $3–5 million would go to a separate fund to build capacity among civil society and ensure their contribution to the success of the program. This intended investment has since been reduced to a Technical Assistance allocation of $2 million and there remains concern that this will be omitted in its entirety from the final SPCR.


1. Consultation and participation

The NAPA claims to have followed a participatory consultation process, with a focus on country-driven adaptation measures that affect the lives of local people, especially the poorest. According to the NAPA, information was gathered on 684 households in 17 provinces regarding the following climatic hazards: flood, drought, windstorm, seawater intrusion, and rising tide. The survey results identified which provinces suffer which hazards. The responses of the villagers, when asked to describe existing ways they adapt to these hazards, demonstrated little access to information and little understanding of how to respond safely.

Most local communities are unprepared for extreme climate events and have little adaptation capacity. Those which are resourceful when dealing with climate hazards are usually settlements with higher social capital and stronger local institutions. Even where communities are aware of possible coping and adaptation mechanisms, the lack of financial resources prevents them from implementing these projects.

2. Capacity

While many adaptation projects and programmes include a capacity-building component, few provide capacity-building programmes that also adapt to changing needs and capacity. Furthermore, few capitalise on the existing knowledge of local communities or the broad networks and capabilities of civil society groups. Instead, they veer towards one-shot workshops with external trainers who provide information without a careful assessment of needs or a consideration of cultural context. All levels – from the most remote village to the highest political level – require a better understanding of their roles and a greater capacity to strategise, co-ordinate, respond to, and monitor climate change.

3. Co-ordination and planning

Cambodia is only just beginning to address climate concerns, and so far has done so in an uncoordinated manner. There is limited understanding of how to mainstream climate change in development planning and budgeting, and little engagement with civil society or community-based groups, despite their potential to support climate adaptation through research, funding, know-how, monitoring, and evaluation. For example, many civil society groups consulted on the NAPA were asked to react to a close-to-final draft of the document. The NAPA has therefore focused mainly on large-scale infrastructure projects rather than responding to the needs of vulnerable communities. The involvement of the private sector in adaptation, disaster risk management, and even mitigation activities is non-existent. The integration of gender considerations in climate change plans is limited.



Overall, there is a need for coordination mechanisms to ensure adequate dissemination of information and ensure stakeholder participation at all levels. The recent confirmation of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) as the 20th member of the NCCC is very welcome. As a member of the NCCC, the ministry is now expected to build capacity to contribute to policy formulation and debates. Moreover, the MoWA is also expected to champion gender mainstreaming and climate change incorporation into plans and policies across government. To do that the ministry needs climate-change related and gender-disaggregated information, capacity, and resources, which are absent at present.

4. Information

Climate-related information is scattered throughout the country’s institutions. While many studies exist or are in the making, there is no centralised source of information that can help educate and reduce duplication. Technical, financial, and human resources to address climate change are much needed throughout the country, as are early-warning systems for extreme climate events. At the same time, basic hydro-meteorological data for planning is limited, as are the human resource capabilities to process this information. Although the National Climate Change Network intends to improve this, it may take time as capacity and co-ordination challenges also impede results within the network.

5. Financing

Adaptation finance needs to be nuanced to address varying needs and capacities. The first phase of adaptation finance needs to support policy development, and institution and capacity building. To begin channelling funds without a clear national policy for climate adaptation will result in approaches that are incoherent and lacking in country ownership. As such, projects are likely to fail. Currently, the ‘soft adaptation’ phase is focusing primarily on government capacity and to a limited extent on local-level capacity.

Civil society plays a significant role in Cambodia’s development, which cannot be over-emphasised. The integration of civil society groups is essential, from local community-based organisations to the private sector, national, and international NGOs, research institutions, and beyond.


As financing for climate change adaptation gathers pace, it has become fundamentally important to identify how it flows into developing countries. This is a major opportunity to shape the governance of funding at the national level so that the needs of the most vulnerable can be met. The core issue is country-level ownership of adaptation finance. Consequently, providers of adaptation finance must put developing countries in the driver’s seat, and the countries themselves must exercise leadership and respond to the needs of those most affected by climate change. Most importantly, civil society and vulnerable communities must be able to steer and hold accountable the way in which adaptation finance is used.

For more information on climate finance governance in Cambodia, please contact Sophoan Phean ([email protected])

Owning AdaptationFactsheet: Ethiopia

India


Ethiopia

Pakistan

Nigeria

Tanzania

Sudan

NigerMali

Angola

ThailandYemen

Zambia

South Africa

East Timor

Afghanistan

Russia

Mauritania

Mexico

Colombia

Peru

Chile

Brazil

Chad

UK

Malawi

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Liberia

Ghana

Eritrea

UgandaKenya

Mozambique

Zimbabwe

IsraelPalestine

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Armenia

Tajikistan

Nepal

Cambodia

Viet Nam

Dominican Republic

Jamaica

Guyana


Bangladesh

Sri Lanka

The Philippines

I n d o n e s i a

Somaliland


Bolivia

Cuba

Ecuador

Burkina Faso

Somalia

China

Guatemala

El Salvador

Honduras

Nicaragua

Haiti

Albania

Rwanda

IntroductionEthiopia is among the least developed countries in the world, with a per capita income of $344 per year.1 It is a large country, but about 90 per cent of the population lives in the highlands, on just 44 per cent of the land. The rest of the population, who are pastoralists, live in the lowlands.2

Despite economic reforms begun in the early 1990s, the country is highly vulnerable to climate change and variability partly because of widespread poverty. Other factors include heavy reliance on rain-fed agriculture, a poor health service, high population growth rate, inadequate or poor road infrastructure in drought and flood-prone areas, and limited access to government services in remote communities.

Policy Instruments and Participative MechanismsEthiopia’s strong vision for country-driven development is embodied in a number of policies on climate action. Last year, the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), also known as the Five-Year Plan, was completed. The GTP aims primarily to:

• doublecurrenteconomicgrowthandmeettheMillenniumDevelopment Goals;

• curbrelianceonforeigninvestmentandshifttoalocally-driveneconomy;

• implementpoliciesonclimatechange,suchasthoserelatedtotheenvironment, agriculture and rural development, health, disaster prevention and biofuel strategies.

National policies also attempt to enhance social services, such as education and health care. These aim to boost provincial and local governance and institutions through decentralisation. For example, there is a shift in approach towards a situation where inputs are gathered locally, consolidated at the district level, sent to regional bureaus, and then to federal ministries for integration into national planning and reporting.

National Adaptation Programme for Action (NAPA)

The government’s 2007 National Adaptation Programme for Action (NAPA) identified priority projects in human and institutional capacity building, improving natural resource management, enhancing irrigation agriculture and water harvesting, strengthening early warning systems, and awareness-raising. However, three years after the document was submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), global partners have shown little interest and no money has been made available from the LDC fund. As a result, not a single NAPA project has been implemented.

1 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries

2 Pastoralist Forum of Ethiopia, Pastoral Updates Vol. 1, Issue 1, www.pfe-ethiopia.org

3 Oxfam (2010), ‘The Rain Doesn’t Come on Time Anymore’,

http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/ethiopia-rain-doesnt-come-time-anymore

Urgent climate finance issues

• AlthoughtheNAPAidentified37potentialand 11 priority projects, no money was made available from the LDC Fund and global partners showed little interest. As a result, no NAPA projects have been implemented.

• TheEPAidentified20issuesforclimatechange adaptation through a national consultation workshop. Following the workshop sector ministries and regional states prepared adaptation plans based on the issues selected.

• Severalconsultationstoidentifypriorityissues have taken place since the time of NAPA preparation but they are often criticised for allowing limited participation by the affected community.

• Ethiopia’sDevelopmentAssistanceGroup of donors does not yet coordinate work on climate change actions, although it is considering a working group.

• TheWorldBank’sconsultationwithlocalcommunities yielded a narrower set of priorities such as:3

• investmentsinroadconnectivityto reduce regional disparities and isolation;

• higheragriculturalproductivitythroughupgraded technology and flood control;

• betterweatherforecasting;

• non-farmdiversification.

Recently, however, a project identification format (PIF) preparation for the project, entitled “Promoting Autonomous Adaption at the Community Level in Ethiopia” has begun. The project is aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience, especially in those communities that are particularly vulnerable. The fund is from the Global Environmental Facility with UNDP as the implementing agency.

