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Since 1 January 1999, the euro hasbecome the single currency ofeleven Member States, whosenational currencies are nowdivisions of the euro. Theintroduction of this commoncurrency will have a profoundimpact on competition in Europe.

1. In general, European MonetaryUnion (EMU) will intensifycompetition for three reasons:

a) The euro will reinforce thepositive effects of the SingleMarket Programme. The SingleMarket has had a pro-competitive impact byintegrating markets effectivelyand making the relevantmarkets broader. The euroshould enhance this effectbecause, for trade between theparticipating Member States, itwill eliminate exchange-raterisk and the transaction costsassociated with converting onecurrency into another. As aconsequence, trade flows arelikely to increase.

Whereas the effects of the SingleMarket Programme were mainlyconcentrated on certainmanufacturing sectors which hadhitherto been protected by highnon-tariff barriers, the euro islikely to affect a wide range ofsectors, including notably financialservices and distribution. Inparticular, the markets for manyfinancial services, which are atpresent national because of theexistence of separate currencies,will gradually be widened to coverthe whole euro zone.

The broadening of geographicmarkets offers new opportunitiesto exploit economies of scale andwill lead to an increase in mergerand acquisition activity. This willespecially be true for the financialsector and for industries wheresales networks have previouslybeen largely confined to nationalboundaries and where companiessee prospects for obtainingimportant cost savings byenlarging these to a Europeanscale.

ECCOMPETITIONPOLICYNEWSLETTER

Editor:HenrikMørchProduction& Layout:VickyHannan

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c o m p e t i t i o n p o l i c y

NEWSLETTER1999number 1February

Published three times a year by the Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission

ContentsArticles1 The euro and competition, by Jean-

François PONS and Joachim LÜCKING4 EC competition law and digital pay

television, by Linsey MC CALLUM

Anti-Trust Rules17 Recent Commission Decisions concerning

the scope of the Group Exemption forLiner Conferences, by David Wood

22 Changement important dans la structurede la DG IV, par Maurice GUERRIN

24 New procedures for anti-trust cases:hearings, and notification of transportcases, by Téa MÄKELÄ and CharlesWILLIAMS

27 Cartel enforcement, by Julian JOSHUA31 SICASOV - La Commission exempte des

accords types de production et de ventede semences protégées par des droitsd’obtention végétale en France, byClaudio MENIS

33 The Commission fines a cartel of Britishsugar producers and merchants, byRüdiger DOHMS and Matthijs VISSER

35 Greene King / Roberts, by Nils VONHINTEN-REED

35 Info-Lab/Ricoh, by Elke FISCHER37 Decision of the Commission dated 9/12/98

in case IV/34.466-Greek Ferries, byPanayotis ADAMOPOULOS

39 EUDIM : complément d’information

Mergers40 Recent Developments and Important

Decisions, by John KEMP

State Aid45 Unanimous agreement in the Council on

the procedural regulation, by AdindaSINNAEVE

49 Principaux développements du 1eroctobre au 31 décembre 1998, parMadeleine TILMANS

International57 Organisation mondiale du commerce, par

Pierre ARHEL58 Enlargement, by Maria BLÄSSAR and

Joos STRAGIER

Competition policy in the Central andeastern European Countries61 Hungary : Matáv / Jász-Tel concentration,

by Gizella GYORKI

Information section64 DG IV Staff list66 Documentation79 Coming up80 CASES COVERED IN THIS ISSUE

The euro and competition

Jean-François PONS and Joachim LÜCKING

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Competition Policy Newsletter 1999 Number 1 February2

On the other hand,competition will expose theweaknesses of less efficientcompanies, which willbecome prone to take-overbids. In general, therestructuring arising fromEMU will pose nocompetition problems andshould enhance the overallefficiency of the Communityeconomy. Provided thatmarket entry is easy, nomajor competition problemsshould result from thereduction in the total numberof firms as inefficient firmsexit and more efficient firmsexpand. Although the numberof domestic suppliers in anylocal market should fall, thetotal number of actual orpotential competitors in thatmarket should increase afterit has been incorporated intoa wider geographic market.

b) The euro will increase price-transparency. After theintroduction of the euro, thegreater ease with whichprices in different countriescan be compared will mainlyaffect those sectors whereprice dispersion betweenMember States is high andnot due to structural reasonssuch as differences inconsumer tastes and indirecttaxation, but rather to themarket-segmentation strate-gies of firms.

A recent study by BEUC –the European Consumers’Organisation - shows that theprices of some goods and

services can differ widelyfrom one Member State toanother. Certain consumerdurables sectors, such asmotor vehicles, are likely tobe particularly stronglyaffected by increased price-transparency, since eachpurchase represents a highproportion of the consumer’stotal expenditure. For suchproducts, the potentialsavings which the consumercan achieve by cross-borderpurchasing can easilyoutweigh the additional costswhich he incurs.

c) The euro will allow easierfinancing, leading to marketentry and more mergers. Theimpact of the euro on themarket for corporate equitywill reduce the cost of capitalwhich could lead to anincrease in the number ofmergers. In fact, this numberhas already increasedsubstantially in anticipationof monetary union, notably inthe financial sector (banks,insurance companies). Newfinancing techniques andmarkets can be put to workfor a new generation of EUentrepreneurs thus leading tomarket entry. Therefore, inprinciple, the change in themarket for capital shouldfurther increase the pro-competitive impact of EMU.

For the consumers, the cost ofthe exchange and the fees forinternational payments willbe reduced in the eurozone.

2. Competition policy has animportant role to play insafeguarding and enhancingthe pro-competitive effects ofthe euro on the markets forproducts and services.

In particular, there appear tobe two types of risk, relatingto antitrust on the one handand to state aid on the otherhand:

a) Antitrust risks:The threat of potentiallyincreased competition couldalso lead to attempts bycompanies to find ways toreduce the actual level ofcompetition. For example,the euro will allow consumersto immediately compareprices and other terms oftransactions across borders.This will create furtherincentives for parallel trade,but will also increase thetemptation for companies tocreate new obstacles toarbitrage.

Similarly, new competitivethreats arising from EMUmay induce incumbents toenter into vertical orhorizontal agreements withthe object of foreclosingrivals’ markets, oralternatively to seek state aid.Finally, in the longer run, theexpected increase in mergersand acquisitions could createoligopolies in someindustries. Companies inthese industries could betempted to reduce thecompetitive pressure either

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Competition Policy Newsletter 1999 Number 1 February 3

by engaging in tacit collusionor by forming cartels. Thiswill be made easier as theincreased price transparencywill facilitate the monitoringof competitors’ prices. It willalso be more difficult todeviate from agreed pricesand hide this fact behindexchange rate fluctuations.

A recent example of antitrustrisks is given by the decisionsof the banks regarding thefees for internationalpayments inside theeurozone. These decisionshave given rise to the concernthat they were devisedbetween the banks at anational level. For thisreason, the Commission hasdecided to start aninvestigation.

b) State aid risks:Some companies willinevitably experiencedifficulties as a result of moreintense competition.Consequently, Member Statesare likely to experiencestrong pressure to protect

these companies by means ofstate aids, notably rescue andrestructuring aids. Such aidscan lead to importantdistortions of competition atthe expense of more efficientcompanies. Another dangerassociated with such aid isthat it will perpetuate the old,unviable structures ratherthan promote a genuineadjustment to new economicrealities.

Finally, the knowledge thatgovernment is willing tointervene to rescue firms indifficulty may give rise to“moral hazard”. Theexpectation that, if the worstcomes to the worst, thegovernment will not allow thecompany to fail may leadsome managers to delaymaking difficult decisions onrestructuring and may temptothers to expose theircompanies to excessive risks.Lenders may also be temptedto underestimate commercialrisks in cases where theborrower is perceived as “toobig to fail”.

\ \ \

Competition policy thereforeneeds to remain vigilant toensure that the euro can deliverits full benefits. BothCommunity and nationalcompetition policy have a vitalrole to play in ensuring thatproduct and service markets(including especially thefinancial services) are flexible sothat European consumers willtruly benefit from the commoncurrency.

In DG IV, Unit A-1 will bespecifically in charge offollowing and analysing theimpact of the euro oncompetition. All relevantanalyses and information can besend to the following address:

Joachim Lücking, DG IV UnitA-1/European Commission/Ruede la Loi/Wetstraat 200/B-1049Bruxelles/Brussel/E-Mail:[email protected]

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1. INTRODUCTION

The past decade has seensignificant changes in thetelevision sector in the EU withthe development of commercial,advertising-funded broadcasters,trans-national channels, and theemergence of subscription-funded broadcasters or pay-TVoperators. The introduction ofdigital television is now set tochange the sector even moreradically by increasing thecapacity of transmissionnetworks and allowing new typesof services, such as pay-per-view, interactive banking orshopping and internet access viatelevision. Pay-TV operatorshave led the way in introducingdigital television in the EU, butthe coming decades will see amore general transition to digitaltelevision by all operators in thesector, whether State-funded,advertising-funded or subscrip-tion-funded.

This article describes theCommission’s policy in applyingEC competition law to the paytelevision sector, with particularemphasis on digital paytelevision. Broader issuesrelating to the television sector,and in particular the role ofpublic service broadcasters, falloutside its scope.

2. EC COMPETITION LAWAND DIGITAL PAY TELE-VISION

2.1. A balanced approach

Co-operation between underta-kings with the aim of entering anew and untested market hasbeen recognised by theCommission over decades ashaving benefits for theCommunity’s industrial,technological and socialdevelopment by virtue of theincreased competition which itcan foster. Co-operation cantake the form of a joint venturebetween undertakings, mergerof the undertakings’ interests oracquisition by one undertakingof another.

Analysis of the effects of suchco-operation concentrates on itsnet impact on competitionwithin the common market, thatis the balance between technicalprogress and restriction ofcompetition. Thus, even wherethe undertakings concerned areactual or potential competitorson the market in question, theCommission will generally takea favourable approach if theoverall effect of the co-operation is pro-competitive.

However, where co-operationwill eliminate competition on

the market in question byforeclosing the access of thirdparties and creating a dominantposition, then the limits of theadvantages of co-operationhave been reached. Thecreation or strengthening ofdominance by joint venture,merger or acquisition willalways fall foul of thecompetition rules, unlessremedies can be found whichprevent such effects. Thisprinciple applies equally toundertakings which haveachieved a position of marketdominance through superiorperformance. The Commissionwill object to any furtherstrengthening through jointventure, merger or acquisitionor indeed through abusivebehaviour.

This balanced approach has beenapproved over the years by theCourt of Justice and Court ofFirst Instance. It is also theapproach followed by theCommission in respect of digitalpay television as the competitionrules set out in Articles 85-90 ofthe EC Treaty1 apply to thissector as to all others which havenot been specifically excludedfrom their scope by the Treaty2.

1 As implemented by Council Regulation

17/62 concerning the application ofArticles 85 and 86 EC and CouncilRegulation 4064/89, as amended byCouncil Regulation 1310/97, concerningthe control of concentrations betweenundertakings (“the Merger Regulation”).

2 See joined cases 209-213/84 Asjes[1986] ECR 1425 at paragraphs 40-42.The cultural exception relating to stateaids and Article 90(2) may affect theevaluation of such aids granted to thetelevision sector. However, even thisdoes not amount to a sectoral exemption.

EC COMPETITION LAW ANDDIGITAL PAY TELEVISION

Linsey MC CALLUM, DG IV-C-2

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Geographic markets in thetelevision sector tend to benational for linguistic, culturaland regulatory reasons. Theintroduction of digital televisionwill not change this fact, as isborne out by the comments onthe Convergence Green Paper:

“Markets for broadcasting wereexpected to remain fragmentedalong national and regionallines for cultural and linguisticreasons but also because of thegeographic scope of certainaspects of the business”3.

2.2. Essential policy goalpursued by Commissionand ensuing benefits

The essential policy goal of theCommission in relation to digitalpay-TV is thus to maintain openmarket structures and prevent theerection of barriers to entry tonational or language-basedmarkets which foreclose furtheraccess. This policy has fourfundamental benefits.

2.2.1. Benefits for consumers

The competition rules seek toensure that the Community’scitizens are not exploited bydominant undertakings throughhigh prices and poor qualityservice. As the Commissionrecognised in its communicationon “Services of general interestin Europe”4:

3 SEC (1998) 1284 final, at page 20.4 OJ C 281, 16.09.96, p. 3, at paragraph

15.

“Market forces produce a betterallocation of resources andgreater effectiveness in thesupply of services, the principalbeneficiary being the consumer,who gets better quality at alower price”.

The benefits of competition inthe digital pay television sectorfor consumers have recentlybeen illustrated in France and theUK. Within a month of theappearance of a competitor in theform of Télévision Par Satéllite(TPS), Canal+ reduced itssubscription price5. Similarly,the prospect of competition fromthe digital terrestrial pay-TVoperator, ONdigital (formerlyBritish Digital Broadcasting,BDB), has led BSkyB not onlyto reduce its prices for digitalpay television, but also to offerconsumers a wider choice ofservices6. The creation ofONdigital has already beenapproved by the Commission. Inthe case of TPS, the Commissionhas announced its intention totake a favourable decision7.Some commentators have also

5 Subscription prices were reduced from

186 FF for the basic package plus twofilm channels (1994 price) to 130 FF forthe basic package plus 4 cinemachannels plus the Diney Channel (pricesbetween March and July 1997). 130 FFwas the price then charged by TPS.

6 http://www.inside-cable.co.uk - seearticle of 16 August 1998 “Sky’s digitalpricing revealed”. New Media Marketsof 13 August 1998 “The decision tolaunch a £6.99 “special value” valuepackage … confirms BSkyB’s desire tobuild a mass market digital market andto counteract the rival digital terrestrialservice of ONdigital”.

7 Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) ofRegulation 17, OJ C 65 [1998] of 28February 1998.

argued that the degree ofsubsidisation of the retail priceof digital set top boxes is alsodue to increased competition.

It is also striking to note thatplans for digital pay television inGermany are proceeding apace,despite the declarations ofBertelsmann, Kirch andDeutsche Telekom that theprohibition of their co-operationplans would inevitably mean theabandonment of digitaltelevision there. DeutscheTelekom has signed agreementswith channel providers for themarketing and distribution oftheir digital pay-TV services8.Kirch had claimed that it wouldcease operation of its digital pay-TV platfrom, DF1. Not only hasthis not happened, but Kirch isseeking investors to develop it9.Finally, Premiere has continuedto add subscribers to its digitalpay-TV service. Thus, theprohibition decision adopted bythe Commission on 27 May1998 has not been to thedetriment of German consumers.

2.2.2. Creation of the internalmarket for televisionservices

The benefits of competition alsounderlie the Commission’scommitment to the creation of asingle market in the televisionsector10. 8 TV Express of 10 December 1998, p. 14.9 Financial Times of 7 January 1999,

“Kirch woos investors with new deal”.10 As expressed in particular in the

Television Without Frontiers Directive -Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3October 1989 as amended by Directive

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“Its (the Single Market’s) aimwas not only to achieveeconomies of scale but also toset free the dynamism and thecreativity inherent incompetition” 11.

The Commission’s objection tothe creation of national dominantpositions12 in the digital paytelevision sector is a reflection ofthis fundamental goal. Theabolition of State measureswhich partition national marketswould be fundamentally under-mined if competition law did notprevent private or publicundertakings from replicating

97/36/EC of the European Parliamentand of the Council of 30 June 1997.

11 White Paper on growth, competitiveness,and employment, COM(93) 700 final.

12 One of the conditions of application ofArticles 85 and 86 EC is that theagreement or conduct in question “mayaffect trade between Member States”. Incases 6 & 7/73 Commercial Solvents v.Commission [1974] ECR 223 atparagraphs 30-35 the Court of Justiceconfirmed that an agreement which altersthe competitive structure within theCommon Market to an appreciableextent, or has “repercussions” for thatstructure will meet the “effect on trade”test. In case 22/79 Greenwich FilmProduction v. SACEM [1979] ECR 3275at paragraph 11 the Court of Justiceconfirmed that this applies equally to theprovision of services as to supply ofgoods. The Court of Justice confirmedin case 8/72 Cementhandeleren v.Commission [1972] ECR 977 that anagreement covering the territory of asingle Member State may affect trade ifalters the competitive structure there anddirectly or indirectly affects trade flows.This principle applies a fortiori wherethe agreement makes penetration of anational market more difficult: case61/80 Coöperative Stremsel-enKleurselfabriek v. Commission [1981]ECR 851.Under the Merger Regulation, there is nojurisdictional equivalent to the “effect ontrade” test.

their effect13. The developmentof a European-scale audio-visualindustry would be impossible ifentry into national markets wasblocked.

2.2.3. Media plurality

While the competition rules areof general application, they musttake account of each sector’sspecial characteristics14. In thecase of television, there aremany such characteristics whichwill be discussed in the annex onmarket definition. However, onequite specific point should bestressed here, namely thedangers inherent in the creationor strengthening of dominantpositions for media plurality.The goal of media pluralitymust, therefore, always be keptin mind15.

13 “An agreement (… ) which might tend to

restore the national divisions in tradebetween Member States might be such asto frustrate the most fundamental objectof the Community. The Treaty, whosepreamble and content aim at abolishingthe barriers between States (..) could notallow undertakings to reconstruct suchbarriers” Cases 56 & 58/64 Consten &Grundig v. Commission [1966] ECR 299at 340. The Court of Justice has said that“without (competition law) numerousprovisions of the Treaty would bepointless”, Case 6/72 Europemballageand Continental Can V. Commission[1973] ECR 215 at 244.

14 See case 45/85 Verband derSachversicherer v. Commission [1987]405 at paragraphs 12-15.

15 See also Article 21(3) of the MergerRegulation which recognises thepreservation of media plurality as alegitimate interest and thus allowsMember States to apply national rules tocleared operations.

2.2.4. Digital television asplatform for convergenceand further technologicalprogress

Although technological conver-gence of the television, telecom-munications and informationtechnologies sectors is a reality,the types of retail services whichwill emerge and consumers’demand for them remainsunclear. There is broadagreement on one point,however, namely that digitaltelevision will be one of, if notthe, most important platforms forthe widespread introduction of“convergent services” in the EU.

The BiB joint venture is a goodexample of this: e-mail, limitedinternet access, home-bankingand shopping are to be madeavailable to UK consumers viadigital television platforms. TheCommission proposes to take afavourable attitude to this jointventure after imposing signi-ficant conditions to ensure thatBiB will not create a dominantposition nor strengthen thedominant positions of two of itsparents, BSkyB and BT, in theclosely related pay-TV andtelecommunications customeraccess infrastructure markets16.

The benefits of convergence forall European citizens will onlybe reaped if market structuresremain open and technicalprogress through innovation isfree to develop. This has been

16 Notice published pursuant to Article

19(3) of Regulation 17, OJ C 322[1998]of 21 October 98.

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recognised by industry in thecomments on the Commission’sconvergence green paper.“There was widespread supportfor their (competition rules’)strict application”17.

2.3. Application of policy goal

Despite these benefits, somecommentators plead for a laxapplication of the Community’scompetition rules to the sector,in particular, in view of the scaleof investment and risk involvedin launching digital paytelevision. A number of differentarguments are advanced insupport of this proposal: nationalmonopolies in digital paytelevision will be required inorder to recoup the costs ofentry; concentration in digitalpay television is necessary torebalance the audiovisual tradedeficit with the US; globalisationmeans that national paytelevision monopolies areconstrained by global potentialcompetition. In sum, therefore,these commentators argue thattechnological progress, in theform of the introduction ofdigital television, and applicationof the Community’s competitionrules can be difficult toreconcile. However, theyprovide little or no justificationof this proposed specificapproach to digital pay televisionin either legal or economicterms, nor of its longer termimplications.

Against the background of thiscriticism, the remainder of this 17 SEC(1998) 1284 final, at p. 24.

article is devoted to a moredetailed description of theCommission’s application of thecompetition rules to digital paytelevision, with reference tospecific cases. It seeks toexplain the broad lines of theCommission’s policy in relationto the issues raised by thesecases, which are complex andinvolve examination of thecompetitive situation at all levelsof the vertical supply chain:• Content – access toimportant programming rights,and in particular to films andattractive sports events;• Transmission – access todigital terrestrial, cable andsatellite capacity and in the caseof more advanced convergentservices to broadband customeraccess infrastructure; and• Set top boxes –access toproprietary digital conditionalaccess, electronic programmeguides and application pro-gramming interfaces embeddedin digital set top boxes (oftenreferred to as the technicalservices necessary for paytelevision).

Section 3 examines horizontalagreements on the pay TVmarket itself. Section 4 dealswith horizontal issues at eachlevel of the vertical supply chainand the effects of verticalintegration. Given theimportance of market definition,the principles underlying theCommission’s approach andtheir application to the marketspertinent to digital pay televisionare set out in annex.

3. PAY-TV MARKETHORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS

The Commission has been calledupon to consider a number ofpay-TV mergers, acquisitionsand joint ventures. These can bedistinguished into two broadcategories:• Alliances between compa-nies active on different geogra-phic markets; and• Alliances between compa-nies active on the same geogra-phic market.

The considerations specific tothese categories are set outbelow.

3.1. Alliances betweencompanies on differentgeographic markets

This form of co-operation isunlikely to pose competitionproblems as there will be little orno overlap in the geographicareas of activity of thecompanies in question. Thus, noobjection was raised when Kirchand Richemont entered theItalian pay-TV market throughacquisition of joint control inTelepiu18. Kirch had previouslybeen active only in the Germanpay-TV market, whereasRichemont through its holding inFilmNet had been active in thepay-TV markets in Belgium, theNetherlands, Denmark, Norway,Sweden and Finland. Equally,no objection was raised whenRichemont and Multichoice

18 M. 410 Kirch/Richemont/Telepiu,

Commission decision of 2 August 1994,OJ C 225 [1994] p. 3.

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merged their pay-TV interests inthe EEA in Nethold (which held100% of the voting rights inFilmNet) with a resulting changein the control of Telepiu19. Theconcentration of Bertelsmannand CLT’s radio and televisionbusinesses, including pay-TV, ina newly-created joint ventureCLT-UFA was also declared tobe compatible with the commonmarket20. With the exception ofGermany, Bertelsmann andCLT’s activities took place onseparate geographic markets. InGermany, the two companies’already operated the channelRTL through a joint venture. Inclearing the merger, theCommission refused to followthe comments of third partiesthat the merged entity, CLT-UFA, would hold a dominantposition and stated that, “themere combination of resourcesand possible synergies is notsufficient to establish a dominantposition in the foreseeablefuture”.

As a general rule, therefore, theCommission will take a positiveattitude under the competitionrules to the creation of cross-border alliances betweencompanies active in differentgeographic markets. These areunlikely to result in the creationof dominant positions.Moreover, they contribute to thecreation of companies in theEuropean audio-visual sector 19 M. 584 Kirch/Richemont/Multichoice/

Telepiu, Commission decision of 5 May1995, OJ C 129 [1995] p. 6.

20 M. 779 Bertelsmann/CLT, Commissiondecision of 7 October 1996, OJ C 364[1996] p. 3.

which can benefit fromeconomies of scale and scope.There is only one caveat, namelythat if a network of strategicalliances between all majorEuropean players were to becreated, the impact of individualoperations would have to beassessed against such abackground21. There might be arisk of partitioning of nationalmarkets and a consequentialcreation or strengthening ofdominant positions in thosemarkets, in particular if twocompanies with strong marketpositions were to ally. However,such an effect would have to beproved (and has not yetmaterialised).

3.2. Alliances betweencompanies active on thesame geographic market

It is useful to distinguish twotypes of pay-TV alliancesbetween companies which areactive on the same geographicmarket.

21 See XVIth Competition Policy Report at

paragraph 82. “At present, more andmore cross-border alliances are beingplanned or forged, typified by a pan-European outlook. If all these projectscome to fruition, most major televisiondistributors in Europe may well belinked through networks of alliances.The Commission will accordingly haveto examine these transactions carefully.In particular, it will have to evaluate thealliances' overall impact at Europeanlevel, going beyond the directconsequences for the specific nationalmarkets.

3.2.1. Alliances betweencompanies which are notactive on the pay-TVmarket, or have onlylimited activities.

Alliances of this type willgenerally be considered to bepro-competitive and to raise nofundamental competition lawconcerns.

Thus, in May 1998 theCommission cleared the creationof a digital terrestrial pay-TVjoint venture between Carltonand Granada, British DigitalBroadcasting (BDB, now knownas ONdigital) in the UK.Carlton and Granada eachoperate regional advertising-funded television channels in theUK and both already haveinterests in pay-TV channels.Granada also has a shareholdingin BSkyB and operates a pay-TVjoint venture with BSkyB.While some amendments to thenotified agreements wererequired, there was no doubt thatthe creation of BDB was, inprinciple, pro-competitive as itwould provide competition to thedominant incumbent operator,BSkyB.

The Commission also announcedits intention in February 199822

to clear the creation of acompany, Télévision ParSatéllite (TPS) to provide digitalsatellite pay-TV services inFrance. TPS’s parentscompanies are the French

22 Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of

Regulation 17, OJ C 65 [1998] of 28February 1998.

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advertising-funded televisionoperators, TF1, France 2, France3 and Métropole Télévision(M6), the telecommunicationsoperator France Télécom and thecable operator Suez Lyonnaisedes Eaux. Although somemodifications to the agreementwere necessary, no fundamentalcompetition problems arise fromthe creation of TPS, as TPS willcompete with the well-established French pay-TVoperator, Canal+.

3.2.2. Alliances concerningcompanies which alreadyhold strong positions onthe pay-TV market.

While competition law does notobject to the creation orstrengthening of dominancethrough superior performance, itdoes object to the creation orstrengthening of dominance byany other means, includingmerger, acquisition or creationof a joint venture. TheCommission has examined twosuch cases relating to digitalpay-TV.

The first arose in the UK. Asoriginally constituted, BSkyBwas a party to the BDB jointventure referred to above. Afterinformal discussions with theCommission, the UK authoritiesinsisted that BSkyB exit the jointventure as a shareholder asBSkyB’s jointly-controllingshareholding in BDB riskedstrengthening BSkyB’s existingdominant position in the UKpay-TV market. In particular,BSkyB would be able to ensurethat there was co-ordination

between BDB and BSkyB on theUK pay-TV market, rather thandirect competition.

In the second case, theCommission prohibited themerger of Bertelsmann andKirch’s pay-TV interests inGermany23. Together, theparties operated the only pay-TVplatforms in Germany, Premiereand DF1, held all importantGerman-language pay-TVprogramming rights, controlledthe de facto standard digital settop box and, by virtue of theiralliance with Deutsche Telekomcould prevent the emergence of adigital cable pay-TV competitor.As the parties were unwilling toprovide the Commission with theundertakings necessary toprevent the merger resulting inan enduring near-monopoly inpay-TV in German-speakingEurope, the operation wasdeclared incompatible with thecommon market.

4. EFFECTS ON COMPETITIONON THE PAY-TV MARKET

Competition on the pay-TVmarket can be affected by theexistence of bottlenecks at eachlevel of the vertical supply chain– the various markets forcontent, transmission networksand/or technical services - aseach of these constitutes anessential in-put for a pay-TVoperator. Competition on thepay-TV market can be affectedby leveraging of market power

23 M. 993 Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere,

Commission decision of 27 May 1998,not yet published.

from one level to another orthrough foreclosure effectscaused by vertical integration.Indeed, the conclusion that anundertaking holds a dominantposition on the pay-TV marketpre-supposes the existence ofbarriers to entry at one or moreof these levels which prevent theemergence of substantialcompetition. Specific competi-tion issues can also arise at eachlevel of the vertical supply chain.

It follows from this that caseswhich affect the pay televisionmarket require a complexexamination of a number ofdifferent markets. In theBertelsmann/Kirch/Deutsche Te-lekom cases the markets for pay-TV, cable infrastructure andtechnical services were affected.In the BiB case, the markets fordigital interactive TV services,pay-TV, technical services,wholesale film and sport contentmarkets and telecommunicationscustomer access infrastructurehave been examined.

These issues are dealt withbelow.

4.1. Issues at each level of thesupply chain

4.1.1. Content

The programming rights forfilms and sports events aregenerally sold exclusively and inrespect of national territories.The competition rules do notobject to either of these standard

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industry practices24. However,where the duration or the scopeof the exclusivity embodied in aparticular contract undulyforecloses the access of otherpay-TV operators, then Article85(1) EC will be applicable andan exemption under Article85(3) EC will be required.

The Commission has applied thisprinciple to rights contracts inrespect of both films25 andsports26 in the context ofnotifications of rights contracts.The considerations relevant tofilm and sports rights vary. Alonger duration of exclusivity forfilm rights will generally beaccepted than for importantsports rights as the latterconstitute “perishable goods”whose value decreases rapidlywith time. The Commission’sobject has been to maintainaccess to such rights for thirdparties within a reasonable time-scale.

However, the existence ofnetworks of long-term exclusivefilm and sports contracts is alsoof relevance to the considerationof operations on the pay-TVmarket itself as a lack of accessto such premium content acts asa barrier to entry. Thus, in the

24 Coditel I [1982] ECR 3381 and Coditel

II [1980] ECR 881 judgments of theEuropean Court of Justice.

25 ARD decision, Commission Decision of15 September 1989 OJ L 284,03/10/1989, p. 36.

26 For example, the granting of a “comfortletter” to the BBC/BSkyB/PremierLeague agreement in 1993. See pressrelease IP(93)614 of 20 July 1993.Further cases are currently underconsideration.

Bertelsmann/Kirch case referredto above, the Commissionsought to ensure that theoperation would not forecloseaccess to the pay-TV market forother operators by seeking anundertaking from the parties tocede programming rights. WhileKirch and Deutsche Telekomwere willing to provide theCommission with the minimumundertakings necessary to ensurecompetition on the pay-TVmarket, in particular, by cedingprogramming rights andallowing private cable operatorsto independently marketPremiere in combination withtheir own channels, Bertelsmannwas not. The Commissiontherefore prohibited theoperation.

4.1.2. Transmission networks

In the long term, digitisation willreduce capacity shortages ofbroadcast transmission networks(whether satellite, cable orterrestrial), at least for backbonetransmission capacity. However,as the Convergence Green Paperrecognises, digitisation will notbe completed in the short tomedium term. The transitionphase is, therefore, likely to belengthy: while it lasts theoperators of cable networks andsuppliers of satellite transpondercapacity are in a position toprevent the emergence ofcompetition in the pay-TVmarket by refusing to carry aparticular pay-TV service or tolease transponder capacity.Ensuring non-discriminatoryaccess to transmission networksis thus essential: the Commission

is examining cases concerningaccess to both cable networksand satellite transpondercapacity.

