Over-the-Counter Derivatives Regulation - Marie Curie Initial
Transcript of Over-the-Counter Derivatives Regulation - Marie Curie Initial
Over-the-Counter Derivatives Regulation:The US Law and its Implementation
Marti G. Subrahmanyam(based on the chapter with Viral Acharya and Or Shachar
from the NYU-Stern book “Regulating Wall Street”)
For presentation at Marie Curie Initial Training Network on Risk Management and Risk Reporting
Deutsche Bundesbank Conference Berlin, May 5-6, 2011
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Restoring Financial Stability:How to Repair a Failed System
November 2009
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Regulating Wall Street:
The Dodd-Frank Act and the New Architecture of
Global Finance
November 2010
Outline• The Financial Crisis and the OTC derivatives market
• The Dodd-Frank bill and OTC derivatives
• Evaluation of the main proposals
• Overview of the OTC derivatives market
• Margin requirements vs. transparency
• How derivatives dealers will be affected
• How end-users will be affected
• Disclosure practices and how they will change
• Clearinghouses and systemic risk
• Implementation of the Dodd-Frank bill: Further work
• Implementation of the Dodd-Frank bill: Recent developments
• Prospects for the future4
The Financial Crisis and the OTC Derivatives Market
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has highlighted two aspects of the OTC derivatives market that deserve attention and potential reform:
1. Leverage
• Thus far, regulatory capital requirements have not been suitably adjusted to reflect all aspects of OTC derivatives exposures, such as their illiquidity and their counterparty and systemic risks
2. The opacity of exposures in OTC derivatives
• The risk monitoring function in OTC derivatives markets is left to the individual counter-parties
• A counterparty risk externality
• Primary concerns surrounding the failures or near-failures of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG all had to do with uncertainty about how counterparty risks would spread through the web of OTC connections
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Timeline of the Proposed Bills• December 11, 2009: “The Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2009” approved by the U.S. House ofRepresentatives Financial Services Committee chaired byCongressman Barney Frank
• March 15, 2010: “The Restoring American Financial Stability Act”was proposed by the U.S. Senate Banking Committee under SenatorChristopher Dodd
• April 21, 2010: The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition andForestry approved the “Wall Street Transparency and AccountabilityAct of 2010”
• July 15, 2010: The Senate passed the Dodd-Frank Wall StreetReform and Consumer Protection Act by a vote of 60 to 39 (TheHouse of Representatives approved the Act on June 30 by a vote of237 to 192). It was signed by President Obama on June 20.
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“Wall Street Transparency and Accountability” Part of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010
• Which derivatives will be affected?– Essentially, all derivatives, with a few exceptions
– FX derivatives (forwards and swaps, among others) could be excluded, based on a later decision of the Treasury Secretary
• Clearing– The default treatment of derivatives will be that they remain
uncleared
– Exemption process is laid out
– Clearinghouse management
– Uncleared swaps to maintain mandated margin/collateral
• Transparency & Reporting Requirements– Position limits, position accountability and large trade reporting
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“Wall Street Transparency and Accountability” Part of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010
• Bankruptcy related issues– Bankruptcy exemption
– Collateral segregation
• Trading and risk mitigation– Systemically important institutions in derivatives markets
– Exemptions for banks for balance sheet hedging and end-user exemption for entities with hedges in other business positions
– De Minimis investment requirement
– Leverage limitation requirement
– The Lincoln Amendment (Section 716)
– Prohibition on lender-of-last-resort support for derivatives dealers8
“Wall Street Transparency and Accountability” Part of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010
• Enforcement authority with SEC and CFTC– Details left for rule making
– Coordination and conflict resolution across regulators
• Extraterritorial enforcement and international cooperation– Foreign platforms (boards of trade)
– International harmonization
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Evaluation of Current Proposals• Overall impact
– Have the potential to stabilize the markets and mitigatesystemic risk
• Clearing– Many important details remain unspecified and subject to
further examination by various regulators, including the SEC,CFTC and the Secretary of the Treasury
– Exact implementation of clearing provisions should contain themoral hazard of clearinghouses given their systemic importance
– Systemic risk in OTC derivatives lies with dealers and not withend-users. The exemption for hedging transactions makes sense
– Clearinghouses to require members to fully collateralize theirlargest exposures, in each class reducing systemic risk
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Evaluation of Current Proposals• Transparency & Reporting Requirements
– The Act’s biggest strength lies in legislating counterparty-leveltransparency for the regulators, price-volume level transparencyfor all market participants, and aggregated transparency ofpositions and players in different derivatives markets (twice ayear)
• The modified Lincoln amendment– Not requiring – or even recommending – “audit-and-punish”
treatment of exemptions that are based on hedging motives isan important weakness of the Act
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Evaluation of Current Proposals• Bankruptcy resolution relating to derivatives entities
– The restriction on Federal assistance to swap entities includingclearinghouses seems to rule out an important mechanism todeal ex-post with systemic risk
– In the event that a clearinghouse gets to the point of insolvency,the Act explicitly prohibits its positions from being transferred toanother clearinghouse. The Act seems to overly restrict ex-postresolution options for stress scenario at a clearinghouse
– In the case of sale and repurchase agreements (“repo markets”),there is a case for softening the bankruptcy exemption forderivative transactions in scenarios where there is a systemicallyimportant counterparty that is going bankrupt
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• Other issues– Does not recognize the difference between credit derivatives
and other derivatives. A gradual implementation from the mostproblematic to the least would have been better.