Environmental Protection Authority (EPA)

The Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) was given overall responsibility for the coordination of climate change initiatives in 2009 by aPrimeMinisterialdeclaration.Sincethen,theGovernmenthasstatedits ambition for Ethiopia to become a Carbon Neutral Climate Resilient Economy by 2025, and to achieve this, the EPA has produced plans for the Ethiopia Programme for Adaptation and the Nationally Appropriate MitigationActions(NAMAs).

The EPA does not seem to see the NAPA document as essential to national climate change policy, partly due to the lack of funding and partly because it only took over implementation after the document was developed. There were also concerns within the EPA that NAPA’s project-focused approach was not the most appropriate way to strengthen climate resilience.

InMarch2010,theEPAstarteddevelopinganewClimateChangeAdaptation Plan which requires both regional states and line ministries to develop their own sector Adaptation Action Plans. Following training and guidance, a number of regions and line ministries have completed their plans.

Climate Change Forum-Ethiopia (CCF-E)

The CCF-E is a multi-stakeholder group that meets regularly to discuss national responses to climate change. The forum includes representatives from the government, non-government and civil society organisations, United Nations agencies, embassies, donor agencies, research and academic institutions, and the business community.

Notably, the CCF-E serves a broader coordination function than the many other forums. It brings together government, national and international NGOs, academia and research institutes, bilateral, regional and multilateral donors to meet and co-operate on a wide array of climate issues. The inclusiveness of the forum, combined with its independence from any one interest group, positions it well to facilitate dialogue, promote collaboration and develop multi-stakeholder projects.

Ethiopia Civil Society Network on Climate Change (ECSNCC)

TheEthiopiaCivilSocietyNetworkonClimateChange(ECSNCC)isacoordination network with more than 50 local civil-society members. It regularly disseminates information, produces publications, and provides members with training and opportunities to consult with government. The network has also been participating in climate change negotiations under UNFCCC.

Vulnerable groups: farmers, pastoralists and women4

• Between1980and2008,Ethiopiahasexperienced eight droughts, five of which precipitated widespread food insecurity – as well as at least 42 incidences of floods throughout the country.5 Predictions indicate that the likelihood of floods increase with climate change, making planning and implementing adaptation policies, measures, and strategies in Ethiopia crucial.6 The areas most vulnerable to drought are the country’s ecologically arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid regions.

• Small-scale,rain-fedsubsistencefarmers and pastoralists are particularly vulnerable, alongside communities living on already-degraded land, and pastoral communities that regularly experience conflict over natural resources with agriculturalists and other groups.

• Genderisamajorconcerninassessingvulnerability, where cultural and socio-economic barriers prevent women gaining full decision-making powers:

– In 2002, the government assigned the management and implementation of a national agenda to empower women totheMinistryofWomen,ChildrenandYouthAffairs(MWCYA).Locally,women’s issues are handled via ‘gender desks’ in the woredas;7

– The Environmental Protection Authority recentlybeganincludingtheMWCYAin high-level and technical discussions. TheMWCYAhasmuchuntappedpotential as a catalyst for women-driven initiatives against climate change.

4 SeeOxfam(2010),‘TheRainDoesn’tComeonTimeAnymore’,Oxford:Oxfam.

5 EM-DAT:TheInternationalDisasterDatabase,UniversitéCatholiquedeLouvain,Brussels,Belgium,

citedinWorldBank(2009),‘DisasterRiskManagementProgramsforPriorityCountries–Ethiopia’.

6 Drought: M.Webster,J.Ginnette,P.Walker,D.Coppard,andR.Kent(2008),‘TheHumanitarianCosts

ofClimateChange’,Medford:FeinsteinInternationalCenter,p.16.

Flood: DFID (2009), Climate Change Facts – Ethiopia.

7 WoredaisalocaladministrativeunitandiscomposedofseveralKebeles–thelowestunitof

administration.

Financing Mechanisms and Issues

According to a recent World Bank study, the costs of adaptation to climatechangeinEthiopiacouldamounttoanaverageof$258millionper year 2010-2050, over and above existing promises of overseas development assistance (ODA).8

While this finance should be provided in addition to existing promises of ODA, it should draw lessons from the provision of ODA. Historically, ODA has flowed through UN agencies, the World Bank or bilateral donors. Over recent years, to bolster governance and the economy, Ethiopia has been moving towards models of mixed implementation and fully government-managed implementation.

DonorsmustnegotiateallmajorsupportthroughtheMinistryofFinanceand Economic Development and in consultation with other ministries. Manydevelopmentpartnersfinancedevelopmentprojectsmainlythrough local NGOs, which are viewed as efficient and effective conduits. Embassies are reformulating their plans to include climate change. They predicted that climate change mitigation will be as, if not more, important than adaptation.

Ethiopia’s Development Assistance Group (DAG) aims to improve coordination among 26 major donor agencies in their work with the government. However, since climate change is not yet on the DAG’s agenda, another gap in adaptation financing remains. That gap could be filled by the creation of a National Implementing Entity (NIE) under theKyotoProtocol’sAdaptationFundand/orafutureadaptationwindowunder the Green Climate Fund established in Cancun. The NIE modality gives countries direct access to funding. Ethiopia is likely to have a good chance of being approved for this financing scheme because of its experience in direct implementation of multi-donor funds.


Mitigation and Adaptation

Ethiopia must weigh the pros and cons of mitigation projects. For example, the government’s plan to achieve a ‘carbon-neutral, climate-resilient’ economy by 2025 is a realistic goal, due to Ethiopia’s already low carbon emissions, especially if major efforts are made in the agriculture sector. The ‘climate resilient’ aspect of this is likely to be more costly, but also more important, in terms of protecting the Ethiopian people and the economy. While both the Ethiopian Government and some proponents of Green Growth highlight the importance of a “development first” agenda that does not entail significant additional costs, there is still a risk that this commitment could skew decision making towards saving carbon and away from poverty reduction.

It is vital that opportunities for low carbon development options, which will have significant benefits for poverty reduction and adaptation co-benefits remain the key criterion for prioritising interventions, though without diminishing in any way the urgent need for substantial new and additional funding dedicated for adaptation.

Consultation and Participation

The government, donors, and other development partners should consult affected communities on specific needs regularly. Together, they can develop clear and coherent priorities and responsibilities.

8 WorldBank(2010),EconomicsofAdaptationtoClimateChange:EthiopiaCountryStudy

http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/documents/EACC_Ethiopia.pdf

www.oxfam.org©OxfamInternational,June2011


Capacity-building is a necessity, especially for the woredas and kebeles. This participatory groundwork must be in place before financing starts to flow. It requires human and financial resources, as well as political will and broad social support.

Policies and activities must be tailored to the needs, schedules, cultural contexts and interests of women farmers, who are often marginalised because they are less literate, busy at home with family duties, and not invited to attend community meetings. Without sustained consultation and grassroots participation, there is no guarantee that assistance will reach these women and others who are most in need.

Information and Monitoring

Information on the impact of climate change in Ethiopia is not easily accessible. It is critical to compile all recent and current research in one place and to avoid duplicating work. Links must be set up with farmers and local communities, who must proactively seek information and also give relevant first-hand observation and analysis of their concerns and the production of sex-disaggregated data must be prioritised.

The EPA is fine-tuning guidelines for the different sectors to mainstream climate mitigation and adaptation into their work. It is drafting a manual that will detail appropriate technologies for vulnerable sectors. This is a progressive move, proving the government’s foresight as it aims for future technology transfer or in-country development of such advanced tools.

Supporting Country Ownership

In addition to supporting strong consultation and participation provisions, climate finance providers should recognise the barriers to national ownership that current approaches to climate finance can entail. Firstly, a project-based approach can limit sustainability of funding, planning, and implementation as a result of varying donor disbursement cycles andrules.Secondly,theprovisionofclimatefinance,eitherintheformof loans or tied to conditionalities such as low carbon criteria, limits their beneficiaries’ choices and the policy space needed to develop a genuinely country-owned approach. Both should be avoided in favour of supporting the capacity of national governments to design and implement long-term plans.


As financing for climate change adaptation gathers pace, it has become fundamentally important to identify how it flows into developing countries. This is a major opportunity to shape the governance of funding at the national level so that the needs of the most vulnerable can be met. The core issue is country-level ownership of adaptation finance. Consequently, providers of adaptation finance must put developing countries in the driver’s seat, and the countries themselves must exercise leadership and respond to the needs of those most affected by climate change.Mostimportantly,civilsocietyandvulnerable communities must be able to steer and hold accountable the way in which adaptation finance is used.