However, digitisation will notremove all competition problemsin relation to transmissionnetworks. In particular, there islikely to be a continuingbottleneck in the market forbroadband customer accessinfrastructure. While digitaltelevision services can beprovided by means of digitalterrestrial, digital satellite ordigital cable networks, this is notthe case of genuine broadbandservices which require two-waytransmission networks. Digitalcable and upgraded telecommu-nications customer accessinfrastructure will be the onlymeans of transmission suitablefor such services in the mediumterm27. Dual ownership bytelecommunications operators ofboth cable andtelecommunications infrastruc-tures can therefore pose aparticular problem which theCommission is seeking toaddress through its proposal torevise Directive 90/388/EEC asamended by Directive 95/51/EC.This proposal concerns legalseparation of cable andtelecommunications infrastruc-tures. There have already beenmoves in a number of MemberStates28 against such dualownership which go beyondlegal separation. It is likely that

27 Broadband radio services are not an

option for the foreseeable future.28 The Netherlands, Ireland and Germany,

in particular.

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divestiture of one of theseinterests may be required on acase by case basis as a conditionof approval of a telecom-munications operator’s partici-pation in pay-TV or multimediajoint ventures. Precisely thisissue has recently arisen in theBertelsmann/ Kirch/DeutscheTelekom and BiB cases whichare described below.

4.1.3. Technical services

There are two broad issuesrelating to proprietary digital settop boxes. The first concerns theaccess of competing pay-TVoperators to existing installedbases of set top boxes. Thesecond concerns interoperabilityof proprietary digital set topboxes.

4.1.3.1. Access

Generally in the EU, pay-TVoperators are also suppliers oftechnical services. When pay-TVoperators entered the market, thetechnical services necessary forpay-TV did not exist. It wastherefore logical that theydeveloped the technical servicesthemselves. In theory, a newentrant into the pay-TV markethas a choice between launchinga set top box population usinghis own technical services forreception of his service andseeking to use the set top boxpopulation of the incumbent pay-TV operator. In practice,however, the scale of investmentrequired means that the newentrants’ most realistic option isto provide a pay-TV serviceusing the set top boxes which

already exist. Quite apart fromthe investment required,consumers are reluctant to buyor rent more than one digital settop box.

There are three essentialcomponents of a set top boxwhich govern the conditions ofaccess: conditional accesssystems, electronic programmeguides and applicationprogramming interfaces. If thesecomponents are not based onproprietary technology, a newentrant can access the set top boxindependently of the existingoperator of technical services.However, the components aregenerally proprietary whichmeans that a new entrant will bedependent on his incumbentcompetitor for access to themarketplace. If access toexisting boxes was refused orgranted only on discriminatoryterms, competition on the pay-TV market would besignificantly impeded.

The Advanced TV StandardsDirective29 accepted thecommercialisation of proprietarydigital set top boxes by pay-TVoperators within the EU.However, it regulates theprovision of digital conditionalaccess services for “digitaltelevision services”. It does notdeal with the provision of digitalconditional access services forother types of service, such asdigital radio or on-line services, 29 Directive 95/47/EC of the European

Parliament and of the Council of 24October 1995 on the use of standards forthe transmission of television signals, OJ[1995] L 281/51.

nor does it deal with provision ofaccess to electronic programmeguides or applicationprogramming interfaces. How-ever, the scope of thecompetition rules is not limitedby the Directive. Thus, theCommission has examinedissues relating to proprietarydigital conditional accesssystems, electronic programmeguides and application program-ming interfaces in theBertelsmann/Kirch/Deutsche Te-lekom and BiB cases which aredescribed below.

4.1.3.2. Interoperability

In the future, digital set topboxes will be replaced byintegrated digital television sets.The Advanced TV StandardsDirective referred to aboverequires such integrated sets toallow for the addition ofmodules containing differentproprietary conditional accesssystems and other relevanttechnical services30. In this way,consumers can be confident inbuying such a set that they willnot be tied to any one digitalservice provider.

However, the transition tointegrated digital television setsis likely to take a significantnumber of years. In themeantime, there is a need toensure that consumers buying a

30 Article 4(a) “Where television sets

contain an integrated digital decodersuch sets must allow for the option offitting at least one standardised socketpermitting connection of conditionalaccess and other elements of a digitaltelevision system of the digital decoder”.

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proprietary digital set top boxare not tied to a single providerof digital services. TheDirective does not deal with thisissue. Enforced standardisationof digital set top boxes appearsto be premature. Indeed, it mayeven be dangerous to do sobefore the market has had timeto settle. However, some degreeof interoperability of digital settop boxes can be ensured byobliging suppliers of technicalservices based on proprietarytechnology to enter simulcryptagreements. Simulcryptinvolves a commercialagreement between the suppliersof different proprietaryconditional access systems tosynchronise the differentsystems such that populations ofdigital set top boxes embeddingeach system are able todescramble signals using bothconditional access systems31. Inthe BiB case, BSkyB has beenobliged to enter such agreementswith operators of differentproprietary conditional accesssystems as one of the proposedconditions of clearance of thejoint venture.

4.2.Vertical integration

Vertical integration occurs whena company extends its scope ofactivity by merger, acquisition orjoint venture into markets whichare upstream or downstream ofits core area of business. Theessential rationale for vertical

31 For a more technical definition see

notice published pursuant to article 19(3)of Regulation 17, OJ C 322 [1998] ofOctober 98.

integration is presumed to beincreased efficiency and, assuch, it is generally consideredby the Commission to beunlikely to pose seriouscompetition problems. How-ever, where the companiesinvolved have strong positionson their core markets, a closeexamination of the effects ofvertical integration is required inorder to ensure that it does notthreaten to erect barriers to entryby foreclosing access to suppliesor markets.

National markets for content,transmission networks, technicalservices and pay-TV in the EUare characterised by theexistence of dominant incumbentoperators. Agreements betweenthese operators may well havethe effect of strengtheningexisting dominant positions incore markets and of creatingdominant positions in newmarkets. Such agreements willbe acceptable under Communitycompetition law only where theparties accept conditions whichprevent such effects. Structuralconditions are likely benecessary, such as divestiture ofpay-TV content rights, cedingcontrol of transmission networksand control over proprietarytechnical services embedded inset top boxes. Behaviouralconditions will be considered tobe adequate only in very limitedcircumstances. Behaviouralundertakings not to abuse anewly created dominant positionwill be rejected.

The Commission has concludedin three cases concerning pay-

TV that the undertakings offeredby the parties were insufficientto prevent vertical integrationcreating or strengtheningdominant positions. In MSG32,the creation of a technicalservices joint venture byBertelsmann, Kirch andDeutsche Telekom wasprohibited as MSG would hold adominant position on thetechnical services market whichwould have the effect ofstrengthening the existingdominant positions of the parentson the pay-TV and cablenetworks markets respectively.

In the Nordic SatelliteDistribution case (NSD)33, theCommission prohibited a jointventure between Telenor,TeleDanmark and Kinnevik toprovide transponder capacity andthe transmission and distributionof satellite TV channels to theNordic area. The Commissionconcluded that NSD would holda dominant position on themarket for satellite TVtransponder services suitable forNordic viewers. NSD’sdominance would strengthenTeleDanmark’s dominantposition on the cable TV marketin Denmark. Finally, thecreation of NSD would lead toViasat (Kinnevik’s subsidiary)acquiring a dominant position onthe market for distribution ofpay-TV and other encryptedchannels to direct-to-homehouseholds.

32 M. 649 Media Services Group [1994] OJ

L 364/1.33 M. 490 Nordic Satellite Distribution

[1995] OJ L 53/20.

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In the recent Bertelsmann/Kirch/Deutsche Telekomdecisions34, the creation of jointventures to supply technicalservices for pay-TV distributedby cable and satellite wasprohibited as the joint ventureswould hold dominant positionson the technical services marketwhich would strengthen thedominant positions of DeutscheTelekom on the cable networkmarket and of Bertelsmann andKirch’s joint venture Premiereon the pay-TV market. In thesecases, the essential problem wasBertelsmann and Kirch’sstranglehold over the pay-TVrights which prevented theemergence of a competitor onthe pay-TV market. Therewould be no new entry in thetechnical services marketwithout a second pay-TVoperator. Deutsche Telekom’sposition on the German cablenetwork market prevented theemergence of competition fromthe private cable operators.While Kirch and DeutscheTelekom were willing to providethe Commission with theminimum undertakingsnecessary to ensure competitionon the pay-TV market, inparticular, by cedingprogramming rights andallowing private cable operatorsto independently marketPremiere in combination withtheir own channels, Bertelsmannwas not.

34 M. 993 Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere and

M. 1027 Deutsche Telekom/ Beta-Research, Commission decisions of 27May 1998, not yet published.

In the BiB case, on the otherhand, the parties have beenwilling to agree to substantialconditions on the operation ofthe joint venture. On this basis,the Commission proposes to takea favourable attitude to thecreation of BiB35. BiB is a jointventure between BSkyB, BT,Matsushita and Midland Bank.It will provide digital interactiveTV services in the UK, such aslimited internet access, home-banking, home-shopping and e-mail via television sets, bymeans of digital satellitebroadcasting with a telecom-munications return path. Incontrast to the cases cited above,BiB will not itself be active onthe pay-TV market. BSkyB and,to a lesser extent BiB, will beactive on the technical servicesmarket.

As originally notified to theCommission, there was a seriousconcern that BSkyB and BiBwould not allow third parties,whether pay-TV operators ordigital interactive TV servicesoperators, to have non-discriminatory access to thedigital set top boxes which BiBwill subsidise. Conditions36

35 Notice published pursuant to Article

19(3) of Regulation 17, OJ C 322 [1998]of 21 October 98.

36 The most important conditions can besummarised as follows: legal separationof BIB’s subsidy payment/recovery anddigital interactive TV servicesoperations, removal of all exclusiverights concerning access to the set topbox, provision of necessary informationabout the set top box and proprietarytechnical systems to all third parties,obligation to enter simulcryptagreements, obligations concerning themanner in which subsidy recovery will

have been agreed to ensure thatthird parties, whether operatorsof digital television or digitalinteractive TV services, havefair, reasonable and non-discriminatory access to allproprietary components of thedigital set top box which BiBwill subsidise (digitalconditional access services, theelectronic programme guide andapplication programming inter-face). As described above,BSkyB has also been obliged toenter simulcrypt agreements.

There was also a concern thatBT’s dominant position in thetelecommunications customeraccess market would be abusedas a result of its participation inBiB. In particular, BT ownsboth the only nationaltelecommunications customeraccess network in the UK which,if upgraded, would be suitablefor the provision of genuinebroadband services incompetition with BiB and alsocable networks. BT hasaccepted not to expand its cableinterests, and to divest itsexisting cable interests, in theUK. Moreover, the Commissionwill keep under close reviewdevelopments in the UKbroadband customer accessinfrastructure market in order toensure that BT’s participation inBiB does not lead to a reducedincentive in the short to medium

be operated, obligations on the provisionof digital conditional access services foron-line services and removal ofobligation on customers to subscribe toBSkyB’s digital satellite pay-TV serviceas a condition of purchase of a BiBsubsidised set top box.

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term to invest in the upgrade ofBT’s infrastructure.

The combination of theseconditions should prevent theBiB joint venture fromstrengthening BSkyB or BT’sdominant positions on the pay-TV and customer accessinfrastructure markets respec-tively. They should also ensurethat there are no structuralbarriers to the emergence ofcompetition on the digitalinteractive TV services market.A final decision is expected in1999.

5. CONCLUSION

The relationship betweencompetitive, open marketstructures and technologicalprogress finds supports not onlyin economic theory, but also inpractice, as the developments inEU digital pay-TV marketsdemonstrate. Competitionpromotes technical progress,without sacrificing the interestsof European citizens. Lowerprices and wider choice are theresult. Where agreements raisefundamental competitionproblems, efforts have beenmade to find solutions. Thesewere accepted by the parties tothe BiB case, but rejected byBertelsmann in the Bertelsmann/Kirch/Deutsche Telekom cases.However, in no circumstancescan the Commission coun-tenance the creation orstrengthening of nationaldominant positions whichforeclose further market entry:consumers would suffer and thecreation of the internal market

would be jeopardised if nationalmarkets were to be furtherpartitioned. The Commission’sbalanced approach to theapplication of the competitionrules as illustrated in the presentnote serves to promotetechnological development in theform of the introduction ofdigital pay television, and alsothe further developments whichconvergence will enable, for thebenefit of all European citizens.

ANNEXMARKET DEFINITION

1. COMMISSION’S GENERALAPPROACH TO MARKETDEFINITION

Market definition is a tool toidentify and define theboundaries of competitionbetween undertakings. Itconsists essentially in identifyingthe effective alternative sourcesof supply for the customers ofthe undertakings involved37,both in terms of products/services and geographic locationof suppliers. The relevant marketwithin which to assess a givencompetition issue is thereforeestablished by the combinationof the product and geographicmarkets. Market definition isthus the essential first step in theexamination of any agreement,as it makes it possible to assess

37 In the case of a concentration, the

undertakings involved will be the partiesto the concentration; in investigationsunder Article 86 EC, the undertakingbeing investigated or the complainants;in investigations under Article 85 EC,the parties to the agreement.

the impact of an agreement oncompetition. In particular, itallows calculation of marketshares that convey meaningfulinformation about market powerfor the purposes of assessingdominance38. The Commis-sion’s general approach torelevant market definition is setout at length in its 1997Notice39.

Three main sources ofcompetitive constraints on thebehaviour of an undertaking areidentified: demand substituta-bility, supply substitutability andpotential competition. Of these,demand substitution constitutesthe most immediate and effectivedisciplinary force on thesuppliers of a given product/service, in particular in terms oftheir pricing decisions. Supplysubstitution is taken into accountwhen it is equivalent to demandsubstitution in terms ofeffectiveness and immediacy.Potential competition is nottaken into account when definingmarkets since the conditionsunder which potentialcompetition actually represent aneffective competitive constraintdepends on an analysis of thespecific factors relating to theconditions of entry. However,potential competition will betaken account of in thesubsequent competition analysis. 38 Market share alone is not indicative of

dominance. Other factors are relevant,such as the existence of barriers to entryand the capacity of reaction ofcustomers.

39 Commission Notice on the definition ofthe relevant market for the purposes ofCommunity competition law, OJ C 372[1997] of 9/12/1997.

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2. APPLICATION TO PAYTELEVISION SECTOR

2.1. Retail markets

Examination of the demandsubstitution of consumers of“free to air” and pay televisionclearly demonstrates that paytelevision constitutes a separaterelevant product market40. It isonly in the case of pay televisionthat consumers have a directtrading relationship with atelevision broadcaster. Pay-TVoperators thus compete forsubscribers, whereas “free to air”broadcasters compete forviewers as audience share is thedeterminative factor in thetelevision advertising market.There is no direct competitiverelationship as the actors on thetwo markets differ. There is,however, a link between thequality of the “free to air” TVoffering and the scope for theintroduction of pay TV.However, this fact does notundermine the conclusion thatseparate markets exist. Viewersdo not consider “free to air” andpay television to be substitutes,but rather complements. Asdigital pay-TV is a developmentof analogue, it does notconstitute a separate productmarket.

It remains to be seen whethernew forms of service, such aspay-per-view form a distinctproduct market. This may be thecase, in particular, in respect of

40 See for example, paragraph 32 of MSG

decision, M.649 Media Services Group[1994] OJ L 364/1.

pay-per-view services for sportsevents. Equally, services inwhich viewing is not the mainobject, such as home-banking orhome-shopping cannot beconsidered to be substitutes forentertainment channels. Giventhe current difference inpenetration rates betweenpersonal computers (PC) andtelevision sets in the EU,separate markets are also likelyto exist in respect of interactiveservices delivered via PC andtelevision.

The geographic market for paytelevision is generally national.Cultural, linguistic andregulatory differences betweenMember States means thatviewers in one country do notconsider pay-TV services aimedat another country, in anotherlanguage to be substitutes.Where there are no suchlanguage barriers and thecultural differences are notextreme, it may be the case thatgeographic markets delimited bylanguage areas exist. Thecomments on the convergencegreen paper bear out the fact thatthis phenomenon is unlikely tobe affected by the introductionof digital television or furtherconvergence.41

2.2. Wholesale markets

2.2.1. Content

The acquisition of exclusivetelevision rights to films andattractive sports events has beena determining factor in the 41 SEC(1998)1284 final, at page 20.

success of pay-TV operators asviewers’ willingness to pay forfilm and sports channels hasbeen shown to be higher thanwillingness to pay for otherforms of programming.Attractive content is a scarceresource.

Copyright licences of film rightsdistinguish between exploitationwindows and national territories:there are separate windows forexploitation on pay-per-view,pay TV and free TV. Thelicences are generally exclusivein respect of each window andterritory. As the price chargedby suppliers of film rights forpay-TV is not constrained bysuppliers of other forms ofprogramming, the acquisition offilm rights for pay-TVconstitutes a separate market. Itsgeographic scope will bedetermined by the territorycovered by the licence. Sportsrights are also generally soldexclusively. However,exclusivity in this case generallyapplies to all forms ofexploitation. As demand forsports rights is particularlyinelastic, a market for theacquisition of sports rightsexists. Moreover, separatemarkets may exist for the rightsto specific sports, such asattractive football. Thegeographic market will again bedetermined by the scope of thelicence.

2.2.2. Transmission

For the moment, television canbe transmitted by three means:terrestrial, cable and satellite

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direct-to-home. The technicalcharacteristics of these forms oftransmission vary: only cable hasgenuine broadband capa-bilities42. As terrestrial frequen-cy is scarce, a pay-TVbroadcaster generally has achoice only between satellite andcable transmission. The price ofleasing satellite transpondercapacity and cable carriage varysignificantly. Where receptionof television by cable is thenorm, satellite is unlikely to actas a price constraint. Theavailability of all three optionsfor a pay-TV broadcaster willalso vary between MemberStates: this is particularly true inrespect of cable. Separateproduct markets are likely toexist in respect of each of theseforms of transmission network.Markets will be national in scopefor terrestrial and cabletransmission. The geographicscope in terms of satellite willdepend on two things: thefootprint43 of the satellites andwhether a policy exists toallocate certain transponders tocertain national markets.

Looking more to the future, aprovider of genuinely broadbandinteractive services44 will require

42 “Broadband” infrastructure is not a

precisely defined term. It is used here torefer to a network which is two-way andhas significant transmission capability.

43 The “footprint” of a satellite means theterritories which can receive a signalfrom that satellite. See paragraph 16 ofthe Nordic Satellite Distribution decisionfor a definition M. 490 Nordic SatelliteDistribution [1995] OJ L 53/20.

44 As distinct from the simulated broadbandeffect which is possible using satellitetransmission and a PSTN (public

a customer access transmissionnetwork which has suchcapabilities. For the moment,there are two options (althoughbroadband wireless infrastruc-ture may emerge in the future).The first is cable, the second isupgraded local loop telecommu-nications infrastructure45. Abroadband customer accessnetwork market is thereforelikely to develop in the future.

2.2.3.Technical services for pay-TV and interactive servi-ces

Pay-TV operators require aspecial technical infrastructurewhich allows them to ensure thatonly viewers authorised to watchtheir service are able to do so.These technical servicesessentially comprise a set topbox, conditional access systemand related smart cards andsubscriber management sys-tem46. Depending on thesophistication of a given set topbox, access to electronicprogramme guides and appli-cation programming interfacesmay also be relevant.

Digital set top boxes will also beused by “free to air” broadcasters

switched telecommunications network)return path.

45 Digital technologies such as the DSLfamily (ADSL,VDSL, HDSL and DSLLite) can increase the capacity of thetraditional copper wire local loopinfrastructure.

46 See paragraphs 20-26 of MSG decisionM. 649 Media Services Group [1994] OJL 364/1 and paragraphs for anexplanation of these various elements.

to demodulate their digitalsignals (until all consumers havebought integrated digitaltelevision sets). Digital set topboxes and the related technicalservices will also be required fordigital interactive TV services.

These services comprise adistinct product market. Thegeographic market will tend tofollow that of the pay-TV andother services markets for whichthe technical services are to beused.

ANTI-TRUST RULESApplication of Articles 85 & 86 EC and 65 ECSCMain developments between 1st october 1998 and 31st January 1999

Competition Policy Newsletter 1998 Number 3 October 17

INTRODUCTION

This article contains a summaryof recent decisions adopted bythe Commission concerning thescope of Article 3 of CouncilRegulation 4056/86: the groupexemption for liner conferences.

The group exemption for linerconferences is unusual in anumber of respects. It is aCouncil Regulation. It wasadopted even though theCommission had no experienceof granting individualexemptions. It allows horizontalprice fixing. It is unlimited intime. It contains no market sharethresholds. In a word, it isgenerous.

First, reference should be madeto the CEWAL47 case. That casehas established that whilstshipping conferences are, ingeneral, considered to bring aboutcertain benefits and therebyjustify the exemptions granted bythe regulation, this fact cannotsignify that every impairment ofcompetition brought about byshipping conferences falls outsidethe prohibition broadly laid down

47 Joined Cases C-395/96 P & 396/95 P,

CMB v Commission.

by Article 85(1) of the Treaty. Italso stated that the general rulethat all derogations must beinterpreted strictly48 also appliesunder Regulation 4056/86.

THE SCOPE OF THECONFERENCE GROUPEXEMPTION

There are six aspects of thegroup exemption which theCommission has addressed in itsrecent decisions: inland pricefixing, the meaning of ‘uniformor common’, capacitymanagement, service contractsand freight forwardercompensation.

Inland Price Fixing

It is nearly ten years since SirLeon Brittan wrote, with the

48 See Judgments of the Court of Justice of

24 October 1995 in Case C-70/93, BMW vALD [1995] ECR I-3439, at paragraph 28and of Case C-266/93, Bundeskartellamt vVolkswagen and VAG, [1995 ] ECR I-3477, at paragraph 33 "... having regard tothe general principle prohibitinganticompetitive agreements laid down inArticle 85(1) of the Treaty, provisions in ablock exemption which derogate from thatprinciple cannot be interpreted widely andcannot be construed in such a way as toextend the effects of the regulation beyondwhat is necessary to protect the interestswhich they are intended to safeguard."

agreement of Karel Van Miert inhis then capacity as TransportCommissioner, to the FarEastern Freight Conference. Heexpressed the view that inlandprice fixing by conferences wasnot permitted under the terms ofthe group exemption for linerconferences contained in Article3 of Regulation 4056/86.

This question occupies a centralplace in the TAA49 and FEFC50

cases which are currently beforethe Court of First Instance. Itcame close to being resolved inthe reference to the Court ofJustice from the High Court inthe SUNAG case51 for a rulingon a point of interpretation. Butthat case was settled before theruling was given.

The debate over the scope of thegroup exemption does not onlyapply to price fixing for inlandtransport. One of the issues notyet fully addressed is wheremaritime transport services endand land transport services begin.In the FEFC decision theCommission expressly avoidedtaking a position on this questionstating that this Decision does notaddress the question whetherprice fixing agreements relatingto port handling services fallwithin the scope of application ofArticle 3 of Regulation No4056/86.

However, the Commission hasfound that ground handling

49 Case T-395/94, ACL v Commission.50 Case T-96/95, CMB v Commission.51 Case C-339/95 Compagnia di Naviga-

zione Marittima v CMB.

Recent Commission Decisionsconcerning the scope of theGroup Exemption for LinerConferences

David WOOD, DGIV-D-2

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services at airports52 fall withinthe scope of Regulation 17 andnot one of the transportregulations. In the Frankfurtairport case, the Commissionfound that, inter alia, the loadingand unloading of baggage, cargoand mail fell within the scope ofRegulation 17 where it tookplace on the ramp (or apron) ofthe airport.

So far as individual exemptionof inland price fixing isconcerned, the Commission’sposition has been clear since theadoption of its Report to theCouncil in 199453: if conferencemembers wish to fix inlandprices they must engage in co-operation of a type whichnecessitates the fixing of inlandprices. This position wasendorsed by the Group of WiseMen set up under thechairmanship of Sir BryanCarsberg54.

Uniform or Common

According to Regulation4056/86, ‘liner conference’means a group of two or morevessel-operating carriers …which has an agreement or

52 Olympic Airways, decision of 23 January

1985. Commission Decision of 14January 1998 relating to a proceedingunder Article 86 of the EC Treaty -Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG.98/513/EC: Commission Decision of 11June 1998 relating to a proceeding underArticle 86 of the EC Treaty - AlphaFlight Services/Aéroports de Paris, OJ L230 p. 10.

53 SEC(94) 933 final, adopted by theCommission on 8 June 1994.

54 See the Final Report of the MultimodalGroup submitted to Commissioner VanMiert on 18 November 1997.

arrangement… within the frame-work of which they operateunder uniform or commonfreight rates …

The Commission has interpretedthe expression ‘uniform orcommon’ as meaning that aconference price must be commonor uniform not only as betweenthe shipping lines but also withregard to all shippers of the samecommodity. Not only does‘common or uniform’ preclude atwo- or multi-tier price structureas between carriers, it precludesthe creation of different classes ofshipper55.

Once again, this is aninterpretation of Regulation4056 which is before the Courtof First Instance in the TAAcase.

Capacity Management

A “capacity managementprogramme” is an agreementunder which the parties agree notto use a proportion of the spaceon their vessels for the carriageof goods in a particular trade.The proportion set aside is partof the forecast excess of supplyover demand.Capacity management program-mes have operated on the

55 Commission Decision 94/980/EC of 19

October 1994 relating to a proceedingpursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty -Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement,OJ L 376, 31.12.1994, p1, at paragraphs322 & 323; Commission Decision of 16September 1998 relating to a proceedingpursuant to Articles 85 and 86 of the ECTreaty - Trans-Atlantic ConferenceAgreement, not yet published, atparagraph 456.

transpacific from 1989 to 1995(the Transpacific StabilizationAgreement), on the transatlanticfrom 1992 to 1994 (the TAA)and on the North Europe/FarEast trades during 1993 (theEATA).

Only the TAA has claimed to bea liner conference covered by thegroup exemption. The TAAparties argued that their capacitymanagement programme wascovered by the exemption sinceArticle 3(d) expressly refers to“the regulation of the carryingcapacity offered by eachmember”.

The Commission considers thatArticle 3(d) enables the membersof a conference collectively toadjust the number of sailings andvessels to seasonal and cyclicalvariations in demand fortransport, to determine the typeof vessel used, and thus toensure that their provision ofcapacity is appropriate to marketconditions.56

In the TAA decision, theCommission argued that theTAA capacity managementprogramme was a controlmechanism aimed at reinforcingprice discipline among itsmembers. It did not regulate thesupply of carrying capacity byconference members, but simplyrestricted the use of availablecapacity on the ships used bythem. It did not adapt availablecapacity to market conditions,but sought to restrict the sale of

56 TAA at para 365.

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that capacity in order to drive upprices.

The Commission concluded thatsuch a freeze on the use ofcapacity was not a traditionalliner conference practice andwas not envisaged when theblock exemption was granted.

The Commission also argued inthe TAA Decision that it must bequestioned whether a blockexemption covering capacitymanagement in conjunction withprice fixing would be lawful,since control over both pricesand the volume of supply topotential customers wouldenable participating undertakingsto eliminate competition,contrary to the fourth conditionof Article 85(3)57.

This is another of theoutstanding issues before theCourt of First Instance in theTAA case.

The Commission has reactednegatively to applications forindividual exemption of capacitymanagement programmes. TheCommission refused to grantindividual exemption in respectof the TAA capacitymanagement programme in 1994and is likely shortly to do thesame in respect of the EATA. Inthe case of the EATA a meetingof the Advisory Committee ofMember States was held on 27January 1999 and a draftdecision will soon be proposedfor adoption by the Commission.

57 TAA at para 367.

The Commission’s view hasbeen that the direct effect of anartificial reduction in capacityutilisation (as opposed to apermanent reduction in capacity)is to share fixed operating costsamongst a smaller number ofcontainers and to have no effectin reducing fixed operatingcosts. A reduction in capacitycould benefit shippers if the costof transport were reduced, i.e. ifcapacity was really withdrawnby the progressive withdrawal ofcertain vessels or certainoperators currently present.

Secondly, there is no evidencethat capacity managementprogrammes help to ensure thatin the long term the level ofcapacity is better adjusted tomeet the level of demand and itis possible that they encouragethe unnecessary prematureintroduction of excess capacity.

Thirdly, capacity managementprogrammes have always beenintroduced into trades wherethere has been a functioningconference. The combination ofprice fixing and output limitationis probably the most potent formof anti-competitive behaviourwhich can exist. Moreover, theyhave appealed to non-conferencemembers so that, in the case ofthe TSA and EATA, the pre-existing conferences have beenable to extend their marketpower in the same way as with atolerated outsider agreement.

Service Contracts

A service contract is a contractbetween a shipper and a carrier or

conference in which the shippermakes a commitment to provide acertain minimum quantity ofcargo over a fixed time period andthe carrier or conference commitsto a certain rate or rate schedule aswell as a defined service level -such as, assured space, transittime, port rotation, or similarservice features.

One of the questions which arosein the TACA case58 was whetherTACA joint service contracts fellwithin the scope of the groupexemption.

The Commission’s firstargument was that the groupexemption permits conferencesto agree upon a ‘uniform orcommon tariff’. Since TACA’sjoint service contracts neitherappeared in the tariff nor werethey based on the tariff, it couldnot be said that the groupexemption covered theagreement of the TACA partiesto enter into such contracts. Thisis a matter under dispute.

So far as the intention of thelegislator was concerned, theCommission saw no reason toassume that the Council musthave intended such an importantform of arrangement to beexempted. In the Commission’sview, there is a clear distinctionto be drawn between tariffpricing and contractualarrangements. Carriage at tariffrates and arrangements relatingto discounts off tariff rates (suchas loyalty contracts and time-volume rates) fall within the 58 Case T-191/98, ACL v Commission.

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former category and servicecontracts fall within the latter.

This distinction seems to have itsorigins in the notion of commoncarriage and in the TACADecision the Commission statedthat the distinction betweencommon carriage and contractcarriage predates liner shippingconferences. It referred to theUK Carriers Act 1830 (11° Geo.IV. & 1° Gul. IV.), an Act ofParliament limiting the liabilityof common carriers, whichprovides that “Provided always,and be it further enacted, Thatnothing in this Act containedshall extend or be construed toannul or in anywise affect anyspecial Contract between suchMail Contractor, Stage CoachProprietor, or Common Carrier,and any other Parties, for theConveyance of Goods andMerchandizes.” 59

Although the distinction betweencontractual arrangements andtariff arrangements is not new,the conference system was basedon the latter and not the former.So far as service contracts areconcerned, the Commission hasconsidered there to be sufficienthistorical evidence to concludethat they were a new breed ofarrangement only just cominginto usage at the time of thepreparations for the adoption ofRegulation 4056/86. There istherefore no reason to assumethat they were intended to becovered by the group exemption.

