OTA-O-567 NTIS order #PB94-134640 GPO stock #052-003 …Preparing for an Uncertain Climate—Vol. I...

Preparing for an Uncertain Climate—Vol. I

October 1993

OTA-O-567NTIS order #PB94-134640

GPO stock #052-003-01356-8

Recommended Citation:U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Preparing for an UncertainClimate--Volume I, OTA-O-567 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, October 1.993).

II

For Sale by the U.S, Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16 -042986-2

Foreword

P reparing for an Uncertain Climate is OTA’S second report on climate change. In1991, we published Changing by Degrees: Steps to Reduce Greenhouse Gases,which focused on ways to reduce the buildup of greenhouse gases in theatmosphere. Slowing the rate of growth in these emissions continues to be very

important, but most analyses conclude that despite international efforts, the Earth is likelyto warm several degrees over the next century.

Climate change poses many potential problems for human and natural systems, andthe long-term effects of climate change on these systems are becoming increasinglyimportant in public policy. For example, international agreements were recently signed onboth climate change and biodiversity. Recognizing the potential problems, Congress askedOTA to examine how the Nation can best prepare for an uncertain future climate. Thisassessment tackles the difficult tasks of assessing how natural and human systems maybeaffected by climate change and of evaluating the tools at our disposal to ease adaptation toa warmer climate. Volume 1 addresses coastal areas, water resources, and agriculture;volume 2 includes wetlands, preserved lands, and forests.

OTA identifies more than 100 options in the full report that could help ease thetransition to an uncertain climate. We categorized a subset of these options as ‘first steps.Options that fall into this group are near-term concerns because they will take a long timeto complete, address ‘front-line” or urgent issues that need attention first in order to makebetter decisions later, can be approached through efforts already under way, are beneficialfor reasons other than helping to prepare for climate change, or represent near-term ‘targetsof opportunity.‘‘

The United States has put in place an ambitious Global Change Research Program to“observe, understand, and ultimately predict global and regional climate change. ” Thiseffort, which has so far been based overwhelmingly in the physical sciences, is not gearedto help make natural resource planning and management decisions, to identify ecosystem-level responses to climate change, or to readily provide policy guidance on mitigation oradaptation. While scientists continue to reduce uncertainty, policy makers will continue toreauthorize environmental legislation, manage natural resources, and develop energypolicy. Having mechanisms for integrating research and evaluating reasonable policyroutes while we are completing the science would be a valuable addition to the Federaleffort. This assessment could help guide these needed improvements.

Preparing for an Uncertain Climate was requested by three congressionalcommittees: the Senate Committees on Environment and Public Works and on Commerce,Science, and Transportation, and the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.OTA appreciates the support this effort received from hundreds of contributors. Workshopparticipants, reviewers, contractors, and informal advisors gave us invaluable support as weattempted to sift through the voluminous material on this subject. OTA, however, remainssolely responsible for the contents of this report.

Roger C. Herdman, DirectorIii

Helen M. Ingram, ChairmanDirectorUdall Studies in Public PolicyUniversity of Arizona

Richard M. AdamsProfessor of Resource EconomicsDepartment of Agricultural and

Resource EconomicsOregon State University

Vera AlexanderDean, School of Fisheries

and Ocean SciencesUniversity of Alaska

Michael J. BeanSenior AttorneyEnvironmental Defense Fund

Margaret Adela DavidsonExecutive Directorsouth Carolina sea Grant

Consortium

J. Clarence Davies.Director

Center for Risk ManagementResources for the Future

Baruch FischhoffProfessor of Engineering

and Public PolicyCarnegie Mellon University

Michael H. Glantzprogram DirectorEnvironmental Impacts GroupNational Center for Atmospheric

Research

George HobergAssistant ProfessorPolitical Science DepartmentUniversity of British Columbia

Henry D. JacobyDirector, Joint Program on the

Science and Policyof Global Change

Sloan School of ManagementMassachusetts Institute of

Technology

Waiter JarckCorporate Director

Forest ResourcesGeorgia-Pacific Corporation

David N. KennedyDirector, California State

Department of Water Resources

Jon KusierExecutive DirectorAssociation of State Wetlands

Managers

Douglas MacLeanAssociate professorPhilosophy DepartmentUniversity of Maryland

Jerry MahlmanDirector, Geophysical Fluid

Dynamics Laboratory/NOAAPrinceton University

Barbara MillerSenior Civil EngineerTennessee Valley Authority

Steve PeckDirector, Environmental Sciences

DepartmentElectric Power Research Institute

Herman Shugart

Department of EnvironmentalSciences

University of Virginia

Phil SissonDirector, Commodities and

Economic Analysis DivisionQuaker oats

Don WilhiteDirectorInternational Drought

Information CenterUniversity of Nebraska

Gary YoheProfessorDepartment of EconomicsWesleyan University

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panelmebrs.The panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility:for the reportand the accuracy of its contents.

iv

Clyde BehneyAssistant Director, OTAHealth and Environmental

Sciences Division

John AndelinAssistant Director,

to Aug. 31, 1993

Robert NiblockProgram ManagerOceans and Environment

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Kathleen BellOffice Administrator

Kimberly HolmlundAdministrative secretary

Sharon Knarvlk

CONTRIBUTORS

Bob Friedman

Beth Robinson

Mark Zinniker

EDITOR

Cynthia AllenEditorial services

ROSINA BIERBAUMProject Director

Michael BowesSenior Analyst

William WestermeyerSenior Analyst

Jacqueline CourteauAnalyst

CONTRACTORS

Timothy BeatleyUniversity of Virginia

Stanley ChangnonIllinois State Water Survey

William ClineInstitute of International Economics

Charles CooperSan Diego University

William EasterlingUniversity of Nebraska-Lincoln

Jae EdmondsPacific Northwest Laboratory

Project Staff

Environmental Defense Fund

David GillilanUniversity of Arizona

Patrick HalpinUniversity of Virginia

Robert LilleholmUtah State University

Janice LongstrethPacific Northwest Laboratory

Geraldine McCormick-RayUniversity of Virginia

Sherry ShowellAnalyst

Nadine CutlerResearch Analyst

Elise HollandResearch Analyst

Julie PhillipsIndexer

Frank Potterconsultant

Carleton RayUniversity of Virginia

Theodore Schadconsultant

Daniel SheerWater Resources Management, Inc.

Joel SmithRCG/Hagler, Bailley, Inc.

William SmithYale University

Nick Sundtconsultant

Richard WahlUniversity of Colorado

Scott WarrenConnecticut College

Daniel WillardIndiana University

Mary McKenneyconsultant

Walt OechelSan Diego State University

workshopWORKSHOP ON WETLANDS

Tom BancroftNational Audubon Society

Ann BartuskaU.S. Forest Service

Michael BeanEnvironmental Defense Fund

Elizabeth BokmanU.S. Department of the InteriorDieter BuschU.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

Douglas CanningWashington Department of Ecology

James ChambersNational Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Kevin ErwinKevin L. Erwin Consulting

Ecologist, Inc.

Lee FooteU.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

Taber HandAssociation of State Wetlands

Managers

Suzette KimballUniversity of Virginia

James KundellThe University of Georgia

Jon KuslerAssociation of State Wetlands

Managers

Bruce MoultonTexas Water Commission

Walter OechelSan Diego State University

ParticipantsRichard ParkIndiana University

Karen PoianiCornell University

Michael SauerNorth Dakota Department of Health

Charles SegelquistU.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

John SimpsonMassachusetts Department of

Environmental Protection

James TitusU.S. Environmental Protection Agency

John ToliverU.S. Forest Service

Richard TomczykMassachusetts Department of

Enviro nmental Protection

Virginia Van Sickle-BurkettU.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

Don VorosU.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

Scott WarrenConnecticut College

Dennis WhighamSmithsonian Environmental

Research CenterDaniel WillardIndiana University

Tom WinterU.S. Geological Survey

Irene WisheuUniversity of OttawaDonald WitherillMaine Department of Environmental

Protection

WORKSHOP ON FORESTS

Robert BaileyUniversity of Georgia

Richard BirdseyNortheastern Forest Experiment Station

Bruce BongartenUniversity of Georgia

J.E. de SteigeurU.S. Forest ServicePhil DoughertySoutheastern Forest Experiment Station

Lauren FinsUniversity of Idaho

Michael FosbergU.S. Forest Service

Kathleen GeyerU.S. Forest ServiceRobin GrahamOak Ridge National Laboratory

Robert HaackMichigan State University

Edward HansenU.S. Forest Service

Roy HeddenClemson University

Arnold HoldenU.S. Forest Service

David Le BlancBall State University

F. Thomas LedigU.S. Forest Service

Robert LilleholmUtah State University

VI

Rex McCulloughWeyerhaeuser Company

Stephen NodvinUniversity of Tennessee

David ParsonsNational Park Service

Phillip RigganU.S. Forest Service

Clark Rowconsultant

Con SchallauAmerican Forest Council

Hank Shugart, ChairUniversity of Virginia

William SmithYale University

Alan SolomonU.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Jack WinjumU.S. Environmental Protection Agency

John ZerbeForest Products Laboratory

Robert ZiemerU.S. Forest Service

WORKSHOP ONWESTERN LANDS

Cecil ArmstrongU.S. Forest Service

Will BlackburnU.S. Department of Agriculture

Terence BoyleColorado State University

Michael CassityUniversity of WyomingStan ColoffBureau of Land Management

Charles CooperSan Diego State University

Doug FOXU.S. Forest Service

Helen Ingram, ChairUniversity of Arizona

Linda JoyceU.S. Forest Service

John KelmelisU.S. Geological Survey

Gil LuskGlacier National Park

Mitch McClaranUniversity of Arizona

Gary McVickerBureau of Land Management

Ron MoodyU.S. Department of Agriculture

David MouatDesert Research Institute

Walter OechelSan Diego State University

Pat ReecePanhandle Research and Extension

Center

Patrick ReedUniversity of Georgia

Tim SeastedtUniversity of Colorado

Richard StroupPolitical Economy Research Center

Eleonora TrotterUniversity of New Mexico

Sara VickermanDefenders of WildlifeMary WallaceUniversity of Arizona

WORKSHOP ON CLIMATETREATIES AND MODELSDan BodanskyUniversity of Washington

Tony BrentonHarvard University

Herman CesarTilburg University

Joel DarmstadterResources for the Future

Hadl DowlatabadlCarnegie Mellon University


Howard GruenspechtUs. Department of Energy

James HammittRand Corp.

William HoganHarvard University

Ted ParsonHarvard University

Steve RaynerPacific Northwest Laboratoratory

John ReillyMassachusetts Institute

of Technology

Joel ScheragaUs. Environmental Protection Agency

Dennis TirpakUs. Environmental Protection Agency

David VictorHarvard University

John WeyantStanford university

Don WilhiteUniversity of Nebraska

vii

WORKSHOP ONAGRICULTURE

Richard AdamsOregon State University

Robert ChenConsortium for the International E a r t h

Science Information Network

Ralph ChiteThe Library of Congress

John ClarkBattelle Institute

Roy DarwinUs. Departmcnt of Agriculture

William EasterlingUniversity of NebraskaDean EthridgeU.S. Department of AgricultureGary EvansU.S. Department of AgricultureSteven HollingerUniversity of Illinois

Marvin JensenColorado state university

C. AlIan JonesTexas A&M University

Jan LewandrowskiUs. Department of Agriculture

Robert LoomisUniversity of California

Robert MendelsohnYale university

Calvin Quaisetuniversity of California

Wayne RasmussenU.S. Department of AgricultureSteve RawlinsU.S. Department of AgricultureJohn ReillyMassachusetts Institute of Technology

Norman Rosenberg, ChairBattelle Institute

Cynthia RosenzweigColumbia University

Vernon RuttanUniversity of Minnesota

Paul UngerU.S. Department of Agriculture

John van EsUniversity of Illinois

WORKSHOP ON ECOLOGYAND REMOTE SENSING

Jim BunceU.S. Department of AgricultureLeonard DavidSpace Data Resources and InformationRuth DefriesUniversity of Maryland

Irv Forsethuniversity of Maryland

Robert HudsonUniversity of Maryland

David Inouyeuniversity of Maryland

Tony JanetosNational Aeronautics and

Space Administr“ “ ation

Michael KearneyUniversity of Maryland

Penelope Koinesuniversity of Maryland

Bill LawrenceUniversity of MarylandEileen McClellanUniversity of Maryland

Aian MillerUniversity of Maryland

Raymond MillerUniversity of Maryland

Rob Nichollsuniversity of Maryland

Karen PrestegaardUniversity of Maryland

Steve PrinceUniversity of Maryland

Alan RobockUniversity of Maryland

John Townshenduniversity of Maryland

Richard WeismillerUniversity of Maryland

Robert WorrestConsortium for the International‘ E a r t h

Science Information Network

WORKSHOP ON EOS ANDUSGCRP: ARE WE ASKINGAND ANSWERING THERIGHT QUESTIONS?

Dan AlbrittonNational Oceanic Atmospheric

Administration

James AndersonHarvard University

Francis BrethertonUniversity of Wisconsin

Ronald BrunnerUniversity of Colorado

William ClarkHarvard University

Robert CorellNational Science Foundation

viii

Jeff Dozier WORKSHOP ONUniversity of California WATER RESOURCES

John Eddy Tony BagwellConsortium for the International Earth Texas Water Development Board

science Information Network Stanley ChangnonDiane Evans Illinois State Water SurveyJet Propulsion Laboratory Hanna CortnerJames Hansen University of ArizonaNational Aeronautics and Space

. . Stephen Estes-SmargiassiAdministration Massachusetts Water Resources

Tony Janetos AuthorityNational Aeronautics and Space

, Myron FieringAdmininstration Harvard University

Jerry Mahlman Kenneth Frederick.Princeton University Resources for the FutureM PatrlnosU.S. Dep

Jerome Gilbertartment of Energy Water Transfer Associates

Robert WatsonNational Aeronautics and Space

Michael Glantz, ChairNational Center for Atmospheric. .Administration Research

Helen IngramUniversity of Arizona

William KelloggNational Center for Atmospheric

Research

Steve MacaulayCalifornia Department of water

Resources

Barbara MillerTennessee Valley Authority

Peter RhoadsSouth Florida Water Management

District

John SchefterU.S. Geological Survey

Nell SchildU.S. Department of the Interior

Rusty SchusterBureau of Reclamation

Joel SmithUs. Environmental Protection Agency

Eugene StakhivUs. Army Corps of Engineers

Dan TarlockChicago-Kent College of Law

Richard WahlUniversity of Colorado


Dennis LettenmaierUniversity of Washington

lx

I—

contents

1 Synthesis, Summary andPolicy Options 1The OTA Assessment 3The Problem of Climate Change 7Choosing Adaptation Strategies 15Overarching Policy Themes 19Near-Term Congressional Action 35Summaries and First Steps for Each

Resource Chapter 39Chapter 1 References 57

2 A Primer on Climate Change andNatural Resources 65How Do We Know Climate Is Changing? 66What Causes Climate Change? 71What Changes in Climate Are Predicted? 71How Will Climate Change Affect Natural

Resources? 79Which Natural Resources Are Most Vulnerable

to Climate Change? 99Chapter 2 References 101

3 Global Change Research in theFederal Government 109The U.S. Global Change Research Program 112Priorities and Balance in USGCRP 119Adaptation Research in the Federal

Government 132Evaluation Mechanisms 139Policy Options: Augmenting the Federal

Research Effort on Global Change 144Chapter 3 References 151

IIx“

4 C o a s t s 1 5 3Overview 154vulnerability of coastal Areas 154The Challenge for Policy 166Obstacles to Better Management 176Encouraging Less-Damaging

Coastal-Development Patterns 170Policy Options for the Federal Government 194First Steps 202Chapter 4 References 204

5 W a t e r 2 0 9Overview 210Background 211Possible Effects of a Warmer Climate

on Water Resource Systems 212Current and Potential Stresses on Water

Resource Systems 213Effects of Climate Stress on Nonconsumptive

Uses of Water 227Adapting Water Resource Systems to

Climate and Other Changes 232First Steps 262Chapter 5 References 266Appendix 5. l—Water Resource Concerns:

Region by Region and State by State 269

Agriculture 275Overview 276U.S. Agriculture Today 277The Problem of Climate Change 266Technologies for Adaptation to

Climate Change 297The Institutional Setting 310Policy Options 316First steps 326Chapter 6 References 329

APPENDIXESA: List of Tables and Figures 333B: Acknowledgments 339

INDEX 345

xii I

Synthesis,Summary

andPolicy

Options 1

w idespread public attention to the question of whetheror not climate is changing intensified during the hotsummers of the late 1980s. Since then, during thetime the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)

was conducting this assessment, the Nation has experiencedmajor drought in the western and southeastern United States,powerful hurricanes in Florida and Hawaii, a destructive forestfire in Northern California, and substantial flooding in theMidwest. Although none of these events can be clearly linked toclimate change, they represent the types of extreme events thatmay occur with greater frequency if climate warms.

Most scientists believe that the Earth’s climate is likely towarm by several degrees during the next few decades. Althoughour understanding of climate change has progressed a great dealin the past few years, major knowledge gaps remain, andempirical evidence of human-induced climate change is notunequivocal. Many factors important to understanding climate,such as the role of clouds, ocean circulation, and solar cycles andthe interactions between living organisms and the environment,cannot yet be reliably incorporated into general circulationmodels (GCMS), science-based computer models used to predictpotential changes in average global surface temperature. Somekey information that could guide policy response is likely toremain unknown for another decade or two (69). We cannotpredict rates or magnitudes of changes in local or regionaltemperature and precipitation patterns. Predicting changes in thevariability of climate and weather patterns, particularly on smallspatial scales, is also beyond current scientific capabilities,Existing ecological, social, and economic models are similarlylimited and cannot adequately predict the responses to climate

2 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

changes by natural systems (e.g., forests andwetlands) or managed systems (e.g., water re-source systems and agriculture). Therefore, mostpolicy decisions made in the near future abouthow to respond to the specter of climate changewill be made in light of great uncertainty aboutthe nature and magnitude of potential effects.

Although climate change has certainly becomea public and scientific concern, what to do aboutit is not clear. Issues now being heatedly debatedare the technical feasibility and economic impli-cations of reducing or offsetting emissions ofgreenhouse gases. Several studies concluded thatcutting U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide (C02),the most important anthropogenic greenhousegas, below current levels is plausible. OTA’S1991 report, Changing by Degrees: Steps toReduce Greenhouse Gases, concluded that byadopting a package of low-cost measures, theUnited States could significantly slow the growthof its C02 emissions over the next 25 years-butcould not easily decrease them to below currentlevels (172). With aggressive-but potentiallyexpensive-initiatives, OTA found that the UnitedStates might be able to decrease its C02 emissionsto 35 percent below today’s levels by 2015. Evenin this case, U.S. emissions of C02 are expectedto rise again after 2015 unless there are successfulprograms for developing alternatives to fossil-energy supplies (such as solar and nuclear power)-programs that would lead to substantial increasesin market penetration of one or more of theseenergy alternatives by 2015.

Since the 1992 United Nations Conference onEnvironment and Development (UNCED) inBrazil, many countries have signed the ClimateConvention, seeking to freeze greenhouse gasemissions at 1990 levels in the near future. OnEarth Day 1993, President Clinton announcedthat the United States would participate in thiseffort. The Climate Convention represents alandmark agreement and recognition that global

environmental problems must be addressed on aglobal scale.

Nonetheless, the bulk of scientific evidenceindicates that simply freezing greenhouse gasemissions at 1990 levels will not stop globalwarming. Stabilizing emissions is different fromstabilizing atmospheric concentrations. Constantannual emissions will still increase the totalconcentration of greenhouse gases and, thus, theheat-trapping capacity of the atmosphere. TheIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(WCC), an international group representing morethan 50 countries, concluded that to stabilize theconcentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmos-phere at today’s levels would require up to an 80percent reduction in world C02 emission levelsimmediately, along with significant reductionsin other greenhouse gases. Even if such redu-ctions could be achieved, the world would warmabout 1 to 4 OF (1 to 2 ‘C) because of long-livedgreenhouse gases emitted over the last century.Given the virtual certain“ ty that energy use (andassociated C02 emissions) in developing coun-tries will rise as they pursue economic growthand given the intense debate in the United Statesand other industrialized countries about the feasi-bility of achieving even a freeze in emissions, itseems certain that global atmospheric concentra-tions of greenhouse gases will continue to rise.Thus, unless the predictive GCMS are seri-ously flawed, average global temperatures areexpected to increase several degrees over thenext century, even under the most optimisticemissions scenarios (see box 2-B). l

If climate change is inevitable, then so isadaptation to climate change. Society and naturemay have to cope with rising sea levels, morefrequent drought and periods of temperatureextremes, changes in water supplies, disruption ofecosystems, and changes in many other climate-sensitive natural resources (see ch. 2). The termadaptation, as used here, means any adjustment to

1 All chapters, boxes, figures, snd tables ckd here can be found in volumes 1 and 2 of this report Volume 1 addrasm coastal areas, U@@resources, and agriculture; volume 2 includes wetlands, preserved lands, and forests.

Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options! 3

altered conditions; it can be a biological, techni-cal, institutional, regulatory, behavioral, or eco-nomic response. It encompasses passive adjust-ments (e.g., biologically driven changes in plantcommunities or gradual changes in human behav-ior and tastes), deliberate reactive responses(management responses after climate changeeffects are observed), and anticipatory actions,(planning, engineering, or regulatory responsestaken in preparation for climate change). Through-out this report, we examine the ability of natural-resource-based systems, both unmanaged andmanaged, to adapt to climate change and considermeans by which adaptation can be enhanced bymodifying management, advancing research andtechnology, disseminating information, and tak-ing legislative actions.

Given the current inability to predict accuratelywhere, when, and how much change will occur,decisionmakers must plan for natural and man-aged systems in light of considerable uncertainty.It is understandable, under these circumstances,that postponing responses until more is knownabout climate change is very appealing. Nonethe-less, uncertainty does not mean that the Nationcannot position itself better to cope with the broadrange of impacts possible under climate change orprotect itself against potentially costly futureoutcomes. In fact, delay in responding mayleave the Nation poorly prepared to deal withthe changes that do occur and may increase thepossibility of impacts that are irreversible orotherwise very costly. Many options that willincrease the Nation’s ability to cope with theUncertainties of climate change will also help indealing with existing threats to natural resourcesystems, such as those related to climate extremes(e.g., droughts, floods, and fire) and the fragmen-tation of natural habitat.

The following sections of this chapter discussthe OTA assessment, general problems posed byclimate change, criteria for choosing strategicresponses, near-term opportunities for Congres-sional action, and summaries and first steps forthe six resource systems studied in detail.

THE OTA ASSESSMENTThree Committees of Congress asked OTA to

help them think about coping with potentialclimate change. OTA was asked: How can theUnited States set prudent policy, given that we donot know for certain what the climate will be?This assessment attempts to answer three keyquestions:

What is at risk over what time frames?Which natural ecological systems and man-aged natural resource systems are at riskfrom climate change? How do the lead timesneeded for human interventions in thesesystems vary?

How can we best plan for an uncertainclimate? When and how should decision-makers consider the uncertain effects of achanging climate as they plan the futuremanagement of natural and managed sys-tems in the United States? What criteriashould be used?

Will we have answers when we needthem? Does the current U.S. Global ChangeResearch Program (USGCRP) reflect theshort- and long-term needs of decision-makers? Will it provide information aboutrates of climate change, the potential for‘‘surprise’ effects on different systems,potential strategies for making systems moreresilient in the face of uncertain climatechange, and adapting to the changes that mayoccur?

Society depends on natural and managed sys-tems for both basic needs and amenities. Theseinclude, for example, food, shelter, clothing,

. .drmking water, energy, and recreation. Manysocial and economic problems arise when theavailability and diversity of goods and servicesdecline. Such disruptions can range from mild tosevere, and they include unemployment, famine,migration of workers, and political instability.Climate change heightens the uncertainty aboutfuture availability of desired goods and services.


In the West, center-pivot sprinklers irrigate wheat,alfalfa, potatoes, and other crops. Increasinglyefficient irrigation techniques maybe critical ifregional climates become drier.

Yet, given the potentially long delays until theonset of significant changes, reacting to climatechange as it occurs may seem more practical thanundertaking anticipatory measures. Why adopt apolicy today to adapt to a climate change that maynot occur, for which there is significant uncer-tainty about regional impacts, and for whichbenefits of the anticipatory measure may not beseen for decades? Effort put into adopting the

measure could well be wasted. Furthermore,future generations may have more sophisticatedtechnologies and greater wealth that can be usedfor adaptation (91).

The Committee on Science, Engineering, andPublic Policy (COSEPUP) (27)2 concluded that itis theoretically possible to put technology andpractices into place to adjust to the changingclimate as it happens if the change is gradualenough. However, the rate of climate change is,admittedly, unknown. IPCC concluded: “it isuncertain whether these changes-should theycome-would be gradual or sudden” (68). Fur-thermore, “our imperfect understanding of cli-mate processes . . . could make us vulnerable tosurprises; just as the human-made ozone holeover Antarctica was entirely unpredicted” (69).

Waiting to react to climate change may beunsatisfactory if it is possible that climate changeimpacts will be very costly. Of greatest concernmay be those systems where there is the possibil-ity of surprise-of facing the potential for highcosts without time to react--or where the climatechange impacts will be irreversible. Such impactsseem more likely if long-lived structures orslow-to-adapt natural systems are affected, ifadaptive measures require time to devise orimplement, or if current trends and actions makeadaptation less likely to succeed or more costly inthe future. In these cases, anticipating climatechange by taking steps now to smooth the path ofadaptation may be appropriate.

Ideally, a policy-relevant research programcould help identify appropriate actions as thecurrent state of knowledge evolves. In response tothe potential risks of climate change and theuncertainties surrounding the science, the FederalGovernment launched a massive, multiagencyresearch effort in 1989 to monitor, understand,

of the National Academy of the National of stated: inventions and their adoption may occur quickly, we must ask whether the broad spectrum of current capital

could be changed faat enough to match a change in climate in 50 to 100 years’ (27). goes on to note that half a should be time enough to allow most major technological systems (and some natural systems) to be transformed most capital stock to over.

Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 5

and, ultimately, predict global changes and todetermine the mechanisms influencing thesechanges (25, 26). Chapter 3 examines theUSGCRP and suggests ways to effectively broa-den the program to both incorporate naturalresource concerns and assessment activities.

Other studies have examined systems at riskfrom climate change in various ways (see boxesl-A, l-B, and 2-F and refs. 27, 67, and 188). Tocomplement these analyses, OTA focused itsexamination of adaptation potential on areaswhere:

■ Costs of climate change may be very high.For example, flood and wind damages frommore-intense storms could lead to death andextensive property damage.

= Impacts of climate change may be irre-versible. For example, species extinction andloss of valuable ecosystems—in wetlands,forests, and wilderness areas-may be per-manent.

■ The validity of long-term decisions madetoday will be affected by climate change.For example, trees planted with a life expec-tancy of many decades may not survive tomaturity if climate conditions change. Agri-cultural and coastal development in climate-sensitive areas may add to the likelihood offuture losses to natural disasters.

■ Preparing for catastrophic events is al-ready warranted. Reacting to climatechange may mean reacting to climate ex-tremes-such as floods, droughts, storms,and fires. Coordinated contingency planningcan help avert high costs and reduce risk ofloss.

■ There is a significant Federal role in theresearch, planning, or management ofthese systems.

On the basis of these criteria, OTA selected sixsystems for further analysis:

1. coastal areas,2. water resources,3. agriculture,

4. wetlands,5. preserves (federally protected natural areas),

and6. forests.

The first three systems are managed natural-re-source-based systems with a high degree ofgovernment involvement and a complex systemof incentives and subsidies in place; these aregrouped together in volume 1 of the report. Theother three systems include less-managed naturalsystems and are presented together in volume 2.Both volumes contain this summary chapter, aprimer on climate change, and a chapter on theFederal research effort. Box 1-A highlights ouroverall methodological approach.

Each of the six systems OTA examined isstressed to some degree today, and that mayinfluence how well it can respond to any changein the future. For example, because populations incoastal areas are growing, the exposure to costlynatural disasters is increasing. Water scarcity andwater-quality concerns are already common inmany parts of the United States. Current agricul-tural support programs often distort and constrainchoices about crop and farm management. Wet-land loss continues-albeit at a much slower ratethan 20 years ago-despite a stated national goalof “no net loss” (see vol. 2, ch. 4). Preservednatural areas serve aesthetic, recreational, andbiodiversity functions, but may not be adequate insize or distribution to maintain wildlife and plantspecies in the face of growing habitat loss andfragmentation. U.S. forest managers are finding itincreasingly difficult to meet the sometimescompeting demands for recreation, environmentalservices, and commercial wood products.

Water is an integral element of all of theresource systems discussed in this report. Itsabundance, location, and seasonal distribution areclosely linked to climate, and this link has hadmuch to do with where cities have flourished,how agriculture has developed, and what floraand fauna inhabit a region. Water quality andquantity will remain key to the economy. Future

6 Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume 1

Box l-A—The OTA Study in Context

Within the past 5 years, three major studies of the impacts of climate change have been released. TheEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA) (166) and the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy(COSEPUP) (27) issued reports on potential effects of global climate change on the United States; WorkingGroup II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) focused on potential impacts from climatechange worldwide (67).

The Sensitivity and Adaptability ofHuman Activities and Nature

Sensitive;adaptation Sensitive;

Human activity Low at some adaptationand nature sensitivity cost problematic

Industry and energy

Health

Farming

Managed forestsand grasslands

Water resources

Tourism andrecreation

Settlement andcoastal structures

Human migration

Political tranquility

Natural landscapes

Marine ecosystems

SOURCE: Redrawn from Committee on Science, Engineering,and Public Policy, Panel on Policy Implications of GreenhouseWarming, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy ofEngineering, and Institute for Medicine, Policy Implications ofGreenhouse Warming: Mitigation, Adaptation, and theScience Base (Washington, DC: National Academy Press,1992).

COSEPUP divided human activities and natu-ral systems into three classes of sensitivity andadaptability to climate change: 1) low sensitivity,2) sensitive but can adapt at a cost and3) sensitive with problematic adjustment oradaptation (see table). The report concluded thatindustry decisionmaking horizons and buildingschedules are shorter than the time frame withinwhich most climatic changes would emerge, somost industries could be expected to adapt asclimate shifts. COSEPUP listed human migrationand water resources as “sensitive to climatechange,” but adaptable “at some cost.” Finally, itsuggested that unmanaged natural ecosystemsrespond relatively slowly and that their ability toadapt to climate change is more questionableand “problematic” than that of managed croplandor timberland. The EPA report concluded thatnatural ecosystems have only limited ability toadapt if the climate changes rapidly and sug-gested that “managed systems may show moreresilience.”

The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)analysis began with the EPA, COSEPUP, andIPCC reports and related literature, but it goesbeyond them in several important ways. CO-SEPUP addressed natural systems primarily inthe general terms of “natural landscape” and

“marine ecosystems.” However, natural systems are much more numerous and complex than this categorizationsuggests. We examine some natural systems in the United States at a much finer level of resolution (e.g., wetlands,forests, and preserved areas) and in different regions of the country.

We also consider systems under varying degrees of management intensity-from Iess-managed wildernessareas, wetlands, and some coastal systems, to systems managed for multiple uses, such as forests andrangelands, to intensively managed agricultural and commercial forestry systems. We consider each to be asystem for which we can characterize outputs and’ inputs. We focus on the outputs that society cares aboutwhether for economic, recreational, aesthetic, or other reasons-in short, things about which policy is made.

While recognizing the value of climate predictions used in previous assessments, we chose to acknowledgethe uncertainties of our changing climate by deliberately avoiding predictions linked to any particular climatechange scenario. Instead, we examine the vulnerabilities of natural resource systems to climate change, attemptto elucidate how different climate variables drive natural resource systems, and examine the types of planning andmanagement practices that might help vulnerable systems adapt to a changing climate.

Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options 7

Timing is key to our analyses. In addition to the sensitivity of systems to climate change, the lead time neededfor human interventions in these systems also varies, as does the time framefor systems to respond. Continuationof the structure, function, and services of many systems in an uncertain future depends on decisions being madetoday. In this report, we highlight how today’s decisions about long-lived systems (e.g., forests and water resource

projects) may determine how those systems respond to tomorrow’s unknown climate.Finally, and perhaps most importantly for Congress, our assessment examines the institutions and legislative

framework that surround natural and built systems in the United States today. Whether or not a system can adaptto a changing climate may depend on how adaptable the institutions themselves are. Many systems transcendagency, geographic, or legislative boundaries; such fragmentation can impede adaptation. OTA identifies theserigidities and offers new legislative, coordination, planning, and management options to facilitate adaptation.

water availability is essential for continued serv- 1) increased unpredictability resulting from chang-ices and functions from coasts, water resources,agriculture, preserves, wetlands, and forests. Com-petition for water, whether for irrigation, recrea-tion, wildlife, or urban use, is likely to heighten insome regions of the country. Throughout thereport, we highlight this and other intersectingissues in cross-cutting boxes, indicated by a bar oficons representing the six systems studied (seetable l-l).

THE PROBLEM OF CLIMATE CHANGE

ing climate averages, and 2) increased risk ofsurprises or large-scale losses. These, togetherwith the “background” of increasing population,greater future demand, and growing competitionfor the use of scarce resources, make the need toimprove the Nation’s ability to deal with anuncertain climate all the more urgent.

Stresses on resources are most acute and visi-ble during extreme events such as floods anddroughts. Our response to such events has oftenproven to be expensive and unsatisfactory. Dam-

Climate change alters the baseline against ages from the Mississippi River flooding in 1993which future actions are gauged. Our lifestyles, are expected to range from $5 billion to $10water supplies, and food supplies and other things billion, with Federal disaster payments of aboutsociety values from natural resources rely on a $3 billion. Almost $4 billion in Federal paymentsdependable, consistent, and sustainable supply.Our institutions and infrastructure presume that

went to farmers suffering crop losses during the

the past is a reasonable surrogate for the future.1988 drought. Hurricane Hugo cost the Federal

When designing reservoirs, for example, historic Government about $1.6 billion. HurricaneAndrew topped $2 billion in Federal disasterrainfall patterns are assumed to provide a good

indication of the range of future patterns. A payments, and many complained about the Govern-

farmer plants knowing that at times, weather ment’s response. 3 Policies that improve the Na-conditions will cause a crop to fail, but with the tion’s ability to prepare for and cope moreexpectation-based on past climate--that the effectively with climate hazards (e.g., floods,crop will succeed, in most years. fires, and droughts) would be valuable now and

Climate change poses two potential problems would help prepare the Nation for a less certainfor existing management strategies for resources: future.

3 Hurricane Andrew’s estimated COSt tO property insurers as of February 1993 is at least $15.5 billion (136). Additional losses involveduninsured property, public utility equipment (e.g., power lines), crop damage, property insured under the National Flood Insurance and theSmall Business Administration programs, lost tax revenue, and the costs of emergency services.

8 Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

Table l-l—List of Boxes in Reporta

Chapter 1 — SummaryBox 1-A — The OTA Study in Context, p.6Box 1 -B — How Climate Change May Affect Various Systems, p 12Box 1 -C — Solutions from General to Specific: Addressing the Overarching Problems, p.20Box 1 -D — Climate Change, South Florida, and the Everglades, p.28Box 1-E — Water Allocation and the Sacramento-San Joaquin River System, p.31Box 1 -F — Changes in Agriculture and the Fate of Prairie Potholes: The Impacts of Drought and Climate Change, p.33Box 1 -G — Climate Change in Alaska: A Special Case, p.50

Chapter 2 — PrimerBox 2-A — What the Models Tell Us. GCMs and Others, p 68Box 2-B — Highlights of the IPCC 1990 Scientific Assessment of Climate Change, p.74Box 2-C — Climate Change and Coastal Fisheries, p.81Box 2-D — Coping with Increased CO2. Effects on Ecosystem Productivity, p 88Box 2-E — Responses of Natural Systems to Climate Stress. Adaptation, Migration, and Decline, p 9260X 2-F — Major Assessments of Climate Change Impacts, p 102

Chapter 3 — Research60X 3-A — Remote Sensing as a Tool for Coping with Climate Change, p.125Box 3-B — Weaknesses in U.S. Environmental Research Identified by the National Research Council, p 137Box 3-C — Lessons from NAPAP, p.141

VOLUME 1Chapter 4 — Coasts

Box 4-A — Saffir-Simpson Hurricane-lntensity Scale, p 162Box 4-B — Protector Retreat?, p 174Box 4-C — South Carolina, Hurricane Hugo, and Coastal Development, p.189Box 4-D — The “Maine Approach”, p 192

Chapter 5 — Water60X 5-A —Box 5-B —Box 5-C —Box 5-D —Box 5-E —60)$ 5-F —60X 5-G —Box 5-H —Box 5-1 —

60X 5-J —

Chapter 6 —Box 6-A — Major Federal Programs Related to Agriculture and the Environment, p.278Box 6-B — Primary U.S. Farm Products, p.28560X 6-C — Previous Studies of Agriculture and Climate Change, p.290Box &D — Water Transfers in the West: Winners and Losers, p.292Box 6-E — Irrigated Agriculture and Water Quality: The Kesterson Case, p.294Box 6-F — Historical Examples of Adaptability in Agriculture, p 298Box 6-G — Adaptation to Declining Groundwater Levels in the High Plains Aquifer, p.301Box 6-H — Current Technologies for Adapting to Climate Change, p.303Box 6-I — The Institutional Setting for Agricultural Adaptation to Climate Change, p.311Box 6-J — Structure of the Agricultural Research and Extension System, p.315

Climate Change, Water Resources, and Limits to Growth?, p.216Water Quality, Climate Change, and the Rio Grande, p.217Reauthorizing the Clean Water Act, p.220Major Doctrines for Surface Water and Groundwater, p 222Navigating the Mississippi through Wet and Dry Times, p,228Important Water-Related Responsibilities of Key Federal Agencies, p.233Permanent Transfer: Conserving Water in California’s Imperial Valley, P.237A Drought-Year Option California’s Drought Water Bank, p.238Seasonal Storage: The Metropolitan Water District’s Interruptible Water Service and Seasonal StoragePrograms, p.247The Use of Reclaimed Water in St Petersburg, p.261

Agriculture

■ What Is at Risk? creased evaporation, and sea level rise. TheAs described in chapter 2, climate change combination of these factors could cause signifi-

predicted by the models includes changes in cant impacts on all systems. For example, seaprecipitation patterns, increased temperature, in- level rise could lead to higher storm surges and


VOLUME 2Chapter 4 — Wetlands

Box 4-A — Wetland Restoration and Mitigation, Maintainmg Wetland Functions and Values, p 154Box 4-B — How Wet Is A Wetland?: The Debate Over Which Wetlands to Regulate, p 157Box 4-C — Wetland Types and Distributionl p,160Box 4-D — Why Care About Wetlands?, p,162Box 4-E — Isa Wetland a Place or a Process?, p,166Box 4-F — Louisiana and Sea Level Rise: A Preview of What’s to Come?, p.173Box 4-G — How Will Climate Change Affect Wetlands?, p 175Box 4-H — Will Climate Change Increase Conflicts Over Riparian Wetlands in the Arid West?, p.178Box 44 — The Wetlands Policy Space, p.189

Chapter 5 — Preserves: Federally Protected Natural AreasBOX 5-A — Climate Change and Management Philosophies for Natural Area Management, p 221Box 5-B — The Strategic Dilemma for Protecting Natural Areas Under Climate Change, p.223Box 5-C — Federally Protected Natural Areas: The Legislative Framework, p.228BOX 5-D — Implications for Endangered Species Conservation Under a Changing Climate, p 235Box 5-E — Landscape Fragmentation: Islands of Nature in a Sea of Human Activity, p.241Box 5-F — Some Innovative Management Models: Toward Ecosystem Management in Natural Areas, p.244Box 5-G — Competition for Water: The Case of the Stillwater National Wildlife Management Area, p.252Box 5-H — Water and Natural Areas Under Climate Change, p.255Box 5- I — The Yellowstone Fires of 1988: Harbinger of Climate Change and Fire Management Conflicts, p.262Box 5-J — Possible Funding Sources for Conservation Programs, p.265BOX 5-K — The Sustainable Biosphere Initiative: Articulating an Ecological Research Agenda for Global Change, p 269Box 5-L — Building Blocks for Integrated Information Systems, p.270Box 5-M — Restoration Ecology Giving Nature a Helping Hand Under Climate Change, p 276

Chapter 6 — ForestsBox 6-A — Major Forest Types of the United States, p.306Box 6-B — Forests and Carbon Sequestration, p.310BOX 6-C — Major Federal Laws Related to Forest Management, p.312Box 6-D — Southern Bottomland Hardwoods: Converting Wetland Forests to Agriculture, p.316Box 6-E — The Blue Mountains: Forest Decline and Climate Change, p.318Box 6-F — Current Weather-Related Stresses on Selected Forests, p.324Box 6-G — Private Property and Fire Risk, p.329Box 6-H — Public Grazing Lands: Management Dilemmas, p.334

a Shading indicates boxes that discuss interactions across resource systems

increased erosion of coasts (see vol. 1, ch. 4).Shifts in precipitation patterns could cause morefloods, droughts, water-supply disruptions, hy-dropower reductions, and groundwater overdrafts,especially in the arid West (see vol. 1, ch. 5). Theideal range for agricultural crops might movenorth as temperatures increase, and drought lossescould become more frequent (see vol. 1, ch. 6).Forests could experience more-frequent fire anddiebacks driven by drought, insects, and disease(see vol. 2, ch. 6). It could become difficult toretain unique assemblages of plants and animalsin preserves as the climate to which they areadapted effectively shifts northward or to higherelevations (see vol. 2, ch. 5). With sea level rise,

loss of coastal wetlands maybe accelerated, andregional drying could eliminate some prairiepotholes (see vol. 2, ch. 4).

The loss of soil moisture that might result fromhigher evaporation rates at warmer temperaturesis likely to present the greatest threat to naturalsystems. Figure 1-1 shows areas of the UnitedStates that may undergo significant changes insoil moisture based on climate changes projectedby two GCMS. The Goddard Institute for SpaceStudies (GISS) scenario suggests that large areasface moderate drying. The Geophysical FluidDynamics Laboratory (GFDL) scenario showsmore severe drying across much of the eastern andcentral United States. Figure 1-2 illustrates the


The summer floods of 1993 in the Midwestdemonstrate the risks of floodplain developmentcombined with intensive control of river flow.The satellite photograph on the top shows theMississippi River as it appeared in July of 1988 duringthe drought; the one on the bottom shows the samearea during the floods of July 1993.

extent to which changes in soil moisture couldaffect U.S. lands in natural cover (e.g., forests andwetlands) or agricultural use. Much of the Na-tion’s natural resource base may face at leastmoderate drying, which is likely to increase stresson vegetation.

It is impossible to estimate with any confidencethe cost of climate change to society. Estimates ofthe costs to the United States resulting from anaverage temperature increase of 4 to 5 OF (2 to3oC)4 range from 0.3 to 2.0 percent of the grossnational product (GNP) (22, 23)-correspondingto tens of billions of dollars per year. Box 1-Bhighlights a broad range of climate impacts thatcould be caused by climate change.

Although it is desirable to anticipate climatechange, the uncertainties involved make thedesign of appropriate policies challenging. Theseuncertainties include: 1) the extent of global andregional climate change, 2) its economic andecological impacts, and 3) the ability of societyto adapt.

Uncertainties About Global andRegional Climate Change

Atmospheric scientists generally agree aboutthe direction of climate change on a global andlatitudinal scale. Global temperatures will likelyrise, which would cause an increase in globalprecipitation and sea levels. Temperature in-creases are likely to be greater at higher latitudes.Winter precipitation could increase in middle andhigh latitudes; decreased summer precipitation inmidcontinental, midlatitude regions could resultin reduced summer soil moisture (69). At finerspatial scales, such as at the regional or Statelevel, uncertainty about climate change increases.

The rate of change is also uncertain. IPCCestimated that global average temperatures willincrease at over 0.5 OF (0.3o C) per decade. Asaverage temperatures increase, the entire range ofexpected temperatures increases as well; thus,both the warmest and coolest temperatures expe-rienced will be warmer than before. This does notpreclude late frosts or early freezes if variabilityincreases. Some analyses show that climatevariability may increase at the regional level-aseries of warm years in a region could be followedby a series of cool years (195). There is, however,significant uncertainty about whether the fre-quency and intensity of extreme events willchange. It is likely that, on average, precipitationworldwide will increase with climate change (69),but the models suggest that the interior ofcontinents will get drier. It is not known whetherdroughts or floods will increase or decrease.

is equilibrium warming to a doubling of above “ levels. Although leading to this is

2030, due several decades later.


Figure l-l—Potential Sol I-Moisture Changes Under Two GCM Climate Change Scenarios

Much Drier

GISS scenario

drier Much wetter

Wetter

NOTE: GFDL=Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory; GISS--Goddard Institute for Space Studies.

SOURCE: P.N. Halpin, ‘Ecosysatems at Risk to Potential Climate Change,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment,June 1993.

Some analyses predict that hurricane intensitiescould increase (43), and drought in lower lati-tudes could be more severe (144).

Uncertainties About Direct EffectsEven if the regional changes in climate could

be predicted, important uncertainties would re-main about the physical and biological effectsthey would have. We do not really know howvegetation, “animals, and other natural resourceswill be affected by climate change. Rising con-centrations of atmospheric CO2 will change therates at which plants grow, respire, use water, andset seeds. Numerous laboratory experiments onintensively managed agricultural systems suggestthat CO2 will boost plant growth and productivityas long as other nutrients are plentiful (6, 39, 81);this is called the CO2 fertilization effect (see ch.2). This effect has not yet been studied in manynatural ecosystems (72, 124). Many studies ofclimate effects have used statistical models thatrelate natural vegetation or crop productivity todifferences in current regional climates in order toestimate impacts under climate change scenarios.These are summarized in chapter 2 and in volume1, chapter 6. The ability of plants and animals to

Figure 1-2-Soil-Moisture Changes for AgriculturalLands and Areas of Natural Cover,by GCM Climate Change Scenario

40 Much wetter

I UKMOGISS — Wetter

I

Natural cover Agricultural land

NOTE: Bars above the zero axis show the percent of land areabecoming wetter; bars below the axis show the percent of land areabecoming drier. GFDL--Geophysical fluid Dynamics Laboratory; GISS-Goddard Institute for Space studies; OSU-Oregon State University;and UKMO-United Kingdom Meteorological Office.

SOURCE: P.N. Halpin, “Ecosystems at Risk to Potential ClimateChange,” contractor report prepared for the Office of TechnologyAssessment, June 1993.


Box I-B-How Climate Change May Affect Various Systems1

Natural ecosystems-These may be the systems most vulnerable to climate change. We are least able tointervene and help with adaptation of natural ecosystems because of limited knowledge about ecologicalprocesses (see chs. 2 and 3). The shift in climate zones may far exceed the ability of vegetation, such as forests,to adapt through migration (see fig. 1-7). Climate zones may shift hundreds of miles in a century, whereas naturalrates of dispersal and colonization maybe on the order of tens of miles in the same time period (35). In addition,fire and disease could result in rapid dieback of many existing forests and other terrestrial ecosystems (157).Helping plants to migrate through such activities as widespread seed dispersal would be very expensive and havedubious prospects for success (188). These issues are discussed in detail in “Forests” (vol. 2, ch. 6).

Climate change could also lead to a loss of species diversity. Isolated (“island”) species may findthemselves in climate zones that are no longer suitable for their survival (132). The potential for migration of plantsand animals to new suitable habitats is not known, but barriers such as water bodies or development could impedemigration (see fig. 1-6), Species in mountainous terrain could migrate to higher elevations. This creates reducedhabitat areas, which are correlated with reductions in species diversity. For example, a study ofa5‘F (3 ‘C)warming in the Great Basin National Park in eastern Nevada concluded that it would cause 20 to 50 percent ofspecies in individual mountain ranges to go extinct (108). The ability for human intervention to maintain speciesdiversity in the face of climate change is currently limited. Selected species could be transplanted to new habitats,but this could be very resource intensive and would only be feasible in certain cases; Iittle research has actuallybeen done on transplantation of multiple-species systems. Migration corridors could be created, but their chancesof success are limited because migration rates are slow and the direction of species migration is unknown. Inaddition, the creation of corridors maybe relatively expensive compared with setting aside new protected areas(154). These issues are discussed further in “Preserves: Federally Protected Natural Areas” (vol. 2, ch. 5).

Climate change can result in the loss of coastal wetlands directly through sea level rise, and indirectly,through interaction with societal response to sea level rise. Many coastal wetlands will likely be inundated becausethe sea will rise faster than wetland sediments accrue (161). Some wetlands will adapt to climate change bymigrating upland with the rising tides. The areas with the greatest risk of wetland loss are along the Gulf and EastCoasts of the United States (see fig. 1 -4). This will result in a net loss of wetlands because vast areas of tidal flats,such as in the Mississippi Delta, will be inundated, while inland migration will create new wetlands having only afraction of the area of today’s wetlands.2 This net loss of wetlands will be even larger where coastal structures,such as bulkheads or levees, block the inland migration of wetlands (162).

Even if it were feasible to create new coastal wetlands, the costs of this would be so high that large-scalerestoration programs would become unattractive. The average cost of creating wetlands has been estimated atroughly $20,000 to $45,000 per acre ($50,000 to $100,000 per hectare),3 not including land-acquisition costs.4

This figure, however, can vary from just a few hundred dollars per acre to many hundreds of thousands ofdollars per acre. Though technology is improving (see vol. 2, box 4-A), attempts to recreate wetland structure andfunction fully have been limited. Prohibiting the construction of or removing coastal structures would enable morewetlands to colonize upland areas. It may not be feasible to move some existing coastal structures that impedewetland migration. For example, it is unlikely that areas of dense development would be relocated.

1 This box is a compendium of information drawn from previous studies, recent research, and OTA’Sassessment. The back chapters of this report discuss a subset of these issues.

2 S. Leatherman, University of Maryland at College Park, personal communication, November 1992.3 To convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

4 D. King, Chesapeake Biological Laboratory, University of Maryland, personal communication, November1992.


Prairie pothole and riparian wetlands in regions that get drier maybe at greater risk than those in regions thatget wetter. For example, in the North central States, increases in temperatures and evaporation rates could causemany prairie potholes to shrink or disappear, leading to further declines in already diminished continental waterfowlpopulations (9). Tundra may shrink as increased temperatures allow the permafrost to thaw and drain (see boxl-G). In addition, wetlands of any type that are already degraded by pollution, water diversions, or fragmentationmay also be particularly vulnerable (1 98, 199). The status and vulnerability of coastal, riparian, depressional, andtundra wetlands are discussed in “Wetlands” (vol. 2, ch. 4).

Fisheries-The potential effects of climate change on aquatic ecosystems have been studied very Iittle todate, and could vary significantly. in some cases, marine fish maybe able to migrate to new, more suitable habitats,depending on several factors, if food sources are available (80). Some freshwater fish in open waters, such asthe Great Lakes, could benefit from a larger thermal niche (98). Fish in small lakes and streams, however, maysuffer from increases in temperature that adversely affect survival, reproduction, or their ability to migrate to coolerlocations (101). Changes in water quality will also affect the survival of aquatic organisms. Climate change mayalter circulation patterns in many lakes, reducing dissolved-oxygen concentrations. Higher temperatures will alsoact to reduce dissolved-oxygen concentrations (71). Sea level rise will increase saltwater intrusion of estuaries,potentially benefiting marine fish at the expense of freshwater species (80). However, changes in estuaries couldhave broad impacts on the U.S. fishery. By far, the greatest portion of commercial catches, with the exception ofthose from Alaskan fisheries, are composed of estuarine-dependent species (139). Ongoing alterations of criticalhabitat (such as those caused by geographic fragmentation and pollution) may be exacerbated by climate change.Box 2-C (ch. 2) discusses, by region, the condition and value of fisheries today, current problems, and the potentialimpacts of climate change.

Agriculture--This system is very sensitive to climate, but climate change impacts maybe offset by intensemanagement over short time frames. High temperatures and drought could reduce crop yields, although this effectcould be counteracted by higher atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and longer growing seasons inhigher latitudes (129). The potential for agricultural adaptation, particularly at the farm level, is very high (30).Changes in management practices (e.g., changing planting dates or using irrigation or crop-switching) can reduceor eliminate many of the potentially negative impacts of climate change. Shifts in climate zones would result inchanges in relative productivity levels, with some areas increasing output, and other areas reducing output dueto increased competition (l). See “Agriculture” (vol. 1, ch. 6) for further discussion.

Coastal resources-Cities, roads, airports, and other coastal resources are vulnerable to flooding from sealevel rise and hurricanes. The population near the coast is growing faster than populations in any other region ofthe country, and the construction of buildings and infrastructure to serve this growing population is proceedingrapidly. As a result, protection against and recovery from hazards peculiar to t he coastal zone, such as hurricanesand sea level rise, are becoming ever more costly (11). The combination of popularity and risk in coastal areashas important near-term consequences for the safety of coastal residents, protection of property, maintenance oflocal economies, and preservation of remaining natural areas. These points are discussed further in “Coasts” (vol.1, ch. 4).

Water resources-These resources are vulnerable to several climate change impacts. Changes in

precipitation and higher levels of evapotranspiration can combine to affect surface-water and groundwatersupplies, flood and drought frequency, and hydropower production. Arid basins could experience the largestrelative change in water flow from climate change (67). Numerous studies have been conducted on the relativevulnerability of the major US. river basins to flood and drought, supply disruptions, hydropower reductions,groundwater overdrafts, and extreme events (48, 49,88, 188). They conclude that the water resource regions mostvulnerable to some or all of these events are the Great Basin, California, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas Gulf, RioGrande, and Lower Colorado (see fig. 1-5). See “Water” (vol. 1, ch. 5) for more information; Appendix 5.1 listsState-by-State problems.

(Continued on next page)


Box l-B-How Climate Change May Affect Various Systems--(Continued)

Human health-Climate change could affect human health, but there is a great deal of uncertainty aboutwhether mortality and morbidity would actually increase and about the potential for adaptive measures (such asthe use of air conditioning) to offset any negative impacts. Several studies have concluded that the potential rangeof infectious diseases could shift with climate change, but the exact nature of these shifts is uncertain (94). Evenif the range of disease-carrying vectors, such as mosquitoes, changes, enhanced pest-control measures couldnullify the increased threat of disease. Effects of climate change in other countries could displace somepopulations. If “environmental refugees” lead to an increase in immigration, there is the potential for increasedimportation of communicable diseases into the United States (184). Other studies have shown that climate changecould lead to increased cases of heat-stress mortality (74). Uncertainties about changes in human physiologicaland behavioral response make it difficult to draw conclusions about the risks of climate change to humanhealth.

Energy-Higher temperatures will no doubt increase energy demand for cooling and decrease energydemand for heating. This would result in an increase in the demand for electricity (primarily for air conditioning)and for electric-generating capacity (93). This new demand would not be completely offset by reductions in theuse of oil and gas for heating (98). The largest capital costs would be associated with increased power plantconstruction, which could cost as much as $170 to $320 billion, about 12 percent more than the increases incapacity needed to meet population and economic growth through the middle of the next century (93). As with sealevel rise, adapting to increased energy demand could involve significant costs.

Transportation-Some forms of transportation could be positively or negatively affected by climate change.inland shipping may be the most sensitive to climate change. On the one hand, warmer winters would likely resultin less ice cover and a longer shipping season. For example, ice cover on the Great Lakes could be reduced by5 to 13 weeks (4), lowering shipping and related costs (78). On the other hand, lower river flow and lake levelscould increase shipping costs by reducing shipping tonnage capacity or blocking shipping (143). Some roads nearthe coast may have to be moved or protected from sea level rise. In many instances, adaptation is highly probablein transportation at some cost to the economy (see vol. 1, box 5-E, “Navigating the Mississippi through Wet andDry Times”).

adapt to changes in climate, either through ■ Uncertainties About Society’sphysiological adjustment or through migration, is Ability to Adaptuncertain. Historically, trees can disperse andmigrate about 60 miles (100 kilometers)5 percentury, but the projected rates of temperaturechange would require migration rates 5 to 10times faster for forests to remain in suitablehabitats (35, 36). The success with which naturalvegetation can migrate will depend on seeddispersal, physical barriers to migration (e.g.,mountains and developed land), competitionbetween species, and the availability of fertilesoils in areas of suitable climate.

Finally, how society will respond to whateverclimate change occurs and the resulting impactsare uncertain. Coping with climate change cantake the form of technical, institutional, regula-tory, behavioral, and economic adjustments.Future technologies and levels of income areunknown, although they will most likely improveand increase and will aid in adaptation (5). Willpopulation growth or environmental consensuslimit or expand adaptation options? Will people

5 To convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.


Box 1-B-How Climate Change May Affect Various Systems--(Continued)The table below summarizes potential climate change impacts for these various systems.

Potential Climate Change Impacts for Various Systems

Systems Potential impacts

Forests/terrestrial vegetation Migration of vegetation.Reduction in inhabited range.Altered ecosystem composition.

Species diversity Loss of diversity.Migration of species.Invasion of new species.

Coastal wetlands Inundation of wetlands.Migration of wetlands.

Aquatic ecosystems Loss of habitat.Migration to new habitats,Invasion of new species.

Coastal resources Inundation of coastal development.Increased risk of flooding.

Water resources Changes in supplies.Changes in drought and floods.Changes in water quality and hydropower production.

Agriculture Changes in crop yields.Shifts in relative productivity and production,

Human health Shifts in range of infectious diseases.Changes in heat-stress and cold-weather afflictions,

Energy Increase in cooling demand.Decrease in heating demand.Changes in hydropower output.

Transportation Fewer disruptions of winter transportation.Increased risk for summer inland navigation.Risks to coastal roads.

SOURCE: J.B. Smith and J. Mueller-Vollmer, “Setting Priorities for Adapting to ClimateChange,” contractor paper prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, March1992.

react quickly and efficiently to trends deemed CHOOSING ADAPTATION STRATEGIESoutside the range of normal, or will they assumethat conditions will return to-historic no&? Will How should” decisionmakers incorporate the

people overreact to periodic climate extremes uncertainties posed by a changing climate into

that do not actually signal a substantial change in long-term plans for resource systems? What can

the underlying climate? Responses to recent be done to minimize vulnerability to climate

extreme events, such as the Mississippi River change? Uncertainty makes acting now difficult,flooding in the summer of 1993, may provide an but it also makes preparing for a wide range andinteresting lesson. intensity of climate impacts essential.

16 Preparing for an Uncertain Climate --Volume 1

The Grand Teton National Park, along with othernational parks and preserves, provides habitat forcountless species of birds and wildlife. The parks andpreserves also offer extensive recreational oppor-tunities such as hiking, camping, nature study, andphotography. These are examples of services at riskfrom climate change.

Possible responses to the threat of climatechange depend on what one wants to save. Do wetry to maintain systems in their current form (e.g.,the extent of forests and the varieties of crops), ordo we maintain the services they provide (e.g.,enough food for the population, scenic views,beach recreation facilities)? Do we wish tominimize the economic costs of facing a changingclimate? Do we attempt to forestall only cata-strophic events? However these interests arebalanced, two general primary characteristics ofadaptation policies stand out: flexibility androbustness. By helping to ensure quick andeffective response to changing circumstances(flexibility) and by being prepared for the worst(robustness), the potential costs of an uncertainfuture climate can be reduced.

Just how much effort should be expended toavoid future risks will ultimately depend on theperceived costs of the effort compared with thelikelihood and scale of future damages that will beavoided. In some cases, the same strategies thathelp protect against climate risks might alsoprovide some immediate and certain benefits:enhanced services from natural systems, im-

proved productivity in managed systems, bettermeans for dealing with existing climate variabil-ity and weather extremes, or reduced environ-mental damages from managed systems. Thecosts of these low-regrets strategies or activitiesmay be relatively easy to defend. Other activities,however, would be most useful only in the eventof severe climate change. The costs of suchactivities may be considered in the same light inwhich we consider the purchase of insurance--it may be better to pay a relatively small pre-mium now than to be uninsured against the threatof severe and more costly ecological and eco-nomic damage.

Enhancing FlexibilityAny policies that improve the chances of

adapting more smoothly and painlessly provide abuffer against the negative impacts of climatechange. Flexible systems and policies are thosethat allow self-adjustments or midcourse correc-tions as needed without major economic or socialdisruption. For example, flexible systems can befine-tuned to cope with hot and dry weather aswell as more-intense rainstorms. The systemshould work now, under current climate condi-tions. Flexibility would not preclude potentiallydesirable actions or lock policy makers intoexpensive, irreversible decisions. For example, insome cases, building a dam is a less flexiblepolicy than is water conservation. If new informa-tion becomes available that suggests that the damis not needed in that location or is the wrong size,fine-tuning is difficult. Efforts to conserve watercan (within limits) be used to supply quantities ofwater without building new, expensive infrastruc-ture with 50- to 100-year lifetimes; the policy isalso reversible in times when water is plentiful(see vol. 1, boxes 5-G, 5-H, 5-I, and 5-J).

Advancing the knowledge base will enhanceflexibility. In agriculture, the development of newcrops suited to a wide variety of climates,improved understanding of the performance o fcrops under a changing climate, and continuing

Chapter 1--Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 17

education and extension programs to providebetter-informed decisionmakin“ g by farmers willall help smooth the path of adaptation (see vol. 1,ch. 6). In general, research that clarifies howsystems respond to climate change will helpidentify and expand the range of possible adap-tive actions and will speed their successfulimplementation.

Removing legislative or administrative con-straints that now limit our ability to change wouldalso promote flexibility. For example, the compli-cated programs of price supports in agriculturenow penalize farmers who choose to changeplanting or management practices significantly.Given the importance of agriculture in the UnitedStates, large economic costs could be associatedwith even brief delays in agricultural adjustmentto a changing climate. Other subsidies, such asthose for irrigation and those implicit in thesupport for infrastructure in coastal zones, add toour inflexibility by encouraging the developmentof built systems in areas that maybe increasinglyat risk to natural disasters. Resolving conflictsover the use of natural resources, through thecreation of organizational structures or marketincentives, should also help with our ability toimplement change.

I Enhancing RobustnessPolicies can also minimize the risk of adverse

effects from climate change by making systemsless sensitive to climate. Robust systems are thosethat can tolerate a wide range of climate condi-tions and are, therefore, less vulnerable to climatechange extremes. Actions that increase robust-ness in a system are those that help protect againstthe threat of large-scale losses or climate sur-prises. The robustness of a system can be in-creased in several ways. One is to take actions thatmake the system itself inherently more tolerant ofa variety of climate conditions. For example,developing and planting crops that perform rea-sonably well under a wide range of climates maybe wise no matter how the climate changes.

Adding capacity to dams or other structures canmake them more ‘‘robust, ’ that is, able toaccommodate greater variability in precipitation.Another way to increase robustness is to put avariety of mechanisms in place to protect againstpossible losses, hoping that some mechanismswill succeed even if others fail. For example, amix of management strategies for forests andnatural areas could be used to protect againstclimate change.

Improving the robustness of a system will oftenrequire an insurance strategy something mustbe initiated now in order to avoid extremely highcosts under a much warmer climate. The idea isthat paying a small amount now will reduce therisks of a major loss in the future. For example,establishing gene banks or learning how toundertake ecosystem restoration may be an “in-vestment’ that would reduce the risks of cata-strophic forest or ecosystem loss in the future.

Efforts that enhance the general health, produc-tivity, or quality of a system can also enhancerobustness by making the system more resilient,or able to tolerate some climate-related stresses.Actions promoting robustness include improvingthe quality and protection of wetlands, minimiz-ing existing threats to natural areas, and establish-ing new preserves (see vol. 2, chs. 4 and 5).Plannin g and management measures that averttrends that make adaptation more difficult in thefuture are also robust strategies.

It is not immediately obvious that naturalsystems, such as forests or wetlands, are lessrobust (more vulnerable) in the short term than aremanaged systems such as agriculture and water-supply systems. Natural systems do have someinherent buffering to protect themselves againstexisting climate variability. However, what mayput natural systems at greater risk than systemsthat are actively managed is continued stress fromclimate change over a long time period. Once anatural system declines, it may take many years torecover. Of particular concern is the possibilitythat losses to natural systems may be irreversi-ble, such as the loss of species. In managed


systems, it is much more likely that there wouldbe intervention to reduce the losses because theeconomic value at stake is often very high.

I Applying the CriteriaFederal agencies are currently making many

decisions about the management of natural re-sources that could be significantly affected byclimate change. What the Federal Governmentdecides now about the management of watersupplies, forests, wetlands, fish, wildlife, andother issues could limit or foreclose the ability ofthese resources and their managers to adapt to thefuture effects of climate change, or could helpmake us better prepared to deal with an uncertainclimate future.

Given the broad criteria of flexibility androbustness, we identified a large class of policyoptions that could remove inefficiencies, addressexisting problems, and help insure against theuncertainties posed by climate change to resourcesystems. Many studies term such options noregrets or low regrets because they make sense topursue now, even assuming no climate change.The question that arises is: Why are actions thatare supposed to be prudent, anyway, even withoutthe added impetus of climate change, beingpursued in such a limited way (5)? Actions thatappear reasonable for protecting resources cannotbe considered in a vacuum. In reality, there arebarriers of many sorts-in information, institu-tions, and process-even to options that appear tobe low regrets. OTA’S policy analysis focused onthese barriers and tried to identify ways toovercome them.

Another large class of policy options calls forus to be prepared for the worst. Whether theseoptions will still be seen as no-regrets onceclimate does change may depend on the rapidityand magnitude of that climate change, and thefuture response of decisionmakers. If, in the faceof significant climate change, the no-regretsoptions prove inadequate, there could indeed beregrets that substantially more aggressive meas-

ures were not taken earlier. OTA has also lookedat some of the more aggressive measures thatwould be appropriate if the likelihood of climatechange is considered high.

The policy options presented in this report toenhance the flexibility and robustness of thevarious resource systems represent a gradationfrom ‘‘learn more about the natural resourcesystem” to “improve the technology or know-how required for adaptation” to “relax theinstitutional constraints that tend to inhibit theability or incentive to respond. ” This gradationdepends on whether the ability to respond toclimate change is limited by information, byavailable technologies, or by the institutions thatgovern the system.

Coastal systems and water resources (dis-cussed in vol. 1, chs. 4 and 5, respectively) facemany institutional factors that may limit adapta-tion. Theoretically, there is enough water tosupply needs throughout the United States, evenunder climate change. We know how to movewater from one place to another and havetechnologies to save water or even to make freshwater from salt water. However, the complexsystem of water rights, lack of incentives toconserve water, and limits on the transferabilityof water result in daunting institutional con-straints and inflexibility. In coastal systems, theinfrastructure of roads and bridges and subsidizedflood insurance encourage a degree of develop-ment in high-risk zones that maybe economicallyunwise even under current climate conditions andsea levels.

In agriculture, market incentives and annualplanting cycles make the system quite responsive,or flexible, to change. As long as there arecontinued efforts in research, technology, andinnovation that expand the base on which adapta-tion can proceed, coping with climate changeshould be relatively easy for agriculture-barringcatastrophic changes (vol. 1, ch. 6). Yet, whetheradaptation is optimal may depend greatly on ourability to remove certain institutional incentivesthat may encourage uneconomic farming of areas


where climatic risks are high. In this regard, farmsubsidies and disaster-assistance programs needreview and, likely, adjustment.

For less-managed systems, our ability to facili-tate natural adaptation is limited by inadequateinformation or understanding of natural processesand by the narrow range of available and suitabletechnologies for adaptation. In wetlands (vol. 2,ch. 4), sea level rise and changes in the timing andamount of precipitation will exacerbate ongoinghabitat loss. Efforts to reduce current loss willmake the system more robust and improvechances for adaptation to climate change. Actionsto minimize the possibility of irreversible damageshould receive high priority. For forests andnatural preserves (vol. 2, chs. 5 and 6), climatechange may make the continued existence ofunique assemblages of plants and animals ques-tionable. Natural areas have become the reposi-tory of biodiversity in the United States. Yet littleis known about maintaining, changing, restoring,or transplanting natural ecosystems. There is nosystematic effort to document what is currentlypreserved and how that can be augmented orprotected under climate change. Enhancing theseareas through strategic acquisitions of land orland easements and through innovative coordina-tion of management with adjacent landownersoffers great promise as an approach for maximiz-ing protection of biodiversity. Filling in gaps inour knowledge through research would allow usto better manage and protect these areas and toreduce the risk of decline under climate change.

OVERARCHING POLICY THEMESAs we developed and evaluated policy options,

using the criteria described above, for the sixdifferent resource sectors examined in this report,many sector-specific policy options appeared tocoalesce into several broad themes, or problems.Four particular themes were found to be shared byseveral or all of the sectors:

■ geographic and institutional fragmentation,w inadequate communication of climate risk,

■

9the need for contingency planning, andan ongoing Federal research effort-theU.S. Global Change Research Progrogram--that will not fill many key research andinformation gaps.

Each chapter addresses these themes within thecontext of the appropriate resource sector, but thecommon threads are highlighted here. Below, wedescribe the overarching themes more fully andillustrate some possible directions Congress couldtake to begin addressing these broader policychallenges. Box 1-C examines some specificoptions from the resource chapters, and relatesthem to these common themes.

H

isa

FragmentationA key problem in natural resource managementthat the most sensible management units fromresource perspective—watersheds or eco-

systems-rarely correspond to the boundarieswithin which resources are actually managed.Furthermore, resources are usually owned andmanaged for multiple purposes. Many differentgovernment agencies and private owners mayhave some responsibility for the management ofa given resource, with differing incentives moti-vating its management and use. As a result,resources may be fragmented geographically andjurisdictionally.

One aspect of fragmentation is the geographi-cal division of landscapes and ecosystems thatresults from uncoordinated development and theencroachment of human activity. Such activityhas left few ecosystems intact in the lower 48States (the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem isoften cited as the most important remainingexample). Inmost parts of the country, remainingnatural areas have become “islands’ of habitat,surrounded by developed or altered landscapesand vulnerable to a variety of human stresses (seevol. 2, box 5-E). This fragmentation of formerlarge ecosystems has led to greater stress on thenatural resources within the remaining fragments.Many natural areas, including the federally pro-


Box l-C-Solutions from General to Specific: Addressing the Overarching Problems

During the course of developing policy options for coping with climate change, OTA heard repeatedly frommany experts that climate change alone is not necessarily the most worrisome threat to natural resources. Rather,climate change is likely to exacerbate various trends and problems that already plague natural resourcemanagement. Current management policies and practices for coasts, water resources, agriculture, wetlands,natural areas, and forests are perceived in many quarters as being inadequate in ways that not only hindermanagement today, but could impose greater constraints under a changing climate. Four particular problems werefound to be common to several or all of the sectors: 1) institutional and geographical fragmentation;2) Inadequate communication of information that would improve response to climatic risks; 3) lack ofcontingency planning and other measures to prepare for extreme events or weather surprises; and4) information gaps in various key scientific and policy areas.

Addressing these overarching problems will pose numerous challenges for Congress and Federal agencies.All four problems have been recognized to varying degrees in the past, but progress toward solving them has beenslow. Attempting to solve any of them could require far-reaching policy changes, but small piecemeal actions couldbe undertaken for individual resource sectors by many different government agencies or by congressionalappropriations, legislation, and oversight committees. Big, bold policy changes could accomplish the job moreuniformly or effectively, but reaching agreement on solutions and then garnering sufficient support to implementthem could prove impossible. Incremental changes do not require such widespread support and may accomplishspecific goals, but such policies can also detract from needed larger changes by leaving the impression that nofurther action is necessary.

In the resource and research chapters of this report (vols. 1 and 2, chs. 3 through 6), we suggest numerouspolicy options that address parts of the four overarching problems in ways that are specific to each resource sector.In many cases these resource-specific options could be formulated in broader terms to attempt across-the-boardsolutions to the overarching problems identified above. Furthermore, many of the sector-specific options areinterconnected, and could be more effective if enacted in a coordinated way. In some cases, any of severaldifferent resource-specific policy options could forma first step toward solving an overarching problem. A few ofthese options are described below.

Fragmentation

Options to help reduce institutional fragmentation include:Promoting the reestablishment and strengthening of Federal-State river basin commissions to improvecoordination among agencies. (Vol. 1, option 5-11—’’Water.”)Promoting integrated resource management at the watershed level, (Vol. 2, option 4-22-’’Wetlands.”)Creating a Federal coordinating council for ecosystem management. (Vol. 2, option 5-12–’’Preserves.”)Amending the Science Policy Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282) to strengthen the ability of the Office of Science andTechnology Policy (OSTP) and the Federal Coordinating Council on Science, Engineering, and Technology(FCCSET) to coordinate research and ecosystem management across agencies. (Vols. 1 and 2, option3-1-’’Research.”)

Although these options seem varied, all four address, in some way, the problem of institutional fragmentation andthe need for greater coordination and integrated management. If enacted individually, these policies could focuson specific problems in the management of water resources, wetlands, and preserves. However, any of the fourcould also serve as part of a larger effort to coordinate the management of all three resources. Reinstated riverbasin commissions could form a local base for watershed management that could be broadened to includeattention to wetlands and other natural areas within the watershed. Similarly, a Federal coordinating council forecosystem management could use watershed units as one level of coordination and examine the interac-


tion of water resources with other natural resources in that unit. The problem in trying to expand any of theseindividual options to cover the overarching concerns would be in how best to assign authority and enforcementcapabilities for any coordinating agency without interfering with the jurisdiction of the agencies to be coordinated.

Options to help reduce geographic fragmentation include:Identifying and assigning priorities to the wetlands that are most important to protect and restore. (vol. 2, Option4-19-- "Wetlands.”)Directing agencies to modify their criteria for land acquisition to include underrepresented ecosystems andlong-term survivability. (Vol. 2, option 5-9-’’ Preserve”)”)Using current conservation incentive programs administered by the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior toenhance the Federal effort to protect natural areas. (Vol. 2, option 5-16-’’ Preserve”)”)Protecting highly valued forest sites. (Vol. 2, option 6-4-’’Forests.”)Providing incentives to reduce fragmentation of private forestland. (Vol. 2, option 6-5-’’Forests.”)

Several of the policy options for wetlands, preserves, and forests either explicitly address the problem ofgeographic fragmentation or could be used to do so. The options listed above would promote priority setting forland acquisition or restoration of valuable natural areas, including wetlands, forests, and other typesof preserves.Reducing landscape fragmentation could be viewed as a high-priority goal. Furthermore, existing conservationincentive programs of various types could be required to focus on the lands most valuable for preventing orameliorating fragmentation.

Communication of climate risk

Options to communicate risk through modifying subsidies include:■ Raising premium rates for the National flood Insurance Program (NFIP) policyholders who receive subsidized

flood insurance. (Vol. 1, option 4-1-’’Coasts.”)■ Reducing the Federal share of public disaster assistance. (Vol. 1, option 4-7-’’ Coast”)”)■ Reforming pricing in Federal water projects. (Vol. 1, option 5-5--"Water.”)■ Defining disasters formally, with assistance provided only for unusual losses. (Vol. 1, option 6-3--’’Agriculture.”)■ Improving participation in the crop-insurance program. (Vol. 1, option 6-5--’’Agriculture.”)■ Eliminating incentives to destroy wetlands. (Vol. 2, option 4-8-"Wetlands.”)■ Reducing Federal subsidies, such as Coastal Zone Management funds and flood insurance, in areas that have

not established setback or “planned retreat” policies. (Vol. 2, option 4-16-’ ’Wetland”)”)

One of the major ways the Federal Government affects the responsiveness to climate risk is in the distribution ofpublic money for disaster assistance and insurance subsidies. Subsidized and regulated prices distort theperception of changing risks and could slow the response to growing water scarcity and to increases in thefrequency of droughts, floods, and storms. The options listed above suggest that policies to reduce or eliminatesuch subsidies could be beneficial in encouraging greater precautions and faster responses to changing climaterisk in nearly every individual resource sector-as well as in reducing Federal spending in an era of constrainedbudgets. If enacted together, these options could go a long way toward addressing the overarching problem ofmisperception of risk.

Options to communicate risk through tax signals include:■ Eliminating or reducing tax benefits for coastal development (such as the casualty-loss deduction). (Vol. 1,

option 4-16--"Coasts.”)■ Reforming tax provisions to promote conservation investments. (Vol. 1, option 5-4--"Water.”)■ Using current conservation incentive programs administered by the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to

enhance the Federal effort to protect natural areas. (Vol. 2, option 5-9--’’ Preserves.”)



Box l-C-Solutions from General to Specific:Addressing the Overarching Problems--(Continued)

The U.S. Tax Code can provide both incentives and disincentives for financial risks. Tax incentives can be usedto encourage behavior that might reduce risks to humans and the environment, including investments in waterconservation and in protecting natural areas. Tax disincentives could be used to help prevent unproductivebehavior, such as coastal development in high-risk zones or where development leads to the destruction ofwetlands or creates barriers against their movement inland as the sea level rises.