For more information on climate finance governance in Ethiopia, please contact Senait Regassa ([email protected])

Owning AdaptationFactsheet: Nepal

India


Ethiopia

Pakistan

Nigeria

Tanzania

Sudan

NigerMali

Angola

Thailand

Myanmar

Bhutan

Yemen

Zambia

South Africa

East Timor

Afghanistan

Russia

Mauritania

Mexico

Colombia

Peru

Chile

Brazil

Chad

UK

Malawi

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Liberia

Ghana

Eritrea

UgandaKenya

Mozambique

Zimbabwe

IsraelPalestine

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Armenia

Tajikistan

Nepal

Viet Nam

Dominican Republic

Jamaica

Guyana


Bangladesh

Sri Lanka

The Philippines

I n d o n e s i a

Somaliland


Bolivia

Cuba

Ecuador

Burkina Faso

Somalia

China

Guatemala

El Salvador

Honduras

Nicaragua

Haiti

Albania

Rwanda

Cambodia

IntroductionDespite the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord, which ended a decade of political conflict, serious problems persist in Nepal and it remains one of the world’s poorest nations. With a per capita GDP of $427, it ranks 157th out of 164 countries.1 According to the UN Development Programme (UNDP)’s Multidimensional Poverty Index, 65 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line (although the national scale puts it at 31 per cent). The gap between rich and poor remains wide and political uncertainties abound.

The economy relies heavily on imports and foreign aid but donors have little faith in the public financial management system. Therefore development assistance comes mostly through bilateral projects, not via the national budget.

Based on data from the UNDP’s Climate Change Vulnerability Index comprising 170 countries, Nepal is one of the most most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change over the next 30 years. Several factors put the country at risk, including its diverse topography, fragile ecosystems and widespread poverty. Climate conditions have worsened. Snow and glaciers are melting faster, rainfall has intensified, and floods have become more severe and frequent. At the same time, the country has to contend with limited climate-science data and technology.

Policy Instruments and Implementing ToolsNepal has ratified the 1994 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 2005 Kyoto Protocol. Various government agencies are managing increasing numbers of separate initiatives on climate change funded by different donors through separate agreements.

National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA)

The cabinet finally approved the NAPA in September 2010 after much delay and a long process, which included preparing and disseminating the NAPA document, developing and maintaining a Climate Change Knowledge Management and Learning Platform, and developing a Multi-stakeholders’ Framework of Action. The plan was financed by $200,000 from the Global Equity Fund (GEF), under the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), with a further $50,000 from the UNDP, $875,000 from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and $200,000 from the Danish International Development Agency.

Consultation was widened to include, for example, national and international NGOs, civil society groups, academia and communities. It also emphasises gender and social inclusion to ensure more effective adaptation actions, and prioritises nine projects at an estimated cost of $350 million. Eighty per cent of available funding is earmarked for village/municipal-level projects through implementing line ministries, but there is scepticism about the feasibility of this plan.

1 World Bank (2009), World Development Indicators database.

Nine National Adaptation Programme of Action priority projects

• Promotingcommunity-basedadaptationthrough integrated management of agriculture, water, forest and biodiversity sector

• Buildingandenhancingadaptivecapacityof vulnerable communities through improved system and access to services related to agricultural development

• Community-baseddisastermanagementfor facilitating climate adaptation

• Glaciallakeoutburstfloodmonitoringanddisaster risk reduction

• Forestandecosystemmanagementfor supporting climate-led adaptation innovations

• Adaptingtoclimatechallengesinpublichealth

• Ecosystemmanagementforclimateadaptation

• Empoweringvulnerablecommunitiesthrough sustainable management of water resource and clean energy supply

• Promotingclimate-smarturbansettlement

Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR)

The PPCR process is divided into two stages: analysis, coordination and planning across ministries to mainstream adaptation into development plans; and implementation of plans and programmes. In Nepal, which is one of nine PPCR-recipient countries, the process has reached the first stage of planning.

Initial funding commitments of $60 million were split equally between grants and loans. The amount has since increased to $110 million ($50 million as grants and $60 million as loans). Despite a broad-based civil society campaign to press the government to refuse the loan – reflecting both the ‘polluter pays’ principle and concerns that reliance on loans to finance adaptation will mean that the most vulnerable and marginalised communities will not benefit from the resources they require to adapt – indications are the government will accept the loan. Five inter-related components have been identified: building climate resilience of watersheds and water resources in mountain eco-regions; building climate resilience to climate-related extreme events; mainstreaming climate change risk management within development; building climate-resilient communities through private sector participation; and enhancing climate resilience for endangered species.

Aligning PPCR with NAPA

The fragmented nature of climate-change programming in Nepal is illustrated by the separation between the PPCR and the NAPA. The PPCR was expected to build on ‘the comprehensive, inclusive and country-driven process to develop Nepal’s NAPA’, with additional activities aimed to fill the perceived gaps in the NAPA and to ensure compliance with PPCR guidelines. These include: assessment of climate change risk; adaptive capacity assessment; definition of priority action needs; resilience assessment; cost/benefit analysis; and design of implementation modalities. The same Thematic Working Groups established under the NAPA were used in the development of the PPCR.

A distinction has also been made, however, that ‘NAPAs are intended to cover urgent and immediate needs for adaptation whereas the PPCR is focused on long-term goals of achieving development that is climate resilient’.2 Nepal’s NAPA document stipulates that prioritised projects include urgent and long-term adaptation strategies.

Hopes were high that donors would collaborate with the government to develop a comprehensive and coordinated strategy for programming and financing adaptation. After the first joint PPCR mission of the Asian Development Bank and World Bank, however, prospects for alignment began to dim. The mission confirmed that the PPCR should focus on long-term concerns while the NAPA favoured urgent needs, but the PPCR was becoming more independent of the NAPA, even setting its own guidelines. The former stressed resilience; the latter emphasised adaptation.

PPCR has been criticised for headquarters-driven priorities and conducting its own processes. This may be contributing to its divergence from NAPA.

Local Adaptation Programme of Action (LAPA)

The LAPA was prepared at local level by a multi-stakeholder team including vulnerable communities. It involves decentralised and bottom-up planning processes and aims to identify local adaptation needs. It will help ensure consolidated and coordinated adaptation responses.

2 Proposal for the Allocation of Resources to PPCR Pilots, June 2010.

The pilot phase of the LAPA is managed by the private consultancy firm HTSPE, and subcontracted to seven NGO partners for implementation across ten districts.

The LAPA’s three main objectives are to:

• enablecommunitiestounderstandchanginganduncertainfutureclimactic conditions and engage effectively in the process of developing adaptation priorities;

• implementclimateresilienceplansflexibleenoughtorespondtochanging climactic and vulnerability conditions;

• informprogrammersandcatalyseintegratedapproachesbetweensectors.

The LAPA has been developed outside of the NAPA, given the delays and time constraints of the latter. But the NAPA recognises that insights from the LAPA’s implementation will enhance policy refinement and formulation. Nepal’s NAPA affirms the needs-based LAPA as a practical approach to analyse critical and site-specific climate issues and encourages people’s participation. DFID has committed $16.5 million to the LAPA, although this amount could increase significantly. The European Union will probably infuse an additional $20 million. If pilot LAPA projects succeed, the programme will be integrated into mainstream development planning and national strategies.

Ensuring that learning and capacity for LAPA implementation is systematised within government will be critical. It is too early to be drawing lessons from the LAPA, but its design and potential funding resources could support vulnerable communities significantly as adaptation actions move up and are integrated into planning processes.

Various initiatives by civil society in research, advocacy and programming are complementing government-led efforts. These organisations include World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Practical Action, Oxfam, CARE ICIMOD, LiBIRD and Clean Energy Nepal. A number of major civil society forums exist: Climate Change Network Nepal (CCNN), NGO Group on Climate Change, AIN Climate Change Task Force and Climate Action Network-Nepal (CAN-Nepal).

The emergence of the NAPA, PPCR, LAPA and civil society projects highlights the need to pull unlinked initiatives together. Government and donors must push for the PPCR to connect meaningfully with the NAPA, LAPA and other initiatives and not work in isolation.

Forums for coordinating climate change initiatives

The Ministry of Environment (MoE) serves as focal point for the UNFCCC and all climate-related work, with climate change initiatives coordinated by its Climate Change Management Division. Their climate change policy envisions disbursing at least 80 per cent of the funds for climate change to village/municipal levels. However, it is understaffed and current assistance is about to run out.