59 TACA at footnote 37.

Freight Forwarder Commis-sion

In the TACA Decision, theCommission addressed for thefirst time the practice ofconferences to agree the level ofreward which conferencemembers pay to freightforwarders60.

Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No4056/86 concerns the fixing ofrates and conditions of carriage,that is to say, the terms on whichmaritime transport services aresold to shippers. It does notexpressly cover an agreement tofix the terms on which freightforwarders or other intermediariesare rewarded for providingintermediary services to themembers of a conferencealthough it has been argued thatsuch a restriction is ancillary tothe restrictions of competitionpermitted under the groupexemption.

The TACA parties argued thatconferences operating on theNorthern Europe/US trades havefixed “westbound levels ofcommissions agreed to be paid toEuropean [other than UK andIrish] forwarders” since the early1970s. They have also argued thatother conferences have fixed suchprices since the beginning of thetwentieth century.

The Commission considered thatthe practice of fixing freightforwarder compensation wasintended to restrict competitionbetween the parties to the TACA 60 TACA at paras 505 et seq.

thereby adversely affectingcompetition as regards thedemand for services supplied byfreight forwarders to the TACAparties. This might deprivecustomers of the benefits whichwould result from competitionbetween the TACA parties.

It might also inhibit competitionbetween freight forwarders and bea disincentive to improvements inthe quality of services providedby freight forwarders, who maybe encouraged to concentrate onthe volume as opposed to thequality of business. Thus,competition may also beadversely affected on the supplyside.

The Commission did not considerthat the removal of maximumlevels of freight forwardercommissions (together with theother restrictions described above)would lead to higher pricesoverall and so justify thisrestriction of competition. In anyevent, this is an argument whichcould be made for every price-fixing agreement on the demandside. In order to achieve optimalallocation, prices should reflectthe real economic value ofproducts and services asdetermined by individual buyers.

If the cost of using freightforwarder services rose toosharply for shippers they wouldbe likely to switch very quickly todealing direct with the carrier. If,however, the freight forwarder isperceived as being capable ofcontributing material added value,there is no reason why this shouldnot be reflected in higher prices.

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In this respect freight forwardersare in the same position as verymany other intermediaries: if thecost of going through theintermediary becomes too high,the consumer will seek otherdistribution channels such asdirect purchase from the supplier.

Accordingly, the Commission didnot consider that the agreement tofix the levels of remuneration paidto freight forwarders could qualifyfor individual exemption. Thisapproach is very much in linewith the approach that theCommission has adopted bothwith other forms ofintermediary, such as insurancebrokers, and with professionalbodies61.

61 The role of intermediaries, such as

brokers and agents, may in somecircumstances give rise to competitionconcerns. The Commission has taken noformal decisions in this field, although itdid in 1987 publish an Article 19(3)notice proposing to exempt an agreementnotified by the Irish Insurance Federationfixing maximum rates of commissionthat insurers would pay tointermediaries. The insurers wished toavoid commission rates rising (whichultimately had to be paid by consumers),and claimed that consumers would alsobenefit because intermediaries would bemore likely to give best adviceuninfluenced by the commission theywere receiving. No decision wassubsequently taken, and it seemsunlikely that the Commission would nowbe persuaded to exempt this type ofhorizontal agreement between insurersfixing the rates of commissions tointermediaries (See for example UIC -Distribution of railway tickets by travelagents [1992] OJ L 366/47 (infringementdecision with fines for inter alia astandard rate of commission to travelagents; decision annulled becauseadopted on the basis of Regulation 17rather than Regulation 1017/68: T-14/93UIC v. Commission [1995] ECR II-1503; C-245/95 P Commission v. UIC[1997] ECR I-1287).

CONCLUSION

Over the course of ten years,there has been considerableargument as to the scope of thegroup exemption for linerconferences. Almost every singleissue on which the Commissionhas taken a formal position hasbeen challenged. The Court ofFirst Instance has ruled in theCEWAL case but its judgmenthas been appealed and the samefate may await the judgments ofthe CFI in the other main cases(TAA, FEFC, TACA).

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Depuis de nombreuses annéesdéjà, la Commission n’a cessé desouligner le caractère nocif desinfractions particulièrementgraves que constituent les cartelsainsi que, selon les propos tenusle 3 décembre 1998 par M. leCommissaire Van Miert,« l’absolue détermination » de laCommission à lutter contre cetteforme d’entente.

Dans cette même déclaration du3 décembre 1998, M. Van Mierta annoncé que dans cet esprit illui était apparu nécessaire decréer au sein de la DG IV unenouvelle unité E1 chargéespécialement de la détection, dela poursuite et de la répressiondes cartels pour l’ensemble desactivités de produits et services,confirmant ainsi de manièreconcrète la priorité que laCommission entend donner à lalutte contre ces pratiques.

Par cartels, il convientd’entendre les accords, pratiquesconcertées, décisions d’associa-tions d’entreprises de typehorizontal ayant pour objet oupour effet de

− fixer les prix et/ou lesconditions de vente,coordonner les politiques devente ;

− répartir les marchés, lesclientèles, cloisonner lesmarchés domestiques ;

− contrôler ou limiter lesproductions et/ou lesinvestissements ;

− échanger entre entreprises desdonnées individuelleséconomiques ou industriellessensibles dans un marchéoligopolistiques.

Ces différentes restrictionspeuvent être décidées ou misesen oeuvre de manière cumulativeou séparée.

Selon une terminologiecommunément admise, lescartels sont des accords conclusentre entreprises indépendantesou des décisions d’associationsd’entreprises, en vued’influencer la production ou lacommercialisation par larestriction ou l’élimination de laconcurrence et d’altérer ou demodifier de manière artificielleles conditions du marché. Ilssont l’expression d’une volontéde réglementation privée, et leplus souvent secrète, du marchéet des relations économiques pardes groupes oligopolistiques.

Les cartels créent au profit desentreprises les plus performantesdes rentes de situation qui lesdissuadent de faire des effortspour améliorer la qualité desproduits, accroître leurproductivité, leur technologie, larationalisation de leurs méthodesde production et de vente parce

que l’entente neutralise le risquede la concurrence.

Les prix cartellisés étant le plussouvent fixés en fonction descoûts des entreprises les moinsperformantes, les entreprisesdont les coûts de production sontles plus bas disposent ainsi d’unegarantie de maintien de margebénéficiaire injustifiée dans lamesure où l’entente les protègede toute tentative desconcurrents de gagner des partsde marché par une politique deprix agressive.

Par ailleurs, les cartelsmaintiennent en survieartificielle les entreprises lesmoins efficaces par la garantiede prix et de parts de marchésconvenus collectivement, et fixésà des niveaux supérieurs à ceuxqui résulteraient de laconcurrence active des plusperformantes sur le marché.

Enfin, les cartels agissent audétriment du consommateurparce que celui-ci doit payer desprix supérieurs à ceux quiseraient pratiqués dans unesituation de réelle concurrence etqu’il ne peut tirer profit desaméliorations technologiques quirésulteraient des efforts quedevraient nécessairement fournirles producteurs pour accroîtreleur part de marché en l’absencede l’accord.

En définitive, la lutte contre lescartels vise en tout premier lieu àempêcher la manipulation deséquilibres économiques et de laconcurrence par les groupesrestreints et dominants, car cette

Changement important dans lastructure de la DG IV

Maurice GUERRIN, DG IV-E-1

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manipulation qui n’est autrequ’une réglementation privée etarbitraire de l’économie, seproduit au détriment desutilisateurs. De tels compor-tements affaiblissent l’économiedans son ensemble par lemaintien de structuresinefficaces ou obsolètes etl’accumulation de marges et derentes injustifiées et créent, de cefait, un dommage considérable àla sauvegarde des emplois dansl’Union Européenne.

Jusqu’à présent, les quatreDirections opérationnelles C, D,E et F de la DG IV ont instruitles procédures relatives auxcartels relevant des secteurs deleur compétence.

La mise en place d’un servicespécialisé dans ce type deprocédure est apparueindispensable parce qu’une tellestructure permet de concentrerles moyens disponibles et demieux préparer les Rapporteurs àces tâches particulières.

Plus que jamais nécessaire, larépression des cartels estcependant rendue de plus en plusdifficile en raison des moyenssophistiqués de dissimulationdes preuves, d’une conceptiontoujours plus large et exigeantedes droits de la défense et duniveau plus élevé de standard depreuve écrite imposé par leTribunal de Première Instance.[Par exemple, à la différence desprocédures d’autres ordresjuridiques antitrust, la procédurecommunautaire ne reconnaît pasle caractère probatoire destémoignages sous serment.]

Cette nouvelle Unitéadministrative entend cependantagir en étroite coopération avecles autres unités de la DG IVafin d’utiliser au mieux lessynergies résultant de laspécialisation de ses fonction-naires dans le traitement descartels et des connaissancestechniques des Directionsopérationnelles dans lesdifférents secteurs d’activité desproduits et services.

Dans la même logique derecherche d’efficacité, laCommission avait publié le18 juillet 1996 une Commu-nication sur la non-impositiond’amendes ou la réduction deleur montant62 pour lesentreprises désireuses de fournirde leur propre initiative lesinformations et les éléments depreuves permettant d’ouvrir oud’instruire plus rapidement lesprocédures anticartels.

La nouvelle structure ne peutmanquer de faciliter et derenforcer la mise en oeuvre decette communication en incitantencore davantage les entreprisesà offrir leur coopération pourmettre fin aux ententes secrètes,par la garantie que s’ouvre undialogue efficace avec unpersonnel spécialisé et formé à larépression des cartels.

Cette réorganisation d’une partiedes services de la DG IVconstitue un signal politique trèsclair adressé aux entreprises tropsouvent tentées par lacommodité apparente de 62 JO C 207/4 du 18.7.96.

concerter ou coordonner leurscomportements avec ceux deleurs concurrents au détriment del’ensemble des consommateurseuropéens et de la consolidationdu marché intérieur.

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Background

One of the underlying objectivesof the current legislativeactivities of the Commission isto modernise, simplify and makemore user-friendly theprocedures under whichcompetition cases are examined.As part of that process, theCommission adopted, on 22December 1998, twoRegulations that simplify thelegislative framework forexamining antitrust cases.

The first of the Regulations isCommission Regulation (EC)No 2842/98 on the hearing ofparties in certain proceedingsunder Articles 85 and 86 of theEC Treaty63. This Regulationmodernises and simplifies theprocedures previously containedin Regulation (EEC) No 99/6364,which has been a worthyinstrument in creating aframework for hearings when

63 Commission Regulation (EC) No

2842/98 of 22 December 1998 on thehearing of parties in certain proceedingunder Articles 85 and 86 of the ECTreaty, OJ L 354, 30.12.1998, p. 18.

64 Commission Regulation (EEC) No99/63 on the hearings provided for inArticle 19(1) and (2) of CouncilRegulation No 17, OJ 127, 20.8.1963,p. 2268/63.

applying competition rules inindividual cases. The Regulationimproves certain aspects of thehearing procedure by takingaccount of the relevantjurisprudence, the Commission’spractice and certaindevelopments in how theCommission protects theprocedural rights of parties incompetition cases. In order tosimplify the legislativeframework for examiningcompetition cases, theRegulation applies to all anti-trust cases including thetransport sector.

The second Regulation concernsapplications and notifications intransport cases. CommissionRegulation (EC) No 2843/98applies to all transport sectors65

(i.e., inland transport, maritimetransport and air transport) andhas therefore replaced rulespreviously contained in threeseparate Commission implemen-ting Regulations. The new


2843/98 on the form, content and otherdetails of applications andnotifications provided for in CouncilRegulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC)No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87applying the rules on competition tothe transport sector, OJ L 354,30.12.1998, p. 22.

Regulation aligns the transportnotification procedures withthose under Regulation No 1766,and by so doing the Commissionhas simplified its procedures forthe benefit both of notifyingparties and of the Commissionitself. The complex legislativeframework in the transport sectorhas been the result of theprogressive extension ofCommunity competition rules tothe different transport sectorssince 1962 when Regulation No14167 removed transport fromthe scope of application ofRegulation No 17.

The Commission adopted thetwo new Regulations afterconsultation with the MemberStates, interested industryassociations and the legalprofession. Drafts of theRegulations were also publishedon the DGIV Competition WebSite on the Internet. The overallreaction to the Commission’sinitiative was positive. BothRegulations came into force on 1February 1999 and togetherrepealed five existingCommission Regulations68. Thefinal texts are available to thepublic in the Communitylanguages not only in theOfficial Journal but also on the

66 OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204/62.67 Council Regulation No 141 of 26

November 1962 exempting transportfrom the application of CouncilRegulation No 17 amended byRegulations Nos. 165/65/EEC and1002/67/EEC, OJ 124, 28.11.1962, p.2751.

68 Commission Regulations (EEC) No99/63, (EEC) No 1629/69, (EEC) No1630/69, (EEC) No 4260/88 and(EEC) No 4261/88 were repealed.

New procedures for anti-trustcases: hearings, and notificationof transport cases

Téa MÄKELÄ, DG IV-B-2Charles WILLIAMS, DG IV-D-2

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DGIV Web Site underhttp://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/.

Regulation (EC) No 2842/98– hearing of parties

Hearing of the parties is animportant procedural stage incompetition cases examined bythe Commission in accordancewith the powers conferred to itby the EC Treaty to ensure thatcompetition is not distorted inthe common market. Regulation(EC) No 2842/98 which hasreplaced Regulation (EEC) No99/63 defines the manner inwhich the Commission ensuresthe right to be heard of thedifferent parties involved incompetition cases.

The parties entitled to submitcomments under the Regulationshould do so in writing, both intheir own interest and in theinterest of sound administration,without prejudice to thepossibility of an oral hearingwhere appropriate to supplementthe written procedure. TheRegulation is divided intodifferent chapters according tothe status of the party69 in orderto make the rules clearer andmore user-friendly.

To facilitate the examination ofindividual cases by theCommission services and toavoid unnecessary delays, theCommission is not obliged to

69 Chapter II: Hearing of parties to which

the Commission has addressedobjections; Chapter III: Hearing ofapplicants and complainants; andChapter IV: Hearing of otherinterested parties.

take account of writtensubmissions from the addresseesof a statement of objectionsreceived after the date set by theCommission for making theirviews known on the objections.Moreover, the addressees of astatement of objections are alsoto indicate by a date, set by theCommission, any parts of theCommission's objections that intheir view contain businesssecrets or other confidentialinformation.

Such an obligation also appliesto any party making known itsviews to the Commission underthe Regulation. Such partiesmust clearly identify anymaterial that they consider to beconfidential, giving reasons, andprovide a separate non-confidential version by the dateset by the Commission. If theparties fail to do so by the setdate, the Commission mayassume that the objections by theCommission or the submissionsby the party in question do notcontain such information.

The Regulation includes aprovision whereby theapplicant70 or complainant71

shall be provided with a copy ofthe non-confidential version ofthe objections and given a dateby which it may make its viewsknown in writing. This is the

70 Applications made under Article 3(2)

of Regulation No 17.71 Complaints made under Article 10 of

Council Regulation 5EEC) No1017/68, Article 10 of CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4056/86 andArticle 3(1) of Council Regulation(EEC) No 3975/87.

case where the Commissionraises objections. This provisionhas codified the existingCommission practice. However,the Regulation provides for theprotection of the legitimateinterest of undertakings in theprotection of their businesssecrets and other confidentialinformation. The Regulation alsorefers to the role of the HearingOfficer in the hearing procedure,and to the right of access to thefile without, however, pre-empting the Commission’sfurther intentions in this field.

With a view to simplifying theway in which the time limit forsubmissions by the parties to theCommission is calculated, allsubmissions under theRegulation are to reach theCommission by a certain date setby the Commission in its writtensubmission to the partyconcerned. In setting such a date,the Commission shall haveregard both to the time requiredfor preparation of the submissionand to the urgency of the case.The time allowed is at least twoweeks. Setting a specific date bywhich the submission must reachthe Commission is consideredless likely to result in legaluncertainty compared with thecalculation of the time limit bythe parties themselves.

In order to simplify and expeditethe conclusion of the hearingprocedure and following theCommission practice in the fieldof mergers, statements made byeach person at the hearing willbe recorded and the respective

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tape replaces the writtenminutes.

Regulation (EC) No 2843/98– applications and notifica-tions in the transport sector

In 1994, the Commissionmodernised the rules fornotifying restrictive agreementsin sectors other than transport byadopting Regulation (EC) No3385/94 and Form A/B.72

Commission Regulation (EC)No 2843/98 and the new FormTR (annexed as Annex I to theRegulation) have introducedsimilar rules for companieswhich wish to notify restrictiveagreements in the transportsector. Form TR specifies theinformation that must beprovided by companies whenapplying for an exemption underthe three transport Regulationsand for negative clearance underRegulation (EEC) No 3975/87.The new Regulation has replacedthe previous Form II (transportby rail, road and inlandwaterway), Form MAR(maritime transport) and FormAER (air transport). Form TR(B)(annexed as Annex II to theRegulation) has replaced FormIII for crises cartels notifiedunder Article 14(1) ofRegulation (EEC) No 1017/68.

The Regulation introduces to thetransport sector rules already


3385/94 of 21 December 1994 on theform, content and other details ofapplications and notifications providedfor in Council Regulation No 17,published in OJ L 377, 31.12.1994, p.28.

applicable to notifications madeon Form A/B, including thefollowing.− The language used for an

application will be thelanguage of the proceedingfor the party or partiesmaking the application.

− The rules on the effectivedate of submission of anapplication are spelt outmore fully, establishingclearly the principle thatapplications must becomplete in order to bedeemed valid.

− Companies are required toprovide more informationthan was previously the case.If, however, some of theinformation requested onForm TR is not necessary fora particular case, theCommission can waive therequirement to provide thisinformation. This avoidsunnecessary costs andregulatory burdens forcompanies.

Although the new Regulationvery closely follows Regulation(EEC) No 3385/94, it differs inthe following ways.− References in Regulation

(EEC) No 3385/94 toRegulation No 17 arereplaced in the newRegulation by equivalentreferences to the threetransport Regulations (EEC)No 1017/68, (EEC) No4056/86 and (EEC) No3975/87.

− The new Regulationprovides that where anapplication is wrongly made

under one of the transportRegulations it can beexamined under anotherRegulation as is applicable.

− Provision is made for thenotification of awards givenat arbitration andrecommendations byconciliators when theyconcern the settlement ofdisputes relating to thepractices of linerconferences referred to inArticle 4 and points 2 and 3of Article 5 of Regulation(EEC) No 4056/86.

− Applications andnotifications made under thecompetition rules of theEEA Agreement may also bemade in one of the officiallanguages of the EFTAStates.

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The District Heating PipeCartel

The formation of a new anti-cartel unit in DG 4 on 1December 1998 was heralded bythe Commission’s recentdecision imposing fines totallingover 90 million ECU on tencompanies which had operated asecret price fixing, market-sharing and bid-rigging cartel indistrict heating pipes from 1991to mid-1996. The best known ofthe companies fined was theSwedish-Swiss industrialcombine ABB which collected apenalty of 70 million ECU.

Announcing the decision, MrVan Miert sent an uncom-promising warning to companieswhich might still be tempted torun the risk of clandestine pricefixing:

“Fines have got to be felt. In thisparticular instance, it is difficultto imagine a worse cartel. Themain producers tried to bankruptthe only competitor who waswilling to take them on. Theydeliberately flouted the EUpublic procurement rules. Bid-rigging is no better than fraud.They continued the violation fornine months after theCommission had caught themred-handed. The violation callsfor condign fines.”

ORIGIN OF THE CASE

DG 4 had first been alerted tothe cartel’s existence in January1995 by Powerpipe, a privately-owned Swedish producer ofdistrict heating pipes. Powerpipeclaimed to have been threatenedwith reprisals by the cartelunless it agreed to confine itsactivities to the Swedish homemarket, in which case it wouldget a guaranteed quota.Powerpipe’s owner – awell-known venture business-man – had even appealedpersonally to senior ABBofficials to stop the cartel. Hisurgent request for a meeting wason one occasion rebuffed on thegrounds that it “could be viewedby competition authorities as anattempt to induce ABB intoillegal arrangements”.

The district heating pipe industryis centred on Denmark. Thebasic idea is that hot water iscirculated from a central heatsource around a whole district.The pipes used have to beinsulated inside a layer of foamand an outer plastic pipe. Thegreatest demand forpre-insulated pipes comes fromthe more Northerly MemberStates. Germany is the largestsingle national market and thefour Danish producers exportsubstantial quantities. ABB hadprogressively expanded its

activities in the sector by a seriesof acquisitions and by 1992 hadsome 40% of the Europeanmarket. It has factories inDenmark, Germany and severalother countries. The other pipeproducers were mainly privatecompanies, two of them locatedin Germany. The market inEurope is worth up to €400million annually.

The Commission carried outunannounced investigations inJune 1995 at all the producerssimultaneously. Unusuallyperhaps in cartel cases,“smoking gun” evidence wasfound at virtually all thesuspected participants.

THE DANISH MODEL

The cartel had first been set upin the Danish market in late 1990between the four domesticproducers. Under the establishedcustomer principle, customerswere directed to their “usual”supplier. If the allocated quotaswere nevertheless exceeded, theoffender had to compensate itsaggrieved rivals. Stability ofmarket shares made for higherprice levels in Denmark than inneighbouring markets. Soon thecollusion was extended to exportmarkets and the two Germanproducers were brought in.

Regular secret meetings betweenthe Managing Directors wereheld, the participants dubbingthemselves “the Popes”; lowerlevel managers who dealt withthe detail were called “ContactGroups”. The earlier cartelarrangements outside Denmark

CARTEL ENFORCEMENT

Julian JOSHUA, IV-E-1

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were relatively fragile andfragmented and the majorplayers led by ABB werelooking for a “Europeansolution” covering the wholemarket. In Germany a quotasystem was agreed in mid-1993;there was to be quarterlyreporting and auditing byaccountants. Fines for exceedingthe allocation were to be paidinto a Swiss bank account.However one of the parties,Løgstør, demurred at signing thedocument. The others werereportedly unwilling to go aheadon the basis of handshakes. Afterbitter mutual recriminations anda “price war” in late 1993 peacewas re-established and a newstructure of collusion was set upin 1994: this time an overallEurope-wide cartel was devisedembracing the Baltic States andEastern Europe as well as theEU.

The cartel allocated sales quotason both a national and aEuropean level. ABB’s quotawas 37%, Løgstør had 20% andthree other producers 10% each.Appropriate committees were setup to run the cartel, the seniorexecutives now callingthemselves the “Elephants”.

A common price list wasdevised; agreed discounts “offlist” were to be progressivelyreduced with the declared aim ofraising prices 30% in two years.

BID RIGGING

A disturbing feature of the casewas the setting up of a biddingring. This is in fact the firstmajor case of bid-rigging dealtwith by the Commission underArticle 85. The market fordistrict heating systems is mostlyproject-based; customers aremainly local authorities or otherpublic utilities. Contracts areusually put up for competitivetender, the EU directives onpublic procurement applying toany project worth over€400.000.

In Germany in particular, wheresome 1500 projects a year areput out to competitive tender,sales managers met every two orthree weeks to deal out contracts.For each project, one producerwas nominated “favourite” towin the bid; it informed theothers what it was going to quoteand they had to put in higher“protection” offers to ensure itobtained the business. Anytemptation to cheat and undercutthe designated favourite wasdiminished by a reportingsystem; a computer programmewas devised to monitor all bids,and one company even acted as akind of “Chief Whip” to ensurecartel discipline.

BOYCOTT

Unlike some other smallerproducers, Powerpipe not onlyrejected pressure to join the club;it incurred the wrath of the cartelby systematically underbiddingthe favourite and winning aseries of major projects in

Germany. The most egregiousexample was the Leipzig-Lippendorf project, one so bigthat no single cartel membercould meet it; a “consortium” ofthe three German producers –including ABB – was thereforesecretly nominated to “win” thetendering procedure. When thenews broke in March 1995, thecartel met in a Düsseldorf hoteland decided an immediateboycott: a meeting note readssuccinctly: “No producer tosupply at all to L-L...; none ofour subcontractors may work forPowerpipe; if they do, furtherco-operation will be stopped. Weshall try to prevent Powerpipefrom obtaining supplies of (forexample) plastic.”

BUSINESS AS USUAL

The Commission’s surpriseinvestigations followed just threemonths later. Despite DG 4’ssuccess in uncovering theevidence, the cartel gambled oncarrying on as if nothing hadhappened. The only concessionto the Commission’sinvestigation was to movemeetings to Zurich; to avoidgenerating travel records whichcould leave a trace, the Danishparticipants flew to Switzerlandin a private aircraft. At this stagethe cartel had defined quotas forall markets. Elaborate tableswere drawn up to check theobservance of the allocatedmarket shares.

This continued for nine monthsand indeed the cartel only fellapart when the Commissionconfronted the participants with

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detailed Article 11 requests toexplain their own incriminatingdocuments.

FINES: GUIDELINES ANDLENIENCY

The sudden disintegration of thecartel may have been acceleratedby the imminent publication ofthe Commission Notice on thenon-imposition or reduction offines (OJ C 207/4 of 18 July1996).

Several of the companiesapproached DG 4 via their legaladvisers offering to co-operatewith its investigations. Someproduced hitherto undiscovereddocuments; tables andmemoranda proving the cartelhad gone on long after theinvestigations were probably themost damning examples.

The companies could not ofcourse bring themselves undersections B or C of the Noticeproviding for most favourabletreatment as the Commission hadalready abundant proof of theinfringement. Most of themhowever qualified for asignificant reduction in theotherwise appropriate fine underSection D: this allows a discountof between 10% and 50% for co-operation by volunteeringsubstantial evidence before astatement of objections is sent oreven for not substantiallycontesting the allegations.

There is no question of formal“plea bargaining” along the linesof the American model. Underthe Notice, the Commission will

only decide at the end of theadministrative procedure whatany co-operation was worth.Moreover the “otherwiseappropriate” fine is fixed atdecision stage by the fullCommission itself; DG 4officials are neither able norauthorised at any stage to“negotiate” the fine amount withthe companies. Undertakings andtheir lawyers should alsoremember that the conditions forgranting leniency applythroughout the administrativeprocedure; backtracking half-way through the case may wellmean losing the benefit of theNotice.

The open question is of coursethe amount of the fine that wouldhave been appropriate before anyleniency.

For “very serious infringe-ments”, the Guidelines on finesissued in January 1998 (OJ C9/3of 14.1.1998) provide for astarting point of at least €20million. Cartels invariably fall inthis category.

One object of the Guidelines wasto break the link between finesand turnover in the productmarket. They recognise thatwhile Regulation No 17 providesfor an absolute ceiling of 10% ofthe undertaking’s total turnover,it does not in fact require fines tobe calculated as any particularpercentage. Nor is theCommission limited to 10%, orany other percentage, of theturnover of the relevant“business” inside a multiproductgroup. (Earlier practice along

these lines has given rise onoccasion to some odd-lookingfigures, and more seriously, todisputes before the CFI aboutexactly what should beconsidered the “relevant”turnover.)

The basic principle of theGuidelines is one of equalpunishment for the samemisconduct. This does not meanthe same amount for all. It wouldbe perverse to impose exactlythe same fine on great and smallalike; the Guidelines thusexpressly allow the Commissionflexibility to recognize thespecific weight and real impactof the offending conduct in eachparticular case.

The latter exercise is particularlynecessary where (as in the pipescase) there are both hugemultinational group and privatesingle-product companies in thesame infringement and a vastdisparity in the sizes of the firmsinvolved.

Here – apart from ABB – theoffenders were mostly single-product companies; even thelargest of them – Løgstør - wasonly half the size of ABB’s pre-insulated pipe business. Thegravity of the offence meant thatfines had to be at or near the topof the scale; but even a fine onABB of double the amountimposed on the second producer(Løgstør) would have been amere pinprick to a combine witha total turnover of €30 billion.The specialist companies wouldbe much harder hit in relativeterms than ABB. On the other

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hand practical considerationsalone dictate against a fine of10% of ABB’s total worldwideturnover. How could fairness beachieved ?

The Commission resolved thedilemma by dividing the tenproducers into four broadcategories according to theirrelative importance in the pipesmarket. The “basic” fine thusreflected in general their relativesales in district heating pipes inthe EU; ABB had the higheststarting point (at ECU 20million), but this was subject inits case to a further upwardadjustment to take account of itsposition as one of Europe’slargest industrial companies.

ABB had attempted to portray itsinvolvement as the aberrant,unauthorised and wholly atypicalactions of a minor Danishsubsidiary. The documentaryevidence showed however that infact the cartel had beenconceived, approved anddirected at a very high level inthe Group.

The upward adjustment servedthe dual purpose of ensuringdeterrence and reflecting theproven involvement in the cartelof a most senior level ofcorporate management.

The Commission considered thatthe minimum fine of ECU 20million should in ABB’s case beweighted by x 2,5 in order toensure sufficient deterrence.

The long duration of the cartelwas reflected by an additionalweighting of x 1,4; whileaggravating factors (such asABB’s leadership role and itsdeliberate continuance of thecartel after being caught) added afurther 50%.

After account was taken inmitigation of ABB’s payment ofcompensation to Powerpipe, the“otherwise appropriate” finestood at exactly ECU 100million.

Under its leniency programmethe Commission then gave ABBa discount under Section D ofthe Notice of 30%.

This was not of course a casewhere an undertaking hadinformed the Commission abouta secret cartel before itundertook investigations or afterunsuccessful visits. Theinformation provided by ABB –and others – did however assistmaterially in establishing thefacts, in particular as to theorigins of the cartel as early as1990.

With regard to each of the otheroffenders the Commission wentthrough a similar exercise.A special nuance should benoted in the fixing of the “basic”amount. Although the fineGuidelines would normally havecalled for a minimum startingpoint of ECU 20 million, thiswould in some cases have comeclose to the entire sales of thecompany; The starting point for

the first of the “single product”companies, Løgstør, wastherefore fixed at ECU 10million and proportionately lessfor the others.

WHERE DO WE GO FROMNOW ?

This was only the latest in a longseries of hard-core cartelviolations uncovered by theCommission. Fines reckoned inmillions and now tens ofmillions do not even seem tohave acted as a brake on illegalprice fixing. Companies stillseem to make the cynicalcalculation whether the risk isone worth taking. This no doubtkeeps cartel investigatorsemployed but that is not themain objective of our policy.Perhaps only the certainty ofbeing caught in the end willmake violators think again. Theestablishment of a special cartelunit will sharpen the focus onenforcement. In this context theCommission’s Leniency noticecould also play a crucial role.The programme is designed toenhance the Commission’seffectiveness as an antitrustenforcement authority. TheCommission may not haveavailable to it weapons like theGrand Jury and compelledtestimony under Court-orderedimmunity, still less the fullweight of the Federal criminallaw, but the Leniency Policyclearly signals to violators thattimely co-operation pays.

.