Other options to communicate risk include:Improving the research and extension process (develop a database on successful practices; expand farmerinvolvement; provide support for on-farm experimentation). (Vol. 1, option 6-11—’’Agriculture.”)Incorporating climate change scenarios into forest plans and assessments. (Vol. 2, option 6-11—’’Forests.”)Eliminating the even-flow-harvest requirement of the National Forest Management Act (P.L. 94-566), whichfalsely implies that future timber supplies will be stable). (Vol. 2, option 6-12–’’Forests.”)Incorporating sea level rise into National Flood insurance Program mapping. (Vol. 2, option 4-5--’’Coasts.”)

The Government is the source of considerable information that can serve to improve private sector response toa changing climate. Outreach and extension services will be valuable in communicating changes in theeffectiveness of farm management techniques and crop choices, speeding t he process of adaptation. Inventories,monitoring, climate data, and resource-status assessments will indicate trends in natural resource conditions andsignal changes in the future supply of products and service from natural resource systems. Better understandingof these trends will help businesses and individuals to anticipate and adjust more effectively to changing futureconditions. Inappropriate signals about climate risk that create an unrealistic expectation of stable conditions mayencourage unwise financial investments in resource-dependent communities that are at risk of decline. The publicgenerally is not well-informed about the risks associated with living in coastal areas, and this lack of awarenesshas led and will continue to lead to large public and private expenditures. Educating people now about the riskof a rising sea level could greatly reduce future damages.

Contingency planning

Options to formalize contingency planning include:

■ Creating an interagency drought task force to develop a national drought policy and plan. (Vol. 1, option5-l&’ ’Water.”)

■ Creating a national flood-assessment board. (Vol. 1, option 5-17--’’Water.”)■ Establishing criteria for intervention in order to protect or restore forest health through a forest health bill. (Vol.

2, option 6-7—’’Forests.”)

Droughts, forest fires, floods, and hurricanes have all become the focus of public attention in recent years afterevents such as the nationwide drought in 1968, the 5-year California drought of 1968-1992, the Mississippi floodsin the summer of 1993, and Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew in 1968 and 1992. In many cases, contingency plansset up to deal with such disasters were either inadequate or nonexistent. Policy options for water resources andforests suggest different types of contingency planning that may help address future disasters as the climatechanges. Because the presence of forests and wetlands moderates how water moves through the landscape, bothshould be considered in flood planning and development.

Options that add a measure of “insurance” against catastrophic events include:■ Increasing support for the development of new commercial crops. (Vol. 1, option 6-14--"Agriculture.”)❑ Conducting research on natural resources to prepare for climate change (restoration ecology, preservation of

biodiversity, effective preserve design). (Vol. 2, option 5-2—’’Preserves.”)■ Directing agencies to modify their criteria for land acquisition to include underrepresented ecosystems and

long-term survivability. (Vol. 2, option 5-9—’’Preserve”)”)

Chapter 1-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options 23

■ Enhancing forest seed banks and genetics research programs. (Vol. 2, option 6-1—’’Forests.”)

Preparing for extreme future climate conditions through the development of technologies or institutions will assistin recovery and can help reduce the threat of future damage. The development of crops well-suited to harsherfuture climate may provide some insurance against a steep decline in our agricultural sector. Contingencypreparations for forests and preserves must consider the potential need for active restoration or protection if naturalprocesses become excessively disturbed. Seed banks may provide the material to rebuild a forest in the eventof severe decline and loss of species or populations from their natural range.

Information gaps

Options to help decrease these gaps include:■ Supporting long-term research and monitoring on the impacts of climate change on wetlands. (Vol. 2, option

4-24--’’Wetlands.”)■ Increasing funding for ecological research in the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP). (Vol. 2,

option 5-1--’’Preserves.”)■ Supporting coordinated research in federally protected natural areas. (Vol. 2, option 5-4--’’Preserves.”)■ Creating a national program for inventorying and monitoring. (Vol. 2, option 5-5-’’ Preserve”)”)■ Using the Experimental Forests for research on adaptation to climate change. (Vol. 2, option 6-2—’’Forests.”)● Using existing monitoring and inventorying efforts to identify causes and effects of forest decline. (Vol. 2,option

6-6--’’Forests.”)■ Creating an Integrated Assessment program within or outside USGCRP positioned above the agency level,

(Vols. 1 and 2, option 3-8-’’Research.”)■ Creating an adaptation and mitigation research program either within USGCRP or separate but parallel to it.

(Vols. 1 and 2, option 3-+’’ Research.”)

Many policy options suggest particular research questions or promote the use of specific existing programs toaddress some of the information gaps regarding climate change. Coordinating these different research effortsand ensuring that each considers some of the related concerns of others might yield synergistic results. Forexample, while the Experimental Forests should be useful sites for examining how forests may adapt to climatechange, research could be focused more broadly to consider issues that affect natural areas (including questionsof how to maintain biodiversity and how to restore damaged ecosystems) and forested wetlands.

While these research programs in individual areas are forming useful building blocks toward solving theoverarching problem of Iack of knowledge, a broader program of coordinated research across-the-board could alsobe attempted. Some of the research listed could be coordinated under the Ecological Systems and Processespriority group in the USGCRP. However, the USGCRP goals and purview need to be broadened to include

ecosystem research, adaptation and mitigation research, and an iterative integrated assessment in order to bemore useful to policy-making.

tected natural areas, may not be large enough to sheds, for example, for dozens of Federal, State,withstand future stresses such as climate change.Managing smaller areas as individual parcels inan uncoordinated manner and without largerneeds in mind has become part of the problem.

A second aspect of fragmentation is the ineffi-ciency that results from a lack of coordination inmanagement across government agencies. It isnot uncommon in even relatively small water-

and local agencies to share jurisdiction overwaterand other natural resources. For instance, theDelaware River Basin is divided among fourStates (fig. 1-3). Responsibility for water re-sources alone in this basin is divided among atleast 10 agencies in each of the four States andamong more than 20 Federal agencies. In mostbasins, responsibility for groundwater manage-

24 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--VoIume 1

u Figure 1-3-The Delaware River Basin

Albany

CONNECTICUT

MARYLAND

on, DC

DELAWARE

NOTE: As is typical of many watersheds, the boundaries of the Delaware River Basin do not coincide with legislated boundaries. The multiplejurisdictions make management more difficult.

SOURCE: W.E. Harkness, H.F. Uris, and W.M. Alley, “Drought in the Delaware River Basin, 1984-85,” in: National Water Summary1985-Hydrological Events and Surface Water Resources, U.S. Geological Survey Water Supply Paper 2300 (Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Off be, 1986).


ment is separate from that for surface-watermanagement (see also vol. 1, box 5-D). Waterquality and water quantity are usually treatedseparately. And jurisdiction over navigation,recreation, flood control, and wetlands may alsobe split, although all these aspects of waterresource management are related and may affectone another. Problems are encountered in manag-ing a single reservoir as if its operation does notaffect how others within a basin are operated, orin managing to control floods without consider-ing the role of wetlands. The result of thisjurisdictional fragmentation is often seen inconflicting efforts, high management costs, andforegone opportunities to provide better overallservice. These inefficiencies may be of increasingconcern if climate changes threaten the supplyand services of natural resources. Box 1-Ddescribes the complexities of trying to manage agrowing urban center, agricultural areas, andthe Everglades of South Florida (see also vol. 1,box 5-B).

More effective management for coping withcurrent and potential future stresses on naturalresources and built systems is possible andneeded. Today’s agency-by-agency, owner-by-owner, and system-by-system managementapproach leaves much to be desired. Manyimprovements can be made by going beyond ourcustomary fragmented style of management toconsider more comprehensively the services ofwatersheds, ecosystems, and landscapes (see vol.2, box 5-F). Within most sectors or systemsexamined in this report, we have identifiedoptions that can begin moving toward moreintegrated management and reduced geographicalfragmentation: breaking down institutional barri-ers among agencies, acquiring and consolidatingnatural areas, and providing private owners withincentives to maintain the environmental servicesof a landscape. Regional priorities could be usedto direct activities in regulatory, acquisition, andincentive programs. We also consider some morefundamental changes, such as creating major newprograms and reorganizing agency responsibili-

ties, which can be pursued if the political willexists. However, neither breaking down institu-tional barriers nor altering private incentives willbe easy. Watershed management, for example,has been discussed for many years, but estab-lished styles of management have changed littleto date. Nevertheless, watershed managementseems to be a concept whose time has come: theEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA), backedby the current Administration, has strongly advo-cated the approach, and watershed management isbeing considered in current legislation to reau-thorize the Clean Water Act (P.L. 92-500) (seevol. 1, box 5-c).

More integrated planning and managementalong watershed and ecosystem lines is likely tobe one of the best ways for the Nation to promotethe flexibility, robustness, and efficiency that isdesirable in coping with the uncertain impacts ofclimate change.

Communication of Climate RiskIf climate changes as predicted, resource man-

agers and individuals will find it necessary toadjust to new circumstances. Certain parts of thecountry are likely to become much less desirable

Hurricanes and other tropical storms cause millions ofdollars’ worth of damage each year as homes, boats,and businesses are destroyed by high winds and water.Some Federal programs and regulations encourageredevelopment in high-risk areas without requiringappropriate safety measures.

26 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

places to live and work. Even where climatechanges are less harsh, current managementpractices and lifestyles may not continue to beappropriate. The speed with which resourcemanagers and individuals can recognize andrespond effectively to new climate conditionswill largely determine the economic and socialcosts of climate change. Adaptation to change islikely to be delayed by the inherent difficulties inrecognizing climate change against the back-ground of normal climate variability. Respon-siveness to changing climate risks maybe furtherimpeded by existing Federal programs designedto protect individuals from the financial risks ofclimatic extremes. It maybe enhanced by provid-ing information about the nature of climatechange risks, the changing resource situation, andthe likely success of particular adjustments inresource-management techniques. Effective com-munication of the nature of climate-related riskscan be promoted through formal educationalefforts or through appropriate incentives.

The Government could better communicateclimate risk by reducing the various publicsubsidies for developments in areas of high risk.The public has come to depend heavily ongovernment disaster assistance and subsidizedinsurance programs, which helps reduce exposureto the financial risks from climate extremes. Suchprograms have been valuable in allowing theproductive use of resources in areas of highlyvariable climate. Problems may arise, however, ifthe financial buffer provided by these Federalprograms unintentionally encourages people tomove into environments where they may beexposed to greater risk in the future, or reducesincentives to take adequate precautions againstclimate risk. Because development decisions arenot easily reversible, and the consequences ofdecisions taken now are, in some cases, likely tobe with us for many decades, it seems prudent tobegin reexaminingg policies that may encouragedevelopment in climate-sensitive areas. Privatecitizens should recognize the true costs of extend-ing farms into economically marginal areas,

building structures in areas of high forest-fire risk,or locating buildings in coastal erosion zones.

We assessed two systems in which a reexami-nation of current risk protection policies may beespecially important in the face of climatechange: coastal areas and agriculture (see vol. 1,chs. 4 and 6). Flooding and erosion are ofparticular concern in coastal areas, and thesehazards could increase in a warmer climate. Wediscuss options in the coastal and agriculturechapters that could help owners respond moreeffectively to climate change and that woulddecrease potential future exposure to climate risk.For example, the National Flood Insurance Pro-gram has been only partially successful in reduc-ing the need for taxpayer-funded disaster assist-ance and in encouraging local mitigation efforts.In agriculture, Federal Crop Insurance, variousdisaster-assistance programs, and irrigation sub-sidies all tend to distort the manner in whichfarmers respond to climate risks. (See box 1-Eonwater allocation in the Sacramento-San JoaquinRiver System and box 1-F on agriculture in theprairie-pothole region.) Improvements can andshould be made in these program to ensure that inthe future, individuals, communities, and theFederal Government are not exposed to exces-sive costs.

Equally important may be quickly communi-cating the detection of any change in key climatevariables and other information that will assist inthe responses to changing climates. Farmers andforesters, for example, may be reluctant to alterpractices until they are convinced climate hasactually changed. The potential role of the Exten-sion Services in tracking the changing success offarming and forestry practices and spreading thisinformation to managers may prove important inreducing the costs of adaptation.

I Contingency PlanningThe goal of contingency plarnning is to mini-

mize losses from natural disasters or accidents bypreparing in advance to take appropriate actions.


Contingency plarming is important where thethreat of significant losses is high in the absenceof preparation and prompt response--as is thecase with floods, forest fires, droughts, andhurricanes (see vol. 1, chs. 4 and 5 and box 4-C;vol. 2, box 5-I). Climate change could affect theintensity or number of extreme climate events,making preparedness perhaps even more impor-tant than it is now. However, adequate contin-gency plans do not exist for all parts of the countrythat are vulnerable to extreme events. For exam-ple, only 23 States have drought-managementplans (197). The States that do have them,however, have generally adapted better todroughts than those without plans (197). Weidentified options that could help mitigate dam-ages, including the ecological harm caused bynatural disasters. Improvements in contingencyplanning would be helpful both to minimizenear-term damages and to prepare for potentiallygreater damages caused by climate change.

States have a key role in planning for mostextreme events and must continue to do so. Statesshould be encouraged to develop contingencyplans or to refine them with climate change inmind. The Federal Government also has a role inplanning for natural disasters, with many agen-cies involved in some way in this activity (seecartoon on page 34). However, the FederalGovernment could do better at defining therespective roles of the agencies that have respon-sibilities for extreme events. It could also promotestronger coordination among Federal agenciesand among the various levels of government inestablishing requirements for assistance and inproviding such assistance in a more timely,consistent, and equitable manner.

Contingency planning is also important whenemergency measures are likely to be controver-sial; it allows potential responses to be consideredin advance when there can be rational debate.

Such controversies are very likely to be associ-ated with any efforts to restore the health ofnatural ecosystems that have been severelyharmed by climate-related stresses. This is well-illustrated by difficulties now faced in respondingto “massively destructive forest health prob-lems” in the Blue Mountain forests of EasternOregon (176; see vol. 2, ch. 6 and box 6-E).Although there is general agreement that majorchanges in management are needed in thoseforests, the response has been slow, and agree-ment about how to proceed has been hard toachieve. Procedures for responding to ecosystemhealth emergencies should be established.

9 Research and Information GapsThe individual resource chapters outline the

important research gaps that need to be addressedfor coasts, water resources, agriculture, wetlands,preserves, and forests. Overall, we found thatvarious strategies for coping with climate changecan be identified for managed natural-resource-based systems (including the coastal zone, waterresources, and agriculture-see vol. 1, chs. 4-6).Some of these strategies may require continuedsupport for research on new technologies ormanagement practices that will enhance thepotential for adaptation. For natural systems,however (e.g., wetlands, unmanaged forests, andnature preserves-see vol. 2, chs. 4-6), theinformational gaps in our understanding of thesesystems are so large that realistic responsestrategies are difficult or impossible to identifynow (see also vol. 2, box 5-K).

Although an estimated $900 million is spentannually on what can be considered research in“environmental life sciences” (54) or “environ-mental biology,”6 there is currently very littleresearch directed specifically at protecting naturalareas under climate change and helping landmanagers modify management strategies to re-

6 J. GOSZ, Executive Secretary, Subcommittee on Environmental Biology, Committee on Life Scicnccs and Heal@ Fcda COO*-Council for Science, Engineering, snd ‘RxImcdogy, personal wmmunication, Sept. 14, 1993, Only 11 percent of these expenditures overlapswith the Federal Global Change Research Program budget.


Box l-D–Climate Change, South Florida, and the Everglades

Lying dose to sea level and in the preferred path of a sizable percentage of Atlantic hurricanes, South Floridais potentially one of the most vulnerable areas of the United States to climate change. It is also one of the mostdistinctive. South Florida’s famed Everglades, a vast subtropical wetland of which about one-seventh is preservedin Everglades National Park, is seen by many as one of the crown jewels of the U.S. National Park System. Miami,Palm Beach, and other coastal communities in South Florida makeup one of the most popular seaside vacationdestinations in the world. Despite hurricane and flood hazards, these cities have experienced phenomenal growthin recent years. In addition, varieties of crops can be grown in the warm, subtropical climate that grow nowhereelse in the United States. And Miami has become a gateway between North and South America, transformingSouth Florida into an important international crossroads.

Despite, or perhaps because of, its distinctiveness and popularity, South Florida is under stress and, like afew other heavily developed parts of the United States, beginning to bump up against Iimits to growth. The criticalfactor is water. Although the region receives an annual average of 60 inches (152 centimeters) of rain, annualevaporation can sometimes exceed this amount, and rainfall variability y from year to year is quite high, resultingin periodic droughts and floods. In the past century, moreover, South Florida has been transformed from a virtualwilderness into a complex, interconnected system of developed and undeveloped land. The main elements of thissystem-the growing urban sector, agricultural areas, and the Everglades and other remaining naturalareas-must all compete for the limited supply of water, and the competition is increasing with every new resident.

Much of the growth of South Florida has occurred since 1870. Then, fewer than 100 people lived in what arenow Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. Now, about 5.2 million people occupy the same area. The vastunaltered Everglades, which originally extended from Lake Okeechobee to Florida Bay, were seen by early settlersas hostile to human welfare and completely without value. Encouraged by a grant from the U.S. Congress, theState of Florida began draining these “useless” wetlands for agriculture, and by the early 20th century, the naturalcharacter of the Everglades had begun to change. Farmers planted sugar cane and a variety of vegetables in thedrained area south of Lake Okeechobee now known as the Everglades Agricultural Area (EAA).

The initial drainage system worked well enough during normal years but was stressed during occasionalabnormal events and failed completely during a major hurricane in 1928. At that time, 2,000 people died in theEAA when the protective dike around Lake Okeechobee burst. This incident prompted the initiation of a massivepublic works project, as attention shifted from drainage of wetlands to flood control. Eventually, an 85-mile(137-kilometer)1 earthen dike was built around Lake Okeechobee, and the meandering 98-mile Kissimmee River,which fed the lake from the north, was transformed into a canal 48 miles long and 33 feet (10 meters) deep.Flooding problems diminished, but the former broad, riverlike system north of Everglades National Park has beengreatly altered into a series of canals and pools. The former sheet-like flow of water to the park, necessary to itshealth, has been blocked. Today, the area has more than 1,395 miles of canals and levees and 143 water-controlstructures.

Projects to expand the supply of water to growing urban centers proceeded in tandem with flood-controlprojects. To accommodate demands for agricultural and urban expansion, diking and draining of wetlandscontinued, and as the expansion progressed, more water was diverted for these purposes. Today, additional wateris diverted for sewage dilution, pest control, and frost protection. Some water is used to recharge aquifers thatsupply cities east of the Everglades and the populated areas of the Florida Keys. Large quantities of water thatcould be recycled or used to recharge urban aquifers are dumped into the Atlantic Ocean (see vol. 1, ch. 5, andvol. 2, ch. 4, for complete discussions of water and wetland issues).

A major effect of this decades-long restructuring of the natural hydrological system has been to drasticallyreduce the supply of water from the Kissimmee River watershed that reaches the much-diminished-in-size

1 TO convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.

Chapter 1-Synthesis Summary, and Policy Options 29

Everglades. The natural system has suffered in several ways as a result: 1) the abundance of speciescharacteristic of Everglades habitats (e.g., wood storks, white ibis, tri-colored herons, and snowy egrets) hasdeclined dramatically in the past 50 years, 2) more than a dozen native species have been listed as endangeredor threatened (e.g., the Florida panther, snail kite, Cape Sable seaside sparrow, American alligator, and Americancrocodile), 3) nonnative and nuisance species have invaded the area (e.g., Melaleuca quinquinervia and theBrazilian pepper tree), 4) sizable land subsidence and water-level declines have occurred throughout the region,5) water quality has been degraded by agricultural runoff containing excessive nutrients, such as phosphorus,6) saltwater intrusion of coastal aquifers has occurred, 7) vulnerability to fire has increased, and 8) massive algalblooms have appeared in Florida Bay, accompanied by die-offs of shrimp, lobster, sponge beds, and many fish.

The impacts of development have not been limited to natural areas. As water use in the region has grown,susceptibility to periodic droughts has increased. A 1981 drought, for example, Ied to mandatory water restrictionsfor half the counties of South Florida and water rationing in the EAA. Pollution from cities, as well as fromagricultural areas, has added to water-quality problems. Saltwater intrusion threatens aquifers used for urbanwater supplies.

Everglades National Park was created in 1947, the culmination of efforts that began in the 1920s. Thetransition of the Everglades from being perceived as “worthless land” to an important preserve worthy ofdesignation as an International Biosphere Reserve and World Heritage Site took decades, but preservation of thisarea and restoration of other degraded wetlands are now considered high priority by a broad spectrum of peopleand organizations. Although there is broad agreement that the hydrology of the Everglades should be restoredto a pattern similar to that found in the original system, it will not be easy to balance the needs of the Evergladesfor water with the similar needs of other users.

South Florida’s Everglades and coastal areas, dearly already under stress, face an unusually difficult problemin the light of global climate change. Both are already vulnerable to sea level rise and intense tropical storms (seevol. 1, ch. 4). (Damage from Hurricane Andrew, for example, was not confined to urban areas-coastal mangroveforests were heavily damaged, as were trees in many densely forested hammocks.) Climate change couldincrease the current vulnerability to these events. Climate change may also result in a hotter and drier climate forSouth Florida, although predictions from general circulation models (GCMs) are not consistent on this point.Whatever occurs, the future is likely to be increasingly stressful for South Florida. Cities are likely to continue togrow and will almost certainly be protected from sea level rise, but the expense of protecting them could beimmense. The Everglades, once deemed worthless, is now considered a valuable natural resource. As valuableas it is, however, the Everglades will probably not receive the same attention as cities threatened by rising seaswill. Farmers are likely to resist attempts to hinder or reduce long-established patterns of agriculture in favor of otheruses for water. In short, South Florida is a system increasingly “close to the edge.” The flexibility to satisfycompeting interests for water and land has been reduced by actions taken since the turn of the century, and climatechange may further reduce flexibility.

In recent years, some efforts have been made to offset some of the damage to the Everglades and restoresome of the lost flexibility to the natural system. In 1970, for example, Congress directed that not less than 315,000acre-feet (389 million cubic meters) of water be delivered annually to Everglades National Park. In 1989, Congressenacted the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act (P.L. 101-229), one purpose of which wasto enable more natural flow of water through a portion of the park. More recently, the Federal Government suedthe Florida Department of Environmental Regulation for not upholding its own water-quality laws, thereby allowingdegradation of the Everglades to continue. As a result, the State has agreed to design and construct treatmentareas in the EAA where drainage could be filtered before it is discharged to the park. The State has also directedthe South Florida Water Management District to implement an Everglades Surface Water Improvement andManagement Plan. Finally, as authorized in the 1992 Water Resources Development Act (P.L. 101-640), the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers will soon begin a long-term project to restore the Kissimmee River to an approximation



spend to climate change. In 1992, only $8 million or the ecological information that would bewas spent on research focused on adaptation to helpful in providing policy guidance and adapta-climate change.7

tion options for natural systems. Overall,

The U.S. Global Change Research Program USGCRP is more focused on understanding the

(USGCRP) is a $1.4 billion research program. causes for and rates of climate change8 than onHowever, as currently designed, it will not examining the ecological and human impacts ofprovide either the practical technologies that change (see ch. 3 for a more complete explanationmight make us more prepared for climate change of USGCRP). The agencies primarily responsible

7 ‘I&Working Group on Mitigation and Adaptation Rcscam h Strategies (disbanded in 1992) of the Commi ttee onl?arth and EawiromncntalSUencca of FCCSET identified FedcraI research that focuses on m contributes to adaptation to global change (24).

s us- ig des- to produce a ptictivc ~of the Earth systan and focuses on three interrelated streams of activity:documenting global change (observations), enhancing understanding of key processes (process march), and pIdiCtiDg @Obd and rcgiondcnvironumtal change (integrated modelnng and prediction). For FY 1994, a fourth activitys- assessrnenq was added.


Box l-E—Water Allocation and the Sacramento-San Joaquin River System

The complexity and divisiveness of western water problems-and the potential for climate change toexacerbate those probleme--is well-illustrated in the continuing battle over allocation of water in California. TheSacramento-San Joaquin River System, and especially the Delta area where the two rivers come together inNorthern California, is the focal point of this conflict. Before western water development began, about 40 percentof California’s runoff converged into the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta on its way to San Francisco Bay and,eventually, the Pacific Ocean. However, about half of this water is now diverted to Southern California, the SanJoaquin Valley, and parts of the Bay Area the the massive State Water Project (SWP) and central Valley Project(CVP). The water delivered through these huge “plumbing” systems has enabled California’s semiarid CentralValley to become one of the Nation’s prime agricultural areas and has been partly responsible for the phenomenalpopulation growth of Southern California’s mild coastal areas.

Agriculture is now firmly established in the Central Valley, and about 16 million people--over 70 percent ofthe State’s population-now live in Southern California. Water supply is crucial to California: it has been the basisfor most agricultural, industrial, and economic development. However, the transfer of water from Northern toSouthern California has not come without a cost to the river system and the State. Water supply and allocationissues directly conflict with water-quality and ecosystem concerns, and they pit interests of Southern Californiansagainst those of Northern Californians. Three issues are of special concern.

Delta fisheries-The Delta and extended Sacramento-San Joaquin River System provide important habitatfor over 40 species of fish. Coho and chinook salmon, steelhead trout, and striped bass all reside in the river systematone point in their lives and have been especially important to the recreational and commercial fishing industries.Yet these species of fish have declined 50 percent or more since the early 1960s. Fewer than 500 winter runsalmon have returned to spawn each year in the Upper Sacramento in recent years, compared with the 60,000per year that returned 20 years ago. Only 432 steelhead returned in 1966 compared with over 17,000 in 1967 (16).The Delta smelt is dose to extinction. Causes of these dramatic declines include loss of habitat; water pollution;dam, levee, and diversion-facility obstructions; and drought. When conditions are poor in the Delta-whenflows are low and water temperatures and exports are high-losses of young, ocean-bound salmon can bevery high.

Fishermen, as well as fish, have suffered. Fish losses have cost the local economy over $15 million per yearin recent years. In effect, the benefits to people who receive water diverted from the Delta have come partially atthe expense of both fish and fishing interests. in March 1993, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the NationalMarine Fisheries Service invoked the Endangered Species Act (P.L. 100-707) to protect winter run chinook salmonand Delta smelt, setting limits on t he operations of the Central Valley Project and intensifying a dispute betweenState and Federal officials on how best to protect the Delta.

Delta farmland and levees--The Delta, once a natural marshland, was developed for farming around theturn of the century and now contains almost 550,000 acres (223,000 hectares)1 of rich farmland. The marshlandwas converted to a mosaic of over 70 islands by building over 1,100 miles (1 ,600 Kilometers)2 of levees. The leveesystem is fragile, however. The peat soils of the Delta have been gradually compacting, requiring that leveesconstantly be raised or repaired. Many of the levee-surrounded Delta islands are now wel below sea Ievel.Maintenance of the levee system is important for protecting life, property, and infrastructure from flooding on Deltaislands. Permanently flooded islands would also have major adverse effects on both water quality in the Delta andfreshwater supplies. Since 1960,24 levees have failed, and with each year, the fate of these islands becomes moreuncertain.

1 TO convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.2 TO convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.



Box l-E–Water Allocation and the Sacramento-San Joaquin River System--(Continued)

Water quality-Water quality in the Delta is of concern because of possible salinity intrusion into the westernDelta from San Francisco Bay, wastewater discharges that contain chemical pollutants, and the inflow ofagricultural drainage water that may contain pesticide residues and other toxic agents (18). Maintaining waterquality and ecological health in the Delta (by, among other things, ensuring that an adequate amount of fresh waterreaches the Delta) is legally required by the State but may conflict with water transfers and local consumptive uses.This is especially true during drought, when there may not be enough water to fulfill all demands. Drought posesanother problem as well: during low-flow periods, water temperature in system rivers increases, and this hascontributed significantly to the decline of cold-water anadromous fish spades in recent years.

In sum, Californians are making heavy demands on the Sacramento-San Joaquin River System. Theyrecognize that the means of transferring water from the Delta must be improved to maintain water quality and toenable more efficient transfer of supplies to the southern part of the State, but the issue has proved to be one ofthe most controversial water problems in the West. In 1982, for example, California voters defeated a referendumto build the so-called Peripheral Canal around the Delta to improve the system’sufficiency. Northern Californiansoverwhelmingly rejected the proposal, for fear that the Delta’s environment would not be adequately protected andbecause they perceived that populous Southern California was attempting yet another “water grab.” Althoughthere was more support in Southern California, many in that part of the State feared the project’s high cost.

Studies of the potential impact of climate change in California suggest-but have by no means proven-thatthe regional effects of climate change could be reduced mountain snowpack, a shift in runoff patterns (i.e., in timing,amount, or duration of precipitation), and large decreases in summer soil moisture. Specifically, a possible resultof warming temperatures is that more winter precipitation will fall as rain and a reduced mountain snowpack willstart melting earlier in the spring. As a result, reservoirs would fill faster. Because a portion of reservoir space mustbe reserved for flood-control purposes, the additional water would have to be spilled. Although California’s totalwater budget might remain the same, less would be available during the summer, when water demand is highest.The reduced snowpack in effect represents the loss of one or more storage reservoirs. Maintaining adequatefreshwater flow to San Francisco Bay would be more difficult in summer and could increasingly conflict with waterneeded for consumptive purposes. Summer temperatures would also likely increase in the Sacramento and otherrivers and represent a threat to fish.

A further complication could be sea level rise. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts atotal sea level rise of 26 inches (65 centimeters)3 by 2100. Such a rise would inundate the entire Delta area andhave devastating effects on Delta islands and water quality. A sea level rise of more than 2 feet would transformthe current 100-year high-tide peak at Antioch, a western Delta location, into a 1 in 10 event-making such rareoccurrences more common. Levees would be even more expensive, or even impossible, to maintain. Becausethe Delta islands are developed for farming and valued for helping preserve water quality, the initial response toincremental sea level rise is likely be to try to preserve the islands. In the long run, a phased retreat from the Deltamay have to be considered (142), Choosing between preservation at any price and abandonment would not beeasy.

if the above impacts occur (or worse, if California’s water budget actually decreases), maintaining California’swater supplies for consumptive purposes and maintaining the health of the Delta will be a great challenge. Thiswould be especially true during droughts, which, if more common than--and as extreme as-the currentdrought in California, could have devastating impacts. A suite of demand-and-supply management andsupply-augmentation responses to the State’s water problems is being considered. No one response will besufficient. Conservation and water marketing could significantly ease California’s water problems, but building newreservoirs and even some desalination plants and other responses may be needed as well.

3 TO convert inches to centimeters, multiply by 2.540.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.


Box l-F-Changes in Agriculture and the Fate of Prairie Potholes:The Impacts of Drought and Climate Change

The prairies comprise millionsof acres over a vast geographical area that includes parts of Canada, and thestates of Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota Minnesota, and lowa.The region is characterized by a glaciated,depressed topography with poorly defined drainage that results In numerous small lakes and wetlands known asprairie potholes.1 Millions of potholes dot the landscape, providing an impermanent water source for the region’sagricuItural operations and diverse wildlife, including migratory waterfowl. Since the early 1960s, a general shiftin the structure of the agricultural economy has occurred in the prairie region, involving a move towardmore-intensive farming practices (80). The drainage of prairie potholes has been accelerated in order to bring moreland into production and to increase yields on existing cropland. However, drought conditions in recent years haveevoked concerns about the sustainability of the regional agriculture and wildlife and have raised questions aboutimpacts that may result from climate change.

The drying effects of climate change are certain to affect the prairie-pothde region by altering aquaticconditions. Agricultural operations and wildlife rely on prairie potholes for water. An increase In temperature, whichwould influence aridity in continental interior areas, would reduce available volumes, thereby putting both farmingand waterfowl at risk. In addition to changes in the availability of surface water, water storage in the soil is likelyto decrease (134). Temperature changes may also mean an extended growing season, which could alter thenesting and feeding habits of wildlife. In total, climate change will affect the region by increasing existing stresson the prairie-pothole ecosystems and agriculture.

Agriculture operations in the prairie region have long provided the bulk of the Nation’s wheat supply. Wheatis well-suited to the region’s dryland agriculture, with the majority of precipitation falling during the growing seasonand with relatively cod temperatures keeping evapotranspiration rates down. Farming in the region has becomemore and more intensive as agriculture has become increasingly mechanized. These developments have had aconsiderable effect on the fate of prairie potholes, which have decreased from 20 million to 7 million acres (8 to3 million hectares)2 leaving only 35 percent of the original pothole acreage intact (179). A poor farm economy inthe 1980s coupled with mechanization caused prairie farmers to push every possible acre into production. NorthDakota’s potholes were being drained at an estimated rate of 20,000 acres per year to support conversion toagriculture (179). And drainage rates became similarly high in other prairie States, as farmers recognized thepotential value of new farmland.

Now, although 20 percent of all remaining prairie potholes are protected? prairie potholes are among the mostthreatened ecosystems in the United States. They provide prime nesting grounds and habitat for a multitude ofwaterfowl and other wildlife. Since the 1970s, populations of three common duck species (the mallard, the pintail,and the blue-winged teal) have declined dramatically. Populations of some other spades of duck less dependenton potholes in agricultural regions have increased. The mallard, pintail, and blue-winged teal nest in thedrought-prone zone of intensive agriculture (1 19). These migratory waterfowl have lost not only extensive areasof breeding habitat, but also adjacent vegetated areas once used for food and cover. Here, the detrimental effectsof the loss of wetlands cleared for agricultural use are dramatic; wildlife populations have likely been cut in half(80).

1 Prairie-pothole wetlands are relatively shallow, water-holding depressions that vary in size, waterpermanence, and water chemistry. They are located in the glaciated portion of the North American Great Plains andare the single most important breeding area for waterfowl on this continent (63). They also support a variety of otherWildlife.

2 To convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

3 Protection includes, but IS not limited to: ownership by Federal or State governments, short-and long-termgovernment easements, and ownership by private conservation groups.



Box l-F-Changes in Agriculture and the Fate of Prairie Potholes:The Impacts of Drought and Climate Change-(Continued)

Though these changes have been occurring over along period of time, effects were most dramatic duringrecent drought conditions in the region. Severe drought marked both the 1988 and the 1989 growing seasons inNorth Dakota the heart of the country’s spring wheat production area (143). This dry spell was the second to occurduring the 1980s and the fourth serious drought in the past three decades (143). The lack of precipitation andsubsequent loss of soil moisture resulted in dramatic decreases in agricultural yields and in abandonment of somecropland. Despite the grain crop losses (some more than 70 percent), net farm income and farmed acreage didnot suffer. This was basically due to government drought assistance, in the form of insurance and direct aid. Thecombination of insurance, aid, and the higher grain prices resulting from the drought helped farmers avoid lossesthat might ultimately have led to extensive farm failure and abandonment.

Climate change may significantly alter growing conditions in the prairie region. Changes resulting from globalwarming may decrease both water depth and the number of ponds holding water in t he spring and summer. Thisaspect is likely to further influence the degradation of waterfowl and wildlife habitat and to upset populations.Waterfowl may respond by migrating to other areas, relying heavily on the semipermanent prairie-potholewetlands, remaining on permanent wetlands but not breeding, or failing to renest as they currently do duringdrought (160). On the other hand, drier conditions in these shallow, temporary, seasonal wetlands will makeland-use conversion to agriculture much more reasonable in terms of expense and ease. Long-term changes inagricultural activity in the region, caused by economics and climate change, are sure to affect the fate of prairiepotholes and the waterfowl and wildlife they support, placing them at further risk.


“LOOKS LIKE A DISASTER RELIEF CHECK, CROP LOSS COMPENSATION, AND A FINE FOR DISTURBING A WETLAND’


for research and management of public lands (theDepartment of the Interior (DOI), the U.S. De-partment of Agriculture, the National ScienceFoundation and EPA) combined receive less than30 percent of the total funding for EcologicalSystems and Dynamics (less than 5 percent of thetotal USGCRP budget). Given that such researchon ecological and human impacts may take yearsor decades to produce results, the slow processmay cost us the ability to respond to globalchange in areas that are especially at risk toirreversible damage. In addition to understandingclimate impacts and effects, it is important toknow how to minimize socioeconomic impacts.Ultimately, to be useful in planning for anuncertain climate, USGCRP must include ecosys-tem research that can feed into management,socioeconomic analysis, and adaptation research.An assessment process that incorporates all thesecategories and permits inputs from stakeholdersand policy makers is necessary to make USGCRPtruly policy relevant. This is a much broaderdefinition of “assessment” than USGCRP canaccommodate given its current research programand structure.

NEAR-TERM CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONIn the resource chapters (vol. 1, chs. 4-6, and

vol. 2, chs. 4-6) of this report, a series of “firststeps’ ‘ is outlined to illustrate ways to beginincorporating climate change considerations intostatutes, policies, and programs relating to vari-ous natural resource--coasts, water, agriculture,wetlands, preserved lands, and forests. The firststeps for the resource chapters are summarizedbriefly in the last section of this chapter. Severalof the first steps focus on actions that offerimportant and immediate benefits, even withoutclimate change as an additional factor justifyingthem. Several targets of opportunity in the near-term congressional agenda, in the announced andpotential initiatives of the new Administration,and in the programs of the various agencies can becapitalized upon now.

Likewise, the USGRP offers annual opportuni-ties for changes. Chapter 3 discusses severaldirections the program could take; many of theseoptions are included below as possible near-termcongressional actions. The process of policydevelopment in government is not so orderly thatone can lay out and follow a detailed plan oflogical first steps, followed by logical secondsteps, and so on. Regular congressional reauthori-zation cycles for major natural resource pro-grams, the annual budget cycle, election cycles,the fragmentation of responsibilities among con-gressional committees, and still other policy-making realities provide the context in whichdecisions about climate change will be made.Seen in this light, the choice of frost steps issignificantly influenced by an assessment ofwhere the opportunities lie.

1 Annual AppropriationsEven if Congress did nothing else, each year it

would enact legislation appropriating money forcarrying out governmental programs. Thus, animmediate and recurrent annual opportunity toaddress many of the issues considered in thisreport is through the appropriation process. Mostsimply and directly, to narrow the breadth ofuncertainties that exist today, Congress can en-sure adequate levels of funding for existingclimate-change-related research programs.Through the appropriation process, Congress canalso encourage natural resource managementagencies to carry out their monitoring and re-search programs in ways that meet their intendedobjectives while simultaneously producing datathat could be useful to their own or otheragencies’ climate change research efforts.

The annual appropriation process is also themeans by which Congress makes major long-terminvestments-for example, in land acquired forNational Parks and wildlife refuges and in damsand other water resource projects. Until now,climate change considerations have not been afactor in deciding whether any of these invest-


ments were prudent. One could justify inclusionof such considerations now because climatechange has the potential to lessen the value ofsuch investments. Thus, Congress could re-quire that the land-acquisition, water-resource-development, and other similar proposalsbrought before it be accompanied by explicitevaluations of how climate change may affectthe long-term viability of the investment. Alter-natively, in the case of lands proposed to beacquired for conservation purposes, Congresscould direct that the criteria by which agenciesrank their acquisition priorities include someconsideration of potential climate change impactson those lands or their resources. Building up theNation’s reserve of protected land would helpstem some climate change impacts by reducingfragmentation and, possibly, reducing otherthreats to natural area resources. Increased pro-tection and reduced fragmentation of these areascould help build more resiliency into somenatural systems (see vol. 2, chs. 4 and 5).

Congress has increasingly linked policy direc-tion to agency funding during the appropriationprocess. Congress could include requirementsin its various appropriation bills that each ofthe agencies managing natural resources po-tentially affected by climate change provideCongress with its own evaluation of the agen-cies } preparedness to cope with a range ofclimate futures. The appropriation process mayalso be especially well-suited to encouragingagencies that implement climate-sensitive pro-grams (e.g., agricultural disaster assistance, cropsubsidies, and flood insurance) to develop long-term budget projections for those programs basedon several future climate scenarios. In this way, abudget-conscious Congress can better informitself early on about the potential costs of climatechange for those programs.

# Reauthorization CycleIn addition to the annual appropriation cycle,

congressional action is heavily influenced by the

reauthorization cycles of major Federal programs.Congressional attention is not focused on allissues at once. Rather, at any given time, itsattention is disproportionately focused, throughits committees, on the major Federal programs forwhich current authorization is about to expire.The process of extending that authorization pro-vides an opportunity to evaluate the workings ofa program closely and to provide legislative direc-tion for that program for a period of many years.Thus, at least with respect to changes in existingFederal natural resource programs, the best op-portunities to implement the first steps recom-mended here are in the context of laws andprograms that are about to be reauthorized.

Among these, the Clean Water Act is a high-priority target of opportunity (see vol. 1, box 5-C).Comprehensive revisions of that law have beenproposed, and the act’s wetland provisions areundergoing particular scrutiny. The reauthori-zation of the Clean Water Act provides a keyopportunity to address one of the more importantneeds identified in this report-the need toachieve more effective integration of resource-management efforts across political jurisdictions.Comprehensive watershed planning (see vol. 1,ch. 5), which integrates wetland protection andrestoration goals (see vol. 2, box 4-A), water-use-efficiency goals, strategies for controlling point-source and non-point-source pollution, and bothwater-quantity and water-quality concerns gener-ally, could create the institutional capability andflexibility to anticipate and plan for climatechange. Such planning could be especially valu-able for finding creative ways to resolve currentconflicts in which landowner and developmentinterests chafe at restrictions on use of wetlands,while environmental interests decry the continuedloss of wetlands (see vol. 2, ch. 4 and box 4-B).

Another major target of opportunity is theupcoming reauthorization of farm programs in the1995 Farm Bill. The next reauthorization cyclecould provide a forum for considering how toenhance farmers’ flexibility and effectiveness inresponding to a changing climate and how climate


change may affect Federal expenditures on disas-ter assistance and farm commodity programs (seevol. 1, ch. 6).

I New Targets of OpportunityIn addition to the reauthorization of existing

laws, Congress regularly considers altogethernew legislation creating programs for existing ornew agencies of Government. A program of po-tentially great significance on the horizon isInterior Secretary Babbitt’s proposal to create aNational Biological Survey (see vol. 2, box 5-L).Legislation to establish the Survey has beenintroduced in both the House and Senate, and aNational Research Council committee has beenasked to offer advice on the formation and role ofthe Survey. The nature, mandate, resources, andoverall purposes of the National Biological Sur-vey, however, are still very much in the process ofdevelopment. The bills introduced in Congressthus far to establish the Survey give only a verygeneral description of its functions. Thus, thereexists an opportunity to shape the content anddirection of this new institution in ways thatwouId be useful to the management of naturalresource systems in a changing climate.

The rationale frequently offered by SecretaryBabbitt for creating a National Biological Surveyis its potential, by cataloging the biologicalresources of the Nation and monitoring theirstatus and trends, to avert future ‘‘train wrecks,’that is, the disruptive and wrenching conflictsbetween conservation and development goals. A‘‘train wreck’ of another sort could take the formof severe adverse impacts on our natural resourcesfrom climate change for which we were unpre-pared. A National Biological Survey could helpdetect, evaluate, and prepare for that climatechange. Thus, an important opportunity exists tostructure the mission and capabilities of theSurvey so that it can contribute to the earlydetection of indicators of climate change, a betterunderstanding of the ability of organisms andnatural communities to respond to climate changes,

and the design and management of a system ofpreserves best able to achieve the purposes forwhich they were established. Careful congres-sional attention now to these details in the designof a National Biological Survey could yield majorreturns in the future (see vol. 2, ch. 5).

I Existing Statutory LanguageOf the many Federal statutes pretaining to the

management of the natural resource systemsdiscussed in this report, only one-the CoastalZone Management Act (CZMA; P.L. 92-583)--explicitly addresses climate change and its poten-tial consequences. The 1990 amendments to thatlaw required that possible sea level rise resultingfrom climate change be anticipated and addressedin State coastal zone management plans (see vol.1, ch. 4). Congress could extend this legislativeprecedent to other statutory arenas; here, weattempt to identify which statutes may be mostappropriate for this.

None of the statutes governing the variousnatural resource systems discussed throughoutthe full report precludes the agencies responsiblefor their management from fully consideringclimate change. Existing grants of authority aresufficiently general and open-ended to allow anagency, on its own initiative, to examine theimplications of climate change for the naturalresources under its jurisdiction and to tailor itsmanagement of those resources accordingly.The question, therefore, is whether Congresswishes to supplement the existing legislativeframework with explicit directives pertaining toclimate change.

Several categories of legislation maybe espe-cially appropriate for considering possible climate-change-related amendments. First among theseare statutes, such as CZMA, that require long-range planning for the management of naturalresources. For example, the Rangeland andRenewable Resources Planning Act of 1974(RPA; P.L. 93-378) requires the preparation of aforest ‘resource planning assessment’ that looks


50 years into the future. Similarly, the CleanWater Act requires preparation of area-widewaste treatment plans that look two decades intothe future, a planning horizon also found in thePacfic Northwest Electric: Power Planning andConservation Act (P.L. 96-501). In general, thelonger the time frame over which management isto be planned, the greater the likelihood thatclimate change may affect the resources beingmanaged. Thus, mechanisms to ensure that cli-mate change is taken into) account when long-range plans are being developed and to ensure thatplans can be revised as new information about thedirection and magnitude of climate change be-comes available are clearly desirable.

A second statutory area where it is especiallyimportant to ensure that potential climate changeis considered is long-term public or privateinvestments affecting natural resources. Exam-ples include public land acquisition for parks,wildlife refuges, and the like (see vol. 2, box 5-C).Historically, such public land acquisitions havebeen viewed as permanent investments, with theintention of keeping the areas acquired in publicownership in perpetuity. The expectation implic-itly accompanying these investments has beenthat the areas acquired would, with appropriatemanagement, continue to provide the environ-mental and recreational benefits for which theywere acquired indefinitely into the future. Cli-mate change introduces a new uncertainty aboutthe validity of this expectation. At the very least,it suggests the need for a more careful examina-tion of whether particular acquisitions are, in fact,likely to continue to provide the environmentalbenefits that they provide today.

Somewhat similar are public or private in-vestments in dams and other water-resource-development projects. Public projects are gov-erned by the Water Resources Planning Act (P.L.89-80) and private ones are licensed pursuant tothe Federal Power Act (P.L. 102486). Theimplicit assumption underlying both has alwaysbeen that hydrological models based on pastclimate will accurately predict future conditions

as well. The possibility of climate change castsdoubt on the continuing validity of that assump-tion and may warrant statutory revisions explic-itly requiring water resource planning agenciesand Federal regulators to factor climate changeinto their decisionmaking.

A third statutory arena relevant here includesthose laws that require an evaluation of theexpected environmental impacts of plannedactions. Foremost among these laws is the Na-tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; P.L.91-190); similar, though less far-reaching, lawsinclude the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act(P.L. 85-624) and the Endangered Species Act(P.L. 100-7O7). Under these and similar laws,expectations of the environmental impacts ofplanned actions may vary, depending on whethera constant or changing climate is anticipated.Legislative direction could provide useful guid-ance to agencies with respect to their duties toconsider climate change possibilities in imple-menting their responsibilities (see, for example,vol. 2, box 5-D).

A fourth set of laws that warrant discussionconsists of those that authorize research pro-grams. The Clean Water Act and the Rangelandand Renewable Resources Planning Act areexamples. As this report makes abundantly clear,there are many uncertainties about climatechange, including its magnitude, its direction, andits impact on natural resource systems. Naturalresource management will require research aimedat resolving many of today’s uncertainties. Re-flecting that need in the legislative description ofthe various research missions may serve ounderscore the importance of this area of inquiry.Each resource chapter highlights important re-search options to consider.

Finally, the Science Policy Act of 1976 (P.L.94-282), which established the Office of Scienceand Technology Policy (OSTP) and the FederalCoordinating Council on Science, Engineering,and Technology (FCCSET), could be amended tostrengthen the ability of these offices to coordi-


nate science and ecosystem management acrossagencies. 9 These offices have the authority todevelop and implement coherent, government-wide science policy and have been the mechanismfor coordinating several multi-agency programs.However, OSTP has not always been an active orinfluential player in the executive branch, andFCCSET lacks the authority to set priorities,direct policy, and fully participate in the budgetprocess (17, 51). FCCSET acts largely as afulcrum for coordination. Agency participation inFCCSET projects is voluntary, and FCCSET hasno authority over how participating agenciesspend their funds. Congress could amendP.L. 94-282 to change this. Similarly, the U.S.Global Change Research Act of 1990 (P.L.101-606) could be amended to require periodicintegrated assessment reports to be presented toCongress and to specify key participants in theassessment process.

SUMMARIES AND FIRST STEPS FOREACH RESOURCE CHAPTER

The Coastal ZoneThe coastal zone is a complicated area that

includes both human-made and relatively ‘undis-turbed” features, ranging from densely settledurban areas to cypress swamps (see vol. 1, ch. 4).Populations in coastal areas are growing fasterthan in any other region in the United States, andthe construction of buildings and infrastructure toserve this growing population is proceedingrapidly. Consequently, protection against andrecovery from hazards peculiar to the coastalzone, such as hurricanes and sea level rise, arebecoming ever more costly (163). The combina-tion of popularity and risk in coastal areas hasimportant near-term consequences for the safetyof coastal residents, the protection of property, the

maintenance of local economies, and the preser-vation of remaining natural areas (see fig. 1-4).

The expected climate change impacts are likelyto exacerbate problems that already plague thecoastal zone (66). Sea level rise will substantiallyincrease flooding and erosion in areas alreadyvulnerable. Coastal storms-whether or not theyincrease in intensity or frequency under a chang-ing climate-will have increasingly greater ef-fects as sea level rises.

The coastal areas most vulnerable to the effectsof climate change are those with low relief andeasily eroded shorelines-such as those in theSoutheast and Gulf Coasts-and those where thecoastline is already subsiding, such as inLouisiana (52). Structures close to the ocean inlow-lying areas are also vulnerable.

Barrier islands provide protection for coastalecosystems and help stem erosion. In some cases, suchas this barrier island near Tampa, Florida, theseislands have been heavily developed, exposing manycommunities to the risks of serious damage fromstorms and high seas.

9 coherent approaches for applying and technology to critical and

in problems and for promoting coordination of the scientific and technological responsibilities and programs of the Federal-rots agencies the resolution of such problems,”and was established to “provide more effective planning andadministration of Federal engineering, and technological programs” 94-282, the Policy Act of 1976).


Figure f-4-An Assessment of Coastal Hazards: Texas and Louisiana

Louisiana Population densityper square kilometer

Mississippi , 2000 or moreTexas

— -- 500-1999

New Or leans `n 100-499

O Less than 100

Relief

Corpus Chrissti Less than 3 m

3-9 m

10-19 mBrownsville 20 m or more

— Overall hazard assessmentOverall hazardassessment

— R e l i e f High risk— Population density

Moderate to high

Moderate risk Moderate to low

NOTE: To convert square kilometers to square miles, multlply by 0.624. To convert meters to feet, multlply by 3.280.

SOURCE: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), "Coastal Hazards,” In: National Atlas of the United States of America(Reston, VA: USGS, 1985). - ‘

Although development pressures in coastalareas are driven by many social and economictrends, government policies can influence the

appropriateness, rate, quality, and location ofdevelopment. The current system of allocatingthe costs of preventing or repairing climate-related damage in the coastal zone among Fed-eral, State, and local governments and privateentities encourages certain types of+ develop-ment, or at least does not discourage them (11).

.Climate change will likely add to the risks andcosts of living in the coastal zone. It is essentialthat all stakeholders, such as property owners,understand them and that coastal developmentand preservation are guided by this understand-ing. The sooner policies are in place that encour-age an adequate appreciation of risk, that offersufficient incentives to take adequate precautions,and that attempt to overcome the organizationalfragmentation that makes a unified approach to

coastal climate change issues impossible, theeasier and less costly adaptation to a changingclimate is likely to be.

The Federal Government has an interest inpromoting sound planning and public safety in aneffective and efficient manner. Federal coastalzone policies can be improved in many ways tobetter guide the decisions of those living incoastal areas, and a suite of options for doing sois presented in volume 1, chapter 4. We focus onfive general categories in that chapter: revampingthe National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP),improving diaaster-assistance policies, revisingthe Coastal Barrier Resources Act (P.L. 97-348)and the Coastal Zone Management Act, changingbeach-renourishment guidelines, and altering theU.S. Tax Code.

To help focus on where to start with responsesto climate change in the coastal zone, some firststeps that could be taken are listed below.


■ Revamp the National Flood InsuranceProgram. The National Flood Insurance Pro-gram could be revised to provide strongerincentives to reduce the potential costsassociated with high-risk development incoastal areas. Congress has been consideringrevising the NFIP for several years, and billsto do this have been introduced in both theHouse and Senate. H.R. 62, the “NationalFlood Insurance Compliance, Mitigation,and Erosion Management Act of 1993, ”contains provisions that partially addresssome of the NFIP improvements that maybedesirable. Most pressing is the need toadequately address erosion along the coast.Erosion losses will increase with rising sealevels. The Federal Emergency ManagementAgency does not now have the authority tomap erosion risks or to reflect such risks ininsurance premiums, and as a consequence,information and incentives to avoid develop-ment in eroding areas are inadequate. Also,it seems especially desirable to increaseinsurance premiums after multiple claims aremade on properties in high-risk areas subjectto repeated flooding.

■ Improve disaster assistance. Several billshave also been introduced in the 103dCongress to revise disaster-assistance poli-cies and regulations. More stringent disas-ter mitigation by States and localitiescould be required, which could hold downfuture costs to the Federal Government.This could be accomplished by more stronglytying disaster assistance to adoption ofmitigation measures. H.R. 935, the “Earth-quake, Volcanic Eruption, and HurricaneHazards Insurance Act of 1993, ” for exam-ple, would establish minimum criteria forreducing losses, recommends such measuresas fiscal incentives to reduce losses, providesfor low-interest loans or grants to retrofitfacilities vulnerable to hurricanes, and pro-vides guidelines for establishing actuarialpremium rates for disaster insurance. S. 995,

the “Federal Disaster Preparedness and Re-sponse Act of 1993,’ would establish, amongother things, a grant program and accompa-nying performance standards to help Statesprepare for, respond to, and recover frommajor disasters.

■ Strengthen coastal zone management.The Coastal Zone Management Act willbe up for reauthorization in 1995, andthis provides an opportunity to requirestronger State controls on risky develop-ment. Such controls could include, forexample, an erosion-setback program(already adopted by several States), re-restrictions on construction of immovablebuildings, a relocation-assistance program,restrictions on rebuilding damaged or de-stroyed structures in high-risk locations, andadoption of minimum coastal-constructionstandards. All of these controls would addsome degree of protection against sea levelrise and flood or storm damage. Anotherpossibility for reducing risks of living on thecoasts would be to encourage States to adoptcoastal-hazards-management programs.These could be overseen jointly by theNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-ministration and the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency.

■ Promote public education. The public gen-erally is not well-informed about the risksassociated with living in coastal areas, andthis lack of awareness has led and willcontinue to lead to large public and privateexpenditures. H.R. 935 provides one possi-bility for expanding public education. Theact authorizes education programs andprovides funds to States to implementthem through a self-sustaining mitigationfund. The private sector, particularly theprivate insurance industry, could also play animportant role in increasing awareness ofcoastal hazards.

■ Require increased State and local contri-butions to beach-nourishment operations.


Most benefits of the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineer’s beach norishment and shoreline-protection projects are realized at the local orregional level, yet these projects are oftenheavily subsidized. In most instances, theFederal share is 65 percent. Greater Stateand local contributions could be required,both for initial construction and for main-tenance, and Federal funding could bemade conditional on adoption of strongermitigation measures. These adjustmentswould tend to increase the interest of localgovernments in acting to limit communityexposure to coastal hazards.

1 Water ResourcesMany factors are straining the Nation’s water

resources and leading to increased competitionamong a wide variety of different uses and usersof water (see vol. 1, ch. 5), Human demands forwater are increasingly in conflict with the needsof natural ecosystems, and this has led to signifi-cant water-quality and water-quantity problems(see vol. 1, box 5-B). In addition, water infrastruc-ture in many urban areas is aging.

Although it is unclear exactly how climatechange will affect water resources, climatechange has emerged as another important factorto consider in water resource planning. Changesin water availability as a result of climatechange could further affect already overbur-dened systems, and changes could occur in thefrequency, duration, and intensity of floodsand droughts (105). The areas that are mostvulnerable to climate change are, not surprisingly,places that are already experiencing stressedwater resources (see fig. 1-5), such as many partsof the Southwest and South Florida; the centralpart of the country, which most models predictwill become hotter and drier; and areas wherecompetition for water is expected to increase.

The country faces a huge challenge in adaptingits water resource systems to the many current andpotential stresses. The numerous impediments to

this adaptation include the fact that traditionalengineering solutions for developing additionalwater supplies-such as dam construction-havebecome prohibitively expensive and politicallyless acceptable because the best sites have alreadybeen developed. Federal agencies’ responsibili-ties for water often overlap or conflict, andcoordination among different levels of govern-ment on water issues is often inadequate (166)(see vol. 1, box 5-F). Many institutional arrange-ments for the management and allocation of waterresources are rigid and inefficient, making themill-equipped to cope well with water scarcity. Andthere are very few incentives to conserve water.

Water resource planning is a complex political,economic, sociological, scientific, and technolog-ical endeavor, so adaptation to change will not bestraightforward. In encouraging adaptation tochanges in water resources caused by climatechange, the Federal Governrnent, in cooperationwith State and local agencies, should focus onencouraging five types of activity: improvingdemand management (e.g., through pricing re-form and conservation); improving supply man-agement (e.g., through improving coordination,jointly managing ground- and surface-water sup-plies, and improving the management of reser-voirs and reservoir systems); facilitating watermarketing and related types of water transfers;improving planning for floods and droughts; andpromoting the use of new analytical tools thatenable more efficient operations.

The following first steps toward improvingwater resources planning and management—selected from a longer suite of options presentedin volume 1, chapter 5-are intended to bothrelieve existing stresses and make sense forclimate change.

■ Improve extreme-events management.Despite all efforts to date, both floods anddroughts continue to cause significant lossesto human and natural systems (143, 200).Greater coordination of the many agen-cies with flood- or drought-related re-

Chapter1-- Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 43

Figure 1-5-Water Withdrawals and Consumption in the Coterminus United States, 1985

NOTE: To convert gallons to liters, multiply by 3.785.

SOURCE: Adapted from W. Solley, R. Pierce, and H. Perlman, Estimated Use of Water the United States in 1990, USGS Survey Circular 1081(Washington, DC: U.S. Geological Survey, 1993),

■

sponsibilities is needed. Congress coulddirect the executive branch to create high-level coordinating bodies, such as an inter-agency drought task force and a nationalflood-assessment board. Such bodies couldbe given the responsibility to develop anational drought policy and to establishnational goals for floodplain management.The “National Flood Insurance Compli-ance, Mitigation, and Erosion ManagementAct of 1993” (H.R. 62) Ca l lS for establish- .ment of a flood-insurance task force. Thisbill could also be broadened to create a morecomprehensive flood-assessment board.

Make it easier to manage reservoirs on abasin-wide level. Operating reservoirs withinthe same basin as a single system ratherthan individually (as is often the case)

could greatly improve the efficiency andflexibility of water-quantity management.New legislation, perhaps as part of the nextomnibus water bill, could grant the ArmyCorps of Engineers and the Department ofthe Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation greaterflexibility to manage their reservoirs basin-wide and thus encourage development of amore integrated approach to water-quality,wetland, flood, and drought management.

Support water marketing. As long asadequate attention is given to protectingall affected parties, water markets couldprovide an efficient and flexible way toadapt to various stresses, including achanging climate. It would be very usefulfor Congress to clarify reclamation law ontrades and transfers and define the Federal


Government’s interest in facilitating thecreation of markets (193). Congress couldurge the Department of the Interior toprovide stronger leadership to assist withwater transfers, and water marketing couldbe thoroughly evaluated as part of theWestern Water Policy Review, authorized inlate 1992.

■ Promote the use of new analytical tools.Further development dissemination, anduse of new modeling and forecasting toolscould greatly enhance water resourcemanagement. Some current analytical ef-forts have not been adequately funded, andthe most advanced tools now available arenot yet being used by many States or waterutilities. Small investments in promotingdissemination and use of these tools todaycould save substantial sums later. Section 22of the Water Resources Development Act of1974 (P.L. 93-251) authorizes funding fortraining and technical assistance to Statesand could be used to promote the adoption ofthe new tools. Congress could also considerproviding funds to develop or refine toolsthat incorporate climate uncertainty intotraditional hydrologic analyses.

■ Promote demand management. The up-coming reauthorization of the Clean WaterAct is one potential target of opportunityfor improving water-use efficiency (seevol. 1, box 5-C). Congress could considermaking conservation projects eligible for theState revolving-fund loans created under theact to fund wastewater treatment plants. TheFederal Government could set an exampleby adopting efficient water-use practices inits own facilities. The Energy Policy Act of1992 (P.L. 102-486) requires that Federalfacilities adopt conservation practices to theextent practicable, but it concentrates pri-marily on energy conservation. A technical-adjustment bill to the Energy Policy Actcould be considered in the 103d Congressand would provide a way to clarify and

underline congressional intent toward waterconservation in Federal facilities.

■ Expand the scope of the Western WaterPolicy Review. With the enactment of Title30 of the Reclamation Projects Authoriza-tion and Adjustment Act of 1992 (P.L.102-575), Congress authorized the Residentto oversee a major water-policy study. Title30 directs the President to undertake acomprehensive review of Federal activitiesthat affect the allocation and use of waterresources in the 19 western States and toreport findings to appropriate congressionalcommittees by the end of October 1995(190). Climate change is not mentioned asa factor motivating the Western WaterPolicy Review, but the study could pro-vide an opportunity to assess more fullyhow climate change may affect waterresources and to evaluate policy optionsthat might help with adaptation to awarmer climate. Congress could expandthe scope of the Review beyond the West, orit could authorize a similar follow-on studyof eastern water issues. The Review couldalso provide an opportunity to explicitlyconsider land-use practices and water re-source issues jointly. The relationship be-tween the two is close, and there appear to besignificant opportunities to improve bothwater-quantity and water-quality manage-ment by improving land-use practices.

9 AgricultureAgriculture in the United States is an inten-

sively managed, market-based natural resource.Throughout the world, agriculture has adaptedcontinuously to the risks associated with normalclimate variability, just as it has adapted tochanges in economic conditions. The Americanagricultural sector will undoubtedly make furtheradaptations in response to climate changes, withmarket forces rewarding and encouraging therapid spread of successful adaptation (30, 41,


148). Just what these adaptations will be and whatpublic actions could be taken to encourage themare addressed in detail in volume 1, chapter 6, ofthis report.

The possible effects of climate change onagriculture are difficult to predict. Agriculturalproductivity is likely to be affected worldwide,which would lead to alterations in the regionaldistribution and intensity of farming (1, 188). Therange over which major U.S. crops are plantedcould eventually shift hundreds of miles to thenorth (13, 150) (see vol. 1, box 6-C). ForAmerican farmers, already facing increasinglycompetitive and growing world markets, anyrelative decline in productivity compared with therest of the world would mean lost markets (40). Asignificant warming and drying of the world’sclimate might lead to an overall decline inagricultural yields (75, 150). Consumers wouldbear much of the cost through higher food pricesor scarcities. Some individual farmers might stillbenefit through locally improved yields or higherprices; others might suffer because of relativelysevere local climate changes. Rapid geographicalshifts in the agricultural land base could disruptrural communities and their associated infrastruc-tures.

If the United States wants to ensure its compet-itive position in the world market and meet thegrowing demands for food without higher prices,public efforts to support the continued growth inagricultural yields remains necessary. Climatechange adds to the importance of efforts toimprove the knowledge and skills of farmers, toremove impediments to farmer adaptability andinnovation, and to expand the array of optionsavailable to farmers (157). Efforts to expand thediversity of crops and the array of farm technolo-gies insure against a future in which existing cropvarieties or farming systems fail (137) (see vol. 1,box 6-H). Efforts to enhance the adaptability offarmers--to speed the rate at which appropriatefarming systems can be adopted-lower thepotentially high costs of adjustment to climatechange.

This soybean field shows the devastating effects ofdroughts. The farmer indicates how tall soybeanplants would normally be. Warmer climates could leadto an increase in both nurnber and severity of droughts.

Impediments to adjusting to climate change arenumerous (see vol. 1, box 6-I). Water shortageswill probably limit the potential for compensatingadjustments in certain regions. The uncertainty ofclimate change makes effective response diffi-cult, as do limitations on the availability ofsuitable crops and agricultural practices. Thedecline in the Federal Government’s interest inagricultural research and extension is also aproblem (138, 174); more-vibrant research andextension programs could enhance adaptability.

Certain agricultural programs may increase thecosts associated with a changing climate (90).Because the commodity programs link supportpayment to maintaining production of a particularcrop, they could inadvertently discourage adjust-ments in farming. Disaster-assistance programsmay become increasingly costly under a harsherclimate, and, if not well designed, may tend todiscourage farmers from taking appropriate cau-tionary actions to reduce exposure to climaterisks. Restriction on the marketing of conservedwater may limit the incentive for efficient use ofscarce water resources.

46 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume

The most pressing tasks concerning agricul-ture and climate change that the FederalGovernment should undertake are: improv-ing technology and information transfer tofarmers in order to speed adaptation andinnovation in farm practice; removing theimpediments to adaptation created unneces-sarily by features of commodity support anddisaster-assistance programs; and supportingresearch and technology that will ensure thatthe agricultural sector can deal successfullywith the various challenges of the next century.

The Government could organize its approacharound the following first steps, which shouldincrease the ability of the farm sector to adjustsuccessfully to a changing climate.

■ Revise the commodity support programs.Congress addresses farm issues every 5years in omnibus farm bills, with the nextone likely to be debated for passage in 1995.The annual budget-reconciliation processand agricultural appropriations bills offerintermediate opportunities for revisions incommodity support programs. commoditysupport payments are linked to the continuedproduction of a single crop. If a farmersignificantly changes crops, support pay-ments will be reduced. This link discouragesthe responsiveness of farmers to changingmarket and climate conditions. The cumula-tive economic costs of even temporarydelays in adjusting to climate change mightprove to be large. Congress should considerbreaking the link between farm support andthe production of a single crop. A furtherincrease in flex acreage (an amount of landthat can be shifted to new crops with littlepenalty) or other more substantial revisionsin the commodity support programs thatwould allow greater flexibility in cropchoice (42) could be considered in the 1995reauth orization of the Farm Bill. Thesechanges would increase the ability of farm-ers to adapt to climate change.

1

■ Encourage research and development incomputerized farm-management systems.The competitiveness of the farm sector willincreasingly depend on advances that im-prove the efficiency of U.S. farmers-ratherthan on further increasesin intensity of inputuse. Computerized farm-management sys-tems include land-based or remote sensors,robotics and controls, image analysis,geographical information systems, andtelecommunications linkages packaged intodecision-support systems or embodied inintelligent farm equipment. Such systemswill be increasingly important to the farmer’sability to increase yields, control costs, andrespond to environmental concerns. TheU.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricul-tural Research Service already providesleadership in this area and has proposed an‘‘Integrated Farm Management Systems Re-search’ program that would provide for thedevelopment and broader use of technolo-gies that have the potential to greatly en-hance the efficiency of farming and toincrease the flexibility with which farmerscan respond to climate conditions.Use the 1995 Farm Bill to modify disaster-assistance programs. Since the late 1970s,Congress has been considering how to beststructure the crop-insurance and disaster-payment programs (20, 21). After a flurry ofproposals and studies before the passage ofthe 1990 Farm Bill, the programs were leftessentially unchanged. Major revisions arelikely to be considered in the 1995 Farm Bill.The best option for revising these programsremain unclear. For the purpose of preparingfor climate change, any program thatprovides a greater incentive for farmersor local communities to reduce theirexposure to risk should lessen the poten-tial for large-scale future losses and en-courage adaptation to changing climaterisks. Features of a restructured systemmight include: defining disasters formallv.


with assistance provided only for statisti-cally unusual losses; eliminating either cropinsurance or disaster payments (or mergingthe two programs) so that one does notundercut the incentives to participate inthe other; limiting the number of times afarmer could collect disaster payments; andrequiring farmers or farm communities tocontribute to a disaster-payment fund, thusproviding a greater incentive to reduceexposure to risks.

I WetlandsMore than half of the Nation’s wetlands have

been destroyed by activities ranging from agricul-ture to flood-control projects to urban develop-ment. Roughly 5 percent of the lower 48 States iscurrently covered by wetlands (see vol. 2, ch. 4).They provide diverse products of considerablecommercial value, playing a key role in theproduction of goods such as finfish, shellfish, fur,waterfowl, timber, blueberries, cranberries, wildrice, and peat. Wetlands also nurture biologicalproductivity, slow surface-water flows, and trans-form nutrients and toxic chemicals. Wetlands arekey to the harvest of 75 percent of the Nation’sfish and shellfish and harbor about one-thirdof the Nation’s threatened and endangered spe-cies (83).

As a result, in 1989, the Federal Governmentembraced the policy goal of no net loss ofwetlands-any destruction of wetlands should beoffset by an equivalent restoration or creation ofwetlands (28, 184). Steps to achieve this goal,however, have not been fully implemented. Partof the problem is that no single Federal statute isdirected at protecting, restoring, and acquiringwetlands, and there is no coordinated effort tomonitor and evaluate wetlands. Different authori-ties with different goals are scattered acrossmany Federal and State agencies, and the criteriathey use for decisionmak“ing are somewhat inconsis-tent. Federal policies have sometimes failed todiscourage--and sometimes have encouraged—

wetland destruction (179). Few programs forwetland acquisition and restoration addressthe possibility of climate-induced alteration ofwetlands.

Climate change is likely to accelerate the lossof wetlands, especially of the following highlyvulnerable types: coastal wetlands, depres-sional wetlands in arid areas (i.e., inlandfreshwater marshes and prairie potholes),riparian wetlands in the arid West and South-west, and tundra wetlands. Coastal wetlandsmay be drowned by a rising sea or altered bychanging salinity (123, 194, 198). Depressionalwetlands are susceptible to the lowered watertables that will likely result from the highertemperatures, increased evaporation, and de-creased summertime precipitation predicted forthese already dry areas. Riparian wetlands in thearid West, which rely on water flowing throughrivers and streams, could also be threatened bydrier conditions. Tundra areas in Alaska mayshrink as increased temperatures allow the perma-frost to thaw and drain.

Whether or not a no-net-loss goal can beachieved as the effects of climate change becomemore pronounced, the goal remains a useful focalpoint for policy makers (114). Wetlands are adiminishing resource, and the Federal Gov-ernment could play a lead role in ensuring thatwetlands survive climate change by adoptingthe following objectives: protect existing wet-lands, restore degraded or converted wetlands,facilitate migration (e.g., the upslope move-ment of coastal wetlands as sea level rises), andimprove coordinated management and moni-toring.

Given the available policy levers (regulationand acquisition, incentives and disincentives, andresearch), limited money to fund programs, andthe level of scientific understanding of the im-pacts of climate change on wetlands, we identi-fied the following strategies as first steps to use inresponding to climate change and the threats itposes to wetlands. Additional options are as-sessed in volume 2, chapter 4.


Prairie potholes, like these in North Dakota, servevaluable storm-water-retention functions and providebreeding and stopover habitat for migratorywaterfowl. Agricultural development, encouraged inpart by Federal subsidies, has eliminated many ofthese wetlands. Climate change rnay pose further risksif moisture declines or if farming intensifies with awarming in these northern lands.

■ Revise the Clean Water Act. The act is upnow for reauthorization, and it could berevised to improve wetland protection (169).This could be done through minor revi-sions or through transforming the act intoa broad wetland-protection and watershed-management act. For example, the mitiga-tion requirements could be clarified to en-sure that lands set aside for protection orrestoration more than compensate for wet-lands that are destroyed. Congress couldestablish uniform standards for mitigationactivities and require that restoration proj-ects be monitored and evaluated for successin meeting these standards. At a broaderlevel, Congress could devise a mechanismfor coordinated management of water qual-ity and wetland resources at a regional orwatershed level. For example, regulationscovering non-point-source water pollutionmight be linked to wetland protection, al-lowing wetland restoration or protection inexchange for relaxation in pollution-controlrequirements (127).

■

■

■

Develop and implement a priority plan tocoordinate wetland protection across agen-cies. Direct Federal agencies to develop andimplement uniform regional plans guidingwetland protection, acquisition, mitigation,and restoration and to coordinate the desig-nation of wetlands deemed high priority forprotection or restoration. These priority planscould be built on existing plans undervarious agencies (e.g., the Army Corps ofEngineers, the Environmental ProtectionAgency, DOI’S Fish and Wildlife Service,and the U.S. Department of Agriculture) thatnow set priorities for wetland managementand acquisition. With better coordinationand guidance and a watershed-managementfocus, existing programs could accomplishwetland protection more efficiently.Ensure that all Federal policies and incen-tives are consistent with wetland protec-tion. Congress could ensure that all Federalpolicies and incentives are consistent withwetland protection, reviewing Federal pro-grams to find and eliminate those that offerincentives to destroy wetlands and to per-haps bolster programs that encourage wet-land protection. For example, the CoastalBarrier Resources Act (P.L. 97-348, asamended) might be extended to includecoastal wetlands; funding for the WetlandsReserve Program might be restored to atleast authorized levels and targeted to wet-lands in high-priority areas. The Fish andWildlife Service could be required to com-plete and issue the report on the impact ofFederal programs on wetlands that wasmandated in the Emergency Wetlands Re-sources Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-645).Conduct research, development, monitor-ing, and evaluation in key areas. A newNational Biological Survey at the Depart-ment of the Interior could incorporate wet-land monitoring as part of its mission (seevol. 2, ch. 5). Relevant agencies should beencouraged to include wetland research in

Chapter 1 Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options I 49

their component of the U.S. Global ChangeResearch Program (USGCRP).

Federally Protected Natural AreasOver 240 million acres of land have been set

aside by the Federal Government to protect somepart of nature for generations to come. Theselands represent and protect the best of theNation’s natural heritage and have become asource of national pride. Chapter 5 of volume 2focuses on National Parks, Wilderness Areas, andNational Wildlife Refuges, which comprise thebulk of the Federal lands held primarily for natureconservation.

Because a variety of human activities hasaltered or degraded the habitat for many species,federally protected natural areas have becomerepositories for the Nation’s rarest species andsites for conserving biological diversity (181,185). Protected natural areas are also subject toincreased stress from activities that occur bothwithin and outside their boundaries. Natural areasare being effectively dissected into smaller andsmaller parts in some places--especially in theEast-leaving them more vulnerable to otherstresses that could degrade habitat quality andecosystem health (103).

Under climate change, the climate “map’that has helped to shape natural areas will shiftwhile the boundaries that define the manage-ment and degree of protection for naturalareas will remain fixed (see fig. 1-6). As aresult the biological makeup of the protectednatural areas will change. Some may becomeincapable of providing the benefits or serving thefunctions for which they were originally estab-lished, such as maintaining their unique ordistinctive character, providing protection for rarespecies and other biological resources, and main-taining the quality or availability of other serv-ices, such as nature study or certain kinds ofrecreation (see vol. 2, box 5-B).

Figure l-S-Preserves and Climate Change

— 1

Southern range limit I

New southernrange limit

❑ \//

- -.

Old southern range limit

NOTE: As climate changes, the preferred range of many species mayshift, Ieaving preserves dramatically changed.


Certain general characteristics of protectednatural areas may make them more vulnerable toclimate change, such as being small, isolated,fragmented, or already under considerable stress,and containing sensitive species or ecosystems,such as coastal, alpine, or Arctic ecosystems ormidcontinent wetlands (67, 133, 188). If climatechange leads to accelerated habitat loss or pro-ceeds so quickly that some species cannot adaptquickly enough, species loss may accelerate, andoverall biodiversity will decline (29, 196).

Even if species can move fast enough, adapta-tion by migration may be difficult because inmany places, the landscape has been sectioned offinto small pieces. Some natural areas are islandsin the middle of extensively developed areas.Geographic fragmentation may limit the ability of


Box l-G-Climate Change in Alaska: A Special Case

Nowhere in the United States does there remain such a vast expanse of land so undisturbed by human activityas in Alaska. Because of its distinctive character, pristine conditions, and abundant natural resources, Alaska hasbecome a national treasure. Nearly 66 percent of Alaska’s land base is protected in wilderness areas, NationalWildlife Refuges, National Forests, or public Iands administered by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Alaskacontains some 170 million acres (69 million hectares)1 of wetlands (over 60 percent of the Nation’s total) and 330million acres of boreal forest. Alaskan plants and animals withstand some of the harshest environmental conditionsin the world and many are unique to polar climates. Although human activities are to some extent adverselyaffecting this remote environment, it remains the most wild place in the United States and is rightly referred to asour “last frontier.”