The Climate Change Council (CCC) provides national coordination, guidance and direction for the formulation and implementation of climate change-related policies, and for the integration of climate change in the government’s perspective, plans and programmes. The Council has 25 members, is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes ministers, other senior government officials, and ‘experts’ (including those from the private sector, NGOs and academia).

Forests and Biodiversity – lessons in adaptation

Almost one-third of the forest area in Nepal is managed by community-based systems that have evolved based on local knowledge. They include community forest, collaborative forest, leasehold forest, buffer zone community forests and conservation areas. The Livelihoods and Forestry Programme is working with 2,500 forest-user groups in 300 Village Development Committees (VDCs) in 15 districts to draw up community adaptation plans and provide funds. They have identified watershed management, farm land conservation, forest management, awareness raising and capacity building through income generation activities.

Nepal National Adaptation Programme of Action, September 2010

Council members interviewed were unclear about their roles in the Council due to lack of detailed Terms of Reference.

The Multi-Stakeholder Climate Change Initiatives Coordination Committee (MCCICC) improves the communication and coordination of climate-change initiatives at programme level to foster synergy and avoid duplication, as well as to optimise benefits and financing programmes and projects. It is made up of representatives from key ministries, national and international NGOs, academia, development partners and local government bodies.

The links between the MCCICC, the CCC and the proposed Climate Change Centre and Nepal Climate Change Knowledge Management Centre (NCCKMC), however, are unclear.

Financing Mechanisms and IssuesNepal needs a common, robust and accountable financing mechanism to ensure effective climate change adaptation down to the regional and local levels. The government had hoped that several NAPA projects would be implemented through the Adaptation Fund, and nominated the MoE as national implementing entity. Donors, however, regard the MoE’s capacity for such a task as a challenge, the agency being young and understaffed. Fiduciary risk, therefore, remains a significant concern of donors.

Outside the UNFCCC, a number of scattered initiatives are being funded by bilateral and multilateral donors. However, the big picture remains incoherent because of differing definitions between agencies about what constitutes a climate change programme, and a lack of coordination among donors and within government between various ministries implementing climate change projects.

The MoE brought 14 donors together to sign a donor compact in 2009 to improve alignment with government and information sharing and coordination between donors. Though no funding was guaranteed under this, it was a vital step towards harmonising support to the government.

Recently-endorsed policy anticipates the creation of a Climate Change Fund. Money from various sources, including the UNFCCC, bilateral and multilateral development partners, the Nepalese Government, and others, for climate change works will be administered through the fund and used for national climate change priorities. At least 80 percent of money in the fund will be utilised for direct implementation of works in the ground. However, there is lack of clarity as to how the fund will be administered and who will act as its trustee.


1. Policy harmonisation

Although it is still too early to draw lessons from pilot projects under the LAPA, efforts to harmonise projects funded under the NAPA and LAPA could offer a more integrated approach to climate change adaptation. Government and donors need to continue to push for the PPCR to connect meaningfully with the NAPA, LAPA and other initiatives and not work in isolation.

2. Strategic leadership

Although the NAPA was credited by many as a consultative and inclusive process, now that the document has been finalised the future picture is unclear. Stakeholders lack consensus, giving rise to concern that the



programme will be implemented in isolation. With a relatively small and young agency at the helm, the strategic sourcing of funds and effective channelling of these remain in question. Implementation also depends to a large extent on whether the government receives funding through the Adaptation Fund and LDCF.

3. Capacity building

The MoE is constrained by a lack of human resources and has had to depend on technical inputs by consultants funded by donors. It is questionable, however, to what degree these consultants have helped to build capacity and institutionalise learning. With much of the support to the Ministry due to end soon, and no clear plan for how this gap will be filled, the government’s climate-change initiatives are in a fragile position.

4. Financing strategy

Much expectation was placed on the NAPA to galvanise efforts and build a harmonised platform for action and finance, but climate change financing in Nepal is fragmented. Despite serious efforts to improve donor coordination, in the absence of a coordinated mechanism to capture climate change adaptation funding, it is highly possible that the number of different modalities and agencies involved will proliferate as funds increase. In addition, although financial management has improved, with more local-level funding than before, there are many bottlenecks at district level.

5. Interim financing mechanism

Nepal is at a critical point. If work on climate change adaptation is to continue, a quick interim mechanism to pool adaptation funding and foster alignment is imperative. The creation of an Apex Steering Committee could serve such a purpose if accountability, decision-making and coordination is worked out and made transparent. For the long term, however, government, donors and other stakeholders need to ensure a financing mechanism that meets the modicum requirements of transparency and trust.



For more information on climate finance governance in Nepal, please contact Prabin Man Singh ([email protected])

Owning AdaptationFactsheet: The Philippines

India


Ethiopia

Pakistan

Nigeria

Tanzania

Sudan

NigerMali

Angola

Thailand

Bhutan

Yemen

Zambia

South Africa

East Timor

Afghanistan

Russia

Mauritania

Mexico

Colombia

Peru

Chile

Brazil

Chad

UK

Malawi

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Liberia

Ghana

Eritrea

UgandaKenya

Mozambique

Zimbabwe

IsraelPalestine

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Armenia

Tajikistan

Nepal

Cambodia

Viet Nam

Dominican Republic

Jamaica

Guyana


Bangladesh

Sri Lanka

The Philippines

I n d o n e s i a

Somaliland


Bolivia

Cuba

Ecuador

Burkina Faso

Somalia

China

Guatemala

El Salvador

Honduras

Nicaragua

Haiti

Albania

Rwanda

IntroductionScientific studies have identified the Philippines as one of the most vulnerable countries in South-East Asia to the effects of climate change. In 2009, research found that all regions in the Philippines were highly vulnerable to climate change, citing the regions’ exposure to extreme climate events, and its human sensitivity resulting from population concentration and low adaptive capacities.1

The effects of climate change – increased precipitation, intensifying typhoons, storm surges, and rising sea-level – affect mainly the agriculture, fishing, and forestry sectors, which provide livelihoods for a majority of the population. More than 61 per cent of those who work in this sector are small farmers and subsistence fisher folk,2 and about 25 per cent of these are women.3

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ‘since 1971, mean temperatures (in the Philippines) have increased 0.14 degrees C per decade.’ As a result, there has been an ‘[i]ncrease in annual mean rainfall since 1980s and in the number of rainy days since 1990s,’ as well as ‘an increase in inter-annual variability of onset of rainfall.’4

The accelerated rise in sea level is a serious threat. Given the country’s archipelagic nature, a one-metre rise in sea level is projected to affect 64 out of 81 provinces, 703 out of 1,610 municipalities, and almost 700 million square metres of land, displacing as many as 1.5 million Filipinos.5

Policy Instruments and Implementing ToolsAs early as 1989, the Philippines had a strategy for sustainable development, aimed at achieving a balance between growth, equity, and ecological integrity.

In 1995, the country hosted the first ever conference on climate change among Asia-Pacific leaders. This resulted in the Manila Declaration, signed by 133 countries, which acknowledged the dangers posed by climate change to ‘small island states, and coastal and other nations of

1 Yusuf A. and H. Francisco (2009), Climate Change Vulnerability Mapping for Southeast Asia. Economy and Environment for Southeast Asia. http://www.idrc.org.sg/uploads/user-S/12324196651Mapping_Report.pdf

2 National Statistical Coordination Board (2008), http://www.nscb.gov.ph/secstat/d_labor.asp

3 Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (2006), http://countrystat.bas.gov.ph/index.asp?cont=factsandfigures

4 IPCC (2007). IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007. http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch10s10-2-2.html

5 Philippine Municipal Data of 2000. National Statistics Office, Republic of the Philippines. http://www.census.gov.ph/

6 Philippine Senate Resolution #9 filed 21 July 2010 with the 15th Philippine Congress

7 ibid

8 EM-DAT (2009). The OFDA-CRED International Disaster Database. http://www.wpro.who.int/internet/files/eha/toolkit/web/Country%20Profiles/Philippines/ Philippines%20Disaster%20Profile.pdf

9 ibid

10 De Guzman, R. (2009), Impacts of Dought in the Philippines. Presentation: e International Workshop on Drought and Extreme Temperatures: Preparedness and Management for Sustainable Agriculture, Forestry. http://www.wamis.org/agm/meetings/etdret09/WOS2-de%20Guzman.pdf

11 http://www.lorenlegarda.com.ph/news_578_legarda_climate_change_causes_more_deaths_due_to_diseases.php

The cost of climate change

• Overthelasttwodecades,anumberofthe deadly and exceptionally damaging typhoons have caused nearly $2 million in direct damage and the deaths of more than 25,000 people in the Philippines.6