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1. Le 14 décembre 1998, laCommission a adopté unedécision qui exempte, au titrede l’article 85, troisièmeparagraphe, du traité CE, desaccords types pour laproduction et la vente desemences protégées par desdroits d’obtention végétale enFrance. Ces accords sontconclus entre, d’une part, laSICASOV (SociétéCoopérative d'Intérêt CollectifAgricole Anonyme à CapitalVariable, Paris) et, d’autrepart, les établissementsmultiplicateurs. La SICASOVregroupe les obtenteurs devariétés végétales protégées enFrance et a pour tâche de gérerles variétés végétales qui luiont été confiées par lesditsobtenteurs (ou par leurs ayant-droits). Cette gestioncomporte notamment laconclusion de contrats deproduction avec desétablissements multiplicateursqui sont les entreprises quiassurent la multiplication dessemences en vue de satisfaireaux besoins des agriculteurs.

2. Les produits en cause sont lessemences protégées par desdroits d’obtention végétale (autitre du droit français ou du

règlement communautaireapplicable en la matière).

Les réglementations commu-nautaires et nationalesétablissent des règles détailléesconcernant la production et lavente des semences. Sur labase desdites réglementations,les semences peuvent êtresubdivisées en:-semences de base: ce sont dessemences qui ne sont pasdestinées à être vendues auxagriculteurs pour leurssemailles mais qui sontexclusivement destinées àproduire d’autres semences.Elles peuvent donc être enquelque sorte comparées à unmatériel industrielintermédiaire;-semences certifiées: ce sontdes semences qui générale-ment sont destinées à êtrevendues aux agriculteurs pourleurs semailles. Elles sontdonc, en quelque sorte,comparables à des produitsindustriels finis protégés parun brevet;- semences techniques: ce sontdes semences certifiées qui,dans certains Etats, peuventlicitement être utilisées pourproduire d’autres semencescertifiées (et remplissent donc

la fonction de semences debase) tandis que, dans d’autresEtats, peuvent être uniquementêtre vendues aux agriculteurs(et remplissent donc lafonction de semencescertifiées).

Pour pouvoir être licitementcommercialisées, les semencesdoivent appartenir à unevariété qui a été préalablementinscrite dans un des cataloguesnationaux, selon les règlesapplicables dans les différentesEtats membres. Après unecertaine période d’inscriptionau catalogue national, lavariété est inscrite aucatalogue commun, ce quipermet aux semences de laditevariété de circuler librement àl’intérieur de la Communautéeuropéenne sans être soumisesà aucune restriction.

3. La SICASOV a notifié à laCommission des accords typesen vertu desquels elle concèdeaux établissements multipli-cateurs (ci-après: les“licenciés”) une licence non-exclusive de production et devente de semences sur leterritoire français (ou, s’ils’agit de semences protégéespar un droit d’obtentioncommunautaire, sur l’ensem-ble de la Communautéeuropéenne).

4. En premier lieu, les accordstypes prévoient un ensemblede clauses qui soumettent aucontrôle de la SICASOV lessemences de base et lessemences techniques. Ainsi,les accords interdisent aux

SICASOV - La Commission exemptedes accords types de production et devente de semences protégées par desdroits d’obtention végétale en France

Claudio MENIS DG IV-F-3

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licenciés les exportations(directes et indirectes) dessemences de base et leurimposent l’obligation de“déclasser”73 les semencestechniques avant leurexportation. La décisionindique que ces clausesrelèvent de l'existence mêmedu droit d'obtention végétale etque, de ce fait, elles ne sontpas visées par l'article 85, par.1, du traité CE (en ce sens,voir l’arrêt de la Cour dejustice Erauw Jacquery/LaHesbignonne, 19.4.1988, aff.27/87, Rec. 1988, p.1919).

5. En deuxième lieu, les accordstypes prévoient des clauses quiinterdisent l'exportation desemences certifiées vers desEtats non membres de laCommunauté européenne ouvers des Etats qui ne prévoientpas de protection légale pourles obtentions végétales. Ladécision considère que cetteobligation échappe àl’interdiction prévue parl’article 85, paragraphe 1er, dutraité CE.

6. Enfin, les accords typesprévoient une clause selonlaquelle le licencié ne peut pasexporter directement lessemences certifiées vers desEtats membres autres que laFrance lorsque la variété àlaquelle lesdites semencesappartiennent est inscrite aucatalogue commun depuis

73 Le déclassement a pour effet d’empêcher

que les semences exportées puissent fairel’objet d’actes de reproduction (endehors du contrôle de l’obtenteur) dansle pays de destination

moins de quatre ans. Ladécision considère que cetteobligation a pour objet derestreindre la concurrence etqu’elle tombe donc dans ledomaine d’application del’article 85, paragraphe 1er, dutraité CE. En outre, ladécision estime que lesaccords ne font pas partieintégrante d’une organisationnationale de marché ni ne sontnécessaires à la réalisation desobjectifs énoncés à l’article 39du traité CE. Par conséquent,la décision indique quel’exception prévue par l’article2 du règlement n. 26/62 doitêtre écartée et que, de ce fait,l’article 85, paragraphe 1, dutraité CE est applicable à laditeobligation.

Toutefois, d’après la décision,l’obligation en cause peut êtreexemptée au titre duparagraphe 3 de l’article 85 dutraité CE puisqu’elle favorisela diffusion de nouvellesvariétés dans les Etatsmembres autres que la France.En effet, les entreprises situéesdans ces Etats seront incitées àconclure des accords delicence et de distributionrelatifs aux nouvelles variétéspuisqu’elles auront la certitudede ne pas être soumises auxexportations directes deslicenciés français pendantquatre ans. Par conséquent,même si une telle obligationlimite les exportations, elledoit néanmoins être exemptéepuisqu’elle contribue àpromouvoir le progrèstechnique et la diffusion de

nouveaux produits au bénéficedes utilisateurs.

7. Sur la base des considérationsdéveloppées ci-dessus, laCommission a décidé d’adop-ter une décision d’exemption,au titre de l’article 85,troisième paragraphe, du traitéCE, valable jusqu’au 26octobre 2004.

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Competition Policy Newsletter 1998 Number 3 October 33

On 14 October 1998, theCommission adopted a Decisionby which fines have beenimposed on the sugar producersBritish Sugar and Tate & Lyle,as well as the sugar merchantsNapier Brown and JamesBudgett for violation of Article85(1) of the EC Treaty. TheCommission found that thecompanies have pursued theobject of restricting competitionthrough a co-ordination of theirpricing policy on the whitegranulated sugar market in GreatBritain. The Commissiontherefore imposed fines of 39.6million ECU on British Sugar, 7million ECU on Tate & Lyle, 1.8million ECU on Napier Brownand 1.8 million ECU on JamesBudgett.

The Decision concerns thecollaborative strategy of higherpricing by British Sugar, Tate &Lyle, Napier Brown and JamesBudgett on the industrial whitegranulated sugar market in GreatBritain, as well as a similar kindof strategy pursued only byBritish Sugar and Tate & Lyle onthe retail white granulated sugarmarket in Great Britain.

The relevant period during whichthese infringements took placewas between 20 June 1986 and 2

July 1990 with respect to BritishSugar and Tate & Lyle, andbetween late 1986 and 2 July1990 with respect to NapierBrown and James Budgett.During this period the fourcompanies represented around90% of the entire whitegranulated sugar market in GreatBritain.

The Commission found evidenceof numerous meetings betweenthe parties, which took place inregular intervals throughout therelevant period. In the initialmeeting between British Sugarand Tate & Lyle on 20 June1986, the principles of the futureanti-competitive conduct wereset. The merchants Napier Brownand James Budgett joined thisconduct before the end of 1986.

18 further meetings aboutindustrial white granulated sugartook place between all fourparties. During these meetingsBritish Sugar informed Tate &Lyle, Napier Brown and JamesBudgett of target prices itintended to obtain with respect toindustrial sugar. Concerning retailsugar, there were 8 furthermeetings between British Sugarand Tate & Lyle in which BritishSugar revealed to Tate & Lyle itspricing policy and in which the

two companies discussed theirrespective discount policiestowards large retail customers.

Whilst the Commission did nothave sufficient evidence thatprices charged to individualbuyers of industrial or retail sugarwere jointly fixed, the systematicparticipation of all four parties inregular meetings concerningindustrial sugar, and of BritishSugar and Tate & Lyleconcerning retail sugar, lead to anatmosphere of mutual certainty asto the participants’ intentionsconcerning their future pricingbehaviour. Each of them couldrely, if not on the precise pricelevels of the other participants, atleast on their intentional pursuitof the collaborative strategy ofhigher pricing.

For all the participants thismutual assurance was of interest,particularly, - though notexclusively - in the price rangeabove the break-even point, inwhich range price competitionwas possible while stillprofitable.

The Decision rejects in detail allthe parties’ arguments for whythere should not have been aviolation of Article 85. Inparticular, the Decision disprovesall the parties’ alternativeexplanations for why theirmeetings took place. Moreover,the Decision shows that BritishSugar’s price leadership on themarket for industrial and retailsugar in Great Britain during therelevant period left scope forcompetition by the other threecompanies in particular by

The Commission fines a cartel ofBritish sugar producers andmerchants

Rüdiger DOHMS, DG IV-A-2Matthijs VISSER, DG IV-F-3

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undercutting British Sugar’s priceincreases. In addition, the factthat the market in the present casewas oligopolistic so thatcompetition for structural reasonstended to be limited to a certainextent, did not allow thecompanies to go further and exante actively co-ordinate theirfuture pricing policy.

The fines imposed by theDecision have been calculated onthe basis of the Commission’spublished Guidelines on theimposition of fines74. TheCommission has taken intoaccount that the infringementswere serious and of mediumduration. Considerabledifferentiation between theindividual contributions of thefour parties to the infringementhas been made:- The participation of British

Sugar, on account of its highshare on the relevant marketsfor industrial and retail sugar,and due to its position as priceleader on these markets, wasessential to the operation ofthe cartel.

- Tate & Lyle, on account of itsshare on the relevant marketswas the second mostimportant member of thecartel.

- The merchants Napier Brownand James Budgett did notparticipate in the key meetingof 20 June 1986. They joinedthe cartel only several monthslater and from then onwardsonly participated in theinfringements concerningindustrial sugar. Moreover,

74 14 January 1998, OJ 1998 C 9/03.

due to the fact that they weredependent on the suppliesfrom the two domestic sugarproducers – British Sugar andTate & Lyle – for a significantpart of the sugar they sold intheir function as merchants,their influence on the relevantmarket and their possibility ofexercising power on thatmarket, was limited.

Moreover, with regard to BritishSugar, several aggravating factorshave been found:- British Sugar was the

instigator of the infringementsand throughout the relevantperiod remained the drivingforce. In fact, after havingwaged a price war against itscompetitors, it took theinitiative, by arranging themeeting of 20 June 1986, toreplace this price war by acollaborative strategy ofhigher pricing with itscompetitors.

- British Sugar acted in amanner contrary to the clearwording contained in its fullcomprising complianceprogramme, which itpresented to the Commissionin October 1986 in the courseof the Napier Brownprocedure, and which theCommission took into accountas a mitigating factor whensetting the fine in the NapierBrown-decision75.

- Already in July 1988, in itsNapier Brown decision, theCommission fined British

75 Commission Decision No 88/518/EEC

of 18 July 1988, Napier Brown – BritishSugar, OJ L 284/41.

Sugar for having attempted toforce a merchant out of theretail market on the whitegranulated sugar market inGreat Britain. This means thatBritish Sugar practiced thecollaborative strategy ofhigher pricing, which is atissue in the present Decision,for two years in parallel withthe Commission-procedureleading up to the NapierBrown decision.

As to Tate & Lyle, theCommission substantiallyreduced the fine under the Noticeon the non-imposition orreduction of fines in cartel cases(“Leniency Notice”)76, in order totake account of the fact that Tate& Lyle co-operated with theCommission, in particular bysubmitting two self-incriminatingletters to it. Indeed, these twoletters adduced decisive evidenceof the cartel’s existence andallowed the Commission tointervene in this case.

At the end of 1998, British Sugar(T-204/98), Tate & Lyle (T-202/98) and Napier Brown (T-207/98) have lodged appealswith the Court of First Instanceagainst the CommissionDecision.

76 18 July 1997, OJ 1997 C 207/04.

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Mr and Mrs Roberts operate apub owned by Greene King.They complained in May1997 to the EuropeanCommission asking theCommission to conclude thatthe beer tie (the obligation tobuy most beer they sell onlyfrom Greene King, theirlandlord-brewer) in their leaseinfringes Article 85. Such aconclusion might haveallowed the Roberts to buytheir beer from the suppliersof their own choice, therebybenefiting from thesubstantial discounts thesesuppliers offer.

The assessment in this case is anapplication of two tests set out inthe Delimitis judgement fordeciding whether the cumulativenetwork of agreements of anindividual brewer falls within thescope of EC competition rules.

The first test is whether themarket concerned is foreclosed.The Commission considers that,given the current data, the UKon-trade beer market continues tobe foreclosed. In 1997, between50 and 58 per cent of thethroughput on the UK on-tradebeer market was covered byrestrictive agreements.

The second test is whether thenetwork of agreements of anindividual brewer contributes

significantly to that foreclosure.Here, the Commission concludesthat Greene King is too small tocontribute significantly to theforeclosure of the UK on-tradebeer market as Greene King’ssales in its managed, tenanted andloan-tied estate account for only1.3% of the UK on-trade market.This is considerably less than the5% (or more) that each of the bigUK brewers (Scottish &Newcastle, Bass, Whitbread andCarlsberg-Tetley) realises in theirtied network (including therestrictive agreements with non-brewing pub companies).

The reasoning applied to GreeneKing is also valid for the leases ofthe other small and regional UKbrewers and for the leases of non-brewing pub companies, whichare supplied by more than onebrewer. The decision cantherefore be considered as a clearprecedent for these companies,and the pubs they tie.

On 7 January 1999 theCommission rejected acomplaint of Info-Lab, amanufacturer of toner forphotocopiers, against Ricoh, aphotocopier manufacturer. Info-Lab alleged that Ricoh abused itsdominant position on the market

for toner cartridges compatiblewith certain Ricoh photocopiersand protected by Ricohintellectual property rights byrefusing to supply Info-Lab withempty toner cartridges, whichwould enable Info-Lab to

compete with Ricoh in the saleof filled toner cartridges.

Info-Lab claimed that it is notpossible to design a tonercartridge which would fit intothe Ricoh machines and at thesame time would not violateRicoh’s intellectual propertyrights. It would therefore like topurchase empty toner cartridgesfrom Ricoh, fill them with tonerwhich it already manufacturesand then sell the filled tonercartridges in competition with

Greene King / Roberts

Nils VON HINTEN-REED, IV-F-3

Info-Lab/Ricoh

Elke FISCHER, DGIV-E-2

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Ricoh. Ricoh, however, whichhas so far not licensed its designrights or sold empty cartridges toanyone, refused to do this.

According to Info-Lab therelevant product market wouldbe the market for empty tonercartridges compatible with Ricohcopiers which are supposed to befilled with toner powder and soldto end-users. Such a markethowever does not exist. Noproducer or dealer sells emptytoner cartridges compatible withRicoh copiers. Aside fromRicoh, no company can producethese toner cartridges, since theyare protected by intellectualproperty rights held by Ricoh,which so far has not licensed itsdesign rights. Nor does Ricohsell empty toner cartridges toother companies or end-users. Atthe retail level there is nodemand for empty cartridgeseither. Cartridge and powder aresold together as a single product.Other copier manufacturers andindependent toner cartridgemanufacturers, such as Info-Labitself, sell filled cartridges toend-users. This satisfies arecognised consumer need,reduces costs, and means that thecomponents have to be usedtogether. Powder and cartridgehave therefore to be consideredas a single product.

Since a market for empty tonercartridges compatible with Ricohcopiers does not exist, thequestion is whether Ricoh,which has neither licensed itsdesign rights nor sold emptycartridges, could be forced tostart selling them so as to allow

Info-Lab to enter the market.Since there is no consumer-demand for empty tonercartridges, because thecomponents cartridge andpowder are used together by endcustomers, the sole purpose ofselling empty cartridges wouldbe to enable Info-Lab to competewith Ricoh in the market forfilled toner cartridges. TheCommission is of the opinionthat a company cannot beobliged to such forced co-operation with prospectivemarket-players or that suchforced co-operation could onlybe envisaged under exceptionalcircumstances (see restrictiveapproach of Court of Justice todoctrine of “essential facilities”in the recent Oscar Bronner case;26 November 1998, Case C-7/97).

The application of Article 86 in acase like the present one could atmost be envisaged were Ricoh tohave a dominant position on theconsumables market, whichwould allow it to actindependently of possiblecompetitors and especially to befree in setting prices. Ricoh isthe only undertaking which sellsfilled toner cartridges compatiblewith Ricoh photocopiers.According to the Commission’sinvestigation, however, Ricohhas no dominant position in thephotocopiers market. This raisesthe issue whether a companycould be considered as dominanton the consumables marketwhere there is no dominance inthe upstream market, i.e. thephotocopier market. Central tothis issue is the existence of a

close link between these twomarkets.

In the Pelikan/Kyocera case77

the Commission took the viewthat Kyocera could not beconsidered to have a dominantposition in the market for tonerand other consumables whichwere compatible with itsproprietary system in the marketfor printers, since Kyocera’smarket share in the market forprinters was relatively low andthere was considerablecompetition on this market. TheCommission found that theprinter market and theconsumables market wereinterrelated in such a way thatthe horizontal competition on theprinter market constitutedeffective discipline in thevertical market.

For assessing whether there wassufficient interrelation betweenthe primary and the secondarymarket the Commission usedfour criteria, which should alsobe applied in the present case.

a) The consumer can make aninformed choice includinglifecycle pricing

According to a number ofphotocopier manufacturers, theproducers also offer servicesupport agreements or all-inclusive rental and leasingcontracts to photocopiermachines customers at an annualfee, where the toner for a fixednumber of copies is included.

77 See XXVth Report on Competition

Policy 1995, p. 140.

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When purchasing a photocopiermachine the customer canchoose between such an“inclusive contract” or an“exclusive contract”, where hepurchases the toner cartridgesseparately. The consumertherefore gets a general idea ofthe average costs forconsumables during the lifetimeof the photocopier machines andis able to compare prices.

b) The consumer is likely tomake an informed choice

Since the consumer can calculatethe price per copy by simplycomparing the various inclusiveand exclusive contracts offeredby the different photocopiermanufacturers, it is very likelythat this factor is taken intoaccount when a purchasedecision is made.

c) In case of an apparent policyof exploitation being pursued inone specific aftermarket asufficient number of customerswould adapt their purchasing

behaviour at the level of theprimary market

In cases where there is sufficientpotential for new customers, theexisting customer base appearsto be protected from exploitativebehaviour by the attentive eye ofthe new customer. Regarding thelow market share of Ricoh in therelevant photocopier market andthe normal life of a photocopierof about 3 years it follows thatthere is a large number ofcustomers that qualify aspotential new customers ofRicoh machines.

d) Adaptation within areasonable period of time

In Pelikan/Kyocera theCommission considered it to bedecisive whether, shouldKyocera start raising prices forits consumables today, suchbehaviour would trigger anadaptation in the purchasingpattern of new customers. TheCommission held that such anadaptation would take place onthe printer market. There are noindications that the situation

would be any different if Ricohbegan to raise its prices forphotocopier consumables.

While Ricoh is the only supplierof toner cartridges for certainRicoh photocopier machines,there is no indication that Ricohhas a dominant position in themarket for the photocopiermachines in question. Theformer market is, however,closely linked to the latter.Under the approach adopted bythe Commission inPelikan/Kyocera, Ricoh cannotbe considered to have adominant position.

Even if Ricoh had a dominantposition it is doubtful whetherthis would be sufficient to justifyimposing an obligation on Ricohto sell empty toner cartridges toInfo-Lab. In the present case,however, any circumstanceswhich might at most justify suchforced co-operation withprospective market-players donot exist.

The facts

Following receipt of a complaintfrom a member of the public, the

Commission carried outinvestigations without priorwarning at the offices of ferryoperators, in Greece and in Italy

in July 1994. Strong evidence ofan infringement of Article 85was discovered. The Commissionconcluded that ferry companiesoperating in Ancona, Bari,Brindisi – Greece routesparticipated in a price fixing cartelfor several years and it identifiedseven companies that participatedtherein, i.e. six companies basedin Greece Minoan, Karageorgis,

Decision of the Commission dated9/12/98 in case IV/34.466-Greek Ferries

Panayotis ADAMOPOULOS, DG IV-D-3

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Marlines, Strintzis, Anek,Ventouris Ferries and one Italiancompany, namely Adriatica.

The legal assessment

It was clear from the evidence inthe this case that the partiesengaged in regular, directconsultations aimed at fixingpassenger fares and freight ratesbetween Greece and Italy.Regular, detailed discussions tookplace each year to decide the tarifflevels for the following year, andad hoc consultations took place todecide how the parties shouldreact to issues that arose duringthe year, such as currencydevaluation or new categories ofvehicles. It is also clear that thesediscussions took place at seniorlevels between the parties. Therecan be no doubt that thisarrangement amounted to anagreement, the object of whichwas to fix selling prices and othertrading conditions by the partiesthereto.

The arguments of the parties

The arguments of the partiesrelated to the Greek legalframework as well as to thesituation in the relevant marketduring the years of theinfringement. According to theparties, the Greek law whichgives the Ministry of MercantileMarine the right to intervene incases of price wars between ferryoperators, induced the companies

to agree on tariffs in order toavoid such intervention.

Furthermore, the war in Ex-Yugoslavia created a state ofemergency.

For the Commission, there is noevidence of the Greek authorities’imposing or encouraging price-fixing collusion in the Adriaticroutes. Moreover, no crisis oremergency is recorded in theparties’ correspondence.

The relevant market

The relevant market is limitedboth in geographical scope andsize. It concerns three out of fiveroutes in Adriatica (there are stillVenice-Patras and Trieste-Patras). Moreover, even if allGreece-Italy routes are takeninto account, the market is stillsmall compared to other marketswithin the EU.

As regards the impact of thecartel, the prices in the marketwere relatively low compared toother routes within the commonmarket, since the Ministryencouraged, during that period,the parties to keep them at thatlevel in order to protect Greekexports to the rest of the EU. Thenumber of the companiesoperating in the market isrelatively high. In 1993, last fullyear of the infringement therewere 18 operators in Greece-

Italy routes. New competitorsentered the market since 1994.

Fines

A price-fixing cartel is by itsnature a very seriousinfringement. However, takinginto account the limited size ofthe relevant market as well as thelimited impact of theinfringement in this market, theCommission concluded that theinfringement was a serious andnot a very serious one.

The Commission also concludedthat the administrative practiceof the Greek authorities createdsome degree of confusion to thecompanies as to whether theircontact constituted aninfringement. The reason for thiswas that the Ministry, whichaccording to the Greek lawdecides the level of tariffs for thedomestic part of the Greece -Italy route, required thecompanies to arrive to acommon proposal prior to theMinistry’s decision.

The co-operation of theundertakings with theCommission has been also takeninto consideration. Providingincriminating documents andnon-contesting the facts asdescribed in the Commission’sStatement of Objections lead tosignificant reductions of fines.

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Le comité de rédaction estimeutile d’apporter à l’article surl’affaire EUDIM figurant à lapage 26 du numéro précédent de«Compétition PolicyNewsletter » les précisionssuivantes :

Le 5 février 1991, Van MarckeNV a introduit une demandevisant les accords au seind’EUDIM auprès de laCommission en vertu de l’article3 du règlement 17/62 CE duConseil.

Parmi d’autres mesuresd’instruction, la Commission ademandé des renseignementsaux entreprises concernées eteffectué des vérifications envertu des articles 11 et 14 duditrèglement.

Le 7 février 1995, laCommission a décidé d’ouvrir la

procédure en vertu de l’article 9paragraphe 3 dudit règlement etd’envoyer une communication deses griefs à EUDIM dans cetteaffaire, conformément à l’article2 paragraphe 1 du règlement99/63 CE de la Commission. Lacommunication des griefs de laCommission exposait son pointde vue provisoire que, tel quepratiqués, les accords d’EUDIMconstituaient une infraction àl’article 85.

EUDIM a exprimé par écrit sonpoint de vue à l’égard des griefs,conformément à l’article 3paragraphe 1 du règlement de laCommission précité, selon lequelses accords ne constituaient pasune infraction, tout en renonçantà l’audition prévue à l’article 19paragraphe 1 du règlement duConseil précité.

Le 28 novembre 1995, EUDIM anotifié des accords en vertu desarticles 2 et 4 du règlement duConseil précité. Les accordsnotifiés incluaient desdispositions qui complétaient ouclarifiaient certaines disposi-tions visées par les griefs de laCommission.

Le 17 avril 1996, la Commissiona publié l’essentiel du contenude la notification en vertu del’article 19 paragraphe 3 durèglement du Conseil précité etannoncé son intention deprendre une position favorable,sur les accords, tels que modifiéset notifiés.

Le 6 août 1998, la Commission aadopté une décision rejetant laplainte de Van Marckesusmentionnée. Le 17 septembre1998, les services de laCommission ont envoyé unelettre à EUDIM l’informant queles observations reçues à l’égardde la publication susditen’étaient pas de nature àmodifier l’évaluation de l’affaireet que, par conséquent, ledossier allait être classé.

EUDIM : Complémentd’information

MERGERSApplication of Council regulation 4064/89


Introduction & StatisticalOverview

The final four months of 1998 sawno reduction in the continuingupward trend in activity under theMerger Regulation78 thatcharacterised the year as a whole(see also previous issues of theNewsletter). A further 80operations were notified, bringingthe total for the year to 235, anincrease of over a third (36%) onthe already-record level for 1997,nearly 25% on the previous fourmonth period. There were 60Decisions on cases under theRegulation’s main provisions(Articles 6, 8 and 9) –bringing thetotal for the year to 238, anincrease of over 40% on the figurefor the whole of 1997 (itself arecord).

The potential for adverse effectson competition which such acaseload implies is also largelyunaltered from previous years,notwithstanding the erosive effectof inflation on the Regulation’sthresholds for notification. Therewas one further decision in theperiod to open a full, second phaseinvestigation (Article 6(1)(c)),bringing the total for the year to arecord 12. Equally significant,however, there were another twocases in which commitments were

78 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89.

accepted in Phase I under thenewly-introduced provisions (seeNewsletter 1998/2), bringing theyear’s total (in fact, only 10months, since the provision’seffective date was 1 March) tonine. There were also twoDecisions on cases following asecond phase investigation(Article 8), bringing the total forthe year to 10: both were cleared,one subject to formalcommitments from the parties toremedy the competition problemsthat the Commission hadidentified.

Phase II Decisions

In (Skanska/Scancem79) theCommission’s investigationfocussed on the markets forcement and concrete (both dry andready-mixed) and concreteproducts in Sweden, Finland andNorway. The combined marketshares produced by the mergerwere in some instances very high– as much as 90% in cement. Themerger also produced substantialvertical effects, since both partiesalso had significant activities at allthree main levels of theconstruction industry – rawmaterials (cement and aggregates),construction materials (concrete,concrete products) andconstruction itself. Most

79 Case No. IV/M 1157.

competitors were not verticallyintegrated, further reducing theirability to compete effectively afterthe merger. Skanska undertook todivest the whole of itsshareholding in Scancem and todispose of Scancem’s cementbusiness in Finland to anindependent purchaser. The firstpart of the remedy is designed toend the vertical links ; the second,to ensure an independent source ofsupply.

The other Phase II case,Enso/Stora80, was cleared. TheCommission’s initial analysissuggested that oligopoly issueswere likely to arise. The mergingparties – Enso of Finland andStora of Sweden, would togethermake the largest integrated paperand board group in the world. Inthe EEA, there were only sixsignificant suppliers of newsprint,and the combined group wouldbecome the largest. TheCommission’s detailedinvestigation found that thesemarkets displayed many of thecharacteristics of an anti-competitive oligopoly – lowdemand growth, concentratedsupply-side, homogeneousproducts, mature technology, highentry barriers, similar coststructures. The merger wouldsignificantly increase the level ofconcentration. However, theCommission also found that otherkey oligopoly characteristics werenot present: in particular, therewas no market transparency –information on prices andquantities supplied was not readilyavailable to competitors, andindeed there were secret discounts.Moreover there was evidence that


Recent Developments andImportant DecisionsJohn KEMP, DG IV-B-4

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customers – principally, largepublishing groups – could exercisea measure of countervailingpower.

‘Buyer power’ was alsoconsidered in this case in respectof the market for liquid packagingboard (used, eg, for milk and fruitjuice cartons). The merger wouldreduce the number of suppliers inthis specialised market in the EEAto three, with the merged entitybecoming the largest. Technicaland commercial entry barrierswere found to be high and totaldemand growth modest, makingnew entry unlikely. However, themarket was also heavilyconcentrated on the demand side,with one firm in particular – TetraPak – accounting for a verysubstantial share. The two othermain buyers (Elopak and SIGCombibloc) did not purchase suchlarge quantities as Tetra Pak.However they too appeared topossess a measure ofcountervailing power, since theyimported ‘strategic’ quantitiesfrom the USA. Overall, theCommission’s investigationsuggested that these circumstancesproduced, exceptionally, asituation of mutual dependencebetween buyers and sellers, whichthe merger was unlikely to disturb.

In clearing the operation, theCommission also took account ofcertain undertakings which hadbeen offered by the parties (someof them in the course of the firstphase of the investigation) in orderto address concerns about theposition of Elopak and Combiblocafter the merger. Enso woulddivest its shareholding in a jointconversion operation with Elopak,since this vertical link could

weaken Elopak’s countervailingpower. The merged companywould offer Elopak andCombibloc an arrangementdesigned to ensure that they werenot subject to unjustified pricediscrimination in comparison withTetra Pak. Finally, the partiesundertook not to oppose anapplication for a duty-free quotafor liquid packaging board fromoutside the Community. Theadoption of such a quota wouldmake imports more competitiveand thus encourage othersuppliers.

Phase I Decisions

The popularity and effectivenessof the new power to accept formalundertakings to remedycompetition problems at Phase Iwas confirmed by the addition oftwo cases81 in this category duringthe period. In many ways typicalof this process was ABB/ElsagBailey Process Automation NV82.This concerned the acquisition bythe ABB engineering andtechnology group of ElsagBailey’s process control business.The Commission’s investigationfound that, although in general theoverlaps (where any existed)between the parties’ activitieswere not significant, there was oneproduct area in which theoperation raised doubts about itscompatibility with the commonmarket. The parties’ combinedmarket shares in gaschromatograph analysers – a

81 in the second case - No. IV/M 1286 ,

Johnson & Johnson/Dupuy - theundertaking concerned the divestment ofan overlapping business in themanufacture of replacement hip and kneejoints.


specialised instrument usedmainly in the petrochemicalindustry, would have been highenough to give rise to competitionconcerns. However, ABBproposed a modification to theoperation by which it agreed todivest the key elements of ElsagBailey’s business in this area(Applied Automation Inc –‘AAI’). The activities to bedivested comprise Elsag Bailey’sinterest in gas chromatographs andin the development of a relatedproduct, a mass spectrometer.After testing this proposal in themarket, the Commissionconcluded that the divestmentwould remove the doubts aboutcompatibility, and declared theoperation compatible on that basis.