The unique characteristics of Alaska-the natural resources, the wildlife, and the pristine, harshenvironment-affect nearly every aspect of life, including the culture and industry of those who live here. Forexample, traditions of the indigenous communities are deeply rooted in t he distinctive wildlife and vegetation ofAlaska. Many indigenous communities, such as the Inupiat Eskimos of Alaska’s North Slope, still rely on wildlifeand natural vegetation for subsistence. The bowhead whale is central to their culture. The whales are a major foodsource and the hunts are a community tradition. Caribou and fish are other staples for Inupiats. AthapaskanIndians, who reside mostly in the boreal forest of interior Alaska, rely heavily on the plant life there for food, housingmaterials, and heating fuels (120). Fish such as salmon and whitefish are primary elements of Athapaskansubsistence, and caribou and moose are important sources of food anddothing(120).

Alaska’s economy is also deeply rooted in its abundant natural resources, with oil and gas, fishing, andtourism providing the base for the economy. Nearly 65 percent of the State’s revenue comes from oil and gasexploration or development. Two of the largest oil fields in North America (Prudhoe Bay and Kuparuk fields) arelocated near Alaska’s North Slope and provide the economic base for much of that region. Alaskan waters arealso sites of some of the world’s most productive fisheries. The Bering Sea has the biggest fishery in the UnitedStates; it is among the biggest in the world. In 1990, Alaska’s fish harvest (mostly salmon, king crab, halibut, shrimp,and scallops) surpassed any other State’s, with more than 5.4 billion pounds (2.4 billion kilograms)2 of seafoodharvested-half of all seafood harvested in the Nation. The seafood industry is also Alaska’s largest private-sectoremployer, employing 23 percent of the State’s work force. In addition, Alaska’s vast expanse of rugged land andabundant wildlife have made tourism a growing and important industry there. Visitors to Alaska spent almost

$1 billion in 1989, the third largest source of income in the State. With 13,500 workers in tourist-related industries,tourism is second only to fisheries as a source of employment?

Because climate changes resulting from rising atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) are expected to beespecially pronounced in Alaska and other high-latitude regions, Alaska may provide an “early warning” of initialclimate effects. In very general terms, Alaska can expect to see increased average temperatures, increasedprecipitation, and melting of sea ice. The rate and ultimate severity of the climate changes is at present unknown(67). In addition, little is known about the sensitivities of wildlife, vegetation, ecosystems, indigenous cultures, orthe economy to any potential climate changes.

Warmer temperatures in polar regions are expected to lead to some melting of sea ice. A recent study ofclimate change effects on the Canadian Beaufort Sea determined that, based on a doubling of atmospheric CO2

the open-water season could increase from an average of 2 months to 5 months, the extent of open water couldincrease from about 100 miles (160 kilometers)4 to 300-500 miles, and maximum ice thickness could decrease

1 TO convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

2 TO convert pounds to kilograms, multiply by 0.454.s P. carlson, Alaska Division of Toursim, personal communication, *ptem~ 1993.4 TO convert miles to Idlonwters, multiply by 1.609.

Chapter l-Synthesis, Summary, and Policy Options | 51

by 50-75 percent (102). Shoreline erosion could increase significantly with a longer open-water season. Overallbiological productivity is also expected to increase in parts of the Bering Sea with an increase in temperature andchange in ice cover. Because of the drying effects of warmer temperatures, there could be an increase in thefrequency and extent of fires. Over the past three decades, fires in Alaska have increased due to warmer and drierconditions. More fires under climate change could expand the extent of early successional vegetation favored bymoose, beavers, Arctic hares, sharptailed grouse, and other wildlife species. However, fire may adversely affectthe lichen supply in spruce forests--an important food for caribou in winter.

The most profound consequence of warming in Alaska and other polar regions maybe the exacerbation ofglobal climate change through the release of carbon from the permafrost of the Alaskan tundra and boreal forests.Worldwide, tundra and boreal forests contain nearly a third of the world’s soil carbon. Thawing of the permafrost,and the resulting decomposition of organic material, could release huge quantities of methane (CH4) and C02 intothe atmosphere and contribute to accelerated warming (67).5 Climate warming may also be exacerbated bymelting of the vast expanse of ice and snow that now reflects away considerable incoming heat. Little can be doneto stem the thaw and resulting secondary climate impacts, except to slow warming by reducing human-madegreenhouse gas emissions.

Potential Losers

Indigenous cultures--Alaska’s indigenous, subsistence communities could be at risk under climate change.Thawing of the permafrost is likely to affect supported structures such as pipelines and bridges, and roads maybe threatened if thawing weakens the soil. Many indigenous peoples use the permafrost for food-storage cellars,so warming may threaten their ability to preserve food during summer months. Hunting the bowhead whale, anancient and sacred tradition for many indigenous communities on the North Slope, is linked to the extent of seaice. Melting of the sea ice will likely change the whale’s migration and affect access to the whales by indigenoushunters.

Plants and animals--early half of the world’s peatlands (tundra) are in North America, with nearly a thirdof these in Alaska. Evena2‘F (1 ºC) warming could lead to forests replacing alpine tundra on many mountainsand islands (122). Some tundra species unable to adapt to climate change might decline. Caribou populationsdepend on lichens for food. The distribution of lichens is sensitive to the amount and extent of snow cover, whichwill change under a warming climate. Furthermore, because caribou calving is linked to vegetation produced duringearly snow melt, changes in the timing of the melt could disrupt calving.

Some 25 species of marine mammals regularly use Alaskan waters. The marine mammals most likely to beadversely affected by climate change are pinnipeds (seals and walruses) that winter primarily in t he Bering Seahave regular contact with ice, and are closely associated with the continental shelf or shelf edge. These includespotted and ribbon seals, which may suffer from increased competition with other species and reduced habitat,and Pacific walruses and bearded seals, which are ice-associated bottom feeders and are therefore tied to theseasonally ice-covered continental shelves. Both the beluga and bowhead whales are associated with sea ice,but they may not be significantly affected by melting because they do not depend on ice cover to protect andnurture their newborn.

Perhaps the biggest unknown impact of climate change is how it will affect fish populations and the fishingindustry. Variations in stock size and species abundance appear to be correlated wit h periodic variability of oceantemperature, but are not completely understood. For example, huge fluctuations in groundfish stocks occur now.6

Many scientists believe that overfishing will remain the primary concern for Alaskan fisheries (122). However,

5 Recent measurements Indicate that the tundra of the North Slope of Alaska has in fact Changed from a“sink” to a “source” of C02 with the warming trend seen in Alaska over the past few decades (125).

6 V. Alexander, Dean, School of Fisheries and Ocean Science, University of Alaska at Fairbanks, personalcommunication, May 27, 1993.



Box 1-G--Climate Change in Alaska: A Special Case-(Continued)

considering the importance of fishing to the Alaskan economy, the potential for loss under climate change issignificant

Potential Winners

0il and gas industry-Reduction of the sea ice could allow the use of less expensive offshore structuresand would reduce the costs of marine transportation. Some speculate that the opening up of the NorthwestPassage would offer a shortcut for shipping from Europe to the Pacific Rim, but Alaskan ports probably would notparticipate significantly in this traffic.

Plants and animals-in general, plant life is likely to benefit from an increase in temperature, though thecomposition of forests and other vegetated areas will likely change. Some boreal forest species, such as whitespruce and birch, are Iikely to expand northward. Others, such as red and yellow cedar, may be less able to migratebecause of the rugged terrain, low genetic variability, and slow dispersing ability. Some migration is alreadyhappening--white spruce ranges have been expanding over the past 40 years. Expansion of white spruce intoboreal forests may eventually be important for timber harvests.

Most wildlife species, including polar bears, moose, muskoxen, mountain sheep, most marine mammals, andmany birds (e.g., grouse, raptors, owls, and migratory birds), will likely benefit from increased temperatures andincreased productivity in vegetation. These benefits might be stemmed by losses of tundra wetlands, increasesin disease spread, or changes in species assemblages that would result in changed predation patterns. Most birdswill likely benefit from having more forage, more insects, and a longer season during which to rear their young.Omnivores such as bears should respond favorable to a changing climate because of the longer availability ofgreen vegetation in the spring. Other forbearers and carnivores should increase in response to larger preypopulations unless they are controlled by hunting, trapping, or other human activities.

Tourism-Higher temperatures are likely to benefit the tourism industry, although vigorous advertising bythe State has almost certainly had more impact on the industry in recent years than has its climate. Increasedwildlife populations will probably attract more hunters, hikers, and campers. However, increased tourism could alsomean more impacts on the environment that is so important to indigenous, subsistence communities.

species to find new habitat-they may have no factors that make natural areas valuable: charac-place to go (34).

Natural areas in the West are currently muchlarger and much less fragmented than they are inthe East. However, the institutions that managethese lands are designed to manage only their ownparcels-in isolation—and are not encouraged toconsider the often more extensive natural ecologi-cal system. This compartmental approach tomanagement, or institutional fragmentation, mayprevent effective solutions to problems that tran-scend individual management parcels, such asthose posed by climate change (64, 92).

The main challenge for policy is to maintainthe high value of the system of natural areas whilerealizing that climate change may affect the very

ter, species protection, and environmental serv-ices. The ideal response to this challenge might besome combination of three general managementapproaches: 1) maintain species where they aretoday, 2) help species migrate through moreintensive management, and 3) acquire lands thatwill be valuable under a changed climate. How-ever, the lack of adequate knowledge and infor-mation precludes the full implementation ofeither approach now.

It is difficult to predict how climate change willaffect natural areas and how they will respond.This lack of knowledge limits the ability to helpnatural areas adapt. We do not know whichspecies are most sensitive to climate change,

—


which could be saved, or how to recreate habitatsor entire ecosystems elsewhere. The limitedsuccess with restoring populations of endangeredspecies illustrates how little is known aboutrestoring species and their natural habitat. Inaddition, we do not know what lands will be mostvaluable as preserves under climate change. Wedo not even know all of the species and kinds ofecosystems currently under formal protection inpreserves today.

The most useful approaches that the FederalGovernment could take to facilitate adapta-tions to climate change in natural areas fallinto two categories: information gathering(including research, inventory, and monitor-ing options) (115, 171), and managing naturalareas now to minimize the impediments toadaptation and to increase their resiliency. Thesecond category includes taking direct Federalaction to influence the management of naturalareas, establishing incentives to private landown-ers to encourage conservation under uncertainty,and promoting larger-scale management throughmore partnerships among agencies, communities,and governments. A variety of options thataddress these needs are assessed in volume 2,chapter 5.

Because money to implement every policyoption and the scientific understanding of howclimate change will affect natural areas arelimited, we have identifed some strategies thatrepresent inexpensive or useful frost steps forfacilitating adaptation to climate change in natu-ral areas. These options meet at least one ofseveral criteria: they will take a long time tocomplete; they address “front-line,” or urgent,issues that need attention before informed policydecisions can be made; they can be approachedthrough mechanisms that are already in place orthrough efforts already under way; and/or theyhave benefits in addition to those that helpprepare for climate change. In some cases, anear-term legislative action will provide a targetof opportunity to pursue these options.

■ Use the National Biological Survey (NBS)to assess ecological inventory and moni-toring needs. Future strategies to protectnatural areas and their resources will requirea national picture of current biological re-sources and the extent of the protectionof-or the threat to-these resources. Anational inventory and monitoring programwould be particularly beneficial in support-ing efforts to protect endangered species andbiodiversity. DOI’S proposed new NationalBiological Survey presents an opportunity toimplement some of these activities (131,132, 188). Congress could ask NBS toinitiate a nationwide inventory and monitor-ing program, synthesize ecological and bio-logical information for managers and plan-ners, establish a mechanism for facilitatingregional-level research and management,and develop a priority plan for expandingprotection of natural areas.

■ Support basic research on key gaps in ourunderstanding of ecosystems. This re-search would include work on species sensi-tivity to climate change, restoration andtranslocation ecology, the design and effec-tiveness of migratory corridors or protectivebuffer zones, the development of ecologicalmodels, and the effect of elevated CO2

concentrations on plants and animals. Basicresearch in these areas is needed now todetermin e how species might respond toclimate change and how best to provide fortheir protection in the future.

■ Conduct a review of ecological researchwithin USGCRP and across Federal agen-cies. Such a review would evaluate howmuch ecosystem research relevant to cli-mate change and other long-term ecologicalproblems (e.g., loss of biodiversity) is beingdone, and would identify important gaps. Areview of all research on ‘natural resources’has not yet been conducted across theFederal agencies. Existing analyses suggestthat a great deal of money is spent on


research relevant to the environment, buthow much is useful to understanding long-term ecological problems is not known.Further, there is currently no mechanism forconsolidating results from disparate researchefforts into “general patterns and principlesthat advance the science and are useful forenvironmental decisionmaking. Withoutsuch synthesis studies, it will be impossiblefor ecology to become the predictive sciencerequired by current and future environ-mental problems’ (97). An effort to charac-terize and synthesize ongoing research couldhelp bridge the gap between basic researchand natural resource planning. Such a re-view could be conducted by the Office ofScience and Technology Policy, the Na-tional Academy of Sciences, or an independ-ent commission.

■ Provide funding for the Fish and WildlifeConservation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-366).This law establishes a Federal cost-shareprogram for “nongame” species conserva-tion. It has already been enacted, but hasnever been funded. Many States have pre-pared initial plans that could qualify forFederal matching funds, making it a targetof opportunity to promote natural areaconservation at the State level. With someamendments to promote multispecies, or“ecosystem,” protection at the State leveland adequate funding., the Fish and WildlifeConservation Act could be used to encour-age natural area protection and conservationon State and private lands.

■ Use acquisition strategies to enhance pro-tection. Federal land-management agenciesshould be directed to consider whether allfuture land acquisitions and exchanges:1) augment underrepresented ecosystems inthe Federal natural area holdings, 2) bufferor connect other preserved land parcels, and3) provide habitat or services likely to persistover the long term despite anticipated stresses.Setting aside a given amount of land within

the modern fragmented landscape does notalone ensure that the ecological features forwhich it is valued will be preserved. To bestconserve species, natural areas should in-clude an array of ecosystems and transitionzones between them to allow for the manycomplex interactions that rely on linksbetween different parts of the landscape. Byasking agencies to incorporate such con-cerns into future acquisitions, Congress couldminimize future geographic fragmentationand use limited monies to maximize therange of protected ecosystems.

9 ForestsForests cover roughly one-third of the U.S.

land area, shaping much of the natural environ-ment and providing the basis for a substantialforest-products industry. These forests are enor-mously variable, ranging from the sparse scrub ofthe arid interior West to the lush forests of thecoastal Pacific Northwest and the South. TheNation’s forests provide essential fish and wild-life habitat, livestock forage, watershed protec-tion, attractive vistas, and an array of recreationalopportunities. Timber is one of the Nation’s mostimportant agricultural crops.

Climate change may pose a significantthreat to forests, particularly forests that arenot actively managed for timber production.Within a century, climate change might shift theideal range for some North American forestspecies more than 300 miles to the north (see fig.1-7). Such a shift would almost certainly exceedthe ability of natural forests to migrate (35, 36,146). Forests stranded outside their ideal climaticrange could suffer from declining growth andincreased mortality from climate-related stressessuch as insects, disease, and fires (2, 58, 100,157). Some forests may collapse, and species andunique populations may be lost from isolatedranges if climate change is too rapid.

The most vulnerable forest resources are thosein regions subject to increased moisture stress, as


Figure 1-7-Current and Projected Range of BeechUnder Climate Change

m Current range

Potentialfuture range

o 500 Overlap

NOTE: Based on climate projections from the Goddard Institute forSpace Studies GCM under the assumption of a doubling of atmosphericCO2. To convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, adapted from M.B.Davies and C. Zabinski, “Changes in Geographical Range Resultingfrom Greenhouse Warming: Effects on Biodiversity in Forests,” in:Global Warming and Biological Diversity, R.L. Peters and T.E. Lovejoy(eds.) (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).

in the dry continental interiors (14, 15, 159, 191).Forests in coastal regions may be at risk fromrising sea levels, with the threat of flooding andsaltwater intrusion, or from increases in damagingwind storms (61, 106). Forests with small orhighly fragmented ranges may be lost, such asthose at the upper elevations of mountains withnowhere to migrate (89). Forests in locationsalready subject to droughts, fire, and wind dam-age will be at high risk if the frequency orintensity of these stressors is increased (157).

The extent to which intervention to facilitateadaptation may be practical or desirable is lim-ited. Even timber-industry forests are not inten-sively managed by the standards of annualagricultural crops. On large areas of public forestlands, even a minimal management response

might be viewed as incompatible with the goalsfor which the forest is held. The challenge is tofind unobtrusive and cost-effective means to helpensure that the health and primary services of theNation’s forest resource will not be lost if climatechange proves to be as serious a threat to forestsas some believe it will be.

The Federal Government can prepare itselfto respond to the threats that climate changeposes to forests in several ways: 1) by betterunderstanding which forests are at risk (e.g.,by supporting research on species sensitivity toclimate and monitoring changes in forests);2) by acting to avoid the potential loss of forestspecies (e.g., by promoting and improvingforest seed banks, mass propagation tech-niques, and forest-restoration techniques);3) by being ready to react promptly to thethreat of large-scale forest mortality (e.g., bypreventing fires, managing pests, or thinningto promote drought tolerance—in forestswhere such activities are determined to beappropriate); 4) by redirecting incentive pro-grams to encourage improvement in the healthof private forests; and 5) by increasing theadaptability of the forest industry and forest-dependent communities to climate changethrough forest-product research and incen-tives for diversification.

Given the existing policy levers, the limitedmoney to fund programs, and the poor level ofscientific understanding of impacts of climatechange on forests, the following subset of poli-cies, discussed in volume 1, chapter 6, are firststeps that Congress could take. Each would helpthe Nation begin to position itself to respond tothe effects of climate change on both timber andnontimber forests. These options are justifiednow either because of existing problems (such asfire, pests, and drought) that will be exacerbatedby climate change, or because of the time requiredto complete the process.

Establish an expanded forest seed-bankprogram. A rapid climate change could


threaten the genetic diversity of U.S. forests.A national effort in the conservation offorest seeds would provide an opportunity torespond to the potential for loss of geneticdiversity in the forest resource under climatechange. An appropriate goal for such aprogram would be to maintain sufficientseed variety, or other genetic material, sothat much of the original diversity of theNation’s forests could eventually be restored(86, 87). (Current forest seed-collectionactivities are uncoordinated and focused ononly a small number of species (113).) Toaccomplish this goal., Congress could au-thorize and fund a National Forest GeneticResources Program within the Forest Serv-ice, providing funds for the construction andoperation of seed-storage facilities, for theestablishment of associated plantations to beused for continuing seed production, and fora forest genetics research program thatwould address climate tolerance of trees andmeans for large-scale propagation. Such aprogram could be partially supportedthrough fees for private access to the seedcollection.

B Develop strategic plans for responding tomajor forest declines. Increased risk offires and insect damage may result under awarmer climate. The relative value of pre-vention activities to reduce risk is likely tobe increased. The need for aggressive inter-vention to protect forest resources may alsobe increased. Because of the need for promptaction and because of the contentiousnessthat often accompanies forest management,policy rules for pest-control activities andsilvicultural management to reduce foresthealth risks are best established before theyare needed. Congress could enact a forest-health bill that would establish criteria thatwould allow prompt action to protect againstthreats of catastrophic mortality or restoreforests after large-scale mortality and de-cline. Such a bill might allow for the

declaration of temporary forest-health emer-gencies, under which accelerated actions toprotect or restore forest health would beauthorized-as long as these actions wereconsistent with established standards forprotection of all forest values. A policy-review group made up of academics, repre-sentatives of interest groups, and Federalforestry personnel could develop criteria forundertaking actions to stem forest decline.

■ Prepare for a forest-management responseto climate change. A changing climate mayeventually require innovations in forest-management and planting practices. Experi-mental efforts will be important in establish-ing a scientific basis for any necessarychanges to future management practices thatmight later be applied to public multiple-useforests. Congress could support a program ofresearch on the Forest Service’s Experimen-tal Forests, or other research facilities, toaddress adaptation to climate change. TheExperimental Forests are already designat-ed as outdoor laboratories for evaluatingforestry practices. The research could bedirected toward finding practical andenvironmentally appropriate techniques formanaging the public forests that will helpbuffer them or help them adapt to a chang-ing climate.

■ Improve incentives for private manage-ment of forest lands. The Federal Gover-nment controls only about one-quarter of theNation’s forestland. In the East especially,where Federal holdings are limited, efforts tosupport the protection of private forestlandmay take on increased importance. TheFederal Government may use incentives,disincentives, and cooperative approaches topromote the health and productivity of thisforestland. Existing subsidy programs underthe Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of1978 (P.L. 95-313), as amended by the 1990Farm Bill, provide cost-sharing assistance toowners of small, private forests. Traditional


forest-support programs (e.g., the For-estry Incentives Program) target funds onthe basis of potential gains in timbersupply. These programs could be modi-fied so that funds could be targeted toareas at high risk of insect and firedamage and to ecologically valuable fores-tland, which would encourage activitiesthat maintain the health of the privateforestland and discourage the furtherfragmentation of forestland. Expandingthe role of the Forest Stewardship and ForestLegacy Programs might help to accomplishthese goals. The funding priorities of theForest Stewardship Program could be clari-fied, thus ensuring that most funds aretargeted to the areas identified above.

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145. Ritchic, J.T., B.D. Baer, and ‘EY. ~ “Effect of G]obdClimate Change on Agriculture m the Great Lakes Regiq”in: The Potential Eflects of Global Climate Chan8e on theUm”ted States, Appendix C, Volume 1: Agncufuue, J. Smithand D. Tirpak (eds.) (WSShirigtom DC: U.S. EnvimnrmmtalProtection Agency, 1989), pp. 1-1 to 1-30.

146. Roberts, L. “HowFastCanTrees Migrate?” Science, Feb. 10,1989.


147. Rocky Mountain“ Institute, Water Eficiency: A Resource forUtility Managers, Comrnutu”ty Planners, and Other Decision-ntakers, in cooperation with the U.S. Environmental protection_ Office of Water (Snowmasa, CO: Rocky MountainInstitute, 1991).

148. Rosenberg, NJ., “A&@ltiOIl of Agriculture to ClimateChange,” Climatic Change, vol. 21, No. 4,1992, pp. 385-405.

149. Roaenzw eig, C., “Potential Effects of Climate Change onAgricultural Production in the Great Plains: A SimulationStudy,” in The Potential Effects ofGlobal Climate Change onthe UnitedStates, Appendix C, Vidume I: Agriculture, J. Smithand D, Tirpak (eds.) (%%shiq~ DC: U.S. *mnmtalprotection Agency, 1989), pp. 3-1 to 3-43.

150. Rosenzweig, C., and M. Pany, Climate Change and WorldFood Supply (OxforL England: University of Oxf~ inpress).

151. Ruq V.W., “W. Parry: climate change and World Agric@m,” Environment, vol. 33, 1991, pp. X-29 (book review).

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153. Sheer, D., “Rcaervoir and Water Resources Systems in theFace of Global Climate Change,” contractor report preparedfor the office of ‘Ikdmology Assessmen g December 1992.

154. Simberloff, D., J.A. Farr, J. COA and D.W. Mehhnaq“Movement Corridors: Conservation Bargains or Poor Invest-ments?” Conservation Biology, vol. 6, No. 4, 1992, pp.493-504.

155. Smi@ J.B., “Amending Natural Resource Statutes to Antici-pate Climate Change,” contractor report prepared for theOfiiCe O f ~hIIO@JY ASSeSSlneIl~ - 1 9 9 3 .

156. Smi@ JB., and J, Mueller-Vollmer, “Setting Priorities forMm@ ~Change,” contractor report prepared forthe Oflice of lkchnology Aasemncrlg February 1993.

157. smit& W.H., “United States Forest Response and Vulnerabil-ity to Climate Changq” contractor report prepared for theGffke of ‘Rchnology Aasesam ent May W92.

158. Solley, W., R Pierce, and H. Perlmaq Estintated Use of Waterin the Unr”ted States in 1990, United States Geological Survey(USGS) Survey Cimular1(N1 (Washin@oq DC: USGS,1993).

159. SolomoZ A.M., “Transient Rcsponse of Forests to COz-I.mluccd Climate Change: Simulation Modeling Expdmamin Eastern Noxth Auwr@” Oecologia, vol. 68, 1986, pp.567-79.

MO. swansoq GA., and IIF. Due~~ “Wetland Habitats ofWaterfowl in the Prairie Potiie Regioq” k NorthernPrairie WetlatuLr, A. vander Wlk (cd.) (Ames, IA: Iowa StateUniversity Press, 1989), pp. 228-67.

161. Titus, J.G. (cd.), Greenhouse Eflectp Sea Level Rise, andCoastal Wetfands, EPA 23(M)5-86413 (Washir@q DC:Us. Environmental Rotection Agency, Office of Policy,Planning and EvahWiOQ hdy 1988).

162. Titus, J.G, “Greenho use Effect snd Coastal Wetland policy:How Americana Could Abandon an Arem the Size of Massa-chusetts at Minimum Cosfi’’Envz”ronmental Management, vol.15, No. 1, 1991, pp. 39-58.

163. Titus, J.G., and M. Grwme. “AnOvemkv of * NationwideImpactaof Sea LcvelRise,” im The PotentialEffects of GlobafClimate Change on the United States, Appendix B: Sea LevelRise, J. Smith and D. Tirpak (eds,) (WaaMngtq DC: U.S.EnvimnmenM Protection Agency, 1989).

164. ‘lbrner, M, D. Swezy, ad J. LongstretlL “Potential Impactsof Global Climate Change in the U. S.: Importation/Exacerbation of Human Infectious Diseases,” cxmwwtmm - fa the OfFice of ‘Rchnology hwsamen$December 1992.

165. United Natiq United Natbns Convention on ClimateChange, Article 2 and Micle 4, Sec. 2(b), 1992.

166. Us. Mvisoly Commi tal Relationassion on Mergovernmen(ACIR), CoordWting WaterResourcesin theFe&ralSystem:The Groundwater&g!ace Wtier Connection (Washin@onjDC: Am (Mob 1991).

167. U.S. by Corps of “Engmeem, Institute for Water Resources,“XWR Review Report for U.S. (hgres~ Office of ‘lkchnol-Ogy hwasmcllg in Reference to Draft Report on Systems atRisk fhrn Climate Change,” IWRPolicy Study 93-PS-1, July1993.

168. U.S. Congress, Genaal Accounting Of&e (GAO), NationalWildlife R@ges: Contiruu”ng ProbIems with IncompatibleUses Call for Bold Action, GAOIRCED-89-1% (Washin@onjDC: U.S. GAO, September 1989).

169. Us. co- Genend Acumnting ma (GAo), WetfandkOverview: Fe&ral and State Policies, Legislation, and Pro-grams, GAOPU2ED-92-79FS (Washin@oQ DC: U.S. GAO,November 1991).

170. Us. congress, office of ‘nXhncdogy Assessmen 4 Wi?rkl?ul%:Their Use andRegu/an”on, OZ&O-206 (W@iogtoq DC: U.S.&WClllUICIlt _ office, March 1984).

171. U.S. Congmw, Of13ce of ‘Ikhncdogy Awewme@ Technolo-gies to Maintain Biological Diversity, OTA-F-30 (Waahing-toq DC: Us. Oov ernrncm Priming Offiq March 1987).

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176. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Blue Moun-tains Forest HeaZth Report: New Perspective in Forest HeaZth(pa OR U.S. Forest Smkc, PdfiC Nmhwest Regio&April 1991).


177. U.S. Department of Energy, Argonne National Laboratory,Environmental Assessment and Information Sciences Divi-sio~ ‘Ikdmology and Environmental Policy SectiorA Efiects ofScient@ Uncertm”nties on the Accuracy of Global ClimateChange Predictions: A Survey of Recent Literature, DOE!internal repcq MJ3. Femau and D.W. South (eds.) (Argonne,IL: U.S. Departmmt of Energy, October 1991).

178. U.S. Departrmmt of Energy, Oftlce of Energy Research Officeof Basic Energy Sciences, Carbon Dioxide Research DivisiomDirect Eflects of Increasing Carbon Diom”& on Vegetation,DOE/Elt-0238, B. Strain and J. Cure (eds.) (Washington DC:U.S. Department of Energy, December 1985).

179. U.S. Department of the Interior, The Impact of FederalPrograms, Volume 1: The Lower Mississippi Alluvial Plan andthe Prairie Pothole Region, a report to Congress by theSecretary of the Interior, Octobex 1988,

180. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land hfanagemen~Fish and Wildlife 2000: Spea”al Status Fishes Habitat Man-agement, BLM/SCLPT - 91~5+6844 (WashingtorL DC: U.S.Government Printing offke, May 1991).

181. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land ManagementFish and Wildlife 2000: Annual Repon ofAccomplishmentsFY1991 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,1991).

182. U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, AnUverview ofMajor WetlandFunctions and Vblues, FWS/OBS-84/18, contractor paper prepared by J. Sather and R. Smith(Washington DC: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, September1984).

183. U.S. Department of the Interior, Fi~ and Wildlife Service,EndimgeredandThr@ened Species Recovery Program (Wash-ington DC: U.S. Government Printing Off@ Decernbes1990).

184. U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service,Wetlandir: Meeting the President’s Cha11eng+1990 WetlandsAction Plan (TVashingtoU DC: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Sexvice,1990).

185. U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service,RejLges 2003-A Plan for the Future of the National WildlfeR@ge System, Issue 2, March 1991.

186. U.S. Departmmtof the Interior, Fish and WildIife Service, andU.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1991Nti”onal Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and Wildlife-AssociatedRecreation (Washington$ DC: U.S. Government PrintingOffke, 1993).

187. U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, TheNational Parks: Shaping the System (Washington DC: Na-tional Park Service, 1991).

188. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Potentitd Eflectsof Glolxrl Climate Change on the United States, EPA-23@05-89-050, J. Smith and D. Tirpak (eds.) (f%Sh@tO~ DC: U.S.Environmental Protection Agency, December 1989),

189. U.S. Gedogicd Survey, “Coastal Hazards,” im NationafAtlas of the United States of America (Restou VA: U.S.@OIO@Cd Survey, 1985) (IllZlp).

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191. Ur~ D.L., and H.H. Shugt@ “Forest Response to ClimaticChange: A Simulation Study for Southeastern Forests,” irxThe Potential Eflects of Global Climate Change on the Um”tedStates, Appendix D: Forests, J. Smith and D. Tirpak (eds.)(Washingtor4 DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,1989).

192, Wn Sickle-Burket$ V., et al., National Wetlands ResearchCenter, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, tables describingcoastal wetland vulnerabilities to climate change, prepared forU.S. CMce of lkchnology Assessment May 1992.

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195. w@dng’tomw., “Reliability of the Models: Their Match withObservations,” h. Climate Change and Energy Policy, L.Rosen and R. Glasses (eds.) (New York: American Institute ofPhysics, 1992).

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197. Wilhite, D., “Drought Management and Climate Chang%”contractor report prepared for the Office of ‘IkcImologyAssemzne@ December 1992.

198, Willard D.E., et al., “Wetland Vulnerabilities to ClimateChange,” contractor paper prepared for the Office of ‘Ikehnol-ogy Assessment, August 1992.

199. Willar& DJ3., and LD. Kosmox4 A Watershed-EcosystemApproach to Lund and Water Use Plawu”ng and Management,contractor report prepared for the Office of TkdnologyAi%WSSUMl~ Aug. 28, 1992.

200. Wingerd, D., and M. Tseng, “Flood and Drought Functions ofthe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,” irx National Watersummary 19884My&ologic Events and Floods andDroughts, U.S. Geological Sumey Water-Supply Paper 2375(_W%shingtq DC: U.S. Governrmmt Printing Office, 1991).

201. World Resources Institute (WR.I), ‘IIM World Conserv ationUnion (IUCN), and United Nations Environment Programmem), GIobal Biodiversity Strategy: Policy-Makers’ Guide(Baltimore, MD: WRI Publications, 1992).

202. Wrigh4 G.IL, Wildlife Research and Management in theNationaZ Parks (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press,1992).

A Primer onClimate Change

and NaturalResources 2

T his chapter summarizes the current state of knowledgeabout climate change and describes the interaction ofclimate variables with natural systems. Backgroundinformation key to understanding the impacts described

in each of the resource chapters (coasts, water, agriculture,wetlands, preserves, and forests) is included here. This chapterillustrates the range of effects climate change could cause acrosssystems and at different spatial and temporal scales.

Human activities have increased the rate at which greenhousegases--carbon dioxide (CO)2 methane (CH4, nitrous oxide(N2O), and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs--are building up in theatmosphere. This increase is likely to lead to changes in climatethat could have significant effects on natural systems. Thefirst-order effects of a buildup of greenhouse gases-increasingaverage temperature, rising sea level, and changes in precipita-tion and evapotranspiration--can be estimated with someconfidence at the global scale. Global average temperature mayincrease about 2 OF (1 ‘C) by 2030 and sea level is predicted torise by about 8 inches (20 centimeters)l in the same period;precipitation and evapotranspiration globally will also increase.

As scientists consider smaller spatial scales, their certaintyabout these effects decreases. Some midcontinent regions arelikely to become warmer and drier rather than warmer and wetter,for example, but not enough is known yet about climate changeon a regional scale to be confident about the direction andmagnitude of changes. A decade or more of research will beneeded before such precision is available. Second- and third-order effects, such as changes in individual plants and animals orwhole ecosystems, are utimately the impacts that humans care

To convert inches to centimeters (cm), multiply by 2.540,To

165


about. These changes in the natural and managedsystems that societies depend on have socioeco-nomic consequences and result in costs or bene-fits.

Plants and animals are more immediatelyaffected by extreme events, such as droughts,floods, or storms, than they are by changes in thelong-term averages of climate variables. How-ever, individuals may not be able to toleratesustained changes in average temperature andprecipitation. Such conditions might, for exam-ple, lead to increased vulnerability to pests,disease, and fires. Repeated stress will adverselyaffect not only individuals but also populationsand species, potentially resulting in altered eco-system ranges and composition.

As the climate changes and average temper-ature increases, the extremes experienced byecosystems will change as well. The hottesttemperatures may be hotter than previously expe-rienced; the coldest temperatures may not be ascold as they are now. Ultimately, temperatureshifts may alter the geographic range of speciesand ecosystems. Climate change may also benefitsome plants and animals. Certain plants, forexample, may derive benefits from the risingconcentration of CO2 in the atmosphere, whichcan act like a fertilizer. Higher temperatures couldenable some plants and animals to increase theirgeographic ranges.

Ecosystems are always changing and wouldcontinue to do so without climate change. How-ever, projected rates of change in temperatureexceed the estimated rates for the past 15,000years, which averaged about 2oF(1oC) per 1,000years; under a changing climate, temperaturescould rise 3 to 8 OF (1.5 to 4.5 oC) over the nextcentury. These changes may be too rapid to allowforest ecosystems to migrate with the changingclimate. Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 arechanging 30 to 100 times faster than shown inice-core records, which go back millennia. Natu-ral ecosystems are more vulnerable to climatechange than are managed ones, such as farms andplantation forests, because active measures--

Many animals, such as this Rocky Mountain coyote,require large expanses of remote and undisturbedhabitat to sustain populations. Human disturbance orfragmentation of habitat leads to declines in preypopulations and vegetation cover. Affected speciescan migrate, decline, or alter their food sources.

irrigation, replanting, and fertilizing, for exampleare much more difficult to undertake in naturalareas.

Many natural systems are already degraded bypollution and geographic fragmentation. Addi-tional human-caused stress may lead to undesira-ble changes in the values and functions of naturalsystems from which humans now benefit. ‘Unerstress, natural systems of plants and animals tendto breakup and reformulate in new systems withdifferent species or mixes of species” (21). Thetotal change in an ecosystem depends not only onits sensitivity to climate change, but also on thesystem’s absolute sensitivity to a variety of otherchanges that influence soil and water chemistry orhabitat fragmentation (21).

HOW DO WE KNOW CLIMATEIS CHANGING?

The Earth’s average temperature has increased0.8 OF (0.45 ‘C) over the past 100 years, with anuncertainty range of +/-0.27 oF (+/-0.15 oC). Thebroad range reflects many inaccuracies intro-duced in the 100-year land-based temperaturerecord by recording temperatures in cities (which

Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources I 67

tend to be warmer than rural areas), 2 usingdifferent instruments over time, and inadequateand changing spatial coverage.

Because the climate system is so inherentlyvariable, it takes a long time to detect trends.Besides greenhouse gases, urban ozone, de-creases in stratospheric ozone, increases in acidicair pollution, volcanic aerosols, and the solarcycle are all likely to have influenced the ob-served global temperature record. For example,the sum of all known greenhouse gases emitted tothe atmosphere to date should have increased theheat-trapping capacity of the atmosphere by 2.1watts per square meter (W/m*). However, over thepast few decades, other forces could have coun-teracted as much as 50 percent of the effect bycooling the earth. Urban air pollution (e.g., sootand acid aerosols) could have offset the warmingby up to 24 percent, ozone depletion by CFCS, 10percent, and increased cloudiness by 20 percent.Although these cooling effects temporarily mutethe greenhouse effect, they do not negate it, so netwarming is expected. Simultaneously, solar irra-diance (the output of the sun) may have enhancedthe greenhouse effect by 14 percent.

Other naturally occurring events can confoundthe temperature record, too, such as the 3- to7-year occurrences of El Niño. Volcanic erup-tions (such as El Chichon in 1982 and MountPinatubo in 1991) can more than offset the entiregreenhouse effect temporarily (for 2 to 4 years).3

Recent satellite temperature measurements takenover a 12-year period show no warming trend(84). This satellite record cannot be used to refuteglobal Warming for three reasons: 1) the record ofmeasurements is over too short a period; 2) twomajor volcanic eruptions occurred during thatperiod (Chichon and Pinatubo), followed by aseveral-year cooling due to the particles theyinjected into the atmosphere; and 3) the satellite

Figure 2-l—Long-Term GlobalTemperature Record

15.5 -

Q

15.0-

14.5- As observed

--- Adjusted

I 1 I I1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980

NOTE: Global average temperature from raw observations (solid line)vs. data adjusted for known biases (dashed line). Lack of data qualityand contlnuity has Ied to an undesirable Ievel of uncertainty about theserecords. To convert oC to oF, multiply by 1.8 and add 32.

SOURCE: T.R. Karl, ‘Missing Pieces of the Puzzle,” in: Research andExploration, Spring 1993, pp. 235-49.

does not measure the near-surface temperature ofthe earth; rather, it integrates a 6,500-yard (6,000-meter) swath of the atmosphere (48).

Despite all the confounding factors, the long-term temperature record shows warming that isconsistent with that calculated by the generalcirculation models (GCMS) (44) (see fig. 2-1 andbox 2-A). The observed 0.8 OF rise is within—but at the low range of--the 0.7 to 2.0 OF (0.4 to1.1 oC) that models predict. The warmin g is not“statistically significant’ ‘-that is, it is not out-side the range of normal variability. The unequiv-ocal detection of a climate change signal fromsuch complicated records requires at least anotherdecade of measurements (44). The nine warmestyears since 1891 were all in the 1980s and early1990s (6). Several ancillary pieces of evidenceconsistent with warming, such as a decrease inNorthern Hemisphere snow cover, a simultaneous

due to “the heat island effect’ is likely to than 0.1 (0.05 ‘C), or less than 10 percent of the (43).

For example, injected 25 million tons (23 billion kg) of sulfur dioxide 15 miles (25 km) into stratosphere; the cooling causedby reflectivity of those particles should offset the warming from greenhouse gases for 2 years until the particles settle out of the


Box 2-A–What the Models Tell Us: GCMs and Others

To describe how the climate system operates and to predict how changes in the composition of theatmosphere will affect climate, scientists have developed models known as general circulation models (GCMs).GCMs are composed of mathematical equations that describe the physical climate processes and interrelation-ships, including seasonal changes in sunlight, global air currents, evaporation and condensation of water vapor,and absorption of heat by t he oceans. The models incorporate basic physical principles (such as the conservationof energy and mass) and empirical evidence from observations of how the climate system seems cooperate (suchas statistical equations describing t he humidity and temperature at which clouds generally form). The four majorGCMs have generated somewhat different predictions about how climate might change largely because they usedifferent empirical evidence and starting assumptions and incorporate different sets of climate variables. Evenmodels that agree on global averages may predict different regional distrbutions because they have different waysof accounting for small-scale climate processes.

The differences in climate change predictions from the various major climate models have drawnconsiderable attention. So, too, has the fact that observed changes in global average temperature have been lowerthan initial estimates. Many models have predicted that based on the increases of human-generated greenhousegas emissions (particularity carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted during fossil fuel combustion) over the past century,global temperatures should already have increased by 0.5 to 2.0 ‘F (0.3 to 1.0 oC). Measurements of warming todate suggest that global average surface-air temperatures have increased approximately 0.5 to 1.0‘F (0.3 to0.6 oC)--on the low end of the predicted range (45).1

That global warming appears to be proceeding more slowly than predicted maybe due to difficulties indistinguishing short-term climate patterns from long-term trends, as well as to the complex and incompletelycharacterized interactions, of oceans, clouds, and air pollution with weather and climate (44, 92). Natural variationsin weather (e.g., rainfall and temperature) occur over years or decades, which may mask longer-term (century andmillennium) climate patterns for many years (63). In addition, oceans have an enormous capacity to absorb heatwhich may delay atmospheric warming for some time (81, 66). Clouds also play an important but uncertain rolein moderating planetary climate. Depending on their composition and location, clouds may either cool the planetby reflecting incoming solar radiation or warm it by contributing to the greenhouse effect so it is not clear whether,in the aggregate, they contribute to or somewhat offset global warming (1, 66). Finally, global warming may beoffset somewhat in the Northern Hemisphere because some human-generated pollution (particularly sulfuraerosols) may actually exert a cooling effect: when converted to sulfate particles in the atmosphere, they reflectincoming solar radiation (44, 66).

Generalities and uncertainties

GCMs paint the following general picture of global climate change. Average global air temperatures willincrease. With increased temperatures will come an increase in average global precipitation because warmer aircauses faster evaporation, speeding up the rate at which water vapor becomes available for aloud formation andprecipitation. Increased temperatures will cause the water in oceans to expand (water expands as it warms above39 OF (4 oC)), and as ocean volume increases, sea levels will rise. Sea level rise may be moderated if increased

¹ Global-average temperature statistics are compiled from historical temperature measurements fromweather stations around the world. Accurate interpretation of historical temperature data Is complkated andcontroversial because changes in measurement technicpes and Iocatlons over the past century make the datadlfflcult to compare. Data analysis is further oomptioated by the urban “heat island effect’’-local warming in areaswith many buildlngs and paved surfaces that tend to trap heat-which has ralsedtemperatures at some monitoringstations, reflecting changes in local dhnate apart from any potential global changes. The estimated temperaturechange reported here wasaconsensusflgure developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on CllmateChange (IPCC)that attempts to amount for both the changes In measurement and the confounding effeots of data from urban areas.

Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources | 69

temperature and water-holding capacity ofthe air lead to more snow at the poles, whichmay cause arctic ice sheets to grow thickerin the near future; on the other hand, warmertemperatures could cause parts of theGreenland and Antarctic ice sheets to melt,causing even more sea level rise. Beyondthese generalities, significant uncertaintiesremain about regional impacts, rates ofchange, and feedbacks. Regional predic-tions are quite murky, and they are the onesthat are most important to individual re-sources and human societies. A variety offactors, including local or mesoscale effectsof hills, and vegetation boundaries, areimportant in determining regional climate.GCMs cannot at present incorporate fea-tures this small (see the figure in this box)because spacing between grid points isbetween 150 and 800 miles (250 and 1,000kilometers) 2 (94). Because models differ inhow they treat these physical features andbecause the current generation of models isonly beginning to incorporate the modelingof ocean currents and aloud cover, it is notsurprising that the major GCMs differ mark-edly in predicting regional changes in pre-cipitation, soil moisture, and other hydrolo-gic variables. For example, certain modelspredict that precipitation will increase insome regions white others suggest that it willdecrease (83). The range (and thereforeuncertainty) in model output for soil moistureand runoff is even greater than it is forprecipitation (49).

Most climate modelers agree that pre-

NOTE: Models cannot yet incorporate regional featuresadequately because grid sizes are too large. The smaller thegrid size, the more complex and time-consuming each modelrun becomes. The top figure shows how a 480-km grid canobscure important geologic features. The bottom figure showswhat the topography of the United States looks like with a120-km model grid. The degree of resolution in the bottomfigure is typical of present global weather prediction models.

SOURCE: National Center for Atmospheric Research.

cipitation is most likely to increase at high latitudes and that the water-holding capacity of the atmosphere(cloudiness) will be largest in low to midlatitudes (30). In the midcontinent areas, especially in summer,evapotranspiration may outstrip precipitation, and thus soil moisture and runoff would decrease. The potential formore-intense or longer-lasting droughts would therefore increase. Some scientists (78) suggest that GCMs(because of their lack of realistic land-surface models) understate the potential for the intensification ofsummertime drought in low to midlatitudes. If current trends in greenhouse gas emissions continue, they predictthe frequency of severe drought in the United States would be expected to increase dramatically, with effectsbecoming apparent sometime on the 1990s (78).

A second likely regional consequence of global warming is that it will lead to changes in the type and timingof runoff. Snowmelt is an important, source of runoff in most mountainous areas. Warmer temperatures in such

2 To convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609. (Continued on next page)


Box 2-A–What the Models Tell Us: GCMs and Others-(Continued)

areas would cause a larger proportion of winter precipitation that now falls as snow to fall as rain. Thus, theproportion of winter precipitation stored in mountain snowpack would decrease. Winter runoff would increase, andspring runoff would correspondingly decrease. During times when flooding could be a problem, seasonal changesof this sort could have a significant impact on water supplies because adequate room in reservoirs would haveto be maintained (53), and thus some early runoff would probably have to be released.3

Uncertainty surrounds predictions of the rate at which climate change may proceed. Most assessments ofclimate change have assumed that it will proceed gradually and continuously until the climate reaches some newequilibrium (21). These assessments attempt to characterize what the climate might eventually be like when theequivalent of doubled C02 has been reached; relatively few studies have examined the intermediate, or transientclimate stages. However, a few suggest that the change may not linear and gradual. For example,the capacityof the oceans to absorb heat may delay warming for sometime, but there maybe some threshold after which oceanheat absorption slows and a relatively rapid warming of air temperatures follows (81)-or proceeds in steps in aseries of punctuated equilibria (relatively rapid change for a short time followed by a period of relative stability),so transient climate stages might be important (15).

Uncertainties also arise from lack of knowledge about potential climate feedbacks--that is, processes thatoccur in response to global warming that either augment or diminish the effect in complex and interacting ways.For example, at warmer temperatures, the atmosphere can hold more water vapor, which is a powerful greenhouse

gas, and this will magnify warming. On the other hand, some portion of the additional water vapor could form intoclouds, which can, depending on their size, shape, and distance from the Earth’s surface, reflect solar radiationand either amplify or offset some of the warming. The role of ice and snow in climate systems has not yet beenquantified, and it is not clear whether it will prove to be an additional feedback. Warming in the polar regions willlikely melt some portion of the polar ice caps, reducing the extent of land and ocean covered by them. Ice andsnow are more reflective than either land or water; reducing the amount of ice and snow will allow both land andsea to absorb more heat= In addition, sea ice tends to insulate the ocean; when the ice is not present the oceanmay release heat to the atmosphere more readily. Both processes could add to the warming cycle, so that as theatmosphere becomes warmer, it triggers various additional processes that will make it warmer still (66).

Other feedbacks may, however, counteract warming. For example, some scientists point out that vegetationmay grow better in an atmosphere with higher concentrations of C02 Increased plant growth could allow plantsto take up more carbon from the atmosphere, potentially acting as a brake to greenhouse warming (61).

Despite the uncertainties attached to climate change predictions, there are many areas of agreement on theglobal, and even some regional, outlines of change. The effects on ecosystems and natural resources are moreuncertain. Even if models could now generate accurate regional and local climate predictions, scientists do notyet have the theoretical knowledge to predict with confidence how ecosystems will react to the predicted climatechanges—and how ecosystem response will translate into impacts on natural resources and on the people whodepend on them. And they are further still from being able to forecast how or whether systems could adapt

3 The California mpartrnent of Water Resources has estimated, for exam~e, that if avera9e temwrature8warm by5‘F (3 ‘C), winter snowmelt runoff would increase, but the average April-Juty runoff would be reduced byabout 30percent (M. Roos, Chief Hydrologi+ California Department of Water Resources, personal communication,1992).SOURCES: Intergovernmental Panei on Climate Change (lPCC), Wxld Meteorological Organization, and United NatbneEnvironment Program, C//mate Change: The /PCC Sc#enfiflc Asseesrnent report prepared for IPCC by Wrking Group 1, J.THoughton, G.J. Jenkins, and J.J. Ephraums (ads) (Oambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990); IntergovernmentalPanel on Climate Change, Wdcf Meteorological Organization, and United Natbns Environment Program, Umate Change 1992: 7heSq@ementary %porf to the /PCC Sdentifk Assessment, report prepared for IPCC by Working Group i, J.T. Haughton, B.A.Callander, and S.K. Vamey (eda.) (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Prees, 1992); U.S. Congress, Offbe of Te&nobgyAaeeesment (OTA), Char@g by Degrees: SYeps to Redme Greenhouse Gases, OTA-O-42 (Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, February 1991 ).

.. . .


decrease in Arctic sea ice, continued melting ofalpine glaciers, and a rise of sea level (48), havealso been corroborated.

WHAT CAUSES CLIMATE CHANGE?4

The Earth’s atmosphere is a natural green-house. Sunlight passes through the atmosphereand strikes the Earth, and as the planet warms andradiates heat, a large share of the heat is trappedby gases in the atmosphere, primarily C02 andwater vapor. Although these gases make up only0.25 percent of the atmosphere by volume, theyare responsible for increasing the average tem-perature of the Earth from O OF (the temperature itwould be without these natural greenhouse gases)to 59 oF. The evolution of such an atmosphereoffered the appropriate conditions for the devel-opment of life on Earth. Humans have added moreCO2 and other greenhouse gases (CH4, N20, andCFCS) to the atmosphere over the past 100 years.These gases effectively trap the heat that wouldnormally be radiated from the earth into space.Instead, heat is reflected back to the Earth, andboth the surface and the lower atmosphere getwarmer-causing global warming. This green-house effect is illustrated in fig. 2-2.

An international panel of scientists was estab-lished in 1988 to assess potential climate changeand its impacts. This Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change (IPCC) includes more than 50countries, and operates under the aegis of theWorld Meteorological Organization and the UnitedNations Environment Program. IPCC issued areport in 1990 and an update in 1992 (44, 45) that

represent the best scientific assessment to dateabout climate change and its causes. IPCCscientists agree on the basic atmospheric mecha-nisms that make the planet a greenhouse. Theyalso concur that human activities, such as burningfossil fuel, deforestation, and agriculture, haveincreased the rate at which greenhouse gases areemitted to the atmosphere, and that the concentra-tions of those gases in the atmosphere areincreasing.

WHAT CHANGES IN CLIMATEARE PREDICTED?5

S Carbon Dioxide and OtherGreenhouse Gases

In contrast to measurements of temperature andprecipitation, which do not reveal clear trends,measurements of greenhouse gases show signifi-cant, steady increases over the past century.6 Forexample, the concentration of atmospheric CO2,the most important greenhouse gas (other thanwater vapor), has been systematically monitoredsince 1958 at the Mauna Loa Observatory inHawaii. 7 It has been increasing steadily for thepast 35 years. Data from air bubbles in ice coresshow that preindustrial atmospheric C02 concen-trations were 280 parts per million (ppm); in1990, the concentration had increased by morethan 25 percent to an annual average of 353 ppmand is increasing at 0.5 percent per year (see fig.2-3, lower data points). Seventy to 90 percent ofthe CO2 added to the atmosphere today (about 8

4 This section briefly summarizes the mechanisms and the greenhouse gases that contribute to the greenhouse effect. For a more detailed

treatment of climate change, see chapter 2 of OTA’S previous report on climate change, Chunging by Degree$ (88). That repxt also examineshow the United States and other countries could reduce emissions that contribute to climate change.

5 The predictions given throughout this section are based on an equivalent doubling by 2025 to 2050 of greenhouse gas concentmtions frompreindustrial levels. In additio% the predictions refer to a future equilibrium climat~ is, one in which the climate has finished changingand the climate system has arrived at a new balanc=ather than the rransient climate, or intermediate stage, that occurs as climate changeis underway. Scientists debate whether the climate will reach anew equilibrium or whether we are instead entering an era of continuous change.Equilibrium may not be reached for centuries. (J. Mahlmaq Director, Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, Princeton University, July 28,1993, at a briefing sponsored by the World Resources Institute and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric A&mm“ “stration.)

6 For a more detailed discussion of the emissions and effects of greenhouse gases, see reference 88.7 C02 is responsible for about 70 percent of the radiative forcing (heat tmpping) caused by greenhouse gases in the 1980s.


Figure 2-2—The Greenhouse Effect

Greenhousegases

45

Atmospheric\ \ processes

1

88Greenhouse

effect

EARTH

NOTE: Radiation flows are expressed here as a percent of total incoming or outgoing energy. Incomlng solar radiation is partially reflected back intospace (30 percent) and partially absorbed by the atmosphere, ice, oceans, land, and biomass of the Earth (70 percent).The Earth then emits radiantenergy back into space. The “greenhouse effect” refers to the trapping of some of the radiant ● nqy the Earth emits by atmosphere gains, bothnatural and anthropogenic. As a result of this effect, the Earth’s surface and lower atmosphere warm.SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Changing by Degrees: Steps to Reduce Greenhouse Gases, OTA-O-482(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 1991).

to 9 billion tons, or 7 or 8 trillion kilograms, ofcarbon each year) is due to the burning of fossilfuels--coal, oil, and natural gas; the remainder isattributed to deforestation. IPCC notes that undera “business-as-usual” scenario, the concentra-tion of C02 could rise as high as 800 ppm-nearlytriple the preindustrial level—by the end of thenext century (44). If world emissions were frozenat 1990 levels, CO2 concentrations would still riseto 400 ppm by about 2070 (see fig. 2-4),8 andtemperatures would continue to rise about 0.4 OF(0.2 ‘C) per decade for many decades.

Increases in the atmospheric concentrations ofthe greenhouse gases CH4, N2O, and CFCS havealso been documented and can be linked to

anthropogenic emissions. As the upper line infigure 2-3 shows, these gases effectively augmentthe greenhouse effect caused by CO2. Sources ofCH4 emissions include rice paddies, domesticanimals (cattle and sheep), natural gas productionand delivery, coal production, and landfills (44).CH4 concentrations increased about 1 percent peryear between 1978 and 1987 (from 150 to 168parts per billion (ppb)). Recently, this increasehas slowed to 0.5 percent per year; the cause ofthis slowdown is unknown (45).

Atmospheric concentrations of N20 began arapid ascent in the 1940s and increased at 0.2 to0.3 percent per year during the mid-1980s, withcurrent concentrations at about 310 ppb. Ice-core

Given that developing countries use the energy of the developed world and their usage 6 to per year, this later scenario is unrealistic (88).


Figure 2-3-Measured and Equivalent CO 2

Concentrations in the AtmosphereFigure 2-4-Expected CO 2 Concentrationsin the Atmosphere According to Various

Emissions Scenarios

300 - ~ ● + * -

275 1 I

1890 00 10 20 30 40 50 80 70 80 1990

NOTE: The lower points represent atmospheric concentrations of C0 2

from Antarctic ice-core data (1890 to 1950, shown as diamonds) andfrom recent Mauna Loa observations (1 958 to 1990, shown as stackedsquares). “Equivalent C0 2 levels” are shown by the connected circles;this is the additional effect caused by various trace gases (methane,nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons) expressed In CO 2 equivalents.

SOURCE: R.C, Balling, ‘The Global Temperature Data,” In: Research& Exploration, vol. 9, No. 2, Spring 1993, p. 203.

data show preindustrial concentrations of 285ppb, which had been relatively stable for 2,000years. Anthropogenic sources appear to be re-sponsible for about 30 percent of N20 emis-sions9—prirnarily from nylon production, nitricacid production, and the use of nitrogenousfertilizers.10

CFCS are humanmade chemicals used primar-ily for refrigeration and insulation. A worldwidetreaty (the Montreal Protocol signed in 1987 andaugmented by several subsequent amendments)will eliminate use of these chemicals by the endof the century. The concentration of CFCS in theatmosphere had been increasing at 4 percent peryear in the 1980s. These chemicals cause ozonedepletion worldwide and the Antarctic ozonehole. Given world action to phase out CFCS, the

A = IPCC “business as usual”B = frozen emissions after 1990

550 C = no emissions after 1990 /

400-

350-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1 i I r1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100

SOURCE: M. Heimann, "Modeling the Global Carbon Cycle,” paperpresented at the First Demetra Meeting on Climate Variability andGlobal Change, Chiandiano Therme, Italy, Oct. 28-NOV. 3, 1991.

ozone hole is expected to close in 70 years. CFCSare greenhouse gases and trap heat, but becausethey also destroy ozone (another greenhouse gas),the net warmingzero (45).

TemperatureIPCC predicted

from CFCS is approximately

that global average tempera-ture would increase at a rate of 0.5 ‘F (0.3 ‘C) perdecade, amounting to a 5.4 OF (3.0 ‘C) increase by2100. BOX 2-B summarizes the IPCC findings.Although the global average temperature hasincreased about 0.80 OF (0.45 ‘C) over the past100 years, a w arming of 1.4 to 4.0 OF (0.8 to 2.2

oC) is expected as an eventual result of thegreenhouse gas concentration increases of thepast century (this estimate does not include anywarming from future emissions).

9 J. Director, Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, Princeton University, personal communication Aug. 27, 1993. of Of (45).


Box 2-B–Highlights of the IPCC Scientific Assessment of Climate ChangeIPCC is certain that:

■ There is a natural greenhouse effect that already keeps the Earth warmer than it would otherwise be.• Emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the

greenhouse gases.

IPCC calculates with confidence that:

Atmospheric concentrations of the long-lived gases (carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and the chlorofluorocarbons)adjust slowly to changes in emissions. Continued emissions of these gases at present rates, would causeincreased concentrations for centuries ahead.The long-lived gases would require immediate reductions in emissions from human activities of over 60 percentto stabilize their concentrations at today’s levels; methane would require a 15 to 20 percent reduction.The longer emissions continue to increase at present day rates, the greater reductions would have to be forconcentrations of greenhouse gases to stabilize at a given level.

Based on current model results, IPCC predicts that:

• Under the IPCC “business-as-usual” scenario,1 the global mean temperature will increase about 0.5°F(0.3°C)per decade (with an uncertainty range of 0.4 to 0.9 °F per decade), reaching about 2°F (1 ‘C) above the presentvalue by 2025 and 5 OF (3 ‘C) before the end of the 21st century.

• Land surfaces will warm more rapidly than the ocean, and high northern Iatitudes will warm more than the globalmean in winter.

■ Global mean sea level will rise about 2 inches (6 cm) per decade over the next century, rising about 8 inches(20 cm) by 2030 and 25 inches (65 cm) by the end of the 21st century.

All predictions are subject to many uncertainties with regard to the timing, magnitude, and regionalpatterns of climate change, due to incomplete understanding of:

■ sources and sinks of greenhouse gases,■ clouds,■ oceans, and■ polar ice sheets.

The IPCC judgment is that:

■ Global sea level has increased 4 to 8 inches (10 to 20 cm) over the past 100 years.■ Global mean surface air temperature has increased by about 0.80 OF (0.45°C) (with an uncertainty range of 0.5

to 1.0 °F (0.3 to 0.6 ‘C) over the past 100 years), with the five globally averaged warmest years occurring in the1980s.

■ The size of this warming is broadly consistent with predictions of climate models, but it is also of the samemagnitude as natural climate variability. Thus, the observed temperature increase could be largely due to naturalvariability y; alternatively, this variability and other human factors (such as aerosol air pollution) could have offseta still larger human-induced greenhouse warming. The unequivocal detection of the enhanced greenhouseeffect from observations is not Iikely for a decade or more.

1 ~is ~nario aSSJmeS that few steps are taken to reciuce greenhouse gas emissions. The atmosphericconcentration of C02would double (over preindustrial levels) by about 2060, but the effective C02concentratlon (thecumulative effect of all trace gases) would double by about 2030.

SOURCES: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (lPCC), Climate Change: 77re tkientif~ Assessment M&id MeteorologicalOrganization and U.N. Environmental Program (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Preaa, 1990); Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change (lPCC), 1992 /PCC Supp/ernent W Meteorological Organization and United Nationa Environment Program(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Preee, 1992).


Greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmos-phere will have effectively doubledll relative totheir preindustrial values by 2030 (44, 45).Changes in global temperature will affect globalpatterns of air circulation and wind, possiblychanging the frequency or pattern of convectivestorms. Some research suggests that a warmer seasurface may lead to a longer cyclone season withmore-intense storms. To date, however, evidenceon whether storm frequencies will change isinconclusive (81).

On the regional level, average temperatures areexpected to increase more in the higher latitudes(in the Arctic and Antarctic), particularly in latefall and winter. In the northeastern part of NorthAmerica under a doubled CO2 climate, forexample, warming could reach 14OF(8‘C) duringthe winter (44), and average annual temperaturescould increase as much as 18 OF (10 ‘C) in somehigh-latitude areas (81). In addition, summerwarming in the middle latitudes, including muchof the United States, could be greater than theglobal average, potentially reaching 7 to 9 oF (4 to5 ‘C) in the Great Lakes area (45). In the tropics,however, temperature increases are likely to beless than the global average, and will vary lessfrom season to season. Figure 2-5 (top) showschanges in the average annual, winter, andsummer temperature ranges predicted for differ-ent regions of the United States used for studiesperformed for the Environrnental Protection Agency(EPA) (94). Regional temperature predictionssuch as these are accompanied by only a mediumlevel of confidence, but the predictions are likelyto improve within the next decade (8 1).

1 PrecipitationWorldwide, average precipitation is expected

to increase by 7 to 15 percent under a doubled

C02 atmosphere. Regional changes will be muchmore variable, with estimated increases of 20 to40 percent in some locations (e.g., coasts), anddecreases of up to 20 percent in other areas (78,94). The seasonal distribution and form of precip-itation are likely to change. In regions whereprecipitation increases, a significant share of theincrease may come during the winter; in somelocations, more winter precipitation will come inthe form of rain than snow (81). Althoughresearchers are fairly confident about the pre-dicted rise in average global precipitation, theyare much less confident about regional precipita-tion because of the many uncertainties surround-ing small-scale climatic processes. Figure 2-5(bottom) shows EPA’s predicted average annual,winter, and summer precipitation patterns fordifferent regions of the United States (94).

Natural climate variability is great relative tothe expected changes in climate variables. Hence,separating the signal of climate change from thenoise of natural variability is difficult. Onestatistical analysis of climate data from thesoutheastern United States indicates that if aver-age rainfall increased 10 percent, there would beonly a 7 percent chance of detecting that trendafter 25 years; even a 20 percent increase inrainfall could only be detected with a 65 percentprobability after 50 years (63). More concretely,it is difficult to know whether the recent 6-yeardrought in the western United States is a rare butpossible outcome of natural climate variability,an early indication of climate change, or a returnto the average climate after a long particularly wetspell. Longer climate records are needed todistinguish among these various possibilities. It isunlikely that researchers will be able to resolvethe uncertainties to develop better predictions foranother decade or two (81).

11 TIM quiv~mt doubling of C02 refers to the point at which the combined total of COZ and other -OUSC @.Us, such U m,, b~tup in the atmosphcrchavc “aradhtive cffcctequivalcnt to doubling the preindustrial value of carbon dioxide from about 2SOppm to 560ppm”(81). Thcfull warming associated with that amount of greenhouse &3scs XIlliY be delayed by ocean wurnin& “~ large heat cupacity of theoceans will delay lwlizul “on of IMl equilibrium _ by perbaps many decades. ‘his implies that any spechlc time when wc reach anequivalent C02 doubling . . . the actual global temperature increase may be considerably less [than 2 to 5 T]. However, thia ‘umdizedwarming’ will eventually occur when the climate system’s thermal response catches up to the greenhouse-gas forcing.’

76 I Preparing for an Uncertain CIimate--Volume 1

1“

I

0


Figure 2-6-Potential Soil-Moisture Changes Underthe GISS Climate Change Scenario

Much wetter (> 0.05)Wetter (0.025 to 0.05)No change (-0.025 to 0.0Drier (-0.025 to -0.05)Much drier (< -0.05)

NOTE: Numbers represent the degree of drying or wetting, calculated as the change in the ratio of actualevapotranspiration (AET) to potential evapotranspiration (PET). This ratio is an index of plant-moisture stress,indicating moisture availability relative to moisture demand. GISS-Goddard Institute for Space Studies.

SOURCE: P.N. Halpin, “Ecosystems at Risk to Potential Climate Change,” contractor report prepared for the officeof Technology Assessment, June 1993.

MoistureDespite overall increases in precipitation, soil

moisture is predicted to decrease in many mid-continental regions. Soil moisture, which isgenerally more important for vegetation than istotal precipitation, may decrease for two reasons.First, the rate at which moisture evaporates fromthe soil surface and from plants (evapotranspira-tion) would increase as temperatures rise. Theincreased evaporation rates may cause soil to losemoisture at a faster rate than is supplied by theincreased precipitation, particularly during thesummer. Second, the manner in which addedprecipitation arrives can affect soil moisture bychanging runoff patterns. There are limits to how

much soils can absorb at once.12 For example,sandy soils allow for relatively quick percolationof water through the soil column and into surface-and groundwater systems. However, the percola-tion rates of clay soils are slow. If increasedprecipitation comes in a few large storms ratherthan being evenly distributed over the year, moreof it may run off rather than remain in the soil.Thus, increases in average annual precipitationwill not necessarily lead to increases in soilmoisture and could be accompanied by drierconditions.

Figures 2-6 and 2-7 identify areas of the UnitedStates that may face significant changes in soilmoisture based on the climate changes projected

of to water considerably according to soil composition (the Of

and organic-matter content. In sandy soils with little organic such those in central have a low for storage. Soils with more clay and a higher organic characteristic of the Midwest, can generally retain more water (13).


Figure 2-7—Potential Soil-Moisture Changes Underthe GFDL Climate Change Scenario

Much wetter (> .05)

m Wetter (0.025 to 0.05) No change (-0.025 to 0.025) Drier (-0.025 to -O.O5) Much drier (< -0.05)

. . . . .

NOTE: Numbers represent the degree of drying or wetting, calculatad as the change in the ratio of actualevapotranspiration (AET) to potential evapotranspiration (PET). GFDL-Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory.

SOURCE: P.N. Halpin, "Ecosystams at Risk to Potential Climate Change,” contractor report prepared for the Officeof Technology Assessment, June 1993.

by two GCMS. An index. of soil moisture wascalculated as the ratio of available moisture topotential moisture demand (calculated as the ratioof actual evapotranspiration to potential evapo-transpiration) .13 White areas in the maps indicateregions of no significant change in the moistureindex, dark shading indicates areas of drying, andlighter shading shows areas that become rela-tively wetter. The Goddard Institute of SpaceStudies (GISS) scenario (fig. 2-6) produces amixed result, with large areas of moderate dryingintermixed with patches of wetting in the South-east and northern Rocky Mountain States. TheGeophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL)scenario (fig. 2-7) provides the most extreme

outcome for North America, with significantdrying across the eastern and central UnitedStates and along the Pacific Coast.

Sea LevelIPCC predicts that global average sea levels

will rise by around 2 inches (6 cm) per decade forthe next century, in contrast to the historic rate of0.4 inches (1 cm) per decade that occurred sincethe end of the 19th century. By 2030, IPCCpredicts that sea levels will have risen by around8 inches (20 cm), with a total rise of 26 inches (65cm) expected by the end of the century (44).

Sea level rise will result from the expansionthat occurs as water warms. Oceans will also be

for of by P. N. (34). is the 10SS of from resulting from both evaporation and plant transpiration. Potential is the of water that would be lost if there werenever a shortage of soil moisture. is the actual amount of released to the atmosphere (reflecting precipitationand limited availability of soil moisture).


affected by the melting of ice in polar regions. Thearea of sea ice and seasonal snow cover will alsodiminish (42). It is likely that ice on the marginswill melt more quickly in warmer waters. Thisresult could change the mix of fresh and salinewaters in high-latitude seas, and could furtherchange ocean circulation patterns.

Sea level may increase more along some coastsand less along others because sea level risedepends not only on whether the oceans are risingbut also on whether adjacent land masses arerising or sinking. Some coasts are sinking as soilsare compressed; others are rising due to tectonicforces or as they gradually rebound from theweight of glacial ice that burdened them duringthe last ice age.

14 Mississippi River Delta in

the Gulf of Mexico is subsiding, leading torelatively rapid rates of land loss, while much ofthe West and the Alaskan coasts are experiencingtectonic uplift and glacial rebound. Thus, therelative sea level rise and the associated land lossis predicted to be greater along the Gulf Coast (aswell as in parts of Florida’s Atlantic Coast and theSouth Atlantic States) than along the PacificCoast. The interaction of sea level rise, alteredwaves and currents, and storms could lead togreatly increased erosion on sandy coasts andbarrier islands (77; see vol. 1, ch. 4).

HOW WILL CLIMATE CHANGE AFFECTNATURAL RESOURCES?

Climate interacts with ecosystems at everylevel, from the individual to the landscape,throughout the energy and nutrient cycles, and ontime scales ranging from seconds to centuries.The effect of climate can be direct, through theaction of temperature, evapotranspiration, and

sunlight, and indirect, through variables such aswind, cloud cover, ocean currents, and the chemi-cal composition of the atmosphere. For example,photosynthesis rates are affected by the amount ofsunlight striking a plant’s leaves, which is deter-mined by cloud cover, which in turn is determinedby such climatic factors as temperature, evapora-tion, and wind. Similarly, global temperatureaffects the amount of precipitation and runoff,which in turn affects the transport of nutrients onland and through wetlands; ocean currents, whichare also strongly affected by global temperatures,carry nutrients through marine systems. Indeed,over the long term, climate both shapes thephysical landscape and determines where variousecosystems can exist (see fig. 2-8). Climatechange of the predicted magnitude is not unprece-dented, but scientists who warn of the potentialharms of human-induced climate change pointout that past global warming and cooling occurredover centuries and millennia rather than decades(see fig. 2-9).15

I Direct Climate ImpactsClimate is often defined as the long-term

‘‘average weather. ’ Likewise, predictions forclimate change characterize changes in the Earth’saverage annual temperature. However, individualplants and animals respond to events on smalltemporal and spatial scales. Variability is usuallymore important than annual totals or averages.The seasonal distribution of precipitation andtemperature, the form precipitation takes (whetherrain or snow), extreme events such as droughts orfloods, climate-generated fire cycles, late springfrosts, and early fall freezes are all significantfactors in determiningg the survival and productiv-

14 hd h de]~ a,rw often subsides. Sediment from upland areas loosely packs layers at the river delta where the river mtits the o-as sediment accumulates over time, it gradually grows heavier and compresses the underlying layers, so the delta land mass sinks relative tothe ocean. Coastal land may also subside in areas where offshore oil and gas extraction or pumping of water from coastal aquifers, has hollowedout underground spaces that are gradually compacted by the masses of land and water above. Much of the northern part of the North Americancontinent is still slowly rising as it rebounds from the weight of glaciers that covered it during the last ice age and is situated on a tectonic platethat is being lifted as the adjacent plate slides beneath iq both processes may cause sea levels on the western and Alaskan coasts to appear lowerrelative to the coastal land mass,

15 Athou@ ~nt ice-cover a.ndysis suggests that climate may have shifted sevem.1 degrees in a decade or less over regions of GH*d.


Figure 2-8--Approximate Distribution of theMajor Biotic Regions

30

- lo

Deciduous forest

forest

1

100 200 300 400Mean annual precipitation (cm)

NOTE: Based on mean annual temperature and mean annual precipitation. To convert oC to oF, multiply by 1.8 and add 32; to convertlcentimeters to inches, multiply by 0.394.

SOURCE: Adapted from A.L. Hammond, “Ecosystem Analysis: BiomeApproach to Environmental Science,” Science, vol. 175, 1972, pp.46-48.

ity of individual organisms. One or severalextreme events (such as a hurricane or drought)may shape ecosystem boundaries more than manyyears of “average” weather. Eventually, how-ever, when the ‘‘average’ has shifted wellbeyond “normal,” ecosystems may have troublepersisting.l6

The Role of TemperatureTemperature and its distribution are important

determinant s of plant productivity and survival.Temperature range exerts three classes of effectson plants: 1) low temperatures can damage planttissues, causing die-offs during unusual extremeevents and controlling the northward or altitudi-nal migration of plants; 2) in intermediate ranges,temperature governs the rates of photosynthesis,

Figure 2-9-Long-Term Temperature and C0 2

Records from Antarctic Ice Cores andRecent Atmospheric Measurements

,1990 date (AD) ::

1956

I I

1 6 0 1 2 0 4 0 0Thousands of years ago

NOTE: Data show that C0 2 is increasing in the atmosphere muchfaster than it has at any time over the past 160,000 years. The observedincrease in temperature is not yet outside the range of natural variability.To convert oC to oF, multiply by 1.8 and add 32.

SOURCE: C. Lorius, J. Jouzel, D, Raynaud, J. Hansen, and H. LeTrout, “The ice-Core Record: Climate Sensitivity and Future Green-house Warming,” Nature vol. 347, 1990, pp. 139-145.

respiration, the growth and development of seeds,and other processes; and 3) high temperaturesmay stress plants to the limits of their ability towithstand heat and moisture loss, thus controllingplant distribution and migration (19). Seasonaldistribution, diurnal cycles (i.e., the variationfrom night to day),17 and the occurrence andtiming of extremes (e.g., late spring frosts, earlywinter storms, and peaksummer high and winterlow temperatures) are all aspects of the effects of

(with standard deviation) will make waves of future.

on prove because day is a major factor productivity.


Box 2-C—Climate Change and Coastal Fisheries

BackgroundThe U.S. commercial, recreational, and sport fishing industries, worth an estimated $14 billion in 1988 (73),

rely on the health of nearshore and coastal areas (such as tidal marshes, coral reefs, seagrass beds, mangroveforests, estuaries, and banks). Two-thirds of the world’s fish catch, and many other marine spades, depend oncoastal wetlands and estuaries for their survival (42). By far the greatest portion of U.S. commercial fisheriescatches, with the exceptlon of those from Alaskan fisheries, are composed of estuarine-dependent spades.Ongoing alterations of critical habitat (such as geographic fragmentation and pollution) maybe exacerbated byclimate change.

Much is yet to be learned about the marine environment and the long-term effects that humans have on itUnderstanding the breadth of environmental stresses that affect fish and coastal systems will be essential toforecasting how climate change may affect these valuable areas. During the 1970s and 1980s, populations ofmany commercially important estuarine-dependent fish plummeted. Human activities In the coastal zone arethought to have been responsible for many of the dramatic declines in fish populations. Overfishing has beenimplicated as a primary cause of the declines of some fish stocks, with some 42 percent of species in Americanwaters considered to be overfished (52). The Atlantic cod fishery of the Grand Banks area has all but collapsed,triggering industry-related layoffs (primarily in Canada) of more than 30,000 people (75). Migratory species suchas salmon, shad, herring, and striped bass have decreased due to a combination of habitat degradation andoverfishing. The Chesapeake Bay’s oyster harvest has declined 98 percent from the levels of 100 years ago dueto disease, over-exploitation, predators, and habitat degradation (18). Neatly half of the Chesapeake’s wetlandsand seagrass meadows, which serve as primary nursery habitat for many migratory species, have been destroyed.Such destruction will adversely affect future fish populations.

The fishing industry from Southern California to Alaska is experiencing similar troubles as a result ofoverfishing, the damming of spawning rivers, water-quality degradation from logging, and other anthropogenic

(COntfnued m mWtj?@e)

temperature on plants. Length of the growing and indirect influences on animals. Higher-than-season is also very important, particularly foragricultural crops. Seed production generallyrequires a certain number of days with a tempera-ture above freezing, often expressed in terms ofdegree-days. At northern latitudes, the growingseason may not be long enough for some speciesto set seeds. Longer growing seasons in a warmerclimate could boost productivity of trees andother plants, especially those that could tolerateerratic spring and fall weather (e.g., early or latehosts). Seeds of many tree species, includingconifers, need to be chilled for particular periodsbefore they will germinate (17,21), so a shortenedCool season could be detrimental to such species.

In addition to the numerous effects of tempera-ture on vegetation, temperature exerts other direct

usual temperatures can adversely affect the repro-ductive success of many birds, mammals, andinsects (26). Increased water temperature limitsthe availability of oxygen in the water and, in turn,reduces the amount of oxygen available to fishand other aquatic organisms (87). For many fishspecies, ambient water temperature is critical forsurvival (see box 2-C). In addition, temperatureincreases can actually reduce the number ofspecies in a given ecological community (87),though total biomass may increase.