• In2009,twokillertyphoons–Ketsana(Ondoy) and Parma (Pepeng) – cost the country $4.8 billion, or approximately 2.7 per cent of GDP.7

• Thefivemostdevastatingtyphoonsinthehistory of the Philippines all occurred after 1990, affecting 23 million people.8

• FourofthecostliesttyphoonsinFilipinohistory occurred after 1990, with combined damaged costs of $1.13 billion.9

• Twoofthemostseveredroughtseverrecorded occurred in 1991-92 and 1997-98. The former affected a combined area of 461,800 hectares, in Mindanao, Central and Western Visayas, and Cagayan Valley, and led to losses totalling $95 billion; while the latter affected about 292,000 hectares of rice and corn, resulting in the loss of rice and corn, with an estimated value of $67.8 million.10

• CitingtheglobalClimateVulnerabilityReport 2010, Filipino senator Loren Legarda noted that diseases, more than disasters, had caused the most number of deaths. In the first quarter of 2011, she noted that incidents of dengue fever had increased by 106% compared to the same period last year. Despite this, however, Legarda noted that the share of priority adaptation projects committed to health was only 3%.11

the Asia Pacific region’. The country ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1994 and the KyotoProtocolin2003.ItwasoneofthefirstcountriestocompleteaNational Action Plan on climate change.

In 2009, the first attempt at crafting a national adaptation strategy through a multi-stakeholder consultation process was led by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), with support from the German government, via its German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) body. The process spanned more than a year and featured the active engagement of civil-society organisations (CSOs), including women’s groups, which led to gender being mainstreamed in the resulting Philippine Strategy for Climate Change Adaptation (PSCCA). This document highlighted key vulnerable sectors, such as agriculture, fisheries, forestry, health, biodiversity, energy, and infrastructure. Through persistent civil society interventions, the document finally included a section on financing. The PSCCA was the first climate change policy document adopted by government line agencies and became a major reference in the development of subsequent plans.

The Climate Change Act was ratified in 2009, shortly after the PhilippineswasravagedbytyphoonsKetsanaandParma.Thelawcalled for climate change to be mainstreamed into government policy and the creation of the Climate Change Commission (CCC). This was to act as the lead agency in carrying out a three-fold mandate: the development of the National Framework Strategy on Climate Change; the National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP); and the Local Climate Change Action Plan.

The CCC, however, was wrecked by strong political dynamics and caught in the transition of outgoing and incoming national governments. CSOs saw the flux as an opportunity to influence the government’s management of climate-change adaptation and financing, and lobbied an urgent change in leadership within the Commission. This resulted in:

• ImprovedcoherenceincountrynegotiatingpositionsintheUNFCCC;

• Closercoordinationamonggovernmentlineagenciesintheformulation of the NCCAP, with the active participation of CSOs;

• Aconsolidatedefforttopushforclimatefinancelegislationthroughtheestablishment of a People’s Survival Fund (PSF), a national adaptation fund driven by the country’s adaptation and risk reduction needs and led by a multi-stakeholder board;

• TheformationoftheClimateFinanceGroup(CFG),aministerial-leveladvisory group composed of the secretaries of the Department of Finance (DoF) and the Department of Budget and Management, as well as the National Economic Development Authority and the CCC.

The NCCAP identified the following priorities: Food Security; Water Sufficiency; Human Security; Sustainable Energy; Climate-friendly Industries and Services; Ecosystems and Environmental Stability. Cross-cutting concerns include capacity development, means of implementation, and climate finance.


Major agents

Funds coming into the Philippines from global sources are generally administered by the DoF. Foreign funds are held in escrow with a government or private depository bank. The DoF approves all fund

Finding the balance between grants and loans, and between mitigation and adaptation in the Philippines ($)

Grants Loans Total costMitigation 636,385,385 491,635,179 1,128,020,564

Adaptation 369,847,995 586,592,639 956,440,634

Total cost 1,006,233,380 1,078,227,818 2,084,461,198

Source: Institute for Climate Change and Sustainable Cities (ICSC)-Oxfam (2010)

disbursements in consultation with the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), which identifies the country’s investment priorities, and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), which is in charge of monitoring foreign exchange flows in and out of the country.

The important role of development banks, also known as development financing institutions (DFIs), government financing institutions (GFIs), and specialised government banks cannot be over-emphasised. These institutions have independent charters with mandates to act in the service of small farmers and fisher folk, those sectors most vulnerable to climate change and most in need of financing. These mandates, however, are not always followed, especially when the bank’s board is composed of appointees neither qualified for, nor inclined towards, pro-poor development banking. Over the last two decades, support for agriculture, including fisheries and forestry, has declined, with the share of agricultural loans to total loans reducing from 9.2 per cent in 1980 to 3.2 per cent in 2006. The share of agricultural production loans has also declined, from 6.99 per cent in 1990 to 0.94 per cent in 2006.

Mix of sources

Climate-change financing in the Philippines comes from a mix of bilateral, multilateral, NGO, and private sources. These sources also tend to determine power relations between those working in the climate change arena. The most powerful actors are multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and donors of bilateral aid. Of the total funding for adaptation, $438.6 million is provided by bilateral sources, while $198.76 million comes from multilateral sources. NGOs, private sector groups (including foundations), and the GEF account for a combined $319 million fund for adaptation.

The problem with multilateral climate-change financing, however, is not just that the funds are often ‘tied loans’ or donor driven, or that decision-making is top-down. Supported projects lack transformational potential. For example, the development of ‘clean coal’ in contrast to the renewable energy sources a developing country like the Philippines needs to develop.

More for mitigation than adaptation

The vulnerability of the Philippines to disasters related to climate change has led to a continual flow of funding for adaptation and mitigation. Over the period 1992–2018, a total of $2.179 billion will have been channelled into the country. Of this, $956 million has been earmarked for adaptation and $1.128 billion for mitigation projects. Some $2.42 million was allocated to aid/relief and $92 million for both adaptation and aid/relief.

Just over half (54.1 per cent) of climate-change financing has been earmarked for mitigation, illustrating a disproportionate focus. Decision makers do not see climate-change adaptation as a high priority in the context of national development plans. The interests and expressed needs of people – especially the rural poor and marginalised groups such as women – are missing in the various climate change-related plans, programs, and financing initiatives put forward by the government, international financial institutions, and donors.

More loans than grants

An earlier study of climate-change financing needs conducted by DENR in 2009 revealed that adaptation projects were funded more by loans than by grants. Between 1992 and 2018, total loan funds for direct climate-change mitigation and adaptation amounted to $1.09 billion, more than half of which ($587 million) were in the form of loans for direct adaptation. Loans for direct mitigation comprised a smaller share of $492

million. These loans contributed to the country’s already huge external debt, that was $55 billion in 2010.12

The CSOs in the Philippines have stressed that the provision of adaptation funds predominantly in the form of loans directly contravenes the ‘polluter-pays’ principle that support climate change adaptation funding is the moral obligation of developed countries. Loans are seen to reverse the burden-sharing role, assigning new debt to a poor country severely affected by climate change, even though it contributed much less to the problem. CSOs in the Philippines have claimed that, to be consistent with the ‘polluter-pays’ principle, climate financing for adaptation must be delivered as grants.

Future access and means

Bearing in mind the need to ensure climate finance is provided in a form which guards against corruption, and is directly accessible to vulnerable communities and sectors – CSOs have called for the Philippines to continue to champion the UN-formed Adaptation Fund, while taking steps to mobilise financing from domestic sources as well. Towards this end, formation of the ministerial-level CFG, as provided for in the NCCAP, is seen to be crucial to determining the sources, modalities, and spending priorities of climate-change financing. The CFG is also seen to have a strategic role to play in tapping into other international financing streams, such as the Green Climate Fund established at the climate conference in Cancun.

These suggestions enjoy broad support in the Philippines. There is a broad alliance between the legislature, the executive office, and local units working together with civil society to accelerate the Philippines’ bid for more climate resilience and disaster preparedness funding. One call which the climate-change movement has unified around is the establishment of the PSF to act as a special trust account to address the gap in adaptation financing, build communities’ adaptive capacity, and increase their resilience to the effects of climate change. A bill providing for the creation of the PSF awaits deliberation by the legislature.


1. An urgent priority

Adaptation to climate change must be established as a national priority, and reflected and mainstreamed in national and local policy, processes and programmes. The government should continue to position itself as a leading voice in advocating for new adaptation finance contributions and pledges channelled to the Adaptation Fund, and for an adaptation window to be established in the new Green Climate Fund, with the Adaptation Fund principles, governance, and modalities – particularly the direct access modality – to become the benchmark.