This case demonstrates many ofthe essential elements of asuccessful use of the ‘Phase Iundertakings’ procedure:

• clearly identified product andgeographic market(s) in whicha competition problem is foundto exist at an early stage of theexamination (some partieshave even drawn such potentialproblems to the Commission’sattention themselves, in orderto hasten the process);

• the notifying party’s ability todivest an overlapping businessthat clearly covers the area(s)of concern, and can be easilyidentified and readily severedfrom the remainder;

• readiness on the part of thenotifying party to acknowledgethe competition problemrapidly and to cooperate withthe Commission in seekingmutually acceptable ways ofresolving it.

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It is also worthwhile recalling theconstraints which the Regulation’svery short timescales place on theCommission and on the partiesunder this procedure, and inparticular the need for theCommission to ‘market test’ aproposed remedy with customers,competitors etc and to liaise withMember States. Popular andeconomical as it is proving, theCommission is not obliged toaccept a remedy at Phase I, and ifthe above elements are not allpresent, then a full investigationunder the Phase II procedures canbe expected.

Joint Ventures

Another change to the MergerRegulation whose effects can nowbe seen more clearly is theinclusion within its scope ofoperations known as ‘full functionco-operative joint ventures’(FFCJVs). The aim of the changeis, broadly, to increase clarity andconsistency. Now, all jointventures involving long-termchange in the structure of theenterprises concerned are - likeother ‘concentrations’ – dealt withunder the Merger Regulation(provided they have a Communitydimension) rather than under therules for agreements betweenunderta-kings83. The change alsomeans that these cases can benefitfrom the ‘one stop shop’ and fixedtimescales that apply to theassessment of other concentrativeoperations.

Article 2(4) brings within theRegulation’s scope all jointventures constituting aconcentration as defined in Article

83 Regulation (EEC) No. 17/62.

3. It provides that they will beappraised under Article 85, ECTreaty ‘to the extent that [the jointventure] has as its object or effectthe co-ordination of thecompetitive behaviour ofundertakings that remainindependent’84. Thus, theoperation’s concentrative effectsare assessed under the MergerRegulation’s ‘dominance test’85 aswith other concentrations; anyeffects on competition resultingfrom the coordination of theparents’ activities other thanthrough the joint venture (knownas ‘spillover effects’) are assessedunder Articles 85(1) and 85(3).Article 2(4) requires theCommission to take account inparticular, in its appraisal of‘spillover’, of whether two ormore parent companies retainsignificant activities in upstream,downstream or neighbouringmarkets to those of the jointventure; and whether thecoordination which is the directconsequence of the joint venture’screation affords the undertakingsconcerned the possibility ofeliminating competition in respectof a substantial part of theproducts or services in question.Previously, the likelihood ofspillover effects being found in anotified merger case could raisedoubts over whether it should beexamined under the MergerRegulation or under Regulation17/62, leading to additional delayand uncertainty, and the prospectof having to engage a differentprocedure.

84 For further details see also Commission

Notice on the concept of full-functionjoint ventures, OJ 98 C 66/01, 2.3.1998.

85 Merger Regulation, Article 2(1) – 2(3).

In the 10 months of 1998 since theamendments to the MergerRegulation took effect, 26 of the76 joint venture-cases decidedunder the Regulation necessi-tatedsome analysis under Article 2(4).The most detailed analyses havebeen made in cases within thetelecommunications and theInternet areas. Remedies to settleArticle 2(4) concerns have beenadopted in one case decided so far(Canal+/ CDPQ/ BankAmerica86)in one other case (BT/AT & T87)the Commission decided to open asecond phase investigation.

In Canal+/CDPQ/BankAmerica,the spill-over effects were foundon a market upstream from thejoint venture. The joint ventureitself concerned pay-TV inFrance; but competition problemswere found to result in the marketfor the wholesaling of TV rights inSpain. In Spain, Canal+ hadstrong or dominant positions onthe pay-TV market as well as onthe upstream market for content.The notified transaction wasfound, through the balance ofpower in the joint venture, to giveCanal+ a strong incentive tofavour Cableuropa (controlled byCDPQ and BankAmerica) in thesale of Spanish pay-TV rights.The remedies adopted aredesigned to eliminate thepossibility of discriminationagainst other competitors on theSpanish pay-TV market.

The case shows the potential useof Article 2(4). Firstly, thenotified transaction did not createor strengthen the dominantposition of Canal+ as such. 86 Case No. IV/M.1327.87 Case No. JV.15.

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Rather, it gave rise to a situationwhere the company’s commercialincentives would change so thatthere would be an increased riskof discrimination against otherpay-TV operators in Spain. Itcreated a direct link betweenCanal+ and the notifiedtransaction which providedincentives to behave in apotentially anti-competitive way.Secondly, the remedy sets abenchmark for the future conductof Canal+ on the Spanish marketfor pay-TV content, but leaves thenotified transaction structurallyunchan-ged. In the absence ofArticle 2(4), this remedy wouldhave been difficult to accept underthe Merger Regulation.

The Commission decided to opendetailed enquiry into a proposedjoint venture between BritishTelecom and the US firm AT&T,two of the world’s largesttelecommunications operators.The joint venture will provide abroad range of telecommu-nications services to multinationalcorporate custo-mers as well asinternational carrier services toother carriers. The Commissiondecided to carry out a second-phase inquiry into the effects ofthe venture on several globaltelecommuni-cations markets andalso some in the UK. Subsequentto its preliminary inquiry, theCommission expressed concernsin the following areas: the parties’combined market position on themarkets for the provision of globaltelecommunications services tolarge multinational companies andfor international carrier services,the effect of the creation of thejoint venture leading to thepossible creation or strengtheningof a dominant position for certain

telecommunications services inthe UK and the possible co-ordination effects of the proposedjoint venture in the UK betweenACC, a wholly-owned subsidiaryof AT&T, and between BT andTelewest, in which AT&T throughTCI will have a jointly controllingstake. The final decision isexpected in April 1999.

The Commission’s first caseswhich have included anexamination of Article 2(4) effectshave already demonstrated somecommon themes. The relative sizeof the Article 2(4) market and thejoint venture’s market, which isassessed for dominance purposes,has been important in assessingthe likelihood of co-ordination.Normally, the commercialincentives, and, thus, the risk ofco-ordination, is smaller if thejoint venture’s market issignificantly smaller than theArticle 2(4) market. However, itcannot be considered as asufficient condition for theabsence of co-ordination betweenthe parent companies. The natureof the markets themselves willalso play a part in theCommission’s assessment. Thenature of existing links betweenthe parent companies is alsorelevant for the determination ofcausality between the notifiedoperation and the Article 2(4)effects, though their existencedoes not automatically imply thatthere is no effect. Again, otherfactors would have to be takeninto account before that analysiscould be made.

Other Changes to theRegulation

Another important change to theRegulation concerned thesuspension period within which anotified transaction cannot beimplemented without specialdispensation from the Commission(Article 7)88. Initial experienceconfirms the desirability ofallowing the Commission moreflexibility. The suspension nowautomatically applies throughoutthe period of examination, but canbe lifted in a slightly wider rangeof circumstances than before.Previously, the test was whethermaintaining the suspension wouldbe likely to cause ‘seriousdamage’ to one or more of theundertakings concerned. TheRegulation now provides for theCommission to make a balancedassessment of all relevant factors,including effects on third partiesand the threat to competition. Aderogation of the new type wasgranted, in some instances subjectto conditions and limitations, infive cases. Details areconfidential, but the effect ofcertain provisions of national lawas regards public bids, and theclear absence of risk of anysignificant anti-competitive effectarising from the merger, werematerial factors. In a number ofother cases, the parties decided notto proceed with a formal requestfor derogation after discussionswith the Task Force.

The supplementary turnoverthresholds– designed to addressthe problem of multiplenotifications of the same

88 For details, see previous Competition

Policy Newsletter, page 62.

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transaction to several nationalauthorities – also appear to behaving the expected effect; thenumber of cases notified by theend of the period (14) beingbroadly in line with theCommission’s estimates of thelikely impact.

Other Developments

Incomplete Notifications

The total number of notificationsconcerning merger cases whichhave been declared incomplete bythe Commission (according toArticle 4 of the ImplementingRegulation) remains small, but hasundergone a certain increase inrecent years. The Commission iskeen to find ways of reducing thenumber of incompletenotifications. Accordingly it waspleased to enter into discussionson this matter with representativesof the legal community, as a resultof which some Best PracticeGuidelines have been drafted andpublished on the Directorate-General IV website on theInternet89.

The Commission found that inmany cases where a notificationwas declared incomplete, theparties had made little or no priorcontact with the Commissionbefore submitting it. This clearlyincreased the risk. Otherwise, themain causes of incompletenesswere as follows. Formal issues –for example, not all the relevantparties had been included, or thenotification was made beforesufficiently clear agreements to

89 See ‘Mergers – Other Documents’ on

the DGIV website -http://europa.eu/int/comm/dg04

bring about the concentration werein existence – accounted for somecases. Possibly the largest singlecategory, however, was where thesupporting information providedwas inadequate or unclear – forexample, as regards the marketsconsidered to be affected by themerger and the parties’ andcompetitors’ shares in them.Because the time allowed for theCommission to reach a decision isshort, clarity is especiallyimportant in cases where thedocumentation is extensive andthe possible markets numerous orcomplex. The third categorycomprised cases where theCommission’s investigationrevealed, sometimes only at a latestage, potential affected marketsnot identified by the notifyingparty - although, in some instancesat least, they arguably could, andtherefore should, have been. The guidelines coverprenotification (including thedesirability, in appropriate cases,of giving the Commission theopportunity to see the notificationin draft form for comment),timing, information on marketdefinition and shares (eg, wherethere is scope for debate overgeographic market definition,providing market data on anational basis as well as a widerone such as the EU as a whole)and the value of meetings withrepresentatives of the undertakingsconcerned who know well theactivities and markets involved.The Commis-sion of courseremains free to make declarationsof incompleteness whereappropriate. But if followed, theguidelines should minimise therisk of a notification beingdeclared incomplete and also

reduce the need for theCommission to request furtherinformation after notification.

STATE AIDMain developments between 1st October 1998 and 31st January 1999


I. Introduction

The agreement reached in theIndustry Council on a proceduralregulation for State aid marks anew era of State aid policy. Aftermore than 40 years, theCommunity control of State aidwill finally be endowed with abasic act, integrating for the firsttime all the rules of procedure ina single and coherent text. Theregulation also widens theinstruments at the disposal of theCommission to act againstunlawful aid and to monitor therespect of State aid decisions. Byits contribution to increase thetransparency and efficiency ofState aid policy, the regulationcan thus be regarded as one ofthe main pillars of themodernisation initiative whichthe Commission is carrying outin the field of State aid.

Despite the expected difficultiesof reconciling the different andopposed interests, which areinvolved in State aid procedures,the Commission’s proposalmade its way through theCouncil in a relatively shorttime. On 18 February 1998, theCommission had adopted itsproposal for a regulation onState aid procedures on the basis

of Article 94 EC-Treaty90. It wassubmitted to the Council on 27February and discussed underthe British and Austrianpresidencies. After a first debateon 7 May 1998, the IndustryCouncil reached on 16November 1998 a politicalagreement on the regulation.Meanwhile the EuropeanParliament has given its opinion,so that the regulation is nowready for formal adoption.

A comparison between theoriginal proposal of theCommission and the final textagreed upon by the Councilshows that the structure andmain contents of the proposalgenerally remained. Thefollowing text gives an overviewof the most important points ofthe agreement reached by theIndustry Council, focusingespecially on the changes withregard to present practice.

II. The question of time-limits for the differentsteps of the procedure

According to a long establishedpractice based on the Lorenz

90 OJ C 116/13, 16.4.1998. See also

Competition Policy Newsletter, 1998,nr. 2, p. 79.

judgement of the Court91, theregulation confirms that thepreliminary examination of anotified aid should be concludedwithin two months from acomplete notification. Where theCommission has not taken adecision within this period, theMember State concerned mayput the measures concerned intoeffect, after giving theCommission prior notice thereof,unless the Commission reactswithin 15 days from the receiptof the notice. From the wordingof the Lorenz case, it had notbeen clear whether theCommission could still havesuch an additional period at itsdisposal, when receiving noticethat the Member State intendedto implement the proposedmeasure. In the Commission’sview, an additional period torectify the situation is needed inorder to avoid seriouslydistortive aid inadvertentlybecoming authorised, withoutany possibility to rectify thesituation. The fact that a formalCommission decision within the15 days gives more legalcertainty to the beneficiary thanan implicit approval, played arole in the acceptance by theCouncil of the Commission’sproposal.

Article 5 concerning informationrequests on incompletenotifications introduces a changeto the preliminary examinationphase as it is currently practised.It states that a notification willbe considered to be withdrawn if

91 Case 120/73 Lorenz v Germany [1973]

ECR 1471.

Unanimous agreement in the Councilon the procedural regulation

Adinda SINNAEVE, DG IV-G-1

ã STATE AID


a Member State does not providethe requested additionalinformation within theestablished time limit. Thisprovision should be adisincentive for Member Statesto drag the procedure by delayedand incomplete replies and canthus be useful in order to speedup decisions. The consequenceof implicit withdrawal ismitigated by the ability of theCommission to extend thedeadline and by the right of theMember State to answer in aduly reasoned statement that therequested information is notavailable or has already beenprovided, so that the notificationshould be considered to becomplete. The latter possibilityconstitutes a proceduralinnovation. By arguing that therequested information is notavailable, the Member State canask for a decision and make thetwo months period definitelyrun. This possibility could comeclose to letting the Member Statein exceptional cases decide itselfthat a notification is complete,while current practice and theCommission’s proposal left thisdecision entirely with theCommission. Where theCommission considers that itnevertheless lacks information toreach a decision, it will open theformal investigation procedure.

The Commission’s originalproposal did not contain a timelimit for the formal examinationprocedure. This choice was notonly based on the practicalproblems such a time-limitwould bring for its services, butalso on the difficulty of

establishing a time-limit which isappropriate for all cases, takingaccount of factors such asdifferences in the complexity ofcases, new questions which mayarise following the commentsfrom third parties and requireadditional information, etc.However, since it was one of themain demands from MemberStates to accelerate proceedingsand to establish at least amaximum duration for theformal examination procedure, asolution acceptable to all partieshad to be found. An agreementwas reached on a time limit of18 months from the opening ofthe procedure. Once this timelimit has expired, and should theMember State so request, theCommission must take adecision within two months.Although the time limit for theformal examination proceduremight still seem to be very long,it should be reminded that it isnot meant to become the rule,but only to establish a maximumduration.

Finally, it should be noted thattime limits are not applicable tounlawful aid. Member Stateswhich do not respect the basicprinciples of State aid law –notification obligation andstandstill clause - should not beput on an equal footing withthose who do so. It seemstherefore justified that thebenefit from binding deadlines isreserved for the examination ofnotified aid. Nevertheless, evenin the absence of the constraintof deadlines, it is theCommission’s objective and taskto put an end to the possibly

incompatible distortions ofcompetition caused by unlawfulaid as quickly as possible.

III. Unlawful aid: provisionaland definite recovery

Where aid has been awardedwithout authorisation, theCommission should be providedwith the necessary instruments torectify the procedural andmaterial infringement of theTreaty. As a consequence, theprocedure for the examination ofunlawful aid differs in someregards from the “normal”procedure.

First of all, the Commission hasdifferent kinds of injunctions atits disposal during the procedureon unlawful aid. The regulationcodifies these injunctions:information injunction (Art. 10(3)), suspension injunction (Art.11 (1)) and provisional recoveryinjunction (Art. 11 (2)). Withregard to the latter injunction,the regulation will bring an endto the academic debate on thelegal competence of theCommission to order an interimrecovery, as the Council, thoughadding three conditions,accepted the principle of arecovery injunction. Accordingto the final text of Art. 11 (2),the Commission may order aMember State provisionally torecover aid provided that (1)there are no doubts that themeasure constitutes a State aid,(2) there is an urgency to act and(3) there is a serious risk ofsubstantial and irreparabledamage to a competitor. Thesecriteria in practice limit the

ã STATE AID


scope of the recovery injunctionto the most serious cases, whereimmediate action for theprotection of competitors isneeded. If the recoveryinjunction has been compliedwith, the regulation provides thatthe Commission will take adecision within the time limitsfor notified aid. The exceptionalapplication of time limits tounlawful aid is justified by thefact that the effectivereimbursement of the aidestablishes a situation which is,from a competition point ofview, similar to the oneprevailing in case of notified aid.

Where unlawful aid isincompatible with the commonmarket, an effective State aidcontrol should ensure its definiterecovery from the beneficiary.Art. 14 of the regulationintroduces, in accordance withthe Commission’s proposal, anobligation for the Commission toorder recovery of all unlawfulaid that is incompatible with thecommon market. It also confirmsthe Commission’s proposal that,for the implementation of arecovery decision, nationalprocedures shall only apply asfar as they allow the immediateand effective execution of thedecision. However, thecontroversial sentenceconcerning the exclusion ofsuspensive effect of nationalremedies against a recoveryorder from the Member State,has been deleted from the finaltext of the regulation. It wasconsidered by the Council to bea harmonisation provision, forwhich Art. 94 would not

constitute a sufficient legal basis.In the Commission’s view, thisargumentation does not seemconvincing, since the non-application of suspensive effectis only a concrete consequenceof the previous sentence of thearticle, which states that nationallaw should not prevent theimmediate execution of theCommission’s decision. Sinceprovisions granting suspensiveeffect precisely prevent thisimmediate execution, theyshould in any case bedisregarded, for their applicationwould infringe the regulation.The Council has also added anew sentence to Art. 14 (3)which obliges Member States, incase of proceedings beforenational courts, to take allnecessary measures, evenprovisional measures, in order toobtain immediate reimburse-ment.

Taking account of the fact thatthe regulation introduces anobligation for the Commission toask recovery whenever it takes anegative decision on unlawfulaid, the question arose whether,for reasons of legal certainty andproportionality, some kind ofrestriction should not be builtinto the system. During thenegotiations in the Council anagreement could be reached on alimitation period for the recoveryof aid. According to the newArticle 15, after a period of tenyears starting from the award ofthe aid, the Commission cannotask recovery anymore. Althoughat first sight, this provision couldbe seen as reducing theCommission’s powers, its

practical effect should not beoverestimated. Cases of unlawfulaid which remained unknown tothe Commission for more than10 years, are not only rare, butcan hardly be very distortive.Moreover, any action of theCommission with regard to themeasure (e.g. a request forinformation) makes the 10 yearsperiod start running afresh. Onthe whole, it seems that for thefew cases where the limitationperiod might apply in future, thisis justified.

IV. Third party rights

With regard to the issue of thirdparty rights, neither theCommission nor the Councilintended to modify the presentsituation. It was considered thatthe rights of interested partiesare sufficiently protected underthe current system and that, evenpresuming that it would bepractically possible to enlargethese rights, no substantialincrease of the efficiency ofState aid control could beexpected therefrom.

Nevertheless, it appeared useful,for the sake of transparency, todefine in a separate chapter ofthe regulation all the possibilitieswhich third parties have todefend their interests: the right toinform the Commission aboutalleged unlawful aid or misuseof aid and to be informed ofpossible Commission decisionson the matter concerned; theright to submit comments wherethe Commission has initiated aformal investigation procedureand to be sent a copy of the final

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decision in that case; the right toreceive on request a copy ofdecisions which are notpublished or not published infull. In the Commission’sproposal these rights were spreadover different articles or onlyimplicitly expressed since theyare to be seen within the contextof a bilateral procedure betweenthe Commission and the MemberState concerned. As to thesubstance, the new chapter VI ofthe regulation does not changethe means of action third partiescurrently have but, by bringingthem together in one chapter,makes them more visible.

V. On-site monitoring

The Commission’s proposalcontained three instruments thatshould reinforce its powers tomonitor compliance with itsdecisions. Two of these wereagreed to by the Council.

First of all, a general reportingobligation with regard to allexisting aid schemes shouldallow the Commission to obtainall necessary information tomonitor existing aid schemes inaccordance with Art. 93 (1). IfMember States do not complywith the obligation to submitannual reports, the Commissionmight propose appropriatemeasures with regard to thescheme concerned, going as faras the abolishment of thescheme.

Secondly, the regulation givesthe Commission the right toundertake on-site monitoringvisits to the beneficiary of an

aid, where serious doubts aboutcompliance with certaindecisions exist. Whereas theoriginal Commission proposalhad only foreseen on-the-spotvisits for checking the respect ofconditional decisions, the scopeof this article was widenedduring the Council negotiationsto all decisions authorising aid.This new power of theCommission is certainly one ofthe main innovations of theregulation in strengthening Stateaid control.

The third instrument, acooperation procedure withnational independent supervisorybodies, was not retained in thefinal text of the regulation.However, the considerablyenlarged on-site monitoringpowers of the Commission seemlargely to compensate for thisdeletion.

VI. Publication

Publication of decisions is anarea where the potential conflictbetween transparency andefficiency is most striking. Itgoes without saying that fullpublication of all decisions in alllanguages would provide aperfect transparency, but - asidefrom the paradox that too muchtransparency might have theeffect of reducing it – this wouldjeopardise the goal of increasingefficiency by speeding up thedecision making process,especially as far as decisions toopen a formal investigation areconcerned. Therefore, theregulation now provides that thelatter decisions will only be

published in the authenticlanguage together with asummary in the other languages.In practice this means, that e.g.for a decision on a French aid,the Official Journal published inFinnish will contain theauthentic French text togetherwith a summary in Finnish. Thissystem should give sufficientinformation to allow third partiesto submit their comments on thecase. At the same time, it shouldreduce the delay in publishingopenings of a procedure andthereby have a direct positiveeffect on the total duration of theproceedings.

However, with regard to finaldecisions, where the objectivewas to speed up the publication –and thereby the legal certainty ofthe beneficiary - rather than thedecision making, the transpa-rency arguments prevailed andthe present system of publishingthe full text in all languages willbe retained. It should be noticed,however, that the possible gainof resources with regard to thepublication of openings of aprocedure might also help toreduce the delay in publicationof final decisions.

VII. Conclusion

The significance and impact ofthe procedural regulation mightbe compared to that of regulation17 for the application of Art. 85-86. Its main importance lies notso much in the new instrumentsit introduces to improve theeffective enforcement of stateaid control, but rather in thevalue of a codification itself. A

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streamlined and binding legaltext setting out the different stateaid procedures will finally put anend to the mixture of case lawand soft law which is at presentdominating the State aid field. Itwill provide the required legalcertainty which state aid is

missing. Finally, it will increasethe transparency and visibility ofstate aid rules and is aprerequisite for administrations,enterprises and academicsincreasing their knowledge ofthis area. Since a better respectof the rules presupposes a better

knowledge of them by MemberStates and by the legal andbusiness world as a whole, theregulation has an important roleto play in this regard. For allthese reasons, its final impactcan be expected to far exceed itscontents.

Communication de laCommission sur l’applicationdes règles relatives aux aidesd’Etat aux mesures relevant dela fiscalité directe desentreprises.

Le 11 novembre 1998, laCommission a adopté unecommunication sur l’applicationdes règles relatives aux aidesd’Etat dans le domaine de lafiscalité directe des entreprises. Lebut principal de celle-ci est declarifier le champ d’applicationdes règles en matière d’aidesd’Etat et de préciser lesprocédures appliquées. C’est ainsiqu’un avantage fiscal tombe sousl’application des dispositions enmatière d’aides d’Etat lorsqu’il estspécifique à certaines entreprisesou certaines productions et qu’iln’est pas justifié par la nature oul’économie du système fiscalconcerné, c’est-à-dire que sanécessité pour le fonctionnementet l’efficacité dudit système n’estpas démontrée par un

raisonnement économique. Parcontre, les mesures de puretechnique fiscale et les incitationsfiscales poursuivant un objectif depolitique économique généralepeuvent, quand elles s’appliquentindifféremment à toutes lesentreprises, être considéréescomme des mesures générales quine tombent pas sous l’applicationdes dispositions en matière d’aidesd’Etat. La Commission évalueraou réévaluera les aspects aidesd’Etat des régimes fiscaux desEtats membres en se fondant surcette communication.

Extension of the validity of theCode on aid to the syntheticfibres industry until 31 August2001.

On 16 December 1998 theCommission decided to extend thevalidity of the Code on aid to thesynthetic fibres industry (OJ C 94,30.03.1996) beyond its scheduledexpiry date of 31 March 1999,until 31 August 2001. This

decision followed a discussion ofthe issue at a multilateral meetingof State aid experts on 18November 1998.

The award of aid to the syntheticfibres industry has been subject tostrict control since 1977 when,because of the low rate of capacityutilisation for the production ofsynthetic fibres within theCommunity and the consequentloss of jobs as well as the risk thataid to the industry wouldexacerbate the situation and distortcompetition, the Commissiondecided to introduce a sector-specific Code for the control ofaid to the sector. Capacityutilisation rates generally continueto lag well behind optimal levelsfor such a capital-intensiveindustry. In the Commission’sview there was insufficientevidence to suggest that thedevelopment of capacityutilisation for any of the fibres andyarns covered by the Code hadimproved to such an extent as tojustify its immediate abolitionwithout engendering futureproblems.

The question of whether sector-specific rules for this industryremain appropriate beyond August2001 will depend on the planned

Principaux développements du1er octobre au 31 décembre 1998

Madeleine TILMANS, DG IV-G-1

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evaluation of the effectiveness ofthe «multisectoral framework onregional aid for large investmentprojects», which entered into forceon 1 September 1998 for a trialperiod of three years. Détermination des plafondsnationaux de couverture desaides régionales.

En adoptant, le 16 décembre 1997,les lignes directrices concernantles aides d’Etat à finalité régionale(JOCE C 74 du 10.3.1998), laCommission s’est dotée d’unenouvelle méthode dedétermination des régions éligiblesaux dérogations prévues auxarticles 92§3.a) et c) du Traité. Enapplication des dispositionsétablies par ces lignes directrices,la Commission a également fixé leplafond global de couverture desaides régionales à 42,7% de lapopulation de l’Union pour lapériode 2000-2006, ce quireprésente une réduction en 4points de pourcentage de lacouverture actuelle.

Le 16 décembre 1998, laCommission a arrêtédéfinitivement les plafondsnationaux de couverture des aidesrégionales (JOCE C 16 du21.1.1999) sur base des statistiquesles plus récentes (1994-1996 pourle PIB par habitant et 1995-1997pour le chômage). En applicationde la méthode établie par les lignesdirectrices, ces plafonds nationauxsont fixés, dans le respect duplafond global de 42,7%, sur labase de critères socio-économiquesobjectifs et transparents, rappelésci-après.

En premier lieu, et comme dans lepassé, peuvent bénéficier de la

dérogation de l’article 92 § 3 a)les régions, correspondant à uneunité géographique de niveau II dela NUTS, qui ont un produitintérieur brut (PIB) par habitant,mesuré en standard de pouvoird’achat (SPA) sur la base de lamoyenne des trois dernièresannées pour lesquelles desstatistiques sont disponibles, nedépassant pas le seuil de 75 % dela moyenne communautaire. Unerépartition de la couverturecommunautaire qui restedisponible pour l’article 92 § 3 c)entre les différents Etats membresest ensuite effectuée en utilisantune clé de répartition qui tientcompte des disparités régionales,en terme de PIB/SPA par habitantet/ou de chômage, dans lecontexte national etcommunautaire. Si nécessaire, lesrésultats ainsi obtenus sont alorscorrigés de façon à garantir:

- que, dans chaque Etat membre,la population éligible au titre dela dérogation 92§3.c) soit aumoins égale à 15% et nedépasse pas 50% de lapopulation non couverte au titrede la dérogation 92§3.a);

- que, dans chaque Etat membre,la couverture de populationéligible au titre de la dérogation92§3.c) soit fixée à un niveausuffisant pour inclurel’ensemble des régions venantde perdre le statut 92§3.a), ainsique les régions à faible densitéde population;

- que la réduction de lacouverture totale des aidesrégionales d’un Etat membre nedépasse pas 25% de sacouverture actuelle;

- que la somme des différentescouvertures nationales del’article 92§3.c) égale celle

disponible pour l’Unioneuropéenne (par le biais d’unajustement proportionnel desrésultats obtenus pour les Etatsmembres non concernésdirectement par les correctionsprécédentes).

Ainsi, les plafonds nationaux depopulation assistée au titre desdérogations des articles 92§3.a) et92§3.c) que la Commissionconsidère comme compatiblesavec le marché commun sont,pour la période 2000 à 2006 et parEtat membre:

- Belgique: 30,9 %- Danemark: 17,1 %- Allemagne: 34,9 %- Grèce: 100 %- Espagne: 79,2 %- France: 36,7 %- Irlande: 100 %- Italie: 43,6 %- Luxembourg: 32,0 %- Pays-Bas: 15,0 %- Autriche: 27,5 %- Portugal: 100 %- Finlande: 42,2 %- Suède: 15,9 %- Royaume-Uni: 28,7 %

Tel qu’établi par la décision de laCommission du 16.12.1997, lesdonnées statistiques utilisées seréférent au découpagegéographique de niveaux II et IIIde la NUTS en vigueur au 15octobre 1997. Dans la mesure oùdes changements de nomenclatureNUTS auraient eu lieu entre-temps, la Commission apprécieral’éligibilité des régions proposéespar les Etats membres auxdérogations régionales prévuesaux articles 92§3.a) et c) du Traitésur la base de la nomenclature envigueur au moment de lanotification des cartes des aides

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régionales, dans le respect desplafonds nationaux.

La Commission a communiquéofficiellement ces plafonds à tousles Etats membres le 30 décembre1998. Les Etats membres sont dèslors en possession de tous leséléments pour procéder à lanotification de leurs cartes desaides régionales, qui serontvalables pour la période 2000-2006. Ils ont été invités à procéderà cette notification avant le 31mars 1999, pour permettre quel’exercice de sélection des régionsassistées se termine à temps, fautede quoi aucune aide à finalitérégionale ne pourra être octroyéeaprès le 31 décembre 1999.

Report on "services of generaleconomic interest in the bankingsector"

At its meeting in June 1997 inAmsterdam the European Counciladopted a Declaration on "Publiccredit institutions in Germany"mentioning the possibility that"services of general economicinterest" might exist also in thebanking sector. This Declarationnotes the Commission's opinionthat the Community's existingcompetition rules would allow totake such services and possiblenecessary compensation measuresinto account in full.