Warmer temperatures could allow some in-sects, including various agricultural pests, tosurvive winters farther north than they now do.For example, the potato leafhopper, which is apest on soybeans and other crops, now overwin-


Box 2-C-Climate Change and Coastal Fisheries-(Continued)

Arctic. .

activities. In Alaska, where the seafood indus-try employs 23 percent of the State’s workforce, this could prove to be a major problem.More than half of the Nation’s seafood harvestcomes from Alaskan waters.

scientists have hypothesized that climatewarming is likely to alter the distribution andreproductive success of coastal species (77).Many marine species are sensitive to narrowtemperature variations. Water temperaturecontrols the respiration and reproduction ratesof fish. Changes in temperature can alsoaffect the geographical distribution of speciesrange because some species will thrive inwarm waters, while others function effectivelyonly in cooler waters. Changes in streamflows will also be important because they canalter the salinity of coastal bays and estuaries.The interactions of temperature and salinitydetermine the “tolerance zone” for most fishspecies. Anadromous fishes-which swimupstream to spawn, such as salmon—alsodepend heavily on stream flow and water

quality (33). If these are altered by climate change, there maybe serious effects on reproductive success. In ailthese cases, climate change would be expected to alter the dose associations between species distributions andreproductive success, and the success of the fishery as a whole. Although it is difficult to estimate the magnitudeof these changes, impacts could upset the stability of the commercial fishing industry on which many coastalresidents rely.

Coastal areas have also been affected by human activities that contribute toxic pollutants and polluted run-off to marine waters. Runoff from developed and agricultural areas and overflow from storm-water systemsadversely impact these areas. Nutrients cause algal blooms, which deplete oxygen available for fish and otherorganisms. Stressed species may become more susceptible to disease and predators. Shoreline construction anddams have also contributed to fishery population declines. Destruction of estuarine and coastal zones limitsnursery and breeding areas, and dams prohibit fish from reaching upriver spawning grounds {see vol. 1, ch. 4,and vol. 2, ch. 4).

Regulatory attention has generally not addressed coastal zone management in light of the potential impactsof climate change. Harvest regulations, which are either inadequate or insuffiaently enforced, seem unable to keeppace with the decline in fish populations (52). In short too many fishermen are taking too many fish fromoverburdened ecosystems. Traditional fishery management is concerned primarily with a few major resources andtends topayfarless attention to the other ecosystem elements that fish depend on (77). Increasing concerns aboutecosystem management (see vol. 2, ch. 5) and the upcoming reauthorizat”km of the Magnuson Fishery Conservationand Management Act (P.L 94-265, as amended) and the Clean Water Act (P.L 92-500, as amended) offeropportunities to work toward improving fisheries and their habitat. Below, we highlight the regional importance ofmarine fisheries and identify particular problems (77).

Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources 183

Regional Characteristics of the U.S. Coastal Marine Fisheries

Acadian-Boreal (Newfoundland and southern Greenland to Cape Cod, MA)

■ Cultural: Indigenous coastal people-New England clam diggers.■ Flshh?g:

—7 percent of the Nation’s commercial fisheries+wtimated value, $250 million in 1990-multispedes trawf fishery-32 percent of species estuarinedependent-important species include hard dam, soft dam, American bbster, sea scallops, northern shrimp, Atlantic cod,

butterfish, cusk, flounder, haddock red and white hake (silver hake)—Atlantic cod most commercially important fish in 1989 (valued at $45 million)

m Common problems:-only remaining self-supporting U.S. salmon runs are in Maine-lobsters are overharvested-northern shrimp are at maximum harvest and subject to environmental variability y, especially when waters

are warmer

Virginian-Mid Atlantic (Cape Cod, MA, to Cape Hatteras, NC)

■ Cdturd: Indigenous coastal people--Chesapeake Bay watermen.■ Flshhlg:

-estimated value, $500 million in 1990

—11 percent of the Nation’s commercial fisheries

-most important species are blue crab and surf and ocean quahog

-Chesapeake Bay fish: 87 percent are estuarinedependent

E Common problems:-region is the most urbanized and densely populated in the United States-disease, overharvesting, predation, and pollution are rampant-responsible for reductions in harvestable

shellfish, forcing many watermen out of business-second to the Gulf of Mexico in the number of point sources of pollution-striped bass began a precipitous decline in 1973

Carolinian-South Atlantic (Cape Hatteras, NC, to Cape Canaveral, FL)

■ FMhg:43 percent of the Nation’s commercial fisheries-estimated valued, $189 million in 1990—94 percent of species estuarinedependent-over half of this harvest from estuarinedependent species-most important species indude Atlantic menhaden, bfue crabs, and penaeid shrimp

● Common problems:-application of pesticides and fertilizers to extensive commercially harvested forested wedands-degradation of shellfish habitat due to agricultural runoff and septic system overfbw

FloridIan-West Indian (Cape Canaveral to Key West, FL, and VWt Indies)

m Fhhhg:-values for individual species are not observed-important species include the Queen conch, spiny lobster, Nassau grouper, and more than 100 reef fishes

(ConthOd on next page)


Box 2-C-Climate Change and Coastal Fisheries-(Continued)

■ Common problems:-growing human populations, greater demands, and technological improvements in catch—virtually all assessed reef-fish stocks are overharvested-major tropical storms, including hurricanes, generally affect the area

Louisiana-Gulf of Mexico (Northern Gulf of Mexico from Central West Florida to South Texas)

■ Fishing:—17 percent of the Nation’s commercial fishery (with Vera Cruzian)—estimated value, $648 million in 1989-leading seafood producer among regions

■ Common problems:-subject to devastating floods, tornadoes, hurricanes and tropical storms, erosion, land subsidence, saltwater

encroachment, and sedimentation-second-fastest growing population rate of all regions-more point sources of pollution than any other region—application of pesticides to agricultural lands is the highest among all regions

Vera Cruzian-West Indian (South Texas to Yucatan Peninsula)

■ Fishing:—fourth leading U.S. port in fisheries value

-major commercial species are similar to those of the Gulf region

■ Common problems:-hurricanes and intense thunderstorms

California-Subtropical Eastern Pacific (Southern California (Los Angeles basin) southward to Mexico andCentral America)

■ Fishing:--major commercial species include Pacific sardine, northern anchovies, and Jack mackerel

■ Common problems:-most wetlands already lost; restoration doubtful-low-lying coastal areas subject to sea level rise

Oregonian-Temperate Eastern Pacific (California north of Los Angeles to British Columbia)

■ Fishing:-estimated value, $337 million in 1989-one-fifth of catch estuarine-dependent species, especially Pacific salmon (Chinook, coho, sockeye, pink and

chum)-commercial landings of salmon valued at $140 million--other important species include northern anchovies, Pacific sardine, Jack mackerel, and groundfish

(flatfishes, rockfish, including Pacific whiting, sable fish, Dover sole, widow rockfish, and others)

■ Common problems:--conflicts among fishermen, the Fisheries Council, various States, Canada, and foreign fisheries regarding

the allocation of resources-worsening freshwater (spawning) habitat has been the main cause of the salmon decline, and wild coho

stocks of the lower Columbia River were recently declared extinct

Sitkan-North Pacific (British Columbia to base of Alaska Peninsula)

■ Fishing:—56 percent of the Nation’s commercial landings of fish (with other Alaskan fisheries)


—estimated value, $1.5 billion in 1990—5.4 billion pounds (2.5 billion kg) landed in 1990 (with other Alaskan fisheries)—76 percent of species estuarine-dependent-most important species include Pacific salmon, Pacific herring, Pacific halibut Gulf groundfish (Pacific

cod, stablefish), king crab, and tanner crabs

■ Common problems:-some rookeries threatened by fishery operations—Exxon Valdez oil spill severely contaminated coastal areas

Arctic-Boreal/Arctic (Southeast Bering Sea to Chukchl and Beaufort Seas and Canadian archipelago)

Cultural: Coastal indigenous people-Eskimo, Aleute

Fishing:-most important species include Pacific salmon, Alaska pollock, Pacific herring—Pacific salmon fisheries rank as the State’s largest nongovernmental employer-provides an integral part of Alaska’s native culture and heritage

Common problems:-some stocks (chinook and coho) maybe harmed by foreign high-seas catches, and some salmon maybe

regionally overfished-destruction of spawning and rearing habitat-human population in this area is expected to increase by 380 percent between 1960 and 2010

Aleutian-North Pacific (Alaska Peninsula base to Aleutian and Pribilof Islands and including southwestBering Sea)

■ Fishing:-estimated value of groundfish, $352 million in 1990--dominant groundfish groups are walleye pollock, flatfishes (Yellow sole, rock sole, other), Pacific cod, Atka

mackerel, and shrimp—Alaska king crab value, $88 million in 1990

■ Common problems:–The U.S. fishery for shrimp in Alaska is at a low level, and potential yields are not well-understood (91)

insular-lndo Pacific (Tropical Indian and Pacific Oceans; not shown in figure)

■ Cultural: Coastal indigenous people-Papuan, Micronesia, and Hawaiian

■ Fishing:—7 percent of the Nation’s commercial fisheries taken in the Pacific United States and Hawaii-major species include invertebrates species (spiny and slipper lobsters; gold, bamboo and pinkcorals), bottom fish (snappers, jacks, groupers, Pacific armorhead), tropical tunas (yellowfin andskipjack), and albacore

■ Common problems:-coastal pollutiondestructive fishery technologies (explosives, poison, etc.)-overfishing by foreign fleets-ambiguous application of Federal environmental laws

SOURCES: M.R. Chambers, “U.S. Coastal Habitat Degradation and Fishery Declines,” In: Tmnsactbnsoftheh rth Amedcan WkWatniNaturaf l?esourws Conference (Washington, DC: The Wildlife Management Institute, in press); U.S. Department of Commeme, NationalOceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), OurLMng Oceans, The f?rstAnnualReporfon the Status of the U.S. Living Marine Resourcss, NOAA Technid Memo, NMFS-FWW-1, 1991; C.G. Ray, G. McCormick-Ray, and F.M.Pottw, G&&l Climate Change and the Coastal Zone: Evaluation oflmpacts on Marfne Eishedas and Bbdhferslty of the U.S., contractorreport prepared for the Office of TAndogy Aseesement, 1993.


ters in only a small area of the southern UnitedStates along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico.Warmer winter temperatures could greatly ex-pand the overwintering range, allowing for muchlarger populations to develop in the spring, andpotentially leading to increased plant damage(94).

The Role of Precipitation and Soil MoisturePrecipitation-or more precisely, soil moisture

(the result of a combination of precipitation,

infiltration, runoff, and evaporation--directlyaffects plant growth through its role in photosyn-thesis. Although average annual precipitation isoften used to characterize climate zones, theseasonal distribution is more significant than theannual total. Adequate moisture during the grow-ing season is critical. Seeds need moisture togerminate, and young plants-both annuals andperennial s-are often quite sensitive to drought.Vegetation may respond by defoliating, whichreduces water and nutrient demand, helpingplants survive dry periods. Precipitation duringthe growing season controls wood growth as wellas the size and maturation time of seeds (21, 42).Decreases in soil moisture can slow growth,interfere with reproduction, and cause plants todie early. Increases in soil moisture are less likelyto cause harm unless the soil in normally dry areasbecomes saturated with water for extended peri-ods. Standing water can drown the roots of plantsnot adapted to wetlands by interfering withnormal respiration; extended saturation of rootsmay kill the entire plant.

Direct effects of moisture on many land ani-mals may often be less important than the indirecteffects-that is, moisture affects plant growth,which then affects the availability of food andhabitat (86). However, moisture does play acritical, direct role in the natural history ofinvertebrate species (e.g., snails) and is essentialto the survival and reproduction of amphibians(105). Fish and other aquatic organisms thatinhabit rivers and streams can be threatened byeither too little water during drought periods ortoo much runoff flowing into streams. Duringperiods of high precipitation, water may becometurbid, interfering with the health and functioningof the aquatic ecosystem. Moisture is also impor-tant to many microorganisms and fungi, includingmany that contribute to human disease or areconsidered forest or agricultural pests (describedin more detail below and in vol. 1, ch. 6, and vol.2, ch. 6).


sunlightThe amount of available sunlight, or solar

irradiance, that strikes vegetation is an importantvariable in photosynthesis and productivity. Indi-vidual plants or species that make up the canopy,those near the edges, or those growing in clear-ings receive more light, whereas those in theunderstory are better adapted to lower light levels.Solar irradiance varies regularly from season toseason and from latitude to latitude. Cloud coveralso affects the quality and quantity of solarirradiance and its distribution over time, allowingless sunlight to reach the surface on cloudy days.If climate change is accompanied by increasedcloudiness, as some models predict, overall plantproductivity could decline. Water stress and hightemperatures may also affect plant response;however, plant response to changes in solarirradiance is complex and difficult to predict (19).

In addition to the total amount of solar irradi-ance, the number of hours of sunlight per day (daylength, or photoperiod) plays a role in plantfictions such as flowering and the setting offruit, and influences the rising of sap in deciduoustrees, such as sugar maple, in spring. Light qualitymay also affect productivity. For example, cottondepends on very regular day lengths, which onlyoccur in southern latitudes. Plant species thatmight migrate northward as the climate warmsmay not be able to reproduce as effectivelybecause day length is longer at northern latitudesduring the summer and drastically reduced duringthe winter (41). On the other hand, adaptation toa shorter photoperiod may limit northward move-ment.

Increased C 02

Rising concentrations of atmospheric CO2 mayaffect the rates at which plants grow, respire, usewater, and set seeds. This is known as the CO2

fertilization effect (see box 2-D). Numerouslaboratory experiments and intensively managedagricultural systems that have been studied sug-gest that CO2 has the potential to boost plantgrowth and productivity by speeding the rate of

photosynthesis, relieving nutrient stress (by im-proving efficiency of nutrient uptake and use),increasing water-use efficiency, decreasing respi-ration (which is a major source of water loss),slowing the rate at which leaves die, and speedingthe development of seeds (27,42, 66,68,69, 93).

Theoretically, the fertilization effect couldcompensate for the water stress faced by plants inareas that become warmer and drier due to climatechange, and might actually increase the totalglobal biomass (41). On the other hand, variousstudies have suggested that in some settings, theremay be limits to and even detrimental effects fromincreased CO2. For example, changes in theamount of carbon in plant leaves affect nutritionalquality (65), which could mean that foraginganimals would have to eat more leaves to gain thesame amount of nutrition. Increased CO2 mayalso cause starch to accumulate in plant leaves tosuch high concentrations that it could actuallyharm the plant by interfering with photosynthesis(50), though there is no field data to support this.

Numerous complex factors interact to deter-mine the extent to which fertilization actuallyoccurs in natural ecosystems, and many uncer-tainties about the overall impacts remain. Plantresponses to CO2 vary according to species andstage of development, as well as to water andnutrient availability (42). Some plant speciesalready use CO2 efficiently and will not receivemuch of a boost, whereas other species are nowlimited by their inefficient use of CO2 and couldprofit from higher atmospheric concentrations.

Plants may experience the greatest productivityboosts from increased CO2 when other nutrientsare plentiful (7). Thus, for example, field studieshave demonstrated that higher CO2 concentra-tions boost productivity in Chesapeake Bay saltmarshes, where water entering the bay is rich innutrients (2, 27, 28, 107), but CO2 fertilizationdoes not appear to be significant or permanent innutrient-limited tundra and other arctic ecosys-tems (32, 68). Few other ecosystem types have yetbeen tested in the field. Intensively managedagricultural systems, in which nutrient deficien-


Box 2-D-Coping with Increased CO2: Effects on Ecosystem Productivity

Climate, particularly the combination of temperature and moisture, Iargely determines where plants grow (14),and vegetation, in turn, is key to the distribution of animal species. Generally, climate belts vary within the UnitedStates from humid and damp in the Southeast and Northeast to moderately dry in the central regions, to arid inmuch of the West except for a humid belt along the Pacific Coast from northern California to Washington.Temperature and precipitation maps of the United States reveal bands across the Nation from north to south fortemperature, and east to west for precipitation. Vegetation growth, in type and lushness, varies with temperatureand altitude, but in all cases, solar irradiance is critical to the productivity of living things.

The sun provides the energy that fuels ecosystems; this energy is transformed through the processes ofphotosynthesis and photorespiration. During photosynthesis, plants use water and the energy from sunlight toconvert carbon dioxide (CO2) and other nutrients into organic matter and oxygen. This process is dependent onthe concentration of C02 In the air (i.e., ambient CO2, and, therefore, changes in normal COz levels may affectphotosynthesis and, likewise, plant growth. External environmental factors, such as temperature and theavailability of nutrients, may modify photosynthesis as well. The output of organic matter by an ecosystem ischaracterized as its biological or primary, productivity. Linked to primary productivity is nutrient cycling-theabsorption by plants of vital nutrients (e.g., carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorous) and their subsequent conversioninto usable forms.1 The combination of energy and nutrient cycling in vegetative systems determines the natureof the assemblage of plants and animals in a given area. Certain types of plants, growing in certain conditions,have higher primary productivities than others. Ecosystems that are highly productive often support both largenumbers of other organisms and many diverse species—that is, they are characterized by high secondaryproductivity and high biodiversity.2 Productivity is also key to carrying capacity—the number of organisms that aparticular area can support. Carrying capacity can vary from year to year based on many factors, including climate,

1 Carbon isdertvedfrom C02through photorespkation; nitrogen andphosphorousare taken upfromthesoiland oonverted to usable forms during the same process.

2 Although deflrtitlons vary, biodiversity generally refers to the “variety and tility m(j II* omtimand the eodogkal complexes in whloh they oocar” (89).

cies can be remedied by adding fertilizers, maybe fires, which play an important and visible role inmore likely to receive a productivity boost fromadditional CO2 than are natural ecosystems.Many complex interactions determine to whatextent, if any, the CO2 fertilization effect docu-mented in laboratory studies will occur in naturalecosystems. The responses will likely vary somuch fromn ecosystem to ecosystem and locationto location that there cannot be a simple answer tothe question of whether it will present a netbenefit or a net harm.

■ Indirect Climate ImpactsThrough Stressors

Climate will also have numerous secondaryimpacts. Increases in herbivores, disease, and

mediating the near-term effects of climate changeon communities and ecosystems, could result. Forexample, although few trees in a forest may dieoutright due to heat or drought, it is likely thatmany trees will sicken and become more suscepti-ble to insects and disease. At the same time, treesin decline will provide more fuel for fires (83).The extent to which an area is stressed byanthropogenic activities, such as land clearingand pollution, will also influence the effects ofclimate change.

Insects anti Disease

Climate may affect the proliferation of insectsand disease in numerous ways. Higher tempera-


and refers to the indivdual species or mix of species in a particular ecosystem. overall, however, ecosystem healthand productivity is dependent on the availability of sunlight water, nutrients, and C02.

Considerable experimental evidence has shown that an increase in the atmospheric concentration of COz

has the potential to increase plant growth and ecosystem productivity (28). This expected effect of Increased plantproductivity in the presence of elevated CO2 concentrations is known as the “CO2 fertilization effect,” and it isexpected to be particularly pronounced in the presence of plentiful supplies of light, water, and nutrients. Over thelong run, this effect may help alleviate the rate of global warming by drawing excess C02 from the atmosphere(8), although researchers are uncertain about the extent to which this will occur (vol. 2, see box 8-B).

Plants vary in their response to CO2 in part because of differing photosynthetic mechanisms—mostspeciesfollow the C3 pathway and some, the C4 pathway. C3 species (e.g., wheat, rice, soybeans, and all woody plants)are not yet fully saturated with CO2 and may greatly increase their productivity, whereas C4 species (e.g., corn,sorghum, sugar cane, and tropical grasses) are almost saturated with C02and their productivity may not be muchaffected. Added productivity of C4 species from doubled C02 may be in the O to 20 percent range, and in the 20to 80 percent range for C3 species. The differential effects of C02 could alter the dynamics of competition amongspecies, with C3 plants potentially prospering at the expense of C4 species. In agriculture, this competition amongplants may prove important. Because 14 of the world’s most troublesome weed species are C, plants that occuramidst C3 crops, enhanced C02 concentrations may make such weeds less competitive (73). However, many ofthe major weeds of corn (a C, crop) in the United States are C3 plants; climate change may favor the growth ofthese weeds. Similarly, natural grassland ecosystems where C4 grasses now dominate maybe invaded by weedyplants. Competitive success, however, does not depend solely on response to CO2. Competition among speciesin natural ecosystems will continue to depend on the ability of species to tolerate soil, light, temperature, andmoisture conditions. Because of the complex effects of competition among species it is by no means clear howthe overall productivity of natural ecosystems will increase under elevated C02 (8).

SOURCES: B.G. Drake, “The Impact of Rising C02 on Eoosystem Production,” Water, A/r, andSo//Po#ut&n, VOI. S4, 1992, pp.2544; P.M.Karalv% J.(3. Kingdver, and R.B. Huey (ecis.), Slot/c /rrteractlons and G/06a/Change (Sundedand, MA: Slnauer Armoo&tsa, Inc., 1993).

tures could accelerate the growth rate of insects. Once stressed by heat or drought, vegetationIf the number of warm days per year increases, thenumber of insect generations per year mayincrease. Also, the range of many insects isdetermined by cold winter temperatures. Asdescribed in the section above on temperatureimpacts, milder winters could allow insects suchas leafhoppers (agricultural pests) to spread northof their present range. Hot, dry conditions encour-age the growth of numerous fungi in forests (suchas Armillaria mellea, a fungus that causes rootdisease), which can cause widespread damage inmany types of forests. Warm, humid conditions,which favor soil and leaf-litter organisms as wellas decomposition, may encourage the growth ofother fungi and insect pests, such as aphids, whichcan also be quite damaging.

may become more susceptible to pests (58).Changes in CO2 concentration may affect thecomposition of leaves, potentially making themless nutritious, so insects might have to consumemore to obtain the same amount of nutrients (8).Thus, damage from insects and disease mightincrease, and in some cases, the effects of climatechange may become noticeable over the shortterm. Over the long term, damage from insectsand disease may cause less-adaptable species todecline, potentially opening the way for exoticspecies to migrate into communities (21, 83).

Exfreme Events

Periodic but unpredictable events such asextended drought, storms, and fire are among theprimary natural factors that shape ecosystems.


Severe storms accompanied by high winds andrain, hail, or ice may cause significant winddamage in forests, toppling older trees andleaving a trail of debris, but also clearing space fornew vegetation to take root (see vol. 2, ch. 6).Storm damage may reduce habitat for birds andwildlife that prefer a dense forest canopy and littleundergrowth, but could increase food and habitatfor animals that thrive in mixed forests withcleared areas, such as deer. In coastal areas,tropical storms and their accompanying highwinds and waves play an enormous role in coastalprocesses (see vol. 1, ch. 4).

The occurrence of fire is critical in determiningvegetation types, successional history, and wild-life species in forests in more arid areas, such asprairie and chaparral, and in wetlands. Fire isimportant in maintaining prairie, but the controlof fire has virtually eliminated most naturallyoccurring prairie areas. In some wetlands, includ-ing the Okefenokee Swamp and others along theAtlantic coastal plain, fire has played an impor-tant role in clearing shrubby growth and maintain-ing wetland vegetation. Under normal conditions,fire clears out forest undergrowth, damagingsome trees but allowing new ones to take root,thus creating a more open stand of trees (see vol.2, box 5-I).

Fire has been recognized for playing an impor-tant role in vegetation succession. In areas wherefires have been suppressed and fuels have accu-mulated, however, fires may become so hot thatthey cause severe damage, and forests mayregenerate slowly or not at all. For example,chaparral ecosystems in the foothills of Californiarely on fire to spur the growth of the shrubbyplants that dominate the area; however, in areaswhere fire has been suppressed, a fire that doesoccur will be more damaging, and the regenera-tion of chaparral species maybe affected. Naturalfire regimes are influenced by the frequency oflightning (which may or may not increase as theclimate changes), the presence of hot, dry windsto carry a fire once ignited, and an abundance ofdry fuel provided by the buildup of undergrowth

or vegetation that has died from drought ordisease, as well as by dry, living vegetation (22).Fires may increase under changed conditions, butthe ability of species to regenerate in areas withless moisture, because of climate change, maybereduced. Thus, recovery may not occur.

Anthropogenlc ForcesClimate change may serve to make species or

ecosystems more susceptible to stresses fromhuman disturbance. Human activities have be-come so widespread that they are now a pervasiveinfluence on much of the environment. Agricul-ture, timber harvesting, road building, and urbandevelopment have fragmented the landscape,carving natural areas into ever smaller andless-connected patches (see vol. 2, box 5-E). Thisfragmented landscape may offer few opportuni-ties for organisms to adapt to a changing climate.Fragmentation often isolates small populations ofplants and animals, which may limit geneticdiversity and make them less able to adapt tochange over time. These small, isolated popula-tions may also be prevented from moving to newand more favorable areas by barriers such asroads, buildings, or large cultivated fields. Inaddition, humans may respond to changes inclimate by adopting land uses (such as moreextensive cultivation) that further fragment thelandscape, exacerbating the stresses on flora andfauna.

Human activities may also result in the intro-duction of weedy and nonindigenous species thatflourish in the disturbed areas and that mayeventually outcompete other species, leading tolocal extinctions and reducing the diversity ofecosystems. In areas where weedy or nonindi-genous species already pose a threat to a particu-lar species or ecosystem, the added stress ofclimate change may further tip the balance infavor of weedy species that thrive in disturbedconditions. Similarly, air pollution in urban areas,and in much of the Northeast, already threatensthe health of many plant species. Climate changecould further weaken individuals that are already

Chapter 2—A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources I 91

stressed by pollution, and could make them moresusceptible to insects or diseases.

Although climate change might not be theproximate cause of ecosystem harm, it couldincrease the potential for damage. In sum, climatechange may exacerbate many other stresses, bothnatural and anthropogenic.

Direct Climate Impacts on EcosystemsAs temperature and moisture regimes change,

climatic zones could shift several hundred milestoward the poles, requiring plants and animalseither to migrate or adapt to a new climate regime.The rate of change will determine the degree ofimpacts: some species might be able to keep upwith change, others could become extinct--eitherlocally or globally (see box 2-E). The ability of aspecies to adapt will be critical to its survival. Bythe same token, the decline and disappearance ofspecies that are unable to adapt will decrease thebiodiversity of ecological communities. Such areduction may leave the remaining species morevulnerable to catastrophic events. Ecosystems,the assemblages of plants and animals, areunlikely to move as units, but will instead developnew structures as species abundance and distribu-tion are altered (42).

The general distribution of ecosystems isrelated to climatic conditions. The Holdridge lifezones shown in figure 2-10 characterize regionsof North America according to the generalvegetative ecosystem suited to current climateconditions. Under climate change scenarios pro-jected by four GCMS, this distribution of vegeta-tion zones will shift significantly (34). There isgeneral agreement among scenarios about thedirection of change: the extent of tundra andcold-desert climate zones will decrease, and thearea of potential forest and grasslands willincrease. Despite this general agreement, thereare qualitative differences, with dry forest typesincreasing under some climate scenarios, andmoister forests increasing under others. Overall,as much 80 percent of the land in the United States

Alpine areas are awash in color when spring andsurmmer flowers bloom.

may shift to a new vegetation zone (see fig. 2-11).Associated with such shifts in climatic zonescould be large-scale disturbances to existingecosystems.

Adjustment of SpeciesNatural adjustments to climate change could

begin with the failure of some species to repro-duce because flowering, fruiting, and seedgermination-and in some animals, reproductivephysiology or mating behavior-could be af-fected. All of those processes are particularlysensitive to climate. Reproductive failure mightallow new species to invade, or give a competitiveadvantage to other species already present. Thus,a gradual adjustment could occur, although in


Box 2-E—Responses of Natural Systems to Climate Stress:Adaptation, Migration, and Decline

Responses of individuals and communities to climate stress fall into three basic categories: adaptation,migration, and decline and die-back. The extent to which individuals and communities respond may depend onthe rate and magnitude of climate change.

Adaptation

It is difficult to predict which species, populations, communities, ecosystems, and landscapes will prove mostable to cope with climate change because of the many variables and uncertainties that exist. However, biologicaldiversity affords populations the ability to adapt to changes in the environment by serving as a natural protectionagainst shocks and stress. “The rule that there is security in diversity is an axiom of ecology as well as finance. . . .Biological diversity is a natural protection against surprises and shocks, climatic and otherwise. Among diversespecies will be some adapted to prosper in a new landscape in new circumstances” (21).

In species with diverse gene pools, the chances will be greater that some individuals will possess acombination of genes that is useful in new environments, such as genes that determine drought resistance andtolerance to extreme temperatures or salinity. These individuals will be the most likely to survive and pass alongadaptive characteristics to their offspring. At the community level, diversity may also increase the chances forsurvival. For example, a forest stand composed of a single species or of trees that are all the same age may beless able to withstand climate change than a forest composed of several species within a range of ages.Biodiversity is generally considered an important trait at the ecosystem level, too, because it increases the charmsthat the overall structure and function of an ecosystem will persist or adapt to changing conditions, even if somespecies that were formerly part of the ecosystem no longer remain (21).

Some species may prosper under climate change conditions, others maybe able to adapt relatively quickly,and still others may prove unable to adapt at all and may face extinction. As a result, ecosystems may changeas different plant species become dominant and different animal species become associated with altered habitats(21). Species in varied landscapes may be able to find microclimates within their current ranges that are suitable,and some species may even thrive and expand their ranges. Species already adapted to disturbed environments(e.g., weedy species) may be particularly resilient to changes in climate. On the other hand, species with extremelyspecific and/or narrow habitats may be more at risk to changes in climate. In addition, species on the fringe ofhabitats, in transitional zones, may also experience greater stress from the impacts of climate change becausethese species may not be well-established. On the whole, some species maybe restricted by a variety of biologicaland physical limitations, but others will be able to adapt to the conditions brought on by climate change.

Certain wildlife species may be able to alter their diet in favor of other, exotic but newly available plant species.White-tailed deer, mule deer, moose, elk and other species benefit from human activities that disturb ecosystemsand alter habitat (22). if, for example, climate change contributes to the conversion of a dense, forested habitatto a more open area, species such as these would likely benefit. Similarly, some birds, such as robins, starlings,and gulls, may adapt easily to alterations in habitat caused by climate change (22). These species tend to feedon a variety of different organisms and are territorial and aggressive in nature. They are very good at vying forresources with less competitive and smaller birds.

Migration

Some communities and ecosystems might have to migrate to survive the environmental conditions that couldresult from climate change. Most species of vegetation and wildlife have the ability to migrate to some extent.However, adverse conditions, such as landscape fragmentation, may limit this ability (see vol. 2, ch. 5). In addition,the ability of a species to migrate depends not only on environmental conditions but on dispersal rate. Animalscan generally disperse much more quickly than plants (22). However, because wildlife is dependent on vegetation

Chapter 2–A Primer on Climate Change and Natural Resources! 93

for survival, many species are forced to migrate only as fast as vegetation does (94). Therefore, the health andsurvival of many species will be dependent on the response of vegetation to climate change.

Dispersal rates for vegetation are considerably slower than the projected rate of climate change, and,therefore, some species will not be able to migrate as fast as their corresponding climatic regimes. For example,most North American tree species can migrate at 12 to 25 miles (20 to 40 kilometers) per century, but climateregimes are expected to migrate at much faster rates, in some cases by at least an order of magnitude (106). Inparticular parts of the United States, climatic regimes may shift hundreds of miles by as early as the middle to theend of the next century (43, 74). Because some species will be unable to keep up with the pace of climate change,their range may be reduced, or they may become extinct.

Coastal and estuarine wetland vegetation will likely attempt to migrate inland as the sea level rises. Theirsuccess in migrating will depend on the steepness of the coast and obstructions to migration that might exist, suchas rocky areas and human-built structures. Wetlands fringing the playa lakes of the Southwest may retreat alongwith the water levels if increased evaporation, in a hotter and drier climate, causes water levels to drop. Alpinetundra will likely migrate toward higher altitudes as lower areas become warmer and drier.

In all of these cases, wildlife and other organisms that are dependent on these ecosystems for survival mayattempt to migrate as well. The least Bell’s vireo, an endangered species completely dependent on riparianvegetation for survival, may lose a great deal of habitat if inland drying occurs (22). The jack-pine forest in northernMichigan, which provides critical habitat for the endangered Kirtland’s warbler, could die off and be replaced bya sugar maple forest in as few as 30 years under climate change conditions (11).

In each case, the ability to migrate will be limited by adjacent land-use patterns and the availability of areasto which organisms can migrate. “Barriers,” such as roads, cities, and agriculture, degrade habitat quality and limitthe ability of vegetation and wildlife to move or spread. Roads may pose a formidable physical barrier to animalmigration, and even plants may have difficulty “moving” across roads if their seeds are too heavy to be dispersedeasily and over large distances by wind. Vast expanses of suburban developments now occupy sites that formerlycould have offered either suitable destinations or pathways for migration of plants and animals from one localeto another. Many animals will not cross seemingly small obstructions, such as railroad clearings or roads, to getto nearby suitable habitat (22). Agricultural land and other highly managed areas prevent species from naturallyestablishing themselves. In general, the ability of plants and animals to migrate in response to climate change islargely affected by anthropocentric influences and factors. Nevertheless, many species will be sufficientlyresourceful to migrate successfully, and some may even thrive and expand their ranges.

Decline and die-back

If climate change is rapid or severe, some species, ecosystems, and landscapes may not be able to adaptChanges in climate may cause severe loss of function or value in certain species, ecosystems, and landscapes,or may result in the disappearance of certain species or entire ecosystems. Just as human land-use patterns maylimit migration, they may also ultimately limit the chances for some species or ecosystems to survive. Some speciesare well-suited to a very narrow set of environmental conditions, but lack characteristics that would allow them tomove or adapt easily to new environments. When human activities reduce or eliminate their normal habitats, thesespecies are likely to show signs of stress leading to decline or die-back.

In forest systems, decline and die-back occur when a large proportion of a tree population exhibits visiblesymptoms of stress, unusual and consistent growth decreases, or death over a large area. Such distinguishingcharacteristics can be irregular in distribution, and discontinuous but recurrent in time. In all cases, however,decline and die-back are the result of complex interactions of multiple stress factors (83). Some common abioticfactors include drought and low- and high-temperature stress. Biotic agents include defoliating insects,root-infecting fungi, and borers and bark beetles. Typicalty, declines are initiated by an abiotic stress, with mortalityultimately caused by a biotic stress agent.



Box 2-E—Responses of Natural Systems to Climate Stress:Adaptation, Migration, and Decline-(Continued)

More often than not, the decline and die-back scenario is a direct or indirect response to a change in someclimatic variable. Changes in precipitation and temperature patterns have been shown to have an interactive andsequential influence on the health of forest systems. Drought conditions tend to enhance the possibility of insectattack. For example, sugar maple in northern forests is extremely sensitive to extreme changes in temperature.Moist, warm weather is particularly conducive to the spread of Eutypella canker, a serious stem disease, whereasdrought periods favor the spread of Armillaria root decay; wind damage and sudden temperature drops significantlyfavor certain cankerous fungi, and the Iack of snow cover can result in deep root freezing (83). Nevertheless, thesephenomena have sufficient common characteristics in various forest tree species to allow for some generalization;changes in climate will almost certainly exacerbate existing stresses, further influencing forest decline anddie-back.

Some ecosystems will be influenced by changes in sea level rise. For example, coastal wetlands have beenable to keep pace with a sea level rise of approximately 0.04 inches (1 mm) per year for the past 3,000 years, whichis the rate at which many marshes are able to accumulate material. However, climate change is sure to increasethe rate at which sea level rises, which may ultimately drown these wetlands (98). Likewise, alpine and arcticecosystems may shrink and, in some sites, disappear if the amount and speed of climate change exceed the rateat which these systems can migrate upslope. On the whole, the rate at which climate change occurs will have adirect effect on the rate at which ecosystems experience declines in population and die-back responses.

SOURCES: P.M. Kareiv% J.G. Kingsolver, and R,B. Huey (cds.), Biot/c /rrteract&s and G/o&d Change (Sunderland, MA: SinauerAssociates, Inc., 1993), 559 pages; R.L. Peters and J.D.S. Darling, “The Greenhouse Effect and Nature Reserves,” i%bscfence, December19S5, pp. 707-17; C. Zabinsti and M.B. Davis, “HardTimes Ahead for Great Lake Forests: A Climate Threshold Model Predkts Responsesto C02-induced Climate Change, “ in: The Pot6ntial Effects of Global Climate Changa on The United States, Appendix O: FwasfsEPA-230-95-S9-054, J.B. Smith and D. Tirpak (eds.) (Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, June 19S9).

some areas, or for some species, slow processes of widely dispersing species (e.g., weeds) increaseseed dispersal, soil development, and achieve-ment of sexual maturity may curtail adaptation.Pollen records suggest that temperate forests canmigrate at approximately 62 miles per century,but the correlated growing-season conditions mayshift by 200 miles for every 4 OF (2 ‘C) ofwarming, so even in the lower range of climatechange predictions, some tree species might notbe able to keep up. Modeling results suggest thatif a forest includes some species that are betteradapted to a new climate, those species maybecome dominant, but if none of the species arebetter adapted, the whole forest might decline.However, climate change is unlikely to decimatevegetation and make land barren, except inlimited areas that are now arid and that maybecome even drier. Rather, ecological communi-ties are likely to change as rapidly moving and

in number, while slower-moving species declineand disappear (21).

The adjustment process will not occur uni-formly across species, communities, and ecosys-tems. Plants or animals attempting to migrate tonew areas may face competition from those thatstill remain. Some migrators may be able tocompete effectively, and others may not. Forexample, wetland vegetation may attempt to takeroot further inland as sea level rise inundatescoastal marshes, but existing inland plants thatsurvive may temporarily block the path. Migra-tion may also be blocked by areas renderedunsuitable as a result of human use. Some wetlandspecies may be more capable than others ofestablishing themselves among the inland vegeta-tion. Thus, many species, as well as ecosystemprocesses and interactions, may be reshuffled,


Figure 2-10-The Distribution of Holdridge Life Zones Under Current Climate Conditions

Dry forest

Cool desert

Warm temperate forest

Semiarid

Hot desert

Cool temperate forest

Subtropfcal rnoist forest

T u n d r a Boreal forest

Steppe + shrublands

Polar desert/ice + cold parklands

SOURCE: Office of Technogy Assessment, 1993, adapted from L.R. Holdridge, Life Zone Ecology(San Jose, Costa Rica: Tropical Science Center,1987), and W.R. Emanuel, H.H. Shugart, and M.P. Stevenson, “Climatic Change and the Broad Scale Distribution of Terrestrial EcosystemComplexes, r’ Climatic Change, vol. 15,1985, pp. 75-82.

especially at the boundaries of current ecologicalzones, where ecosystems are the least mature andthe most stressed (21). However, plants that arecapable of migrating or adapting may not neces-sarily be the most desirable. Climate changecould lead to an increase in less-valued speciesand a change in ecosystem composition.

Development of AsynchronyThe migration of vegetative species could put

many organisms ‘‘out of sync’ with their envi-ronments and disrupt many symbiotic relation-ships. As plants migrate inland and upland,pollinators and other vectors that assist in thereproductive process may not move at the samerate. If insects and birds are left behind, plants willface significant losses in populations, and somemay become extinct. This may be especially true

for organisms with very specific ranges, whetherthey be limited by topography, precipitation, ortemperature. In addition, insects and birds mayarrive at their migratory destinations prematurely,before feeding and nesting conditions are opti-mal, or too late, after resources have beenexhausted. Organisms will be exposed to differ-ent and varying conditions, such as photoperiod,intensity of sunlight, and temperature, unlikewhat they are currently acclimated to, which mayaffect reproductive capabilities as well. In addi-tion, some plant species may alter nutrient cyclesand other processes in order to adapt to new soiland moisture conditions. This could not onlyadversely affect the health of plants, but couldreduce their nutritional value, thereby affectingthe health of the wildlife that depends on them forsustenance. Marine species will face similar


Figure 2-n-Percent of U.S. Land Area ShiftingHoldridge Life Zones After CO 2 Doubling

UKMO OSU GFDL GISS

NOTE: UKMO-United Kingdom Meteorological Office, OSU-OregonState University, GFDL=Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, andGISS=Goddard Institute for Space Studies.

SOURCE: P.N. Halpin, “Ecosystemsa at Risk to Potential ClimateChange,” contractor report prepared for the Office of TechnologyAssessment, June 1993.

Many species of birds, like this Clark’s nutcracker,are dependent on specific habitats that providesustenance and cover. Fragmentation of these areascould have a dramatic impact on populations unableto locate mating, nesting, feeding, and over-winteringhabitat.

difficulties because most fish require specificconditions for reproductive activities to occur atoptimum rates. Anadromous fish (those that swiminto freshwater streams from the sea to spawn)may be most affected as salinity in intertidalwaterways is altered due to sea level rise. On thewhole, the migration of vegetation in response toaltered climate and the subsequent response ofinsects, birds, and other organisms could havesignificant impacts on ecosystem structure, func-tion, and value.

Interactions Among Climate, Ecosystems,and the Physical Environment

Climate change will affect living organismsboth directly and indirectly, as described above,but it will also affect the processes of the physicalenvironment in which they exist-soils andnutrient cycling, the hydrologic cycle, and pho-torespiration. Effects on the physical environ-ment and living organisms will interact and causefurther modifications to the environment and theorganisms. Because the various biological andphysical processes are intricately interconnected,with many feedbacks among them, it is difficultto predict what the overall effect of climatechange will be. The following sections suggestthe range of interactions between climate and thebiological and physical processes it affects.

Interaction of Water Resources and EcosystemsWater influences ecosystem function, but eco-

systems, in turn, influence the flow of waterthrough the hydrologic cycle (see fig. 2-12 andvol. 1, ch. 5). Water falls to the Earth’s surface inthe form of precipitation. Some water stays on thesurface and evaporates relatively quickly. Somepercolates into the soil and is taken up byvegetation, from which it is eventually transpiredthrough the processes of photosynthesis andrespiration. The remaining precipitation movesfrom upland to low-lying areas-on the surface,as shallow groundwater flow toward rivers orstreams, or by infiltrating more deeply into andthrough aquifers, eventually emptying into rivers,


Figure 2-12—The Hydrologic Cycle Shows How Water Moves Through the Environment

Evaporation and transpiration’ from surface water bodies,land surface and vegetation

Evaporation fromConsumptive use oceans

‘ -- S t r e a m f l o w

NOTE: BGD billions of gallons per day, To convert gallons to liters, multiply by 3.785.

SOURCE: Office of TechnoIogy Assessm ent, 1992.

lakes, and oceans, from which it eventuallyevaporates-and the cycle begins again.

The extent to which water evaporates, dis-charges to surface water, seeps into the ground, orremains on the surface depends on the amount andform of precipitation, the temperature, the topog-raphy, the nature of soils (whether sandy orclayey, and the content of organic matter), and thetypes of vegetation. Vegetation moderates thecycle in several important ways: it adds to theorganic matter of soils, increasing their waterretention; roots and stems may physically anchorsoils and slow the passage of water and channelwater below ground, further reducing runoff; andcanopies of leaves reduce droplet impact on thesoil and affect the rate of evapotranspiration.Because of these interactions, changes in vegeta-tion may cause changes in the hydrologic cycle.

For example, a semiarid grassland that is strippedof vegetation through overgrazing (by either wildor domestic herbivores) may lose some of itsability to retain water as plants no longer slowrunoff or take up water to release it slowly later.The interaction of changes in the ecosystem andthe hydrological system may eventually lead todesertification.

Climate interacts with the hydrologic cycle ondifferent scales. Global average temperaturesaffect how much moisture can be carried in theair, how quickly clouds form, how readily cloudsyield precipitation, and how much precipitationoccurs and in what form (e.g., rain or snow), aswell as the large-scale wind patterns that carryclouds from one region to the next. On a regionalor local scale, temperature affects the rate atwhich water evaporates from the surface or


transpires from plants. Temperature further af-fects the rate of evapotranspiration by influencingthe form in which precipitation falls. Rain typi-cally runs off soon tier it falls. Snow may remainon the surface for a considerable amount of time,with the delayed runoff supplying downstreamand adjacent areas with water during the spring.Thus, global and regional changes in temperatureand precipitation can affect the hydrologic cycleand the related ecosystem interactions in numer-ous ways.

The predicted changes in global climate willessentially increase the rate at which the hydro-logic cycle occurs, although different hydrologicmodels yield rather different scenarios of what theregional results will be (79). As outlined aboveand in volume 1, chapter 5, total global precipita-tion is expected to increase 7 to 15 percent, butwarmer temperatures will allow for greater andmore rapid evapotranspiration, which could leadto drier conditions in some areas (particularly inmidcontinent, midlatitude regions). Hydrologicstudies suggest that river watersheds can be quitesensitive to even small climatic changes, particu-larly in arid and semiarid areas, where annualrunoff tends to be highly variable. In river basinswhere snowmelt is important, both the annualtotal runoff and its seasonal distribution can beaffected by changes in temperature and precipita-tion. Overall, climate change is expected to leadto significant changes in both high-flow andlow-flow runoff extremes (42).

Soils, Nutrients, and VegetationSoil development and nutrient cycling rely on

a dynamic interaction among rock, plants, fungiand microorganisms, and atmosphere. The devel-opment of soils depends in part on the rock thatcontributes sediments as it erodes and weathers,on the kinds of plants that grow on the soil,generating detritus of varying composition, andon the microorganisms associated with the plantsthat decompose the detritus into nutrients andorganic matter. Nutrients, including carbon andnitrogen, are cycled in various forms through

plants, soil, and the atmosphere. The type of soilthat has developed may limit the kinds of plantsthat can easily take root and survive (which thenprovide habitat for particular animal species thataffect nutrient turnover from plants). The pres-ence of vegetation further affects the soil byanchoring it, thus preventing erosion.

Both temperature and moisture affect the typeof vegetation that grows, the amount of detritusproduced, and the rate at which litter decomposesand releases nutrients that can then be used byother plants, animals, and microorganisms. Withintermediate levels of moisture, increased tempera-tures accelerate decomposition. This may freemore nutrients in the short term, potentiallyboosting productivity. However, faster decompo-sition could also release more carbon (in the formof CO2) from the soil, particularly in the northernUnited States, where soils store a large share ofthe global carbon, thus amplifying the greenhouseeffect. Furthermore, as described in the earliersection on C02, increased concentrations ofatmospheric C02 will likely lead to changes in thecomposition and structure of plant leaves. Theratio of carbon to nitrogen may increase, whichmay actually slow the rate at which these leavesdecompose and release minerals (see box 2-D).Changes in precipitation and runoff will alsoaffect whether nutrients are maintained or lostmore quickly from soils. More-frequent or more-severe storms could cause more erosion and soilloss in areas where land use is intensive or wherevegetation has declined because of altered climateconditions (19, 42, 64).

The overall effects of climate change on soilsare difficult to calculate because of the manycomplex and interacting processes that contributeto soil development. Regardless of the long-termchange in soils, in the shorter term, soils may playan important role in vegetation changes. Astemperatures Warm the suitable ranges or climateconditions for many plant species may expandnorthward. However, soils at the northern edge ofthe United States and into central Canada tend tobe thinner and less fertile than those in the


Midwest, which may make adaptation difficultfor some species. In agricultural systems, any lackof nutrients in the soils can be compensated for byadding fertilizers, although there may be environ-mental costs associated with this (see vol. 1,ch. 6).

Sea Level, Oceans, and Coastal EcosystemsThe many interconnected physical changes in

oceans and coasts will affect marine ecosystemsin numerous ways (see box 2-C). Wave patternsin certain areas could be altered as a result ofchanges in regional climate, which could affectthe stability of coastal areas.

Coral-building organisms thrive at a rathernarrow range of water temperatures and depths.Although these organisms build reefs at a rate ofup to 0.6 inches (1.5 cm) per year, fast enough tokeep up with predicted sea level rise, other factorssuch as storms and warmer water temperaturescould interfere with their growth and, in somecases, could kill the organisms, Loss of coral reefswould change the wave and water patterns nearthe coast and could allow for increased coastalerosion. Likewise, mangrove trees along manytropical coasts play an important role in shorestabilization. Sea level rise could inundate somemangrove swamps. As these trees die, the coastwould be left vulnerable to erosion. In addition,the potential elimination of salt marshes andseagrass beds could have serious effects onmarine organisms. However, wetlands may mi-grate landward at a rate dictated by the landwardslope and sea level rise. In any case, the physicaland biological changes along oceans and coastscould interact to amplify the effects of climatechange (see vol. 1, ch. 4).

WHICH NATURAL RESOURCES ARE MOSTVULNERABLE TO CLIMATE CHANGE?

Although regional predictions of the naturalresources most at risk from climate change cannotbe made based on existing knowledge, certaincharacteristics may put some parts of a natural

resource system at greater risk than others. Forexample, ecosystems with limited options foradaptability-such as alpine ecosystems, old-growth forests, fragmented habitats, and areasalready under stress-may be particularly vulner-able to changes in climate (42) (see vol. 2, ch. 5).How ecosystems will fare under climate changealso depends on other factors that influence soiland water chemistry, including land use, airpollution, and water use (21). A1though systemsat the edges of their ranges and those alreadystressed may be at the greatest risk from climatechange, some systems that now appear healthycould also suffer.

Natural ecosystems may be more vulnerable toclimate change than managed ones. Furthermore,natural or less managed ecosystems may beaffected not only by changes in climate, but byfurther stresses resulting from human responsesto those changes, such as increased irrigation,diversion of water from streams, and expandedtillage or grazing (see vol. 2, chs. 4 and 5). On theother hand, poor management responses in for-estry and agriculture, such as planting species thatare not well-adapted or maintaining g stands at highdensities, could make some managed areas vul-nerable as well (see vol. 1, ch. 6, and vol. 2, ch. 6).Vulnerability to climate change will certainlyvary widely, and predictions about how systemswill respond to climate change are difficult tomake.

Changes in soil moisture may be among thebest indicators that a natural resource system isbecoming stressed. Figures 2-6 and 2-7 illustrateareas of the United States that may face changesin soil moisture under the climate change sce-narios projected by GCMS. The extent to whichthese changes in soil moisture will affect areas ofsignificant natural cover (34) is presented infigure 2-13. The figure shows the percent of areain each land class that is becoming effectivelywetter (measured above the zero axis) or drier(below the zero axis). The GFDL scenario pro-duces dramatic effects, with the majority of allexisting ecosystems except tundra and deserts


Natural disturbances, such as the Yellowstone fires,create openings in forested areas where grasses andwildflowers can flourish. This provides new foodsources for elk and other wildlife, Fires also promoterecycling of nutrients, which enriches the soil.

moving toward drier climatic regimes. Almost 80percent of agricultural lands of the United Statesface drying under the GFDL, scenario. The GISSscenario produces a mix of wetting and drying inareas of natural cover, with the exception of somenoticeable drying in the wetlands. Agriculturallands (the midwestern corn belt and California)are more effected, with over 40 percent of theagricultural lands showing some drying under theGISS scenario.

Natural resource systems could change in anynumber of ways in response to a changingclimate, but not all changes damage things thathumans value. For example, a gradual shift in the

boundaries of a wetland would probably not beconsidered a damage unless this results in areduction of the habitat, flood control, waterfiltering, or recreational services offered by thatwetland. Similarly, an increase in tree mortalitymay be of no concern in a forest valued as wildlifehabitat rather than as a source of timber supply.

The degree of human intervention may alsoinfluence the vulnerability of natural resourcesystems to climate change. Depending on hownatural systems are valued, they may be managedalong a spectrum from active to passive manage-ment regimes. Because intensively managed sys-tems are considered valuable, and because peopleare already exerting effort and expense to keepthem productive, use of additional measures torespond to a changing climate is likely. On theother hand, wilderness areas are essentiallyunmanaged--but highly valued precisely becauseof ‘this lack of management. Active interventionto protect these areas seems unlikely (see vol. 2,ch. 5), but there may be little loss of value fromany but the most extreme effects of climatechange on these natural areas. Thus, climateimpacts on natural resource systems and the needfor taking precautionary actions in preparation forclimate changes cannot be evaluated without alsoconsidering how people value and manage theseresources. These are the issues considered insubsequent chapters that investigate the effects ofand possible responses to climate change inindividual natural resource sectors: coastal sys-tems, water resources, agriculture, wetlands, pre-serves, and forests.

The Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange, the National Academy of Sciences, andthe U.S. Environmental Protection Agency haveall conducted assessments of the potential im-pacts of climate change (see box 2-F). Theirreviews describe numerous impacts of climatechange on U.S. natural resource systems, whichlaid the foundation for this report. Subsequentchapters will summarize some of the predictionsmade by these reports for individual naturalresources, then explore in greater detail the

40

20

60

80


Figure 2-13-Soil-Moisture Changes Under the GFDL and GISS Climate Change Scenarios,by Land-Use and Cover Type

GFDL

GFDLn GFDL

D r i e r Much drier

GFDL

GISS

GFDL

Much wetterWetter

GFDL

Tundra Coniferous Deciduous Grass-shrub Desert Wetland Agriculturalforest forest

NOTE: Bars above the zero axis represent the percent of Iand-use area predicted to become wetter bare below the axis chow the percent of landarea becoming drier. Drying or wetting is calculated from the change In the ratio of actual evapotranspiration (AET) to potential evapotranspiration(PET). No change is reported If the index changed (up or down) by lees than 0.025; wetter= 0.25 to 0.05; much wetter= > .05; drier= -0.25 to -.05;much drier. <-0.05. GFDL-Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, GISS=Goddard Instltute for Space Studies.

SOURCE: P.N. Halpin, “Ecosystems at Risk to Potential Climate Change,”contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, June1993.

vulnerability and adaptability of the variousresources and the potential management strate-gies and policies that might assist adaptation.


1. B.A., “The Effect of U in the Representa-tion of Cloud Processes in Climate Models on Climate Change

of Scientific Uncertainties theAccuracy of Global Climate Change Predictions: A Survey ofRecent Literature, and South U.S.

of (DOE) Internal Na-tional Environmental Assessment and

and Environmental PolicySection (Argonne, IL: DOE, October 1991).

W.J., Drake, Photosynthetic Capacityof After 4 of Exposure to Elevated Plant, Cell, vol. 14, No. 9, 1991, pp. 1003-6.

3. “Impact of Global Warming on Great Cycles,” The Change onthe United States, Appendix A: Water Resources, EI?A-23@OS-89-050, Smith D. DC: U.S.

. Protection Agency, 1989).4. J.H., ClimateStill Nature, vol. 350,

1991, pp. 649-52.5. J.H., “A Second at Impacts of

“ Scientist, vol. 79, 1991, pp. 6. Jr., Research

& vol. 9, No. Spring 1993, pp. 201-07.7. F.A., Response of Natural Ecosystem to

C02 Annual Review 21, 1990, pp. 167-%. .

8. PA., ED. “Plant in a Wor14° 226, January 1992, pp.68-744

9. and Climate A Orion Nature Quarterly, Spring

1989, pp. 22-27.


Box 2-F–Major Assessments of Climate Change Impacts

Three major assessments by national and international organizations have addressed the potential impacts

of climate change: the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) 1989 report, The Potential Effects ofClimate Change (94), the three-volume climate change series issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange in 1990 (42, 43, 44, and the 1992 supplement (45)), and a 1991 report by the National Academy ofSciences, Policy /mplications of Greenhouse Warming (22), and its 1992 supplement. These reports focus ondifferent aspects of climate change. Taken together, they lay the foundations for OTA’s assessment of theadaptability and vulnerability of systems to climate change, and their findings are cited throughout this chapter.1

The EPA Report—In 1987, Congress requested that EPA study “the potential health and environmentaleffects of climate change including, but not. . . limited to, the potential impacts on agriculture, forests, wetlands,human health, rivers, lakes, estuaries, as well as societal impacts.” To respond, EPA conducted a massive 2-yeareffort, hiring more than a hundred contractors to model potential effects on each system, and contracting outseveral regional case studies to integrate how all impacts might interact in different regions. The results weresynthesized in a 400-page report accompanied by 11 appendixes of contractor papers.

EPA used regional predictions of temperature and precipitation generated by four major general circulationmodels GCMs to examine the sensitivities of managed and unmanaged systems and to evaluate regional effects.The climate predictions were distributed to contractors, who then incorporated the results into their own modelsfor crop growth, forest productivity, farm-level decisionmaking, etc., to predict the potential effects on particularsystems and in particular regions.

EPA found that unmanaged systems such as coastal wetlands, parks, and forests “maybe unable to adaptquickly to rapid warming.” Effects could include a reduced range for many tree species, changes in forestcomposition, a decline in cold-water fish and shellfish (although some warm-water species could benefit), anincrease in species extinction, loss of coastal wetlands, and an increase in salinization of estuaries. Such impactscould begin in 30 to 80 years. Climate changes may heighten the effects of other stresses (such as pollution,increased radiation accompanying stratospheric ozone depletion, pests and pathogens, and fire). For example,climate-induced stress may make large regions of forests more susceptible to other stresses, such as fire, pests,disease outbreaks, wind damage, and air pollution. Changes in forest species and productivity could lead tosecondary effects such as increased soil runoff and erosion, reduced aquifer recharge, reduced biodiversity, andchanges in wildlife habitat and recreational opportunities. Species extinctions could increase (and biologicaldiversity could decline), especially in areas where roads, agriculture, and urban development block or restrictmigration pathways or habitat, and in areas that harbor heat-or drought-sensitive species. Some forested landcould become grassland. As communities and ecosystems are displaced by climate change, it may be necessaryto expand scientific knowledge on the practice of ecosystem restoration, so that communities can be rebuilt indegraded sites or relocated to new areas where they have not existed in the past (94) (see also vol. 2, boxes 4-Aand 5-M).

Overall, EPA found that managed systems such as water resources and agriculture are more capable thannatural systems of withstanding climate change. However, problems may still arise as humans attempt to adaptto the changes to these systems brought about by climate change. Agricultural yields might be reduced, butproductivity could shift northward so that overall production could probably meet domestic needs, with somepossible reductions in exports. Farmers might have to change their practices, such as beginning or increasingirrigation, which might increase conflicts over water use. If climate change leads to reduced stream flows, waterquality may suffer because less water will be available for diluting or flushing pollutants and dissipating heat; these

1 Ail three reports were based on the assumption that there would be no @Or*a~OSin C!i~te Wd*ilty.


Changes could affect fish and wildlife populations. The effects on agriculture might vary considerably over regions,with declines, for example, in crop acreage in t he Great Plains potentially offset by increased acreage in the GreatLakes States.

Quality of life may not suffer much in areas where, for example, forests shift from one species to another, andwhere the shifts are gradual; however, in areas where forests die altogether (such as may occur in some partsof California), people would face severe environmental and land-use effects. Recreation relies on relatively healthyforests; rapid changes that caused stressed or declining forests would Iikely reduce recreational opportunities anddemand.

The IPCC Report—The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is an international group ofhundreds of scientists from more than 50 countries established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organizationand the United Nations Environment Program. The IPCC setup three working groups: Working Group I to assessthe scientific basis for how human activities affect the climate; Working Group II to study the potential impacts ofclimate change worldwide; and Working Group Ill to formulate possible policy responses. The results werePublished in the three-volume Climate Change report in 1990 (The IPCC Scientific Assessmemt, The IPCC ImpactsAssessment and The /PCC Response Strategies). The working groups continue to meet, and issue occasionalupdates to the 1990 reports.

The scientific assessment predicted that under a ’’business-as-usual” scenario (characterized by continuedreliance on coal-intensive energy sources and only modest efficiency increases), the global average temperaturewould increase at a rate of 0.5°F (0.3 °C) per decade, with a likely increaseof2‘F (1 °C) over current levels by2025 and 5.4 °F (3 °C) before the end of the next century. The impact assessment used this business-as-usualprediction for increasing temperature (with accompanying estimates that equivalent atmospheric CO2

concentrations would double by 2025 to 2050 and sea level would rise about 1 foot (0.3 meter) by 2030) to predictpotential impacts on systems including natural terrestrial ecosystems, agriculture, and forestry.

IPCC suggested that climate change could shift climatic zones several hundred miles toward the poles overthe next 50 years, requiring natural terrestrial ecosystems to either migrate or adapt to a new climate regime. Therate of change will determine the degree of impacts: some species might be able to keep up with change, but somecould become extinct, thus reducing global biodiversity. Ecosystems are unlikely to move as units, but will developnew structures as species abundance and distribution are altered. Most at risk are systems with limited optionsfor adaptability (montane, alpine, and polar areas, island and coastal communities, remnant vegetation, heritagesites or reserves, and areas already under stress). Sea level rise and ocean warming will affect fisheries, potentiallyreducing habitat for several commercially important species. Coastal wetlands may be inundated by rising seasand forced to migrate inward, though in many areas, this may not be possible. Inland wetland areas may comeunder increased pressure for agricultural use. As for managed systems, forests may become more susceptibleto parasites, and losses from fires will increase. It is urclear whether global agricultural productivity would increaseor decrease overall, but many regions are likely to experience shifts or losses in production (for example, a declinein cereal and horticultural production in the southern United States), which will alter trade patterns. Impacts willdiffer considerably from region to region, as will the socioeconomic effects. Water availability will likely increasein some areas and decrease in others, but regional details are not yet known. There may also be a change indrought risk which could seriously affect agriculture at both the regional and global levels.

The NAS Report—The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) convened three different scientific panels toconduct preliminary analyses of climate change effects, mitigation strategies, and adaptation strategies. Eachpanel drafted a report that described their analyses and conclusions. A fourth “synthesis” panel drew on the workof the other three panels to formulate a policy report which was published in April 1991.

2 The Cumulative warming effect of all greenhouse gases is equivalent to a doubled C02 concentration.


104 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate—Volume 1

Box 2-F-Major Assessments of Climate Change Impacts-(Continued)

The NAS panels assumed greenhouse warming In the range of 2 to 9°F(1 to 5°C), but did not give a specifictime frame of reference. Based on this scenario, NAS classified natural resource systems and human activitiesinto one of three categories: low sensitivity to climate change within the given range; sensitive but adaptable ata cost; and sensitive with questionable ability to adjust or adapt. NAS concluded that built systems generally fitinto the first or second categories, and managed crop or timber lands fit into the second.

Water resources are quite sensitive to climate because runoff is the “small difference between the largerquantities of precipitation and evaporation,” and runoff fluctuates relatively more” than either precipitation orevaporation. Changes in runoff will have adverse impacts only when water supply no longer matches waterdemand for use and consumption. In the United States, water supply and demand are now closely matched in theGreat Basin, Missouri, and California water regions, so these areas maybe particularly vulnerable to decreasesin precipitation (and conversely, they would reap large benefits should precipitation increase). Activities such asirrigation are also vulnerable to decreased precipitation because irrigation is most common in areas whereprecipitation is already light and evaporation is high. Unless climate changes quickly relative to demographicchanges that affect water demand, however, the NAS report concludes, “the overall impact of climate change isunlikely to be substantially more serious than that of the vagaries of the current climate” {21).

In contast, NAS suggested that unmanaged ecosystems—the “natural landscape” and marine ecosystems-respond relatively slowly to climate change and that their ability to adapt is questionable and “problematic.”

SOURCE : Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

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I@ I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

IM. ~“ C., ml M.B. Davis, “Hard TSmcs head for Great 107, ~ L.H., B.C3. Dmkc, and S. Chambcrlaiq “Long-’I&mLaksForcsts: A Climate ‘IllmholdModclPrdcta“ Responsca P&otosyntbtic Rcspmsc in Siagle Lcavca of a ~ and C, Saltto co2-hxhIced Clhxuw -“ h The Potential Effects of Marsh Speck Grown at Elevated Atmospbcric COz in Situ,”Globsd Climtate Change on the United States, Appendix D: Oecolo@, vol. 83, 1990, pp. 469-72.~O~4?5tS, EI?A-230-9S-89-0S4, JB. Smith and D. T@ak (cd%)w~ DC: Us. Environmal ml Protection Agency,June 1989).

Global ChangeResearch

in theFederal

Government 3

0 n October 13, 1992, the United States ratified the UnitedNations Framework Convention on Climate Change.The convention was one of the key accomplishments ofthe United Nations Conference on Environment and

Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Itsdeclared goal is ‘‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrationsat a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-ence with the climate system, ’ and it calls for parties to return“individually or jointly to their 1990 levels of these anthropo-genic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasesnot controlled by the Montreal Protocol” (46). Most of the 166countries that signed the convention have pledged to do so by2000 (on April 21, 1993, President Clinton made a commitmentto reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by thatyear). The convention also requires all participating countries toprepare action plans detailing their strategy to mitigate climatechange. The Biodiversity Convention, signed by most develop-ing and industrialized countries at UNCED, calls for thedevelopment of strategies for global biodiversity conservation,and Agenda 21, the comprehensive action agenda to promotesustainable development adopted at UNCED, also calls forpolicies to minimize environmental degradation.

All these concerns about climate change, biodiversity, andsustainable development reflect a policy agenda that is inextrica-bly linked to scientific research. “The relationships betweenscientific and technological advancement and government sup-port are complex, and the stakes in these decisions are high, notjust for scientists and engineers, but for society as a whole.Consequently, a better understanding of the process of articulat-ing goals, both within and outside science, is vital” (3).

I 109

110 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--Volume

The Federal Government launched a multi-agency research effort in 1989 in response to theuncertainties and potential risks of climatechange. Its purpose is to observe, understand, andpredict global change (9). When the U.S. GlobalChange Research Program (USGCRP) was cre-ated as a Presidential Initiative in 1989, it did nothave an explicit plan to link research to policy.Before codifying the program, Congress directedit to provide information useful to policy makers;however, Congress did not identify or mandateany mechanism to ensure this. When the programwas first implemented, key questions of thescientists and policy makers were: Are humanssignificantly changing the climate, and can cli-mate change be predicted? The program wasintended to replace a crisis-driven, one-problem-at-a-time approach to environmental problemswith a more systemic, proactive approach thatrecognizes that different environmental problemsare linked by the very nature of the Earth system.1

Although the program is scientifically well--grounded, it has become overwhelmingly a physi-cal science program focused on basic Earthsystem processes that largely ignores the behav-ioral, economic, and ecological aspects of envi-ronmental problems. For example, understandingthe role clouds play in climate change and the roleof the ocean-land-atmosphere interface is now itshighest priority.

Understanding the size and scope of USGCRPcan be difficult, and the coordination challengesof such a large interagency program are formida-ble. Agency personnel committed to the programhave made a commendable effort to ensure thatthe program functions smoothly. However,USGCRP is not a managed entity with onebudget, nor does it have an authoritative bodymaking decisions on projects. It is, rather, a

1

loosely coordinated collection of several pro-grams and budgets. Even this level of coordina-tion is undermined at the legislative level, wherethe program, collected into a compilation ofbudgets by the Federal Coordinating Council forScience, Engineering, and Technology(FCCSET), is splintered into several parts andnever considered as a whole during the authoriza-tion, appropriation, and oversight processes.

The primary questions of policy makers havechanged since 1989 in the wake of the worldclimate treaty and the publication of several keyreports: the Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange (IPCC) reports, the Environmental Pro-tection Agency (EPA) reports on the potentialeffects of climate change and policy options, andthe Committee on Science, Engineering andPublic Policy (COSEPUP) report.2 It is nowgenerally accepted that unequivocal detection ofthe greenhouse effect requires another decade ofmeasurements, and that rates of climate changeand regional details about climate changes willnot be available for at least that long (see ch. 2).Thus, questions being asked today have movedbeyond the basic science issues of “observing,understanding and predicting’ climate change toa second set of concerns: What can be done tomitigate or adapt to climate change? What are theclimate effects of most concern? How can wemanage natural and human systems wisely givenan uncertain climate? Consequently, USGCRP’Smission statement and priorities are now toonarrow to address questions such as how tominimize negative impacts of climate change.

The congressional committees requesting thisstudy recognized that decisionmaking must con-tinue in the face of uncertainty. They expressedthe following concerns to the Office of Technol-ogy Assessment (OTA):

1 The Earth system is the sum of all interactions among living organisms and their biotic and abiotic environments.

2 IPCC*S Scien@c~5Hmnt (28), Impacts Assessment (26), Response Strategies (27), and Supplementary Report to the rCC s~emycAssessntent (29); EPA’s Policy OptionsforStabilizing Global Climate (52) and The Potenn”alE#ects of Global Climate Change on the UnitedStates (51); and COSEPUP’s Panel on Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming, National Academy of science9, National Academy ofW-* and Institute of Medicine, Policy Implications of Greenhouse W~”ng: Mitigation, A&ptation, and the Science Base (10).

Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government! 111

m

9

■

“We think it is prudent to begin--today—investigating how our research and development programs should incorporate concernsabout climatic uncertainty. ”3

“Do current U.S. R&D Programs focus onthe right questions to provide informationabout effects on different systems, potentialstrategies for making systems more resilientin the face of climate change and adapting tosuch changes that may occur?’

“What information can more research pro-vide over various time frames to guidedecisions about reducing greenhouse gasemissions, ameliorating effects of globalclimate change, and building resiliency intosystems?’

Conducting research to answer some of thesequestions has been a low priority. Although theresults of the program, as currently structured,will provide valuable information for predictingclimate change, they will not necessarily contrib-ute to the information needed by public andprivate decisionmakers to respond to globalchange. Three areas are particularly lacking:ecosystem-scale research, adaptation research(ecological, human, and economic), and inte-grated assessments (evaluation of all focusedand contributing research results and their implic-ation for public policy). Research can begin nowon topics more closely related to policy decisionsdespite incomplete answers from the physicalsciences. More research is needed on the impactsof climate change on natural and managed eco-systems and the resulting implications for landand water resource management, on how peopleadapt, and on why people resist change. Keyprojects for a USGCRP committed to policy-relevant research should also include gatheringinformation about the relative importance ofpopulation size and expectations of quality-of-life

improvements, the demand for goods and services(including clean water, agriculture and forestryproducts, and access to natural areas), and eco-nomic and institutional barriers to the dissemina-tion and adoption of technological innovation.Some of the research in these areas will takedecades and, if started now, may leave us muchbetter prepared to respond to global change in thefuture.

Implicit in the current structure of USGCRP isthat the initiation of a comprehensive adaptationresearch program must wait until predictions ofclimate change are reliable. However, there areseveral important reasons not to wait to initiateadaptation research. First, according to IPCCestimates, few reliable predictions of climatechange on a regional scale will be available beforethe next 15 to 20 years. Although such regionalinformation might help focus research on man-aged and natural systems in areas expected toexperience the most change, research on ecosys-tems is a multidecade task (see vol. 2, chs. 4-6)and should begin now. Second, even though theeffects of climate change on a regional levelcannot currently be modeled accurately, generaleffects can be predicted, such as sea level rise.Adaptation research that addresses sea level riseand other effects of climate change need not waitfor reliable predictions. Third, much adaptationresearch makes sense regardless of climatechange. For example, restoration of wetlandsaddresses adaptation to climate change, but it alsoaddresses the current depletion of wetlands due toother causes. Adaptation research can use histori-cal records of societal, economic, and environ-mental impacts of environmental change com-bined with reasonable hypothetical scenarios forfuture environmental change (31).

Because policy makers and scientists havedifferent educational and professional backgrounds,scientific research findings need to be translated

3 House Committee on Science, Space, and ltchnology, letter to Ow Sept. 27, 1991.4 Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, letter to OT~ Oct. 4, 1991,5 Senate (!omrnittee on Commeree, Seienee, and Tnmspmta tioq letter to Ow Oct. 8, 1!391.


into terms relevant to policy making and deci-sionmakin“ g. Regardless of the “completeness”of climate research, policy makers are makingdecisions now that affect global change andwhether the Nation will mitigate and/or adapt toit. They also decide where to allocate scarceresources for research.

A recent National Research Council report,Research to Protect, Restore, and Manage theEnvironment (37), stated: “No matter how goodthe science, environmental problems cannot besolved without integrating the science with envi-ronmental policy. To accomplish that, integrativestudy is needed to bridge the multidisciplinarygaps and deal with the conflicting goals held byvaried constituencies. Research is necessary butnot sufficient to solve problems. ” One way toimprove the relevance of” research results forpolicy makers is through the use of integratedassessments. Integrated assessments are a mecha-nism for synthesizing all the research relevant toan identified problem and for presenting researchresults in policy-relevant language. Such assess-ments, if conducted by multidisciplinary teams ona regular basis, could help bring together andevaluate research results produced by USGCRP,which is now composed largely of isolatedprograms and projects.

Although assessments were not included in theoriginal USGCRP program, they are included ina rudimentary form in the FY 1994 budget (8).However, there has been no fundamental changein the mission of USGCRP, which remainspredominately focused on understanding climatechange. As a result, different people draw differ-ent conclusions about what changes in researchfocus to expect from USGCRP. In addition, thequality of assessments is determined solely by theinformation fed into them and the backgrounds ofthose constructing the assessment homework. Ifecological, economic, and sociological researchcontinues to be neglected. the planned assess-ments will not be useful to policy makers (24).John Gibbons, assistant to the President forscience and technology, testified recently that

USGCRP needs to expand the scope of itsresearch to include the impacts of climate changeon natural and human environments and strate-gies for mitigating and adapting to climatechange. He also recognized the need to improvethe integration of research with policy making(20).

This chapter will examine the broad issuessurrounding the Federal research effort to under-stand climate change-particularly within thecontext of the natural and managed systemsdiscussed in chapters 4 through 6 of volumes 1and 2. The options presented here, if imple-mented, could help commit the Federal Govern-ment to addressing areas of imbalance in

USGCRP, the need for adaptation research, andthe issues surrounding a national research pro-gram with an explicit science-policy interface.These program changes could benefit policymakers and decisionmakers by ensuring thatUSGCRP and other federally funded globalchange research supply the integrated informa-tion they need to make choices in the face ofuncertainty about global change and its impacts.

THE U.S. GLOBAL CHANGERESEARCH PROGRAM

1 Inception and StructureRecognition that human activity could signifi-

cantly alter the global environment grew duringthe 1970s and 1980s. Concerns focused particu-larly on the threat of climate change fromincreased emissions of greenhouse gases and thedepletion of the ozone layer by chlorofluorocar-bons (CFCS). In response to the potential risks ofclimate change and the uncertainties surroundingthe science, the Federal Government launched amassive, multiagency research effort in 1989 “toobserve, understand, and, ultimately, predict globalchanges and to determine the mechanisms influe-ncing these changes” (9). In 1989, USGCRPwas developed by the Committee on EarthSciences (now the Committee on Earth and

Chapter 3--Global Change Research in the Federal Government I 113

Figure 3-1A--Organlzatlonal Chart for the Federal Coordinating Council forScience, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET)

John H. GibbonsFCCSET membership ChairDOS DOEd HUDDOD DOL OMB I IDOI DOT NASA FCCSET SecretariatUSDA VA EPA Charles Dickens, Executive SecretaryDOC GSA NSC Elizabeth Rodriguez, Senior Policy AnalystDOE HHS NSF Alicia Dustira, Senior Policy Analyst

CEES CISETCommittee on Earth and Committee on International Science,Environmental Sciences Engineering and Technology

Frederick M. Bernthal (NSF), Chair Chair vacant

CFAFRCommittee on Food, Agriculture and

Forestry ResearchChair vacant

CPMESCommittee on Physical, Mathematical

and Engineering SciencesFrederick M. Bernthal (NSF), Acting Chair

CEHRCommittee on Education and

Human ResourcesLuther Williams (NSF), Acting Chair

CLSHCommittee on

Life Sciences and HealthDavid Galas (DOE), Acting Chair

r

CTICommittee on Technology and Industry

Chair vacant

NOTE: For definition of terms, eee figure 3-1 B, next page.