2. Policy changes

Although the policy environment in the Philippines seems favourable, in light of the enactment of the Climate Change Law and the Disaster Risk Reduction and Mitigation Act, revisions are necessary in order to clarify and define some of the law’s critical provisions. The role of the CCC must be more clearly delineated. Advocates of adaptation finance, especially CSOs, should push the Commission to play a more robust, coordinated leadership role. It should act as the Philippine climate knowledge hub and lead capacity-builder, empowering local government units to develop long-term, climate-resilient development agendas.

12 Economic and financial data correct as of August 2010, National Statistical Coordination Board, http://www.nscb.gov.ph/sdds/nsdp.asp

Major adaptation projects in the Philippines

Project Proponent/Status

Donor

Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Management

NEDA Status: Ongoing (as of 2009)

GEF

Philippines Climate Change Adaptation Programme – Phase 1

DENR Status: Ongoing

World Bank-GEF

Enabling Activity for the Preparation of the 2nd National Communication to the UNFCCC

DENR Status: Finished

GEF

Strengthening the Philippines’ Institutional Capacity to Adapt to Climate Change

NEDA and DENR Status: Ongoing

Spain, UN Development Programme, MDG Fund

Source: ODA Watch Philippines (2009)



3. An enabling national mechanism

A National Implementing Entity (NIE), fully compliant with fiduciary rules established by the Adaptation Fund and reflective of accepted transparency and accountability standards, should be installed immediately. A broad alliance of adaptation finance champions in the legislature and the executive departments – from the line agencies to the barangay (the basic local government unit) should be convened to accelerate the formation of the Philippine NIE and to put together the country’s multi-stakeholder proposal for the Adaptation Fund. The same mechanism could become an implementing entity to also access finance from an adaptation window of the Green Climate Fund.

4. The People’s Survival Fund

The PSF must be immediately established, in order to create predictable long-term finance streams for urgent adaptation and risk reduction work. The PSF, largely proposed by multi-stakeholder groups and key government champions, with sources of funds coming through both international channels and national budgets, must be designed according to the principles of accountability, transparency, scalability, predictability, and direct access.

5. Climate-sensitive budget

Since 2006, a consortium of 60 NGOs spearheaded the call for higher allocations to environment, education, agriculture, and health. Called the Alternative Budget Initiative (ABI), advocacy included a campaign for a climate-sensitive budget, one that provides clear and targeted allocations for adaptation and mitigation measures. The ABI’s budget proposals in terms of climate change refer to the findings and recommendations of the provincial-level risk maps developed by the Manila Observatory and the DENR.



For more information on climate finance governance in the Philippines, please contact Kalayaan Constantino ([email protected])

Owning AdaptationFactsheet: Tajikistan

India


Ethiopia

Pakistan

Nigeria

Tanzania

Sudan

NigerMali

Angola

Thailand

Burma

Bhutan

Yemen

Zambia

South Africa

East Timor

Afghanistan

Russia

Mauritania

Mexico

Colombia

Peru

Chile

Brazil

Chad

UK

Malawi

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Liberia

Ghana

Eritrea

UgandaKenya

Mozambique

Zimbabwe

IsraelPalestine

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Armenia

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

Kyrgyzstan

Nepal

Viet Nam

Dominican Republic

Jamaica

Guyana


Bangladesh

Sri Lanka

The Philippines

I n d o n e s i a

Somaliland


Bolivia

Cuba

Ecuador

Burkina Faso

Somalia

China

Guatemala

El Salvador

Honduras

Nicaragua

Haiti

Albania

Rwanda

Cambodia

IntroductionTajikistan is the poorest country in Central Asia. The difficult transition after independence in 1991, the 1992–1997 civil war, and recurring natural disasters have resulted in widespread poverty, particularly among rural people. An estimated 53 per cent of the seven million population lives below the poverty line, and 17 per cent below the extreme poverty line. More than 70 per cent of poor and extremely poor people live in rural areas.1

Despite being one of the countries least responsible for the greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change, Tajikistan is one of the most vulnerable. Poverty, poor health and inadequate education, weak infrastructure, and a dearth of private investment, combined with exposure to natural hazards such as drought, flooding, mudslides, extremes of heat and cold, and earthquakes, have resulted in frequent humanitarian crises. In addition, food production already faces many serious challenges, including the limited space available for crops and livestock due to steep slopes and high elevations, and micro-climates that are unsuitable for agriculture.

Tajikistan’s poverty is increasingly feminised. Male migration for work to other parts of the former Soviet Union has created large numbers of women-headed households. Because there are few wage-earning opportunities in rural Tajikistan, many women are dependent on remittances from male relatives, but these are often unreliable and may dry up entirely. Smallholder farming on household plots is therefore their main livelihood.

Families in rural areas frequently have many children, which increases poverty and women’s workloads. Girls tend to be withdrawn from education earlier than boys, leading to lower educational qualifications and fewer earning opportunities. Land reform legislation, although not overtly discriminative, lacks mechanisms for gender- sensitive implementation. Lobbying work by international organisations has succeeded in increasing the amount of land certificates issued to women from two per cent in 2002 to14 per cent in 2008, and land-use certificates have been issued for 60 per cent of arable land as part of land reform. But flaws remain in ensuring equitable and secure provision of land-use rights.

Policy Instruments and Implementing ToolsTajikistan is a signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. It has developed a First and Second National Communication to the UNFCCC outlining the country‘s key vulnerabilities. A National Action Plan for Climate Change Mitigation completed in 2003 specifies priority activities designed to respond to urgent adaptation needs.

Tajikistan is a participant in the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR). The PPCR government lead is the Deputy Prime Minister and the focal point is the Deputy Head, Department for Environment

1 FAO (2009), ‘FAO Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to Tajikistan’,

http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/ak339e/ak339e00.htm

2 Oxfam (2009), ‘Reaching Tipping Point? Climate Change and Poverty in Tajikistan’,

http://publications.oxfam.org.uk

Specific impacts of climate change

• Theunpredictabilityofseasonalweatherincreases the risks attached to planting and other agricultural decisions.

• Therearealsopotentialthreatstotheavailability of water as many glaciers shrink in size and disappear, leading to a significant long-term decrease in river flow. This increases the risk of low run-off in the dry season and could trigger a sharp reduction in the overall supply of water.

• Temperatureincreaseswillresultinan average decrease in crop yields. Grasslands are also expected to become less productive. Heat stress and reduced water intake for livestock may reduce milk yields and increase the prevalence of livestock disease.

• Meanwhile,theincreaseinriverwaterflow in the wet season brings the threat of floods and heavy sedimentation.

• Climatechangeisalsoexpectedto increase the risk of malaria in mountainous central Asia as conditions conducive to mosquito reproduction reach higher elevations.2

Protection and Emergency Situations under the Executive Office of the President. However, despite the involvement of powerful figures and agencies, a government reshuffle left the focal point post vacant between April and August 2010, when the Strategic Program for Climate Resilience (SPCR) document was being completed. The multilateral development banks (MDBs), principally the World Bank, facilitated the process. Proposals for funding were prepared jointly by the government and MDBs, although the lack of capacity within government meant that much of the work was done by MDB staff and consultants. Since early 2011, when the new government climate change focal point retired, this government post has once again been vacant.

Several joint missions were conducted between October 2009 and October 2010, led by the three principal MDBs – the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). At each turn, mission reports outlining the priority areas, activities and next steps were agreed by the government and MDBs. Meetings were also held with other government stakeholders, selected international organisations, bilateral donors and civil society to solicit feedback on the document outcomes, including Tajikistan’s grant application. A final SPCR request for $50 million was completed and eventually approved by the PPCR Sub-Committee in November 2010 in Washington DC.

Challenges and Issues

Stakeholder participation and involvement

The lack of stakeholder involvement in the PPCR process surfaced repeatedly. The MDB representatives explained their dominant role by calling attention to the limited capacity of national institutions and the reshuffle that left the role of government lead vacant for several months. Through its representatives, the government conceded its limited capacity to address climate change adaptation. Although several line ministries and agencies were involved in the design of the PPCR, their lack of understanding of the issues meant their input was limited.

Civil society groups, including the Tajikistan Climate Network, highlighted the lack of broader stakeholder consultation processes. The World Bank acknowledged the limited time allotted to consultations, though stressed that field visits and consultations were conducted with community members and households. In light of insufficient local expertise, significant funds were spent to cover the costs and fees of visiting international experts.