Following the adoption of theDeclaration the Council asked theCommission to examine whethersimilar cases exist in the otherMember States and to inform theECOFIN Council about the fin-dings. In order to gather thenecessary information the Com-mission sent a questionnaire to allMember States, asking which

particular kind of tasks of theircredit institutions they consideredto be such services of generaleconomic interest.

Based on the answers to thisinquiry the Commission drew upthe report which was presented tothe ECOFIN Council at itsmeeting on 23.11.1998. Insummary, the answers suggest adistinction between three types ofactivities which are consequentlydiscussed in the report:1. the provision of a basic

financial infrastructure whichcovers in full a certainterritory,

2. the fulfilment of certainspecific tasks by creditinstitutions on behalf of aMember State and

3. the raising of funds exclusivelyfor the public authorities.

1. A vast majority of the MemberStates do not consider theprovision of a comprehensiveand efficient financialinfrastructure covering theentirety of a certain territory asservice of general economicinterest within the meaning ofArt. 90 (2) EC Treaty. (Onlytwo Member States, Germanyand Austria, entrust creditinstitutions with the task toprovide a basic financialinfrastructure covering acertain territory.) Furthermore,all Member States agree thatsuch infrastructure can be andis provided by the creditinstitutions under marketeconomy conditions. (OnlySweden compensates thePostbank for the extra costs ofoperating certain particularbranches in remote areas.)Therefore, no exemptions from

the competition rules seemnecessary to ensure acomprehensive financialinfrastructure within theCommunity.

2. Special tasks performed bycertain credit institutions onbehalf of the state, e.g. socialhousing loans, might fall underArt. 90 (2).

3. Fund raising activities ofspecial institutions exclusivelyfor non-commercial, non-competitive public purposesshould not pose problemsunder the competition rules ofthe Treaty if all repercussionson commercial activities areavoided.

Based on the findings of the reportthe Commission will examine thecompatibility of individual casesand systems under Art. 90 (2) on acase to case basis.

Sweden - Measures in favour ofemployment and in favour oftraining.

On December 16, the Commissionhas authorised two measuresproposed by the Swedishgovernment in favour ofprofessional training andemployment, considering thatsuch measures do not constitutestate aid.

The aim of the approved measuresis to provide an incentive forcompanies to take-on long-termunemployed persons.

The first measure is a scheme infavour of employment whichallows companies to receivesupport of up to 50% of the gross

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salary of every long-termunemployed person they recruit.Long-term unemployed people aredefined as people who have beenunemployed for more than 12months and registered asunemployed by the publicemployment service. People whoare less than 25 year old and whohave been unemployed for morethan 3 months are considered as“long-tem unemployed” as well.

Support under the scheme isgranted for a maximum period of6 months. If the duration of theemployment contract is less thansix months, support will only beprovided for the duration of thecontract. Companies have anobligation to provide training tothese new personals, so that theygain professionally useful skillsand become fully employable inthe longer term. The subsidy willcorrespond to 50% gross of thesalary which may not exceed SEK350 (€ 37.3) per day.

This scheme also includes aprovision to support employmentof long-term unemployed peoplefor up to 12 months when they arerecruited for public investments orinvestments of social nature.When a public authority (forinstance a territorialadministration) planning to makesuch an investment wishes tobenefit from the scheme, it mustfirst obtain the agreement of theCounty Employment Board, acentral government agency incharge of administrating thescheme. Once the public authorityin charge of the investment projecthas obtained this agreement, itwill proceed with a call for tendersfrom companies wishing to carryout the investment project. This

call for tender will indicate thatcompanies winning the tender andthus obtaining a contract inconnection with the public orsocial investment project willautomatically receive employmentsubsidies for up to 12 months ifthey recruit long-term unemployedpersons. This transparentprocedure ensures that the onlybeneficiary of the employment aidfor public investments orinvestments of social nature(besides the recruited personsthemselves) is the promoter of theproject, which is a publicauthority.

In addition to the above describedscheme in favour ofunemployment, the Swedishgovernment will implement ameasure aimed at stimulatingprofessional training ofcompanies’ staff. Companies maybenefit from public support up toapproximately € 2130 for thetraining costs of each staffmember, provided that they take-on a long-term unemployedperson as a substitute for everystaff member sent for training.

Neither the measure foremployment nor the measure fortraining favours any specificsector. These measures do notcontain any discrimination withregard to free movement ofworkers, services or free right ofestablishment. Both measures areunlimited in time, and would stillbe applied even if the actualexpenses exceeded the foreseenbudget. Furthermore, providedthat the criteria set for theapplication of these measures arefulfilled, companies will beautomatically eligible for publicsupport. Therefore, the European

Commission reached theconclusion that these measures aregeneral in nature, and do notconstitute state aid within themeaning of the EC Treaty.

The Netherlands. - TheCommission considered aidcompensating for damagecaused by extreme heavy rain inThe Netherlands compatiblewith the common market.

On December 9th the EuropeanCommission decided to considerthe aid measure compensating forthe damage caused by extremeheavy rain on September 13th and14th 1998 compatible with thecommon market. Purpose of theaid is to make partially good thedamage caused by this naturaldisaster.

The weather conditions on 13 and14 September 1998 in the damagearea concerned have beenexceptionally harsh: at least 100millimetre of rain has fallen inthese two days, an event whichaccording to the Dutch RoyalMeteorological Institute occursonly once every 125 years. Thewater led to a disruption of thesociety in the areas hit by thewater (parts of the Provinces Zuid-Holland, Zeeland, Noord-Brabanten Zuid-Limburg). In Zuid-Limburg several rivers overflowedtheir banks. In the remainingdamage area, a “polder” area(below sea level), a strong windcoming from the sea made itimpossible to drain the water tothe sea – on the contrary, waterwas pushed inwards towards theland. The water managementsystems in the region failed, withthe result that the level of thewater table rose and the land

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became saturated from below. Theconsequences of this chain ofevents were therefore very similarto those which would haveoccurred had the land beenflooded in the traditional sense.Therefore, the Commissionconsidered this very unusualcombination of geographical andclimatic circumstances as a naturaldisaster. According to the Dutchauthorities, thousands ofhouseholds and over 5000companies have suffered lossesbecause of this unexpected naturalphenomenon.

The aid scheme fixes the area thatis hit by the flooding and settlesthe modalities, which determinethe amount of the compensation tothe victims. It concerns an onetime only direct grant thatcompensates partially for thedamage. This scheme applies toanybody or any institute (privatehouseholds, lower governmentbodies, churches, companies, etc)that suffered damage. The amountof the loss will be valued by anindependent expert and will bespecified in a damage report.

The Commission notes that the aiddoes not result in overcom-pensation of damage. The Dutchauthorities have confirmed that thecalculation of the losses will beundertaken individually for eachbeneficiary, who will be expectedto bear a proportion of the losses(own risk) themselves. The ownrisk for companies in relation tothe amount of the loss is limited toNLG 10.000 (€ 4560). Onlycompensation will take place forcosts, which are in principle notinsurable, are not or could nothave been compensated onanother account and are not

caused by own guilt or becausethe victim didn’t take sufficientmeasures to prevent or to limit thedamage. Furthermore, it is notedthat no compensation will begranted if the amount of the loss isunder the threshold of NLG 2000(€ 907.56)

The costs of the aid measure areestimated between NLG 300million (€ 135 million) and NLG400 million (€ 180 million). TheCommission considered the aid inline with Article 92 (2) b of theEC Treaty. According to Article92 (2) (b) of the Treaty MemberStates can grant State aid in orderto make good the damage causedby natural disasters.

Germany - Opening of theArticle 93(2) procedure inrespect of the shipyardKvaerner Warnow WerftGmbH

On 25 November the EuropeanCommission decided to open theArticle 93(2) procedure in respectof the Eastern German shipyardKvaerner Warnow Werft GmbHin order to examine the company'sexceeding of an annual new ship-building capacity limitation.

Restructuring aid of DM 1 247million (€ 638 million) had beengranted to this former GDRshipyard by means of severalCommission decisions in 1993-1995. The approval of the aid hadbeen made subject to an annualnew-building capacity limitationof 85 000 cgt. However theregular monitoring report of theyard (of 30.6.1998) indicated thatproduction would be considerablyin excess of this limit for 1998 and1999. Accordingly, as the

conditions of the decisions hadbeen breached, the aid could nolonger be considered compatiblewith the common market pursuantto provisions of Directives92/68/EEC and 90/684/EEC onaid to shipbuilding.

At Germany's request this matterwas discussed at the IndustryCouncil of 16 November 1998.Germany tried to get the Councilto ask the Commission to reviewthe interpretation of the capacitylimit set in the Council Directive92/68/EEC. The Council's overallopinion was that the State aidrules and the Commission'sdecisions must be respected infull.

Italie – Décision d’injonctiondans le cadre de la procédureouverte au titre de l’article93 § 2 du traité CE à l’égard dela société Seleco S.p.a.

Le 2 décembre 1998, LaCommission a pris une décisiond’injonction imposant auGouvernement italien de luifournir toutes les informationsnécessaires pour lui permettre declore la procédure ouverte àl’égard des aides octroyées àplusieurs reprises à la sociétéSeleco S.p.a. Celle-ci appartientau secteur de l’électronique(téléviseurs couleurs, décodeursde programmes cryptés,projecteurs et moniteurs).

La Commission s’apprêtait à clorepar une décision partiellementnégative la procédure qu’elle avaitouverte en 1994 à l’égard d’aidesoctroyées à Seleco lorsqu’elleapprit l’existence d’aidessupplémentaires en faveur de cettedernière. Elle décida dès lors, en

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janvier 1998, d’étendre la procé-dure ouverte afin d’examinerl’intégralité des aides octroyéesdans une même procédure.

En septembre 1998, les autoritésitaliennes communiquèrent que lafaillite de Seleco S.p.a avait étédéclarée en avril 1997, c’est-à-dire10 mois avant l’extension de laprocédure. Après avoir vainementtenté d’obtenir de la part desautorités italiennes lesinformations complémentaires,notamment concernant laprocédure de liquidation en cours,qui lui sont nécessaires pour clorela procédure par une décisionfinale sur l’ensemble des aides encause, la Commission a décidé deprendre la décision d’injonctionprécitée à l’égard du gouver-nement italien.

Allemagne - La Commissionconclut que les dotationsfinancières en faveur de lasociété Infraleuna Infra-struktur und Service GmbH neconstituent pas des aides d’Etattombant sous l’application del’article 92 du traité CE

La Commission, le 25 novembre,a clos la procédure au titre del’article 93 §2 du traité CE qu’elleavait ouverte à l’égard del’assistance financière que lesautorités allemandes projettentd’octroyer à la société InfraleunaInfrastruktur und Service GmbHnouvellement créée, dans le Landde Sachsen Anhalt, sur le site ducomplexe chimique de Leuna dontles installations de production ontété privatisées et vendues à unecentaine d’investisseurs différents.Infraleuna, dont la majorité desparts appartient au secteur public,a pour objet la réalisation et la

gestion de l’ensemble desinfrastructures du site au profit desentreprises qui s’y sont installées.Elle a également été chargée del’assainissement du site dontl’exécution incombait auxautorités publiques, ces dernièresayant réalisé les terrains au prix dumarché pour un site assaini.

La Commission a constatéqu’étant donné l’impossibilité detrouver un investisseur privé pourles infrastructures, la création deInfraleuna constituait l’uniquealternative à l’accomplissement deces diverses tâches par lesautorités publiques et que, dèslors, la dotation initiale en capitalde cette dernière pour un montantde 1.018 millions de DEM (520,50millions d’€) ne constituait pasune aide d’Etat tombant sousl’application de l’article 92 § 1 dutraité CE. Quoiqu’une partie, nonquantifiable, de la subvention de150 millions de DEM (76,69millions d’€) en faveur del’environnement constitue uneaide d’Etat, celle-ci est néanmoinscompatible avec les dispositionsde l’encadrement des aides enfaveur de l’environnement. LaCommission a constaté égalementl’inexistence d’aides dans le chefdes entreprises nouvellementinstallées sur le site, celles-cirémunérant à un prix normal lesservices rendus par Infraleuna,rémunération qui assurera lefinancement ultérieur de cettedernière.

La Commission a cependantimposé certaines conditions augouvernement allemand, notam-ment, quant à l’assurance que lesservices d’Infraleuna seront offertsà toutes les entreprises du site sansdiscrimination, quant à l’obliga-

tion d’exclure des subventionsprojetées celle d’un montant de 50millions de DEM (25,57 millionsd’€) prévue au titre decompensation des pertes et quantau contrôle de l’utilisation desdifférentes subventions.

France - La Commission prendune décision partiellementnégative sur les aides octroyéesillégalement depuis 1996 à lasociété Nouvelle FilatureLainière de Roubaix et enimpose le remboursement àconcurrence de plus de 15millions de FRF.

La Commission a clos la procédureau titre de l’article 93 § 2 du traitéCE qu’elle avait ouverte en 1997 eta décidé que les aides octroyéesillégalement en 1996 pour la reprisedes activités de l’ancien groupeLainière de Roubaix par lal’entreprise nouvellement crééeNouvelle Filature Lainière deRoubaix, située dans la région duNord-Pas-de-Calais, constituent enpartie des aides incompatibles avecle marché commun. Ces aides ontété octroyées sans approbation parla Commission sous la forme d’uneprime à l’investissement de 22millions de FRF (3,35 millionsd’€) et d’un prêt participatif de 18millions de FRF (2,74 millionsd’€).

En ce qui concerne la subventionde 22 millions de FRF, octroyéepour la réalisation d’investis-sements d’un coût de 22,2 millionsde FRF, la Commission a concluque seul pouvait se justifier, autitre d’aide régionale àl’investissement, un montant de7,77 millions de FRF (1,18millions d’€) correspondant au

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plafond régional de 35 % pour lesPME.

Quant au prêt participatif de 18millions de FRF, la Commission aconstaté que cette aide ne pouvaitpas être approuvée en tant qu’aideau sauvetage ou à la restructurationd’une entreprise en difficulté, legouvernement français n’ayant pasprésenté à la Commission un plande restructuration permettant des’assurer de la viabilité à long termede l’activité. D’autre part, étantdonné qu’il couvre des coûtscontinus, le prêt comporte desaides au fonctionnement s’élevantau total à 1,46 million de FRF(0,22 million d’€), soit ladifférence entre le taux appliqué etle taux de référence applicable aumoment du prêt. Ces aides nepeuvent pas être approuvées dansle cas présent étant donné que laLainière de Roubaix est situéedans une région assistée au titre del’article 92(3)(c) alors que ce n’estque dans les régions assistées autitre de l’article 93 § 3 a) que detelles aides peuvent éventuel-lement être autorisées.

La Commission a dès lors décidéd’autoriser la partie de lasubvention s’élevant à 7,77millions de FRF et d’imposer lasuppression des autres aides par leremboursement de la somme de14,23 millions de FRF (2,74millions d’€) augmentée desintérêts et par l’application au prêtparticipatif d’un taux s’élevant auminimum au taux de référence de8,28 % applicable au moment del’octroi de ce dernier.

Allemagne - La Commissioninterdit l’octroi de plusieursaides nouvelles en faveur de lasociété Addinol Mineralöl

GmbH i.GV (Addinol Old) et dela nouvelle société Addinol LubeOil GmbH & Co. KG., tout enconfirmant la compatibilité avecle marché commun d’aidesantérieures.

Le 25 novembre, la Commission adécidé de clore la procédure au titrede l’article 93 § 2 du traité CEqu’elle avait ouverte à l’égard denouvelles aides en faveur de lasociété Addinol Mineralöl GmbHi.GV (Addinol Old) et de lanouvelle société Addinol Lube OilGmbH & Co. KG., créée aprèsl’ouverture d’une procédure enfaillite à l’égard d’Addinol Oldpour reprendre les activités dedistribution de lubrifiants de cettedernière. Il s’agit d’aides déjàoctroyées à concurrence de 7millions de DEM (3,58 millionsd’€) et prévues pour un montantde 40,05 millions de DEM (20,48millions d’€). La Commission aconstaté que ces aides nerespectent pas les prescriptionsdes lignes directrices pour lesaides aux entreprises en difficulté,notamment en ce qui concerne laviabilité à long terme desbénéficiaires et la contribution desactionnaires privés qui, dans le casprésent, est notoirementinsuffisante par rapport à celle del’Etat. La Commission a dès lorsimposé la récupération de l’aidede 7 millions de DEM, augmentéedes intérêts compensatoires, et ainterdit l’octroi des 40,05 millionsde DEM projetés.

Etant donné l’existence de cesnouvelles aides, la Commissionavait également décidé deréexaminer la compatibilité desaides au sauvetage qu’elle avaitprécédemment approuvées enfaveur de Addinol Old. Elle a

conclu que la compatibilité de cesdernières ne devait pas être remiseen cause.

Germany - Commission does notapprove illegal aid to the firm ofthe chemical sector Riedel-deHaën and asks for repayment.

The European Commission hasnot authorised state aid measuresalready granted by Germany toRiedel-de Haën on its investmentin a residue processing plant.Germany provided grants of intotal DEM 8 million (€ 4,09million). The Commission decidedthat the grants are not consistentwith the current Communityguidelines on State aid forenvironmental protection and aretherefore incompatible with thecommon market. Consequently,the State aid must be abolishedand repaid.

Riedel-de Haën pursues itsactivities in the chemical sectorand forms part of the US groupAlliedSignal Inc. The productionof the company causes a numberof tonnes of liquid waste per year,which contains halogenhydrocarbon compounds(halogenhaltige Kohlenwasser-stoffverbindungen). Up to date,the company has sold its liquidwaste to waste disposalcompanies, which incinerated thewaste in special waste incinerationplants. In 1994, the companybegan to invest in a residueprocessing plant to dispose thisliquid waste at the company's site.This plant is still not in service.

Germany maintained that the aidwas given to improve onmandatory standards and toprovide a significant improvement

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of the environment in the areawhere mandatory standards do notexist. However, Germany did notdefine the part of the investment,which was required to achieve asignificant improvement of theenvironment. Accordingly, theCommission could not approvethe grants as environmental aidsince Germany has notdemonstrated the existence ofeligible costs. The grants aretherefore not consistent with thecurrent Community guidelines on

State aid for environmentalprotection and are, consequently,pursuant to the environmentalcriteria, incompatible with theCommon market.

The Commission also assessed theproject in accordance with therules for a general investment.Riedel-de Haën is located outsidethe assisted areas and is a largeundertaking. The Commissiondoes not consider a generalinvestment aid to a large

undertaking to be compatible withthe Common market.

As there is no justification for thisaid, it has to be regarded asadversely affecting tradingconditions to an extent contrary tothe common interest. The aidwould give Riedel-de Haën anunjustified advantage over itscompetitors on the market, whichdo not receive such aid.Consequently, the State aid mustbe abolished and repaid.

INTERNATIONAL


S'inspirant d'une propositioncommunautaire, (communicationde la Commission au Conseil du18 juin 1996 "Vers l'établissementd'un cadre international de règlesde concurrence", COM (96)284 ;comm. P. Arhel Rev. du MarchéCommun n° 410, juil.-août1997), la première Conférenceministérielle de l'OrganisationMondiale du Commerce, quis'est tenue à Singapour endécembre 1996, a chargé ungroupe de travail d'"étudier lesproblèmes relatifs aux liens entreles échanges et la politique de laconcurrence, y compris lespratiques anticoncurrentielles,afin d'identifier tous domaines quimériteraient d'être examinés ausein de l'OMC".

Après deux ans de discussions (laliste des contributions écritesproduites par la Communauté etses Etats membres a été publiéedans le précédent numéro deCompetition Policy Newsletter),et conformément au mandat deSingapour, le groupe de travail arendu un rapport comprenantdeux parties :

1) Une partie factuelle, reflétant larichesse des débats, notammentsur les liens entre la concurrence,les échanges et le développement.

Cette partie fait notammentapparaître les éléments suivants :- Importance de la contribution

qu'une politique active deconcurrence peut apporter auxobjectifs de promotion ducommerce internationalpoursuivis par l'OMC ;

- Importance de la politique deconcurrence pour ledéveloppement économique ;

- Importance de la coopérationentre autorités de contrôle.

2) Une recommandation :“The Working Group shallcontinue the educative work thatit has been undertaking pursuantto paragraph 20 of the SingaporeMinisterial Declaration. In thelight of the limited number ofmeetings that the Group will beable to hold in 1999, the WorkingGroup while continuing at eachmeeting to base its work on thestudy of issues raised by Membersrelating to the interaction betweentrade and competition policy,including anti-competitivepractices, would benefit from afocused discussion on: (i) therelevance of fundamental WTOprinciples of national treatment,transparency, and most-favoured-nation treatment to competitionpolicy and vice-versa (ii)approaches to promotingcooperation and communication

among Members including in thefield of technical cooperation; and(iii) the contribution ofcompetition policy to achievingthe objectives of the WTO,including the promotion ofinternational trade. The WorkingGroup will continue to ensure thatthe development dimension andthe relationship with investmentare fully taken into account. It isunderstood that this decision iswithout prejudice to any futuredecisions that might be taken bythe General Council including inthe context of its existing workprogramme."

Le texte de cette recommandationest tout à fait satisfaisant pour laplupart des pays membres. D'unemanière générale, la rédactionest bien équilibrée. A la grandesatisfaction des USA, de laCommunauté, du Brésil, duCanada, etc..., un programme detravail, portant sur des questionsde concurrence, a été établi.Cependant, le programme n'estpas exclusif, ce qui répond engrande partie aux préoccupationsde pays tels que l'Inde, l'Egypte,le Mexique et le Pakistan : àchaque réunion n'importe quelpays membre pourra souleverdes questions qui ne sont pasexpressément prévues dans laliste, dès lors qu'elles relèvent dumandat de Singapour.

Par ailleurs, conformément auxsouhaits de la Communauté, larecommandation comprend uneindication de calendrier ("In thelight of the number of meetings(… ) in 1999 … "). Afin d'évitertoute interférence avec lapréparation de la troisième

Organisation Mondiale duCommerce

Pierre ARHEL, DG IV-A-3

ã INTERNATIONAL


Conférence ministérielle, quidoit se tenir cette année auxUSA (le Conseil Général del'OMC devra notammentdéterminer si les négociations ducycle du millénium pourront,

comme le souhaite laCommission, être étendues audomaine de la concurrence), laCommission estime que legroupe devrait terminer ses

travaux à la fin du mois de juilletau plus tard.

Le 11 décembre, cetterecommandation a été approuvéepar le Conseil Général de l’OMC.

Accession negotiations

At the end of March 1998accession negotiations wereopened with six candidatecountries, i.e. Czech Republic,Estonia, Hungary, Poland,Slovenia and Cyprus. Thesenegotiations are part of a wideraccession process comprising theten Central and EasternEuropean applicant States(CEECs) and Cyprus. In April1998 the Commission started theanalytical examination("screening") of the acquiscommunautaire simultaneouslywith the first six countries andwith five countries (i.e. Bulgaria,Romania, Slovak Republic,Latvia and Lithuania) withwhich the opening ofnegotiations will take place at alater stage.

On 9-19 October, the first sixcandidate countries participatedin the screening of the

competition chapter92. Theobjective of the exercise was toinform - during a day ofmultilateral screening (theexplanatory section) - theapplicants about the Communityacquis and - at subsequentbilateral meetings (theexploratory sections) - toidentify, within each applicantcountry, possible substantiveproblems that could arise duringthe accession negotiationsproper.

The Commission transmitted itsscreening reports to the Councilat the end of last year. The sixcandidate countries haveannounced that they will submittheir negotiation positions oncompetition in January of thisyear. In line with the intentionsof the German Presidency, draftcommon positions oncompetition policy will be

92 Following a multilateral screening

meeting on competition in May 1998,the five other CEECs will participate inbilateral screening meetings oncompetition in March-April 1999.

prepared and presented by theCommission in March.

If the screening results areconfirmed, candidate countrieswill be asking for only a fewtransitional periods and it isexpected that most of them willconfirm that their legislation andimplementation capacity will beready at the date of accession.However, in the field ofcompetition, it will be necessaryfor the Commission to conduct ageneral assessment of the abilityof the candidates to withstandthe competitive pressures of theinternal market resulting fromthe full and direct application ofthe competition acquis uponaccession. An essential factor ofthis assessment is whether therespective countries respect theirobligations under thecompetition rules of the EuropeAgreement, and in particularwhether they have sufficientlyaligned their legislation to theCommunity competition regimeand have set up adequateenforcement structures. Thisagain underlines the need toproperly prepare for accessionand to adapt progressively butdecisively to the situationprevailing in the Community

Enlargement

Maria BLÄSSAR and Joos STRAGIER, DG IV-A-3

ã INTERNATIONAL


well in advance of actualmembership.

Progress in alignment ofcompetition rules

The Commission agreed toreport regularly to the EuropeanCouncil on progress made byeach of the candidate countriestowards accession. The firstprogress reports for the tenCEECs, Cyprus and Turkeywere submitted at the end of1998. The reports take intoconsideration progress since thedelivery of the CommissionOpinions in 199793.

In 1998, most of the CEECs tookdecisive steps to adopt orprepare new legislation, oramendments to existinglegislation, in order to furtheralign their legislation withCommunity law. This wascertainly the case in the field ofanti-trust. For example, newcompetition acts came into forcein Hungary, Bulgaria, Estoniaand Latvia. The competitionauthorities of the CEECs havefurther gained experience in theenforcement of the law.However, in general, there is stillneed to strengthen thecompetition authorities, inparticular with regard to theirinvestigative and fining powers,independence and resources.

In contrast to anti-trust policy,the introduction of State aidcontrol in the CEECs has provento be much more controversial

93 Competition Report 1997, paragraph

323.

and difficult to bring about.While a number of countrieshave started introducing orpreparing rules on the control ofState aid, all the countries stilllag clearly behind the level thatis required in the run-up foraccession. The most urgentpriority is to create transparencyin the granting of State aid byestablishing a State aid inventoryof all existing direct and indirectaid. While during 1998 someCEECs provided reports to theCommission on the distributionand volume of aid to industry,the Commission has generallybeen critical of the lack of acomprehensive picture of theState aid situation in mostCEECs.

A second priority is the setting-up or strengthening of anindependent State aid monitoringauthority, and of a system forimplementing this monitoring.Most of the CEECs have nowestablished such a monitoringauthority. However, legalprocedures and the necessarypowers to ensure genuine controlof new and existing State aid inthese countries are still lacking.

Finally, substantial progress isstill needed with respect toapproximation of substantiveand procedural rules in this fieldin most of the countries.

Joint training sessions oncompetition

In view of these remainingshortcomings, technicalassistance in the field ofcompetition remains an essential

tool to prepare the candidatecountries for accession. While itis for the candidate countriesthemselves to devote thenecessary resources to focusedand cost-efficientimplementation of competitionlaw, Community assistanceserves as a catalyst.

The annual DG IV training forofficials of the candidatecountries, i.e. the Joint TrainingSessions, was organised in 1998for the fourth time. The firstsession (16-20 November 1998)targeted the junior competitionofficials whereas during thesecond session (14-18 December1998) lectures were given toexperienced officials.

As to the themes raised duringthe Joint Training Sessions, itwas relevant to focus on theobligations of the candidatecountries both during the pre-accession phase (i.e. under theEurope Agreements) as well ason those arising upon accession.The important link between pre-accession and accession is nowall the more apparent followingthe opening of the membershipnegotiations with five Centraland Eastern European Countries(Estonia, Czech Republic,Hungary, Poland and Slovenia)and Cyprus in 1998 (see infra).Basically the substantive rules inthe competition field under theEurope Agreements follow thecriteria arising from Articles 85,86 and 92 of the EC Treaty.Despite the differences betweenprocedural rules and institutionalset-up during pre-accession andaccession, it is becoming

ã INTERNATIONAL


increasingly important tounderline the current obligationsof the candidate countries. Themore they comply with theEurope Agreements, the betterthey will prepare themselves forfull membership.

It was against this backgroundthat the training programmeswere drafted. Since the gravestproblems facing the candidatecountries in the field ofcompetition are those relating to

State aid, the topics for the Stateaid sessions were chosen in anambitious and careful manner. Alot of emphasis was put on issuesthat are of particular interestand/or relevance to the CEECssuch as the notion of aid, Stateaid control mechanism under theEurope Agreement, set up of aninventory on existing aid and thepreparation of the annual Stateaid report, regional aid, steel aid,restructuring and privatisation.Specific problems such as

Special Economic Zones andfiscal aids were also discussed.The topics which were chosenfor the anti-trust sessionsincluded, among other things,merger control, abuse ofdominant position, horizontaland vertical agreements, andcompetition in some specificsectors such as transport,financial services andtelecommunications.

COMPETITION POLICY IN THE CENTRAL ANDEASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIESAt the Competition Conference of the CEECs and the EC Commission in Bratislava on 26 May 1998 it was agreed, inorder to strengthen awareness of competition enforcement in the CEECs, to create a special section in this Newsletterfor contributions on competition issues from the CEECs. This is the first contribution of this kind. The articles in thissection are delivered under the sole responsibility of the authors and the views expressed in these articles do notnecessarily reflect those of the Commission or DG IV.


The Hungarian Telecommu-nication joint stock company(hereinafter: MATÁV) notifiedto the Competition Office itsintention of acquiring controlover JÁSZ-TEL Telecommu-nications Developing andServicing joint stock company(hereinafter: JÁSZ-TEL) bybuying 95 per cent of its shares.

Activities of the Parties

The main activity of MATÁV isoperating public wired telephoneservices, and it has controllingright over 11 furtherundertakings (10 of themsupporting MATÁV's operationand another one is a mobilephone operator). Its net turnoverof the previous business yearwas more than HUF 200 billion.The majority shares of MATÁVis owned by MagyarCom that iscontrolled jointly by Ameritechand Deutsche Telecom.

JÁSZ-TEL is a local operator ofpublic wired phone service. Itsnet turnover of the previousbusiness year was HUF 1.2billion.

The Market

Under concession contractsMATÁV acquired right ofoperating long distance domesticand international service as wellas operating 36, out of 54,primer local public telephoneservices. The duration of theconcession period is 25 yearsstarting from December 1993,during the first 8 years of whichMATÁV has an exclusive right.During this period the primerareas could connect exclusivelythrough MATÁV's trunknetwork for the purpose ofdomestic long distance- andinternational calls. For the use ofthe trunk network primer areaspay charges set by law.

JÁSZ-TEL also operates underconcession contract in a localarea for 25 years and, similarlyto MATÁV, has an exclusiveright for 8 years.

In the year under review 76.7 percent of the end users, linked towired network, subscribed toMATÁV and only 0.8 per centof them prescribed to JÁSZ-TELand the market shares countedon the bases of incomes are alsosimilar.