Environmental Sciences, CEES), an interagencygroup under FCCSET in the President’s Office ofScience and Technology Policy (OSTP) (see fig.3-l). USGCRP became the first PresidentialInitiative indicating that it was to be a high-priority program with strong administrative back-ing. In 1990, Congress passed the U.S. GlobalChange Research Act (P.L. 101-606), which

(Continued)

codified USGCRP. In 1992, USGCRP became aNational Research Program.7 Between FY 1989and FY 1993, the Government spent $3.7 billionon this effort. A new administration that asserts itscommitment to taking action on climate changeissues and a Congress with a large number of newmembers coincide with this 5-year benchmarkand could change the direction and scope of the

Initiatives exist: cc computing and communication advanced materials biotechnology mathematics and science education. . to coordinate interagency in these

developed this for continuing Initiatives that have reached


Figure 3-lB-Organizational Chart for the Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES)

Frederick M. Bernthal (NSF) Lennard Fisk (NASA)Chair Vice-Chair

DOD HHS N!3F 1 IDOI HUD CEQUSDA OMB SI

CEES Secretariat

DOC OSTP NRCPenelope Firth, Executive Secretary

DOE NASA TVASylvia Edgerton, Senior Science Associate

NIEHS FEMA ICABetty Wong, Professional Assistant

SGCRSubcommittee on

Global Change ResearchRobert Corell (NSF), Chair

— — — — — r — ’SET I

Subcommittee onEnvironmental Technology

Joseph Bordogna (NSF), Interim Chair

SERNRESubcommittee on

Economic Research on NaturalResources and the Environment

Joseph Stiglitz (CEA), Chair

SNDRSubcommittee on

Natural Disaster ReductionRobert Hamilton (USGS), Chair

I1

SUSCOSSubcommittee on

U.S. Coastal Ocean ScienceDonald Scavia (NOAA), Acting Chair

1 I

A.tmospheric ResearchRichard Greenfield (NSF”), Acting Chair

I

SWRSubcommittee onWater Resources

Stephen Ragone (USGS), Chair

1

SFOFCSubcommittee on Federal

Oceanographic Fleet CoordinationR. Adm. Peterson (NOAA), Chair

II I

I PEGI IWorking Group for Private Enterprise/

Government InteractionsWilliam Busch (NOAA), Chair

NOTE: DOS-Department of State; DOD-Department of Defense; DOI-Department of the Interior; USDA-U.S. Department of Agriculture;DOC-Department of Commerce; DOE-Department of Energy; DOEd-Department of Education; DOL-Department of Labor; DOT-Department ofTransportation; VA. Department of Veterans Affairs; GSA-General Services Administation; HHS-Department of Health and Human Services;HUD-Department of Housing and Urban Development; OMB-Office of Management and Budget; NAS-National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration; EPA-Environmental Protection Agency; NSC-National Security Council; NSF-National Science Foundation; NIEHS-NationalInstitute of Environmental and Health Sciences; OSTP-Office of Science Technology Policy; FEMA-Federal Emergency Management Agency;CEQ=Council on Environmental Quality; S1-Smithsonian Institution; NRC-National Research Council; TVA-Tennessee Valley Authority;ICA-lntelligenoe Community Affairs, CEA-Council of Economic Advisors; USGS-U.S. Geological Survey; NOAA-National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration.

SOURCE: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), Our Changing Planet.’ The FY 1994 U.S. Global Change Research Program(Washington, DC: CEES, 1993).


program for FY 1994. There is no officialtermination date for the program; however, pro-gram plans indicate that it will last at least 40years (11).

Three ‘ ‘activity streams, ” or program ele-ments, defined the USGCRP mission between itsinception and FY 1994:

■

■

■

Documentation and analysis of Earth sys-tem changes, which include observation—using both ground- and space-based obser-vation systems-and data management;

Process Research to enhance the under-standing of the physical, geological, chemi-cal, biological, and social processes thatinfluence Earth system behavior; and

Integrated Modeling and Prediction ofEarth system processes.

Each of these priorities is represented by aworking group under the Subcommittee on GlobalChange Research under CEES. The chair of thesubcommittee along with the chair of each of theworking groups make up the principal bodyresponsible for the planning, development, coor-dination, and review of USGCRP (7). In FY 1994,a new activity stream, Assessment, was added.

USGCRP was originally envisioned as a com-plete global change research program, coveringresearch on natural climate change, human-induced climate change, impacts of climate andland-use change on the Earth system, and impactsof human activity on ecosystem health. Theprogram has evolved in parallel with the Intergov-ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) andhas drawn heavily from the panel’s work.8

Consequently, the main focus of global changeresearch under USGCRP has become climatechange. Important global changes other than

human-induced climate change, such as loss ofbiodiversity, changes in land use, and increases inindustrial pollution, were determined to be be-yond the scope of USGCRP and are addressedonly to the extent that they interact with theclimate system. This is reflected in the researchpriorities of the program’s science elements.

To guide research, CEES identified and priori-tized seven scientific research elements, or sci-ence elements.9 In order of priority, the scienceelements are Climate and Hydrologic Systems,Biogeochemical Dynamics, Ecological Systemsand Dynamics, Earth System History, HumanInteractions, Solid Earth Processes, and SolarInfluences (7). More-specific areas of researchare prioritized under each of these seven researchelements (see fig. 3-2). Several criteria, althoughnot applied systematically, are used to evaluateprojects under each research element, including:relevance and contribution to the overall goal ofthe program, scientific merit, ease or readiness ofimplementation, links to other agencies andinternational partners, cost, and agency approval.

1 New DevelopmentsIn 1992, CEES began developing a manage-

ment plan for the program that would include theaddition of Assessment as a fourth activity streamalong with Documentation, Process Research,and Integrated Modeling and Prediction (see fig.3-3). The primary function of the Assessmentworking group is to ‘‘. . document the state ofscientific knowledge and address the implicationsof the science of global change for national andintemational policy-making activities over abroadspectrum of global and regional environmentalissues” (8). The group will also help coordinatethe scientific assessments of global change with

6 KC is an intergovernmental body sponsored jointly by the World Meteorological Organiza tion and the United Nation’s EnvironmentalProgramrne. The group was set up in 1988 to assess the scientific understanding of natural and human-induced climate change, its impacts,and potential response strategies. IPCC is scheduled to produce anothex full assessment in 1995,

s CEIUl (formerly C’ES) works closely with and has drawn heavily on the ongoing activities of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS),the World Climate Resewuh Pmgrarn (WCRP) of the World Meteorological Organization the International Council of Scienti~c Unions(lCSU), the International Geosphere-Biosphere Program (IGBP), and IPCC in designing the structure of USGCRP and in identifying thepro~’s key scientific issues and research priorities.

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Chapter --GIobal Change Research in the Federal Government I 117

related assessments on environmental impacts,technologies for adaptation and mitigation, riskassessment, and policy-response strategies (12).Although the FY 1994 budget proposal reflectsthese changes, it is unclear how much moneyagencies will allocate for assessment and how theassessments will be structured. The FY 1994budget does not show Assessment separately but,rather, embeds it within the other three activitystreams. Comprehensive assessments cannot becarried out without expanding the ecological andsocioeconomic aspects of the program and incor-porating impacts research into it. The FY 1994budget does not reflect any significant expansionin these areas.

Nonetheless, the Admini“ “stration has expressedinterest in significantly broadening the programto include studies of environmental and socioeco-nomic impacts and of mitigation and adaptationstrategies. “The development of a successfulassessment activity in the USGCRP will, I be-lieve, go far toward demonstrating the Clinton-Gore administration’s commitment not only toresearch but to effective action to manage thisNation’s national and international environmentalpolicy” (19). If this research materializes, it couldthen be integrated with research on Earth systemprocesses to conduct integrated assessments. Theexpanded program should be reflected in theFY 1995 USGCRP budget.

To ensure progress in each of the activitystreams, timetables and milestones have beenincluded in each agency’s USGCRP researchprogram, although they have not appeared in anypublished document. These milestones, specifiedfor both the near term (5 to 10 years) and the longterm (10 to 30 years), “will guide program andbudget development and serve as a criticalelement in evaluating program accomplishmentsand progress’ (11). The Office of Managementand Budget (OMB) could hold research programsto these targets only if the milestones are clearlystated and easily measured and, therefore, en-forceable. Representative George Brown, chair-man of the Committee on Science, Space, and

Figure 3-3-Functional Architecture of USGCRP

DocumentationGlobal observationsData management

I

Integratedodeling

Processm o c l i n g research

SOURCE: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES),Our Changing Planet: The FY 1993 U.S. Global Change ResearchProgram (Washington, DC: CEES, 1992).

Technology, has suggested building performanceguidelines into authorizing legislation as well asmandates that would redirect or terminate pro-grams that do not make sufficient progress towardstated goals (2).

The Interface Between Policy and ScienceResearch programs intended to be relevant to

management and policy making often fail be-cause of fundamental tensions among research-ers, resource managers, and decisionmakers. Thesetensions are created because of conflicts in thetime horizons of each group, differences betweenpriority- or goal-setting processes, and differ-ences in the agendas of extramural researchorganimations (e.g., universities, industries, andindependent laboratories), mission-oriented agen-cies, and Congress.

The timetable for governmental decisions isdriven primarily by the annual budget cycle andan election cycle that ranges between 2 and 6years. Not surprisingly, policy makers fundingglobal change research often have a shorter timehorizon for “answers” than do researchers. Thisdisparity leads to tension between Governmentofficials, who are required to formulate annual


budgets and make immediate decisions, and thescientific community, whose long-term researchis dependent on continuous and reliable funding.When the questions of policy makers are notanswered in one or even a few years, it maybecome more difficult to sell a program asrelevant to policy needs. Mission-oriented agen-cies are repeatedly deflected by the ‘crisis-of-the-month’ syndrome, which siphons resources awayfrom long-term programs (37). The result maybeannual budget fluctuations and/or rapidly shiftingpriorities-both of which are detrimental to thedevelopment of a sound scientific program. Abalance between continuity in priorities andfinding and flexibility in project direction isessential (3).

Tension arises between extramural researchorganizations and the Federal Government be-cause of different research agendas. Universitiesand independent laboratories judge their scien-tists to a large extent on their ability to raise fundsfor research. Adherence to management- andpolicy-relevant goals is not seen as importantunless it leads to more Federal funding.

Many scientists believe that the science mustbe “complete” before policy conclusions can bemade safely. Policy makers, on the other hand,cannot afford the luxury of complete information.Decisions about reauthorizing environmental leg-islation and natural resource planning and man-agement will continue to be made based on thebest available information, “[I]f policy is to beeffectual, then we must make policy while wecontinue to investigate the physical and societaleffects of global warming. But this means thatpolicy will also enter the feedback loop, influenci-ng societal responses and physical effects” (30).Science need not proceed in a sequential fashion.Research on the climate system need not be“complete” before research on the ecologicaleffects of climate change is undertaken nor doesresearch on the ecological effects of climatechange need to be ‘complete’ before research onthe societal impacts of and potential responses toclimate change is initiated (45). If USGCRP is to

address policy-relevant questions, a parallel appreach to climate effects and response research isnecessary.

In a narrow sense, USGCRP is policy-relevantif the most important policy concern is to gain abetter understanding of Earth system processes inorder to predict climate change. However, themajor international assessments conducted byIPCC demonstrate that the key questions policymakers need to address move far beyond thenarrow definition of ‘‘observe, document, andpredict” global change, into the realm of issuesrelated to adaptation and mitigation. As a result offocusing research funds on climate prediction,USGCRP is not addressing other key scienceissues or broad policy questions for the near term.For example, what plants and animals are sensi-tive to climate changes? How might biota andvegetation respond to changes in climate? Whatare the implications for forestry, agriculture, andnatural areas? What mitigation strategies wouldslow climate change the most? How much wouldthey cost? To whom? How might society respondto changes in climate and global ecosystems?What technologies should be developed? Howwill the effects of climate change interact withother global environmental changes? How impor-tant is climate change in the scheme of long-termenvironmental threats? How can natural resourcesbe managed to minimize economic and ecologicalloss? These issues were largely excluded fromUSGCRP to keep it primarily driven by the earthsciences. Even if accurate regional climate pre-dictions could be given today, land managers,planners, decisionmakers, and policy makerswould not have all the information they need toguide their response (33). As originally envi-sioned in 1990, these issues were to be addressedunder the CEES Working Group on Mitigationand Adaptation Research Strategies (MARS),which was abolished in 1992.

If USGCRP begins to address this broader setof questions, it will be moving closer to policy-relevant research. Some fear that a programdriven by policy concerns will undermine or

Chapter 3--Global Change Research in the Federal Government 1119

Table 3-l—List of Departments and Agencies or Bureaus Involved in USGCRP Research

DOC

DOD

DOE

DOI

EPA

HHS

Department of CommerceNOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Department of DefenseCRREL Cold Regions Research and Engineering

LaboratoryONR Office of Naval Research

Department of EnergyOHER Office of Health and Environmental

Research

Department of InteriorBIA Bureau of Indian AffairsBLM Bureau of Land ManagementBOM Bureau of MinesBOR Bureau of ReclamationFWS Fish and Wildlife ServiceNPS National Park ServiceOS Office of the SecretaryUSGS U.S. Geological Survey

Environmental Protection AgencyORD Office of Research and Development

Department of Health and Human ServicesNIEHS National Institute of Environmental Health

Services

NASA National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationOSSA Office of Space Science and Applications

NSF National Science FoundationBIO Directorate for Biological SciencesGEO Directorate for GeosciencesSBE Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and

Economic Sciences

SI Smithsonian InstitutionIC International CenterNASM National Air and Space MuseumNMNH National Museum of Natural HistoryNZP National Zoological ParkSAO Smithsonian Astrophysical ObservatorySERC Smithsonian Environmental Research

CenterSTRI Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute

TVA Tennessee Valley AuthorityRBO River Basin Operations

USDA Department of AgricultureARS Agricultural Research ServiceCSRS Cooperative State Research ServiceERS Economic Research ServiceFS Forest ServiceSCS Soil Conservation Service

SOURCE: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), Our Changing Planet: The FY 1993 U.S. GlobalChange Research Program (Washington, DC: CEES, 1992).

change the direction of science. Others maintainthat the second set of policy-related questions canbe addressed adequately by research driven by theearth sciences. Maintaining the long-term pol-icy relevance of scientific research underUSGCRP will require a formal and iterativeassessment link that simultaneously transfersscientific research results in policy-relevantlanguage to decisionmakers and policy con-cerns to the research community.

PRIORITIES AND BALANCE IN USGCRP

I BudgetCEES designed USGCRP as a cohesive, inte-

grated research program that would encompassthe unique attributes of 11 Federal agencies,including 31 bureaus, but it did not assign acentral management body (see table 3-l). The

priority scheme set up by the three activitystreams and the seven science elements is in-tended to guide budget decisions, and, to date,funding levels have followed these priority areas.

Since the program formally began in FY 1990,the USGCRP budget has grown from $660 mil-lion in its first year to $1.33 billion in FY 1993 (7,9). The proposed budget for FY 1994 is $1.47 bil-lion (8). The budget can be analyzed in terms ofdistribution across agencies, activity streams, andscience elements (see figs. 3-4, 3-5, and 3-6). InFY 1993, projects funded by the National Aero-nautics and Space Admini“ stration (NASA) com-prised 69 percent of the program’s budget ($921million) while projects funded by the Departmentof the Interior (DOI), which contains most of theland-management agencies, comprised 3 percentof the program’s budget ($38 million). For FY1994, the requested budget for DOI’S global


1,200

1,000

800

E~ 600Ew

400

200

0

Figure 3-4--U.S. Global Change Research Program Budget by Agency

- “1993

D -1994 1013

921

169

67 7089 98

46 48

NOAA DOD DOE DOI EPA HHS NASA NSF Smi th- TVA USDAsonian

NOTE: For definition of terms, see table 3-1. FY 1994 values are the requested, not the appropriated, amounts.

SOURCE: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), Our Changing Planet: The FY 1994 U.S. GlobalChange Research Program (Washington, DC: CEES, 1993).

change research program decreased to 2.3 percentof the total.

Of the activity streams, Documentation, in-cluding observation and data management, re-ceived 45 percent of the budget ($595 million) inFY 1993. Earth Process Research for under-standing climate change received 46 percent ofthe budget ($610 million), and Integrated Model-ing and Prediction received 9 percent of thebudget ($121 rnillion).l0

Although USGCRP programs include projectson almost every aspect of climate change, thebulk of the funds is focused on answeringscientific questions related to understanding thephysics and chemistry underlying climate sys-tems. Research on Climate and Hydrologic Sys-

tems and Biogeochemical Dynamics constitutedabout 71 percent of the program’s FY 1993budget ($937 million). Ecological Systems andDynamics received 17 percent of the budget($224 million). The remaining 12 percent of thebudget ($165 million) was divided among theremaining four research elements: Earth SystemHistory, Human Interactions, Solid Earth Proc-esses, and Solar Influences (8).

Projects are categorize as focused --directlyrelating to global change--or contributing—justified on a basis other than global change buthaving the potential to contribute to the globalchange knowledge base (see fig. 3-7).11 Evenwhen both focused and contributing research areconsidered, 70 percent of all funds is targeted for

10 wt ofthc * for modeling and prediction go toward ncmmodoling process research. The major modeling groups Mve mceivcd ~ya small portion of thc8c funds,

11 U* ~fi~y nom budget fi~S refer to the focused budget.


Figure 3-5-USGCRP Focused Budgetby Activity Stream

800 ,

600-

ms.—=.- 4 0 0 -E

652595 n

—

680610 m

m 1993

m 1994

Documentation Process Modeling andresearch prediction

NOTE: Total budget does not include one-time appropriation of$5 million for the State Department In FY 1993 because the distributionof funding among proposed projects is still being determined. Thebudget for the FY 1994 Assessment activity stream is embedded in theother three activity streams. FY 1994 values are the requested, not theappropriated, amounts.

SOURCE: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES),Our Changing Planet: The FY 1994 U.S. Global Change ResearchProgram (Washington, DC: CEES, 1993).

projects in the first two priority research areas.There are no standardized criteria for classifyingcontributing research, and each agency uses itsown system. Consequently, it is difficult to knowprecisely the extent of contributing research or toget a comprehensive picture of relevant research.Both focused and contributing programs areconsidered in a procedure called the ‘‘budgetcrosscut. ’ USGCRP is one of only a few Federalprograms that uses a budget crosscut as a coordi-nating mechanism. This approach has been rea-sonably successful in facilitating cooperation andsecuring new funding for global change research.The USGCRP budget-crosscut process works asfollows.

Each program within an agency submits newprojects to the appropriate subworking group of

CEES. This subworking group determines whetherto recommend to the agency that the project beincluded in USGCRP (projects can be added laterin the budget process, but this is the most likelystep at which new projects are added).

Each agency that participates in USGCRP thendevelops its own GCRP budget, with somecoordination between agencies for joint projects.These budgets are then submitted to CEES, whichmay continue to negotiate with the agencies.CEES submits one budget proposal incorporatingprograms from all participating agencies to theOffice of Management and Budget (OMB). Whenthe proposal reaches OMB, it is initially reviewedat one meeting by all of the budget examiners forthe various agencies involved in USGCRP. Al-though one examiner takes the lead for USGCRP,the participation of the other examiners is criticalbecause each must understand the purpose of theUSGCRP projects that fall within his or heragency’s budget. The USGCRP budget is re-turned to each agency when that agency’s wholebudget is returned. At that point, deliberationsbetween OMB and the agencies proceed asnormal. As agencies work to meet OMB-established budget targets, they look at modifyingall projects—they can accept or reject OMB’Srecommendations and reprogram their globalchange budgets. 12 The final USGCRP budget ispresented to Congress along with the annualPresidential Budget Request.13 When the pro-gram first started, approximately 70 percent of theproposed budget consisted of research funds fromalready existing projects.

The USGCRP budget falls within the jurisdic-tion of several congressional authorization andappropriations committees and subcommittees(see table 3-2). With all of these committeesreviewing components of the USGCRP budget, it

12- & f~t fw yws of the pro= USCWIW required agencies to “fence off,” or cornmi~ their global change Hearch budgetrequests to the progm.rn. They could not repmgnun this money later if OMB cut ovemll agency funding further down the line.

13 ntittwo budget rcqumts were long, detailed documents accornpaniedbyexecutive summaries, but since FY 1992, only the summarieshave been published. USOC!RP staff determined that the information in the detailed budgets changes slowly @ themforc, needs to bepublished Ody CVUy 5 yt?.SIX


700

600

500

u) 400cg=E

V3 300

200

100

0

Figure 3-6--USGCRP Budget by Science Element

664

376

596n

249224 m

S5_&LE_LA%CHS BD ES&D ESH HI SEP SI

NOTE: CHS-Climate and Hydrologic Systems; BD=Biogeochemical Dynamics; ES&D= Ecologcal Systems andDynamics; ESH=Earth System History; H-Human lnteractions; SEP=Solid Earth Processes; SI=Solar Influences.FY 1994 values are the requested, not the appropriated, amounts.

SOURCE: committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), Our Changing Planet: The FY 1994 U.S. GlobalChange Research Program (Washington, DC: CEES, 1993).

is much more difficult for Congress to considerthe USGCRP budget as a whole than it is for theexecutive branch to do so. Several members ofCongress have complained about the fragmenta-tion of congressional attention to the USGCRPbudget, but no alternatives have been proposed. Itmight be useful for Congress to consider using anad hoc appropriations subcommittee consisting ofmembers from the committees with primaryjurisdiction over elements of USGCRP to reviewthe program’s budget as a comprehensive unit. Iftwo or three agencies are cooperating on a singleproject, but one agency does not receive funding

for it, the entire project could beat risk.14 Large,interagency programs such as USGCRP willrequire innovative methods of funding if they areto succeed.

9 Satellite vs. Nonsatellite MeasurementsNASA’S Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE)

program accounts for over 60 percent ofUSGCRP focused funding (crossing several ofthe priority research areas). The core of the MTPEprogram is the development and maintenance ofthe Earth Observing System (EOS), an ambitioussatellite program originally designed to provide

Id ~r CX~ple, at O’IA’S workshop “EOS and USGCRP: k We Ad@ d AKISWU@ thc R@ ~stio~?” @b. ~-~, 1993),participants cited programs such as the World OcesnCirculation Experiment (WOCE), Tropical Oceans Global Atmosphm (TOGA), and theJOiXlt Global occan~ux Study (1~00~)(50). All three arc interagency research p~ where the success of the entire program depends oncontributions ffom NASA, the National oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the National !lcieme Foundation. However, in a recentbudget cycle, NASA received more than it asked for these programs while NOAA and NSF received no money. Rather than let the programsdie, NASA filled the financial gap left by inadequate funding for NOAA and NSF.

1,000

800

600Wcg=.—E

(@400

200

0

Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government I 123

Figure 3-7--FY 1993 USGCRP Budget of Focused andContributing Programs by Agency

—

NOAA

_ Focused

m Contributing

279

d

139116

DOD DOE DOI

136

48

HHS

921

274

177

--__._D15 9

Smith- TVA USDA—sonian

NOTE: For definitlon of terms, see table 3-1.

SOURCES: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), Our Changing Planet: The FY 1993 U.S. GlobalChange Research Program (Washington, DC: CEES, 1992); Office of Technology Assessement, 1993.

data over a 15-year period related to the study ofprecipitation; ocean circulation; sources and sinksof greenhouse gases; changes in land use, landcover, hydrology, and ecology; changes in gla-ciers and ice sheets; ozone; and volcanic activity.Because of EOS’S central role in NASA’sUSGCRP effort and the great expense of puttingsatellites in space, the USGCRP budget as awhole is heavily weighted toward satellite-basedmeasurements. 15

EOS has suffered extensive restructuring overthe past few years, which may jeopardize thequality of information gained from remainingEOS instruments. Some instruments that weresupposed to have improved the understanding andobservation of possible climate change impacts

Artist’s conception of NASA’s Earth Observing System(EOS). EOS (AM-1 Platform) is scheduled to belaunched in 1998.


Table 3-2-Congressional Authorization Committees and Appropriations Subcommitteeswith Significant Legislative Authority over Agencies with a USGCRP Component

House and Senate Authorization Committees

HouseAgricultureArmed ServicesEnergy and CommerceNatural ResourcesSciences, Space, and TechnologyPublic Works and TransportationMerchant Marine and Fisheries

SenateAgriculture, Nutrition, and Forest~Armed ServicesCommerce, Science, and TranspodationEnergy and Natural ResourcesLabor and Human ResourcesEnvironmental and Public WorksRules and Administration

House and Senate Appropriations SubcommitteesLabor, Health and Human Services, and EducationHousing and Urban Development and IndependentAgenciesEnergy and Water DevelopmentInterior and Related AgenciesAgriculture and Rural Developmentb

Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary

Jurisdictiona

USDADOD, DOEDOE, HHSDOE, USDA/FS, SINASA, NSF, DOE, EPA, NOAA, S1NOAA, SIUSDA, NOAA, SI

USDADOD, DOENSF, NASA, NOAADOE, DOIDOE, DOI, HHSEPA, SISI

HHSNASA, NSF, EPA

DOEDOE, USDA, DOl, SIUSDANOAA

Defense DODa For definition of terms, see table 3-1.b The corresponding subcommittees of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations have the same name withone exception: the Senate Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies and the HouseSubcommittee on Rural Development, Agriculture, and Related Agencies.

SOURCES: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Federally Funded Research: Decisions for aDecade, OTA-SET-490 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 1991); Office of Technology Assessment,1993.

have been dropped or postponed. For example,the High Resolution Imaging Spectrometer (HIRIS),an instrument potentially capable of resolvingsome of the more subtle aspects of ecologicalchange that cannot be detected by satellites today,was originally scheduled to be part of EOS, butwas dropped during program restructuring (54).EOS began as a $30 billion program, but wasscaled back to an $8 billion program (see box3-A).16

Most participants at OTA’S workshop “EOSand GCRP: Are We Asking and Answering theRight Questions?” agreed that had EOS beendesigned initially to be an $8 billion program, itlikely would be different from the program wehave today. All acknowledged that much gooddata will be collected and good science will bedone through EOS, but that it will provide neitherthe continuous, multidecade data set necessaryfor ecosystem studies nor a true global monitoring

Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government | 125

Box 3-A–Remote Sensing as a Tool for Coping with Climate Change

Remote sensing is the observation of the Earth from a distance. The ability to view and monitor large areasof the Earth has become valuable in understanding regional and global-scale phenomena such as weathersystems, deforestation rates, and, most recentty, climate change. Remote sensing can help reduce theuncertainties associated with climate change in two ways: 1) by improving climate predictions through betterunderstanding of atmospheric and climate processes and 2) by improving scientists’ ability to detect and predictthe effects of climate change on the biosphere. Both uses of remote sensing would be important for coping withclimate change. However, most biosphere-related climate research to date has focused on the former, whereasrelatively little has focused on the latter. This box examines the uses and limitations of remote-sensingtechnologies for observing, detecting, and understanding changes in the biosphere resulting from climate change,land-use change, or other factors.

Development of remote-sensing technology

Airborne sensors-The oldest form of remote sensing-invented about 100 years ago—consists ofphotographs taken from balloons. The development of the airplane made aerial photography the primary way tomonitor and study the Earth’s surface from a distance. Scientists also discovered that images created from otherparts of the electromagnetic spectrum (i.e., the infrared region) could provide additional information about surfacecharacteristics, such as mineral composition, soil moisture, and crop condition.

The U.S. Forest Service has been using aerial photography since the 1930s to measure the area of forests,monitor forest health, and plan timber harvests. Aerial photography is also an important tool in the U.S. Fish andWildlife Service’s National Wetland Inventory Program. The technique is best suited for observing relatively smallareas and for studies requiring a high level of spatial detail. Riparian wetlands and wetlands less than 5 acres(2 hectares)f in area, for example, cannot be accurately characterized by satellite-based observations (18).Therefore, aerial photography is an essential tool for comprehensive wetland monitoring.

However, using aerial photography to get consistent coverage overlarge areas for regional analysis is verydifficult and costly. The aerial photography technology used frequently by the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA) for ecological studies can cost about $10,000 per flight. Difficulties also lie in determiningexactly where the plane is in space so that the area being photographed can be precisely identified. Also, takingphotographs at different times from exactly the same vantage point is difficult. Although aerial photography maybe preferable for ecological applications requiring high levels of detail (e.g., wetland inventory and forestmonitoring), it is not practical for routine, regular measurements or for studies of targe-scale ecologicalphenomena.

Remote sensing from satellites-By the late 1960s, advances in technology made transmitting electronicimages to Earth from satellite-based instruments practical. Polar-orbiting satellites (orbits pass over both the Northand South Poles) allow imaging of the entire globe. These Earth observation satellites are equipped with varioussensors that detect natural radiance (electromagnetic waves emitted by surface features) and reflectance (thosereflected from Earth’s surface).2 The intensity and wavelength of the signal detected become a type of signaturefor certain surface features. By combining these signals, various vegetation types and other characteristics canbe identified.


2 Sunlights absorbed by Earth’s atmosphere, scattered and reflected Off Earth’s Surface, orabsor~ @ 1*

surface. Surface features that absorb some waves can re-emit electromagnetic signals-often at longerwavelengths. In generat, reflected (or scattered) signals give information about the structure of the surface features,and radiated signals give information about its chemical composition.

(Continuedon nexfpa~)


Box 3-A–Remote Sensing as a Tool for Coping with Climate Change—Continued)

Satellites include several instruments that monitor Earth with “passive sensors” designed to detect a narrowrange, or window, of various parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. These windows are called spectral bands. Bydetecting different parts of the spectrum, a variety of signatures is obtained. Being able to detect narrower bandsimproves the ability to categorize detected signatures by wavelength. More narrow bands over a wider range ofthe spectrum enables detection of more signatures, which improves the ability to discern closely spaced objectsand identify surface features. Identification of a wetland, for example, generally requires analysis of three or moreinfrared spectral bands (18): one discriminates amounts of vegetation, water, and soil moisture; another helpsdetermine water quality; and another helps to classify different vegetation types. However, detailed geographicand spectral resolution is more expensive, requires higherdata-collection rates, and limits spatial coverage (49).Passive optical sensors detect only surface features. They cannot be used for Earth observation through clouds,accurate measurement of soil moisture through dense vegetation cover, or detection of submerged vegetation.Radar instruments have “active” sensors that provide their own illumination via microwave pulses and thenmeasure the reflected energy. Unlike optical sensors, radar data can be acquired through clouds and at night.Radar signals are especially sensitive to water and may improve the way soil and vegetation moisture aremeasured (53, 54). In addition, radar can probe to greater depths and may provide better information about surfaceroughness, canopy height, and, perhaps, vegetation beneath a dense canopy than can optical sensors (53,54).

Several countries besides the United States, including France, Japan, India and Russia have launchedsatellites for environmental studies and Earth observation. Discussed below are satellites whose data are mostwidely used by U.S. scientists for detecting change in the biosphere and for large-scale ecosystem studies.

Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR)-This scanning radiometer, aboard NOM’s PolarOrbiting Environmental Satellite (POES), uses five detectors to create surface images in five spectral bands (49).AVHRR data allow multispectral analysis of vegetation, clouds, lakes, coasts, snow, and ice and have been usedto monitor crop conditions, classify global vegetation, and demonstrate the scale of deforestation in the tropics (44).AVHRR provides daily coverage of the Earth, allowing frequent monitoring of a large region and the creation ofvirtually aloud-free images at a fraction of the cost and computing time required for aerial photography or othersatellite technologies (43).3 Although PMHRR data have much lower spatial resolution than do data from aerialphotography—about 0.7 miles (1.1 kilometers)4 per pixel, or data point—0.6-mile to 16-mile resolutions areadequate for “assessing many global or regional trends in land cover, vegetation damage, deforestation, and otherenvironmental conditions” (44).

Landsat-in 1972, NASA launched the first of a series of Landsat satellites for civilian Earth observation andmonitoring. Now, a 20-year continuous data set has been acquired for some selected areas (primarily in the UnitedStates and the former Soviet Union), making Landsat data the primary source of data for detecting long-termecological trends. This long-term record is just now beginning to provide valuable information about trends andchanges in wetland area, vegetation types, forest growth, deforestation rates, and urban expansion.

Consistency in measurement is very important for maintaining accurate and useful long-term records.Landsat missions have been designed so that data from different missions can be compared while allowingmoderate advances in technology. Sustaining Landsat missions and maintaining a continuous data set over 20years has not been easy. Over this time, operation of Landsat has changed from public to private and back to public

3 The EROS Data Center makes global data sets that are almost aloud-free by hwjng Over WPrO~mate&10 days.

4 TO convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.~g.


hands.S These changes have threatened to limit the availability of data to users, have increased the costs of data to users, and have limited the number of scenes imaged. Landsats 4 and 5 have already surpassed their expected life spans by several years. The recently launched Landsat 6 (October 1993) never reached orbit, and the long-term landsat record is now threatened.

The main advantage of Landsat and similar saterlltes is that they can distinguish surface features with higher spatial and spectral resolution and broader spectral coverage than do NHRR data 8 Landsat data have been used to identify and monitor crops, classify forest stands with finer classification scales, and assess damages from natural disasters. However, Landsat provideS less frequent coverage of an area (every 16 days) and requires more computing time and power than do NHRR data sets. For these reasons, AVHRR is more widely used than Landsat for global data analyses. Landsat data sets are also significantly more expensive than are AVHRR data sets. According to one scientist, "The 1 O-times-greater expense and 1 ,OOO-times-greater data volume [of Thematic Mapper of Landsat (TM) data as opposed to NHRR data preclude1 use of multiple annual [Landsat) data sets for global studies" (43). (The cost of each 120· by 110-mile scene is about $5,000 (18)).

New technologies7-1nstruments considered for Landsat 7 will improve surface resolution and allow the creation of topographic images (by having the ability to point to the side), thereby increasing Landsafs revisit frequences from once every 16 days to once every 3 days (49). Until recentfy, a High Resolution Imaging Spectrometer (HIRIS) was under consideration for development as part of NASA's Earth Observing System (EOS) program. In principle, HIRIS data could be used to detect specific species of trees or other ground cover, track pollutants in water, and identify natural vegetation that is under stress. A SynthetiC Aperture Radar (SAR) proposed for EOS-but recently canceled-would have been capable of multlangle, multi frequency , and multlpoiarizartion measurements (49). SAR could have measured soil moisture under vegetated land, determined the vertical structure of vegetation canopies, and measured canopy moisture (53). However, both HIRIS and SAR were dropped from consideration because of high costs and launch requirements (54).

Uses of remote sensing under climate change'

Many questions about climate change impacts and how to respond to them remain unanswered. For example, which plant and animal communities are likely to change first? How will they change? How fast will changes occur? Which species are already declining? Why? Where? Which are flourishing? Satellite data are already being used to answer many questions related to large-scale ecological change, but limitations in both satellite technology and in ecoi0gicai understanding prevent some of t he most compelling questions about global ecoi0gicai change from being addressed with satellite data. The table in this box (next page) lists some potential uses of remote-sensing data

Remote sensing for scientific study-Aithough an Earth observation satellite has never been launched specifically for ecoi0gicai studies (41), current operating satellites can help reveaJ some important aspects of

5 Landsat 4 and 5 are operated and maintained by the Earth Observation Satellite Company (EOSAT). a private company. Landsat 6 wil be launched by the U.S. Government but operated by EOSAT (16). The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (P.L 102-555) transfers aJl control of future Landsat miSSions (starting with Landsat 7) to the Department of Defense and NASA (49).

6 Landsat 4 and 5 carry the Thematic Mapper (TM) sensor, providing 1 oo-foot (30-m) ground resolution in six spectral bands (one thermallnfared band has a 390-foot (120-m) resolution). Landsat 6 is scheduled for launch on September 5,1993, and will carry an Enhanced Thematic Mapper Imaging Instrument (ETM). ETM will improve the TM by adding a 5-foot resolution panchromatic sensor, making it possible to collect data streams with sharper resolutions and lnaease vegetation dlsaimlnatlon.

7 See The Future of Remote Sensing from Space: Civilian Satellite Systems and Applications (49) for a more complete discussion of the future of remote-sensing technologies.

8 Much of this section was developed from a workshop, "Ecology and Remote Sensing," held September 18, 1992, at the University of Maryland at College Park.

(ContinU6d on next page)


.

Box 3-A-Remote Sensing a8 a Tool for Coping with Climate Change-(Contlnued)

Potential .... of current remote-8IM'ng data for bIOIpha study OIaaaIfy land-surface cover Detect vegetatlon-dlmate refatlonshlps Detect frequency and extent of fire Detect hmdatlon extent Detect Ufaca 8011 moIature In areM of low vegetation cowr Detect land and ocean surface temperature C81cuJat. ocean color Indlcee Calculate vegetation IndIoe8 EstImat. global net primary production EaUmate range, of evapotranspiration M ........ horfzontaJ canopy etructural charactertItIot Measure canopy biochemical conatltuent8 M .... vegetation wet« content

Potential ... of tuture .... 0 ........ dI ... CIaIIIfy vegetation oovw by oolMU'llty typee or apecIe8 aaaernbI8gea Detect and monitor margIna of ecoey .... Detect eucoelllonel ..,.. In foretI8 Oharaotertze vegetation .... (In natural oomnU'lltlelu wei U In orope) Eatfmate contamhInt conoentratlont In water and InOW Eltlmate blochemlcal composition of vegetation canopies In more detail EItImate canopy etructur8I charactertttIct with Independent methodI Elllnate ....... Eatfmate extent of daforettatIon Measure eon molal.". In vegetated ..... ....... ~ canopy atructuraI charactertItIot Measure canopy biochemical contlltuenl8ln more ••• Measure canopy mofat ... content Measure canopy height

.......... mIIY ...... further~ In order to be pnwen. 8OUROE8: U.s. eongNM, Offtoe of Technology '.1 .I.ment (Of A), Ecology MCf ............. ~ c.ne._ .... a.nge. ~ofM~ at College PUc, Sept. 18, ,. U.s. CangteII. orb ............ _ ....... (O'&ll ~. -E08 e.l!d lllGCRP: Art We~ e.~ ~ tht RW!t OL--''''''~. 00. M. .. ", iM;8.L u.an ..... , "Opportunltl. for UIIng the EOsImIgIng Spectnmtt .. and 8ynthetIoApetkft ...... lnicala .. a .. ModIIa," EaDIotw. wi. 72, No. 8, 1881, pp. 18S4-45: D.E. WIcIdand ........ to PIIMt Earth: Tht BoaIogIaaI p~," &ttIqw, vol. 12. No. e. 1801, pp. 102N8.

Gamma rays

Q) Q)

~ ~ ~~~~~ .ot:""OlIO;, F 'liS 0: 8: ar

X-rays Ultraviolet :> ~ ,~ ....J,~ infrared

~Radar~

EHF SHF UHF VHF HF MF LF •• 11111 III __

! ! ! ! ! I

0.01 0.1 10 0.1 10 0.1 10 10 100 1

VLF ELF

! !

10 100 nm nm nm nm ~m ~m ~m mm mm em em m m m km km km

Molt of the energy that It reflected, abIorbed. or acattered by the Earth', atmotphere Ia vIeIbIe or thortwa'Ie InfIwed .... (from 0.4 to 4 mloront). In the thermal Infrarect, moet .......... Ia by ......... 8hon~ radiation larefltcted by cIoud8, water vapor, .... and 8Ir;aoattered by .. moIecI .... tmIIIer than radiation waveIengIht; and abIorbed by ozone In Ihorter waveIengttIe (<0.8 rnIoron) and by .... vapor at the longer vf8ItIIe wavelengths (>1.0 micron). SOURCE: A. It Carleton, Sat .. ".".",. s..Ing it CIImatoIcW(Iooa Raton. FL: ORO PNM. 1811).


changing ecosystems and the consequences of various impacts on the biosphere. Most importantly, satellite datahave allowed the biosphere to be studied from a new perspective and at much larger scales than ever before,opening up a whole new area of ecological study. The most direct application of satellite data is the detection andstudy of land-use change. Because satellite data can be used to discern broad classes of vegetation (e.g.,grasslands, crops, evergreen forests, and deciduouos forests), it has been an important toll in studying the extentof deforestation in the tropics and the extent of desertification in Africa.

Leaf area, which can be calculated from remote-sensing data, has been used for identifying more specifictypes of vegetation cover of large vegetated areas. A leaf Area Index (LAl) is being used to identify the extentof specific crops (such as wheat) and their stress levels throughout the growing season. It is also being used tomonitor the condition of rangelands, pastures, and other mostly homogeneous land cover. This technique is lessuseful for natural vegetation where suboptimal growing conditions and a mix of species make the links among LAI,vegetation type, and health weak.

Remote sensing has also been used to monitor soil-moisture conditions in areas where-and during seasonswhen—vegetation cover is sparse, but it cannot measure ground soil moisture in heavily vegetated areas. Thus,satellite images miss most forested wetlands. Coastal erosion and some processes of large, shallow, openwetlands (such as those in the Mississippi River Delta) can easily be studied and monitored over time withremote-sensing data. For adequate delineation of wetlands, many wetland scientists believe that color infrareddata at a I6-foot (5-meter)g resolution viewed in stereo is required (18). Landsat 7 may be able to get this kindof resolution for wetland delineation, but wetland scientists studying the larger-scale processes of coastal wetlandswould rather have a coastal contour map at l-foot contour intervals than improved satellite remote-sensingtechnology (50).

Remote-sensing data have been used for mapping forest evapotranspiration and photosynthesis—keyprocesses that control the exchange of energy and mass in terrestrial vegetation. Climate change will likely perturbpatterns of evapotranspiration and photosynthesis. Regional maps of these processes will help researchers detectand understand such change.

Remote sensing for land-management and planning—Remote-sensing data are being used inconjunction with data from other sources as a tool for land management and planning. For example, the Fish andWildlife Service launched the Gap Analysis Project (GAP) in 1991 to identify areas of potentially high biodiversityand their protection status to guide future land acquisitions and habitat-protection efforts. Remote sensing (mostlyLandsat data) is the primary tool used to identify vegetation types (see vol. 2, box 5-J).

In addition, Geographic Information Systems (GISS) have been developed and used throughout Governmentagencies for regional analyses and planning. Vegetation and land-cover information from remotely sensed datais combined with digitized geologic, geographic, hydrologic, and topographic data in one computer system, so thatone overlay containing all this information can be studied and used to test potential land-use decisions (such asaltering the hydrology). Such analyses can lead to a better understanding of the Earth’s surface and subsurfaceprocesses and more sound regional land-use planning near environmentally sensitive areas (see vol. 2, box5-J).

Ducks Unlimited uses remotely sensed data from satellites in combination with aerial photography from theFish and Wildlife Service’s National Wetlands Inventory project for wetland monitoring. For their purposes,combining National Wetlands Inventory digital data with satellite data for evaluating wetland functions is morevaluable than using either product alone (18).

Current satellite data are useful for studying ecological processes on a very large scale, but are relativelyinadequate for detecting more subtle ecological changes, such as those at ecotones, at the edges of ecosystems,or within an individual plant community. “Satellite data cannot match the extent, classification detail, or reliability”of data from aerial photography and other manual techniques used in the National Wetlands Inventory Project (18).

9 TO convert feet to meters, multlply @ 0.W5.(Continued on next page)


Box 3-A-Remote Sensing as a Tool for Coping with Climate Change—Continued)Limitations to broader applications of remote sensing

The principal drawbacks of satellite data for detecting impacts of climate change are their limited spatial andspectral resolution. Remote sensing can be used to determine broad classes of vegetation, but it cannot identifyspecies or communities. With satellite-based information, it is nearly impossible to study the more subtle aspectsof regional ecological change. These include vegetation health in natural areas and mixed forests, ecologicalchange at ecosystem boundaries, migration of a single species or even a species community, drought conditionsand soil-moisture trends in heavily vegetated areas, and exact rates of wetland loss. Furthermore, few ecologistsare skilled at studying ecosystems at large, cnarse-resolution scales.

Technology is available to expand applications of sateillte remote sensing for studying impacts of climatechange, but high costs, launching requirements, and scientific priorities have delayed its development. Evencurrent satellite data have not been used to their full potential for studying potential impacts of climate change.For example, large-scale studies of the biosphere are limited by the availability of data sets. The only globalvegetation data set available is the Global Vegetation index (GVI), generated from AVHRR data. Even a

Landsat MSS ImageSeptember 15, 1973

Landsat MSS ImageMay 22, 1983

Landsat MSS ImageAugust 31, 1988

Landsat data have been used to identify and monitor crops, classify forest stands, and assess damages fromnatural disasters. These Landsat images of Mount St. Helens show the area in 1973 before the volcanoerupted and in 1983 and 1988, after the volcano erupted.


consistent, calibrated, single-source map of U.S. land cover and land use does not exist. More detailed coverageof large areas on the global or continental scale is limited by high costs and data volume. In fact, many universityresearchers have started to study AVHRR data despite its limited resolution and spectral information because ofthe high costs of Landsat data.

Another factor that limits wider use of remotely sensed data stems from differences among scientificdisciplines. Many ecologists, for example, are not trained to use satellite data (41), and those who useremote-sensing technologies are typically not mainstream ecologists. There has never been a remote-sensinginstrument designed specifically for ecological studies (41). Furthermore, few remote-sensing scientists havebackgrounds in ecology or biology (41). Ecologists must essentially take what they can get from remote-sensingdata that may not be optimal for their field. Opportunities for interdisciplinary studies at universities and therelatively recent surge of interest in ecosystem research (spurred by climate change, deforestation, and globalpollution) may help to bridge the gap.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment 1993.

network. Both these shortcomings are important a 20-year data set, despite several changes into consider in future discussions about the sciencebase of USGCRP. Many correlative measure-ments made with airborne platforms or ground-based instruments (that would verify and calibratethe satellite measurements and provide continu-ous coverage when satellites are not operating)were originally planned to be part of USGCRPbut were not funded. Costs for such efforts couldbe a small percentage of the USGCRP budget—inthe tens of millions of dollars each year.17

The Landsat satellite monitoring program is ofsignificant ecological interest because it is theprimary source of data for detecting long-termecological trends (18).18 Landsat satellites con-tain instruments that analyze multispectral data toobtain images of the Earth (see box 3-A). Newtechnologies have allowed resolution to improvefrom about 100 feet (30 meters)lg to a few feet.Landsat data allow changes to be detected invegetation type and cover, hydrologic patterns,extent of wetlands, land use, and soil moisture. Itis the only satellite monitoring program that has

ownership and new technology over the years thatnearly resulted in its termination. The data are justnow becoming relevant for ecological studies ofchanges in vegetation cover due to natural proc-esses. Multidecade data sets are vital to globalchange research; however, consistency is ex-tremely difficult because the average life of asatellite is only 5 years. A central element of anextended set of missions must be ensuring thecompatibility of future satellite data with currentdata while accommodating new technologies. Inaddition, subsequent satellites must survive fiscalfluctuations.

■ Balance Among NASA andOther USGCRP Agencies

The question of balance between satellite andnonsatellite measurements is directly connectedto the question of balance among participatingUSGCRP agencies. Currently, NASA, the Na-tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration(NOAA), and the Department of Energy (DOE)

17 OW)S Worbhop “EC)s and usOCRP: Are We Asking and Answering tbe Right Questions?” WAh@Om w, Feb. 25-26, 1993.18 ~~~ ~iv= appm~~ly 2.5 Percmt of its budget from NASA and 75 percent fmm DOD, It is apart of NASA’s Mssion to P-t

~ but it is separate from EOS.19 ~ Convw fmt to meters, multiply by 0.305.


This Landsat photo of Yellowstone National Parkdemonstrates the different hand-use patterns in thevicinity of the park. A clear line, formed by differentland-use patterns, delineate the park boundary. Thearea spans three States and is managed by Federal,State, private, and tribal landowners. The Federalportion of the area comprises two National Parks, nineNational Forests, and land owned by the Fish andWildlife Service and the Bureau of Land Management.(See vol. 2, ch. 5, box 5-F.)

control 80 percent of the focused research budgetfor USGCRP. Even when contributing programsare considered (e.g., those that are ongoing forother reasons), NASA, DOE, and NOAA control60 percent of the USGCRP budget (see figs. 3-4to 3-7). The lack of participation by agenciesother than NASA has led to gaps in the overall

program. For example, DOI, which managesapproximate ly 500 million acres (200 millionhectares) 20of public land that could be affectedlyclimate change, requested a decrease inUSGCRP funding for both FY 1993 and FY 1994.This can be attributed partly to managementagencies focusing their resources on what theyperceive as more immediate management con-cerns.

Another dimension of the imbalance in agencyparticipation is the historical attraction that Con-gress and the executive branch have had forspace-based research. Federal agencies may cor-rectly perceive that it is easier to get financialsupport for large, space-based projects than forlower-profile research such as monitoring (36,55).

NASA’S contribution dwarfs contributions fromother agencies, but it is unclear how to bring morebalance to the program to help fill the gaps andmake the necessary links to other global changeissues. Because USGCRP does not have a pro-gram budget, it would be difficult to redistributefunds across agencies; however, there might beOpportunities to modify projects within agenciesto help meet the needs of global change research.

ADAPTATION RESEARCH IN THEFEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Mitigation and Adaptation Research Strat-egies program was created about the same time asUSGCRP and operated as an independent work-ing group under CEES. MARS was conceived todevelop “a coordinated Federal research strategyfor mitigation of, and adaptation to, global changeand with assessment of economic, social andenvironmental effects of the proposed responses.The program addressed four functions: mitiga-tion, adaptation, economics, and social dynamics(5). MARS objectives under its adaptation pro-gram were to:

1. determine the sensitivity and adaptivecapacity of human and other natural sys-tems to global change, and the social,cultural, economic, and other constraints orimpediments to implementation of adaptivemeasures and methods to reduce thoseconstraints;

2. determine the mechanisms and timing re-quired for current evaluation proceduresand practices to be modified to meet soci-

~ ~ COIIVUI ~ to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

Chapter 3--GIobal Change Research in the Federal Government I 133

ety’s needs to accommodate global change,given the uncertainties about the timing andmagnitude of global change and its effects;and

3. identify, develop, demonstrate, and evalu-ate technologies and strategies to adapt toglobal change.

These objectives were to be directed towardwater resources; natural systems; food, forestry,and fiber; and human systems. In a sense, MARSwas charged with conducting all the researchcomponents missing from USGCRP.

However, MARS did not receive the adminis-trative backing that USGCRP did and neverdeveloped an interagency research program onmitigation and adaptation research. By 1992,MARS, as a formal entity, ceased to exist. Underthe CEES Subcommittee on Global Change, aninformal, and later formal, Subcommittee on theEnvironment and Technology formed in 1992,which continues to address mitigation and adap-tation issues, but in a much broader context.Although this subcommittee has no budgetarypower, it is holding the door open for agencieswith more interest in applied climate changeresearch than in basic research, such as theEnvironmental Protection Agency, the Depart-ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),the Tennessee Valley Authority, the U.S. Depart-ment of Agriculture (USDA), and the Departmentof the Interior, to redirect their funds to this end.

Although MARS provided a forum for agen-cies to discuss global change programs of mutualinterest, it was unable to exercise any influenceover project selection and funding. Consequently,MARS served primarily to identify existingagency programs and projects that addressedmitigation, adaptation, social dynamics, and eco-nomic issues either as a main focus or as acontributing element.

1 Research “Focused” on AdaptationMARS classified only a handful of projects as

focused on adaptation research, and funding for

Three-level, open-top chambers, such as these atFinley Farm, North Carolina, can be used to study theeffects of increased carbon dioxide, ozone, anddrought stress on trees and plants.

these projects totaled $8.18 million in FY 1992(5) (see table 3-3A). These projects are notincluded in USGCRP per se because they do notconform to the USGCRP mission of ‘‘observe,understand, and predict. ”

Of the $8.18 million considered focused onadaptation research, NOAA spent $4.1 million, orclose to 50 percent, the National Science Founda-tion (NSF) and EPA each spent $1.2 million, or15 percent, each, and USDA spent $0.35 million,or 4 percent, of the total spent on adaptationresearch. DOI, the department that houses land-management agencies responsible for 500 millionacres of public land, was conspicuously absentfrom the MARS list of agencies undertakingfocused adaptation research.

Examples of focused adaptation research in-clude: a $200,000 NSF program on the effects ofclimate change on coastal zones; a $1.1 millionUSDA program that seeks to simulate the effectsof changing climate and management practices onorganic matter, crop yields, and rangeland pro-ductivity; a $20,000 TVA program on regionalclimate scenarios; a $30,000 TVA program ad-dressing the sensitivity of the TVA reservoir andpower supply systems to extreme meteorology; a$250,000 Department of Defense (DOD) programthat assesses the impacts of potential climate


Table 3-3A-FY 1991 and 1992 Focused Research by Agency and Function($ millions)

Totals Mitigation Adaptation Economics

Agencya 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992DOC 3.3 5.1 0.1 1.0 3.2 4.1DOD 1.1 1.1DOE 1,7 2.2 1.7 2.2DOS <0,1 0.1 <0. 1 0.1DOT 0.2 0.2NSF 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2USDA 3.5 2.1 0.4 1.0EPA 3.3 3.3 2.4 2.1 1.0 1.2

Totals 9.5 16.5 4.1 7.3 5.4 8.2 1.0a DOS= Department of State; DOT= Department of Transportation. For definition of other terms, see table 3-1.SOURCE: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), Mitigation and Adaptation Research StrategiesWorking Group, MARS Working Paper /: Description of Proposed Coordinated Program (Washington, DC: CEES,1992).

Table 3-3B--FY 1991 and 1992 Focused Adaptation Research by Agency and Element($ millions)

Natural Human Food, Forestry, WaterTotals Systems Systems and Fiber Systems—

Agencya 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992DOC 3.2 4.1 0.7 1.1 0.4 1.0 2.2 2.0DOD 1.1 1.1DOS < 0.1 0.1 < 0.1 0.1DOT 0.2 0.2NSF 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2USDA 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1EPA 0.9 1.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3

Totals 5.4 8.2 1.0 1.6 1.8 2.8 0.2 0.3 2.4 3.4a DOS= Department of State; DOT= Department of Transportation. For definition of other terms, see table 3-1.SOURCE: Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES), Mitigation and Adaptation Research StrategiesWorking Group, MARS Working Paper/: Description of Proposed Coordinated Program (Washington, DC: CEES, 1992).

change on water resource management; and a$50,000 DOE pro-on regional impacts thatseeks to develop a model designed to capture theessential climate-sensitive relationships withinand between resource sectors (6).

Research that MARS classified as focused oneconomics received $1.0 million in FY 1992; noresearch was classified as focused on socialdynamics.

I Research “Contributing” to AdaptationMARS identified research on the effects of

climate change on natural and engineered systems

and research on the potential impact on society ofthese changes as contributing to adaptation re-search. With the exception of NASA’s compo-nent, the majority of USGCRP research under thescience elements Ecological Systems and Dy-namics and Human Interactions can be consid-ered impacts research-that is, how climatechange effects plants, animals, and people. Eco-logical Systems and Dynamics research made up$224 million, or 17 percent, of the FY 1993USGCRP budget, and Human Interactions re-search made up $22 million, or less than 2 percentof the USGCRP budget. NASA spent 66 percent

Chapter 3--Global Change Research in the Federal Government 1135

Table 3-4A-Percent of Total FY 1992 USGCRP Budget for theThird Science Element, Ecological Systems and Dynamics (ESD), Compared with

Percent of Each Agency’s GCRP Budget for ESDa

Percent of USGCRP ESD Percent of USGCRP ESD budgetbudget allocated allocated or requested as percentor requested b of each agency’s GCRP budget

Agency FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1993 FY 1994DOC/NOAA 1 1 5 4DODDOEDOIEPAHHSNASAC

NSFSmithsonianTVA

<12440

6610

20

<12340

6612

20

154

2136

0161762

0

154

2439

0161862

0USDA 11 10 53 52

a ESD received $224.3 million in FY 1993; for FY 1994, the budget request is for $249.3 million(approximately 17 percent of the total USGCRP budget).b FY 1993 figures represent appropriated funds; FY 1994 figures represent requested funds.c Part of the reason the NASA figures are so high is that the capital costs of their projects are greaterrelative to other projects. Although these comparisons are instructive, they do not reflect information on thecost and yield of research.

Table 3-45-Percent of Total FY 1992 USGCRP Budget for theFifth Science Element, Human Interactions (Hi), Compared with Percent of

Each Agency’s GCRP Budget for Hla

Percent of USGCRP HI Percent of USGCRP HI budgetbudget allocated allocated or requested as percent

or requested of each agency’s GCRP budgetAgency FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1993 FY 1994DOC/NOAA 3 3 1 1DODDOEDOIEPAHHSNASANSFSmithsonianTVA

o11131550

4230

0106

1160

5330

037

13100

08

100

034

10100

08

100

USDA 8 9 3 4a HI received $22.2 million in FY 1993; for FY 1994, the budget request is for $24.4 million (approximately1.6 percent of the total USGCRP budget).b FY 1993 figures represent appropriated funds; FY 1994 figures represent requested funds.SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

of the total USGCRP Ecological Systems and climate change on ecological systems. In contrast,Dynamics budget; however, Ecological Systems USDA spends only 11 percent of the USGCRP

and Dynamics research represents only 16 per- Ecological Systems and Dynamics budget, whichcent of the agency’s global change research represents 53 percent of their global changebudget (see table 3-4A). In addition, NASA’s research budget. DOI spends 3.5 percent of theresearch in this area focuses primarily on ecologi- USGCRP Ecological Systems and Dynamicsmalfunctions and characterizations, not effects of budget, which represents 21 percent of their


global change research budget (see table 3-4A).The agencies that one would expect to conduct thebulk of research on ecological systems and theeffects of climate change on ecosystems--EPAand the land-management agencies of DOI andUSDA-play only a minor role. The reasons arevaried and complex, but include the higher capitalcosts of NASA projects and the reluctance ofsome agencies to actively support and participatein the program. Consequently, these agencies’contributions to USGCRP comprise projects thatare in place for reasons other than climate changeresearch, such as characterizingg ground- andsurface-water flows, maintaining weather data,and monitoring ecosystem change.

Definitions of what encompasses EcologicalSystems and Dynamics research become veryimportant in the face of such disparate budgetallocations among agencies. If the definition isnot consistent across agencies, or if it is too broad,large gaps could potentially exist. For example, itis unclear how much large ecosystem research isbeing conducted-such as research on the use ofcorridors for the migration of plants and animalsin response to global change or techniques forecosystem transplantation. Are we clarifyingrates at which various species in an ecosystem canmigrate? Do we understand how to maintainecosystems in place? Will pest ranges increase?Will fire hazards increase? Are our crop and treevarieties genetically diverse enough to cope withthe range of potential changes? What agencies areaddressing these questions, and is research ade-quate to find the answers to these questions? Whatquestions under this research category doesNASA attempt to answer compared with whatquestions USDA attempts to answer? NASA’scontribution to the understanding of ecologicalsystems comes largely from space-based meas-urements and observations, whereas the land-management agencies’ contribution comes morefrom field research. Box 3-B highlights weak-nesses in environmental research identified by theNational Research Council (NRC).

Of the $22 milliontions, NSF spends 427.5 percent of theirbudget. Except for the

spent on Human Interac-percent, which representsglobal change research

Department of Health andHuman Services (HHS), which spends $5.41million, or 100 percent, of its USGCRP budget onHuman Interactions, the percent of agencyUSGCRP budgets allocated to Human Interac-tions ranges from O to 10 percent (see tables 3-3Band 3-4B). Although it is difficult to obtainreliable numbers, because social science researchhas many labels, it is doubtful that any Federalagency devotes as much as 1 percent of its totalresearch budget to environmental social science(37).

Specific projects classified as contributing toadaptation include: a $4.7 million program atDOI’s National Park Service (NPS) to improvethe scientific basis of adaptive management of thetypes of ecosystem responses likely to be associ-ated with climate and other global environmentalchanges; a $1.3 million program at DOI’S Bureauof Reclamation (BOR) to study the changes inhydrologic processes under scenarios of globalclimate change and to determine the potentialimpacts on snowpack, snowmelt, and runoff inthe 17 Western States; a $1.5 million program atDOI’S U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) to evalu-ate the sensitivity of water resources to climatevariability and change across the United States;and a $150,000 DOE program to evaluate theexisting social science knowledge base concern-ing energy and the analysis of the role ofinstitutions in making decisions affecting climatechange (6).

Very little of the effects research describedabove could also be considered research on theimpacts of global change on human systems.USGCRP’S new Economics Initiative does con-sider the impact of climate change on the econ-omy, and several agencies support research in thisarea, including NSF, NOAA, and USDA (in itsEconomics Research Service). However, the eco-


Box 3-B–Weaknesses in U.S. Environmental Research Identifiedby the National Research Council

The research establishment ispooriystructured todealwith complex, interdisciplinary research oniarge spatialscales and long-term temporal scales. These traits characterize the primary needs of an effective environmentalresearch program.There is no comprehensive national environmental research plan to coordinate the efforts of the more than 20agencies involved in environmental programs. Moreover, no agency has the mission to develop such a plan, noris any existing agency able to coordinate and oversee a national environmental research plan if one weredeveloped.The Iackofanintegrated national research plan weakens the ability of the United States to work creatively withgovernments of other nations to solve regional and global problems.The Nation’s environmental efforts have no dear leadership. As suggested by the lack of a cabinet-levelenvironmental agency, the United States has lacked strong commitment to environmental research at thehighest levels of government. Environmental matters have been regarded as iess important than defense,health, transportation, and other government functions.Although individual agenaes and associations of agencies analyze data to provide a base for dedsions onstrategies and actions to address specific environmental problems, no comprehensive ‘think tank” exists forassessing data to support understanding of the environment as a whole and the modeling of trends whoseunderstanding might help to set priorities for research and action.Bridges between policy, management, and science are weak, There is no organized system wherebyassessments of environmental problems can be communicated to decisionmakers and policy-setters.Long-term monitoring and assessment of environmental trends and of the consequences of environmental rulesand regulations are seriously inadequate. The UrWd States has a poor utierstanding of its biological resourcesand how they are being affected by human activities. Although biological surveys have a long history at the Stateand Federal level in the United States, it is only very recently that we appear to be approaching a consensuson the need for a comprehensive, national biological survey.There Is insuffident attention to the collection and management of the vast amwnt of data being developed bythe 20 agencies involved in environmental research. Coiiection and management ofenvironmentai iife-sdencedata are iess weii organized than those of environmental physicai-sdence data.Education and training in the Nation’s universities are stiii strongiy disciplinary, whereas soiution ofenvironmental problems requires broadly trained people and multidisdpiinary approaches. Opportunities forbroadiy based interdisdplinary graduate degrees are few, and facuity are not rewarded as strongty forinterdisciplinary activities as they are for disciplinary activities Thus, there is a risk that envinmmentai scientistsappropriately trained to address pressing needs will be lacking.Bioiogkal-sdence and social-science components of environmental research are poorty supported, comparedwith the (stiii inadequate) support given to the physicai sciences.Research on engineering soiutions to envkonmentai problems is senousty underfunded. That reduces our abilityto protect ecosystems and restore damaged ones to productivity and jeopardizes the Nation’s ability to achievemapr ecunomic benefits that are certain to derive from increasing wotldwide use of technologies for these purposes.With respect to environmental affairs, government operates in a strongiy adversarial relationship with bothindustry and the general pubiic, to the detriment of integrated planning and maintenance of an atmosphere ofmutuai trust that is essentiai for effective government functioning.With important exceptions in the National Science Foundation, the National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration, and the US. Geoiogicai Survey, most environmental research and development is narrow,supporting either a regulatory or a management function. That appears to be particularity true in theenvironmental iife sciences.

SOURCE: National Researoh Council, ReseardI to IWect, ffeetore, and Ma- the Envhrunent Committea on EnvironmentalReeaarch, Commission on LHe Sdences (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993).


nomics component of USGCRP is not well-integrated with the rest of the program.21

CEES is aware of the absence of research on theimpacts of climate change and has slightlyexpanded Earth Process Research, the secondintegrating priority, to include research to deter-mine the impacts associated with predicted globalchanges (12). However, explicit recognition ofthe need for research on impacts of climatechange is not yet reflected in the programstructure.

9 A New Adaptation ProgramFor reasons discussed above, it is necessary to

pursue research on impacts of global change andpotential response and adaptation strategies with-out waiting for USGCRP to complete climateresearch. The issues addressed by MARS con-tinue to be discussed because MARS sought toanswer near-term policy questions and questionsthat naturally accompany climate change re-search: If the climate is changing, how willforests, agriculture, and natural areas be affectedand what should we do? MARS may not have hadthe administrative, congressional, and programsupport it needed to pursue its mission a few yearsago, but now MARS-related questions are beingasked with more persistence, and it might be timeto consider reinstating another MARS-type pro-gram.

22 The following discussion addresses how

such a program might be structured. We suggestsome possible ways to incorporate adaptation intoUSGCRP below and in option 3-5.

A framework for developing research prioritiesfor an adaptation research program (ARP) shouldbe developed through a combination of an intera-gency committee and an external advisory panel.The interagency committee should consist of

members from several scientific disciplines andthe policy- and decisionmaking communities.Committee and advisory panel members shouldbe committed to the goal of creating a management-and policy-relevant research program.

The committee and advisory panel could ad-dress the following questions:

1.

2.

3.

What areas of science are important topursue in order to support adaptation re-search? What existing federally supportedresearch, which is not currently classified asglobal change research, could be augmentedto support an adaptation-focused researchprogram?

What areas of research would most effec-tively reduce the physical, biological, social-behavioral, and economic uncertainties facedby decisionmakers in choosing among pol-icy options affecting global change?23

How can ARP be organized so that it isuseful to public and private decisionmakers?

Answers to these questions require cooperationand coordination in the ecological and socialsciences communities, coordination among theland-management agencies, and a clear delinea-tion of the role of adaptation research in agencypolicy and management. As concluded by theCommittee on Human Dimensions of GlobalChange, there is “an almost complete mismatchbetween the roster of Federal agencies thatsupport research on global change and the rosterof agencies with strong capabilities in socialscience” (35). There is a similar mismatchbetween the roster of Federal agencies withenvironmental responsibilities and the roster ofagencies with strong capabilities in social science(37).

21 OW’S workshop ‘‘EOS ~ us~~: ~ We Ask@ and hsw~ th R@ QUeStiOM?” W@d@OIL ~, Feb. 2S-26, 1993.

22 Conw=5 spflc~y ~k~ on t. ~j~5 ~~on issues howev~, ifco~ss C&WSeS to ~Q@ m adaptationprogrmq it shouldalso decide whether related mitigation issue:] should be addressed along withan adaptation pmgrarq as a separate prograq or within USGCRP.

23 ~s question WaS develop in the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program’s (N~~’S) lg~ ~d vfi for HGroup I (39). Unfortunately, that task group was disbanded the next year.


The Ecological Society of America’s Sustain-able Biosphere Initiative (SBI) has made a start infostering cooperation among the ecological andsocial sciences. SBI has clearly laid out scientificpriorities in the ecological sciences. Coordinationamong the land-management agencies is alsobeginning with groups such as the TerrestrialResearch Interest Group, an ad hoc coordinatingcommittee of Federal agencies and other organi-zations conducting terrestrial research (see box5-J). An adaptation program could continue toencourage such efforts.

Budget Mechanisms for ARP

Because the scope of any ARP would reachacross agencies, a new agency or executive body,or a new office in an existing agency, could becreated to house it or, as with USGCRP, a budgetcrosscut could be used. Because several agencieshave significant expertise and infrastructure topursue research on adaptation to global changeand because of budget constraints, Congressmight find it difficult to create a separate body forARP. If an existing agency housed ARP, it couldundermin e the ARP mission by creating tensionamong agencies about interagency authority.Because budget crosscuts have worked weIl in thepast, at least until the point when they aresubmitted to Congress, the use of a budgetcrosscut for ARP might be desirable.

FCCSET currently coordinates the budgetcrosscut of USGCRP and could coordinate thebudget crosscut for ARP. However, becauseFCCSET supports science, engineering, and tech-nology initiatives but does not initiate management-and policy-relevant deliberations within theseprograms, it may not be the best organization forARP budget coordination. If an office within theWhite House coordinated ARP’s budget, theprogram could more easily maintain its emphasison policy-relevant research; however, it might bemore subject to political pressure.

ARP Withln USGCRPIf Congress does not wish to create anew ARP,

but chooses instead to augment the existingUSGCRP three points should be considered.First, the priorities of USGCRP would need to bechanged. In addition to observation, understand-ing, and prediction, “planning’ for climatechange and other global changes, including adap-tation, would have to be incorporated into theUSGCRP goals. The seven scientific elements inthe priority structure of USGCRP might need tobe rewritten, with the help of advisory panels,agency personnel, and, perhaps, the NationalResearch Council. More funds would need to beallocated to the research topics under the presentEcological Systems and Dynamics and HumanDimensions elements. Adaptation would have tobe incorporated into the existing elements, or anew adaptation element would have to be added.

Second, as would be the case with a separateprogram for adaptation, the land-managementagencies must be encouraged to Unify theirresearch programs that address ecological andhuman-system response to and management ofglobal change. Congress must commit moreresources to the Ecological Systems and Dynami-cs and Human Interactions research areas, espe-cially within the land-management agencies.Finally, projects currently supported underUSGCRP would need to be reviewed for theirusefulness to adaptation research. For example,the Earth Observing System (EOS) currentlyconcentrates on climate monitoring and ecologi-cal monitoring, primarily for the sake of deter-mining land-atmosphere interfaces for globalclimate models. Could EOS be modified toprovide information on processes that are import-ant for adaptation?

EVALUATION MECHANISMSTo date, there has been no formal evaluation of

the overall scope, goals, and priorities ofUSGCRP and of whether its activities collec-tively are addressing the needs of policy makers.


Several evaluation mechanisms could be used toaddress the dichotomy between science andpolicy in USGCRP, including internal and exter-nal reviews, integrated assessments, and coordi-nated congressional oversight. Appropriate com-munication links among scientific disciplines,Federal agencies, State agencies, policy makers,decisionmakers, and all levels of USGCRP arevital for its success.

D ReviewsMost formal reviews of USGCRP elements

have centered on the instruments and methodsused in research about specific scientific prioritiesor have focused on individual projects within theprogram. For example, teams reviewing the EOSprogram have addressed specific instruments thatEOS should use, and the National Academy ofSciences (NAS) has carried out reviews andmidcourse evaluations of specific agency pro-grams and projects.

Reviews should be used as a mechanism formaintaining flexibility in the program and toredirect its activities, if necessary. Reviewsshould: be timely and efficient; include peoplewho do not have an immediate stake in USGCRP,but do have significant knowledge about itscurrent structure, content, and history; be con-ducted periodically to reflect the nature of thequestions being asked; and identify programs thatcan be eliminated as well as recommend newones. Perhaps most importantly, reviews that callfor a redirection in the overall program shouldconsider that research on global change issuesrequires a financial and institutional commitmentthat transcends political and budgetary cycles.Reviews should not be used to respond to thepolitical crisis of the day or as a mechanism toundermine effective programs with long timehorizons.

H Integrated AssessmentsReviews generally look at individual parts of a

program or the program as a whole and determinehow they are functioning; they do not try tointegrate the program’s different research results.Integrated assessments are a mechanism forsynthesizing all the research relevant to anidentified problem and for presenting researchresults in a policy context to decisionmakers (13,42).24 Just as important, integrated assessmentshelp guide research and identify key assumptions,uncertainties, gaps, and areas of agreement. TheFederal Government tried to incorporate an as-sessment process into the National Acid Precipi-tation Assessment Program (NAPAP) in the1980s with only limited success (see box 3-C). Achallenge for the global change research commu-nity will be to devise assessments that minimumdisruption of ongoing programs but still allow forredirection of program elements in light of newdiscoveries, advances in technology, and chang-ing long-term needs of policy makers.

Scientific information is critical, but not suffi-cient, in determining how the United Statesshould respond to the risks of global change. IfUSGCRP is to be driven by social relevance aswell as by scientific curiosity, its research priori-ties should include sociocultural factors as well asphysical factors (23). Integrated assessmentscould help determine the importance of theproblems presented by global change relative toother policy problems, outline alternative policiesto respond to global change, and explain the prosand cons of various responses and implementa-tion strategies.

For example, preliminary results of an inte-grated assessment computer model to prioritizepolicy-relevant research, by Carnegie MellonUniversity, suggest that: economic and ecologicalimpacts are unambiguously the most important

~ ]nregrat~ a~~e~~~nt (idso knmvn as comprehensive and end-to-end a.wew?wu) is an evolving COncept. AII titemd WSCSsmnt ofglobal change would generally include at least the following activities: assessments of the physical scienee component of a projec~ assessmentsof the potential impacts of change o~ the environment, human heal@ and the eeonomy; assessments of the effectiveness and economic impactof possible societal responses to change; and assessments of the political feasibility of possible responses (31),

Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government 1141

Box 3-C-Lessons from NAPAP

In 1980, Congress passed the Acid Precipitation Act (Title Vll of the Energy Security Act, P.L. 96-294) andthereby established an interagency task force to plan and oversee a 10-year National Acid PrecipitationAssessment Plan (NAPAP). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. Department ofAgriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency jointly chaired the task force, which included representativesfrom the Department of the Interior, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Commerce,the Department of Energy, the Department of State, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, theCouncil on Environmental Quality, the National Science Foundation, and the Tennessee Valley Authority alongwith representatives of the Argonne, Brookhaven, Oak Ridge, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratories andfour Presidential appointees. The purpose of NAPAP was to increase our understanding of t he causes and effectsof acid precipitation through research, monitoring, and assessment activities that emphasized the timelydevelopment of science for use in decisionmaking (39).

NAPAP (with an annual budget that ranged from about$17 million at the beginning of the program to justover $300 million at its end) was one of the most ambitious interagency programs ever focused on a particularproblem (47). It was designed to be a major research effort that provided policy-relevant information in a timelymanner. It succeeded in its research efforts, but it did not provide policy-relevant information in a timely manner.Because the nature of problems facing the country is increasingly interdisciplinary and global in scope, it isreasonable to assume that the government will mandate more programs that try to twidge the gap between sdenceand public policy. To reap the greatest benefits from t hese programs, it will be necessary to incorporate the lessonsof NAPAP into program structure. This box focuses on the Task Group on Assessments and Policy Analysis andthe overall lessons learned from such a large, interagency program.

When founded, NAPAP consisted of 10 task groups, each with a single agency serving as the coordinationcontact: Natural Sources of Acid Precipitation, Human Sources of Acid Precipitation, Atmospheric Processes,Deposition Monitoring, Aquatic Effects, Terrestrial Effects, Effects on Materials and Cultural Resources, ControlTechnologies, Assessments and Policy Analysis, and International Activities. In 1985, the assessments and policyanalysis task group was disbanded-a decision that undermined the value of the program for decisionmakers.

Congress established NAPAP in large part to determine whether acid rain was a problem. However, in thecontext of research NAPAP did not approach acid rain as a unified issue. Rather, it examined the subject atmultidisciplinary and subdisciplinary levels with Iittte emphasis on synthesizing findings. As stated in one critique(24):

The program reported findings in excruciating disciplinary detail, an approach which was not especiallyhelpful to non-specialist decision makers. The disciplinary pluralism of NAPAP also allowed policyadvocates to pick and choose among NAPAP’s reported findings, emphasizing facts or uncertaintiessupporting a particular position and deemphasizing others. NAPAP lacked an extradisciplinaryperspective that would have allowed it to characterize acid rain as a problem, non-problem, orsomething in between.

Assessment and policy analysis research develops and uses quantitative methods to organize andcommunicate scientific and other information in ways that allow comparison of policy choices. These methodsinclude decision analysis, benefit-cost analysis, risk analysis, and technology assessments. The NAPAP TaskGroup on Assessments and Policy Analysis attempted to begin early in the program to develop integratedassessment methodologies and to perform multiple assessments throughout the program to ensure policyrelevance. A 1985 report was to include an assessment of the current damages attributed to aad deposition, anuncertainty analysis of key scientific areas, and the implications of uncertainty for policy choices. The task grwpalso tried to develop a framework for the methodology for subsequent integrated assessments in 1987 and 1989(25).


142 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat&Volume 1

Box 3-C-Lessons from NAPAP-(Continued)

However, in 1985, NAPAP’s management changed and, consequently, the focus of the program changed.The assessments task group was disbanded, and responsibility for assessments was transferred to NAPAP’sdirector of research. It was uncertain whether NAPAP would produce even one assessment: NAPAP ceasedfunding integrated assessment modeling because the Interagency Scientific Committee decided to spend their

limited funding on other research. The new director repeatedly delayed the 1985 assessment, but it was finallyreleased-with much controversy-in 1987. The 1987 and 1989 integrated assessments were never produced.Finally, during the last few years of the program, NAPAP produce its second integrated assessment; however, the1990 publication of the report came too late to be of maxinwm use to policy makers in fornndating the amendmentsto the Clean Air Act (47).

Because NAPAP failed to carry out the full range of assessments it originality pianned, key components forthe 1990 integrated assessment were either not pursued or were underfunded, and the assessment wasincomplete (39). For example, although NAPAP was initially supposed to evaluate the economic effects of aciddeposition on crops, forests, fisheries, and recreational andaestheticresources andtodeterminethe impkationsof alternative policies, funds were significantly reduced for research in these areas (47).

l%eoversight Review Board (ORB) of NAPAP, in its 1991 report tothe JohtChairs Council of the InteragencyT&sk Force on Acidic Deposition, strongly emphasized that an assessment function be given primacy throughoutan interagency program (39). ORB’s key recommendation on lessons learned about the interface between scienceand policy was to give assessment priority over research (24) because “science and research findings perse havelittle to offer directiy to the public policy process, [andl their usefulness depends on assessme~ defined as theinterpretation of findings relevant to decisions” (39). ORB also outlined eight other suggestions that any programwith such a close interface between science and policy should follow:

1. Match institutional remedies to problems.2. Obtain and maintain political commitment.3. Take steps to ensure continuity.4. Configure organization and authority to match responsibility.5. Give assessment primacy.6. Provide for independent external programmatic oversight.7. Understand the role of science and how to use it.8. Take special care with communication.9. Prepare early for ending the program.