Project selection

Informed commentators from Tajik and international civil society organisations made a range of comments on, and critiques of, the projects chosen for the PPCR. In addition, some NGOs and UN agencies have pointed out gaps in the analysis and selection criteria.

Because the timeline of the project was truncated, the first phase was not completed (or in some instances even begun) before decisions were made on the second phase. The World Health Organization sought – unsuccessfully – to lobby for health to be included in PPCR projects, pointing out the impact of climate change on health infrastructure. Concerns were raised that reforestation as an adaptation strategy was not sufficiently considered and that lessons learned through successful bilateral forestry strategies might be overlooked. A number of organisations questioned the focus within the energy sector on large-scale, rather than small-scale, hydropower infrastructure and other renewable energy sources in rural areas. Another significant gap was the lack of an effective insurance mechanism in the agricultural sector that

SPCR investment decisions

• Buildinggovernmentcapacitytomanageclimate resilience

• Improvingthedatagatheringandweather forecasting capacity of the state meteorological agency

• DevelopingclimatemodelsforTajikistan

• Enhancingtheclimateresilienceofthehydropower sector

• Increasingtheresilienceofagricultureand sustainable land management

• ClimateresilienceinthePyanjriverbasin

could allow farmers to mitigate the financial risks of climate-related crop failure. Many also found the selection lacking in gender analysis.

Arguing that the PPCR is an opportunity to embed climate change in development investments, some civil society groups, including Oxfam, FOCUS, Ecocentre, Little Earth and the Association of Dehkan (peasant) Farms, are calling for selection criteria more inclusive of the needs of vulnerable groups and mindful of being able to replicate good practices developed by different organisations or in different regions.

Governance

Implementation of the PPCR will need to be managed, monitored and evaluated. Many plans in the SPCR document still need to be detailed. The proposed governance structure in the SPCR document is focused around PPCR implementation and is being led by the ADB, which provided bridge financing under Phase one to fast-start a secretariat team by March 2011. Subsequently the secretariat will be funded with the capacity-building component of the Phase two grant. The secretariat will be vital in establishing other coordination mechanisms, including a steering group that will serve as a forum for discussion and a monitoring tool to ensure meaningful outcomes of the PPCR activities. Both national and international NGOs are insistent that civil society is represented on the steering group.


1. PPCR-funded projects should address the needs of those most vulnerable to climate change

The mechanisms and processes for channelling adaptation funds should include the most vulnerable communities, particularly women and small-scale food producers. This requires re-orientating the SPCR and individual projects towards rural smallholder farmers, even if they are not a significant part of national economic statistics.

2. The government of Tajikistan must exercise full ownership of PPCR funding

The government should be the primary actor in designing, implementing and channelling resources for national climate change adaptation strategies. One lead agency should have the authority and functionality to develop the national strategic framework on adaptation, oversee implementation and coordinate financial resources. This lead agency should work with all relevant ministries and departments. A Tajikistan national climate change adaptation strategy should be further developed and aligned with national development and poverty strategies. PPCR funding should contribute to capacity building of government staff so that they are able to take leadership for climate-change investments in the country.

3. Civil society groups and communities should be guaranteed meaningful participation throughout the planning and implementation process of climate change funding

Civil society – particularly organisations representing those most vulnerable to climate change – should be able to fully engage and participate in the articulation and implementation of strategies and decisions about adaptation funding so that funding decisions integrate their needs and interests.

In order to facilitate community involvement and empowerment within the PPCR process, civil society organisations, local communities, households, and men and women farmers need to understand the concepts and

Possible interventions which could be supported by the PPCR:

• researchtoimprovethescenarioofclimate change impact on various aspects of farming, pastures, water management, and the socio-economic situation of poor rural Tajiks;

• buildinginfrastructuretoimproveaccessto weather forecasts for farmers and rural communities;

• pilotingandrollingoutadaptiveapproaches in conservation agriculture, pasture management, and water and energy efficiency;

• farmwater-management(terracingandmulching, drip irrigation, etc);

• provisionofnew,moresuitable,cropvarieties for remote communities;

• capacitybuildingincommunity-baseddisaster risk reduction;

• strengtheningpartnershipsforresearchand development in the region, with the participation of farmers, local NGOs, the private sector, and academia.



practical application of climate change adaptation measures and the mechanisms by which these could be financially supported.

4. Gender equality and women’s participation should be central to climate funding

Climate change will affect most severely those who are poorest and have limited capacities to adapt and mitigate its negative impact. Women are disproportionately represented in the poorest segments of society. Climate investments must therefore be based around a thorough gender assessment that examines the impact of climate change on women and on men, and guides investments that address the needs of both.

5. Capacity-building should accompany climate funding

Resources need to be set aside for capacity building, which should be rapid, up front and sustained throughout the adaptation process. Capacity building is needed across government ministries for local government leaders, as well as among civil society and community organisations. The capacity-building strategy should mirror each investment so that it is in line with identified tasks and enables accountability. Capacity-building should span technical competencies and the ‘softer’ engagement and leadership skills. Building capacity at the national level will also enhance programme ownership, and reduce the reliance on international technical assistance often imposed by donors and MDBs, as well as the high costs of international consultancies.

6. Climate funding processes should be transparent and accountable to the people of Tajikistan

Government and development partners should publicly disclose all documents related to the usage of PPCR funds and create regular and accessible public reports outlining how funds are allocated. Spending should be clearly disaggregated into measureable components in order to facilitate monitoring. The mandate, membership, resources, and capacity of the oversight and management body, as well as voting rights and conflicts of interest within that body, should be carefully considered. In the proposed steering group of the PPCR secretariat, civil society representatives must be present with full voting rights. Social audits and an independent watchdog, with representation from diverse stakeholders, could be established to ensure accountability.

7. National climate funding approaches should be informed by existing models

Approaches to climate change funding in Tajikistan should consider existing mechanisms that have been designed with a similar intention of poverty mitigation. Such mechanisms exist in state agencies and civil society projects. Where possible, climate finance modalities should build on existing structures rather than create new ones. Funding recipients should be allowed to access resources directly, without the need for intermediaries. As the PPCR will be the first of much larger future investments, it is an opportunity for Tajikistan to organise a single, representative body that can plan and monitor investments itself, and therefore avoid the transaction costs of multiple administration channels such as the MDBs.



For more information on climate finance governance in Tajikistan, please contact Andy Baker ([email protected]

Owning AdaptationFactsheet: Viet Nam

India


Ethiopia

Pakistan

Nigeria

Tanzania

Sudan

NigerMali

Angola

Thailand

Myanmar

Bhutan

Yemen

Zambia

South Africa

East Timor

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UgandaKenya

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Rwanda

IntroductionViet Nam is one of the countries likely to be most affected by climate change. In part, this is due to its long coastline, dependence on agriculture and relatively low levels of development in rural areas. The projected effects include: an increase in rainfall in wet seasons and a decrease during the dry season by 10 per cent or more; an increased intensity and frequency of storms and floods; and a sea level rise of around one metre by 2100.1

The effects of climate change are already evident: the average surface temperature has risen 0.7°C since 1950; the typhoon and flood seasons are longer than they used to be; there have been droughts in areas previously not vulnerable to aridity; there is more heavy rainfall and flooding; and storms are moving south.2

Policy Instruments and Implementing MechanismsViet Nam ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1994 and completed the National Target Program to Respond to Climate Change (NTP-RCC) in 2008. The government sought to mainstream climate change in its Socio-Economic Development Strategy (SEDS 2011–20) and Social Economic Development Plan (SEDP 2011–15), as well as committing to a long-term, ‘low carbon’ industrial economy, and prioritising greenhouse gas reduction in energy, forestry and agriculture. However, climate change adaptation is only mentioned in the agriculture section of the SEDP, and is not mainstreamed as a development challenge across all sectors.

The NTP-RCC provides the institutional framework for developing action plans related to climate change. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE) is the lead ministry, and the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol are the focal point and designated national authority for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. MoNRE is now drafting criteria for climate change project selection with the aim of guiding the next round of climate change planning in the line ministries.

Concerns about the climate-change planning process include the fact that the NTP-RCC is considered technocratic, with few opportunities for input from lower levels of government such as provinces or people’s organisations. The fear is that the likely recommendations, such as large-scale infrastructure improvements, are not attuned to the localised, community-level impacts of climate change. The SEDS and SEDP will provide for guidance in the integration of climate change at sub-national levels.