– Many issues relegated to regulators for rule making e.g.separation of normal banking from derivatives transactions willrequire a lot of regulatory intervention
Evaluation of Current Proposals
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The Growth in the OTC Derivatives Market
• OTC derivatives are a significant proportion of activities of global banks
• Used for both hedging and speculation
• Customized vs. standardized derivatives products
• Systemic risk of OTC derivatives demonstrated in the financial crisis of 2007-2009
• Opacity of exposures to OTC derivatives
• Cost of bailouts borne by taxpayers, while benefits of speculation go to bank employees/shareholders
Overview of the OTC Derivatives Business
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Why Credit Derivatives are Different
• “Jump to default” risk
• Difficulty in setting margin
• Risk to clearing house
• Rule of 100% of loss given default of largest position
• No obvious sellers of credit derivatives
• Pro-cyclical risks of credit derivatives
• Legitimate use of sovereign CDS – to hedge sovereign risk in sovereign bonds as well as bonds of corporate headquartered in a country
• Banning/restricting sovereign reduces CDS market liquidity in the underlying bond market, without any benefits
• Better to insist on greater transparency from participants
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Breakdown of the Global Derivatives Market:OTC vs. On-Exchange and by Underlying Asset Class*
* Exotic underlyings (e.g., weather, freight rates, economic indicators) account for less than 0.3%
Source: BIS, WFE, FIA, Deutsche Borse Group17
The Size of the OTC Derivatives Market
Notional amounts outstanding (in trillions of US dollars)
Gross market values and gross credit exposure (in trillions of US dollars)
Source: BIS
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CDS Contracts ($, trillions)
1 Notional amount outstanding (rhs)
Source: BIS Quarterly Review, December 2009
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Derivatives Usage: Breakdown by Industry
98.497.7
96.3
95.2 95
92.391.7
84.4
75
80
85
90
95
100
Financial Basic Materials Connsumer Goods
Technology Health Care Industrial Goods
Utilities Services
Deriv
ative
s Usa
ge A
cross
Indu
stries
(%)
Source: ISDA20
Derivatives Usage by Financials and Non-Financial Firms (Among Fortune 500 Companies)
No. of Firms
% of Firms Using
Derivatives
FX Interest Rate
Commodity Equity Credit (CDS)
Banks 71 100 100 99 87 86 86
Insurers 45 96 89 87 24 76 64
Diversified Financial
7 100 86 100 29 29 43
Non-Financial 377 93 86 80 44 12 2
Total 500 94 88 83 48 29 20
Source: ISDA
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Credit Derivatives Composition by Product Type as of 4Q09
Credit Default Swaps98.10%
Total Return Swaps0.68%
Credit Options0.26% Other Credit
Derivatives0.96%
Credit Default Swaps
Total Return Swaps
Credit Options
Other Credit Derivatives
Source: OCC, 4Q09 Report22
Net Dealer CDS Exposure (Total CDS Selling – Total CDS Buying) by Index ($, bln)
IG, investment gradeHY, high-yield
Source: DTCC, CIRA23
Margin Requirements vs
Transparency
The Size of the OTC Derivatives Market• Regulations are easy to implement for standardized products
• Non-standardized products: collateral?
• Risks mainly in these products with the major dealers (global banks) who do not post enough margin
• What about others such as large insurers and corporates?