The insights gained from the experiences of NAPAP were not considered when designing the U.S. GlobalChange Research Program (USGCRP)-a much larger program on both a temporal and spatial scale thanNAPAP. Some argue that USGCRP is following the same path as NAPAP+ research will come fromUSGCRP, but the results will not be used to inform poiicy, and decisions concerning global change will be madewith little more knowledge than is available today (42). The logical questions to ask are: Why didn’t Congress usethe experiences of NAPAP in formulating legislation for USGCRP, and how should incorporation of lessons fromNAPAP be integrated into USGCRP and future interagency programs?


sources of uncertainty and that reducing the according to the policy objectives chosen and theuncertainty is more important than resolving the time horizon; although they must not be ignored,differences among climate models; the priority uncertainties about climate variables appear, inplaced on research in different fields will vary many cases, to be less important than certain


social, economic, and ecological factors; andmodels that measure all impacts in monetaryterms are unlikely to be able to explore many ofthe most important aspects of the climate prob-lem (15).

Regardless of the scope of an integratedassessment, its primary functions should be: toidentify key questions to be answered, to surveythe state of current scientific judgments aboutwhat we know and do not know about globalchange and its impacts, to idenify and prioritizewhat the key uncertainties are in relation to policyneeds, to list key assumptions and judgments, toidenify where new research is needed to aid thepolicy process most effectively, including re-search on key uncertainties in understanding theclimate system and fostering mitigation andadaptation research, and to establish the require-ments for peer and public review (24, 42).

Assessments need not be conducted sequen-tially (e.g., results of earth science research oreconomic research need not be complete beforean assessment can begin), but should begin at thebeginning of a program and continue throughoutthe life of the program (l). The ideal assessmentwould pay particular attention to bridging gapsand maintainingg essential links among variousresearch projects and disciplines and woulddetermine the value of new information.

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Carnegie Mellon University, the Electric PowerResearch Institute, and Battelle Pacific NorthwestLaboratory have programs for developing com-puter models for integrated assessments. Forexample, the Battelle Pacific Northwest Labora-tory is developing an Integrated Climate ChangeAssessment Model (ICCAM)25 that will incorpo-rate information from models on human activi-ties, atmospheric composition, climate and sealevel, and terrestrial ecosystems (17). ICCAM isintended to be an integrated collection of these

models in a reduced, or simplified, form, with thegoal of giving practical answers to practicalquestions. The models are limited by the com-plexity and uncertainty of each system, and somefear that the results from these integrated assess-ments could be difficult to understand. However,these models can at least help to structure thought,direct inquiries, identify which uncertainties areimportant and which are not, and suggest coursesof action (40).

Assessments could be performed by independ-ent, nongovernment committees, Federal intera-gency task forces consisting of agency personnelwho are participating in the program, a mix of thetwo groups, or by the National Academy ofSciences (42). Nongovernment committees wouldoffer the fresh perspective of independent evalu-ators who are less weighed down by politicalagendas; however, they might have little controlover the agencies they are trying to influence.Interagency committees would have the advan-tage of using Government researchers who arewell-informed about the program and who couldnot easily ignore assessment findings.

To date, integrated assessments have receivedlittle administrative support and almost no fund-ing from any ongoing program. Some agencypersonnel have expressed interest in integratedassessments, but few have committed any re-sources to it (EPA and DOE have funded someassessment research). The little funding thatintegrated assessments have received has comelargely from NSF and the Electric Power Re-search Institute. A small percentage of the totalUSGCRP budget—perhaps 1 to 5 percent-couldbe set aside for integrated assessment (15, 50).The Carnegie Commission also recommends thata larger percentage of environmental research anddevelopment dollars go toward assessment andpolicy research (4).

~ Ba~ellc PNIC Norr.hwHt hbomto~ is working in conjunction with the University Corporation for Atmospheric ReseafeL the Elm~cPower Research Institute, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency.


I Congressional OversightCongress has held several hearings on global

climate change that have focused predominantlyon what we know, what we do not know, theaccuracy of current data, reconciling the existenceof conflicting data, the implication of climatechange for natural resources and the economy,and the potential costs of actions designed tomitigate climate change. However, these hearingshave not successfully addressed USGCRP as aprogram. Some hearings have focused on thecurrent research of program participants, which isa first step in determiningg the necessity of theresearch, but few have focused on whetherUSGCRP research was supplying informationneeded to develop policy responses to globalchange. The direction of the program and itsemphasis on the first two science elements havenot been altered.

In addition, the different committees withjurisdiction over USGCRP have not been equallyactive in their oversight activities. As a result,certain portions of the program are regularlyreviewed while others are never reviewed.

New approaches to traditional authorizationand appropriation procedures for large intera-gency programs such as the USGCRP need to beconsidered. The current authorization and appro-priation process guarantees that USGCRP will beexamined by Congress only in pieces (38). Anannual, ad hoc appropriation subcommittee mightbe created to specifically address the USGCRPbudget as a whole. This committee should consistof members from appropriation subcommitteeswith jurisdiction over elements of USGCRP (seetable 3-2).

For congressional oversight to be effective ininfluencing USGCRP, a long-term systematicapproach to communication and oversight mustbe developed. Congressional feedback, expecta-tions, and prospective actions must be communi-cated quickly to the program. Oversight should beextended to include regular meetings amongpolicy makers who have jur isdict ion over

USGCRP and USGCRP participants; an interdis-ciplinary, multiagency group working withUSGCRP; and outside reviewers. Results fromthese meetings should be freely and widelydisseminated. Oversight hearings should be coor-dinated with all committees who have jurisdictionover USGCRP (see table 3-l).

POLICY OPTIONS: AUGMENTINGTHE FEDERAL RESEARCH EFFORTON GLOBAL CHANGE

To policy makers, climate change does notbecome a problem the moment that the change inthe Earth’s mean average temperature becomesstatistically significant. For them, it becomes aproblem when a community feels the pinch of anunwanted event-drought or flood or decline oftimberland, for example. Knowing how best toameliorate or cope with any costs that climatechange might induce is important to policymakers. Knowing how mitigation efforts to reduce greenhouse gases will affect our ability toadapt is important. Knowing what information isknowable and unknowable over various timescales is important to policy makers. This kind ofinformation does not automatically emerge froma basic research program. To be useful to thegoverning bodies of the world, the science factsgained by USGCRP must somehow be translatedinto potential costs or benefits incurred by climatechange and must guide strategies to prepare for orreact to change. Currently, there is no formalmechanism in USGCRP for making the linkbetween policy and science.

Given the complicated and long-term nature ofclimate change, the research needed to understandit, and the shorter-term needs of policy makers,a research program for global change shouldideally:

■ identify the key science and policy questionsfor the near term and the long term;

■ orchestrate a research program that involvesthe physical, biological, and social scientists;


integrate the research results across disci-plines (i.e., assess the state of understanding)periodically; and

communicate results back to the researchersand policy makers effectively.

Identifying the outcomes that matter to policymakers should be the first step in refining globalchange research programs, with scientists helpingthe policy makers to ask pertinent questions (14).Next, scientific priorities should be comparedwith the policy questions. Where there are seriousmismatches between scientific and political prior-ities, programs should be reevaluated-not todirect a basic science agenda, but to ensure thatkey information needed for policy decisions frommany disciplines is available alongside the funda-mental chemistry and modeling. The particulardisciplines, research methods, and instrumentsthat would be used to gather and analyze datashould flow from these priorities and should bescience-driven. Ideally, information needs ofdecisionmakers will influence questions asked byscientific researchers, and vice-versa. For exam-ple, the communication between scientists andpolicy makers may cause a change in key policyquestions, which in turn may redirect the researchprogram; “policy makers need to understand thelimitations of what science can determine, andscientists must understand what the policy com-munity really needs’ (42). This has proveddifficult in past research efforts, such as NAPAP’s(See box 3-C).

The following policy options generally fallunder three categories:

■ Effectively broaden USGCRP by incorpo-rating results of Federal research relevantto but not currently under its purview.USGCRP as currently constructed and im-plemented cannot do this. It could requirecongressional or executive branch codifica-tion. There are several policy options di-rected both at broadening USGCRP and atensuring that USGCRP and other programsrelevant to global change are connected (the

Figure 3-8-Alternative Organizational Schemesfor Global Change Research

Environmentaltechnology

F(F

8

n

Assessment(OSTP/FCCSET)

1Mitigation

$’ f ‘$4.

mm*Earth systems

science andprediction

\b/Assessment

Evaluation of

[ ~~i~:’‘g

policy decisions:

L 1


diagrams in fig. 3-8 show some possibleorganizational schemes for building in someof the missing components). The National

I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume

Research Council has recommended thecreation of a National Environmental Coun-cil in the Executive Office of the President(37), and the National Commission on theEnvironment (NCE) recommended the de-velopment of a National Environmental Strat-egy (34); either or both of these couldcomplement the options described below.Increase funding or redirect funding toareas where research is inadequate. Amodest redirection of 1 to 5 percent ofcurrent funding ($15 to $70 million) couldbegin filling in the large gaps between thecurrent climate change program and a policy-relevant global change program (15, 50).Because the bulk of this OTA report focuseson natural-resource-based systems and theNation’s potential to adapt to climatechange, we discuss coordinating existingecosystem research and initiating new effortsthat are critical to planning for and/or manag-ing natural resources under climate change.However, building strong socioeconomiccomponents of USGCRP is equally impor-tant.Make the program more relevant to policymaking by incorporating an assessmentfunction. Assessment and regular reevalua-tion of USGCRP could be instrumental inidentifying the current information base onclimate change, gaps in knowledge, andshort- and long-term policy questions.

U Effectively Broaden USGCRPAs currently structured, USGCRP is a collec-

tion of programs from several agencies with nocentral management. Although research shouldremain decentralized, coordination should becentralized and top-down. The Subcommittee onGlobal Change Research under the Committee onEarth and Environmental Sciences is currentlyresponsible for coordinating activities under theFederal Coordinating Council for Science, Engi-neering, and Technology. FCCSET acts largely as

1

a fulcrum for coordination, but agency participa-tion in FCCSET projects is voluntary, andFCCSET has no authority over how participatingagencies spend their funds. A previous OTAreport (48) looked broadly at the health of U.S.research and development and concluded:

In the Executive Branch, Congress should insist,at a minimum, on iterative planning that resultsin: a) making tradeoffs among research goals; andb) applying (after scientific merit and programrelevance) other criteria to research decisionmak-ing that reflects planning for the future. . . OSTP[Office of Science and Techhnology Policy] couldinitiate broader priority-setting.

Option 3-1: Amend the Science Policy Act of1976 (PL. 94-282), which established the Officeof Science and Technology Policy and the Fed-eral Coordinating Council on Science, Engineer-ing, and Technology, to strengthen the ability ofthese offices to coordinate science and ecosystemmanagement across agencies. OSTP was estab-lished to “define coherent approaches for apply-ing science and technology to critical and emerg-ing national and international problems and forpromoting coordination of the scientific andtechnological responsibilities and programs ofthe Federal departments and agencies in theresolution of such problems,” and FCCSET wasestablished to “provide more effective planningand administration of Federal scientific, engi-neering, and technological programs” (P.L. 94-282). These offices have the authority to developand implement coherent, Government-wide sci-ence policy and have been the mechanism forcoordinating several multiagency programs. How-ever, OSTP has not always been an active orinfluential player in the executive branch, andFCCSET lacks the authority to set priorities,direct policy, and fully participate in the budgetprocess (2, 21). The directions for environmentalresearch must be set-and responsibilities amongvarious Federal agencies must be coordinated-atthe executive level because environmental re-search is of the highest national importance.

Chapter 3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government 1147

About 20 Federal agencies have major responsi-bilities related to the environment. In all instances(except for EPA), concern for the environment isnot the primary role of the agency conducting theenvironmental research (37). For example, DOEsupports much environmental research, but thedepartment’s primary responsibility is energy,not the environment.

OSTP could be given budgetary authority,perhaps in conjunction with the Office of Man-agement and Budget, to guide agency programsthat contribute to science and technology. Thiscould mean reinstating “fencing,” or requiringagencies to commit funds to USGCRP projects(see footnote 12). These funds could not then beredirected to meet OMB targets for other areaswithin each agency.

A further step would be to create a NationalScience and Technology Council to replaceFCCSET as proposed by Vice President Gore inhis National Performance Review (21). Underthis plan, agencies would clear their budgets withthe science council as well as with OMB.

Option 3-2: Establish a committee withinFCCSET to standardize the criteria for classify-ing focused and contributing research toUSGCRP and to classify all government researchaccordingly. Much research that could qualify as‘‘contributing’ to USGCRP may be ongoingunder another title (such as ‘‘EnvironmentalBiology;’ see option 3-6 below). Likewise, more“focused work” might occur in the agencies ifthe USGCRP scope is broadened. A defined set ofcriteria for classifying research would be of greatvalue in identifying Federal research that is trulypertinent to the global change problem and inidentifying critical gaps in research.

option 3-3: Reassess program priorities. Re-assess the order of priority given to the sevenscience elements. Although the current structureis producing good science, research results willnot be sufficient to provide the informationnecessary to answer policy questions concerningthe impacts of climate change on the Nation’sresources. To answer these questions, more em-

phasis needs to be directed toward the scienceelements that address the ecological, socio eco-nomic, adaptation, mitigation, and human aspectsof global change. Some of this can be done easilywithin the current construct of USGCRP; somemay require additional programs outside theUSGCRP research structure.

Option 3-4: Make research on the humandimensions of global change a primary element ofthe program. A human-dimensions program wouldlook at the interface between human actions andthe natural environment. Humans alter the envi-ronment through population growth, economicgrowth, technological change, political and eco-nomic institutions, and attitudes and beliefs.Human response to a changing environment willdepend on individual perceptions, markets, so-ciocultural systems, organized responses at asubnational level, national policies, internationalcooperation, and global social change (35). Theseelements of a human-environment interface willdirectly influence adaptation responses to climatechange.

Option 3-5: Create an adaptation and mitiga-tion research program (ARP) either withinUSGCRP or separate but parallel to it. Thisprogram should either have the authority toinfluence project selection throughout USGCRPor feed into a formal assessment process thatinfluences program direction. Congress mustdecide whether an ARP should function as aprogram separate from, but parallel, to USGCRPor whether ARP should operate within USGCRP.If ARP is created as a separate program, it shouldhave formal ties to USGCRP. If USGCRP sub-sumes adaptation, the USGCRP mission wouldhave to change to make adaptation equal inimportance to the other three activity streams.

The mission of such a program must explicitlystate its management and policy orientation.ARP’s mission might be:

. . . to pursue research that will support public andprivate decisionmaking on issues related to globalchange if climate change occurs. At a minimum,

148 I Preparing for an

research will includeprivate managementsystems and of how to

Uncertain Climate--Volume 1

studies of the public andof natural and manageddevelop strategies to adapt

to the effects of climate change. Annually, theprogram will assess the state-of-the-science, de-velop Government policy and management op-tions for responding to the potential for globalchange (including programs that supply informat-ion to private decisionmakers), and incorporatethese findings into new research directions. Theassessment, policy options, and new directionsfor research will be reported to Congress in anannual report presented along with the President’sBudget Request.

The program must include a formal mechanismfor bridging the gap between science and policy;specifically, integrated assessments need to be atthe center of any ARP structure. Congress shouldconsider mandating this in any enabling legisla-tion in order to ensure that assessments are giventop priority.

Congress should consider several “rules ofthumb” in structuring the program:

Management agencies should act as the leadagencies.

Goals for research must have problem-oriented task descriptions and milestonesthat are specific and easily measurable.

Congress should consider retaining the “powerof advice and consent’ in the appointmentsof the director and assistant directors of theprogram.

Other mechanisms for ensuring policy relevancecould include requiring the program to makeperiodic reports to Congress, and giving Congressoversight and investigation authority.

If Congress chose to augment USGCRP, itmust recognize that the program has little abilityat present to target its programs to help public andprivate decisionmakm- g. Given the structure ofUSGCRP, management- and policy-relevant re-search would be hard to’ initiate because theprocess of setting priorities in USGCRP isdo .minated by key agency personnel in conjunc-tion with members of the national and interna-tional scientific community.

1 Incorporate More EcosystemResearch and Natural Resource PlanningInto USGCRP

Although an estimated $900 to $943 million isspent on what can be considered research inenvironmental life sciences (22) or environmentalbiology, 26 there is currently very little ecological

research directed specifically at protecting naturalareas under climate change and helping landmanagers modify management strategies to re-spond to climate change.27 Of the $943 millionthat FCCSET estimates is spent on environmentalbiology, only 11 percent was also reported asUSGCRP program money.28 A former workinggroup under FCCSET found that in 1992, only$8 million was spent on research focused onadaptation.29 This number represents less than0.8 percent of the USGCRP budget and less than0.9 percent of the amount spent on environmentalbiology research. A review of ecological experi-ments from 1980 to 1987 found that 50 percent ofall studies were done on very small scales--onplots less than 3 feet in diameter; only 7 percentlasted longer than 5 years. Large-scale andlong-term experiments are essential to respond to

26 J. GOSZ, EXeCUtiVC Secretary, Subcommittee on Environmental Biology, Cornrnittee on Life Sciencesand Healt@ Federal CodinahgCouncil for Science, En@e@ng, and lkchnology, personsl COrnrrnm .Catiom Sept. 14, 1993.

~ XCSET defines envirmmentafbidogy as all areas of biology d@ing with the ~dy of @_ ~d their ~“OILl with their bioticand abiotic environment (J. GOSL personal communication, Sept. 14, 1993). Gramp et al. (22) define environmentdf~e sciences as processesand interactions of living resources such as environmenttal biolog, inchd.@ ecology, forestry, biolo~, and marine biology.

2S 6sL op. cit., footnote 26.29 ~ Work@ ~~p on ~ti@ion~ ~p~onsmtegies (dis~~ ~ 1992) Of ~ ~~a~ on~~ EXla~ sci~

of FCCSET identified Fedend research that focuses on or contributes to adaptation to global change (6).


the challenges of global research (37). Yet,research on large-scale ecosystem management,structure, and function is necessary to protectnatural areas in the future, and it is not clear thatit is occurring under the auspices of “environ-mental biology” or USGCRP.

USGCRP as currently designed will not pro-vide either the practical technologies that mightallow us to be more prepared for climate changeor the ecological information that would behelpful in providing policy guidance and adapta-tion options for natural systems.

Option 3-6: Conduct a review of ecologicalresearch within USGCRP and across Federalagencies; evaluate how much long-term ecosystem-level research relevant to climate change, bio-diversity, and other long-term problems is underway; and identify important gaps in ecologicalresearch. A review of all research on “naturalresources’ has not yet been conducted across theFederal agencies. Existing analyses suggest agreat deal of money is spent on research relevantto the environment, but how much is useful tounderstanding long-term ecological problems (suchas biodiversity and climate change) is not known.There is currently no mechanism for consolidat-ing results from disparate research efforts into“general patterns and principles that advance thescience and are useful for environmental deci-sionmakmi g. Without such synthesis studies, itwill be impossible for ecology to become thepredictive science required by current and futureenvironmental problems” (32).

In volume 2, chapter 5, of this report, wehighlight key gaps in our understanding ofecosystems, such as: past climate changes andcorresponding species responses, restoration andtranslocation ecology, the effectiveness of corri-dors and buffer zones, the development of eco-logical models, and the effect of elevated C02 onassemblages of plants and animals.

Basic research in these areas is needed now todetermin e how species might respond to climatechange and how best to provide for their protec-tion in the future. Agencies could attempt to

redirect existing funds within USGCRP or pro-cure new funds for addressing these basic eco-logical research needs under the Ecological Sys-tems and Dynamics research area. Alternatively,NSF, whose mission is to support basic scientificresearch, could take the lead in supporting theseresearch areas outside the auspices of USGCRP.The new National Biological Survey (see ch. 1and vol. 2, ch. 5) could also be an appropriatevehicle to use in addressing some of the researchthat directly relates to land-management issues.

An effort to characterize and synthesize ongo-ing research could help bridge the gap betweenbasic research and natural resource planning.Such a review could be conducted by OSTP,NAS, or an independent commission.

Option 3-7: Make research on monitoring andmanaging natural resources a key component ofa broadened global change research program.One of the most prudent approaches to naturalarea conservation under climate change is morecoordinated management on the ecosystem orregional scale. This approach would also helpaddress threats to biodiversity and maximizepossibilities for species survival under climatechange. The land-management agencies shouldreceive increased funding--or existing fundsshould be redirected-for research that woulddirectly address concerns of managing naturalresources under climate change. In particular, asthe National Research Council recommends (37),‘‘environmental research should advance thesocial goals of protecting the environment forpresent and future generations, restoring dam-aged environments so that they are productiveonce more, and managing our natural, economic,cultural, and human resources in ways thatencourage the sustainable use of the environ-merit. ’

Inventory and monitoring programs are usuallythe last to get funds and the first to be cut in abudget crisis (36, 55); existing institutions arepoorly designed to support and strengthen them(37). Many monitoring programs that have beenestablished in protected natural areas have been


discontinued because of personnel changes, pol-icy alterations, or budget cuts (55).30 Baselineinformation is needed on the status and trends ofvegetation cover, plant distributions, animal dis-tributions, soils, and water resources to detect andmonitor climate-induced changes. All Federalagencies conduct some type of inventory as amatter of policy, but these efforts vary widely incompleteness and quality, are not consistentlyimplemented and funded, and are not coordinatedat the national or even agency level.

A concerted effort to connect, in a timelymanner, the information contained in inventoriesto the resource-management and land-use-planning process is vital. If these connections arenot adequately addressed, the gap between re-search and management could increase, whichwould be detrimental to DOI’S new NationalBiological Survey.

H Incorporate Assessment and OversightOption 3-8: Amend the U.S. Global Change

Research Act of 1990 (PL. 101-606) to requireperiodic integrated assessment reports to bepresented to Congress and specify key partici-pants in the assessment process. If such aprogram is incorporated into USGCRP, it shouldbe positioned above the agency level. However,because all of the elements necessary for anintegrated assessment are not found in USGCRP,an assessment program would have to incorporateinformation from outside the program and includeresearch that is not formally contained withinUSGCRP but that contributes to it. An assessmentprogram should fund external and internal assess-ment efforts. Because integrated assessments thatuse computer models to knit together all aspectspertinent to global change are not well-developed, they should be used only as a guide tosteer program elements. To ensure policy rele-vance, an assessment program must be given the

authority to influence program priorities andproject selection. Assessment teams must beinterdisciplinary. Documenting the state of scien-tific knowledge is listed as the primary functionof the newly created Assessment Working Group;however, the results of such a survey are highlydependent on the questions being asked-what isregarded as unknown or uncertain depends onwhat one wants to know and the perspective andbackground of the person or team carrying out theassessment (24). To ensure commitment andaccountability to the assessment process, thedirector of anappointed withgress.

Option 3-9:involvement in

assessment program could bethe advice and consent of Con-

Create innovative congressionalUSGCRP. USGCRP does not

function as an individual agency, and Congresscannot expect to interact with the program in thesame manner it does with agencies. Congressneeds to create a forum where USGCRP can beaddressed as a whole before being broken downinto individual components that fit neatly intoauthorization and appropriation jurisdictions. Forexample, the Environmental and Energy StudyInstitute could conduct an annual seminar for itscongressional members on the USGCRP budget,or Congress could establish an ad hoc appropria-tion committee consisting of members from eachcommittee and appropriations subcommittee withjurisdiction over USGCRP to consider the pro-gram’s budget as a whole.

Congress should conduct oversight of theprogram as a whole. Because USGCRP is aninteragency program, it cannot be evaluatedeffectively by Congress on an agency-by-agencybasis or through the activities of individualcommittees working independently. Committeeswith jurisdiction over USGCRP should coordi-nate oversight of the program.

30 w -Ie, in FY 1993, tie Bure.au of Land Management (M.&f) eliminated 6 of its 16 acid rain stations to release hut $30,0(K) forother BLM activities. Several of the six stations had been in operation for 10 years and had beta maintaining data sets to monitor the healthof forests and the effects of acid rain, Continuation of this long-term record was lost as a result of these cuts.

Chapter


3-Global Change Research in the Federal Government I 151

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Performance Review, Sept. 7, 1993.Gramp, K.hl, A.H. Tkicb and S.D. Nelsoq Federal Fti”ngfor Environmental R&D: A Special Report, R&D Budget andPolicy Rojec4 The American Association for the Advancementof Science, AAAS publication number W-48S, 1992 (Washing-ton, DC: AAAS).HernX C.N,, “Science and Climate Policy: A HistoryLesmL” Issues in Science and Technology, vol. 8, No. 2,Winter 1991-92, pp. 56-57.Herrick, C.N., and D. Jamiescq “The Social Construction ofAcid Rain: Some Implications for Science/Policy Assessment”paper to be presented at the 18th annual meeting of the Societyfor the Social Studies of Science, Nov. 19-21, 1993.Interagency Task Force on Acid Precipitation Annual Report)982 to the President and Congress (Washington DC: National

Acid Precipitation Assessment ProgranL 1982).Intergovemm ental Panel on Climate Change (WCC), WorldMeteorological Organizationj and United Nations EnvironmentRograrq Climate Change: The IPCC Impacts Assessment,report prepared for IPCC by Wodcing Group KL W. McG.T@@ G. Sheldon, and D. Griffith (eds.) (CanberYW AustmlkAustralian Government Publishing Service, 1990).Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (WCC), WorldMeteorological Organiza tioq and United Nations EnvironmentRogram, Climate Change: The IPCC Response Strategies,report prepared for IPCC by Wodcing Group III, 1990.Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (lPCC), WorldMeteorological Organiza tioq and United Nations EnvironmentProgranL Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment,report prepared for IPCC by Working Group I, J, Houghtq G.Jenkins, and J. Ephraums (eds.) (Cambridge, England: Cam-bridge University Press, 1990).


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Coasts 4Status= Population is increasing in coastal areas faster than in any other

region of the country.- More people and property are becoming exposed to coastal

hazards daily.■ The costs of mitigating and recovering from disasters is

steadily increasing.

Climate Change Problem= Sea level rise.■ Possibility of more frequent and/or more intense coastal storms.■ Temperature and precipitation impacts.

What Is Most Vulnerable?■ Low-relief, easily eroded shorelines (e.g., Southeast and Gulf

coasts)., Subsiding areas (e.g., Mississippi River Delta).■ Structures immediately adjacent to the ocean.

Impediments to Better Management■ Popularity of coastal areas.■ Insufficient incentives to take adequate precautions.s Perceived or actual cost.■ Private property concerns.m Institutional fragmentation.

Types of Responses, Revamp the National Flood Insurance Program■ Improve disaster-assistance policies.- Revise the Coastal Barrier Resources Act and the Coastal Zone

Management Act.■ Change beach-nourishment guidelines.■ Alter the U.S. Tax Code.

I 153


OVERVIEWThe subject of this chapter—the coastal zone-

is somewhat distinct from that of the otherchapters in this report because it focuses on areadily identifiable geographic area and on thebuilt components of this area rather than on aspecific natural resource. The coastal zone can bebroadly characterized both as a popular place tolive, work, and play and as an area where someunique, climate-related risks to people, property,and ecosystems occur. Population near the coastis growing faster than in any other region of thecountry, and the construction of buildings andinfrastructure to serve this growing population isproceeding rapidly. As a result, protection againstand recovery from hazards peculiar to the coastalzone, such as hurricanes and sea level rise, arebecoming ever more costly. The combination ofpopularity and risk in coastal areas has importantnear-term consequences for the safety of coastalresidents, protection of property, maintenance oflocal economies, and preservation of remainingnatural areas.

Longer-term climate change impacts are likelyto exacerbate existing problems associated withliving in the coastal zone. Sea level rise is apotential climate change impact unique to coastalareas and one that could lead to increasedflooding and erosion in areas already vulnerableto the dynamic forces of wind, waves, currents,and tides. Climate change could also lead to morefrequent and/or severe hurricanes and other coastalstorms. Scientists are less confident about thispossibility than they are about sea level rise, buteven if coastal storms are unaffected by climatechange, their impact on the coast will increase asthe sea rises.

Climate change in coastal areas would clearlybe costly for Federal, State, and local gover-nments. These costs are associated both with theinherent risks of living in the coastal zone andwith how these risks are allocated among variouspublic and private entities. The present system ofrisk allocation in the coastal zone does notpromote an adequate appreciation of the current

and potential hazards associated with living inthis area. As a result, certain types of riskydevelopment are encouraged (or at least notdiscouraged) that could lead to greatly increasedFederal outlays in the future. One need only lookat the costs to the Federal Government for disasterassistance after Hurricanes Hugo (about $1.6billion), Andrew (about $2.1 billion), and Iniki(about $400 million) to appreciate the potentialmagnitude of the outlays involved. Moreover, ineach of these cases, total costs were considerablygreater. Climate change will likely add to the risksand costs of living in the coastal zone, so it isessential that these risks be well-understood by allstakeholders and that coastal development andpreservation are guided by this understanding.The sooner policies that encourage an adequateappreciation of risk are in place, the easier andless costly adaptation to a changing climate islikely to be.

Risk management is a Federal, as well as aState and local, responsibility. The Federal Gov-ernment has an interest in promoting soundplanning and public safety in an effective andefficient manner. Federal coastal zone policiescan be improved in several ways to better guidethe decisions of those living in coastal areas.Considered in this chapter are policies to improvethe National Flood Insurance Program, disasterassistance, beach nourishment and shoreline pro-tection, coastal zone and barrier-island man-agement, and the U.S. Tax Code. In otherchapters, we consider related water, wetlands, andpreserves issues (ch. 5 and vol. 2, chs. 4 and 5).

VULNERABILITY OF COASTAL AREASClimate-related risks, from blizzards to torn-

adoes, are inherent to many parts of the UnitedStates. However, the coastal zone--that narrowboundary zone where ocean and dry land meetand most directly influence one another-is adynamic area of larger-than-average risk. Hurri-canes and other violent coastal storms causehundreds of millions of dollars in damage every

Chapter 4-Coasts I 155

year and are responsible for numerous deaths. Forexample, the two most destructive natural disas-ters of 1992, Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki didconsiderable damage in the coastal zone, andthese two catastrophes accounted for almost 80percent of the more than $21 billion of insurance-industry claims for the 10 most costly catastro-phes in 1992.

Less dramatic than the destruction of homesand other structures by storms-but ultimatelyvery costly-is coastal erosion. A significantproportion of the U.S. coastline is eroding.Although rates of erosion are highest duringmajor storms, long-term erosion caused by theunremitting action of normal waves, wind, andtides adds much to the risks and costs of living incoastal areas. Structures in or near eroding areasare increasingly at risk as erosion progresses.Furthermore, erosion can be exacerbated byhuman activities, including the deepening of portsand harbors, maintenance of tidal inlets, dammingof major rivers, and pumping of coastal ground-water and petroleum.

The remaining undeveloped parts of the coastalzone (e.g., wetlands and many barrier islands) arealso at risk. They are vulnerable both to the effectsof climate change and to human encroachmentand thus may need special attention if societywishes to preserve them.

The coastal zone may be the region of thecountry most vulnerable to climate change. Likeother areas, it would be affected by higher temper-atures and changes in precipitation In addition,coastal regions would have to contend with thechanging sea level and could be subject to more-frequent and/or more-intense hurricanes and othercoastal storms. Such expressions of climatechange would cause, among other things, in-

creased coastal flooding and erosion, higher stormsurges, increased wind damage, and increasedsaltwater intrusion into freshwater aquifers.

1 Demographic TrendsIncreases in population and development in

coastal areas have been dramatic in recent de-cades. Between 1%0 and 1990, the population ofcoastal counties grew from 80 million to roughly112 million people. People living in coastalcounties in 1990, about 44 percent of the totalU.S. population, occupied an area that comprisesjust 11 percent of the United States outsideAlaska. ] Population density in coastal counties,roughly 350 people per square mile (135 peopleper square kilometer),? is more than four times thenational average. Projections suggest that by theyear 2010, coastal populations will grow to 127million (15). Seventeen of the 20 States expectedto grow by the greatest amount by 2010 arecoastal. Florida alone is expected to add 11million people to its population, a 230 percentchange from 1960 (15).

With population growth has come develop-ment and a corresponding increase in the expo-sure of property to natural disasters. For example,the property-casualty insurance industry has esti-mated that its insured property exposure inresidential and commercial coastal counties in the18 Gulf and Atlantic Coast States increased from$1.13 to $1.86 trillion between 1980 and 1988(l). This change is a result of increasing propertyvalues as well as of greater numbers of propertiesinsured. 3 Insurance-industry liabilities in someStates have grown much faster during this periodthan the coastal-State average-by 83 percent inSouth Carolina, a victim of Hurricane Hugo in1989, for example (l). Many insurance compa-

1 The coastal zone baa been defined in a variety of ways-for example, as the area encompassed by counties adjacent to the oce.aIL tbeamabelow a specified elevatiom or the area within an arbitrary number of miles fmm the coast. About 53 percmt of the U.S. population lives incounties entirely or substantially within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of tk coast (89).

2 ~ COmW - mjIa to square kilometers, multiply by 2.590.3 lbcsc f- do not include smounts for the Pacific Coas~ near-coad cities, such as Houston and Philadelphia that could bc (and have

been) affected by coastal storms, or any uninsured property or self-insured government Proper&,

156 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate-Volume

.“

The concentration of people in coastal areas is steadilyincreasing. Densely populated Miami Beach, shownhere, was spared the major losses suffered only a fewmiles to the south when Hurricane Andrew struck in1992. The city may not always be so fortunate.

nies decided to pull out of Florida after HurricaneAndrew, and others are increasing premium ratessignificantly, perhaps an indication of futuretrends.

I Sea Level RiseContinuing sea level rise and associated long-

term shoreline erosion could be a substantialproblem for some U.S. coastal regions (see, forexample, fig 4-l). Global sea level has risen bysome 4 to 8 inches (10 to 20 centimeters)4 in thepast 100 years, largely as a result of melting ofland-based ice sheets and glaciers (64).5 Alongthe U.S. Gulf Coast, relative sea level rise6 hasbeen closer to 12 inches (67). According to theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(WCC), sea level could rise another 10 inches orso in the next 50 years. Estimates of future sealevel rise due to global warming vary greatly, butthe change is likely to be between 12 and 43

1

inches by the year 2100, with a “best estimate”of 26 inches above levels that would otherwiseexist (40). Future sea level rise in this range couldexpand areas where coastal flooding and inun-dation occur, and coastal erosion could increase.A 20-inch rise could inundate more than 5,000square miles (mi2, or about 13,000 square kilome-ters) 7 of dry land and an additional 4,000 mi2 ofwetlands in the United States if no actions aretaken to protect threatened areas (63, 82). TheFederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)suggests that the number of households subject toflooding would increase from about 2.7 millionnow to almost 6 million by 2100 as a result of acombination of a 12-inch sea level rise andcoastal area population growth (21).

Sea level rise would especially be a problemalong the low-lying barrier-island system of theAtlantic Coast from New York south to Floridaand along the Gulf of Mexico Coast, where small,vertical rises in sea level would cause large,horizontal movements in the shoreline and wherethe full effects of storm surges, winds, waves, andtides are felt (fig. 4-2). High-risk shorelines arecharacterized by low-relief, easily eroded sur-faces, retreating shorelines, evidence of subsi-dence, and high wave and tide energies. A coastalvulnerability index based on these factors hasbeen used to identify areas most vulnerable tofuture sea level rise (35).

The most vulnerable shorelines in the conter-minous United States are in the Gulf of Mexico,and include virtually all of the Louisiana shore-line and parts of the Texas coast. These areas haveanomalously high relative sea level rise, anderosion there is coupled with low elevation andmobile sediments. Forty percent of the entire GulfCoast is retreating at rates greater than 80 inches

4 ~ @nvert inches to ~“ eten, multiply by 2.54,s Other factors include thermal expansion of the oceans, the slow rebound of land after melting of glaciers (@acid isostatic adjustrmmt),

and local tectonic activity.

6 AS tie sea rises, adjacent land may be independently increasing or decreasing in elevation due to tectonic activity, compacting ofsediments, or subsurface pumping of petroleum or water, for example. Relative sea level rise reflects the net effect of all these factors.

7 lb convert square miles to quare kilometers, multiply by 2.590.

Chapter 4--Coasts I 157

per year. The highest rate of relative sea level risein the United States occurs in Louisiana, wherethe average rate during the past 50 years has beenmore than 0.3 inches per year (35). About half ofall land estimated to be inundated from sea levelrise is in Louisiana. The Mississippi River Deltais especially at risk. In the absence of adequateprotective measures, coastal cities such as Gal-veston, Texas, would frequently suffer intolerableflooding (16, 81, 83).

The highest-risk shorelines along the AtlanticCoast include the outer coast of the DelmarvaPeninsula, northern Cape Hatteras, Long Island,and segments of New Jersey, Georgia, and SouthCarolina. Heavy damage from periodic floodingand some loss of land due to inundation can beexpected in such coastal cities as Atlantic City,New Jersey; Ocean City, Maryland; Charleston,South Carolina; and Miami Beach, Florida, if thesea level rises as predicted and no steps are taken

1

I Pennsylvania.,

Virginia “&Yw

P o t o m a c R i v e r , \ I,,I Chesapeake Bay

Poplar Island

SOURCE: S. Weatherman, University of Maryland, College Park

to protect against it (48). About 25 percent of theAtlantic Coast is eroding; 8 percent is accreting.

Most of the tectonically active West Coast ofthe United States is steeper than the Atlantic andGulf Coasts. Thus, western coastal areas aregenerally less Vulnerable to sea level rise. How-


Figure 4-2-Schematics of a Developed and an Undeveloped Barrier Island

\ - . ‘-.

Tides

NOTE: General Iocations of Iand-use and Iand-cover types are shown In relation to dominant shoreline process.

SOURCE: R. Dolan, University of Virginla, Charlottesville.

— ——— —

ever, areas such as the low-lying San Joaquin-Sacramento Delta (adjacent to San FranciscoBay—see box 5-A), the barrier beaches of Wash-ington and Oregon, and parts of the Puget Soundlowlands are all quite vulnerable to sea level rise(35). The Pacific Coast generally is less vulnera-ble to erosion, too, because erosion-resistantrocks prevail over unconsolidated sediments.Only about 6 percent is eroding.

Several studies have attempted to estimate thepossible costs of protecting U.S. coastlines froma rising sea. On the basis of results of studiescommissioned by the Environmental ProtectionAgency, the cumulative costs of coastal defensivemeasures in populated areas have been estimatedto be from $100 to $350 billion for a 40-inch risein sea level by 2100 (83).8 More recently, theU.S. Army Corps of Engineers has used similardata to make the same calculation but withdifferent assumptions (e.g., about the protectionmeasures that would most likely be used). TheCorps estimates maximum costs at less than$120 billion (in 1992 dollars) (86).

The large spread between the estimates sug-gests that attaching great significance to anydollar figure for protecting the coast against sealevel rise should be done cautiously. Of necessity,all such studies are based on a large number ofassumptions about an uncertain future—especially the degree to which sea level is likelyto rise in the next 100 years-and on extrapola-tions from a few well-studied areas to all vulnera-ble coastlines. Defensive and mitigative strate-gies, however, are site-specific and cannot easilybe generalized nationwide (60). Also, the currentIPCC “best estimate” for sea level rise by 2100is 26 inches, which, if realized, could mean thatprotection costs would be much lower than thosereported above. Furthermore, the above costestimates, accumulated over more than 100 years,have not been discounted to present worth. Usingthe Corps’ high estimate of $120 billion and a


discount rate of 3 percent, the present worth ofinvestment during this period would be $25billion, or, equivalently, an average annual cost of$700 million. The costs of protecting against arising sea may be manageable, but they will notbe trivial.

Substantial damage to the natural environmentcould also result from sea level rise, includinginundation of large areas of coastal wetlands(63, 81) and loss of biodiversity (73) (see vol. 2,chs. 4 and 5). The value of lost land (wetlands andundeveloped dry land) as a result of sea level risehas been estimated to be from $50 to $250 billionby 2100 (83). Losses of wetlands will be largestwhere human development, such as constructionof bulkheads and houses, impedes the naturallandward migration of wetlands in response to sealevel rise (82). (For more on wetlands, see vol. 2,ch. 4.) Also, some human activities outside thecoastal zone, such as construction of upland dams(which trap sediments that would otherwisereplenish beaches), can thwart natural processesthat could otherwise mitigate the potential ero-sion and flooding caused by an accelerated sealevel rise (40).

~ Hurricanes and Coastal StormsHurricanes and severe coastal storms are among

the most destructive and costly of natural phe-nomena. Flooding, erosion, and wind damagecaused by such storms result in many lost livesand hundreds of millions of dollars of propertydamage every year.

The East and Gulf Coasts of the United Statesare especially vulnerable to hurricanes. Since1871, roughly 250 hurricanes of varying intensityhave struck parts of the coast between Texas andMaine. Virtually no segment of this coast hasbeen spared (fig. 4-3A) (28). The destructivepotential of a hurricane is a function of both itsintensity (see box 4-A) and the density ofdevelopment in the area affected. As develop-

B The authors of reference 83 consider their estimates conservative because they do not take into account impacts not readily quantified orthe costs of protecting future development.


Figure 4-3A--lntensity of Historic Hurricanesn

NOTE: Estimate of the Saffir-Simpson intensity at landfall of tho 247coastal crossings by hurricanes that affected the Gulf or East Coast in thell9-year period between 1871 and 1990. Total hurricanes striking each segment of coast plus the number of hurricanes of each intensity areshown. For example, 23 hurricanes struck the southern tip of Florida during this period. Only one was a category 5 hurricane at landfall. Figure4-3B shows that the present-day damage-producing potential of each of these 23 hurricanes was greater than $lO million but less than $lO billion(i.e., fell into categories 2, 3, or 4).


Figure 4-3B--Damage-Producing Potential of Historic Hurricanes

n-k

/1I

u

A-Ji5-l:.ONiN001001

%VY’3Q Catastrophe Damage potentialt index ($ millions)

~ ‘% 1 1-10 =- * *@v 2 10- 100

# @ 3 100-1,0004 1,000 -10,000~o*\ 5 10,000 - 100,000

NOTE: Estimate of the catastrophe index, which shows the present-daydamage-producing potential of the 247 land-falling hurricanes that occurredsomatime in the past 119 years. Numbers of hurricanes In each damage category are shown. For example, 10 hurricanes that have struck thesouthern tip of Florida were strong enough to cause between $1 and $10 billion in damages if they occurred today (category A). Hurricane Andr-is not Included in the data, but It would be the first to fall into category 5.SOURCE: D. Friedman, Natural Hazards Research Program, Travelers Insurance Co., "estimation of Damage-Producing Potentials of FutureNatural Disasters in the United States Caused by Earthquakes and Storm%” paper presented at the International Conference on the Impact of NaturalDisasters, Los Angeles, CA, 1991.

162 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat%Volume 1

Box 4-A-Saffir-Simpson Hurricane-Intensity Scale

Category O1. Winds less than 74 mph (119 kti).12. Storm surge less than 4.0 feet (1.2 meters).2

Abroad coastal area may experience some darnage to shrubbery, signs, and small structures and possiblysome beach erosion, but the overall scope and impact of damage would not likely require relief action by theFederal Government.

Category 11. Winds 74 to 95 mph; some damage to

shrubbery, trees, and foliage; no real damageto building structures; some damage to poorlyconstructed signs, etc.

2. Storm surge 4 to 5 feet above normal;low-lying coastal roads inundated; minor pierdamage; some small craft in exposed anchor-ages break moorings.

Category 21. Winds 96 to 110 mph; considerable

damage to shrubbery and tree foliage; sometrees blown down; no rnajordamage to buildingstructures.

2. Storm surge 6 to 8 feet above normal;coastal roads and low-lying escape routesinland cut by rising water 2 to 4 hours beforearrival of the hurricane’s center; considerablepier damage; marinas flooded; small craft inunprotected anchorages break moorings; evac-uation of some shoreline residences and low-Iying island areas required.

Category 31. Winds 111 to 130 mph; damage to

shrubbery and trees; foliage off trees; large

Safflr-Simpson Hurricane-intensity Scale

>156Wind speeds in mph

Lm I 131-155; 30-g0 20-%if~ lo- 111-130—

74-95 96-110

n1 2 3 4 5

Saffir-Simpson intensity

NOTE: To convert miles per hour to kilometers par hour, multiply by1 .s09.

SOURCE: Adapted from P. Hsbatl J. Jarrell, and M. Mayfiekf, 7?MDeadiest, Costhst, andMostintense UnitedStates HurdcanesoflhieCentury (and Other Frequently Requested Hurdcane Fwts) (CoralGables, FL: National Hurricane Center, 19S2).

trees blown down; some structural damage to small residences and utility buildings.2. Storm surge 9 to 12 feet above normal; serious flooding at coast with many smaller structures near coast

destroyed; larger structures damaged by battering offloading debris; low-lying escape routes inland cut3 to 5 hoursbefore center arrives; terrain continuously lower than 5 feet maybe flooded inland 8 miles or more; evacuationof low-lying residerws within several blocks of the shoreline may be required,

Category 41. Winds 131 to 155 mph; shrubs and trees down; all signs down; extensive roofing-material darnage; extensive

window and door damage; complete failure of roof structures on many small residences.

1 TO convert miles per hour to kilometers per hour, multiply by 1.609. Speeds given here are at aandafdanemometer elevations. An anemometer is a device for measuring wlndspeed.

2 TO convert feet to meters, multiply by 0.305.

Chapter 4-Coasts 1163

2. Storm surge 13 to 18 feet above normal; terrain continuously lower than 10 feet may be flooded inland asfar as 6 miles; major darnage to lower floors of structures near the shore due to flooding and battering action;low-lying escape routes inland cut 3 to 5 hours before center arrives; major erosion of beach areas; massiveevacuation of all residences within 1,500 feet of the shorelins and of shgie-story residences on low ground within2 miles of the shoreline maybe required.

category 51. Winds greater than 155 mph; shrubs and trees down; roofing damage considerable; all signs down; severe

and extensive whdow and door damage; complete failure of roof structures on many residences and industrialbuiidings; extensive glass failure; small buildings overturned and blown away.

2. Storm surge heights greater than 18feet above normal; major damage to Iowerfloors of all structures locatedless than 15 feet above sea ievel and within 1,500 feet of the shoreline; low-lying escape routes inland cut 3 to5 hours before center arrives; massive evacuation of residential areas situated on Iowground within 5 to 10 milesof the shoretine may be required.

SOURCE: P, Hew J. Jarell, and M. Maytbld, The Deadliest COW@ mdhbst /nhmse L4WdStutm Hurdcana of7h& Csntury@dOthurFreqwnt/y Reqmsted Hurricane Facts) (Coral Gables, FL National Hurdcane Center, 19S2).

ment has expanded, exposure to coastal risks has Lauderdale, Florida; and $34 billion in Hampton,increased dramatically. Table 4-1 compares dam- Virginia (see table 4-2).ages from 49 hurricanes between 1949 and 1986

Hurricane Andrew was a category 4 hurricanewith damages those same hurricanes would havewhen it struck South Florida in August 1992. The

caused if they had occurred in 1987. Figure 4-3B third most intense storm to strike the Unitedshows the current damage-producing potential of States this century,9 Andrew’s total damagesthe 247 hurricanes that struck the United Statesbetween 1871 and 1990. The different values,

were more than 4 times greater than total damagesfrom Hurricane Hugo, the former damage record

after adjusting for inflation, are due to increases holder. Andrew’s estimated cost to propertyin the size of the market (i.e., the amount of insurers as of February 1993 was at least $15.5development) and the percentage of the market billion (72). However, this figure does notinsured (27). For example, Hurricane Betsy, a include losses involving uninsured property, suchcategory 3 storm, caused about $3.1 billion of as damage to Government military facilities or

insured losses in 1965 (adjusted to 1987 dollars). other public property; utility equipment, such asHad it struck in 1987, the insured losses would power lines; economic losses, such as crophave been $6.3 billion. damage and lost tax revenue; and aircraft. It also

does not include the cost of emergency services orApplied Insurance Research, Inc., in Boston, property insured under the National Flood Insur-

has developed estimates of total losses for major ance or Small Business Administration programsU.S. cities of a major hurricane strike. They (72). The total losses from Andrew are likely toestimate, for example, that a category 5 hurricane be greater than $30 billion. Moreover, if Andrewcould generate $43 billion (in 1993 dollars) in had struck 15 miles further north, in centrallosses in Galveston, Texas; $52 billion in Fort Miami, damages could have been twice as much.

9 TIE two StOIIM that hit land in the United StateS this century that were of greater intensity were Hurricane He, wtia sti *Mississippi coast in 1%9, killing 256 people, and the Labor Day hurricane that struck the Florida Keys in 1935, killing at least 600 (3). Hugoranks llth in intensity.


Table 4-l—Estimates of Insurance-Industry Potential Losses in 1987 Resultingfrom a Recurrence of Past Hurricanes

Scenario 3Damages adjusted

for inflation,Scenario 1 Scenario 2 market size, and

Damages in year-of- Damages expressed insured share inoccurrence dollars in 1987 dollars 1987 dollars

Year Hurricane ($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions)

1986198619851985198519851985198519841983198219801979197919771976197519741973197219711971197119711970196919861967196619651964196419641964196119611960

CharleyBonnieKateJuanGloriaElenaDannyBobDianaAliciaIwaAllenFredericDavidBabeBelleEloiseCarmenDeliaa

Agnes,b

GingerEdithFerna

Doriaa

CeliaCamilleGladysBeulahAlmaBetsyIsbellHiIdaDoraCleoEstherCarlaDonna

7217844

419543

371336

67513758

753122

223

11912

38251

14310165

334

5715

2231267

4100

91

7228146

391440

79017082

1,151187

445

25928

822

6144

401,007

55410

13622

3,0969

10454

30320

473

7228447

582401441

893192106

1,243217

453

352361136

8206

571,602

82223

596,300

23

137815

541,2631,313

a Tropical storm (maximum winds less than hurricane force).b Wind damage only.Note: Based on assumptions about changes in the cost of repair, size, and insured share of the affectedproperty market since 1960.Scenario l—Occurrence of past hurrianes under original conditions.Scenario 2—Recurrence of past hurricanes with original market conditions, but using current value andcost-of-repair factor (inflation-adjusted only).Scenario 3--Recurrence of past hurricanes and their effect on current industry-insured properties, values,and costs of repair (combined market size, insured share, and inflation adjustment).

SOURCE: D. Friedman, Estimation of the Loss of Producing Potential of the Wind and Hail Perils toInsured Properties in the United States (London, England: Insurance and Reinsurance Research Group,Ltd., 1987).

———. .—

Hurricane Andrew seen from space as it reachedsoutheastern Florida on August 4, 1992. Andrew wasone of the most destructive hurricanes in U.S. history.Estimated total losses of $30 billion would have beeneven higher had the eye of the hurricane struck heavilypopulated Miami a few miles to the north.

Neither Andrew nor Hugo hit major populationcenters.

On average, between 16 and 17 hurricanes perdecade have occurred in the United States since1900. About seven of these per decade have beenmajor (37).10 Much of the urban growth along theEast and Gulf Coasts has occurred since 1%0,during which period hurricane and coastal-stormactivity has been somewhat less than average (14per decade between 1960 and 1990, of whichabout 5 per decade were major) (37). About 80percent of people now living in hurricane-proneareas have never experienced a direct hit by amajor storm (34). Prophetically, the NationalCommittee on Property Insurance suggested in1988 that the people of South Florida, who hadnot experienced a major hurricane since 1950,were living on borrowed time (58). Also, muchcoastal development since 1960 has been in themost vulnerable locations, including barrier is-


Table 4-2—Estimated Cost of a Major HurricaneStriking Densely Populated Areas

(or Major Cities)Saffir- Estimated

Simpson total losscategory a Landfall location ($ billions)b

5 Galveston, TX 435 New Orleans, LA 265 Miaml, FL 535 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 525 Hampton, VA 344 Ocean City, MD 204 Asbury Park, NJ 524 New York City, NY 454 Long Island, NY 41

a Severity of the hurricane (5 IS more severe than 4)b 1993 dollars

SOURCE Applied Insurance Research, Inc , Boston, MA

lands, ll beachfront areas, on or near coastalwetlands and estuarine shorelines, and in flood-hazard zones. Notably, many of the counties mostsusceptible to hurricanes (e.g., Monroe County,Florida, where the annual probability of a hurri-cane striking is 19 percent) are expected to growat much faster rates than the Nation as a wholebetween now and 2000 (l).

Loss of life from hurricanes has declined overtime, in large part due to improved weatherforecasting and evacuation planning (34). Forexample, 35 deaths were caused by Andrew,whereas many hurricanes this century havecaused many more than 100 deaths.12 Althoughexisting warning and prediction systems arelikely to continue to improve, people continue tocrowd into coastal areas, so the time required toevacuate them could increase. Aging infrastruc-ture in some areas (see ch. 5) may also contributeto evacuation problems. Therefore, even withoutincreased numbers or intensities of hurricanes(but more so with them), the potential exists forincreased loss of life in the future.

10 ~jor St= w &OSC ckitied ZIS cti~o~ 3 or k7@a,11 ~~=n 1955 ~ 19’75, develop ~ on ~er is~ds ‘mmeased by 153 percent (51).1 2 & unnamed hurricane that struck Galvestoq lkxas, in 1900 caused more than 6,000 death.


Table 4-3--insured Losses Likely To Be Experienced Under DifferentMaximum-Wind-Speed Scenarios

Estimated1990 Estimated 1980 insured losses if

insured maximum wind speed increaseslosses ($ billion)

storm Class Year ($ billions) 5 percent 10 percent 15 percent

Hugo 4 1969 4 5 7 9Alicia 3 1963 2 3 4 6Camille 5 1969 3 4 5 7

SOURCE: K. Clark, “Predicting Global Warming’s Impact,” Contingencies (newsletter of AppliedInsurance Research, Inc., Boston, MA), May/June 1992.

Will the intensity or frequency of hurricanesand/or other storms increase in a warmer climate?General Circulation Models (GCMs) cannot sim-ulate the occurrence of hurricanes in detail (40),but researchers have found that by modeling thedoubling of carbon dioxide (CO2, the number ofsimulated tropical disturbances-although nottheir intensity-increased (36) (see ch. 2 for adiscussion of GCMS). There has also been someresearch on the relationship between rising sea-surface temperatures and hurricane severity andsome suggestion that these may be positivelycorrelated. However, no unambiguous corre-lation has yet been established. Some havesuggested, for example, that hurricanes may beless intense in a warmer climate (13). Additionalresearch is clearly needed to establish the rela-tionship between global warming and hurricaneintensity and frequency.

What is somewhat clearer is the nonlinearrelationship between the maximum wind speedsof hurricanes and their damage-causing potential.Table 4-3 shows some examples of how insuredlosses would increase with maxinimum wind speed.If wind speeds for the three hurricanes shown hadbeen 15 percent higher, insured wind losseswould have more than doubled (13). Hence, ifclimate change leads to only marginally more-intense hurricanes, substantially greater damagecan be expected.

I An Overall Coastal-Hazard AssessmentThe U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has com-

bined information about a variety of natural

processes and coastal characteristics with infor-mation about population density to develop anoverall coastal-hazard map (90). Factors sepa-rately considered are coastal relief, shorelinechange (a measure of sea level rise), storm surge,frequency of major storms, frequency of earth-quakes and other earth movements, stabilization(a function of the density of structures), ice(important only in Alaska and the Great Lakes),and permafrost (perennially frozen ground, im-portant in northern Alaska). Segments of the coastare rated from very high to very low risk in sixcategories. Figure 4-4 shows two simplifiedsegments of the USGS map. The complete map,however, shows that Louisiana eastern Texas,parts of the Pacific Northwest, and much ofAlaska and Hawaii are the most vulnerablesegments of the U.S. coastal zone. USGS iscurrently in the process of producing more-detailed regional maps, which should be veryhelpful in assessing the vulnerability of U.S.coastal areas to climate change.

THE CHALLENGE FOR POLICYAlthough development pressures in coastal

areas are driven by many social and economictrends, government policies can influence theappropriateness, rate, quality, and location ofdevelopment. Historically, government has subsi-dized coastal development, both directly andindirectly. In particular, four important programsand policies address the riskiness of living in thecoastal zone: 1) the National Flood Insurance


Figure 4+-Coastal Hazard Assessment

)1 Population density- -

~’ T R e l i e f~ Massachusetts

N e w Y o r k — Overa l l hazard assessment

‘,(

*.,

,/ {’,

$!‘ L,

I

Jersey ~

I/’

New York to Massachusetts.

‘.

\

I Louisiana )

Texas

f(’r‘ c~. s Christi~’

(i

\– ~ rownsvilleI--La 4U

L--11- Overall hazard assessment

ReliefPopulation density

Orleans

Population densityper square kilometer

_ 2000 or more

~ 500-1999

n 100-499

m Less than 100

Relief

m Less than 3 m

~ 3-9 m

m 10-19 m

m 20 m or more

Overall hazardassessment

m High risk

~ Moderate to high

m Moderate risk

m Moderate to low

B Low risk

Texas to Louisiana.

SOURCE: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), “Coastal Hazards,” National Atlas of the United States of America(Reston,VA: USGS, 1985).


Program (NFIP), 2) Federal disaster assistance,3) Federal beach-renourishment and shoreline-protection programs, and 4) the U.S. Tax Code.These programs and policies have clear benefits,but some of their elements have contributed to adistortion of the Nation’s perception of thevulnerability of living in coastal areas and havelead to some inappropriate or ill-suited develop-ment. The goals of some coastal programs andpolicies are also often at cross-purposes with oneanother: improving coordination is as relevant incoastal areas as it is in other sectors discussed inthis assessment.

9 National Flood Insurance ProgramCongress made Federal flood insurance avail-

able in 1%8 through the creation of the NationalFlood Insurance Program (authorized under theNational Flood Insurance Act, P.L. 90448). TheNFIP was enacted to limit increasing flood-control and disaster-relief expenditures and toprovide a pre-funded mechanism to more fullyindemnify victims of flood-related disasters. Itwas also intended to limit unwise development infloodplains while at the same time providingaffordable Federal insurance for structures lo-cated in special flood-hazard areas (14). Between1978 and 1992, 430,000 flood-insurance claimswere made, and total payments, including claimsarising from Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Iniki,have been nearly $4.0 billion (22).

The NFIP has been only partially successful. Ithas reduced somewhat the need for taxpayer-funded disaster assistance and has been a factormotivating local government mitigation efforts.Homes built in compliance with NFIP regulationsare some 70 percent less likely to be damagedthan those built before NFIP requirements wentinto effect. Before the program was created,affordable private flood insurance was generallynot available. However, the program has also

contributed to coastal development and has beencriticized frequently for not adequately fosteringprudent land use in hazardous areas.

The program is administered b y t h e F e d e r a lInsurance Admlnlsinistration (FIA), a unit of FEMA.Under the NFIP, Federal flood insurance cover-age is made available to owners of flood-proneproperty in communities that adopt and enforce afloodplain-management ordinance that meets theminimum program standards. Coverage is avail-able both for the structure itself (up to $185,000for a single-family structure) and for its contents(up to $60,000) (26). Participating communitiesmust adopt certain minimum floodplain-management standards, including: 1) a require-ment that new and substantially improved struc-tures in the 100-year flood zone13 be elevated toor above the 100-year flood level (generallyknown as base flood elevation, or BFE), 2)restrictions on new development in designatedfloodways (e.g., development within a floodwayis prohibited if it results in raising the floodlevels), and 3) a requirement that subdivisions bedesigned to minimize exposure to flood hazards.Additional standards are imposed within high-hazard coastal zones (“velocity” zones, or “V”zones), including requirements that buildings beelevated on pilings, all new development belandward of the mean high water value, the BFEinclude wave heights greater than 3 feet (0.9meters), l4 ad new development on dunes not

increase potential flood damage.

NFIP participation by a community is volun-tary, but there are now strong incentives toparticipate. Because of limited participation ini-tially, the 1973 Flood Disaster Protection Act(P.L. 93-234) required flood insurance for allfederally backed mortgages (e.g., for Departmentof Veteran Affairs (VA) and Federal HousingAdministration (FHA) loans) and for all loansobtained through federally insured and regulated

13‘fbo area tha! Wdd be inundated by a flood whoac elevation haa a 1 percent cbance of being _ m =* h m y-, w M, tit

would occur on average only onca cvuy 100 yaua.14 ~ ~~ feet to mctcra, multiply w 0.305.


financial institutions. Also, disaster-assistancegrants to local governments for repair of publicfacilities are reduced for those governments notparticipating in the program (although individualproperty owners need not have flood insurance tobe eligible for individual and family disaster-assistance grants). As a result, communit y partic-ipation has been high, and about 82 percent of the22,000 flood-prone communities have adoptedminimum floodplain-management standards (47).However, it is estimated that less than 25 percentof individual owners of flood-prone propertycurrently purchase flood insurance.

The participation of individual property own-ers nevertheless amounts to a considerable Fed-eral financial liability. There are currently about2.6 million flood policies in effect. These repre-sent nearly $230 billion of insurance (22). Theprobable maximum loss in any given year hasbeen estimated to be about $3.5 billion. More than70 percent of NFIP policy holders are located incoastal communities. Those located in the mosthazardous V-zones (some 65,000 policy holders)represent about 2.5 percent of the policy base(55); but between 1978 and 1992, these areasaccounted for approximately 6 percent of totallosses and 5 percent of all premiums.

Properties that existed before community regu-lations went into effect (i.e., pre-FIRM proper-ties)15 are eligible for subsidized premium ratesnationwide. In the 1978-92 period, these proper-ties represented about 80 percent of the NFIP’sexposure while accounting for about 90 percent ofthe losses. Currently, about 42 percent of theNFIP’s policies are subsidized. Subsidized busi-nesses pay premiums that are, on average, one-third what the full-risk premiums would be.Through the 1970s and early 1980s, Congresssupported heavy premium subsidies on existingconstruction in order to encourage broad-basedparticipation of flood-prone communities in theprogram. Subsequently, subsidies have been re-

duced but not eliminated. The amounts of insur-ance that can be subsidized per policy are limited.In the case of single-family-structure coverage,this amount is $35,000. Protection above this ispurchased at full-risk rates. About 19 percent ofthe $230 billion of insurance is subsidized.l6

Historically, the NFIP has suffered from sev-eral problems and has been the subject ofconsiderable criticism. Between 1978 and 1987,the program ran an average annual operatingdeficit of about $65 million, generating a $657million deficit over that lo-year period (55).Beginning with FY 1986, however, the NFIP hasbeen self-supporting. Rating and coverage changesmade by the NFIP through the mid-1980s haveenabled the program to build up reserves in yearswhen losses were less than the historical averagein order to help fund the program in years whengreater-than-average losses occurred. Post-FIRMconstruction in general and post-FIRM construc-tion in V-zones in particular have generatedsurpluses whereas pre-FIRM subsidized insur-ance has continued to be a drain on the NationalFlood Insurance Fund (74).

As of early 1993, the flood-insurance fundcontained less than $40 million in reserves. Thisamount seems low when compared with potentialflood-damage liabilities. FIA’s estimates suggestthat the probability is high of exceeding theexisting surplus amount in any given year. Astable 4-4 indicates, the probability that totalannual losses will exceed $800 million nation-wide is a high 30 to 35 percent, and the probabilitythat losses will exceed $300 million per year is 60to 70 percent (23). The FEMA director canborrow up to $500 million from the Treasurywithout notifying Congress, and an additional$500 million if Congress is notified. Thus,FEMA’s present $1 billion borrowing authority ismuch less than its $3.5 billion probable maximumloss in any given year (23). FEMA estimates thatits combined borrowing authority and annual

IS ~t fi, ~op~es tit efis~ wore the development of flood-hmranm-rate m4% or ~. Most COmlmlKliti(X had m by 1975.

16 H. IAIc@ Federal Insumnce Admms“ “ tration, personal cornrnunieatio~ June 29, 1993.


Table 44-Estimated Probabilities of ExceedingGiven Levels of Flood-Insurance Losses

Probability of exceedingTotal annual loss costs total annual costs

($ millions) (percent)

300 60-70800 30-35

1 , 4 0 0 1 0 - 1 5

1,800 2 - 73,500 0,05-0.50

SOURCE Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),“Estimating Probabilities of Exceeding Given Levels of FloodInsurance Losses in a One Year Period “ (Washington, DCFEMA, Aug. 4, 1992)

premium income are adequate 85 to 90 percent ofthe time.17

The average annual cost of flood insurance perstructure, as reported by FIA, is $296.18 Forfull-risk policies in coastal high-hazard zones, itis over $800. Many homeowners would notconsider these costs modest. Compared with themagnitude of potential liabilities under the pro-gram and the meager size of the current surplus,however, the current cost of insurance to propertyowners may not be high enough. Moreover, 86percent of insured property owners in coastalhigh-hazard areas receive insurance at subsidizedrates and pay about $440 less per year than thosewithout subsidies. Premiums are still set to coverthe average historical-loss year. Other possibili-ties would be to set the premium rate high enoughto cover a catastrophic-loss year or, perhaps, tocover the loss associated with a 1 percent chanceof occurrence in any year.

Another problem is that although flood insur-ance is mandatory for new construction that usesloans from federally insured banks, many lendersare not ensuring that the requirement is satis-fied.19 It has been estimated that there are between8 and 11 million structures in flood-hazard areas,but fewer than 2 million are actually covered byflood-insurance policies (47). In Maine and Texas,

for example, 22 and 78 percent, respectively, ofproperties in special flood-hazard areas thatrequested disaster assistance did not have insur-ance (87). In some cases, properties were errone-ously classified and in others, insurance policieswere allowed to lapse (87). Many properties inflood-hazard areas simply are not required by lawto have flood insurance because they have nomortgage or because they have a mortgage froman unregulated lender (i.e., from a non-federallyinsured lender).

Repetitively damaged properties represent an-other problem for the NFIP. Over 40 percent of allflood-insurance claims have been for propertiesdamaged more than once (87), yet FIA does nothave the authority to cut off or substantiallyrestrict future coverage for such properties. lndi-viduals are permitted to rebuild and to continue toreceive insurance, and the program allows for apotentially unlimited cycle of damage-rebuild-damage. Many believe that the premiums chargedto repetitive-loss properties should be raised byFEMA to better reflect the risk of recurring flooddamage (7).

Another significant concern about the way theNFIP functions in coastal areas is its failure totake into account long-term erosion. This amountsto a hidden subsidy of erosion risks because theflood program pays claims for erosion damage,although the risk is not a component of the ratestructure for flood insurance.

Congress initiated changes to the definition of“flood” in 1973 to include collapse or subsi-dence along shorelines, and NFIP regulationswere amended to allow creation of special erosionzones (“E” zones) and to mandate local land-management programs to take these hazards intoaccount (59). Congress has not given FEMA theauthority to map non-flood-related erosion zones(74), however, and property owners are generallyopposed to erosion mapping. Also, FEMA has not


sought to require local land-management pro-grams (e.g., housing setbacks) to address erosionhazards, and long-term erosion trends are gener-ally not taken into account in FEMA’s currentfloodplain mapping. V zones are the flood zonesclosest physically to shoreline-erosion zones, yetthey are often narrowly drawn, and “frequentlyexclude adjoining areas with virtually indistin-guishable hazard characteristics” (59).

The NFIP plays a role in regulating reconstruc-tion following a flood event. When a building is“substantially” damaged (e.g., more than 50percent destroyed), it must be rebuilt in compli-ance with the local floodplain standards currentlyin force. Replacement of older, unelevated struc-tures with newer, elevated buildings after disas-ters like Hurricane Andrew, for example, canhave important mitigation benefits. However,flood policies do not pay for the increased cost ofbringing buildings into compliance with newerstandards. Thus, for example, more than 3,000buildings in South Florida damaged by Andrewneed to be elevated, but there is no insurancemoney available to do so. In addition, localgovernments may choose to apply the ‘ ‘substan-tially damaged” standard only if damages aregreater than 50 percent of the replacement valueof the structure. This has the effect of exemptingmore damaged structures from elevation andfloodplain-management requirements when re-building.

FIA would like to provide “increased cost ofconstruction coverage’ but needs authority fromCongress to do so (74). Such coverage, onaverage, would cost property owners an extra $34annually. In coastal high-hazard zones, however,the additional premium would be substantiallymore, especially for subsidized property owners.

Finally, flood-insurance maps are infrequentlyrevised and updated. FEMA is able to remapcommunities every 9 years, on average. However,many participating communities are growingrapidly, and development in the floodplain cansubstantially modify local flood hazards in lesstime than that.

A house tumbles onto the beach at Fire Island, NewYork, as a result of erosion damage caused by theDecember 11, 1993, northeaster.

I Federal Disaster Assistance

The Federal Government has been involved formany years in assisting State and local gover-nments in responding to, and recovering from,national disasters. Its primary authority for pro-viding disaster relief is the Robert T. StaffordDisaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of1974 (P.L. 93-288, as amended by P.L. 100-707).Such assistance has, as it should, enabled commu-nities to rebuild centers of commerce after disas-ters and to return (more or less) to pre-disasterconditions. However, although financial assist-ance to people who have suffered a majormisfortune is often appropriate, it can also subsi-dize risky public and private actions and thusfunction as another form of incentive for hazard-ous coastal development.

Disaster assistance available through FEMAgenerally falls into two categories: individual andfamily assistance, and public assistance. UnderFEMA’s Individual and Family Grants (IFGs)program, grants upto$11,500 (adjusted annuallyfor inflation) can be made to individuals andfamilies to cover disaster-related expenses (e.g.,home repairs not covered through insurance and


replacement of personal belongings) .20 UnderFEMA’s public-assistance program, States andcommunities can receive grants (usually at a 75percent Federal cost share) to cover the cost ofdamages to public facilities. Eligible projectsinclude repair of roads, bridges, sewer and watersystems, recreational facilities, and public board-walks, and, if certain beach-maintenance eligibil-ity criteria are met, renourishment of beaches.Communities not participating in NFIP, however,receive reduced amounts of public assistance.Applicants under the IFG program need not be ina participating community nor have purchasedFederal flood insurance, though they must agreeto purchase flood insurance as a condition ofreceiving an IFG grant.

Precisely how much of an impact Federaldisaster assistance has in encouraging (or failingto discourage) hazardous and damaging coastaldevelopment is uncertain Amounts of Federaldisaster assistance in recent years have beensubstantial. Some $8.3 billion was spent between1978 and 1988 on presidentially declared disas-ters. FEMA reports that approximately $89 mil-lion per year was spent as a result of hurricanesand coastal-storm events during this period (55).These disaster-assistance monies provide a sig-nificant subsidy for coastal communities, under-writing various potentially risky coastal publicinvestments. In several recent disasters, includingHurricanes Andrew and Hugo, the Federal Gov-ernment agreed to cover 100 percent of the costsof eligible public-sector damages. Where the 25percent cost sharing has been required, the Statefrequently assumes half of that, leaving localgovernments to assume only 12.5 percent of thecost of such damages.

There are currently no provisions in this systemfor considering the magnitude of the damage to anindividual community or the financial capabilityof the State or local government to cover thesedamages. High-risk communities would havestronger incentives to ensure that public facilities

are placed in safe locations or designed in waysthat minimize future vulnerability to hurricanes orother disasters if such factors were considered. Inmany cases, the Federal reconstruction subsidy isin addition to the original Federal subsidy used toconstruct the facility.

Disaster assistance has in many ways been seenby States and communities as an entitlement thatis deserved regardless of the extent or cause of thedamages, the ability of these jurisdictions toassume the costs, or participation in the NFIP. Intheory, Presidential disaster declarations are onlyto be issued when the resources of affected Stateand local governments are clearly exceeded. Yet,Presidential declarations (which average 20 to25 annually; 46 were proclaimed in 1992) areincreasingly viewed as pro forma and haveoccurred even where damage levels are relativelymodest and where State and local governmentscould clearly have assumed the cost with littleburden. (A Presidential disaster declaration wasmade after Hurricane Diana struck the NorthCarolina coast in 1984, for example, even thoughthe $79 million in damages was relatively smalland the State could have handled the damages.)One survey of 481 communities found that localofficials believe they can handle losses muchlarger than those defined by FEMA as constitut-ing a disaster (1 1).

FEMA has sought to reform this system in thepast, only to be criticized by representatives ofState and local governments and owners ofproperty in high-risk areas. In the mid-1980s, forexample, FEMA proposed that the required Stateand local share of public-assistance grants beincreased to 50 percent (i.e., 50 percent Federal,50 percent State and local) and that a set of criteriabe imposed to determine a legislative entity’sability to pay. These proposals met with consider-able political opposition and were eventuallydropped. Many commentators, however, haveechoed the need for such reforms, which might

m WG ~ts me avtiable only to people who do not qualify for low-interest SIIMI1 Bustiess AdIQUU5“ “ tration disaster loans.

——


, , .-%

*-’ --- -

The San Francisco sea wall.

help to promote implementation of State mitiga-tion measures (10, 25).

In addition to FEMA, several other Federalagencies provide some form of disaster assist-ance. These include loans, grants, and reconstruc-tion monies from the independent Small BusinessAdministration and Economic Development Ad-ministration, the Department of Transportation’sFederal Highway Administration (for roads andbridges), the Department of Education (for schoolbuildings), the Department of Agriculture’s Farme-rs Home Administration., and the Army Corps ofEngineers. In all, there are some 30 Federaldisaster-relief programs (5).

One effort to coordinate the actions of thedifferent Federal agencies was the InteragencyHazard-Mitigation agreement signed in 1980.Under this agreement, an interagency hazard-mitigation team is called into action immediatelyafter a disaster declaration and is required toprepare a report within 15 days of the declaration.These reports typically identify hazard-mitigationopportunities and contain recommendations, manyof which have been pursued by FEMA and otherFederal agencies. These recommendations alsotypically are considered in the Section 409hazard-mitigation plans prepared by States (seebelow). No systematic evaluation of how recom-

..-

Beach-nourishment project at Rockaway, New York.

mendations in these reports are implemented hasyet been done.

1 Federal Beach Nourishment andShoreline Protection

Shoreline protection, either in the form of“hard” devices, such as seawalls, revetments,groins, jetties, and breakwaters, or as “soft”buildup or replenishment of beaches and dunes, isoften justified where storm surges and/or erosionthreaten well-developed coastal communities andexpensive facilities like harbors and resorts (59).The best protective measure for a given site willdepend on the underlying physical conditions atthe site and on economic, social, and environ-mental costs (see box 4-B).

The Federal Government, through the ArmyCorps of Engineers, has subsidized shore-protection projects for decades. Where the bene-fits of shoreline protection are associated withimproving recreational opportunities or counter-acting erosion, the Federal share of approvedprojects is currently 50 percent. Where thebenefits include prevention of physical damage toproperty, the Federal share of construction costsincreases to 65 percent. Most projects are nowjustified on the basis of prevention of physicaldamages, The periodic renourishment that mayberequired on some beaches after a project has been

174 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat+Volume 1

Box 4-B-Protect or Retreat?

There are essentially two types of responses to erosion and sea level rise: protect vulnerable areas or retreatfrom the coast. lhe most appropriate response for a specific area will depend on an array of sodoeconomic andenvironmental factors, including the number and value of coastal structures at tisk, the relative cost of protectionand retreat options, aesthetic values, and the value of preserving undeveloped areas (49). The appropriateresponse will also depend on physical conditions at the site, including the availability and suitability of sand.

Protection can mean either building defenses that “harden” the shoreline against incursions of these% orreplaang eroded beach sand, as necessary, thrwgh beach noun’shmenfor replenishment Since 1946, the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers has undertaken 121 shore protection projects encompassing atotal shoreline distanceof just over 300 miles (460 kilometers).’ Another 52 projects that would protect about 230 miles of coast have beenauthorized (but not yet funded) by Congress (66). About 75 percent of all Corps projects involve beach nourishmentas a basic feature, although beach nourishment is sometimes used in combination with hard structural protectionmeasures (91).

The number of miles devoted to beach and dune nourishment in Corps projects reflects a general communitypreference for nonstructural approaches where feasible. Such approaches are especially preferable wherebeaches are primary assets for coastal communities, as, for example, in Miami Beach, Florida. Beach nourishmentprojects can also be expensive, but costs are site-specific and highly variable. In Miami Beach, nourishment ofa 10.5-mile stretch of coast cost about $6 million per mile in the late 1970s. Beach nourishment can be an effectiveprotective measure because beaches are efficient in absorbing wave energy. Usually, beach nourishments usedwhere erosion of a natural beach is occurring. The ability of the nourished beach to absorb wave energy may, thus,come at the expense of its own erosion, so periodic renourishment maybe required. As an adaptation to sea levelrise, beach nourishment has the advantage that it can be abruptly halted (e.g., in favor of retreat) withoutabandoning large investments when the costs of continued nourishment exceed benefits.

Some beach-nourishment projects have been criticized forhaving’life spans that are shorter than anticipatedand, more generally, for falling to perform as designed (66). Debate continues on the performance of specificbeach-nourishment projects (e.g., see ref. 39). However, it seems clear that as understanding of fill and sedimentdynamics has advanced, the performance of such projects has improved (39).