1 World Bank (2010), ‘The social dimensions of adaptation to climate change in Vietnam’,

http://climatechange.worldbank.org/reports/social-dimensions-adaptation-climate-change-vietnam

2 Ibid.

Challenges and issues

The overlap of functions between and within ministries represents a significant challenge in the disbursement of climate change funds:

• TheMinistryofFinance(MoF)isresponsible for the budget, while the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) leads the development planning process and is responsible for management and coordination of Official Development Assistance (ODA);

• AstheleadagencyfortheNTP-RCC,thework of a number of Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MonRE) departments now intersect with various MPI functions;

• Themajorityofclimatechangeprojectsare implemented by other line ministries. The MoF has highlighted concerns about delegating too much responsibility to the MoNRE, which could weaken the MoF’s accountability to stakeholders such as the National Assembly;

• Donorsarecallingforanexpandedroleof the NTP-RCC Standing Office or for the creation of a new unit that will handle large-scale ODA coordination.


Budget support

This is the government’s preferred choice, with the possible exception of MoNRE. However, donors have concerns about the possible diversion of climate change funds to other activities. This could be addressed by institutionalising a process for mainstreaming climate change into ministry-level and local development plans. A further concern is that budget support mechanisms are limited in their ability to attract private sector financing, which is seen to be crucial to meet the financing targets in particular for mitigation.

ODA support is expected for the NTP-RCC where 50 per cent of funds are expected to come from ‘foreign capital’. The Japanese and French governments have committed $134 million in ODA loans under a Support Program to Respond to Climate Change (SP-RCC). The interest on the Japanese loans, which form the majority of funds, will be 0.25 per cent over a 40-year repayment period with a 10-year grace period. The funds work in a similar way to the Poverty Reduction Support Credit where progress is measured through a policy matrix. The World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) are now also planning additional funds for this mechanism.

Project support

Although compiled and updated into a matrix of climate change projects by the World Bank, this modality suggests a high level of fragmentation. In addition, the level of investment, especially for adaptation projects, is relatively low. However, project support will be essential, especially in the short term, to encourage innovation in different sectors. This mode of support is also likely to be one of the few available to civil society groups. Project support is bound to decline, however, once multi-donor funds such as the Adaptation Fund are up and running.

Multilateral channels and multi-donor trust funds

The Trust Fund for Forests (TFF)

The national-level Trust Fund for Forests (TFF) has been considered as a potential channel for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation. It was established in 2004 with pooled funding from Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. It addresses sector priorities within agreed policy frameworks, such as the National Forest Development Strategy. TFF funding appears to be on the decline as only Finland and Switzerland have committed to support it after 2012.

The Global Environmental Facility (GEF)

The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is a hosting financing mechanism for the different UN conventions, including the UNFCCC. GEF provides grants for projects tackling climate change, biological diversity, international waters and ozone layer depletion. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and World Bank are traditionally the three implementing agencies that channel most of the GEF resources to national partners in a wide range of projects. Increasingly, regional development banks and other UN organisations also channel GEF finance, as ‘executing agencies’. In Viet Nam, most GEF funding is for large technical assistance projects focusing on mitigation, e.g. efficient energy.

Useful lessons and limitations of the Trust Fund for Forests (TFF)

• TheTFFcreatesacommonapproachtocapacity building in the sector.

• Therotationofthechairensuresthatalldonors feel equal in the decision-making process.

• Governmentanddonorproceduresareharmonised and therefore efficient.

• Donorsstillplayamajorroleinprojectmanagement because of the government management board’s low capacity.

• Proceduralcompliancehasbeenweak,exposing the work to financial risks.

• Projectsselectedareeithercarriedoutbylarge entities (e.g. the Asian Development Bank or World Bank) where the bulk of funding is absorbed by international consultants or by agencies lacking in capacity, leading to project failure.

• Withsofewdonors,sustainabilityofthefund is weak.

Limitations of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF)

• Limitedtechnicalcapacityofnationalstakeholders in project design.

• Government’sinabilitytoprovidecounterpart funding, which is an often-criticised GEF requirement.

• Slowprojectcyclesandinefficiency,e.g.because of the need to apply through intermediate agencies.

Government trust funds

These include the Viet Nam Environmental Protection Fund (VEPF), Viet Nam Conservation Fund (VCF) and Forest Protection and Development Fund (FPDF).

• VEPFsupportsenvironmentalprojects,mostlyintheformofsoftloans. Current regulations require that all ODA-supported CDM credits will accrue to this fund and not to the project owners. Some stakeholders are concerned that this could limit the development of carbon financing and cause Viet Nam to lose out on significant funding opportunities in the future.

• VCFaimstoimprovetheconservationandsustainableuseofbiodiversity resources in special-use forests (SUFs), and funds support projects up to $200,000. The projects are considered to be generally successful. Sustainability is a significant concern as SUFs cannot be used for commercial purposes.

• FPDFisanon-profit,stateentitylaunchedin2008toacceptmoneyfrom various sources to invest directly in activities that seek to develop and protect forests, socialize forestry and raise awareness about the need to protect forests.

Adaptation Fund (AF)

This was set up under the Kyoto Protocol to help mainstream climate risk management into policies and plans. Initial funding is from a levy on CDM proceeds and some bilateral donors have also started to finance it. AF funds are made available through Multilateral Implementing Entities (MIEs) such as UNDP and the World Bank, which provide countries with indirect access to the funds and through National Implementing Entities (NIEs) which are accredited by the AF for direct access by developing countries’ organisations. Viet Nam is keen to access climate funds through this new channel and is currently considering potential NIEs.

Lessons learned and recommendations1. Adaptation strategies must target those who are most vulnerable,

including poor people, women, children and minority ethnic groups. They should be participatory, ensuring that those who are most vulnerable have a voice in planning and decision-making. Poverty reduction programmes such as Programme 135 can be used as an example of how marginalised groups can be reached. Participation and ownership are essential to resource allocation and project implementation.

2. From the highest level of government officers to village heads, from international and local NGOs to mass organisations (e.g. the Farmers’ Association and Women’s Union) and informal interest groups, it is important to have trusted and accountable representatives and intermediaries. Evaluations have shown that such representatives and intermediaries increase the voice of vulnerable groups, although at times their work can suffer from donor pressure, weak capacity and a lack of sustainability.

3. It is vital that climate change funds are available for local capacity building, from addressing poor working conditions for village officials to promoting participation of the people and community in programme and project implementation. Training should be prioritised at the commune level so that staff and communities become trusted owners of the work. Building capacity at local level is essential because the impact of climate change varies significantly from one locality to another.

Adaptation Fund: direct and indirect access

• Theadvantagesofdirectaccessarethat it could speed up the project cycle, depending on the capacities of NIEs, and enhance country ownership, thus offering greater potential for alignment with national needs and priorities. However, there are no guarantees that the action plans are inclusive or attuned to the needs of the most vulnerable sectors and local communities, and there are no mechanisms in place to hold approved applications accountable to programme outcomes.

• Themajordrawbackofindirectaccessisthat government ownership is diminished. In addition, within the UNFCCC negotiations, developing countries appear to have lost faith in the ability of the World Bank to manage climate funding.



4.ThenatureofpovertyischanginginVietNam.Localcivilsocietygroups can provide useful insights into the types of adaptation investments that will yield results. However, traditional ODA to such groups is on the decline. Future funding schemes such as the Adaptation Fund should be reviewed soon in terms of stronger procedures for community and civil society engagement, and these lessons should be captured for the design of the new Green Climate Fund established in Cancun.

5.Leadershipcapacityshouldbebuiltatalllevels,inparticularat commune and village level. The SEDP should consider how decentralisation, grassroots democracy and the role of the National Assembly should evolve over the next five years in terms of developing new and different forms of accountability. Transparent design, funding and implementation practices will allow the government and people’s organisations to provide sufficient oversight. Government, mass organisations and NGOs should work together to find ways to improve accountability to and leadership by vulnerable groups.

6. Viet Nam should reach out to other developing countries and together establish a position such as demanding grants – rather than loans – for all adaptation plans. Adaptation funds should be made available to meet the demands of decentralisation, including building local capacities and project ownership. Communities should already be developing adaptation options, and local-level planning and experimentation should be a funding priority.

7. Climate finance projects and programmes must be mobilised according to national, sector and local socio-development plans. The government should accept only those grants that are consistent with the principles underlying the Hanoi Core Statement on Aid Effectiveness.



For more information on climate finance governance in Viet Nam, please contact Le Mihn ([email protected])

Owning Adaptation and Factsheet [Climate Funding]

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