• Tradeoff between excessive collateral requirements and systemic risk created by OTC derivatives
• Require disclosure of trades and positions in an aggregated manner, including collateral posted
• Rely more on transparency rather than regulatory rules, which could become rigid
Margin Requirements vs. Transparency
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Collateral CoverageGrowth of value of total reported and estimated collateral, 2000 – 2009 ($, bln)
Growth of reported collateral agreements, 2000-2009
12,00016,000
28,140
38,543
54,838
70,892
109,733
132,732
149,322 150,881
2000 (est) 2001 (est) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Reported Estimated
Source: ISDA Margin Survey 2000-2009
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Counterparties of Collateralized Transactions
Source: ISDA Margin Survey 2009
• A total of 67 ISDA member firms responded to the 2009 Margin Survey..
• Based on the number of collateral agreements executed, the Survey classifies respondents into: – A “large” program: at least 1,000 agreements (under this criterion, 20 firms are classified as “large”).
– A “medium” program: 51-1,000 agreements (25 firms)
– A “small” program: less than 50 agreements (22 firms)
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Trade volume and exposure collateralized:2003-2009 Survey (%)
Percent of Trade Volume requiring Collateral Percent of Exposure Collateralized
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003
OTC Derivatives
65 63 59 59 56 51 30 66 65 59 63 55 52 29
Fixed Income
63 68 62 57 58 58 53 71 66 65 57 58 55 48
FX 36 44 36 37 32 24 21 48 55 44 44 43 37 28
Equity 52 52 51 46 51 45 27 52 56 56 56 61 52 24
Metals 39 38 37 37 31 24 18 47 41 34 34 44 40 18
Energy 39 40 42 48 36 26 16 47 39 41 44 37 30 15
Credit 71 74 66 70 59 45 30 66 66 66 62 58 39 25
Source: ISDA Margin Survey 2009 and earlier years28
• A few large dealers account for a significant portion of outstanding amounts and volume
• Significant systemic risk resides here
• Need to separate hedging from pure speculation through “prop trading” – Volcker rule
• Not necessary to hive off trading/asset management, but simply require higher capital/collateral
• Strictly monitor hedge exemptions and impose penalties if there are violations
How Dealers will be Regulated
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Concentration of Derivative Contracts:All Commercial Banks, 1Q09 ($, Trillions)
Source: Call Reports, OCC 4Q0931
Notional value of derivatives contracts outstanding held by US Banks as of 1Q09 ($, Trillions)
81.1
77.9
47.8
39.1
31.7
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
JP Morgan Chase
Bank of America
Goldman Sachs
Morgan Stanley
Citigroup
Source: Deutsche Bank, WSJ, OCC32
The Proposed Reforms will Help the End-Users
How End-users will be affected
• Corporations use derivatives to hedge business risks• Use is mostly concentrated in small percentage of firms• Cost of customized derivatives may go up• Standardized products create basis risk• Dealer counter-party risk will go down due to clearing
and greater transparency• End-users will get special exemption, but subject to
monitoring with penalties for violation of hedging norms
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Company Total Assets Total Derivative Assetsa
Total DerivativeLiabilitiesa
Selected Insurance Companies
American International Group 819,758 10,192 5,197 MetLife, Inc. 491,408 9,351 4,009Prudential Financial 427,529 7,430b 4,621b
MBIA, Inc. 27,907 1,126 5,332Selected Utilities and Power Companies
Duke Energy Corporation 53,584 491 649Southern Company 49,557 20 461Exelon Corporation 48,863 1,437 506American Electric Power 45,865 710 353FPL Group, Inc. 45,304 1,016 1,762Edison Intl 44,429 950 948Dominion Resources, Inc. 41,687 2,219 2,219PG&E Corporation 41,335 298 542Entergy Corporation 36,613 351 91AES Corporation 34,838 202 467Consolidated Edison, Inc. 34,224 279 464FirstEnergy Corporation 33,557 383 869Progress Energy, Inc. 30,903 5 935Centerpoint Energy, Inc. 19,676 142 221
Selected Energy and Oil Companies
Exxon Mobil Corporation 222,491 N/A N/AConocoPhillips 143,251 7,442 7,211Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 48,154 533 84XTO Energy, Inc. 37,056 2,397 66Chesapeake Energy Corporation 29,661 1,978 635El Paso Corporation 22,424 873 896Spectra Energy Corporation 21,417 26 22
Derivative Assets and Liabilitiesas of June 6, 2009 ($, mln)
a Includes the impact of netting adjustments.b Presented gross without netting benefits.
Source: Fitch, quarterly filings.