Hard structural protective measures arealsoappropriate in some circumstances. The most common are seawalls, breakwaters, and groins. Sea walls are concrete, steel, stone, or timber structures built parallel to and onthe landward side of beaches. Their primary purpose is to protect upland areas. Like nourishment projects, theyare normally built in areas that are eroding, and thus beaches in front of sea walls may eventually disappear.However, properly designed sea walls can protect the land behind them without causing adverse effects tobeaches (59). Sea walls are initially more expensive than beach-nourishment projects, but the periodic costsrequired of beach-nourishment projects are not incurred. Some sea walls will likely have an adverse effect on theability of wetlands to migrate in response to sea level rise. A 20-inch (0.5-meter)2 rise in sea level could result inthe loss of35 percent of coastal wetlands if standard measures are taken to protect currently developed Iowfands;however, 30 percent of wetlands could be lost in any case if no protective measures are taken (62).

Breakwaters are linear structures placed in nearshore waters whose purpose is to shield the shoreline fromincoming wave energy. Groins are wall-like structures constructed perpendicular to the shoreline andusedtotrapsand moving parallel to the shore. They are usually used in combination with beach nourishment. They have oftenbeen improperly used in the past, resulting in downdrift beach erosion.

1 TO convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.z To convert inches to meters, multiply by 0.025.


In coastal cities and seaside resort communities, the value of the land is usually great enough that decisionsto install hard structures or replenish beach sand are often made. Retreat is usually not a practical alternative inthese areas. In sparsely developed areas, the opposite isgeneraliythe case, and retreat maybe the only feasibleoption (83). Gradual retreat from the coast, iimiting coastal uses to those that can be accommodated withoutprotection, is favored by many insurance companies and environmentalists as the ultimate solution to coastalerosion and sea level rise. They argue that protection measures can only forestall inevitable destruction and, ifrisky development is ailowed to continue, increase the costs of protection and retreat (54). Policies that promoteretreat include setback provisions that some coastal States have adopted and the Federal Government’sfiooded-properties-purchase program and UptonJones relocation-assistance program (see main text).

A substantial amount of money has been invested in coastal areas. Owners of beachfront property areunderstandably upset when their homes or businesses are threatened by erosion, and retreat to a safer site maynot be an option for many. The reality of erosion and sea level rise creates some difficuit public-policy issues.Property owners naturally want to take steps to protect threatened iand. However, in some instances (e.g., in somequickly eroding areas), it will probably not be desirable or economically justified from a community or nationalperspective to do so, and gradual retreat will be preferred. Two issues with immense consequences for coastaldevelopment are likely to continue to be debated. First, is the extent to which private-property owners shouid besubsidized by taxpayers at large to maintain risky coastal development. Second, is how much property ownersshould be compensated when a State limits the economic use of seaside property. These issues will become morecontroversial as the amount of money invested in coastal development increases. The possibility of future sea levelrise suggests that ciear policies guiding the expectations of property owners need to be established.


completed (see box 4-B) has not to date been Because the largest benefit of beach-protectionconsidered a “maintenance activity’ (if it were,the Corps would not be involved), so theserecurring costs are subsidized as well.21 If theCorps uses sand dredged from navigation projectsfor beach nourishment, the Federal Governmentcurrently provides 50 percent of the increasedcosts that would be incurred to place this sand onbeaches rather than to dispose of it in the leastcostly manner. Finally, the Federal Governmentshares the costs of feasibility studies with States.Federal aid is usually recommended to continuethrough the life of the project, normally 50 yearsfor hard structures (91).

In recent years, the Corps has spent between$40 and $70 million annually for beach nourish-ment and structural-protection measures, the ma-jority of which has been for beach nourishment.22

projects is realized at the local or regional level,it may be desirable to shift more of the burden ofpaying for such projects from the Federal Govern-ment to the States. Responsibility for maintainingbeach-nourishment projects, in particular, couldbe shifted to affected States, just as is mainte-nance of Corps-built flood-control projects.

States have also been active in assisting withand subsidizing shore-protection efforts. SeveralStates now provide funding, often through theissuance of bonds, for local renourishment pro-grams, and often in combination with Federalsubsidies. In South Carolina, for instance, theState legislature created a $10 million BeachRenourishment Fund in 1988, most of which wentto emergency renourishment and dune-rebuildingprojects after Hurricane Hugo (43). Likewise, the

21 L. wanos, Institute of Water Resources, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, personal COm@CatiO% J~Y 1993.

22 J. HOUSleY, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, personal COXuIXMIicat@ JUIY 1993.


State of Maryland has provided about $60 millionunder its Shore Erosion Control Program (SECP)for beach renourishment in Ocean City. The Statealso provides interest-free loans and technicalassistance for shorefront property owners experi-encing erosion problems, and 50 percent match-ing funds to property owners who undertakenonstructural erosion-control measures such asplanting grass (68). The State of New Jerseyrecently passed a bill to appropriate $15 millionper year for shore projects, including beachnourishment.

H U.S. Tax CodeSeveral major coastal-development subsidies

are also available in the U.S. Tax Code. Thecasualty-loss deduction allows coastal propertyowners to deduct the cost of uninsured damagesresulting from hurricanes and other natural disas-ters. Allowable deductions are determined bysubtracting the post-storm value of property fromits pre-storm value, less insurance received.23 Thededuction is only allowed where losses exceed 10percent of adjusted gross income.

Other U.S. Tax Code subsidies include interestand property-tax deductions for second homes(which comprise much of coastal development)and accelerated depreciation for seasonal rentalproperties. These types of subsidies are largelyhidden, and estimates of their aggregate cost arehard to come by. There is little doubt, however,that the extent of implicit public subsidy issubstantial.

1 Other Development SubsidiesCoastal growth is subsidized by a variety of

other Federal development programs and grants.The Farmers Home Administration, for example,provides subsidies in the form of community-facility loans, business and industry loans, andrural housing loans (88). The Department ofHousing and Urban Development provides guar-

1

anteed home loans, as doesVeterans Affairs. The Rural

the Department ofElectrification Ad-

ministration provides loans for development ofelectrical systems, and the Environmental Protec-tion Agency has provided considerable fundingfor water systems and for wastewater treatment.Extensive funding for the construction of high-ways, roads, bridges, and other improvementsthat make many otherwise remote coastal areasreadily accessible has been provided by theDepartment of Transportation and is one of themore significant factors affecting the develop-ment of barrier islands. Most of these develop-ment-related grants and subsidies are not limitedto coastal areas, and estimates of their magnitudeand of their impacts in coastal regions are notavailable.

OBSTACLES TO BETTER MANAGEMENTImprovements in the Federal and State pro-

grams that affect development in the coastal zoneare possible and, considering the potential forincreasing vulnerability in coastal areas as a resultof global climate change, desirable. However,several impediments to reducing risk exist. Amongthese are the fact that people continue to beattracted to coastal areas, the notion of subsidiesas social entitlements, private-property concerns,the cost of change, and institutional fragmenta-tion and regulatory obstacles.

1 The Attraction of Coastal AreasThe economic and personal attraction Ameri-

cans have to coasts can be seen as an obstacle tomany coastal-management reforms. Recent sur-veys of coastal-property owners suggest thatmany have a solid appreciation for the danger andriskiness of building and living in coastal areas,but see hurricanes and coastal storms as simply anecessary part of the tradeoff for the benefits ofcoastal living (6). Table 4-5 shows the results ofa questionnaire mailed to owners of beachfront

u S= now 455 on Stem, hurricanes, and floods in 26 U.S. Code (’U. S. C.) 165.


Table 4&Results of a Mail Survey of 132 Owners of Beachfront Property inSouth Carolina After Hurricane Hugo That Asked the Question:

“Now that you have experienced the effects of a hurricane, has this had any influence on yourfeelings about owning beachfront property?”

Percent

1. Yes, would not buy beachfront property again 62 Yes, would like to sell my property and buy property in a safer location 73. No, hurricanes are just a normal risk in beachfront areas 394. No, the benefits and enjoyments of beachfront living outweigh the

potential risks 425. Other 6

SOURCE: T. Beatley, Hurricane Hugo and Shoreline Retreat: Evacuating the Effectivenessof the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act, final report to the National ScienceFoundation, September 1992

property in South Carolina heavily damaged byHurricane Hugo. Even those who were devas-tated by such events did not generally have regretsor plan to move to safer locations. A relatedobstacle is the economic advantage of beachfrontlocations. Owners of beachfront property maybereluctant to relocate structures at risk until theyhave nearly collapsed into the surf because theincome from renting these units on the beach issubstantially higher than it would be on sitesfarther inland. Also, equivalent beachfront prop-erty is often unavailable or too expensive.

~ Coastal Subsidies as Social EntitlementsSome coastal subsidies have, over time, ac-

quired a constituency and set of beneficiaries whotend to view them as social entitlements, in muchthe same way that people view social security.Similar views exist about disaster assistance.Almost regardless of the magnitude of the dam-ages or the ability of States, localities, andproperty owners to assume the damages, manypeople perceive that a disaster declaration anddisaster assistance are deserved. Taking away orCurtailing programs such as Federal flood insur-ance would be opposed by communities andcoastal property owners who fear that propertyvalues, salability, and economic attractiveness ofcoastal areas would be reduced.

9 Private Property and the Takings IssueA major impediment to more-effective and

more-sensible coastal management is concernabout impacts on private property. Specifically,property owners who are restricted as a result ofcoastal-management programs (e.g., Ocean-frontsetback requirements or restrictions on fillingwetlands) may claim that these restrictions repre-sent unconstitutional takings of private propertyunder the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitu-tion (as well as under similar provisions in Stateconstitutions). If land-use regulations are so re-strictive that they deny all reasonable economicuse of a coastal property, the courts may wellconclude that a taking has occurred.

A recent case in South Carolina, Lucas v. SouthCarolina Coastal Council, illustrates the poten-tial dimensions of this obstacle.24 David Lucas, aSouth Carolina developer and property ownerwho had acquired two small lots on Isle of Palms(a barrier-island community east of Charleston),was prevented from building on them as a resultof the 1988 South Carolina Beachfront Manage-ment Act (both lots were seaward of the so-called“baseline”) (69). Arguing that the setback re-strictions deprived him of all reasonable eco-nomic use of his property, he challenged therestrictions as an unconstitutional taking. Thelower court found in his favor and awarded him


$1.2 million. The South Carolina Supreme Courtoverruled this decision, upholding the CoastalCouncil’s actions as merely preventing a publicharm and thus not requiring compensation. Lucasappealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, where themajority determined that some compensationshould be paid when the value of property isessentially destroyed by regulation. The courtreiterated the position that when land-use regula-tions that preclude all economic use of propertygo into effect, a taking might occur (unless theregulation serves only to enforce a preexistingcommon-law doctrine, such as nuisance law). Thecase was then returned to the South CarolinaSupreme Court, which, in reconsidering, foundthat a temporary taking had occurred. In July1993, a settlement was finally reached, and theState agreed to pay Lucas $1.5 million.25 The fullimplications of the Lucas decision remain to beseen, but it will likely be cited by opponents ofmore-stringent coastal land-use regulations.

Takings law is still developing, and consider-able disagreement exists about when a regulatorytaking actually occurs. What constitutes a reason-able economic use, for example, remains adebatable question. The South Carolina law didnot prevent the erection of a temporary structureon the Lucas property, or prohibit the sale of thelots to adjoining property owners. The use restric-tions in the NFIP generally are not considered ataking because participation by communities isvoluntary and because protecting people from thethreat of harm is part of community authorityunder police powers.

Irrespective of the specific constitutional chal-lenge of a taking, additional restrictions on the useof land have in recent years met with seriouspolitical opposition. Several property-rights-protection groups, such as supporters of the wiseuse movement in the West., have been establishedand have been vocal in opposing additionalgovernment restrictions (see vol. 2, ch. 5).

I Cost of Change: Perceived and ActualPotential cost—actual and perceived-repre-

sents an obstacle to many proposed programchanges. Coastal-land acquisition, for example,may entail major expenditures, given the highprice of coastal property. Public subsidies forrelocation of vulnerable structures could alsoinvolve substantial public expense. On the otherhand, some alternatives are relatively inexpensive,and their perceived costs may be much higherthan their actual costs. Adoption of coastalbuilding standards, for instance, actually involvesa relatively small increase in the cost of homeconstruction (l).

In addition, attention is frequently focused onthe initial costs of programs without consideringthe resulting long-term cost reductions. Althoughrelocation subsidies (e.g., the Upton-Jones reloca-tion assistance, discussed below) may involvesubstantial upfront costs, they serve to curtailfuture-loss expenditures, sometimes on proper-ties that would likely be damaged again. Simi-larly, public acquisition of wetlands, floodplains,and other sensitive coastal lands, although expen-sive initially, can serve to prevent future publiccosts that could be many times higher (e.g., costsof disaster relief and ecological damages).

I Institutional Fragmentation andRegulatory Obstacles

An important obstacle to better management,especially at the Federal level, is institutional (ororganizational) fragmentation. No single Federalagency or department has responsibility for coastalmanagement and coastal-damage risk reduction.For example, the Coastal Zone Managementprogram is administered within the NationalOceanic and Atmospheric Administration ( N O A A ) ;responsibility for wetland management is sharedby the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),the Corps of Engineers, and many others (see vol.2, ch. 4); FEMA has responsibility for flood

~ South caroIina intends to nxoup its money by selling the lots for development. However, thc new build.@ -t W stip*@ tit *owner must remove structures that ever flood or become seaward of the dunes because of beaeh erosion (50).


insurance; and several agencies and offices areinvolved in disaster assistance. These differentFederal programs and initiatives are not well-coordinated and there is no unified, compre-hensive strategy for reducing the risks of living onthe coast or for addressing specific issues such asclimate-related sea level rise. Moreover, theperceived missions of these different agenciesvary considerably, and can result in actions andprograms that work at cross-purposes. FEMAhas historically seen its mission not in terms ofcoastal management, but in terms of helpingfamilies and communities respond to, and copewith, natural disasters.

Hazardous coastal development is caused, inpart, by an inadequate regulatory and enforce-ment framework. Many coastal States and local-ities have minimal controls on the location andquality of development. Although some Stateshave adopted fairly stringent coastal setbackrequirements, for example, many others fre-quently permit new development close to theocean front and in locations subject to erosionthreats. North Carolina requires major coastalstructures to be set back 60 times the averageannual erosion rate (61). Yet, South Carolinaeffectively has no fixed shoreline setback, andthrough a special permit procedure, allows devel-opment very close to the ocean.

Few coastal States or localities prohibit devel-opment within floodplains, although structures inthese areas may be subject to certain designrequirements, such as being elevated to or abovethe 100-year flood level. To the uninformed coastalresident or buyer of coastal property, securing aState or local permit maybe falsely perceived asa “certification’ of the safety of a coastal site orlocation. Moreover, ensuring full communitycompliance with existing floodplain-managementregulations is difficult because FEMA’s enforce-ment and monitoring staff is small.

The extensive wind damage from HurricaneAndrew illustrates the looseness with which

many development codes have been implementedand enforced. The South Florida Building Code(with a wind-design standard of 120 miles (190kilometers) 26 per hour) was generally viewed asone of the most stringent performance-basedbuilding codes in use anywhere. Yet, problemswith enforcement and implementation (and withthe provisions of the code itself) have raisedquestions about the stringency and effectivenessof coastal regulations. A grand jury in DadeCounty recently issued a report extremely criticalof the “shoddy” building practices evident inSouth Florida (8). Among the problems cited bythe grand jury were inadequate and lax buildinginspection, inability to control untrained andunlicensed building contractors, and corruption,apathy, and high turnover in the Florida Buildingand Zoning Department. Strengthening the code(including changing the ways roof systems areconstructed) and increasing Federal wind stand-ards for mobile homes (most of which weredestroyed in the hurricane) were recommended.

In many coastal areas, building codes aresimply not required. In 12 coastal States, adoptionof building codes is left entirely up to localofficials (53). In South Carolina, for instance,local governments are under no requirement toadopt a building code (although if they choose todo so, it must be the State’s standard buildingcode). In Texas, no State building code ismandated, and counties do not even have theauthority to adopt building codes if they wantedto-leaving many rural and unincorporated areaswithout any construction standards.

ENCOURAGING LESS-DAMAGINGCOASTAL-DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS

The existing policy framework does includeseveral major programs and policies that seek toreduce the risks of living on the coast and thatcould serve as the foundation for policy changesin the future. As mentioned earlier, the NFIP has

26 ~ conv~ miles per hour to kilometers per hour, multiply by 1.609.


mandated, from its beginning, the adoption of.

certam minimum standards for floodplain man-agement. In recent years, the program has beengiving much greater attention to risk reductionand hazard mitigation. Some relatively recentchanges to the NFIP, discussed below, includethe Section 1362 Flooded Properties PurchaseProgram, the Upton-Jones relocation-assistanceprogram, and the Community Rating System.Recently, several bills introduced in Congresshave proposed further reforms, and these initia-tives are described here as well. Other programsthat have positively encouraged mitigation andrisk reduction (or have the potential to do so)include the Federal Hazard Mitigation Grantsprogram (Section 404 of the Robert T. StaffordDisaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act),State hazard-mitigation plans (required by Sec-tion 409 of the Stafford Act), the Coastal BarrierResources Act (COBRA; P.L. 97-348), the Fed-eral Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA; P.L.92-583), and the State coastal-management pro-grams through which the Federal CZMA isimplemented.

M Section 1362 Flooded PropertiesPurchase Program

The NFIP, despite some limitations, has im-proved gradually over the years, and certainprograms and provisions have been developedthat move it in the direction of greater hazardmitigation and loss reduction. One of these is theSection 1362 Flooded Properties Purchase Pro-gram. Authorized in 1968 by a section of theNational Flood Insurance Act, the program allowsFEMA to break the damage-rebuild-damage cyclethat accounts for many damage claims.

Under the program, FEMA can offer to buy outowners of damaged property, paying the differ-ence between the fair market value of the struc-ture and the allowable insurance claim, plus thevalue of the land on which the structure is or waslocated. The community must agree to partici-pate, must be willing to accept the land, and must

prepare a plan for its use that ensures that it willnever be developed in the future. Eligible proper-ties must have had Federal flood insurance andmust meet one of several damage criteria (e.g., bedamaged substantially beyond repair).

The Section 1362 Program has been usedsparingly: since first funded in 1980, FEMA hasacquired only about 100 properties per year.Modest amounts of funds are set aside for Section1362 purchases, and there seems to be a biasagainst using those funds in coastal areas; be-cause land in coastal communities is often veryexpensive, it is usually possible to get a greater“bang for the buck” when these limited funds areused along rivers. Since 1980, Congress hasappropriated less than $5 million per year forSection 1362 funds, and in some years, FEMAhas not spent it all.

1 Upton-Jones Relocation AssistanceAnother major change in the flood-insurance

program was passage of the so-called Upton-Jones Amendment. An amendment to the Hous-ing and Community Development Act of 1987(P.L. 100-242), this provision sought to makeavailable funds for subsidizing the demolition orrelocation of shoreline structures that are subjectto fairly immediate erosion hazards. Under theNFIP prior to Upton-Jones, a property ownercould not receive any flood-insurance paymentuntil the structure was actually damaged.

Under Upton-Jones, owners of shorefront prop-erty with Federal flood insurance are eligiblefor sizable demolition or relocation subsidies.Specifically, the amendment provides up to 40percent of the insured value of a building forrelocation (or 40 percent of the cost of relocation,if less) and up to 110 percent of the insured valueof a structure for demolition. Relocation fundscan be used for, among other things, new sitepreparation, construction of a new foundation,and utility hook-ups.

To qua.ii@, structures must be within a zone ofimminent collapse. FEMA defines this area as


Figure 4-5--FEMA’s Criteria for Imminent-Collapse and Setback DeterminationsUnder the Upton-Jones Amendment

Dune scarpvegetation line

Minimum 30-year setback distance4 b

Zone ofimminent collapse

A

~//1( l o +3!5X4)) , u 1

//C2

‘.-’”- ._/ --”- -/d--‘ \ I Measured/ 1 Erosion rate = 4 feet per yearreporteddistance

Beach scarp/high water line

NOTE: To convert feet to meters, multiply by 0.305.

SOURCE: National Research Council, Managing Coastal Erosion (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1990).

seaward of a line 10 feet plus 5 times the averageannual rate of erosion, as measured from areference feature such as the normal high-waterline (fig. 4-5). The provisions also require theState or local government to condemn structuresor certify that they are in danger of collapse. OnceFEMA declares a structure subject to imminentcollapse, the owner has a certain reasonable timeto relocate or demolish it, after which only 40percent of losses can be recovered in the nextstorm or flooding event.

Once demolition or relocation occurs, certainrestrictions are placed on the availability of newinsurance. Specifically, to receive flood insur-ance, any future development on the propertymust be located landward of the 30-year erosionline for structures with one to four dwelling unitsor landward of the 60-year line for larger struc-tures. Structures moved to a different site mustalso meet these and whatever other floodplain-

management restrictions are in effect in the newlocation.

To date, use of the Upton-Jones Amendmenthas been limited. As of April 1992, only 494claims had been filed. Of these, 283 wereapproved, 217 for demolition and 66 for reloca-tion. The average value of demolition claims hasbeen more than twice that of relocation claims(79). Low participation can be explained in partby a general lack of awareness about the program,a reluctance to remove or interrupt income fromrental properties, a lack of suitable or affordablerelocation sites, and problems encountered incondemning structures (e.g., many States do notallow condemnation unless there is actual struc-tural damage (59)).

Despite considerable support for the concept,the Upton-Jones Amendment has not decreasedNFIP expenditures or induced voluntary, antici-patory action by owners and has been insufficientto overcome individual and market incentives for


ocean-front owners to remain on the coastline (17,18, 56). The National Research Council hasrecommended that relocation be encouraged overdemolition, relocation behind the 30-year erosionline be mandated, easements or some other formof legal restriction preventing use of vacatedshorefront areas be required, and insurance beterminated or premiums raised for structureswithin the zone of imminent collapse that are notrelocated or demolished after a certain time (59).

The Upton-Jones program could be criticizedas underwriting private risks because it encour-ages risky coastal development if property own-ers expect relocation assistance in the future (7).Also, the program applies only to individualproperties: Upton-Jones provisions can be used torelocate one structure even as another one is beingbuilt on an adjacent, eroding site. The suggestedchanges mentioned above, in addition to couplingprogram benefits to more stringent erosion man-agement for new construction (e.g., coastal set-backs), would serve to substantially eliminatesuch incentives.

1 Community Rating SystemFEMA has recently initiated a program, the

Community Rating System (CRS), to rewardcommunities for the additional activities andprograms they undertake to minimize flood dama-ges beyond the minimum requirements of theNFIP. Specifically, the insurance premiums ofproperty owners within communities that under-take flood-damage-reduction activities are re-duced based on the extent of eligible activitiesundertaken. CRS gives credit for 18 mitigationactivities, grouped into four categories: publicinformation, mapping and regulations, flood-damage reduction, and flood preparedness (seetable 4-6). Points are assigned to activitiesdepending on the extent of their implementationwithin the community and their likely effective-ness at achieving CRS objectives (24).

Points allocated to individual measures areadded to produce the community’s total points,which are then used to determine the extent ofpremium reduction for property owners. As table4-7 indicates, premium reductions range from 5 to45 percent for property within Special FloodHazard Areas (i.e., A and V zones). A maximum5 percent reduction is allowed for propertyoutside Special Flood Hazard Areas, largelybecause premiums are already low in these areasand because the measures for which credits aregiven are directed at the 100-year-flood zones.

The numbers of communities participating inthe CRS program have so far been modest. In FY1993, only 565 communities took part (3 percentof those participating in the NFIP). This smallpercentage, however, does represent about 45percent of the flood-insurance-policy base. Thelevel of mitigation effort for most participatingcommunities has been relatively low, with thevast majority of communities (about 78 percent)eligible for only a 5 percent reduction in policy-holder premiums. Another 15 percent of commu-nities are eligible for 10 percent reductions.Twelve communities were given reductions of 15percent, and one qualified for a 25 percentreduction. 27

Questions nevertheless remain about the CRSstrategy. It is not clear whether the most activelocal governments would not be undertakingthese kinds of mitigation actions, anyway. Someof the measures for which local governments aregiven credit, such as hazard disclosure, may notlead to clear hazard or damage reduction. Con-versely, credits are not now given for some mea-sures, such as erosion management, that might bedesirable. The CRS approach could also becriticized for further reducing premiums paid inhazardous areas. As an alternative, several of themeasures for which localities are given credit (e.g.,erosion setbacks) could simply be made manda-tory as conditions for participating in the NFIP.

27 Data on the COmmunity Rating System provided by C, Keegu Federal Emergency Mmagement Agency, JWL 3, 1993.


Table 4-6--Community Rating System Designed by the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency to Encourage Communities to Minimize Flood Damage

Percent ofActivity Maximum points Average points applicants

allowed earned requesting credit

Public informationElevation certificatesMap determinationsOutreach projectsHazard disclosureFlood-protection libraryFlood-protectionassistance

Mapping and regulationsAdditional flood dataOpen-space preservationHigher regulatorystandards

Flood-data maintenanceStorm-water management

Flood-damage reductionRepetitive-loss projectsAcquisition and relocationRetrofittingDrainage-system

maintenance

Flood preparednessFlood-warning programLevee safetyDam safety

1 37a

140175

81a25

66

360a

450a

785’12oa380a

441 a

1,6001,400

330’

200a

900a

120a

73140

593920

51

601 15b

101 a

41121

419723

226

1730

64

1 0 0

92534077

45

2042

594137

1113

3

82

50

45

a Maximum Points revised since the 1990 community Rating System schedule. b 1990 credits revised to reflect the 1992 Community Rating System schedule.

SOURCE. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Interagency Hazard Mitigation SurveyTeam Report on the Northeaster Storm, FEMA 973-NJ-DR (Washington, DC: FEMA, January 1993)

1 Hazard-Mitigation Programs andRequirements Under the Stafford Act

There have also been some reforms in theFederal disaster-assistance framework in recentyears. The 1988 amendments to the Stafford Actcreated a Hazard Mitigation Grant Program(HMGP) (Section 404), which provides Federalmatching funds for 50 percent of individual Stateand local mitigation projects. The grant funds aretied to disaster declarations and are limited to 10percent of the total Federal share of the public-assistance monies made available for permanentrestorative work.

FEMA had approved 206 applications forhazard-mitigation grants through 1992, obligat-ing approximately $43 million. As table 4-8indicates, these funds have been used to financevarious types of mitigation, including improvingpublic-private facilities (e.g., floodproofing sew-age treatment systems), constructing drainagesystems, purchasing equipment, relocating struc-tures, developing planning programs, promotingeducation and training activities, and improvingland. Nearly 60 percent of the funds were used forimprovements to public-private facilities. Onlyabout 11 percent of these grants were used forrelocation or acquisition, and only about 3 percent


Table 4-7—Premium Reductions for SpecialFlood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) and Non-SFHAs inthe Federal Emergency Management Agency’s

Community Rating System

SFHA NonSFHApremium premium

Points reduction reductionearned Class (percent) (percent)

4,500+ 14,000-4,499 . . . . . . . 23,500-3,999 . . . . . . . 33,000-3,499 . . . . . . . 42,500-2,999 . . . . . . . 52,000-2,499 . . . . . . . 61,500-1 ,999 . . . . . . . 71,000-1 ,499 . . . . . . . 8500-999 . . . . . . . . . . . 90-499 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

45 540 535 530 525 520 515 510 5

5 50 0

SOURCE Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), NationalFlood Insurance Program Community Rating System CoordinatorsManual (Washington,DC: FEMA, July 1992.

for planning programs, such as development ofbeach-management plans, hazard-mitigation plans,and zoning- and building-code ordinances (41).

A joint task force of the National EmergencyManagement Association and the Association ofState Floodplain Managers was formed to evalu-ate HMGP. Among the concerns identified werethe slow pace of implementing the program, thelack of “hazard mitigation principles and guid-ance, ’ difficult.ies in State-level coordination,and the failure of States and localities to identifymitigation opportunities before a disaster occurs.The specific recommendations of the joint taskforce include: creating State teams to respondto disaster declarations; developing and endors-ing a Federal-State hazard-mitigation strategyafter each disaster declaration to identify mitigat-ion opportunities; updating and refining Statehazard-mitigation plans through the Federal-Stateagreement; strengthening technical-assistanceactivities (e.g., through training and publicationof handbooks); and improving guidance on pro-ject eligibility (41). Of special importance are thetask force’s conclusions that FEMA should betterenforce State hazard-mitigation-plan requirementsand seek to elevate the priority and importance

Table 4&—Rank of Project Categories by DollarAmount and Percent of Estimated Obligations

in the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program(January 1989 to August 1992)

Type of project $ Millionsa Percent

Public-private facilities 25 58

Drainage projects 6 14Equipment purchases 5 12Relocation of structures 5 11Planning products 1 3Education and training <1 1Land Improvements <1 1

Total 43 100a 1992 dollars

SOURCE. Joint Task Force on the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program,The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.” An Evaluation Report,prepared by National Emergency Management Association, theAssocia t ion of Sta te F loodpla in Managers , and the Federa lEmergency Management Agency, September 1992

given to these plans. Land use, relocation, andnonstructural programs are perhaps underrepre-sented in the HMGP. The overall level of fundingseems modest, but not all available funds havebeen obligated because too few eligible projectshave been proposed.

The Stafford Act also made mitigation aneligible expense under the FEMA public-assistance program (Section 406), and thus allowsthe Federal Government to contribute 75 percentof the funds for reconstruction improvements tothe infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, and utilitylines) to make them less vulnerable to futuredamage. Before these changes were made, mitiga-tion expenditures were not eligible for publicassistance, and if State and local governmentswanted to rebuild damaged infrastructure tohigher standards, they had to bear the entireexpense. Section 406 could be more useful toStates than the Hazard Mitigation Grant Programbecause opportunities for mitigation can be iden-tified and taken advantage of quickly during thedamage survey process, the mitigation can beincorporated into reconstruction without havingto go through a grant-review process and competewith other projects, and the amount of money


available is not limited by the 10 percent cap ofthe Federal share of public-assistance monies.

The existing Federal disaster-assistance frame-work does have some significant ‘‘teeth’ forpromoting and requiring hazard mitigation. Sec-tion 409, although rarely used, states that thePresident may make disaster assistance condi-tional on State or local actions to mitigate hazards(’‘including safe land use and construction prac-tices”). In addition, States receiving disasterassistance are required to prepare a State hazard-mitigation plan-a so-called Section 409 plan.These plans are intended to require States (andlocal communities) to confront the natural haz-ards they are subject to and identify programs andpolicies that can be implemented to reduce thosehazards. In theory, FEMA can withhold disaster-assistance funds if the programs and policiescontained in the plan have not been implemented.Politically, however, this is quite difficult to do,and FEMA has chosen not to adopt such astringent approach. Most States required to pre-pare Section 409 plans have done so. However,FEMA lacks a clear system for monitoring Stateprogress and compliance with Section 409 plans.Furthermore, once a disaster is over, States arerelieved of much of the pressure to undertakeplanning and mitigation activities.

9 Coastal Barrier Resource ActCoBRA, enacted by Congress in 1982, repre-

sents an attempt to move away from some of theill effects of Federal subsidies such as floodinsurance and disaster assistance. COBRA’S statedobjectives are to reduce growth pressures onundeveloped barrier islands; to reduce threats topeople and property of disasters and minimize thepublic expenditures that typically accompanysuch disasters; and to reduce damage to fish,wildlife, and other sensitive environmental re-sources.

. . .-..— ... .

. . . . ,,, - -+...

Morris Island lighthouse, once on solid ground, nowsits in the Atlantic Ocean off Charleston, SouthCarolina.

The act designated the Coastal Barrier Re-sources System (CBRS), originally comprising186 undeveloped barrier-island units, including453,000 acres (183,500 hectares)28 and 666 milesof shoreline. After a certain date, several Federalsubsidies would no longer be permitted in thesedesignated areas, including new flood-insurancepolicies, monies for infrastructure construction,and nonemergency forms of disaster relief. TheDepartment of the Interior is responsible forimplementing the program.

Barrier islands were defined in the act asincluding sand deposits, such as barrier islandsand spits, and ‘associated aquatic habitats,” suchas adjacent marshes and estuaries. A barrier islandwas deemed to be undeveloped, and thus eligiblefor inclusion in the system, if it had less than onewalled and roofed building per 5 acres of land;there was an absence of urban infrastructure on it(e.g., vehicle access, water supply, wastewaterdisposal, and electrical service to each lot); and

~ ~ CoKIvm acres to hectares, multiply by 0.40S.


it was not part of a development of 100 or morelots (32).

CBRS was expanded in 1990 under the CoastalBarrier Improvement Act (P.L. 101-591) to in-clude 560 units comprising 1.3 million acres and1200 shoreline miles (88). In addition, under the1990 act, the Department of the Interior wasdirected to map all undeveloped coastal barriersalong the Pacific Coast (for eventual inclusion byCongress in CBRS).

Several studies have sought to evaluate theeffectiveness of CoBRA at discouraging barrier-island development (31, 32,42, 88). These studiessuggested that COBRA has not stopped develop-ment pressures on undeveloped coastal barriers,although the withdrawal of Federal subsidies hashad some effect on discouraging new develop-ment there. The General Accounting Office (GAO)noted that the “availability of accessible coastalland is limited [and] populations of coastal areasare expected to increase by tens of millions by theyear 2010. This population increase will furtherspur market demand, providing an incentive fordevelopers, owners, and investors to assume therisks associated with owning and building inthese storm-prone areas” (88).

The study results suggest several policy direc-tions, including the acquisition of undevelopedbarrier lands despite the high cost of such astrategy .29 Some studies in the past have arguedthat despite the high cost of acquisition, the publicsavings in the long term still justify such pur-chases (e.g., see ref. 55). One study (42) recom-mended removal of the remaining forms ofFederal subsidy allowable under the current U.S.Tax Code (e.g., casualty-loss deductions); prohi-bition of all loans made by federally insuredbanks and lending institutions (originally waivedunder Section 11 of CoBRA); prohibition ofFederal block grants; and prohibition of federally

funded projects occurring outside, yet affecting,designated units.

H The Coastal Zone Management Act andState Management Programs

The 1972 enactment of the Federal CZMA hasserved as a major catalyst for improved coastalplanning and management. Under Section 305 ofthe act, the Federal Government-through theOffice of Ocean and Coastal Resource Manage-ment within NOAA-provides grants for thedevelopment of State coastal-management pro-grams. These programs must contain certainelements, and once approved, Section 306 of theact provides funding for State implementation.Funds are provided on a Federal-State cost-sharebasis. The Federal share was initially as high as 80percent, but shares are now equal. In addition tothe financial incentive for participation, Stateswere also encouraged to participate as a way ofexercising some degree of control over Federalactions and projects in their coastal zones. Thus,once a State’s plan is approved, subsequentFederal actions must be consistent with it (perSection 307) to the extent practicable.

Although the program is voluntary, participa-tion has been very high. Of the 35 coastal Statesand Territories eligible for funding, 29 now havefederally approved plans (notable exceptionshave been Texas and Georgia, but each is nowworking toward developing a program). Illinoisis the only eligible State not developing a pro-gram (note that States along the Great Lakes arealso considered “coastal”). Moreover, CZMAhas clearly served as a major catalyst for thedevelopment of more-extensive and more-effective coastal-management programs. Com-pared with the State-only management framework that existed before CZMA, there is littledoubt that current coastal-development patternsand practices are more protective of sensitive

@ ~f=ue 88 dtises the fee-simple and less-than-fee-simple approaches. [email protected] ~tiitiOn hlvOh@ ~“ fllllo~P$or the endre ‘bundle of rights.’ Izss-than-fcesimplc acquisition involves purchasing less than full ownership, or a partial interest in tk lan4typically the right to build or develop on all or a portion of the land.


coastal resources and have reduced the exposureof people and property to coastal risks (9, 33).

States have considerable freedom under CZMAto craft a coastal program to fit their individualneeds and circumstances. It must include certainbasic components, however, including identifica-tion of the boundaries of the coastal zone,definition of permissible land and water useswithin the zone, creation of an inventory anddesignation of areas of particular concern, andidentification of the means by which the State willexert control over activities in the coastal zone.Some States-Florida and New Jersey, forexample--have taken a networking approach,pulling together into their coastal programs sev-eral already-existing management provisions. OtherStates, such as North Carolina, have createdentirely new management and regulatory frame-works and new State decision-making bodies toimplement the program (9).

There is considerable variation in the specificprovisions and management tools used in Statecoastal programs and in their stringency andextent of coverage. Some State programs clearlyhave made major strides in reducing the riskinessof coastal development. At least 13 States nowimpose some form of coastal setback, requiringnew development to locate a certain distancelandward of the ocean (table 4-9) (38, 59,71, 89).

Increasingly, these setback requirements arecalculated according to local erosion rates. NorthCarolina, for example, uses one of the toughesterosion-based setbacks. Specifically, for small-scaIe development in beachfront areas, newdevelopment must be set back a distance of atleast 30 times the average annual rate of erosionfor that particular stretch of coastline, measuredfrom the first stable line of vegetation (61, 71).Development must also be landward of the crest

of the “primary dune” and of the landward toe ofthe “frontal dune. ” For larger structures, thesetback is doubled to 60 times the annual rate oferosion.

Other types of restrictions are also imposed.Under New York’s Coastal Erosion Hazard Areas

Table 4-9--Status of U.S. Setback Authorities

State or Setback New policiesTerritory Iegislation for sea level rise

Alabama.. . . . . . . . . . .

Alaska. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

American Samoa. . . . .

California . . . . . . . . . . . .

Connecticut . . . . . . . . . .Delaware. . . . . . . . . . . .Florida. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Georgia. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Guam. . . . . . . . . . . . . .Hawaii. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Illinois. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Louisiana. . . . . . . . . . . .Maine. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Maryland. . . . . . . . . . . .

Massachusetts. . . . . . .Michigan. . . . . . . . . . . .

Minnesota. ... , . . . . . .

Mississippi. . . . . . . . . . .

New Hampshire. . . . . .

New Jersey . . . . . . . . . .

New York . . . . . . . . . . .North Carolina . . . . . . .

Northern Marianas. . . .

Ohio. ...... 0,..,....Oregon. . ,. . . . . . . . . . . .

Pennsylvania. . . . . . . . .

Puerto Rico.........,

Rhode Island. . . . . . . . .

South Carolina . . . . . . .Texas. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Virgin lslands. . . . . . . .Virginia. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Washington. . . . . . . . . .Wisconsin. . . . . . . . . . .

YesN oN oN oN oYesYes

N oNoYesN oN oYes a

NoN oYesN oN oN oYes b

YesYesYes a

NoNo

YesYes a

YesYesNoYes a

N oN oN o

No

No—NoNoN oN oN o—N oNoN oYesNoNoN oN oNoNoNoN oNo—NoN oNo—N oYesNo—

NoNoNo

a State haS a construction setback, but It is not primarily for coastal-erosion-hazard purposes.

b The State setback currently applies only to projects requiring aState coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA) permit (i.e., projectsof greater than 24 residential units). A proposed bill would revampCAFRA and give the State greater control over oceanfront areas.Local municipalities have authority for “sub-CAFRA” projectsthrough dune- and beach-protection ordnances.

SOURCES: J. Houlahan, “Comparison of State Coastal Setbacks toManage Development In Coastal Hazard Areas,” Coastal Manage-ment, vol. 17, 1989; P. Klarin and M. Hershman, “Response of CoastalZone Management Programs to Sea Level Rise in the United States,”Coastal Management, vol. 18, 1990.


Act,30 for example, in certain erosion zones (i.e.,so-called ‘structural hazard zones’ ‘), only ‘mov-able’ structures are permitted (71). Specificdensity limitations are imposed by some States incertain high-risk locations. Under North Caro-lina’s program, for instance, development in inlethazard zones is restricted to structures less than5,000 square feet (450 square meters)31 in size,and generally must not exceed a density of morethan one unit per 15,000 square feet of develop-able land (61).

Some coastal States have also imposed signifi-cant restrictions on the building of erosion-control structures (e.g., seawalls, revetments, andgroins). North Carolina, South Carolina, andMaine have banned the construction of new,permanent shore-hardening structures altogether.Such actions serve in the long run to reducedestruction of beaches, and put property ownerson notice that should a beachfront structurebecome subject to erosion hazards, it will not bepermissible to allow the construction of suchprotective (yet damaging) structures. States likeNorth Carolina have managed to resist recentpolitical challenges to such controls.

Most coastal States have also imposed restric-tions on development in tidal, or saltwater,wetlands, and a smaller number apply restrictionsto nontidal, or freshwater, wetlands. States typi-cally require a permit before certain activities cantake place in wetland areas, and usually include amore expansive list of potentially damagingactivities than those regulated under the FederalSection 404 program (see below and vol. 2, ch. 4).Regulated activities typically include dischargingdredge material, draining wetlands, cutting trees,and destroying vegetation. These regulationsoften extend to adjacent buffer areas as well. Statewetland standards often incorporate many of thekey concepts contained in the EPA-developedSection 404(b) guidelines, including restrictingdevelopment activities to water-dependent uses

and forbidding such activities where practicablealternatives exist.

Most state wetland programs also requiremitigation when natural wetlands are destroyed ordamaged. Imposed mitigation ratios-the amountof created, restored, or enhanced acreage requiredfor each acre of natural wetland destroyed ordamaged--can be two-to-one or greater (77).

Many State coastal programs also seek tomanage rebuilding and reconstruction after hurri-canes or other major flooding events. Most Stateprograms require development permits for re-building substantially damaged structures. Hurri-canes and coastal-storm events, while exactingsubstantial human and economic cost, oftenrepresent opportunities to rebuild in ways thatminimize exposure to future risks (e.g., throughrelocation and through elevating structures andsetting them further back from the water).

The South Carolina Beachfront ManagementAct (BMA), originally created in 1988, containedsome of the most stringent reconstruction provi-sions in the country when Hurricane Hugo hit thecoast a year later (see box 4-C). In enacting theBMA, the State sought to explicitly implement along-term shoreline-retreat policy. Under theoriginal act, habitable structures that were foundto be “damaged beyond repair’ (i.e., damaged bymore than 662/3 percent) could only be rebuiltlandward of a no-construction zone (the so-called“dead zone”). All structures rebuilt within alarger 40-year erosion zone were also required tomove as far landward as possible (see fig. 4-6).The rebuilding of pools and recreational ameni-ties damaged more than 50 percent was alsoprevented, and restrictions were placed on re-building erosion-control structures if damage wasgreater than 50 percent. Vertical seawalls couldbe replaced with sloping barriers, but only undercertain conditions (6, 70).

Opposition to the rebuilding restrictions afterHurricane Hugo was intense, especially by beach-

M ~cle 34, New York Environmental Conservation hlw.

31 ~ conv~ WW feet to square metera, multiply by 0.093.

Chapter 4--Coasts 1189

Box 4-C-South Carolina, Hurricane Hugo, and Coastal Development

No natural event illustrates the vulnerability of coastal areas to erosion, flooding, and wind damage rmreconvincingly than the onslaught of a major hurricane. Hurricane Hugo, which hit the coast of South Carolina in1989, was an unusuaily powerful storm. Classified as a category 4 hurricane (see box 4-A), Hugo was one of themost powerful storms ever to strike the East Coast of the United States. The storm surge accompanying Hugoexceeded 20 feet (6 meters)’ above mean sea level in some locations (84). This high water level, plus strong windsand heavy rains, destroyed coastal real estate and affected farms, forests, and coastal habitats along much of the181-miie (2904dlometer)2 South Carolina coastline. Such intense storms are rare, but hurricanes of lower intensityand strong storms are a recurring, year-round phenomenon along the eastern seaboard. Each year, millions ofdollars of damage to public and private infrastructure and property occurs along the East Coast as a result of thesestorms. In addition, significant, though usually less well-publiazed, damage occurs to the natural environment.

Each year, as well, population in coastal areas increases more rapidly than population in other parts of thecountry. As a consequence, the exposure of people and property to coastal hazards is steadily increasing.Development pressures in South Carofina and throughout the Southeast are Intense. Between 1980 and 1990,for example, South Caroiina’s population increased by 13 percent. In coastal counties, however, populationincreased by 22 percent, and in the popular Myrtte i3each resort, it increased by over 40 percent (15).

Damage to South Carolina from Hurricane Hugo was extensive and was a resuit of both the intensity of thestorm and the density and type of development in the area it struck. The following catalog of losses caused byHugo illustrates the variety of ways that human lives and ecosystems can be disrupted and suggests the necessityof implementing strong coastal-zone-management policies and of educating the public about the risks of living inhazardous areas.

Homes and buildfnga-l+urricane Hugo caused about $7 billion in property damages in North and SouthCardim Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, the four principal areas affected. Charleston County, South cardi~was one of the hardest hit areas, suffering more than $1.9 billion in damages, about 30 percent of the assessedproperty value of the area Acoording to the American Red Cross, Hugo destroyed 3,307 single-family homes inthe major impact area. An additional 18,171 homes sustained major damage, and 56,580 sustained minor

m. Mofethan 12,600 tile homes were destroyed, and approximately 18,000 units ofmultifarnitydweilingswere either destroyed or damaged (1 9). Despite the large number of homes destroyed, many homeowners rebuiltin the same location. Over 90 percent of homes destroyed in the hard hit and affiuent communities of Sullivan’sIsland and Isle of Palms, for example, were rebuiit in approximately the same place, a pattern that was repeatedin many beachfront communities.

Tourism-South Carolina’stourist industry depends heavily on coastal attractions and generates rnorethan$8 billion annually. The tourist industry suffered amajorblowfrom Hurricane Hugo. In the Charleston MetropolitanAre% for example, attendance at local attractions dunhg the 3 months following the storm was down 72 percentcompared with attendance during the same period the previous year. Attendance finally returned to normal levels3 years after the storm.

Forests and the forest Industry-About half the land in South Caroiina’s coastal counties is devoted toeither forestry or agriculture. Over 1.8 million acres (0.7 million hectares)3 of the State’s coastal forests were

- bY ~nd and waterr. @WM on timberlands =US~ W l+urfica~ Hugo amounted to about $1 biilion.

1 TO convert feet to meters, multiply by 0.305.

2 TO convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.6093 TO convgrt acxes to hectares, multiply by 0.405.



Box 4-C-South Carolina, Hurricane Hugo, and Coastal Development-(Continued)

Seventy percent of saw timber in Francis Marion National Forest northeast of Charleston was downed, and over6 billion board feet (12 million cubic meters)4 of pine and hardwood sawtimberwere damaged. The amount of deadand downed wood amounted to 3 times the annual harvest in the State, enough to house virtually all the peopieof West Virginia. The damaged trees are now more susceptible to fire and insect attack.

Agriculture-The agriculture industry suffered over $320 miiiion in damages from sait contamination andhigh winds. immediately after the hurricane, sodium concentrations on some agricultural iands near the coast were120 times the average annual concentration, and signs of sait stress can stiii be found on vegetation in coastaiand tidai areas (30). Further inland, vegetables and orchards were heaviiy damaged by the high winds, and manyfarm structures also sustained damage.

Seafood industry-Of the 316 commercial fishing vesseis iicensed in South Caroiina, 58 (18 percent) weredamaged or destroyed. The totai damage to vessels amwnted to about $3 miilion (85).

Tax receipts-The effects of Hurricane Hugo on South Caroiina’s tax base were mixed. Because a iargenumber of properties were destroyed, short-term reductions in tax collections did occur, but this impact was notsevere. The property tax rate and other fees were temporarily increased in some hard-hit areas after the stormto maintain services and compensate for ioss of some dweliings from the tax roils~ However, many homesdestroyed by Hugo were increased in size when rebuilt, and thus assessed at higher rates than before the storm.About haif of the property loss attributed to Hugo was uninsured, so State income taxcoiiections were negativelyaffected as a resuit of income write-offs from casuaity iosses.

Ironically, because of increased demand on lodging, accommodation tax collections increased foiiowing thestorm. The area also experienced a significant increase in personai income, in part because ofadramatic increasein coastai construction jobs. By the Spring of 1990, neariy 8,000 construction jobs had been added to the State’seconomy, more than offsetting the 6,800 jobs temporarily iost in the twrist industry. As a resuit, income and saiestax collections increased, and the net affect on State tax collections was considered a “wash.” One estimate setthe impact on State tax collection at only $12 miilion, a figure too smaii to conclusively attribute to Hugo (80).

Shoreiine impacts and beach renourishment—Extensive shoreiine erosion was caused by HurricaneHugo. Some of the most noticeable effects inciuded the erosion of the primary dune riige system and the reductionin width and siope of beaches. To repair eroded beaches, the State and severai coastai communities spent over$1.5 miilion on emergency dune scraping, over $7 miilion for the piacementof 1.2 miilion cubic yards (0.9 miiiioncubic meters)e of sand on Grand Strand beaches, and about $1.2 miliion for sand fencing and revegetationbetween North Myrtie Beach and Foliy Beach (44).

Coastai wetiand~ait marshes escaped significant damage from Hurricane Hugo. Primary productivity inthese coastai marshes was virtuaiiy unaffected. The high tide during Hugo’s iandfail may have spared marshesfrom potentiai wave damage. During the months after the storm, some marshes advanced into adjacent forestssuffering from sait damage, iending support to the hypothesis that sizabie storms are capabie of aitering theboundaries between salt marshes and upiand ecosystems (29).

Marine and coastai wiidiif-immediately after the storm, a reduction of sait and oxygen in coastai watersiedtoextensive mortality of sea iife in some areas. Repopulation of most areas occurred within 2 months after thestorm, however, as water quality improved (46). Heavy erosion of nesting areas on barrier isiands during the stormaffected some bird populations, inciuding brown peiicans and royai terns. iniand, wit h the exception of afewareas

4 TO convert board feet to cubic meters, multiply by 0.M2.5 Som taxes are still at the raised levels.

6 TO convert cubic yards to cubic meters, multiply by 0.765.


affeoted by the highest storm surges, heavy wildlife mortality was not noted. Some wildlife in forested areasdamaged by Hugo, however, maybe suppressed for aconsiderabie period beoause damaged forests will requiredeoadesto reoover. Forest species Iikelytobe affected inolude gray squirrels, the redackdd woodpecker, andsome forest songbirds (12). Overall, exoept for coastal forests, the natural environment weathered the storm withlittle long-term damage.

Personal ioase-During the first weeks after Hurricane Hugo, some disaster vktims experienced anxietyand mental disorientation (4). Eight in 10 reported experiencing more than normat depression (57). Althoughthese emotional effects of Hugo decreased with time, other personal losses oould not be restored. These h?cludeiternsdestroyed in the hurricane that, although oflitt!e intrfnsiovalue, had great personal significance toindjvkkmis.

Coastal development isadouble-edged sword in South Caroiinaj asit is in other States. Living nearthecoasthas a strong attraction for many, and as communities grow, bcai revenues increase and public servioes jmprove.However, as people move to ooastal areas, they expose themselves not only to occadmd intense events jikeHurricane Hugo but to more mundane, but stijl potentially costly, risks such as erosion and sea level rise.Hugo-strength storms are rare, but category 2 and 3 hurricanes strike the South Carolina coast about once every7 or 8 years, on average.

SOURCE: MA. Davidson, Exeeutlve Dlreetor, South Carolina Sea Grant Coneortlum, K.H. Duffy, Duffy and Awe&tee, DJ. Smith,Southeast Regional Climate Center, and A. Felts, University of Charfeetoo, pereond eommunicatbn, May 1% 1993.

front-property owners.3 2 Moreover, several *-

undertaken assessments of the issue (45). Elevenings decisions (e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina of these have initiated new public and intergov-Coastal Council) suggested that the State’s finan- ernmental processes (e.g., forming a sea level risecial liability in cases where the dead-zone restric- task force), and 13 States have existing regula-

Figure 4-8-New Zones Established byBeachfront Legislation

tions prevented all reasonable use of a parcel. . .-

tions that are adaptable (or partially adaptable) tocould exceed $100 million. In 1990, the SouthCarolina legislature amended the law, completelyeliminating the dead zone and creating a specialvariance procedure allowing development tooccur even further seaward than the dead zoneunder certain conditions. Despite creating some-what stronger rebuilding restrictions for erosion-contcol devices, the 1990 revisions in many waysrepresent apolitical “retreat horn retreat” (6).

Increasingly, State coastal programs arerequir-ing that local governments prepare hurricane andcoastal-storm recovery and reconstruction plans.North Carolina was the fiist State to impose suchrequirements, but other States have followed suit(e.g., Florida and South Carolina) (34). SomeStates have begun to explicitly incorporate con-

Setbaokline tI1

1 /’

BaselineNo ~

~ construction II 1 zone \I 11 1I 8 1I I I

1 t11 1

I 1

1 I1

1I I

i1

sideration of sea level rise into their programs.Seventeen coastal States have ofilcially recog- SOURCE: T. Beatley, “RiekAlloeatlon Polby in the Coaetal Zone: The

Current Frameworkand Future Direetbne,”eontraetor report we~arednized the problem of sea level rise and have for the Office of Twhnology Aeeeeement, February 1993. . .

32 some IYJ beachfront structures located in the no-construction zone were found to be damaged beYond repti by Hugo.


Box 4-D-The “Maine Approach”

One response to sea level rise that may allow room for wetlands to migrate (see vol. 2, ch. 4), as well asmaximize the human use of the coastal zone at minimum cost, has been implemented by the State of Maine. ThisState has adopted a poticy of allowing development in the coastal zone to continue subject to the constraint thatstructures will have to be abandoned if and when sea level rises enough to t hreaten them (52). Ail new structures,therefore are presumed movable. This so-called “Maine approach” will likely be less expensive than preventingdevelopment because coastal land would remain in use until the sea rises a given amount, whereas restrictingdevelopment prevents the property from being used in the interim even though its inundation maybe decadesaway. The presumption of movability is more flexibte than restricting development because it does not require aspecific estimate of how fast the sea will rise or the shore will retreat or how far into the future one should plan.It also enabtes private real estate markets to discount iand prices according to information on the risk of sea ievelrise.

The Maine approach can be implemented in several ways. Maine has explicitly adopted this policy along itssand dune and wettand shores, with regulations that: 1) prohibit bulkhead construction, 2) explicitly put propertyowners on notice that structures are presumed to be movable, and 3) require property owners to affirmativelydemonstrate their intention toabandonthe property before being granted a permit to erect a structure in any areathat would support wetland vegetation if sea level rises 3 feet (0.9 meters). Although implemented in 1989, theMaine approach has not yet been tested, so it is uncertain how weli the approach will work if sea level rise actuallybecomes a problem. States’ abilities to require or induce private property owners to allow coastal wetiands tomigrate with arising sea wiil hinge on the batance between t he rights of private property owners and public trustdoctrines. if the Federal Government wishes to promote this type of adaptation, it might do so through changesin the Coastal Zone Management Act (P.L. 92-583) when it is reauthorized in 1995.

several other State~”nduding North Caroiina-have impliatly adopted the Maine approach along theocean coast by prohibiting the construction of sea walis while continuing to allow construction of bulkheads alongwettand shores. In some States, a strict interpretation of the common iaw “pubtic trust doctrine” wouid hold thatas the shoreline migrates inland, so do the public rights to use tidelands for access and environmental purposes,inciuding wetlands. Finally, private conservancies can implement this approach by purchasing coastal iands andthen reseiiing them at a slight discount in return for deed restrictions prohibiting bulkheads or requiring that theproperty revert to the conservancy whenever the sea reaches a threshold.

SOURCE: Office of T~nology Assessment, 1993.

future sea level rise (e.g., coastal setbacks, such as more)(45) (see box 4-D). Also, in certain fiontal-those discussed above). Only three, however,have adopted new policies specifically to respondto sea level rise (45).

Under Maine’s Natural Resources ProtectionAct, wetland buffer zones are established toanticipate migration in response to sea level rise.As this zone moves in the future, developmentwithin it must also move (specifically, develop-ment must be relocated or abandoned if waterencroaches on the development for more than a6-month period or if it is damaged 50 percent or

dune areas (where some development is permit-ted), developers are required to build structuresexceeding a certain minimum size to take intoaccount a predicted 3-foot rise in sea levels overthe next 100 years (45).

Some State programs have sought to facilitateand promote landward relocation of structures. Inresponse to rising Great Lake levels, the State ofMichigan created the Emergency Home MovingProgram (EHMP). Under this emergency pro-gram, the State provided loan-interest subsidies to

Chapter 4--Coasts I 193

property owners wishing to relocate lakefrontstructures threatened by erosion (71, 76). Prop-erty owners had a choice of either a 3 percentinterest subsidy on the frost $25,000 of relocationcosts or a one-time grant of $3,500. As acondition of this assistance, property owners hadto move their structures at least 45 feet landward.The State also implemented an Emergency HomeFlood Protection Program, which provided simil-ar subsidies for the elevation of threatenedstructures (71).

Another strategy some States are using is theacquisition of coastal-hazard areas and sensitivelands. State programs, such as Florida’s Preser-

vation 2000 program and California’s CoastalConservancy program, have been very effectiveat protecting wetlands, beaches, and other sensi-tive coastal lands through outright purchases.33

Many State coastal programs also impose someform of real estate disclosure requirement, whichmay be useful in discouraging hazardous devel-opment. Under North Carolina’s program, forexample, an applicant must sign an Areas ofEnvironmental Concern Hazard Notice to ac-knowledge that “he or she is aware of the risksassociated with development in the ocean-hazardarea and of the area’s limited suitability forpermanent structures” (61). Under South Caro-lina’s modified beachfront-management program,similar disclosure provisions are required when aspecial beachfront variance is issued (6).

Building codes and construction standardsrepresent another important component of manyState and local risk-reduction strategies (althoughnot necessarily an explicit component of a State’scoastal program). Coastal structures can be de-signed to better withstand hurricane winds, waves,and storm surges. Building codes may be State-mandated (as in North Carolina) or locallymandated (as in South Carolina) and can varysubstantially in stringency. The Federal CZMAdoes not mandate that States impose building

codes, and, in some 12 coastal States, adoption ofbuilding codes is left as a local option. It is notuncommon for rural areas especially to have noconstruction standards (53).

The stringency of the wind-design standard towhich coastal structures must be built is onevariable in State programs. Under the N.C.Building Code, for instance, construction on theOuter Banks must be designed to withstand windspeeds of 120 miles per hour (mph). Structuresthere must also adhere to fairly stringent pilingand foundation standards (34). The benefits ofNorth Carolina’s standards are illustrated bycomparing damages from Hurricanes Alicia andDiana in Texas and North Carolina, respectively(75). Though the storms were comparable instrength and wind speeds, resulting damages weremuch less in North Carolina. The lower damagesappear to be due in part to North Carolina’smandatory construction standards and to the lackof any control over building in unincorporatedareas of Texas (see ref. 58).

The South Florida Building Code (SFBC) isconsidered one of the strongest prescriptive codesanywhere and similarly mandates a 120-mphwind-speed standard. However, inspections ofdamage from Hurricane Andrew identified sev-eral potential deficiencies in the code, includingpoor performance of roof coverings, poor connec-tion between the roof system and the building,inadequate use of staples to attach plywoodsheathing, and problems with windows and wallsiding (65). Local enforcement and builder-compliance problems were also identified. Al-though a relatively strong code, some have arguedfor even tougher standards given the location,frequency, and potential magnitude of futurestorm events; density of development; and conse-quent greater threat that projectiles torn from onehome will hit other homes. Others argue thattougher enforcement, not stronger standards, isneeded.

33 ~esewation XI(ICI is a l~yeu pro~~ eshblish~ in 1990 with the intent of acquir@ $3 billion of environmentally WXISifie M ova

10 years.


The Federal CZMA, then, has stimulatedconsiderable coastal planning and managementthat may not otherwise have occurred or wouldhave occurred more slowly. Participation has beenhigh, and even the two nonparticipating oceanfrontStates, Texas and Georgia, have been developingprograms (Section 305 funds are now availableagain under the 1990 reauthorization of CZMA).

CZMA has suffered from certain implementa-tion problems, however. First, funding levelshave not changed much since the early 1980s,with annual implementation monies (Section306) staying at about $33 million (89). Given themagnitude of the management tasks, individualState allocations seem modest. Provision ofadditional CZMA monies to States specificallyfor the development, strengthening, and enforce-ment of strong shorefront and hazard-area-management provisions could return benefitsmany fold. Second, the Federal coastal-management program has also historically suf-fered from a lack of clear and uniform perform-ance standards. Some States have aggressivelymanaged and controlled coastal developmentwhereas others have done little. Third, NOAA hasnot applied sanctions to States that do notimplement their adopted and approved programs.Although programs can be “disapproved,” thisaction has never been taken. (On the other hand,the 1990 CZMA amendments now provide for“interim sanctions” if a State is not performingadequately.)

POLICY OPTIONS FOR THEFEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Although some important improvements inmanaging coastal development have been madein recent years, additional improvements arelikely to be needed to forestall unwise develop-ment and to decrease existing vulnerability. Thepotential for sea level rise and more frequentand/or intense storms as a result of climate changeadds to the already significant vulnerability ofboth developed and natural areas in the coastal

zone. The following options for readjusting theexisting incentive structure in coastal areasshould be viewed as a starting point for additionaldiscussion about appropriate changes. These pos-sible changes are summarized in table 4-10.

1 Revamping the National FloodInsurance Program

The NFIP still provides subsidies to a substan-tial number of buildings in high-risk coastal areas.Current NFIP policy has been established byCongress, and Congress could make program andpolicy changes to the NFIP to reduce thesesubsidies and otherwise improve flood-mitigation activities and reduce damages fromcoastal hazards. Several bills suggesting suchchanges have been introduced into the 103dCongress, including S. 1405, the National FloodInsurance Reform Act of 1993, and H.R. 62, theNational Flood Insurance, Compliance, Mitiga-tion, and Erosion Management Act of 1993.Several options discussed below could be incor-porated into these bills as they evolve.

Option 4-1: Raise premium rates for thepolicyholders who receive subsidized flood insur-ance. Despite the gradual increase in rates overthe years, the average yearly premium paid bycoastal property owners remains modest relativeto the risk. The potential for catastrophic futurestorms and sea level rise associated with climatechange suggests that the risks of living near thecoast will be greater in the future. If the availabil-ity of flood insurance is to be maintained, ratesmay need to be raised to reflect these factors.Currently, rates reflect only average annual loss-es; occasional catastrophic losses can be muchhigher than average. Rates might be raised toincorporate an ‘increased cost of reconstruction’benefit into policies.

Option 4-2: Mandate erosion-managementstandards. The current NFIP does not adequatelyaddress long-term erosion trends. One way itcould do so would be to require minimumerosion-management standards. For example,


Table 4-10--FederaI Programs and Laws Influencing Coastal Development:Status and Potential Changes

Federal Key Legislative Existing mitigation Potential changes andprogram provisions basis provisions policy options

National Flood Provides Federal floodInsurance insurance to propertyProgram owners in participating(NFIP) communities

Communities must adoptminimum floodplainmanagementprovisions (e g.,elevation to 100-year-flood level, restrictionsto building in floodway

Disaster Individual and familyassistance grants program

Public-assistance grantson 75-25 cost share

Coastal-barriermanagement

Federal taxbenefits

Coastal zonemanagement

National Flood Minimum floodplain-Insurance Act management standards,

Flood Disaster Upton-Jones relocationProtection Act assistance

Community Rating System1362 flooded properties

purchase program

Stafford Disaster Mitigation grants programRelief and Section 409 StateEmergency mitigation plan required.Assistance Act

— —Withdraws Federal Coastal Barrier

subsidies for new Resources Actdevelopment in (COBRA)designated CoastalBarrier ResourcesSystem (C BRS);prohibits issuance ofnew flood insurance,post-disasterassistance, and otherdevelopment funds,

Casualty-loss deduction, U S Tax CodeInterest and property tax

deductions for secondhomes.

Accelerated depreciationfor seasonal rentalproperties.

Federal funds and Coastal Zonetechnical assistance Management Actfor developing and (CZMA)implementing Statecoastal-managementplans (cost-sharebasis).

Adjust premium ratesMandate erosion-

management standards.Curtail insurance for high-

risk, repetitive-lossproperties,

Prohibit new insurance inrisky locations.

Incorporate sea level rise inmapping and ratestructure

Expand relocationassistance

Reduce Federal share forpublic assistance

Require more stringentmitigation

Impose ability-to-paystandard

Eliminate public-assistancefunds altogether,

Review criteria for declaringdisasters.

Further limit subsidies.Expand coverage to other

sensitive lands.Promote State coastal barrier

resource acts.Acquire undeveloped areas

Eliminate or reduce taxbenefits for coastaldevelopment

Create tax deductions tosupport mitigation.

State coastal-management Mandate strongerplans (e.g., ocean-front development controls.setbacks, land Expand resources availableacquisition, construction to coastal States.standards, post-stormreconstructionstandards).


Table 4-10--Federal Programs and Laws Influencing Coastal Development:Status and Potential Changes--( Continued)

Federal Key Legislative Existing mitigation Potential changes andprogram provisions basis provisions policy options

Beach Provision of funding andrenourishment technical assistanceand shore for beach-protection renourishment and

shore-protectionprojects.

Federal cost share from55 to 90 percent

Federal Restricts discharge ofwetland dredge and fillprotection materials into U.S.

waters.

Federal FloodControl Acts (of1917, 1936, 1945,1955, 1968; for adetailed review ofthese, see ref. 71)

Section 404 of theClean Water Act

Discourage permanentshoreline stabilization.

Increase State and localcontribution.

Phase out Federal funding ofbeach renourishment.

Condition funding onminimum State and localcoastal management.

Section 404 (b)(l) Tighten regulatory control inguidelines, and U.S. Section 404 permit review,Army Corps of Incorporate sea level rise intoEngineers public-interest wetland managementreview. decisions.

Explore use of transferabledevelopment rights.

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1993

minimum State or local erosion setbacks could berequired as a condition of participation in theNFIP (see also option 4.18, below). Alternatively,communities could be penalized for failure toadopt minimum setbacks-for example, by mak-ing them ineligible for mitigation and relocationassistance, by raising insurance premiums, or byreducing future claims in 10-year erosion zones.Erosion-based setbacks, such as these in NorthCarolina, represent models, although the timeframes used for calculating the setback could beexpanded. Where lot depths or project designsallow, more extensive setbacks could be encour-aged or required, for example. Another option foraddressing erosion would be to factor long-termerosion trends into the premium rate structure forexisting and future policyholders.

A precursor for improved erosion managementis identifying and mapping erosion risks. Propertyowners are not anxious to have such risksidentified due to potential adverse effects onhousing values, but construction in erosion zonesis risky and potentially costly to the FederalGovernment as well as to both present and futureproperty owners. The Federa1 Insurance Adminis-tration is currently working, on guidelines and

standards for mapping erosion zones, but Con-gress needs to give the agency the authority tobegin mapping.

Option 4-3: Prohibit new insurance policies inrisky locations. NFIP could take several actions toreduce its long-term insurance liability and tobring the program more in line with the risk-averse philosophy of private-sector insurers. Itcould acknowledge that development in certainlocations is extremely risky and prohibit all newinsurance policies in these locations. In particular,the program could be changed so that no newinsurance would be issued in V zones or inhigh-risk erosion zones (e.g., within a 10-yearerosion zone). H.R. 1236, introduced in the 102dCongress, contained language prohibiting all newflood-insurance policies for development sea-ward of the 30-year erosion line. Eventuallyeliminating new insurance within the 50-yearerosion zone might also be considered.

A downside of this option is that it would limitthe number of people paying into the fund. Also,those who insisted on building without floodinsurance might still be helped by disaster reliefafter a major disaster but would have contributednothing in the way of insurance premiums.


Option 4-4: Increase insurance premiumsafter each claim on properties subject to multiple-flooding claims. Current NFIP regulations do notsubstantially restrict how often a homeowner mayrebuild after a loss, even if a future loss can bereasonably foreseen. By tying insurance premi-ums in high-risk areas to the number of losses aproperty has sustained, homeowners will havemore incentive to consider coastal hazards inrebuilding decisions. Congress could also con-sider establishing a limit on the number of claims

permissible before insurance is terminated (e.g.,just as an automobile-insurance company mightterminate a policy in the event of multipleaccidents).

Option 4-5: Incorporate sea level rise into theNFIP mapping and rate structure. As discussedin earlier sections, future sea level rise may serveto substantially increase the size of the coastalzone subject to inundation and flooding in thefuture. The current NFIP mapping and ratestructure does not take this into account, in partbecause FEMA contends that a 12-inch rise in sealevel would not significantly affect the ability ofthe rating system to respond (21). Incorporationof even conservative estimates of sea level riseinto FEMA maps might serve to discourage futuredevelopment in these areas and put coastalcommunities and property owners on notice aboutsuch future risks. Development that does occur inthese areas would be subject to certain minimumflood-management standards (e.g., elevation re-quirements). A means of accomplishing essen-tially the same goal may be to update floodplainmaps more frequently. More-frequent updateswould reflect changes related to sea level rise aswell as those related to recent development. FIAmaps are currently updated, on average, only onceevery 9 years. FIA’s own goal for revisions isonce every 5 years. More frequent updates wouldrequire more staff and additional funds.

Option 4-6: Expand relocation assistance.FEMA and NFIP could substantially expand theemphasis given to relocation assistance. Theexisting Section 1362 and Upton-Jones programs

represent good strategies but are underused andunderfunded. Section 1362, or something like it,could be expanded and funding could be in-creased. Efforts could be made to expand the useof Upton-Jones, as well, and to promote reloca-tion as an alternative over demolition. Amongpossible improvements to Upton-Jones that couldbe considered are: 1) requiring relocation outsidehigh-risk locations (e.g., landward of the 30-yearerosion line), not simply making future insuranceconditional on such relocation, and 2) expandingeligibility beyond the currently narrow definitiono f imminent collapse.

Incentives to relocate could be made strongerby modifying the ways in which NFIP treatsstructures that are at risk because of erosion.Requiring higher premiums for structures sea-ward of certain erosion zones (e.g., the 30-yearerosion line) would create financial incentives torelocate. Cutting off insurance to structures withina zone of imminent collapse (e.g., within the 10-or 5-year erosion line) after a certain period oftime (e.g., 2 years after a chosen date) may havea similar effect, but property owners whosehomes were subsequently destroyed could stillclaim casualty-loss deductions, thus offsettingother Federal tax liabilities.

The Federal Government may also wish to helpStates develop their own more-extensive relocation-assistance programs. Just as the Federal Gover-nment has helped States establish revolving fundsto f inance improvements in local sewage-treatment plants (see ch. 5), so also could theFederal Government help States establish coastal-relocation revolving funds.

Under the Clean Water Act P.L. 92-500), theFederal Government has encouraged creation ofState wastewater revolving funds through theprovision of start-up capitalization grants. Onceestablished, States then allow local governmentsto borrow funds for the construction of newwastewater treatment facilities or the improvem-ent and upgrading of existing facilities. Loansare provided at interest rates at or below fairmarket (depending on factors such as a commu-


nity’s financial circumstances and the severity ofthe water-quality problem). In the case of Vir-ginia’s Water Facilities Loan Fund, annual pay-ments back to the fund are required, and fullrepayment of loans must occur within 20 years(e.g., see ref. 92). Thus, annual repayment byborrowers ensures a steady pool of funds avail-able for new loans.

Such revolving funds could be similarly usefulin providing grants to assist private propertyowners in locating and purchasing alternativecoastal or noncoastal sites. State revolving fundsmight be used to purchase relocation sites inadvance, later making them available to beach-front-property owners needing to relocate. Prop-erty owners could then be asked to repay the fundfor these acquisition costs, perhaps at below-market rates.

Such a fund could also be useful in purchasingdamaged properties after a hurricane or majorstorm event, in turn selling or relinquishing theselands to local governments for needed beach-access points and public recreational areas. Inrare cases, land swaps may be possible, allowinga beachfront-property owner to trade for a State-acquired relocation lot further inland.

States could also be required to consider andincorporate relocation strategies and programs inthe hazard-mitigation plans required by Section409 of the Stafford Act (71). Relocation pro-grams could be a minimum-requirement compo-nent of State 409 plans.

I Revamping Disaster AssistanceThe existing disaster-assistance framework could

be modified in several ways to reduce incentivesfor hazardous and costly coastal developmentpatterns, including the following.

option 4-7: Reduce the Federal share ofpublic assistance. Typically, the Federal Gover-nment share of disaster-assistance funds for Statesand communities has been 75 percent. In somerecent cases, the Federal Government has pro-vided 100 percent of the disaster-assistance mo-

nies. Although it is difficult to specify what theFederal share of such assistance ought to be, veryhigh levels of assistance are probably a disincen-tive to improving State and local disaster mitigat-ion. Unsuccessful efforts have been made in thepast to reduce the Federal share to no more than50 percent. Cost-sharing proportions havechanged in other areas, however. For example,the Federal share of water-resources-develop-ment studies has been reduced from 100 to 50percent in recent years in a successful effort tomotivate more thoughtful State consideration ofwater projects (see ch. 5).

Option 4-8: Tie disaster assistance morestrongly to State and local hazard-reductionprograms. The mitigation provisions and require-ments currently included under the Stafford Actare already strong. However, a shortcoming maybe that FEMA does not force States and localitiesto adopt mitigation (e.g., a dune-protection ordi-nance) as a condition of disaster assistance.FEMA rarely withholds disaster-assistance fundsfrom States that fail to adopt or implementmitigation measures. Most States prepare Sec-tion 409 mitigation plans, but there is generally nomechanism for requiring or ensuring that Statesimplement the plans. Thus, FEMA could adopt amore stringent view of mitigation, more clearlyand aggressively tying disaster-assistance fundsto tangible, long-term hazard-reduction policies,programs, and actions.

It may also be useful to establish some clearersystem for judging State accountability for Sec-tion 409 progress. States could be required tomore clearly indicate the mitigation actions theyagree to adopt and implement within a specifiedtime frame (e.g., adopting a shoreline setbackrequirement). Although politically difficult in theface of a disaster, the Federal Government couldspecify that subsequent Federal disaster assist-ance would not be provided where the plan hasnot been implemented. Alternatively, subsequentassistance could be limited, for example, to nomore than 50 percent of otherwise eligible fund-ing, or States could be required to repay disaster

.—-.

assistance if mitigation measures are not adoptedwithin a specified period.

FEMA could try to establish a system forcertifying that State 409 plans meet a minimummitigation threshold, that is, that they containactions and policies sufficient to bring about asubstantial degree of long-term risk reduction.For example, coastal States could be required toadopt a building code (or mandate local adoption)and to ensure that an adequate system of imple-mentation and enforcement will exist. Suchminimum construction standards (perhaps one ofseveral standard codes) could be made a conditionof participation in the NFIP, or of receivingfunding under CZMA. The Federal Governmentcould also consider raising national wind stan-dards for mobile homes.

Option 4-9: Consider ability to pay and extentof damages. The existing disaster-assistance frame-work fails to explicitly consider the ability ofaffected localities and States to assume disasterlosses, or the extent of damage actually incurred.Once a disaster area is designated, all localitiesare eligible for disaster assistance regardless ofthe extent or size of damage incurred. MuchFederal disaster assistance is provided in smallamounts to numerous localities--damage levelsthat could clearly be covered by local gover-nments. Furthermore, certain localities (andStates) are wealthier and have a greater capacityto pay for and assume the costs of hurricanes andother disasters. FEMA has proposed a $2.50 percapita threshold for costs per disaster to determinewhen local resources are adequate and whenFederal funds are not necessary or appropriate.Survey data indicate that most local governmentscould easily cope with this level of loss and thata sizable proportion of governments could copelocally with per capita losses of $14 or more (11).A threshold provision would act as a kind ofdisaster “deductible,” and Federal resourceswould kick in only after it is reached. Such asystem would further contribute to greater ac-countability of local and State governments for


their decisions and to greater equity in thedisaster-assistance system overall.

Option 4-10: Eliminate public-assistance funds.Although not very feasible politically, certaincategories of disaster assistance could be elimin-ated. Although the public generally supports therole of the Federal Government in assistingindividuals and families in recovery and rebuild-ing, this “helping” sentiment may not be asstrong when it comes to helping States andlocalities rebuild boardwalks or local streets. Onepossibility would be to develop alternatives tooutright grants, including creating a Federalpublic-assistance-loan program. If local gover-nments need to borrow funds to rebuild sewersystems, roads, and recreational amenities, thiskind of program would make such funds availablebut subject to repayment with interest. Loanscould be offered at below-market interest rates.Such an arrangement may result in more cautiouslocal and State investment policies. Anotherpossibility might be to develop some type ofinsurance fund for local governments.

Option 4-11: Through oversight hearings,Congress could review the criteria used by thePresident to declare disasters. One question thatcould be investigated is whether existing criteriaare too generous in situations that are not majordisasters.