From the date of expire ofexclusivity several undertakingsare expected to enter the marketof service on linkage on trunknetwork.

The Planned Transaction

JÁSZ-TEL is jointly owned (50-50 per cent) by Swisscom AGand KPN Telecom BV and theyintended to sell their shares,altogether 95 per cent 47,5 percent of each, to MATÁV whichwas the highest bidder.

The Notification

The undertakings concerned hadobligation to notify the plannedtransaction as their aggregatenet annual turnover exceeded theHUF 10 billion and theundertaking becoming integratedexceeded the HUF 500 millionnet turnover threshold in theprevious business year, as it isdefined in the Competition Act.

Arguments of the Parties

The parties concerned referred tothe fact that they were notcompetitors as they were actingon different geographic marketstherefore the concentrationwould not have any effect on thestructure of the relevant market.They explained the advantagesof the concentration in thefollowing way:• considering the possibility of

purchasing larger quantitiesafter the transaction moreefficient economic activities

HUNGARY : MATÁV / JÁSZ-TELConcentration

Gizella GYORKI, Senior CounsellorInternational Section, Hungarian Competition Office

ã COMPETITION POLICY IN THE CENTRAL AND EASTERNEUROPEAN COUNTRIES


would be performed by theparties,

• in the present area of JÁSZ-TEL operation the offeredservice would reach the levelof MATÁV, both in qualityand quantity,

• after the transaction a moremodern management andoffice system would beavailable,

• JÁSZ-TEL would take overthe present lower tariffs ofMATÁV,

• JÁSZ-TEL would introduce aregistration of the actual timeof telephone conversation onthe bill one year before thelegal obligation would bealive,

• the deadline of exclusivity ofJÁSZ-TEL would beadvanced six months, equallyto MATÁV’s.

Furthermore MATÁV arguedthat, after the expire of itsexclusivity, its market share aswell as its dominanceprospectively will be reduceddue to appearance of alternativenetworks and technical progress.

Opinion of Third Parties

According to the opinions ofthird parties, received by theCompetition Office on itsannouncement, the concentrationwould strengthen the dominantposition of MATÁV thereforelimitation of competition andhindering the market entrancewould be expected. In the viewof these arguments theconcomitant advantages of the

transaction do not exceed theconcomitant disadvantages.

The Decision of the CompetitionCouncil

Considering the present legaland market situation theCompetition Council stated thatthe planned transaction does nothave significant effect on theexisting competition since, onthe one hand the parties areoperating on differentgeographic markets of wiredtelephone service, and thevertical link between JÁSZ-TELand MATÁV (the trunk networkused by JÁSZ-TEL is operatedby MATÁV) does not harmcompetition either, on the other.

The Competition Council,however, made a thoroughexamination of the liberalisedmarket period after 2002 whenMATÁV will not have exclusiverights and any undertakingswhich will own trunk networkwill be able to operateconnection services. In the caseof expiration of the exclusivityof the 54 undertakings operatingin the country, in theory, severalundertakings would be able tooperate services for subscriberson the given territory.

At present 80 per cent of the endusers are clients of MATÁV onthe wired telephone servicewhich situation will not changeconsiderably in the early periodof the liberalised market. Due tothe high cost of building up newnetworks and the difficulties ofestablishing new range of clients

considerable problems for newmarket entrants are expected.

On the market of local networksthe dominant position ofMATÁV is strengthened by thefact that it is acting not only onthe market of service for end-users but on the market of trunknetwork as well.

The Competition Councilemphasised that, similarly to EUMember States, in the liberalisedperiod the Hungariantelecommunications will begoverned by sectoral rules whichprotect against abusive marketconducts. In its view, however, itis a substantial interest thatMATÁV be dominant only tothe slightest possible extant inthe liberalised period, since it ismore difficult to treat a dominantposition ex post than hinderingan increase of the market powerex ante. The Minister,supervising telecommunications,has not impeded theconcentration but also expressedhis concerns

The Competition Councilconsidered that the plannedconcentration strengthens themarket power of MATÁVtherefore it examined itsconcomitant advantages as well:• It pointed out that in the case

of authorisation advantagesare verifiable only on thelocal area of JÁSZ-TELwhile disadvantages(strengthening of dominantposition) appear on the wholeterritory of the country.

• Cost savings resulting fromthe economies of scale,

ã COMPETITION POLICY IN THE CENTRAL AND EASTERNEUROPEAN COUNTRIES


followed by price reduction isadvantageous for the endusers of JÁSZ-TEL only,permanent advantages,however, could be assuredonly by the pressure ofcompetition.

• Similarly, the improvementof the level of service must bethe question of marketpressure instead of anintention of undertakings.

• It did not consider assignificant argument of the

parties that the exclusivity ofJÁSZ-TEL would expire 6month earlier.

• The Competition Council didnot consider as veryimportant the argument thatJÁSZ-TEL, because of itspoor economic efficiency,needs the concentration withMATÁV. There would be amore acceptable argument forthe Competition Council ifJÁSZ-TEL, indeed, wouldnot be able to stay on the

market anymore or if no otherbids had been received.

The Competition Council did notclear the planned transaction asit considered that the arguedadvantages did not outweigh thedisadvantages of the increasingdominance.

The parties did not appealagainst the decision therefore ittake effect.

INFORMATION SECTION


DG IV staff listTélécopieur central : 295 01 28

Directeur général Alexander SCHAUB 2952387/2954576

Directeur général adjoint Jean-François PONS 2994423/2962284plus particulièrement chargé des Directions C et DDirecteur général adjoint Gianfranco ROCCA 2951152/2951139plus particulièrement chargé des Directions E et FDirecteur général adjointplus particulièrement chargé des Directions G et H Asger PETERSEN 2955569/2958566

Conseiller pour les réformes Helmut SCHRÖTER 2951196/2960246

Conseiller auditeur Roger DAOÜT 2965383Conseiller auditeur . . .

Assistants du Directeur général Henrik MØRCH 2950766/2967532. . .

directement rattachés au Directeur général :1. Personnel, Budget, Administration, Information Irène SOUKA 2957206/29959882. Questions informatiques Guido VERVAET 1959224/2951305

DIRECTION APolitique de concurrence, Coordination, Affaires Internationales et relations avec les autres Institutions Jonathan FAULL 2958658/2957689Conseiller Juan RIVIÈRE MARTI 2951146/2960699Conseiller Georges ROUNIS 2953404

1. Politique générale de la concurrence,aspects économiques et juridiques Kirtikumar MEHTA 2957389/2995470Chef adjoint d'unité . . . .

2. Projets législatifs et règlementaires ;relations avec les Etats membres Emil PAULIS 2965033/2955894Chef adjoint d'unité Paolo CESARINI

3. Affaires internationales Yves DEVELENNES 2951590/2966861Chef adjoint d'unité . . . .

DIRECTION BTask Force "Contrôle des opérations Götz DRAUZ 2958681/2952965de concentration entre entreprises"

Télécopieur du Greffe Concentrations 2964301/29672441. Unité opérationnelle I Claude RAKOVSKY 2955389/29623682. Unité opérationnelle II . . .3. Unité opérationnelle III Wolfgang MEDERER 29535844. Unité opérationnelle IV Paul MALRIC SMITH

DIRECTION CInformation, communication, multimédias John TEMPLE LANG 2955571/2954512

1. Télécommunications et Postes Herbert UNGERER 2968623/2968622Coordination Société d'information- Cas relevant de l'Article 85/86 Suzette SCHIFF 2957657/2995365- Directives de libéralisation, cas article 90 Christian HOCEPIED 2960427

2. Médias, éditions musicales Anne-Margrete WACHTMEISTER 2953895/2963904Chef adjoint d’unité Eric VAN GINDERACHTER 2954427

3. Industries de l'information, électronique de divertissement Fin LOMHOLT 2955619/2951150

ã INFORMATION SECTION


DIRECTION DServices Humbert DRABBE 2950060/2952701

1. Services financiers (banques, assurances) Luc GYSELEN 2961523/29599872. Transports et infrastructures des transports Serge DURANDE 2957243/29546233. Commerce et autres services Jorma PIHLATIE 2953607/2960256

DIRECTION EIndustries de base et énergie Angel TRADACETE 2952462/2953596

1. Acier, métaux non ferreux, produits minéraux non Maurice GUERRIN 2951817/2951816métalliques, bâtiment, bois, papier, verre

2. Produits chimiques de base et transformés, Wouter PIEKE 2959824/2956422caoutchouc

3. Energie et eau . . .4. Cartels et Inspections . . .

Chef adjoint d'unité notamment chargé des Cartels Julian JOSHUA 2955519

DIRECTION FIndustries des biens d'équipementet de consommation Sven NORBERG 2952178/2965550

1. Industries mécaniques et électriques et industries diverses Franco GIUFFRIDA 2956084/29506632. Automobiles, autres moyens de transport Dieter SCHWARZ 2951880/2950479

et construction mécanique connexe3. Produits agricoles, alimentaires, pharmaceutiques,

textiles et autres biens de consommation Jürgen MENSCHING 2952224/2995276

DIRECTION G Aides d'Etat I Michel PETITE 2965052Conseiller . . .

1. Politique des aides d'Etat Anne HOUTMAN 2959628/2960562Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

2. Aides horizontales Jean-Louis COLSON 2960995/29625263. Aides à finalité régionale Loretta DORMAL-MARINO 2958603/2952521

Chef adjoint d'unité Klaus-Otto JUNGINGER-DITTEL 2960376/29650714. Analyses, inventaires et rapports Reinhard WALTHER 2958434

DIRECTION HAides d’Etat II Martin POWER 2955436

1. Acier, métaux non ferreux, mines, construction . . .navale, automobiles et fibres synthétiquesChef adjoint d'unité . . .

2. Textiles, papier, industrie chimique, pharmaceutique, Cecilio MADERO VILLAREJO 2960949/2955900électronique, construction mécanique et autressecteurs manufacturiersChef adjoint d'unité . . .

3. Entreprises publiques et services Ronald FELTKAMP 2954283/2967987

Task Force ‘Aides dans les nouveaux Länder’ Conrado TROMP 2960286



SPEECHES AND ARTICLES

La politique européenne deconcurrence et l'audiovisuel :ententes, alliances et concentrations- PONS - LEGAL EUROPE - Paris- 21/01/99

Some views on pricing and ECcompetition policy - MARTÍNEZLÓPEZ - Conférence "LegalChallenges of Pricing" - NortonRose - 7/12/98

L’application du droitcommunautaire de la concurrence etle contrôle des concentrations et desalliances dans l’audiovisuel –AUBEL ANTOINE - CentreFrançais du Commerce Extérieur -1/12/98

Der wettbewerbliche Binnenmarktfür Strom und Gas Zur Rolle vonArt.90 Abs.2 EGV - SCHAUB/DOHMS - Die Aktiengese-llschaft(AG) - issue 12/1998 - 1/12/98

Ensuring efficient access tobottleneck network facilities. Thecase of telecommunica-tions in theeuropean Union - UNGERER –Competition Workshop - Florence -13/11/98

Extension of EU air transportcompetition rules to air transport toand from the EU - DRABBE -European Air Law Association

annual conference - Vienna -6/11/98

After Taca? Towards a moreCompetitive and Innovative LinerShipping Market - PONS -European Shippers' Council -Barcelona - 29/10/98

Universal postal service in Europeand the future of the social dialogue- UNGERER - European UnionJoint Postal Committee - Brussels -29/10/98

EC Competition System - Proposalsfor Reform - SCHAUB -FORDHAM CORPORATE LAWINSTITUTE - New York - 22/10/98

Antitrust and Trade Policy - RoundTable: Proposed answers toProfessor Jenny's questions -FAULL - Fordham Corporate LawInstitute - New York - 22/10/98

Comision de libre competencia yasuntos del Consumidor - RIVIÈREMARTÍ - Congreso InternacioSobre Competencia - Panama -6/10/98

La politique européenne deconcurrence : tendances récentes etnouveaux défis - PONS - 7øEncontro Nacional de EconomiaIndustrial - Vila Real - 2/10/98Intervention de M. Karel Van Miert,commissaire en charge de lapolitique de concurrence, devant la

commission écnomique etmonétaire du Parlement européen -VAN MIERT - European Parlament- Bruxelles - 24/09/98

COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONS ONCOMPETITION

LEGISLATION

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IA-Rulesapplicable to undertakingsSituation at 30 june 1994; thispublication contains the text of alllegislative acts relevant to Articles85, 86 and 90.Cat. No: CM-29-93-A01-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT).

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Addendum to VolumeIA-Rules applicable to undertakingsSituation at 1 March 1995.Cat. No: CM-88-95-436-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT).

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IIA-Rulesapplicable to State aidSituation at 31 December 1994; thispublication contains the text of alllegislative acts relevant to Articles42, 77, 90, 92 to 94.Cat. No: CM-29-93-A02-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT).

Competition law in the EC-VolumeII B-Explanation of rules applicableto state aidSituation at December 1996Cat. No: CM-03-97-296-xx-C(xx=language code= FR; les autresversions suivront)

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IIIA-Rules inthe international field- Situation at

Documentation…This section contains details of recent speeches or articles givenby Community Officials that may be of interest. Copies of theseare available from DG IV’s home page on the World Wide Web.Future issues of the newsletter will contain details of conferenceson competition policy which have been brought to our attention.Organisers of conferences that wish to make use of this facilityshould refer to page 1 for the address of DG IV’s InformationOfficer.



31 December 1996 (Edition 1997)Cat. No: CM-89-95-858-xx-C xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, GR,EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, SV, FI)

Merger control in the EuropeanUnion-Situation in March 1998Cat. No: CV-15-98-899-xx-C(xx=language code: EN, FR; theother versions will be availablelater).

Brochure concerning thecompetition rules applicable toundertakings as contained in theEEA agreement and theirimplementation by the ECCommission and the EFTAsurveillance authority.Cat. No: CV-77-92-118-EN-C

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Dealing with the Commission(Edition 1997)-Notifications,complaints, inspections and fact-finding, powers under Articles 85and 86 of the EEC TreatyCat. No: CV-95-96-552-xx-C (xx=FR, ES, EN, DE, NL, IT, PT, SV,DA, FI)

Green paper on vertical restraintsin EC competition policy -COM(96) 721- (Ed. 1997)Cat. No: CB-CO-96-742-xx-C (xx=ES DA DE GR EN FR IT NL PTSV FI)

Final report of the multimodalgroup - Presented to CommissionerVan Miert by Sir Bryan Carsberg,Chairman of the Group (Ed. 1997).Cat. No: CV-11-98-803-EN-C

The institutional framework for theregulation of telecommunicationsand the application of ECcompetition rulesFinal Report (Forrester Norall &Sutton).Cat. No: CM-94-96-590-EN-C

Competition aspects of accesspricing-Report to the EuropeanCommissionDecember 1995 (M. Cave, P.Crowther, L. Hancher).Cat. No: CM-94-96-582-EN-C

Community Competition Policy inthe Telecommunications Sector(Vol. I: July 1995; Vol. II: March1997)-volume II Ba compedium prepared by DG IV-C-1; it contains Directives under art90, Decisions under Regulation 17and under the Merger Regulation aswell as relevant Judgements of theCourt of Justice. - Copies availablethrough DG IV-C-1 (tel. +322-2968623, 2968622, fax +322-2969819).

Brochure explicative sur lesmodalités d'application duRèglement (CE) Nø 1475/95 de laCommission concernant certainescatégories d' accords de distributionet de service de vente et d'aprèsvente de véhicules automobiles -Copies available through DG IV-F-2 (tel. +322-2951880, 2950479, fax.+322-2969800) EN, FR, DE

COMPETITION REPORTS

XXVII Report on CompetitionPolicy 1997Cat. No: CM-12-98-506-xx-C

European Community onCompetition Policy 1997Cat. No: Cv-12-98-263-XX-C (xx=FR, ES, EN, DE, NL, IT, PT, SV,DA, FI)

XXVI Report on Competition Policy1996Cat. No: CM-04-97-242-xx-C

European Community CompetitionPolicy 1996Cat. No: CM-03-97-967-xx-C (xx=ES*, DA*, DE*, GR*, EN*, FR*,IT*, NL*, PT*, FI*, SV*)

XXV Report on Competition Policy1995Cat. No: CM-94-96-429-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

European Community CompetitionPolicy 1995Cat. No: CM-94-96-421-xx-C (xx=ES*, DA*, DE*, GR*, EN*, FR*,IT*, NL*, PT*, FI*, SV*)

XXIV Report on competition policy1994Cat. No: CM-90-95-283-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, SV, FI)

European Community competitionpolicy 1994Cat. No.: CV-88-95-202-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, SV, FI ). Copies availablethrough Cellule Information DG IV

XXIIIe Report on competition policy1993Cat. No: CM-82-94-650-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

XXIIe Report on competition policy1992Cat. No: CM-76-93-689-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

XXIe Report on competition policy1991Cat. No: CM-73-92-247-xx-C (xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT)

Sixth survey on State aid in theEuropean Union in themanufacturing and certain othersectors (Edition 1998)Cat. No: CV-18-98-704-xx-C (xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT, SV, FI )

Fifth survey on State aid in theEuropean Union in the



manufacturing and certain othersectors (Edition 1997)Cat. No: CV-06-97-901-xx-C (xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT, SV, FI )

4ième rapport sur les aides d'Etatdans l'Union Européenne dans lesecteur des produits manufacturéset certains autres secteursCat. No: CM-92-95-368-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, SV, FI)

OTHER DOCUMENTS andSTUDIES

The application of articles 85 & 86of the EC Treaty by national courtsin the Member StatesCat. No: CV-06-97-812-xx-C (xx=FR, DE, EN, NL, IT, ES, PT)

Examination of current and futureexcess capacity in the Europeanautomobyle industry - Ed. 1997Cat. No: CV-06-97-036-EN-C

Video : Fair Competition inEurope-Examination of currentCat. No: CV-ZV-97-002-xx-V (xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT, FI, SV)

Communication de la Commission:Les services d'intérêt général enEurope (Ed. 1996)Cat. No: CM-98-96-897-xx-C xx=DE, NL, GR, SV

Study of exchange of confidentialinformation agreements and treatiesbetween the US and Member Statesof EU in areas of securities,criminal, tax and customs (Ed.1996)Cat. No: CM-98-96-865-EN-C

Survey of the Member StateNational Laws governing verticaldistribution agreements (Ed. 1996)Cat. No: CM-95-96-996-EN-C

Services de télécomunication enEurope: statistiques en bref,Commerce, services et transports,1/1996Cat. No: CA-NP-96-001-xx-Cxx=EN, FR, DE

Report by the group of experts oncompetition policy in the new tradeorder [COM(96)284 fin.]Cat. No: CM-92-95-853-EN-C

New industrial economics andexperiences from European mergercontrol: New lessons aboutcollective dominance ? (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM-89-95-737-EN-C

Proceedings of the EuropeanCompetition Forum (coédition withJ. Wiley) -Ed. 1996Cat. No: CV-88-95-985-EN-C

Competition Aspects ofInterconnection Agreements in theTelecommunications Sector (Ed.1995)Cat. No: CM-90-95-801-EN-C

Proceedings of the 2nd EU/JapanSeminar on competition (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CV-87-95-321- EN-C.

Bierlieferungsverträge in den neuenEU-Mitgliedstaaten Österreich,Schweden und Finnland - Ed. 1996Cat. No: CV-01-96-074-DE-C DE

Surveys of the Member States'powers to investigate and sanctionviolations of national competitionlaws (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM-90- 95-089-EN-C

Statistiques audiovisuelles: rapport1995Cat. No: CA-99-56-948-EN-C

Information exchanges among firmsand their impact on competition(Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CV-89-95-026-EN-C

Impact of EC funded R&Dprogrammes on human resourcedevelopment and long termcompetitiveness (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CG-NA-15-920-EN-C

Competition policy in the new tradeorder: strengthening internationalcooperation and rules (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM-91-95-124-EN-C

Forum consultatif de lacomptabilité: subventions publiques(Ed. 1995)Cat. No: C 184 94 735 FR C

Les investissements dans lesindustries du charbon et de l'acierde la Communauté: Rapport surl'enquête 1993 (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM 83 94 2963 A C

Study on the impact of liberalizationof inward cross border mail on theprovision of the universal postalservice and the options forprogressive liberalization (Ed.1995) Final report,Cat. No: CV-89-95-018-EN-C

Meeting universal serviceobligations in a competitivetelecommunications sector (Ed.1994)Cat. No: CV-83-94-757-EN-C

Competition and integration:Community merger control policy(Ed. 1994)Cat. No: CM-AR-94-057-EN-C

Growth, competitiveness, employ-ment: The challenges and waysforward into the 21st century: Whitepaper (Ed. 1994)Cat. No: CM 82 94 529 xx C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Growth, competitiveness, employ-ment: The challenges and waysforward into the 21st century: Whitepaper (Ed. 1993)-Volume 2 Part C



Cat. No: CM-NF-93-0629 A C

The geographical dimension ofcompetition in the European singlemarket (Ed. 1993)Cat. No: CV-78-93-136-EN-C

International transport by air, 1993Cat. No: CA-28-96-001-xx-Cxx=EN, FR, DE

Les investissements dans lesindustries du charbon et de l'acierde la Communauté: Enquête 1992(Ed. 1993)9 languagesCat. No: CM 76 93 6733 A C

EG Wettbewerbsrecht undZulieferbeziehungen derAutomobilindustrie (Ed. 1992)Cat. No: CV-73-92-788-DE-C

Green Paper on the development ofthe single market for postalservices, 9 languagesCat. No: CD-NA-14- 858-EN-C

PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIALJOURNAL1st October 98 to31st January 99

ARTICLES 85, 86 (RESTRICTIONSAND DISTORTIONS OF COMPETITIOBY UNDERTAKINGS)

30/01/99L 24 1999/L 024-001 CommissionDecision of 21 October 1998relating to a proceeding underArticle 85 of the EC Treaty (CaseNo IV/35.691/E-4: - Pre-InsulatedPipe Cartel) (Notified under numberC(1998) 3117) ...

29/01/99C 24 1999/C 024/10 Application fornegative clearance and notificationfor exemption (Case No IV/36.551 -

Financial Times Information Ltg,Dow Jones Information PublishingInc. and Knight Ridder BusinessInformation Inc. (now DialogCorporation plc)) ...

28/01/99C 23 1999/C 023/05 Notification ofa cooperation agreement (Case NoIV/F-2/37.145 - MTU/Volvo Aero)

23/01/99C 20 1999/C 020/12 Judgment ofthe Court (Sixth Chamber) of 26November 1998 in Case C-7/97(reference for a preliminary rulingfrom the Oberlandesgericht Wien):Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v.Mediaprint Zeitungs- undZeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co.KG, Mediapri ...C 19 1999/C 019/04 Commissionnotice pursuant to Article 19(3) ofCouncil Regulation No 17concerning case No IV/37.123 -MetroHoldings Limited ...

12/01/99C 8 1999/C 008/04 Notification of acooperation agreement (CaseIV/37.310 - Lorelei) ...

9/01/99C 6 1999/C 006/07 Case NoIV/37.214 - DFB - Centralmarketing of TV and radiobroadcasting rights for certainfootball competitions in Germany ...C 6 1999/C 006/06 Commissionnotice pursuant to Article 19(3) ofCouncil Regulation No 17concerning track access agreementsfor the Channel Tunnel rail link(CTRL) (Case No IV/D2/37.289)

8/01/99L 4 1999/L 004-027 CommissionDecision of 14 December 1998relating to a proceeding underArticle 85 of the EC Treaty(IV/35.280 - Sicasov) (notifiedunder document number C(1998)3452)

30/12/98L 354 98/L 354-022 CommissionRegulation (EC) No 2843/98 of 22December 1998 on the form,content and other details ofapplications and notificationsprovided for in Council Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87applying the rules on competitionL 354 98/L 354-018 CommissionRegulation (EC) No 2842/98 of 22December 1998 on the hearing ofparties in certain proceedings underArticles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty

19/12/98C 396 98/C 396/06 Commissionnotice pursuant to Article 12(2) ofCouncil Regulation (EEC) No4056/86 concerning Case NoIV/36.844 - POLFIN ...

15/12/98C 390 98/C 390/07 Initiation ofproceedings (Case No IV/JV.15 -BT/AT& T) ...

9/12/98C 382 98/C 382/06 Noticepublished pursuant to Article 19(3)of Council Regulation No 17concerning case F.1/36.718.CECED

5/12/98C 378 98/C 378/01 Judgment of theCourt (Fifth Chamber) of 1 October1998 in Case C-279/95 P:Langnese-Iglo GmbH v.Commission of the EuropeanCommunities, supported by MarsGmbH (Competition - Article85(1)of the EC Treaty - Exclusivepurchasing agreements for ice-cr ...

1/12/98C 371 98/C 371/05 Notification ofan agreement on terminal duesbetween postal operators (Case NoIV/36.748) ...



28/11/98C 369 98/C 369/02 Communicationpursuant to Article 5 of CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 3976/87 of 14December 1987 on the applicationof Article 85(3) of the Treaty tocertain categories of agreements andconcerted practices in the transportsector ...

26/11/98C 365 98/C 365/07 Proposal for aCouncil Regulation (EC) amendingRegulation No 17: First Regulationimplementing Articles 85 and 86 ofthe Treaty ...C 365 98/C 365/04 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/JV.12 - Motorola/Ericsson/Nokia/Psion) ...C 365 98/C 365/03 Communicationfrom the Commission on theapplication of the Communitycompetition rules to verticalrestraints (Follow-up to the GreenPaper on Vertical Restraints) ...

21/11/98C 358 98/C 358/08 Judgment of theCourt (Second Chamber) of 1October 1998 in Case C-38/97(reference for a preliminary rulingfrom the Giudice di Pace diGenova): Autotrasporti LibrandiSnc di Librandi F. & C. v. CutticaSpedizioni e Servizi InternazionaliSrl (C ...

17/11/98C 348 98/C 348/05 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/JV.13 - Wintershall/EnBW/MVV/WV/DEO)10/11/98C 342 98/C 342/04 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/JV.15 - BT/AT& T)

7/11/98C 340 98/C 340/26 Judgment of theCourt of First Instance of 15September 1998 in Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-

388/94: European Night ServicesLtd (ENS) and Others v.Commission of the EuropeanCommunities (Competition -Transport by rail - Agreements onC 339 98/C 339/03 Notice pursuantto Article 19(3) of CouncilRegulation No 17 concerning caseIV/36.213/F-2 - General ElectricAircraft

4/11/98C 336 Notification of licensingarrangements (Case No IV/37.156 -Draxis/Pfizer)

31/10/98C 334 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/JV.14 -PanAgora/DG Bank)

27/10/98C 329 Application for negativeclearance and notification forexemption (Case No IV/37.161Financial Times/Goldman Sachs)

24/10/98C 327 Judgment of the Court ofFirst Instance of 16 September 1998in Joined Cases T-133/95 and T-204/95: International ExpressCarriers Conference (IECC) vCommission of the EuropeanCommunitiesC 327 Judgment of the Court ofFirst Instance of 16 September 1998in Case T-110/95:InternationalExpress Carriers Conference (IECC)v Commission of the EuropeanCommunities (Competition Remail- Action for annulment - Partialrejection of a complaint)C 327 Judgment of the Court ofFirst Instance of 16 September 1998in Case T-28/95: InternationalExpress Carriers Conference (IECC)v Commission of the EuropeanCommunitie (Competition Remail -Action for annulment - Partialrejection of a complaint)

23/10/98C 325 Commission noticeconcerning the alliance agreementsbetween Air France and ContinentalAirlines (Case IV/36.314) and AirFrance and Delta Airlines (CaseIV/36.315)

21/10/98C 322 Notice pursuant to Article19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 -Case IV/30.373/D-1 - P& I clubs -International Group AgreementC 322 Notice published underArticle 19(3) of Council Reg. No 17concerning an application fornegative clearance or an individualdecision to grant an exemptionpursuant to Article 85(3) of the ECTreaty (Case No IV/36.539 - BiB)C 322 Notification of agreementsconcerning joint research anddevelopment (Case No IV/37.239 -Ballard Power Systems Inc.,Daimler Benz AG and Ford MotorCompany)

10/10/98C 311 Notification of agreements(Case No IV/37.207/F3 - Searle +Pfizer)

CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS /MERGER PROCEDURE

30/01/99C 25 1999/C 025/05 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1410 - DeutschePost/Danzas) ...C 25 1999/C 025/04 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1387 -Lufthansa/Menzies/Sigma ATManchester) ...C 25 1999/C 025/03 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1335 - Dana/GlacierVandervell) ...

29/01/99C 24 1999/C 024/11 Priornotification of a concentration (Case



No IV/M.1419 - GroupeCofinoga/BNP) ...C 24 1999/C 024/09 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1334 - VolvoAero/ABB/TurboGen) ...

27/01/99C 22 1999/C 022/04 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1365 - Vivendi/FCC) ...C 22 1999/C 022/03 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1397 - Sanofi/Synthélabo)

23/01/99C 19 1999/C 019/06 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1325 - Bayer/ChironDiagnostics) ...C 19 1999/C 019/05 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1403 - Astra/Zeneca) ...

22/01/99C 17 1999/C 017/04 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1405 - TNT PostGroup/Jet Services) ...C 17 1999/C 017/03 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1298 - Kodak/Imation) ...C 17 1999/C 017/02 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1256 - OK EkonomiskFörening/Kuwait Petroleum SverigeAB) ...

21/01/99C 16 1999/C 016/08 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1135 - ELF/Texaco/AntifrezeJV) ...C 16 1999/C 016/07 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1200 - Arco/Union Texas) ...C 16 1999/C 016/09 Renotificationof a previously notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1377- Bertelsmann/WissenschaftsverlagSpringer) ...

20/01/99C 15 1999/C 015/02 Re-notificationof a previously notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1347- Deutsche Post/Securicor) ...

19/01/99C 14 1999/C 014/06 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1367 - Inchcape HoldingsHellas/EFG Eurobank) ...

16/01/99C 12 1999/C 012/04 Re-notificationof a previously notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1418- SCA Packaging/Rexam) ...C 12 1999/C 012/03 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1357 -Nordic/Capital/Hilding Anders) ...C 12 1999/C 012/02 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1379 - Valmet/Rauma) ...

15/01/99C 11 1999/C 011/04 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1398 - DeutscheBank/Crédit Lyonnais Belgium) ...C 11 1999/C 011/03 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1361 - Rast- und TankstättenAG) ...

12/01/99C 8 1999/C 008/07 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1411 - DeutscheBank/Coral) ...C 8 1999/C 008/06 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1382 - Tyco/AMP) ...C 8 1999/C 008/05 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1391 - InternationalPaper/Union Camp) ...

9/01/99C 6 1999/C 006/05 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1418 - SCAPackaging/Rexam) ...