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Current OTC Disclosure Provided by Dealer Banks
Goldman Sachs’ accounting disclosures of credit default swap exposures: Sep 2009
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Goldman Sachs’ accounting disclosures of credit default swap exposures: June 2009
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Goldman Sachs’ accounting disclosures of credit default swap exposures: March 2009
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Goldman Sachs’ accounting disclosures of credit default swap exposures: Nov 2008
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Citigroup’s accounting disclosures ofcredit default swap exposures (Sep 2009)
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Citigroup’s accounting disclosures ofcredit default swap exposures (June 2009)
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• Key aspect of the reforms
• Increases transparency and reduces risk due to more stringent collateral requirements
• Risk of fragmentation due to multiple CCPs vs. economies of scale and scope of a single CCP
• Risk of failure of the clearinghouse itself – historical precedent
• Need for Fed support through “lender of last resort” access, despite moral hazard
• Better to focus on one central place for fragility rather than multiple fragmented places as happened in 2008
Clearinghouses (CCPs) and Systemic Risk
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• SEC and CFTC jointly charged with rule-making
• CFTC has 30 rule making areas, each with its own committee
• Ranging from “Definition of Swap Contracts” to “Capital and Margin for Non-banks” to “Position Limits”
• Comments from concerned parties received
• Several groups have published comments and interim rules
• Final rules supposed to be published soon: 360 days after the bill –July 2011
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Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Bill: Further Work on OTC Derivatives
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Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Bill: Further Work on OTC Derivatives
Source: Davis, Polk
• Example of rule making: Definitions of new swap entities
- Swap dealer
- Major swap participant
- Swap Execution Facility
- Other entitles eg. Futures and commodities brokers, pools etc.
- Swap data repository
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Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Bill: Further Work on OTC Derivatives
Work on OTC DerivativesurtherWorkon OTC
Derivatives
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Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Bill: Further Work on OTC Derivatives
Source: Davis, Polk
• Draft rules for about half of the 30 areas published
• Deadlines will slip: “What difference does it make if it‘s a month later or six weeks later?,“ - Rep. Barney Frank (D. – Mass.), former Chairman House
• Do the SEC/CFTC have the resources to frame/implement rules?
• Political battle: “…lack of due diligence in the implementation of Dodd-Frank will result in unduly burdensome regulations that will undermine the competitiveness of our domestic financial industry.” – Sen. Orrin Hatch (R. – Utah) , Ranking Member, Senate Finance Committee
• Need for International coordination: “Assurances from partners.”
• The Treasury Department plans to exclude foreign-exchange swaps from key portions of Dodd-Frank, because not doing so could expose the market to greater risk and instability.
Implementation OTC Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Bill: Recent developments
(CCPs) and Systemic Risk Risklearinghouses (CCPs) and SystemicProspects for the Future
• Consolidation across the world of clearinghouses and exchanges, and potentially also large dealer banks
• Emergence of global transparency platforms and services related to processing of new data on derivatives transactions and positions
• Transition of (some) end-user hedging demand to centralized platforms and exchanges
• Separation of market-making and proprietary trading/asset management positions in large financial institutions
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“The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009” (H.R. 4173)
• Financial stability and “too-big-to-fail” regulation• Ends Taxpayer Bailouts• Creation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency• General investor protection and anti-fraud efforts, including
enhanced funding for the SEC• Sweeping changes in the structure (centralized trading vs over-the-
counter) and regulation (margin requirements and transparency) ofcertain derivatives, but with exemptions for commercial end-users.
• Registration of private fund managers and increased reportingobligations for the private fund industry
• Reins in Executive Compensation
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“The Restoring American Financial Stability Act” (S.3217)
• Financial stability and “too big to fail” regulation
• Liquidation regime for systemically important financial institutions
• Partial realignment of U.S. bank supervisory responsibility
• Restrictions on banking group activities and size (The “Volcker Rule”)
• Enhancements to the regulation of bank holding companies anddepository institutions
• Creation of a new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
• Reform of the markets for derivatives
• Registration of private fund managers and increased reportingobligations for the private fund industry
• General investor protection efforts
• Executive compensation and corporate governance-related issues
• Credit rating agency-related reforms54
“Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010” (“Lincoln Bill”)
• Mandatory clearing and exchange trading for certain transactions
• Registration and regulatory requirements for derivatives dealers and major market participants
• capital and margin requirements for cleared and uncleared transactions
• Segregation requirements for collateral
• Position limits
• Split regulatory responsibility between the CFTC and SEC
• Goes beyond the House and Dodd bills: – Prohibits U.S. federal assistance (including Federal Reserve advances and access to the
discount window as well as emergency liquidity or debt guarantee program assistance) to any dealer, major market participant, exchange or clearing organization in connection with derivatives activities or other activities.
– Broad new enforcement authorities that could apply to a range of derivatives market activities.
– Unlike the House bill, the bill would also cover foreign exchange forward and swap transactions absent a specific exemption.55