C 6 1999/C 006/02 Notice pursuantto Article 19(3) of CouncilRegulation No 17 concerning CaseIV/F-1/36.160 - International DentalExhibition ...C 6 1999/C 006/04 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1377 - Bertelsmann/Wissenschaftsverlag Springer) ...C 6 1999/C 006/03 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1363 -DuPont/Hoechst/Herberts) ...

30/12/98C 409 98/C 409/04 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1375 -Volkswagen/Ford/Autoeuropa) ...

29/12/98C 408 98/C 408/07 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1400 - Rexam/PLM) ...C 408 98/C 408/06 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1388 - Total/PetroFina) ...C 408 98/C 408/05 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1376 - Cargill/ContinentalGrain) ...C 408 98/C 408/04 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1328 - KLM/Martinair) ...

24/12/98C 405 98/C 405/10 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/ECSC.1268 -Usinor/Cockerill Sambre) ...C 405 98/C 405/09 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1287 - Elenac/Hoechst) ...

23/12/98C 403 98/C 403/03 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1248 - Kingfisher/BUT) ...C 403 98/C 403/06 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1330 - Pechiney/Samancor) ...



C 403 98/C 403/05 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1329 - Usinor/CockerillSambre) ...C 403 98/C 403/04 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1394 - ALBA/OTTO) ...

22/12/98C 400 98/C 400/04 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1337 - Koch Industries/SabaHoechst) ...

19/12/98C 397 98/C 397/13 Judgment of theCourt (Sixth Chamber) of 27October 1998 in Case C-152/97(reference for a preliminary rulingfrom the Commissione TributariaProvinciale di Milano): Abruzzi GasSpA (Agas) v. AmministrazioneTributaria di Milano (Directive69/335/EEC ...C 396 98/C 396/05 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1402 - Gaz deFrance/BEWAG/GASAG) ...

17/12/98C 394 98/C 394/06 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1184 - Travelers/Citicorp) ...C 394 98/C 394/05 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1259 - Voest AlpineStahl/Vossloh/VAE) ...

16/12/98C 392 98/C 392/07 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1347 - DeutschePost/Securicor) ...C 392 98/C 392/08 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1244 - Bank America/Nationsbank) ...

15/12/98C 390 98/C 390/07 Initiation ofproceedings (Case No IV/JV.15 -BT/AT& T) ...

12/12/98C 387 98/C 387/07 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1360 - AkzoNobel/Glaverfin/Eijkelkamp) ...C 387 98/C 387/08 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1387 -Lufthansa/Menzies/Sigma atManchester) ...C 387 98/C 387/10 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1355 - Newell/Rubbermaid) ...C 387 98/C 387/09 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1346 - EDF/LondonElectricity) ...

11/12/98C 385 98/C 385/07 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1380 - Siebe/BTR) ...C 385 98/C 385/03 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1280 - KKR/Willis Corroon)C 385 98/C 385/04 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1292 - Continental/ITT) ...C 385 98/C 385/06 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1318 - Constructor/Dexion) ...C 385 98/C 385/05 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1303 - ADEG/EDEKA) ...

10/12/98C 384 98/C 384/06 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1370 - Peugeot/Credipar)C 384 98/C 384/05 Withdrawal ofnotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1246 - LHZ/Carl Zeiss) ...C 384 98/C 384/04 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1202 - Renault/Iveco) ...

9/12/98C 382 98/C 382/03 Withdrawal ofnotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1321 - Verbund/Kelag/Porr/OMV Proterra/Siemens/KRV)

8/12/98C 381 98/C 381/05 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1358 - Philips/LucentTechnologies (II)) ...

3/12/98C 374 98/C 374/03 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1256 - OK EkonomiskFörening/Kuwait Petroleum SverigeAB) ...

2/12/98C 372 98/C 372/06 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1307 - Marsh&McLennan/Sedgwick) ...

28/11/98C 369 98/C 369/05 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1340 - BNP/DresdnerBank - Austrian JV) ...C 369 98/C 369/07 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1354 - SAirGroup/LTU)C 369 98/C 369/04 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1260 - Edon/Rova/Reco) ...C 369 98/C 369/06 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1368 - Ford/ZF) ...

27/11/98C 367 98/C 367/07 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1235 - NewHolland/Orenstein&Koppel) ...C 367 98/C 367/08 Re-notificationof a previously notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1332- Thomson/Lucas)C 367 98/C 367/06 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1372 - HughBaird/Scottish&Newcastle) ...

26/11/98C 365 98/C 365/04 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/JV.12 - Motorola/Ericsson/Nokia/Psion) ...



25/11/98L 316 Commission Decision of 6May 1998 concerning the extensionof eligibility for regional aid for theacquisition costs of intangibleproperty for large firms provided forin the 25th outline plan for the jointFederal Government/Länderprogramme for improving regionaleconomic structures (notified underdocument number C(1998) 1942)(Only the German text is authentic)(Text with EEA relevance)L 316 Commission Decision of 26June 1997 declaring a concentrationto be incompatible with thecommon market (Case NoIV/M.890 -Blokker/Toys 'R' Us)(notified under document numberC(1997) 1884) (Only the Englishtext is authentic) (Text with EEArelevance)C 363 98/C 363/06 Opinion of theAdvisory Committee onConcentrations given at the 53rdmeeting on 21 April 1998concerning a preliminary draftdecision relating to Case IV/M.970 -TKS/ITW Signode/Titan ...C 363 98/C 363/05 Opinion of theAdvisory Committee onConcentrations given at the 46thmeeting on 10 June 1997concerning a preliminary draftdecision relating to Case IV/M.890 -Blokker/Toys 'R' Us ...C 363 98/C 363/03 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1333 - Kingfisher/Castorama) ...

24/11/98C 361 98/C 361/06 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1319 - Smurfit Condat/CVC)

21/11/98C 357 98/C 357/04 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1171 - PTA/TelecomItalia/Telekom Austria) ...

20/11/98C 355 98/C 355/04 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1326 - Toyota/Daihatsu)

19/11/98C 353 98/C 353/05 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1335 - Dana/GlacierVandervell)C 353 98/C 353/04 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1143 - DSM/KoninklijkeGist-Brocades)C 353 98/C 353/06 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1342 - Knorr-Bremse/Robert Bosch)

17/11/98C 348 98/C 348/04 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1336 - DeutscheBank/Vianova)C 348 98/C 348/03 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1366 -Paribas/CDC/Beaufour)C 348 98/C 348/05 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/JV.13 - Wintershall/EnBW/MVV/WV/DEO)

14/11/98C 346 98/C 346/08 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1356 - Metsä-Serla/UKPaper)C 346 98/C 346/07 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1305 - Eurostar)C 346 98/C 346/06 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/ECSC.1289 - BritishSteel/Layde)

13/11/98C 345 98/C 345/03 Initiation ofproceedings (Case No IV/M.1313 -Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier)C 345 98/C 345/02 Priornotification of a concentration (Case

No IV/M.1361 - Rast- undTankstätten AG)

12/11/98C 344 98/C 344/06 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1320 - LGV/Dorana/Emtec)C 344 98/C 344/05 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1279 - CDE/La Henin)C 344 98/C 344/04 Inapplicabilityof the Regulation to a notifiedoperation (Case No IV/M.1315 -ENW/Eastern)

11/11/98C 343 98/C 343/06 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1332 - Thomson/Lucas)

10/11/98C 342 98/C 342/05 Renotificationof a concentration (Case NoIV/M.1293 - British Petroleum/Amoco)C 342 98/C 342/03 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1188 -Kingfisher/Wegert/Promarkt)C 342 98/C 342/06 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1339 - ABB/Elsag Bailey)C 342 98/C 342/07 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1252 - AT& T/TCI)C 342 98/C 342/04 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/JV.15 - BT/AT& T)

7/11/98C 339 98/C 339/02 Priornotification of a concentration (CaseNo IV/M.1359 - RoyaleBelge/Anhyp)

6/11/98C 338 98/C 338/04 Non-oppositionto a notified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1306 - Berkshire Hathaway/General RE)



4/11/98C 336 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1314- Framatome/Berg Electronics)C 336 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1194- SGB/Fortis AG)C 336 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1304- Hercules/Betzdearborn)C 336 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1271- Pirelli/Siemens)

31/10/98C 334 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/JV.14 -PanAgora/DG Bank)

30/10/98C 332 Renotification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1327- Canal+, CDPQ and BankAmerica/NC)

29/10/98C 331 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1337- Koch/Saba/Hoechst)C 331 Initiation of proceedings(Case No IV/M.1246 - LHZ/CarlZeiss)

27/10/98C 329 Opinion of the AdvisoryCommittee on Concentrationsdelivered at its 49th meeting, heldon 30 September 1997, concerning apreliminary draft Decision in CaseIV/M.938 - Guinness/GrandMetropolitanC 329 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1114- SAP/Heidelberger)

23/10/98C 325 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1331- ING/BHF)

22/10/98C 324 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1097

- Wacker/Air Products)

21/10/98C 322 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1334- Volvo Aero/ABB/TurboGen)

20/10/98C 321 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1325- Bayer/Chiron Diagnostics)

16/10/98C 319 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1326- Toyota/Daihatsu)C 319 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1303- ADEG/EDEKA)

14/10/98C 316 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1269- LSG/Onexcorp/Sky Chefs/Caterair)

10/10/98C 311 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1313- Danish Crown/VestjyskeSlagterier)C 311 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1301- Texaco/Chevron)

9/10/98C 309 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1291- Bosch/ZF Friedrichshafen)C 309 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1219- Seagram/Polygram)C 309 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1300- Allied Signal/AMP)8/10/98C 308 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1318- Constructor/Dexion)

7/10/98C 307 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1132

- BT/ESB)C 307 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1161- Alcoa/Alumax)C 307 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1282- Retevisión Móvil)C 307 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1168- DHL/Deutsche Post)C 307 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1276- NEC/PBN)

6/10/98C 306 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1293- BP/Amoco)C 306 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1273- Crédit Suisse/Nikko/Msa)C 306 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1258- GEC Marconi/Alenia)C 306 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.1296- Norske Skog/Abitibi/Hansol)C 306 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1254- Dexia/Argentaria/Crédito Local)

2/10/98C 303 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1246- LHZ/Carl Zeiss)C 303 Initiation of proceedings(Case No IV/M.1221 -REWE/Meinl)C 303 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1319- Smurfit Condat/CVC)

1/10/98C 302 Prior notification of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.1327- Canal+, CDPQ and Bank ofAmerica/NC)

STATE AID

29/01/99C 24 1999/C 024/06 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92



and 93 of the EC Treaty - Caseswhere the Commission raises noobjections ...C 24 1999/C 024/05 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the EC Treaty - Caseswhere the Commission raises noobjections ...C 24 1999/C 024/04 Commissionnotice on the extension of the periodof validity of the Code on aid to thesynthetic fibres industry ...

27/01/99C 22 1999/C 022/05 State aid - C68/98 (ex N326/98) - Greece ...

23/01/99C 20 1999/C 020/16 Judgment ofthe Court (Fifth Chamber) of 1December 1998 in Case C-200/97:(reference for a preliminary rulingfrom Corte Suprema di Cassazione):Ecotrade Srl v. Altiforni e Ferrieredi Servola SpA (AFS) (State aid -Definition - Advantage conferred ...

21/01/99C 16 1999/C 016/04 Nationalceilings for regional aid coverageunder the derogations provided forin Article 92(3)(a) and (c) of theTreaty for the period 2000 to 2006C 16 1999/C 016/03 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the EC Treaty - Caseswhere the Commission raises noobjections ...C 16 1999/C 016/05 State aid - E23/95 - Sweden ...

15/01/99C 11 1999/C 011/02 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the EC Treaty - Caseswhere the Commission raises noobjections ...

13/01/99C 9 1999/C 009/06 State aid -C61/98 (ex NN 189/97) - Austria ...

30/12/98C 409 98/C 409/06 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the EC Treaty - Caseswhere the Commission raises noobjections ...C 409 98/C 409/05 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the EC Treaty - Caseswhere the Commission raises noobjections ...

24/12/98C 405 98/C 405/04 State aid - C60/98 (N196/98) - Portugal ...

23/12/98C 403 98/C 403/07 State aid -C48/98 (ex NN60/98) - Italy ...

19/12/98C 397 98/C 397/25 Judgment of theCourt (Sixth Chamber) of 12November 1998 in Case C-415/96:Kingdom of Spain v. Commissionof the European Communities (Stateaid for undertakings in the textilesector)C 396 98/C 396/03 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the EC Treaty - Caseswhere the Commission raises noobjections ...C 396 98/C 396/02 State aid -C62/98 (ex N118/98) - Greece ...

18/12/98C 395 98/C 395/08 State aid -E/1/98 - Ireland ...C 395 98/C 395/07 State aid - C3/97(ex N546/96) - Italy ...C 395 98/C 395/09 State aid -E/2/98 - Ireland ...

17/12/98C 394 98/C 394/09 Corrigendum toGuidelines on National RegionalAid (OJ C 74, 10.3.1998) ...

16/12/98C 392 98/C 392/05 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the EC Treaty - Cases

where the Commission raises noobjections ...C 392 98/C 392/03 Authorisationfor State aid - Measures notconstituting aid in the meaning ofArticle 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty ...C 392 98/C 392/04 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the EC Treaty - Caseswhere the Commission raises noobjections ...

15/12/98C 390 98/C 390/05 Initiation ofproceedings (Case No IV/JV.15 -BT/AT& T) ...C 390 98/C 390/04 State aid -C57/98 (ex N826/97) - Italy ...

12/12/98C 387 98/C 387/04 State aid -C23/97 (ex N90/97) - Germany ...C 387 98/C 387/05 State aid - C8/98(ex N237/97, NN151/97) - Germany

10/12/98C 384 98/C 384/08 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the EC Treaty - Caseswhere the Commission raises noobjections ...C 384 98/C 384/03 Commissionnotice on the application of the Stateaid rules to measures relating todirect business taxation ...C 384 98/C 384/07 State aid -C49/98 (ex NN75/98 andNN164/97) - Italy ...

9/12/98C 382 98/C 382/08 State aid -C26/98 (exNN79/96) - Italy ...

4/12/98C 376 98/C 376/02 State aid - C32/98 (ex NN 22/98) - Greece ...

2/12/98C 372 98/C 372/05 State aid -C59/98 (N701/97) - TheNetherlands ...



1/12/98C 371 98/C 371/04 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the EC Treaty - Caseswhere the Commission raises noobjections ...

28/11/98C 369 98/C 369/03 State aid -C45/98 (ex NN45/97) - Germany ...

27/11/98C 367 98/C 367/04 State aid -C47/98 (NN41/98) - Italy ...

25/11/98L 316 Commission Decision of 6May 1998 concerning the extensionof eligibility for regional aid for theacquisition costs of intangibleproperty for large firms provided forin the 25th outline plan for the jointFederal Government/Länderprogramme for improving regionaleconomic structures (notified underdocument number C(1998) 1942)(Only the German text is authentic)(Text with EEA relevance)L 316 Commission Decision of 1July 1998 on State aid granted bythe Republic of Austria and theLand of Upper Austria to ActualMaschinenbau AG (notified underdocument number C(1998) 1943)(Only the German text is authentic)(Text with EEA relevance)L 316 Commission Decision of 25February 1998 concerning aidawarded by Germany to HIBEG andby HIBEG via Krupp GmbH toBremer Vulkan AG, facilitating thesale of Krupp AtlasElektronik GmbH from KruppGmbH to Bremer Vulkan AG(notified under document numberC(1998) 582) (Only the Germantext is authentic) (Text with EEArelevance)L 316 Commission Decision of 16December 1997 on State aid grantedby the Land of Thuringia toThüringer Motorenwerke GmbH(notified under document number

C(1997) 4341) (Only the Germantext is authentic) (Text with EEArelevance)C 363 98/C 363/08 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the EC Treaty - Caseswhere the Commission raises noobjections ...C 363 98/C 363/07 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the EC Treaty - Caseswhere the Commission raises noobjections ...C 363 98/C 363/04 State aid -C51/98 (ex N852/97 and N6/98) -Portugal ...

24/11/98C 361 98/C 361/04 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the EC Treaty - Caseswhere the Commission raises noobjections ...C 361 98/C 361/03 State aid -C80/97 (ex NN53/97) - Germany ...

19/11/98C 353 98/C 353/03 State aid - C22/98 (ex NN 9/98 (N 433/97)) -Germany

18/11/98C 351 98/C 351/04 Authorisationfor State aid pursuant to Articles 92and 93 of the EC Treaty - Caseswhere the Commission raises noobjections

14/11/98L 304 Commission Decision of 14July 1998 concerning aid schemesin Germany under which aid couldbe awarded which is subject to thenotification requirement of themultisectoral framework on regionalaid for large investment projects(notified under document numberC(1998) 2271) (Only the Germantext is authentic) (Text with EEArelevance)

11/11/98C 343 Framework on Training Aid

C 343 98/C 343/07 Framework ontraining aid

7/11/98C 340 98/C 340/32 Judgment of theCourt of First Instance of 15September 1998 in Joined Cases T-126/96 and T-127/96: Breda FucineMeridionali SpA (BFM) and EntePartecipazioni e FinanziamentoIndustria Manifatturiera (EFIM) v.Commission of the EuropeanCommunitiesC 340 98/C 340/29 Judgment of theCourt of First Instance of 15September 1998 in Case T-140/95:Ryanair Limited v. Commission ofthe European Communities (Stateaid - Formal investigation procedureunder Articleÿ93(2) of the Treaty -Conditional decision approving aidC 340 98/C 340/30 Judgment of theCourt of First Instance of 16September 1998 in Case T-188/95:Waterleiding Maatschappij Noord-West Brabant NV v. Commission ofthe European Communities (Stateaids - Tax exemptions - Refusal toopen the procedure laid down byArticle 93(2)C 340 98/C 340/31 Judgment of theCourt of First Instance of 15September 1998 in Case T-95/96:Gestevisión Telecinco SA v.Commission of the EuropeanCommunities (State aid - Publicservice television - Complaint -Action for declaration of failure toactC 340 98/C 340/27 Judgment of theCourt of First Instance of 15September 1998 in Case T-11/95:BP Chemicals Limited v.Commission of the EuropeanCommunities (State aid - Action forannulment - Time-limits - Personsindividually concerned - Privatemarket economy investor)

6/11/98C 338 98/C 338/03 State aid – C15/98 (ex NN 191/97) - Germany5/11/98



C 337 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 337 Authorization of State aidpursuant to Article 61 of the EEAAgreement and Article 1(3) ofProtocol 3 to the Surveillance andCourt Agreement - EFTASurveillance Authority decision notto raise objectionsC 337 Authorization of State aidpursuant to Article 61 of the EEAAgreement and Article 1(3) ofProtocol 3 to the Surveillance andCourt Agreement - EFTASurveillance Authority decision notto raise objections

4/11/98C 336 STATE AID C 54/98 (ex N101/98) Germany

31/10/98C 334 State aid - C 44/98 (ex N708/97) - NetherlandsC 334 State aid - C 56/98 (ex NN42/98) - GermanyC 334 State aid - C 10/97 (ex NN9/97) - Portugal

27/10/98C 329 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objections



10/10/98C 311 State aid - C 36/96 (ex N963/F/95) - Netherlands9/10/98

C 309 State aid - C 53/98 (ex N31/98) - Italy

8/10/98C 308 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 308 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 308 Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objections

7/10/98C 307 State aid - C 37/98 (ex N124/98) - FranceC 307 State aid - C 20/98 (ex NN166/97, NN 169/97, NN 170/97) -GermanyC 307 State aid - C 43/98 (ex N558/97) - NetherlandsC 307 State aid - C 35/98 (ex N783/97 and N 160/98) - Italy

COURT OF JUSTICE / COURT OFFIRST INSTANCE

Devant le Tribunal

Aff. T-108/98 AJUdo Platte / Commission :Demande d'assistance judiciaireprésentée antérieurement au recoursconcernant le refus de laCommission de donner suite à laplainte du requérant visant à ce quecelle-ci retire à l'importateur devéhicules «Mazda Motors(Deutschland) GmbH» le bénéficede l'exemption par catégorie prévuedans les règlements n. 123/85 et n.1475/95

Aff. T-110/98RJB Mining plc / Commission :Annulation d'une décision de laCommission, du 10 juin 1998,portant sur des interventions

financières de l'Allemagne en faveurde l'industrie houillère en 1997, ence qu'elle autorise un certainnombre de mesures

Aff. T-111/98RJB Mining plc / Commission :Annulation de trois décisions de laCommission, du 3 juin 1998,statuant sur des interventionsfinancières complémentaires del'Espagne en faveur de l'industriehouillère en 1994, 1995 et 1996, en1997 et en 1998, en ce qu'ellesautorisent le versement d'un certainnombre d'aides

Aff. T-112/98Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG /Commission : Annulation de ladécision de la Commission, du 15mai 1998, relative à une procédureau titre de l'art. 11, paragraphe 5, durèglement CEE/17/62 du Conseil -Demande de renseignements dans lecadre d'une enquête sur uneinfraction à l'article 85 du traité CE

Aff. T-116/98Compañía Trasmediterránea SA /Commission : Annulation de ladécision de la Commission, du 18février 1998, d'engager la procédureprévue à l'article 93, paragraphe 2,du traité en ce qui concerne lesystème d'aides à la navigationmaritime que les autoritésespagnoles se proposent de mettreen place (nouveau contrat de servicepublic maritime)

Aff. T-121/98Taurus Beteiligungs-GmbH & Co.KG / Commission : Annulation dela décision de la CommissionK(1998) 1439, du 27 mai 1998,modifiée par la décision K(1998)1518 de la Commission, du 2 juin1998, relative à une procédured'application du règlement (CEE) n.4064/89 du Conseil, déclarantincompatible avec le marchécommun et le fonctionnement de



l'accord EEE l'opération deconcentration visant au contrôleconjoint des sociétés PremiereMedien GmbH & Co. KG,BetaDigital Gesellschaft für digitaleFernsehdienste mbH etBetaResearch Gesellschaft fürEntwicklung und Vermarktungdigitaler Infrastrukturen mbH parles sociétés CLT-UFA SA et TaurusBeteiligungs-GmbH & Co. KG

Aff. T-127/98UPS Europe SA / Commission :Recours en carence visant à faireconstater que la Commission s'estillégalement abstenue de prendreune décision définitive dans le cadred'une procédure concernant laprétendue infraction de l'article 86du traité CE par la Deutsche PostAG

Aff. T-128/98Aéroports de Paris / Commission :Annulation de la décision de laCommission C(1998) 1417 final, du11 juin 1998, relative à uneprocédure d'application de l'article86 du traité CE concernant desredevances commercialesdiscriminatoires imposées parl'exploitant des aéroports parisiens

Aff. T-139/98Amministrazione Autonoma deiMonopoli di Stato (AAMS) /Commission : Annulation de ladécision de la Commission, du 17juin 1998, relative à une procédured'application de l'art. 86 du traité CE- Position dominante dans le marchéitalien de la distribution en gros decigarettes

Aff. T-148/98J.G. Evans e.a. / Commission :Annulation de la décision de laCommission, du 30 juillet 1998,rejetant les plaintes déposées par lesrequérants contre le CentralElectricity Generating Board(CEGB) et British Coal, relatives à

une prétendue entente concernantles prix de vente du charbon destinéà la production d'électricité

Aff. T-154/98Asia Motor France SA e.a. /Commission : Annulation desdécisions de la Commission, du 16juillet 1998, rejetant les plaintes desrequérants relatives à des prétenduespratiques d'ententes concernantl'importation en France de véhiculesde marques japonaises

Aff. T-162/98South Wales Small MinesAssociation / Commission :Annulation de la décision de laCommission, du 30 juillet 1998(affaire IV/E-3/SWSMA), rejetantla plainte déposée par la requérantecontre le Central ElectricityGenerating Board (CEGB) et sessuccesseurs National Power etPowerGen, relative à une prétendueentente concernant les prix de ventedu charbon destiné à la productiond'électricité

Aff. T-181/98Georgsmarienhütte Holding GmbH/ Commission : L'annulation de ladécision de la Commission, du 29juillet 1998, K(1998) 2556concernant une aide du LandNiedersachsen à l'entrepriseGeorgsmarienhütte GmbH

Aff. T-182/98UPS Europe SA / Commission :L'annulation de la décision de laCommission de ne pas engager laprocédure prévue à l'art. 93, par. 2,du traité CE, suite à la plainte de larequérante concernant les aidesprétendument accordées par lesautorités allemandes à DeutschePost

Devant la Cour

Aff. C-279/98 PCascades SA / Commission :Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal(troisième chambre élargie), rendule 14 mai 1998, dans l'affaire n94/60 du 13 juillet 1994, relative àune procédure d'application de l'art.85 du traité CE - Carton - Maintiendes amendes, malgré l'insuffisanceconstatée en ce qui concerne lamotivation de leur calcul.Interprétation erronée de la notiond'«effets de l'infraction sur lemarché» - Violation du principe denon-discrimination

Aff. C-280/98 PMoritz J. Weig GmbH & Co. KG /Commission : Pourvoi contre l'arrêtdu Tribunal (troisième chambreélargie), rendu le 14 mai 1998, dansl'affaire T-317/94 opposant MoritzJ. Weig GmbH & Co KG à laCommission à une procédured'application de l'article 85 du traitéCE - Carton - Annulation ouréduction de l'amende -Circonstances atténuantes

Aff. C-282/98 PEnso Española SA / Commission :Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal(troisième chambre élargie), rendule 14 mai 1998, dans l'affaire n94/60 Commission, du 13 juillet1994, relative à une procédured'application de l'art. 85 du traité CE- Carton - Calcul d'une amendeexprimée dans une monnaie qui asubi des dévaluations

Aff. C-283/98 PMo och Domsjö AB / Commission :Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal(troisième chambre élargie), rendule 14 mai 1998, dans l'affaire n94/60 de la Commission, du 13juillet 1994, relative à uneprocédure d'application de l'art. 85du traité CE - Carton



Aff. C-286/98 PStora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB /Commission : Pourvoi contre l'arrêtdu Tribunal (troisième chambreélargie), rendu le 14 mai 1998, dansl'affaire n 94/60 de la Commission,du 13 juillet 1994, relative à uneprocédure d'application de l'art. 85du traité CE - Carton

Aff. C-288/98Istituto nazionale della previdenzasociale (INPS) / Mario MaraldiSpA : Préjudicielle - Corte supremadi cassazione - Interprétation desart. 92 et 93, par. 3, du traité CE -Sociétés en état d'insolvabilité quin'ont pas été déclarées en faillite etqui, bénéficiant d'une suspensiondes créances, sont autorisées àpoursuivre leur activité productiveet sont exonérées du paiementd'amendes pour le non versement decontributions sociales

Aff. C-291/98 PSarrió SA / Commission : Pourvoicontre l'arrêt du Tribunal (troisièmechambre élargie), rendu le 14 mai1998, dans l'affaire n 94/60 13juillet 1994, relative à uneprocédure d'application de l'art. 85du traité CE - Carton

Aff. C-294/98 PMetsä-Serla Oyj e.a. / Commission :Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal(troisième chambre élargie), rendule 14 mai 1998, dans les affairesjointes T-339/94, T-340/94, T-341/94 et T-342/94 opposant Metsä-Serla Oyj e.a. à la Commission - n94/60 d'application de l'art. 85 dutraité CE - Carton - Entreprisesmembres d'une association àl'encontre de laquelle laCommission a constaté uneinfraction - Responsabilité solidairedes entreprises membres pourl'amende

Aff. C-297/98 PSCA Holding Ltd / Commission :

Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal(troisième chambre élargie), rendule 14 mai 1998, dans l'affaire n94/60 Commission, du 13 juillet1994, relative à une procédured'application de l'art. 85 du traité CE- Carton

Aff. C-298/98 PMetsä-Serla Oy (anciennementTeollisuus) / Commission : Pourvoicontre l'arrêt du Tribunal (troisièmechambre élargie), rendu le 14 mai1998, dans l'affaire n 94/60Commission, du 13 juillet 1994,relative à une procédured'application de l'art. 85 du traité CE- Carton - Motivation défectueusecomplétée au cours de la procédurejudiciaire - Pratique des «rabais»pour «aveu» ou «non-contestation»

Aff. C-332/98France / Commission : Annulationde la décision de la Commission(C(1998)1728 final), du 10 juin1998, relative à l'aide dugouvernement français au Centred'exportation du livre français(CELF)

Aff. C-336/98Agenzia R di Recapito Srl et PosteItaliane Ente Pubblico Economico :Rinaldo Agenzia di Ricapito Srl :Préjudicielle - Tribunaleamministrativo regionale per laLombardia - Interprétation des art.86 et 90 du traité CE - Entreprisepublique chargée de la gestion del'ensemble des services relevant dumonopole postal se désaisissant dela gestion directe de certains de cesservices par le biais de concessionsà des tiers désignés directement sanspasser par des procéduresconcurrentielles - Service decourrier rapide

Aff. C-344/98Masterfoods Ltd et HB Ice CreamLtd : HB Ice Cream Ltd etMasterfoods Ltd, agissant sous le

nom commercial «Mars Ireland»Préjudicielle - Supreme Court -Application d'une décision de laCommission relative à uneprocédure d'application des art. 85et 86 du traité CE - Obligations desjuridictions nationales lorsqu'unetelle décision fait l'objet d'unrecours devant le Tribunal depremière instance - Décisioninterdisant la pratique de mise à ladisposition des détaillants desurgélateurs affectés en exclusivité àla vente de glaces produites par lefournisseur desdits surgélateurs

Aff. C-351/98Espagne / Commission : Annulationde la décision (C(1998)2048 final),du 1 juillet 1998, relative au régimeespagnol des aides à l'achat devéhicules industriels «Plan RenoveIndustrial» (avril 1994 à décembre1996)

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COMING UP

Competition law in the EC- VolumeIIA - Rules applicable to State aid -Edition 1998

Competition Policy Newsletter 99 -June -

European Community on Compe-tition Policy 1998

XXVIII Report on CompetitionPolicy 1998

Application of EC State aid law bythe Member State Courts



Cases covered in this issue

Anti-Trust Rules

17 Group exemption for liner conferences27 The District Heating Pipe Cartel31 SICASOV33 British Sugar35 Greene King/Roberts35 Info-Lab/Ricoh37 Greek Ferries39 Eudim

Mergers

40 Skanska/Scancem40 Enso/Stora41 ABB/ Elsag Bailey Process Automation NV

State Aid

49 Fiscalité directe des entreprises49 Synthetic Fibres industry50 Aides Régionales51 Banking sector51 Sweden – employment and training52 The Netherlands – heavy rain damage53 Germany – ship-building53 Italie - Seleco54 Allemagne – Infraleuna Infrastruktur & Service GmbH54 France – Nouvelle Filature Lainière55 Allemagne - Adinol55 Germany – Riedel-de Haën

ML DG4001

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