H Extending and Expanding the CoastalBarrier Resources Act (COBRA)

Although withdrawal of Federal subsidies frombarrier-island development clearly will not stopsuch development, it has been shown to slow it.Moreover, this approach is sensible from theperspective of taxpayer equity: if developers andcoastal property owners choose to build inhigh-risk locations, at least the general publicwould not have to pay for it. The COBRA exper-ience is positive, but efforts could be made toexpand its coverage and strengthen its provisions.

option 4-12: Further limit subsidies. As notedearlier, COBRA does not eliminate all Federal


subsidies. Important remaining subsidies includethe casualty-loss deduction under the U.S. TaxCode, Federal block grants., and grants and loansfrom federally insured banks. COBRA could bestrengthened, and coastal development on desig-nated units further discouraged, by eliminatingthese remaining subsidies. CoBRA could also bemodified to prohibit Federal subsidy of projectsand expenditures that, although technically out-side the Coastal Barrier Resources System, serveto directly encourage or facilitate development(e.g., construction of a bridge).

Option 4-13: Expand coverage to other sensi-tive lands. Consideration should also be given toexpanding the kinds of lands to which Federalsubsidies are limited, including other sensitivecoastal areas besides barrier islands. These couldinclude coastal wetlands (and wetland bufferzones), estuarine shorelines, critical wildlife habi-tat, and Other areas (see vol. 2, ch. 4). Substantialresource-management benefits could result fromthe “CoBRA-cizing” of other sensitive lands.Also, efforts to expand the CBRS to the PacificCoast, although currently meeting some resis-tance, could be continued.

Option 4-14: Encourage the development ofState COBRAS. Florida is one State that hasimposed certain limitations on future State invest-ments in high-risk coastal areas, but few otherStates have such restrictions. One way the FederalGovernment could encourage development ofCoBRAS in other States and reinforce the effectsof Federal limitations is to require as an elementof State coastal-zone-management plans thatStates consider the circumstances under whichrestrictions on State investments in coastal areasmight be appropriate. Restrictions on expendi-tures for State roads and bridges might beconsidered, for example. This change could beimplemented when CZMA is reauthorized in1995.

Option 4-15: Acquire undeveloped areas.Although COBRA has been able to slow develop-ment of barrier islands, studies by the U.S.General Accounting Office and others illustrate

that development will likely continue in manyplaces despite withdrawal of Federal subsidies(88). Consequently, consideration should be given,as suggested by GAO and others, to acquiringmany of the remaining undeveloped barrier-island units.

Acquisition now, though costly, may be cost-effective in the long run. Acquisition is especiallywarranted for barrier-island units of special eco-logical importance (e.g., those that contain endan-gered species habitat) and in areas that couldprovide important public-recreation benefits. Ac-quisition could be encouraged at Federal, State,and local levels, and in concert with privateconservation groups and land trusts. At theFederal level, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serviceis the logical agency to spearhead such acquisi-tion (see also vol. 2, chs. 4 and 5).

9 Revamping the U.S. Tax CodeAs discussed in earlier sections, the U.S. Tax

Code offers several major subsidies for coastaldevelopment, including casualty-loss deductionsfor damage from hurricanes and storms, deprecia-tion tax shelters for seasonal rental properties, anddeductibility of mortgage interest and propertytaxes for second homes. The actual effect of thesetax benefits is difficult to determine. They dorepresent another major category of public sub-sidy of coastal development.

Option 4-16: Eliminate or reduce tax benefitsfor coastal development. For example, the casu-alty-loss deduction (that is, the deduction forlosses in excess of insurance coverage) could beeliminated altogether for risks peculiar to thecoastal zone, or restricted only to damages thatoccur to a principal residence (see ref. 71).

Option 4-17: Modify the Tax Code to supportand encourage mitigation. This could be accom-plished, for instance, by providing a tax deductionfor home improvements intended to mitigatestorm damages or for expenses associated withrelocation (including purchase of a relocation lot).

—


M Strengthening State and LocalCoastal Management

Generally, coastal States and localities are inthe best position to manage and control coastaldevelopment. Also, efforts to impose land-useplanning or land-use controls at the Federal levelhave met with great skepticism and politicalopposition at the State level. On the other hand,the Federal CZMA has been successful in moti-vating improvements in coastal planning andmanagement since it was passed more than twodecades ago. Significantly, the 1990 amendmentsto the CZMA recognized for the first time thepotential importance of climate change and sealevel rise and called for coastal States to antici-pate and plan for these possibilities. CZMA couldbe further modified and reinforced, when reau-thorized in 1995, to promote greater risk reduc-tion and more sensible land-development patterns.

Option 4-18: Mandate certain specific--andstronger+ minimum development controls. Thesecould include, for instance, an erosion-setbackprogram (already adopted by several States),restrictions on construction of immovable build-ings, a relocation-assistance program and restric-tions on rebuilding damaged or destroyed struc-tures in high-risk locations, and adoption ofminimum coastal-construction standards. MajorFederal financial subsidies could be accompaniedby the adoption of certain minimum risk-reduction measures. Minimum measures couldalso include wetland protection (possibly includ-ing protection of buffer and migration areas-seevol. 2, ch. 4) and minimum consideration of sealevel rise in coastal programs.

The CZMA program could also be adjusted tocreate financial incentives to undertake additionalrisk-reduction measures. The current coastal-zone-enhancement grants program (Section 309) repre-sents a movement in this direction and doesinclude, as areas eligible for funding, manage-ment and protection of coastal wetlands andmanagement of natural hazards (including sea

level rise). More comprehensively, a “coastal-hazards-management program’ could be requiredas a component of State CZM programs. Such aprogram might be modeled after the non-point-source-pollution-management program that par-ticipating coastal States were required to developunder the 1990 CZMA amendments. EPA andNOAA together oversee this program and jointlyapprove the State programs. A similar arrange-ment could be created with NOAA and FEMA.

Option 4-19: Expand available resources. Thecurrent level of funding provided to coastal Statesis meager at best. Annual appropriations for Stateprogram implementation (Section 306 funds)have remained around $33 million, despite thefact that the magnitude of coastal-managementproblems is increasing. Also, since the number ofStates participating in the CZM program hasincreased, funding available per State has de-creased. Adequate funding is needed to imple-ment State regulatory and development provi-sions (e.g., setback requirements) and to facilitatelocal coastal planning. Additional funding ear-marked for State actions and programs that reducecoastal risks could also be provided. Funding forsuch coastal-planning activities could be a cost-effective expenditure that can serve to reducelong-term risks, as well as to better protect coastalenvironmental resources.

The Federal Government could also, to theextent possible, help to facilitate the developmentand implementation of State land-acquisitionprograms. Programs such as Florida’s Conserva-tion and Recreation Lands (CARL) program andCalifornia’s Coastal Conservancy represent someof the most effective and sensible strategies forprotecting wetlands, barriers, and other sensitivecoastal lands and for preventing future exposureof people and property to coastal risks. TheFederal Government could facilitate such pro-grams by providing technical assistance and seedmonies for State acquisition funds.


1 Shoreline Protection andBeach-Nourishment Programs

Significant subsidies to coastal developmenthave also occurred through the programs andactivities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,including construction of shoreline-stabilizationstructures and funding of beach-nourishmentprojects.

Option 4-20: Discourage permanent shorelinestabilization where feasible. Several States havetaken the lead in banning permanent shore-hardening structures such as sea walls and groins.Such Projects are costly and may actually increasedevelopment pressures. The Corps (or Congress)could develop a long-term coastal-managementstrategy that explicitly discourages the use ofsuch hard shoreline techniques, except whereabsolutely necessary. Priority could be given tobeach renourishment and approaches that are lessenvironmentally damaging.

Option 4-21: Increase State and local contri-butions and phase out Federal finding of beach-renourishment projects. Concurrently, States couldbe encouraged to ensure that a substantial portionof renourishment costs are borne by beach-frontcommunities and property owners. Ideally, theproperty owners and businesses directly benefit-ing from these investments would bear the lion’sshare of their costs. Renourishment can legiti-mately be considered a maintenance cost and,therefore, not eligible for Federal funding. Ear-marking local revenue sources, such as special tax(renourishment) districts, a dedicated sales tax, ora tourist tax, could be encouraged.

As an alternative, Federal funding could beeliminated entirely (or phased out over time), andperhaps replaced with Federal seed monies forStates to establish revolving-fund renourishmentprograms. An approach could be taken similar tothat used for Federal funding of sewage treatmentplants under the Clean Water Act (see ch. 5).

Option 4-22: Make the Federal proportion offunding for renourishment projects conditionalon adoption of certain State and local coastal-

management initiatives. These could include, forexample, setback requirements, post-disaster re-strictions, and relocation assistance.

I Strengthening Wetland ProtectionThe Federal Government currently exercises

substantial regulatory and management controlover coastal wetlands. The existing programs,principally Section 404 of the Clean Water Act,jointly implemented by the Army Corps ofEngineers and EPA, could be further strengthenedto take into account future sea level rise and tobetter guard against destruction by coastal-development pressures. OTA’S options for im-proving wetland protection are discussed mvolume 2, chapter 4.

FIRST STEPSWith or without climate change, average an-

nual property damage in the coastal zone isexpected to continue increasing (78). People willcontinue to move into and develop hazard-proneareas. As previously noted, for example, thedamage-causing potential of hurricanes is muchgreater now in many coastal areas than it wasseveral decades ago. This greater threat is attribut-able mostly to the fact that the coastal zone hasbecome more intensively developed. Moreover,this development trend shows no sign of abating.Thus, coastal hazards are not just the result ofuncontrollable natural phenomena. Rather, thegrowing coastal population both contributes toand modifies such hazards.

We suggest in this chapter that improvementscan be made in allocating and managing risk incoastal areas. However, given current demo-graphic trends, the longer the Nation waits toaddress the shortcomings of current policies, themore difficult and expensive coping with futuredisasters will be. There is no need to wait forunequivocal information about the nature ofclimate change; acting now to mitigate coastalhazards through implementation of prudent poli-cies is likely to save both the public and private


sectors substantial sums in the coming decades, aswell as save lives and natural areas and improvethe quality of coastal living. When climate changeis considered, however, with its potential foraccelerated sea level rise and the possibility ofmore-intense or more-frequent storms, the casefor strengthening existing policies is even morecompelling.

Implementation of some or all of the optionsconsidered in this chapter could help send clearersignals to residents, potential residents, busi-nesses, and visitors of coastal areas about thenature of coastal risks and the costs associatedwith those risks. Many of the options suggested inthis chapter would also promote the flexibilityand efficiency needed for adapting to a changingclimate. Several bills now before the 103d Con-gress and some upcoming reauthorizations ofexisting laws could provide excellent “targets ofopportunity” for implementing some of theseoptions.

■ Revamp the National Flood InsuranceProgram. Congress has been consideringrevamping the National Flood InsuranceProgram for several years, and bills to do thishave been introduced in both the House andSenate. S. 1405, the National Flood Insur-ance Reform Act of 1993, and H.R. 62, theNational Flood Insurance Compliance, Miti-gation, and Erosion Management Act of1993, contain provisions that partially ad-dress some of the NFIP options presented inthis chapter (e.g., erosion management, relo-cation assistance, repetitive losses, and in-surance for risky locations). As these billsevolve, other options in this chapter could beincorporated.

■ Improve disaster assistance. Several billshave also been introduced in the 103dCongress to revise disaster-assistance poli-cies and regulations. OTA’S disaster-assistance options could be incorporatedinto these evolving bills. H.R. 935, theEarthquake, Volcanic Eruption, and Hurri-cane Hazards Insurance Act of 1993, for

example, would establish minimum criteriafor reducing losses, recommends such meas-ures as fiscal incentives to reduce losses,provides for low-interest loans or grants toretrofit facilities vulnerable to hurricanes,and provides guidelines for establishingactuarial premium rates for disaster insur-ance. S. 995, the Federal Disaster Prepared-ness and Response Act of 1993, wouldestablish, among other things, a grant pro-gram and accompanying performance stan-dards to help States prepare for, respond to,and recover from major disasters.

■ Strengthen coastal zone management. TheCoastal Zone Management Act will be up forreauthorization in 1995. OTA’s coastal-zone-management options could be included inreauthorization legislation at that time. Inparticular, mandating that States adopt cost-effective risk-reduction measures as part oftheir CZM programs would help reducefuture vulnerability to climate change. Also,the reauthorization process would be anappropriate time to consider whether acoastal-hazards-management programshould be required as a component of StateCZM programs. With oversight by NOAAand FEMA, such a program could helpimprove coordination among governmentagencies as well as help reduce the risk ofliving in the coastal zone.

■ Promote public education. The publicgenerally is not well-informed about therisks associated with living in coastal areas,and this lack of awareness has led and willlead to large and unnecessary public andprivate expenditures. Timely public educa-tion about erosion, sea level rise, floodingrisks, and building codes, for example, couldbe a cost-effective means of reducing futurerisk as well as future expenditures. This“first step” does not appear in any of theoptions presented earlier in this chapter;however, education is equal in importance toall of the programs discussed here. H.R. 935,


the Earthquake, Volcanic Eruption, and Hurri-cane Hazards Insurance Act of 1993, pro-vides one possibility for expanding publiceducation. The act authorizes educationprograms and provides States the fimds withwhich to implement them through the estab-lishment of a self-sustaining mitigation fired(Section 104). The private sector, and inparticular, the private insurance industry,could also play an important role in increas-ing awareness of coastal hazards.

■ Require increased State and local contri-butions to beach-nourishment operations.Most benefits of the Army Corps of Engi-neers’ beach-nourishment and shoreline-protection projects are realized at the local orregional level, yet these projects are oftenheavily subsidized. In most instances theFederal share is 65 percent. Greater State andlocal contributions could be required, bothfor initial construction and for maintenance,

tional on adoption of stronger mitigationmeasures.

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COASTS-FIRST STEPS

m Revamp the National Flood Insurance Program-Direct FEMA to identify and map non-flood-related erosion zones.+Aandate erosion-management standards.

E Improve disaster assk?tance—Require States and localities to adopt mitigation measures as a oondltion of disaster assistance.—Review and, if necessary, revise the criteria used by the President to declare disasters.

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——

Status■ Competition for high-quality water is increasing due to popula-

tion grow@ concerns for the environment, and assertion of newwater rights.

■ Significant water-quality problems; urban water infrastructureaging; ground water overdraft is a problem in some areas.

Climate Change Problem■ Changes in water availability could add stress to already strew-

ed systems.■ Changes in the frequency, duration, or intensity of floods and

droughts could occur.

What Is Most Vulnerable?■ Parts of the Nation already experiencing considerable stress (e.g.,

many parts of the Southwest and South Florida).■ Areas where competition for water is expected to increase.■ The central part of the United States, which many scientists

expect to become hotter and drier.

Impediments■ Rigid and inefficient institutions.■ Fragmented and uncoordinated management.= Traditional engineering solutions less acceptable economically

and environmentally.

Types of Responses■ Promote contingency planning for floods and droughts.■ Improve supply management (e.g., by improve coordination,

using ground and surface water conjunctively, improving reser-voir and reservoir-system management).

■ Facilitate water marketing and other transfers.- Promote use of new analytical tools.■ Improve demand management (e.g., pricing reform and conser-

vation).■ Augment supplies (e.g., by adding reservoirs and building

desalination plants).

Water 5

I 209


OVERVIEWFresh water is an integral element of all the

systems discussed in this two-volume report. Itsabundance, location, and seasonal distribution axeclosely linked to climate, and this link has hadmuch to do with where cities have flourished,how agriculture has developed, and what floraand fauna inhabit a region. The potential forclimate change to affect, first, the current status ofthe Nation’s water resources and, second, thosesystems that depend on water, is of considerablelong-term importance. Exactly how climatechange will affect water resources, especiallyregionally, is still unknown. Although it isunlikely that the droughts, floods, and hurricanesthat have been so much a part of the news in thepast few years can be linked to a changingclimate, they illustrate the kind of extreme eventsthat climate change may make more common inthe future.

Climate change, then, is an additional factor toconsider in water resource planning. A variety ofother factors is clearly straining the Nation’swater resources and leading to increased competi-tion among a wide variety of different uses andusers of water. Human needs for water areincreasingly in conflict with the needs of naturalecosystems. The stress is particularly obvious inthe West, where a high percentage of availablesupplies has already been developed in someareas, but examples of conflict among uses forscarce, high-quality water occur throughout thecountry.

The Nation faces a considerable challenge inadapting its water resource systems to thesenumerous current and potential stresses. Amongother things,

Traditional engineering solutions for devel-oping additional supplies have become lessacceptable.Many institutions are ill-designed to copewith scarcity in water resources.Few incentives exist to conserve water.Responsibilities among Federal agencies oftenoverlap or conflict.

Coordination between levels of governmentcan be inadequate.Flood- and drought-related costs amount tohundreds of millions of dollars each year andcontinue to increase.

Major changes are occurring in the way waterresource problems are addressed. The manage-ment of existing resources is taking on increasingimportance as the potential for developing newsupplies declines. Similarly, reallocating waterthrough markets from lower- to higher-valueduses is becoming more common. Promisingpractices beginning to be used include conserva-tion, pricing reform, resenvoir-system manage-ment, marketing and transfers, conjunctive man-agement of ground and surface water, wastewaterreclamation, and river basin planning. Thesepractices promote greater flexibility and/or effi-ciency in water resource management which willhelp enable water resource systems to cope withuncertainty and adapt to any climate change.Necessary improvements in the management ofwater resources do not, however, come easily:proposed changes often create losers as well aswinners, so many politically sensitive debates canbe expected.

Stresses on water resources are most acute andvisible during extreme events such as floods anddroughts. The Nation’s approaches to dealingwith such events have generally proven to beunsatisfactory and expensive. Policies that im-prove the ability to cope flexibly and efficientlywith floods and droughts would be valuable nowand would help prepare the Nation for a less-certain future. It is difficult to know whether therecent 6 years of drought in the western UnitedStates are a rare but possible outcome of naturalclimate variability, an early indication of climatechange, or a return to the average climate after along, particularly wet spell. Longer climate re-cords are needed to distinguish among thesevarious possibilities. Regardless of the cause ofrecent droughts, improving plarnning for andmanagement of extreme events should be a highpriority for the Federal Government.

—

Chapter 5-Water I 211

Figure %1—Water Withdrawals and Consumption In the Coterminous United States, 1985a

Withdrawals Consumption Return flows

79Evaporation

2765

Precipitation4200

Domestic/commerciai 39

Withdrawals

Surface/ 339 Return flow

groundwaterflows1435 Instream/subsurface use Surface/

1096 groundwaterflow to oceans

1343a Mil[ons of gallons per day; to convert gallons to liters, multiply by 3.785.

SOURCE: Adapted from W. Solley, R. Pierce, and H. Perlman, Estimated Use of Water the United States in1990, USGS Survey Circular 1081

212 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat--Volume

dependent on water (e.g., fishing and sailing) orenhanced by it (e.g., camping),4 and the demandfor water-related recreation is growing (79).Substantial amounts of water are used for coolingfossil fuel and nuclear power plants. Finally,water dilutes and/or helps carry away pollu-tion that either intentionally or unintentionallyreaches the Nation’s rivers, lakes, and estuaries.

Throughout the country, stress on water sup-plies is increasing, and many of the uses for waterare being (or could eventually be) affected in oneor more regions. The increasing stress is espe-cially obvious in arid and semiarid parts of thecountry where water is not abundant, but is alsoapparent in many nonarid areas as well. Popula-tion growth in some areas has stimulated in-creased demand for water and has been ultimatelyresponsible for many water-quality problems,groundwater overdraft, and saltwater intrusioninto some freshwater aquifers.

Additionally, groups whose water rights werenot previously represented or asserted are begin-ning to compete for water with traditional users.In particular, as more water is diverted fromstreams for human purposes, concern has grownabout the need to reserve water for environmentalpurposes. Several States now recognize rights toinstream flow (i.e., rights to retain water in thestream channel) or have minimum-flow require-ments to protect fish and wildlife, and water leftin streams is no longer considered wasted. Simil-arly, entities such as American Indian tribes,whose water rights have been inadequately recog-nized in the past, are beginning to claim theirrights. In many cases, unused Indian water rightsare senior to the rights of those who now divert thewater. The new competitors, plus a growingpopulation, will all draw from the same basicallyfixed supply of water.

Many of the Nation’s water institutions (e.g.,doctrines, laws, admini strative procedures, andcompacts), first established when water use was

1

low, are proving unable tocompetition amid greaterparticular, many existing

cope with increasing

relative scarcity. Ininstitutions lack the

flexibility required to ease adjustment to chang-ing circumstances. Finally, much of the Nation’swater infrastructure is aging. High leakagerates, for example, are common in urban watersystems, and many of the country’s reservoirsneed reconditioning.

Climate change cannot yet be counted amongthe reasons water resource systems are understress. Moreover, demographic and technologicalchanges are likely to have a greater effect on watermanagement in the near term than climate change.However, climate change does have the potentialto seriously affect some water supplies, furtherstressing already stressed water resource systems.

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF A WARMERCLIMATE ON WATER RESOURCE SYSTEMS

The hydrological cycle, depicted in figure2-12, traces the cycling of water in the oceans,atmosphere, land and vegetation, and ice caps andglaciers. Exchanges of water among these ele-ments occur through precipitation, evapotranspi-ration, and stream and groundwater flow. Thehydrological cycle has an important role in theglobal climate system and both affects climateand is affected by it (8).

Most scientists agree that global warming willintensify the hydrological cycle (31). The in-crease in global average temperatures anticipatedfor a doubling of greenhouse gasess could in-crease average global precipitation from 7 to 15percent and evapotranspiration between 5 and 10percent (62). Increases in temperature, precipita-tion, and evapotranspiration would, in turn, affectstream runoff and soil moisture, both very impor-tant to human and natural systems. Averageglobal runoff would be expected to increase, butgeneral circulation models (GCMS) do not relia-

4 The f- is a combined one for fnxh and salt water.

5 Most stimtits -t 1.5d4.5‘C (2.7 and 8.2 OF) ss thcrange for an “effective COZ doubling” (32); see chapter 2 for more diSCUSSiO~

Chapter 5--Water I 213

bly predict how much (62). Certain modelspredict that precipitation will increase in someregions, whereas others suggest it will decrease(48). The range (and therefore the uncertainty) inthe models’ predictions of soil moisture andrunoff is even greater than it is for precipitation(34).

Most important to water resource planners ishow global warming will affect key variablesregionally. A variety of factors, including localeffects of mountains, coastlines, lakes, vegetationboundaries, and heterogeneous soil, is importantin determining regional climate. Currently, GCMScannot resolve factors this small because the gridthey use-blocks of 155 to 620 square miles-istoo large (80).

Climate modelers generally agree that a firstlikely consequence of climate change is thatprecipitation will increase at high latitudes anddecrease at low to middle latitudes (where thewater-holding capacity of the atmosphere will belargest (18)). Thus, in the midcontinent areas,especially in summer, evapotranspiration couldexceed precipitation, and soil moisture and runoffwould decrease. The potential for more-intense orlonger-lasting droughts would, therefore, increase(58).

A second likely consequence is changes in thetype and timing of runoff. Snowmelt is animportant source of runoff in most mountainousareas. Warmer temperatures in such areas wouldcause a larger proportion of winter precipitationthat now falls as snow to fall as rain. Thus, theproportion of winter precipitation stored in moun-tain snowpacks would decrease. Winter runoffwould increase, and spring runoff would subse-quently decrease. During times when floodingcould be a problem, a seasonal shift of this sortcould have a significant impact on water suppliesbecause to maintain adequate storage capacity inreservoirs, early runoff would probably have to bereleased (40). Many Western States (e.g., Califor-

nia and Colorado) depend on the late springsnowmelt as a major source of water. Runofffilling reservoirs early in the spring means thatless stored water would be available duringsummer, when demand is highest. The CaliforniaDepartment of Water Resources has estimated,for example, that if average temperatures warmby 3 ‘C (5.4 oF), winter snowmelt runoff wouldincrease, but the average April-July runoff wouldbe reduced by about 30 percent.6

Sea level rise, a third likely consequence ofglobal warming, could have effects on watersupplies in some coastal areas. Higher sea levelwould cause a slight increase in saltwater intru-sion of freshwater coastal aquifers, would createproblems for levees protecting low-lying land,would increase the adverse consequences ofstorm surges, and might affect some freshwaterintakes. (Effects of sea level rise on coastalstructures and wetlands are discussed in detail inch. 4 and in vol. 2, ch. 4.)

CURRENT AND POTENTIAL STRESSES ONWATER RESOURCE SYSTEMS

9 IntroductionAlthough scientists are not yet certain about the

magnitude, direction, or timing of the regionalimpacts of global climate change, much can besaid about current stresses on water resourcesystems. Climate change could, exacerbate theadverse effects of these stresses in some regionsand alleviate them in others. However, areas thatare already approaching limits for developingnew water supplies or are under stress for otherreasons should be particularly concerned aboutthe possibility that climate change may furtherstress water resource systems and reduce thecapability to adjust. Appendix A catalogs themajor water resource problems for each of the 50States.

6 M. Roos, Chief Hydrologis~ California Department of Water Resources, personal communication 1992.


Figure 5-2—Average Consumptive Use and Renewable Water Supply by Water Resource Region

and

Tennessee2/45

KEY (b

11/69 = Consumptive use/Renewable water supply

Consumptive use as a percentage of renewable supplyw

El o-1o D1G40 B 4 O - 1 O O

a Represents entire Colorado River Basin.b Represnts entire Mississippi River Basin.

NOTE: To convert gallons to liters, multiply by 3.785.

SOURCE: W. Solley, U.S. Geological Survey, 1993,

I Growing Population, IncreasingCompetition

Water is a renewable resource, but long-runaverage supplies are essentially fixed as long asclimate fluctuates within a known range. The U.S.population, however, is steadily increasing. By2010, the United States is projected to add about35 million people to its 1993 population ofroughly 256 million people. Total U.S. popula-tion is projected to grow about 7 percent over thisdecade, but the populations in the 10 fastest-growing States7 will increase by 14 to 23 percent.Nine of these States are in the South and West, yet

‘u

developed water-supply systems in many arealready overburdened. Current demand for waterrelative to annual supply in all western riverbasins (except the usually well-watered PacificNorthwest) is 10 to 50 times higher than it is in theeastern half of the country, and some westernbasins have few undeveloped sources left (26).Figure 5-2 illustrates average consumptive userelative to renewable water supply in each of thewater resource regions of the conterminousstates.

Large western cities, like Los Angeles and SanDiego, must import water from sources hundreds

7 h OdtX of decrcas ing projected growth rate, these arc Arizoq Neva@ New Mexico, Florid% Gcors@ Alas4 Hawaii, New Hampshire,C& fOrni& and ~XaS (78).


of miles away. As a result of population growth,atisfying the demand of such cities is becomingmore challenging, especially during drought.Despite considerable water-storage capacity inCalifornia, for example, many cities find itnecessary to implement emergency-rationing pro-cedures. Other fast-growing western cities-LasVegas, Reno, Denver, El Paso, San Antonio, fore x a m p l ~e having problems ensuring ade-quate water supplies for the future. In the South-east, population growth is becoming a problemfor water-supply planners in Atlanta and in somecities in Florida.

The challenge for growing cities is to developor acquire new sources of water and use the waterthey have more efficiently. Many opportunitiesexist for using water more efficiently, and somecities and States are addressing water-supply-related problems in creative ways (see the sectionAdapting Water Resource Systems to Climateand Other Changes, later in this chapter). How-ever, a general and growing complication is thatdemands for water for use in cities can andincreasingly do conflict with established or previ-ously neglected demands for water for otherpurposes, including irrigation, fish and wildlifesustenance, ecosystem conservation, recreation,navigation, and power generation. Areas thatbecome hotter and drier as a result of climatechange would likely see competition among usesincrease (see box 5-A).

~ Poor Water QualityPeople also stress water systems when they

permit pollutants to enter surface Water andsubsurface groundwater.8 Pollution can diminishsupplies available for human consumption (supplies that in some cases are already stressed bypopulation growth) and can adversely affect fishand wildlife that depend on clean water. Surfacewaters may be contaminated by siltation, nutri-ents, salts, organic matter, and hazardous materi-

als (94). Despite high-priority Federal and Stateefforts, many supplies of surface and groundwaterare currently polluted.

Box 5-B describes water-quality problemsaffecting the Rio Grande. This river presents aparticularly challenging set of problems becauseit flows through an arid region where water ismuch in demand and because it forms a 1,200-mile boundary between two sovereign countries,the United States and Mexico, that must worktogether to ensure the river’s health.

During drought, when stream flows and lakelevels are low, water temperatures are higher andpollutants are more concentrated (33). Lowstream flows in estuarine areas also enable saltwater to move further upstream, in some casesaffecting freshwater supplies. For example, in1988, drought-related salt intrusion into theMississippi River Delta affected petroleum refin-eries at New Orleans, and fresh water had to bebarged into operate boilers and to cool machinery(57). Rivers that normally carry high salinityloads, such as the Colorado, can be dramaticallyaffected by decreased runoff. These problemswould be exacerbated in parts of the country thatbecome drier as a result of climate change.

Higher surface-water temperatures can be aproblem for fish that depend on cold water forspawning, such as Chinook salmon. When opti-mal temperatures for salmon incubation areexceeded by only a few degrees, increases inmortality can be expected (l). In California’sSacramento River System, for example, a problemexists during dry years when reservoir levels arelower and water discharged from them is warmerthan normal (35). A few newer dams havetemperature-control outlets that allow water to bereleased from various depths, but retrofitting damsthat do not have such controls is very expensive.Global warming may make it impossible topreserve some cold-water fish without providingartificial temperature controls at large dams thatlack these controls (35). Conversely, some warm-

8 Groundwater conatitutca about 36 percent of municipal &inking-water supplies.


Box 5-A-Climate Change, Water Resources, and Limits to Growth?

Many cities of the Southwest-Las Vegas, Tucson, and Phoenix, for exampltiave beautiful green golf

courses positioned like islands amidst seemingly endless expanses of parched desert. Although less likely now,it is still possible to see fountains shooting water, much of which evaporates, high into the airon scorching summerdays. These are just two of the more obvious extravagant practices that people who have relocated from thewell-watered eastern parts of the country brought with them as they settled the arid and semiarid parts of theAmerican Southwest. Growing cotton and other water-intensive crops in such areas is another.

Many peopte are drawn to the Southwest by generally mild climates and outstanding recreational

opportunities and by the new, dynamic potential for economic development. High growth rates have been typical,and the three U.S. States with the highest projected growth rates, Arizom Neva@ and New Mexico, are all addWestern States. California much of which is arid, is now the most populous of the 50 States (78).

That continued growth and development of water-stressed areas of the United States is desirable is rarelyquestioned. Until recently, except perhaps forafew small settlements in out-of-the-way places, water has not beena limiting factor in western development. Where additional water has been needed to enable further growth, watermanagers have been able to find it-but now usually at increasingly long distances from where it is used or atgreater depth in subsurface aquifers. Ims Angeles, for example, imports significant portions of its water fromsources hundreds of miles away-northern California the Owens Valley, and the Colorado River. Without thisadditional water, Southern California would not be able to sustain the dramatic growth that has occurred there (atleast given current usage patterns). San Diego, Las Vegas, Reno, Denver, El Paso, Phoenix, and many other

cities, large and small, face similar challenges in acquiring enough water to sustain growth or in using what waterthey now have more efficiently.

Western author V#allace Stegner noted that aridity imposes limits on human settlement that can be ignoredonly at one’s peril @8). So far, the impressive water infrastructure developed in the M@st during the past 100 yearshas enabled society to meet its water demand and push back these limits. Growth could be difficult to sustainwithout major and difficult adjustments. Expiiat growth-control policies have been limited and generally very

unpopular. Water issues, especially in the V&t, are usually framed in terms of how to accommodate urban growthand not howtoadjust to limitations imposed byaharsh environment (70).1 Nevertheless, it maybe prudent at least

to consider the possibility that future severe water shortages in arid parts of the country will require strong andexplicit growth-limiting policies in addition to implementation of other adaptive measures. Federal constitutionaldoctrines designed to promote the free flow of goods and people across State lines and the core principle of publicutility law-that water providers have a duty to serve market demand (70)-imply that growth maybe difficult torestrict legally. Nevertheless, at some point in a possibly drier future, some industries and individuals may begin

basing their decision to move to arid areas (or to stay in them) in part on the cost and availability of water. Suchan occurrence would mark a fundamental shift in development and demographic patterns.

1 A few policies do r~nize limitations. Arizona, for example, requires developers to show that they havea 100-year water supply before they are allowed to build. Such polides, however, generally have not fundamentallyoalled into question the desirability of continued growth. The Arizona polioy has also had some unwanted side effeotsbecause it has encouraged cities to take extraordinary action to find water for continued long-term growth. As aresult, the practioe of “water farming” has developed. Some rural areas are being dewatered, and economicdevelopment in these areas has consequently been stifled.

Chapter 5-Water 1217

Box 5-B-Water Quality, Climate Change, and the Rio Grande

Poor water quality is a problem in manyparts of the country. However, in an arid regionsuch as southwest Texas, where water isrelatively scarce, waterquality problems cancontribute significantly to water-supply probIems. This water quality/water quantity con-nection is especially important in the lower RioGrande Basin, where population growth, mu-niapal and industrial expansion, and an in-crease in irrigation have dramatically increasedthe demand for water while negatively affect-ing water quality. Managing the water re-Sourws of the Rio Grande is especially diff”wltgiven the river’s bi-national status.

The Rio Grande forms the border betweenTexas and Mexico for some 1,200 miles (1 ,935kilometers)l and is one the most importantrivers in North America. It originates in Colo-rado as a pristine alpine stream, but as itmakes its way south and east to the Gulf ofMexico, it becomes a river under stress.Intensive muniapal and industrial activitiesalong its banks have resulted in tens ofmillions of gallons of sewage yearly enteringthe river. Agricultural runoff degrades waterquality by contributing significant amounts offertilizers and pesticides to the river. Andnatural discharges of highly saline ground-water contribute to salinity problems. Inaddition, a very high 72 percent of the renew-

The Rio Grande Basin

3 Colorado.— -—--- -— -- -- —-—--1I Oklahoma1

~ d. \ ‘ -----

r--— --’3

UPPER BASIN

SOURCE: W. Stone, M. Minnis, and E. Trotter (eds.), The Ho GrandsBasin: Global Clhnate Cha~e Scenarios, New Mexico Water ResourcesReeearch Institute Report No. M24, June 1991.

able water supply of the basin is now consumed. This percentage is surpassed only in the Colorado River Basinand is dramatically greater than the single-digit percent of renewable supply consumed in most basins in the easternUnited States. If current trends continue, consumption of water in the basin is likely to increase.

Climate change could exacerbate current water conflicts. Many western rivers, including the Rio Grande, wouldexperience a significant reduction in dependable stream flow if average temperature increases. This effect wouldseriously threaten irrigated agriculture, industrial deveiopmen$ and drinking-water supplies in the region. Even ifclimate change leads to a decrease in agriculture in the lower Rio Grande Basin, industrial and nnmiapaldevelopnmt, spurred by the North American Frw Trade Agrwment (NA~A), mght continue to place significantdemands on the river in a warmer climate. The combined effects of climate change and more-direct human-causedstresses would pose a considerable adaptation challenge.

The Rio Grande’s drainage basin is separated into northern and southern regions encompassing a total of182,215 square miles of arii to semiarid land in southern Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico. Some 2.7million people live in the basin and depend on its water. Precipitation ranges from 10 inches (25 cm) per year in thewestern part of the basin to up to 24 inches (60 cm) per year along the Gulf Coast, but annual evaporation exceeds

1 TO convert miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.

(Continued on next,oage)


Box 5-B–Water Quality, Climate Change, and the Rio Grande-(Continued)

predpitation in much of the region. Many parts of the area rely on ground water to supplement scarce surface watersupplies, and groundwater overdraft is a problem in parts of the region. Concern about droughts and flooding hasled to the construction of dams and levees, so the once highly variable flow of the river is now moderated. Storedsurface water is the principle source of supply in the western part of the basin, but the lower part of the basindepends almost entirely on surface water due to the poor quality of ground water in the area.

Historically, the Rio Grande Basin has supported apredominantty agrarian economy. Many of the crops grownin the valley are very water-intensive, including cotton, rice, and sugar cane. To northerners, the region is knownas the “winter garden” because it supplies the country with voluminous amounts of citrus fruits and vegetablesduring winter months (see ch. 6). ITre Rio Grande is almost completely diverted at JuaretiEl Paso to supportirrigated agriculture in the southern part of the basin. (Return flows and more southerly tributaries supply water tothe river below this point.)

kw flows and surface-water shortages have become a problem in the basin, as have increases in salinity ingroundwater. To date, farmers have been more concerned with water shortages than with increasing salinity. Saltbuildup in the soil, however, is certain to affect future production and may force abandonment of some agriculturallands. Runoff laden with pesticides, fertilizers, and sediment reaches the river and further impedes water quality.Moreover, reduced flows mean that less water is available to dilute pollutants, so their concentration in the riverincreases during low-flow periods.

Municipal and industrial demands on the river are growing dramatically, driven by the region’s burgeoningpopulation growth. A significant increase in growth is occurring in the so-called “colonias” that have beenestablished along the border. These communities, which are home to many hundreds of thousands of people,generally lack sewage systems, wastewater treatment plants, and potable water. Wastewater in some cases isdischarged directly into irrigation canals, which ultimately supply water for some crops. This lack of infrastructure,including overflowing and inadequately lined waste dumps, has resulted in a high inadence of infectious diseases(e.g., hepatitis and cholera), contamination of grourrdwater, and clogging of storm-water systems. Industrialoperations exacerbate these problems by discharging wastewater directiy into the river. As a result, water qualityis so low in the eastern part of the basin that only 1 percent of the water is fit for agricultural or municipal use. Allof these impacts have severely degraded water quality in the river, and, given the limited supply, could presentserious water-allocation problems in the future. Changes in management practices will ultimately be required onboth sides of the border.

The international boundary created by the Rio Grande separates much nwre than land mass: it represents theoften dramatic division of first and third world nations. The socioeconomic differences that exist between the twocountries are deeply rooted. Some of the poorest U.S. counties with some of the fastestgrowing populations arealong this border. These communities generally experience depressed economies, poverty-level incomes, short lifeexpectancy, low levels of education, and high population mobility. Much of the economy is based on providing foodfor other parts of the United States. Economic conditions in Mexico are even worse. Such conditions make thedevelopment of sound water-management poliaes and the development and enforcement of regulations to sustainhuman and ecosystem health much more difficult.

Wildlife and migratory bird populations also rely on the river, but maintaining stream flow for environmentalpurposes is not always possible because of competing demands for the water, and it will likely become even moredifficult in the future.

Conservation, recycling, shifting to dryland farming, changing water pricing, and establishing water-masterprograms for the basin are among the approaches that could be used to address present and future waterqualityand -quantity problems. Focusing on improving water quality may be one way of assisting adaptation to climatechange that would be especially appropriate in the arid Rio Grande Basin.

SOURCES: This box k drawn largely from J. Schmandt and G, Ward, Texas and Global Wvming: Water Supply and Dernandh FourHydm/o@a/Regions (The University of Texas at Austin: The Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Pubiic Affairs, 1991); W. Stone, M. Minnis,and E. Trotter (ads.), The Rio Grade Basin: G/obaJ C/irnate Change Scenarios, New Mexica Water Resources Research Institute ReportNo. M24, June 1991.


water fish populations are likely to benefit fromtemperature rises associated with global warmingas their thermal habitat expands (52).

The contamination of groundwater is a particu-larly troublesome problem; once an undergroundaquifer becomes contaminated, its value is im-paired or lost for a long time. Fertilizers andpesticides, effluent from various manufacturingprocesses, leakage from underground storagetanks, and oil spills can all find their way intogroundwater. The extent of groundwater pollu-tion in the United States is not known precisely,but some groundwater contamination occurs inevery State, and the Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) has identified close to 1,000hazardous-waste sites that have contributed togroundwater contamination (10). The Northeasthas groundwater problems associated with indus-trial waste, petroleum products, and landfillleachate, and many farming States have problemsarising from agricultural practices.

Groundwater can also be contaminated bysal twater intrusion-part icular ly in coastalStates. In some cases, intense groundwater pump-ing has allowed salt water to intrude into coastalaquifers. For example, Orange County, Califor-nia, now injects treated, recycled surface waterinto its coastal aquifer to keep salt water fromintruding. Miami has spent millions trying torepel saltwater intrusion. Sea level rise willenable salt water to penetrate somewhat furtherinto coastal aquifers (80).

Many water-quality problems will be ad-dressed in 1993 and 1994, when Congress consid-ers reauthorizing the Clean Water Act (P.L.92-500). The Water Pollution Prevention andControl Act of 1993 (S. 1114) was introduced inJune 1993 and will likely serve as the mainvehicle for considering changes in the Nation’swater-pollution laws. Box 5-C describes somekey issues being considered.

9 Environmental Water Allocation

The value of water for environmental uses(e.g., for preserving aquatic species and habitat)has typically been neglected in developing waterresources for consumptive purposes (16). In theearly part of the 20th century, water was oftenconsidered wasted if it was allowed to remain ina stream and not put to some “beneficial’ use.Diverting water from a stream was not especiallya problem for instream requirements as long asenough water was available. However, the effectof diversions on instream environmental uses hasincreased as more and more water has beendeveloped for consumption. Over the past 20years, popular awareness of the environment andthe desire to protect it have increased. Thus, animportant new competitor for water (or at leastone with increasing clout) is the environment:water used for protection of wetlands, fisheries,and endangered species or for preservation of thewild and scenic status of a river cannot besimultaneously available for offstream, consump-tive uses like irrigation and domestic supply.

The potential for conflict between instream andother uses of water is high. California’s CentralValley farmers, for example, vigorously (butunsuccessfully) opposed a provision of the re-cently enacted Central Valley Project (CVP)Improvement Act (P.L. 102-575) that requires800,000 acre-feet (af)9 of project water to bereallocated or set aside for fish, wildlife, andhabitat restoration. Similarly, South Florida’sdemands for water for the environment (e.g., forrestoring the Everglades) are in growing competi-tion with water for humans (see box l-D).Notably, the Endangered Species Act (P.L. 93-205) has become a powerful preservation tool inrecent years, and many water resource managersare concerned that vigorous enforcement of thisact to protect water-dependent species will in-

9 One acre-foot (@ equals 325,851 gallons of water (43,560 cubic fec~ or 1,234 cubic meters), the amount of water it takes to cover 1 ameto a depth of 1 foot. It is enough water to sustain two average households for a year, ‘Ib convert horn acre-feet to cubic meters, multiply by1,234!


Box 5-C-Reauthorizing the Clean Water Act

The Clean Water Act (CWA; P.L. 92-500), formally known as the Federal Water Pollution control Act of 1972,is the Nation’s foremost piece of water-quaiity legislation. The ambitious goai of the originai act was to restore@iuted waters throughout the Nation to a “fishabie, swimmable status” by 1983, to eiiminate discharges ofpollutants into navigabie waters, and to prohibit the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts. Two majorstrategies for achieving these goais included establishment of a Federal grant program to heip iocai areas buildsewage treatment piants and a requirement that aii munidpai sewage and industrial wastewater be treated beforeit is discharged into waterways (1 1). The comprehensive act specifies technology-based effiuentiimitations andstandards, receiving-water-quatity standards, and a discharge permit system.

The Nation has made considerable progress in cieaning up poiiuted waters since 1972. Some $540 biiiionhas been spent on water-poiiution controi (36). Currently, more than 37 biiiion gaiions (140 biiiion iiters)~ ofwastewater are treated daiiy, and about 15,500 wastewater treatment facilities and dose to 20,000 collectionsystems operate in the United States. Eighty-nine percent of waste treatment fadiities now provide secondary oradvanced treatment (11).2 Asaresuit, Conventional pollutants such as bacteria and oxygendernanding materiaishave diminished. Nevertheless, and despite major amendments to the CWA in 1977, 1981, and 1987, somesignificant water-quaiity probiems remain. Sedimentation, nutrient enrichment, runoff from farmiands, and toxiccontamination of bottom sediments are proving to be more persistentprobiems(11).

The Ciean Water Act wiii iikeiy be reauthorized again during the 103d Congress inan attempt to address thesecontinuing probiems. S. 1114, the Baucus-Chafee Water Poiiution Prevention and control Act, has emerged asthe primary legislative vehicie for revising waterquaiity iaw. The biii revisits such key issues as watershed planning,controi of non-point-source poiiution and of toxic discharges, and funding for munidpai wastewater treatmentfacilities.

Watershed pianning+l. 1114 encourages states to adopt watershed-pianning programs. A watershedgeneraiiy is defined as a region that iies between two ridges of high iand and drains into a river, river system, orother body of water. Watershed pianning refers to efforts to identify waterquaiity probiems unique to a particularwatershed, pinpoint the sources of those probiems, and devise a strategy for addressing them. This approachrecognizes that iocai soiutions to iocai problems may often be preferable to a singie nationai soiution. Voiuntarywatershed-pianning programs wouid be encouraged through a series of financiai and other incentives.

Non-point-source poiiution-Non-point-source (NPS) poiiution accounts for half the Nation’s remainingwaterquaiit y problems (11). S. 1114 wouid piace stronger emphasis on mitigation and alteration in managementpractices to reduce the volume of poiiuted runoff. Mitigating NPS poiiution is difficuit, however, because it involveschanging the iand-use practiws of private landowners. Runoff from agricultural iands containing, for example,nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizers, contributes a sizabie percentage of nutrients and sediment to ground andsurface water, but urban areas, faiied septic systems, siivicuiture activities, cattie feediots, and suburbandevelopment are sources of NPS poiiution as weii (81 ). S. 11 14directs States to submit revised NPS managementprogram~ntaining specific program eiements-to EPA within 30 months after the act is reauthorized.

Funding for municipai sewage treatment—The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) most recentestimate of sewage-treatment requirements suggests that over $100 biiiion wiii be needed during the course ofthe next 20 years for State and iocai governments to meet the goais and mandates of the Ciean Water Act (1 1).The State Revoiving ban Fund established by the CWA substantially assists communities and municipalities in

1 TO convert from gallons to liters, multiply by 3.785.

2 Secondary treatment typicaiiy means that 85 peroent of solid and organic matter Is removed; advanwdtreatment removes more than 95 percent of pollutants and Is required when seoondary treatment is Insufficient toproteot a reoeiving stream and meet a State’s waterquality standards.


their efforts improve water quality, but appropriations for this program are set to expire in 1994.S.1114 expandsfunding for wastewater treatment programs. Funds would be available for improving aging infrastructure,controlling non-point-source poilution, managing estuaries, addressing combined sewer overflows andstorm-water problems, and managing animal waste.

Regulation of toxice-EPA currently regulates only about one-fifth of the industrial plants that dump toxicsubstances into rivers and lakes. Non-point sources of toxic pollutants, such as pesticides from agricultural fieldsandvarious contaminants in urban storm-water runoff, are currendy unregulated (36). Toxic pollutants may haveadverse effects on human and aquatic health and may remain in the ecosystem for long periods. S. 1114 callsfor EPA to identify at least 20 toxic pollutants that would have to be controlled by industry through intensivepollution-prevention strategies. The bill also callsfornot Iessthan 60percent of thevolumeof each pollutant listedto be reduced within 7 years and provides for the public to petition EPA to add pollutants to its list.

Wetland protection-Wetlands play a key role in preserving water quality, but the extent and nature of theauthority provided by the CWAfor wetland protection promises to be a contentious issue in CWA reauthorization.The current version of S. 1114 does not address wetland protection, but an additional section on wetiands isexpected to be included in the final reauthorization. The Federal Government has struggled over the past few yearsto reach a workable compromise with property owners, industry groups, environmentalists, and others on how andto what extent wetlands should be protected. Major wetland issues likely to be addressed in the reauthorizationinclude clarifying the regulatory process and responsibilities of Federal agencies; clarifying the process throughwhich States can take control of permitting; paying attention to opportunities for wetland restoration throughmitigation banking; and considering whether Alaska, which has large amounts of wetiands, should receive specialtreatment. (See vol. 2, ch. 4, for a compiete discussion of wetland issues.)

The reauthorization of the Clean Water Act comes at a critical time. The understanding of ecologicalprocesses and of the effects of human influence on ecosystems is growing. However, stresses on ecosystemsare also growing. Additional data gathering and monitoring are needed to close remaining information gaps.kgisJative efforts must attempt to balance human needs and ecological health.

creasingly impinge on development and use ofwater supplies.

Although the benefits of maintaining minimuminstream flows are increasingly recognized andare gaining legal protection in a growing numberof States (75), the rights to a significant amountof stream flow in the West have already beenestablished. In Western States, rights to divertwater are acquired under the prior-appropriationdoctrine (i.e., first in time, fist in right)(see box5-D), and many rivers are either completelyappropriated by those who got there first (seniorrights holders) or are close to being so. A few areeven overappropriated. The rights to water forinstream uses, where protected at all, are usuallyvery junior. This means that water for fish andwildlife has the lowest priority, and the need forit is satisfied only after the demands of seniorrights holders are met. During a drought, junior

and unprotected rights are most at risk, so fish andwildlife may suffer more than they would ifinstream water rights were better protected.

Clearly, growing competition between con-sumptive and environmental uses for water wouldbe exacerbated in areas of the country thatbecome drier as a result of climate change. Ifavailable supplies diminish and/or demand in-creases, existing developed supplies will have tobe used more efficiently to satisfy both consump-tive and environmental uses. Protecting adequateinstream flows to attain multiple water-use goals,which is not easy now, could become much moredifficult in the future.

1 Uncertain Reserved Water RightsRights pertaining to water for the environment

are not the only “new” rights being asserted thatmay conflict with established uses of water.

222 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat*Volume 1

Box 5-D-Major Doctrines for Surface Water and Groundwater

Surface WaterRiparian doctrine-Authorization to use water in a stream or other water body is based on ownership of the

adjacent land. Each landowner may make reasonable use of water in the stream but must not interfere with itsreasonable use by other riparian landowners. The riparian doctrine prevails in the 31 humid States east of the IOOthmeridian.

Prior appropriation doctrin~sers who demonstrate earlier use of water from a particular source acquirerights over all later users of water from the same source. When shortages occur, those first in time to divert andapply the water to beneficial use have priority. New diversions, or changes in the point of diversion or place orpurpose of use, must not cause harm to existing appropriators. The prior appropriation doctrine prevails in the 19Western States.

GroundwaterAbsolute ownership-Groundwater belongs to the overlying landowner, with no restrictions on use and no

liability for causing harm to other existing users. Texas is the sole absolute-ownership state.Reasonable use doctrin~roundwater rights are incident to land ownership. However, owners of

overlying land are entitled to use groundwater only to the extent that uses are reasonable and do not interfere withother users. Most Eastern States and California subscribe to this doctrine.

Appropriation-permit systern-Groundwater rights are determined by the rule of priority, which providesthat prior uses of groundwater have the best legal rights. States administer permit systems to determine the extentto which new groundwater uses will be allowed to interfere with existing uses. Most Western States employ thisdoctrine.

SOURCES: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Volume ///, Surnrnary of Water R&hfs-State Law? ar?dk$nkrktratim? Procedures, reportprepared for U.S. Army, Institute for Water Resources, by Apogee Reeearch, Inc., June 1992; and U.S. Geological Survey, fVaffona/ 144WwSummary 1988-8Hydm/og/c Events and Floods and Dnwghts, Water-Supply Paper 2375 (V%ehington, DC: U.S. (30vemment Printingoffice, 1991).

Indian reservations, National Forests, and Na-tional Parks are reserved lands-that is, they havebeen reserved or set aside ffom public-domainlands and, as such, carry with them authority forFederal reserved water rights (see also vol. 2,ch. 5). These rights have priority over Stateappropriative water rights acquired at a later date.In the case of Indian reservations, they havespecifically been recognized in the SupremeCourt’s 1908 Winters decision (65), and ensuingcourt cases have extended the reservation doc-trine to other lands.

Significantly, many Indian claims have not yetbeen exercised or quantiled, although Indiansassert large claims to both surface water andgroundwater throughout the West. Because re-served rights are often senior once they arequantiled, junior, non-Indian water users may

have to forgo water uses in times of shortage (93).In some cases, water for settlement purposes hasbeen purchased by the Federal Government bornother water users. However, the potential forconflict between Indian and non-Indian waterusers is clear and could grow in areas that becomedrier as a result of climate change. Similarly,Federal reserved rights in National Forests andParks have the potential for leading to disputesbetween States and the Federal Government ifsupplies decrease. Wilderness areas within Bu-reau of Land Management lands do not now havereserved water rights, and this has been a sourceof contention in most wilderness legislationbefore Congress.

A still-unresolved issue is whether Indians willbe allowed and will choose to transfer some or allof their water off-reservation. If so, flexibility


Figure 5-3-U.S. Groundwater Overdraft

NOTE: To convert gallons to Iiters, multiply by 3.785.SOURCE: H. Ingram, Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, University of Arizona, 1993.

and economic efficiency might be enhanced, andsome wealth would be transferred from non-Indians to Indians (70). The exercise of Federalreserved water rights for National Parks andForests has proved controversial, but it is onemeans of providing water for such nonmarketuses as maintenance of fish and wildlife habitat(92).

1 Groundwater OverdraftGroundwater overdraft is the removal of sub-

surface water at a rate faster than its naturalrecharge rate. When groundwater is pumpedfaster than this rate over long periods of lime, it isin effect being mined and, therefore, is nonrenew-able. Overdraft is a problem in several parts of thecountry (fig. 5-3). It is common in the OgallalaAquifer, for example, which is the principalsource of water for farming on the Texas HighPlains (see box 6-G), and to a lesser degree, in

some sections of the aquifer that underlie otherPlains States. Overdraft leads to successivelyhigher water costs because pumping expensesincrease as the water table is drawn down. Highercosts, in turn, can lead to adoption of innovativewater-saving strategies, dryland farming, or re-duced planted area. Groundwater overdraft alsooccurs in the southern half of California’s CentralWiley, much of Florida, and parts of other States.Some regions are trying innovative plans torestore or conserve groundwater supplies (e.g.,Arizona with its Phoenix-area groundwater re-plenishment plan).

Climate change will Meet groundwater. Insome locations, it could increase recharge, but itcould also lead to increased groundwater pumpi-ng in areas where surface-water supplies dimin-ish. Mining groundwater may sometimes makeeconomic sense (as, for example, can miningcoal) but, where feasible, it should be viewed only


as a temporary adaptation to climate change. Tothe degree that groundwater is mined, flexibilityto respond to future dry spells and droughts isreduced. Overdraft may also lead to land subsi-dence. Temporarily increasing groundwater pump-ing, however, can be an effective short-termresponse to drought-whether it occurs undercurrent climate conditions or during a futurewarmer climate.

1 Outmoded InstitutionsMost laws and institutions guiding the allocat-

ion and use of water were established when waterwas essentially free and supply greatly surpasseddemand. These provisions served their regionsreasonably well when most new demands couldbe met by developing new supplies. However,new development is no longer either easy orinexpensive, and in some areas, it is practicallyimpossible. Institutions and laws must increas-ingly deal with shortages and competing legiti-mate demands for water, many of which representnew tasks for which they were not originallydesigned (15). Subject to changing competitivedemands and societal interests, some institutionsare too rigid and inefficient to allow adequateresponses to real or apparent water scarcity. Also,little has been done to educate the public aboutwater issues, and as a result, professional knowl-edge of the value and scarcity of water has notbeen adequately disseminated.

Examples of innovative institutions are notrare, however, and institutional change is occur-ring. Congress, for example, passed the CentralWiley Project (CVP) Improvement Act in 1992,which explicitly recognizes the importance ofinstream uses for water in California’s CentralValley and the need to balance competing de-mands for water. The Act includes provisions to:1) guarantee that much more water will remain instreams for fish or be directed to wildlife refuges,2) remove institutional obstacles that limit benefi-cial water transfers and discourage conservation,3) raise the price of Water sold to farmers,

4) establish a fish and wildlife restoration fund (tobe financed by fees on CVP water and power salesand on water transfers), and 5) place limits on therenewal of irrigation and municipal water con-tracts. In coming years, this law may serve as amodel for similar changes in other parts of theWest. Arizona’s Ground-Water Management Act,with its goal of safe yield in the State’s importantgroundwater basins, is another innovative, ifimperfect, institutional change.

Nevertheless, rigid and inefficient institutionsare common. Such institutions can add to thestress already on water resources by makingadjustments to new situations more difficult.When water rights are unclear, for example, asthey continue to be in parts of the West, reallocat-ion of water is difficult. Agreements abound thatwere negotiated when either information wasinadequate or future circumstances concerningsupply and demand could not be foreseen. Theseagreements constrain the responses that waterresource managers can make to short- and long-term problems, and they are often difficult tochange.

For example, much water is supplied to South-ern California by the Metropolitan Water District(MWD). By statute, MWD member agencies areentitled to water in proportion to their percentcontribution to MWD tax revenues. Los Angelescurrently contributes about 27 percent but nowuses only 5 percent of its allotment because itsother sources are usually adequate. San Diego,however, takes up the slack and currently usesabout 30 percent of MWD supplies, although it isentitled to only 12 percent. If Los Angeles’supplies shrink during a drought, the city wouldbe entitled to claim its MWD allotment, and SanDiego, which receives about 90 percent of itswater from MWD, would have to cut back (91).As San Diego grows, the potential for significantwater shortages could create a critical problemduring drought.

Similarly, the structure of the Colorado RiverCompact and related laws governing the Colo-rado River System make it impossible to operate


this system as efficiently as possible. Problemsare already apparent, given aridity, growing andshifting populations, and the fact that the Com-pact, negotiated in 1922 after a few unusually wetdecades, allocates more water among the sevenbasin States than the average annual flow (26).The Colorado could be operated more efficiently(and San Diego might have an additional sourceof water) if, for example, interstate water transferswere legitimized. A stumbling block is that Statesthat have water allocations through the Compactlegislation and individual contractors jealouslyguard their existing entitlements and believe anychanges in the current institutional structurecould dilute their water-use rights (70).

Current stresses on water resource systems arealready motivating changes in laws and institu-tions. The potential for climate change addsanother, if currently secondary, reason to makethose changes. Given the uncertain impacts ofclimate change on water resources, however,institutions that are flexible (i.e., those that couldfacilitate adaptation in a variety of differentclimates) and that foster an efficient allocation ofwater would be most responsive to changescaused by global warming (47). As institutionschange, equity in water resource allocation couldbe promoted by providing more opportunities forthe public to become involved in decisionmakingbodies. Such involvement could stimulate healthydebate about the values at stake in water resourcedecisions.

In many cases, promoting flexibility, effi-ciency, and equity will require more coordinationand cooperation among the large number ofFederal, State, and local water resource organiza-tions. (Table 5-1 shows how complex the Federalwater structure alone is.) River basins and water-sheds are rarely managed in an integrated fashion,for example, and there are clearly opportunitiesfor some significant increases in yield by more-efficient joint management of existing reservoirsystems (63, 64). Similarly, water-quantity laws

and water-quality laws are seldom coordinated.Surface water and groundwater are often man-aged separately. The respective responsibilities ofFederal and State agencies are sometimes unclear,and Federal Government agencies that have waterresponsibilities do not always cooperate with oneanother.

M Aging Urban Water InfrastructureThe current poor condition of much of the

Nation’s urban water infrastructure (e.g., pipes,valves, pumping stations, and storm-water drains)could affect both safety and water-supply effi-ciency in the future. Also, urban infrastructureneeds are likely to compete for funding with otherwater-development needs.

In the Northeast and Midwest, deterioration ofold systems is especially a problem. In 1977, forexample, the Boston distribution system, dueboth to leaks and nonfunctioning meters, couldnot account for 50 percent of the water it haddistributed (89). Although the American WaterWorks Association recommends a 67-year cycleof replacement, many of Boston’s water mains areover 100 years old. More recently, the Associa-tion found an average leakage rate of about 10percent in a study of 931 U.S. utilities.l0 Althougheliminating leakage entirely is probably notpractical, opportunities exist in this area for im-proving the efficiency of water-supply systems.

The inability of some urban storm-water drain-age and treatment facilities to handle possibleincreases in flood discharges is a source ofconcern. The need for additional facilities isgrowing as urban areas grow. Expenditures fornew construction, maintenance, and rehabilita-tion do not appear to be meeting current needs,and the potential for sea level rise and urbaniza-tion of undeveloped land will likely increaseneeds in the future. Many communities will haveto invest more in storm-water drainage or faceincreased property damages from flooding. In-

10 Unpubtihed obsmatio~, 19%?. The leakage rate in this study included water escaping fmm leaks and M, ~ f~ti meters.


Table 5-l—Federal Offices Involved in Water Resource Planning, Development, or Management

Legislative offices (U.S. Congress)Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and ForestrySenate Committee on AppropriationsSenate Committee on Commerce, Science and

TransportationSenate Committee on Energy and Natural ResourcesSenate Committee on Environment and Public WorksSenate Select Committee on Indian AffairsHouse Committee on AgricultureHouse Committee on AppropriationsHouse Committee on Energy and CommerceHouse Committee on Interior and Insular AffairsHouse Committee on Merchant Marine and FisheriesHouse Committee on Public Works and TransportationHouse Committee on Science, Space and TechnologyGeneral Accounting OfficeLibrary of CongressOffice of Technology Assessment

Executive off icesExecutive Office of the President

Office of Environmental PolicyOffice of Science and Technology Policy

Department of AgricultureAgricultural Research ServiceAgricultural Stabilization and Conservation ServiceCooperative State Research ServiceEconomic Research ServiceExtension ServiceFarmers Home AdministrationForest ServiceSoil Conservation Service

Department of the ArmyArmy Corps of Engineers

Department of CommerceEconomic Development AdministrationNational Bureau of StandardsNational Marine Fisheries ServiceNational Ocean ServiceNationa Weather Service

Department of EnergyAssistant Secretary for Conservation and Renewable

EnergyFederal Energy Regulatory CommissionFederal Power Administrations

Department of Health and Human ServicesAgency for Toxic Substances and Disease RegistryNational Center for Toxicological ResearchNational institute of Environmental Health Sciences

Department of Housing and Urban DevelopmentAssistant Secretary for Community Planning and

Development

Department of the InteriorBureau of Indian AffairsBureau of Land ManagementBureau of MinesBureau of ReclamationFish and Wildlife ServiceGeological SurveyMinerals Management ServiceNational Park ServiceOffice of Policy AnalysisOffice of Surface Mining and Enforcement

Department of JusticeLand and Natural Resources Division

Department of StateBureau of Oceans and international Environmental

and Scientific AffairsDepartment of TransportationU.S. Coast GuardSaint Lawrence Seaway Development corporationFederal Highway Administration

Independent establishments and GovernmentcorporationsEnvironmental Protection Agency

Assistant Administrator for WaterAssistant Administrator for Solid Waste and EmergencyResponseAssistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic

SubstancesFederal Emergency Management AgencyGeneral Services Administration

Public Buildings Serviceinterstate Commerce CommissionPanama Canal commissionSmall Business Administration

Loan ProgramsPollution Control Financing Program

Tennessee Valley Authority

Quasi-officiai agenciesSmithsonian Institution

Smithsonian Environmental Research CenterSmithsonian Tropical Research Institute

Bilateral organizationsinternational Boundary and Water Commission,

United States and Mexicointernational Joint Commission, United States and Canada

SOURCE: Adapted from J. Beecher and A. Laubach, Compendium on Water Supply, Drought, and Conservation (Columbus, OH: The NationalRegulatory Research Institute, 1989).


creased flooding potential in some areas of thecountry as a result of climate change should because for concern.

Most large urban areas should be able torenovate aging infrastructure through increases inservice rates. Small and medium-size water sys-tems, however, may have much greater problems.The large costs associated with renovating infra-structure, meeting Safe Drinking Water Actstandards passed in 1988 (P.L. 93-523, mostrecently amended by P.L. 100-572), and provid-ing additional service to growing areas are anespecially heavy burden on smaller communities.Small systems typically lack adequate managerialand technical expertise and cannot benefit fromeconomies of scale. One recent survey of infra-structure studies concluded that the gap betweeninvestment needs and available sources of financ-ing the renovation of the water infrastructure isbetween $4.5 and $6.3 billion per year over thenext 20 years.

EFFECTS OF CLIMATE STRESS ONNONCONSUMPTIVE USES OF WATER

Many uses of water do not deplete the totalsupply of water available; these are called non-consumptive uses. Prominent among these arehydroelectric-power generation, powerplant cool-ing, waterborne transportation, and recreation, allof which climate change may seriously effect.

Hydroelectricity is a large proportion of thetotal electricity generated in some parts of thecountry. Washington State, in particular, pro-duces 30 percent of U.S. hydroelectricity, buthydropower is also significant in such States asCalifornia and Tennessee. Such power productionis sensitive to droughts and is reduced whenreservoir levels are low. Reductions in hydroelec-tric power can usually be filled by a shift togreater use of fossil fuels, but alternative sourcesof electricity cost more and cause more pollution(including carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions). The

effect of drought on power generation can beconsiderable: during the 1988 drought, for exam-ple, hydroelectric-power generation on the Mis-souri River, in the Pacific Northwest, on the OhioRiver, and in the Southeast was reduced between20 and 40 percent (57).

A primarily nonconsumptive use for water is11 Many power plants usepower-plant cooling.

fresh water for condenser cooling and (some-times) emergency cooling. Heated water dis-charged from power plants is returned to thestream from which it was taken. Because suchwater contributes to thermal pollution and canhave adverse impacts on aquatic life, watertemperature and quality are regulated by Federaland State Governments. When water tempera-tures are high, power plants often must curtailpower production or use cooling towers to com-ply with regulations. Higher water temperaturescan also reduce the efficiency of many power-plant operations, and the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission mandates that nuclear power plantsbe shutdown if a specified upper temperature limitis reached. Other water uses may be affected ifadditional releases from multipurpose reservoirsare needed to moderate water temperatures (45).

Power-system operations in regions such as thesoutheastern United States are currently affectedduring critically hot summers by temperatureconstraints. Problems can be acute when hightemperatures correspond with peak power de-mands. Also, on some eastern rivers, power-plantwater needs are, at times, so large that there maynot be enough water to dissipate heat duringlow-flow periods (80). Power systems couldbecome less reliable in a warmer climate, espe-cially during the summer (45). In turn, power-production costs and consumer-electricity pricescould increase.

Waterborne transportation is also affected bydrought-and with considerable adverse impacts.In 1988, water in the Mississippi, Ohio, andMissouri Rivers was so low that barge traffic was

11 ~eshwaterwi~&a~ to produce the Nation’s electricity totals about 130bgd, but currently ody about 4bgd are actually consu.md (66).


impaired (37). On one of the worst days, for commodities piled up in Mississippi River ports.example, 130 towboats and 3,900 barges were Conversely, railroads and some Great Lakes

backed up on the Mississippi at Memphis while shippers benefited. Box 5-E describes these

dredges deepened a shallow stretch of the river effects in more detail.

(57). The economic consequences of the low Recreation may seem to be a less essential useflows were considerable: barge and towboat for water; however, in some areas, the economicowners suffered economic losses, and agricultural value of water-related recreation outweighs its

ITO oonvert square miles to square kllorneters, multiply by 2.590.z 10 oonvwt miles to Idlorrwters, multlply by 1.609.


As expected, water levels intheriverrespondedto the drought by dropping precipitously. In normalyears, water flow through the river peaks in Apriland May. In 1988, however, water flows began todecline in April and reached record lows duringMay that were to continue throughout the summer.On June 8,1988, a barge-pulling tow grounded ona section of the river near St. Louis. it was the firstof a series of navigational disruptions that wouldseriously impede barge transport on the riverthrough late July.

Mississippi River navigation is aided by a seriesof locks and dams constructed and operated by theU.S. Army Corps of Engineers along the upperMississippi as well as on much of the Missouri andOhio Rivers. During normai years, this intricatenetwork of water-control structures can be oper-ated to maintain water levels and safeguardnavigation during much of the year. in 1988,however, even carefully controlled and timed waterreleases could not prevent low water levels. Fullyioaded barges require minimum water ievels of9 feet (2.7 meters)s to operate safely. Not onlydoes water at this level provide suffiaent clearance

Navigable Waters of theMlsslsslppl River System

f-

MN

SD

KS MO

TX

/

SOURCE: W. Relbsame, S. Chagnon, and T. Karl, DroughtandNatural Resources Managementlnthe UnitadStates: Impactsand /mpkdons by the 1987-89 Drought (Soulder, CO:Westview Press, 1991).

to keep the barge from hitting the bottom, but it aiso generally ensures that the water is moving fast enough toforestall the formation of shoals, sand bars that form in shallow sections of the river and jmpah navigation.

The first action managers generally take when water levels drop too Iowisto start dredging the blocked areas.Constant work by several dredges for several days can often dear the channel enough to keep it open. A secondstrategy is to limit the number and weight of the barges pulled by a towboat so the tow is more maneuverable andthe lightly loaded barges are less likely to hit bottom. A third strategy is to release more water from upstream dams,although this can interfere with other water uses at the upstream locations (including hydropower generation,recreation, and agricultural, industrial, and municipal water supplies). In the event of severe disruptions, alternatenavigation routes or modes of transportation may have to be found.

Costly barge backups

In 1986, managers drew on ail of these strategies and more. Following the June 8 grounding in St. Louis,the Corps dredged that section of the Mississippi and limited traffic to barges that drafted no more than 6 feetDespite the Corps’ efforts, watbr levels continued to drop. By June 15, water levels in that reach dipped to thelowest Ieveis measured since 1872, when record keeping first began. In addition, water levels on a nearby stretchof the Ohio River dropped below 8fee4 with extensive shoaling. The Corps dosed a stretch of the Ohio for dredgingfrom June 14 through 17. Over the next severai weeks, the Mississippi and Ohio rivers were periodically dosedfor dredging in locations that included Greenville, MS, Mound City, IL, and Memphis, TN. Even when the river

3 TO convert fwt to meters, multiply by 0.305.

(Continued on nexfpage)

230 I Preparing for an Uncertain CIimat%Volume 1

Box 5-E-Navigating the Mississippi Through MM and Dry Times-(Continued)

8! 4 “8

Mz .

ii i –

A barge and ‘towboat’ on the &fississippi River. LXJWjlows &ring the 1988 drought strandkd thousaruh ofbarges at Memphis and other river ports. The 1993jlooding along the Mississippi and its tributariesstranded more than 2,000 barges, costing the bargeiruikstry more than $3 million per day.

remained open, river traffic and loads werereduced. By early July, river traffic was downby one-fifth, and toads totaling 15,000 tons(13.6 million kilograms)4 of commodities hadbeen halted.

Some barge traffic was diverted to theTennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, a river sys-tem built and operated by the Corps thatparallels the southern half of the Mississippi.The Tennessee is not usually the favoredsouthward route because it is slower and lessdirect than the Mississippi, but it was able tohandle more than 2.1 million tons of cargoabove normal levels to relieve some of theMississippi barge backup. As the extent of thedisruption became apparentj some grain ship-ments were shifted to alternate ports androutes on the Great Lakes instead of theMississippi, further absorbing some of thebarge backups and storage overflows in theports on the Mississippi.

Repercussions from the interruption in navigation were widespread. By the time of the dosing of the Ohio onJune 14,700 barges were backed up at Mound City, a major grain port. VViththe barges notrunningand no emptybarges arriving, grain piled up at the port. Within days, the port hadtofindstorage space for 200,000 bushels (7,000cubic meters)5 of corn, and more than $1 million worth was simply stored on aty streets because there was nomore room in the elevators. Thus, even farmers who managed to harvest crops despite the drought (and couldpotentially earn higher prices due to the lower supplies) faced the risk that their grain would spoil while awaitingshipment. Similar pileups occurred elsewhere. By June 17,700 barges were trapped in Greenville. By the 19th,3,900 barges were stranded in Memphis. Barge traffic wassporadicthrough late June; inearlyJuty, another 2,000barges were held up in Memphis.

International implications

Attempts to combat low water levels and maintain navigation even led to international controversy. It istechnically feasible to increase the flow of the Mississippi River by diverting water into it from Lake Michiganthrough the Illinois River channel. At one point during deliberations over how to respond to the drought thegovernor of Illinois proposed to triple the normal water releases from the Lake for a limited time to help restoreMississippi River levels. l%e increased diversion was expected to raise Mississippi levels by 1 foot at St. Louisand around 6 inches (15 centimeters)Gat Memphis, while Ioweringthe level of Lake Michigan by only 1 or2 inches.This proposal caused considerable controversy when intrcxixed, however, because it ignored the history ofcontroversy over water diversions, and because at the time of the proposal, Lake Superior water levels were wellbelow average even though they had been at record high Ievelsjust 2 years before. Governors of four Great LakesStates threatened court action, and the Canadian ambassador delivered a formal protest to the U.S. State

4 TO convert tons to kilograms, multiply by 907.5 TO convert bushels to cubic meters, multiply by 0.035.

e TO convert inches to oentimers, multiply by 2.540.


Department. Residents on both sides of the Great Lakes considered the levels of the Lakes-already low due tothe drought-of fundamental importance and declared that the levels should not be artificially altered for anyreason. Sufficiently low lake levels could, among other things, disrupt the operation of locks, thus affecting shippingactivities and the production of hydroelectric power at Niagara and on the St. Lawrence River. In the end, the Illinoisgovernor backed off the proposal, and no water was diverted.

Winners and losers

The economic costs due to less-efficient barge transport may have reached $1 biiiion. Farmers, agrkuituraichemical manufacturers, and coai ad oii companies found it more costly to ship products as barge shipping pricesquickly rose from $9 to $15 per ton. Barge shipping was reduced 20 percent, costing the industry perhaps $200

miiiion. Other iosers included the consumers of shipped commodities, particularity utiiities forced to pay higherprices for coal. in addition, the drought ied to a 25 percent drop in hydropower production on the river and a 15percent decline in recreational use, and low water ieveis ailowed sait water from the mouth of the Mississippi totravei 105 miies iniand, damaging wetlands aiong the river.

Despite considerable turmoil and costly losses to shippers and the barge industry, there were others whobenefited from the drought, partiy offsetting the overaii costs. Shippers on the Tennessee-Tombigbee and theGreat Lakes received a considerable boost in business, and showed gains in economic competitiveness due tothe greater reliability of their routes. The Illinois international Port at Chicago shipped neariy $2 miiiion worth ofgrain that wouid otherwise have been shipped through Mississippi River ports, generating an income for the portof$O.5 miiiion. On the other side of the Lakes, shipping traffic on the St. Lawrence Seaway rose by 7 percent duringthe summer months.

Perhaps the biggest winner was the iilinois Central Raiiroad (iCRR), a north-south system running fromChicago to New Orieans. Because its route is roughiy paraliei to the iiiinois-Mississippi River system, the raiiroadhas iong been a competitor with the barge industry. In 1988, the going rate for shipping by rail was $8 to $12 perton, which put the ICRR at a considerable disadvantage in competing for cargo with the barge industry, whichgeneraiiy charged around $5 per ton. When barge prices increased to $14 to $15 per ton due to the backups,however, the iCRR was weii-situated to compete.

The Flood of 1993

The Drought of 1988 illustrates the powerful role that climate plays in maintaining the navigational servicesthat many have come to expect from the Mississippi. in times of drought, the iow water ieveisthat caused shoaiingand grounded tows in 1988 can aiso affect wintertime navigation because the river freezes up more quickly andextensively in shaiiow areas. Conversely, during times of above-average precipitation, fioods can be disruptiveas some stretches of the river become nonnavigable during high fiow. Flooding aiong the Upper Mississippi andmany of its tributaries reached ievels in June and July 1993 not seen in many decades. A 500-mile stretch of theupper Mississippi, from St. Paui to St. Louis, was shut to ail commercial traffic, leaving thousands of bargesstranded. Water Ieveis did not return to normai for more than a month, wit h costiy effects on grain shipments f romiowa, Missouri, iiiinois, Minnesota, and Mhconsin. Cargoes heading north (e.g., rubber, sugar, and metai fromoverseas) were aiso stranded. The fiooding caused many smaii towns to be evacuated and darnaged thousandsof homes and businesses. Crop losses have been estimated to be between $5 and $10 biiiion.

Considerable uncertainty surrounds predictions of ciimate change in the Mississippi River Basin.Nevertheless, both the 1988 drought and the 1993 flooding couid be harbingers of the challenges ahead for thebarge industry-and for others who iive near and/or depend on the Mississippi.

SOURCES: This box Is drawn largely from W. Riebsame, S. Changnon, Jr., and T Kart, Drought amf Natund IkxxJrcas Mmagement Inthe United States: Impacts and hnpkahrs of the 1987-89 L)ruught (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1891), pp. 43-112. Supplementalmaterial came from W. Koeilner, “Climate Variabdity and the Mississippi t%ver Navigation System,” in: Sorxkta/ Responses to F?egiorta/C/hnato Change: Forecasting by Ana/ogy, M.H. Glantz (cd.) (Bouldar, CO: Westvlew Press, 19S8), pp. 243278; Imvels Reference StudyBoard, “Final Report of CCC GCM 2 X COz Hydrologkal Impacts on the Great Lakes” (Hanover, NH: Levels Reference Study Board,Deoember 1991); and Reuters Ltd., “Midwest Laveea Straining: Mississippi River Continues to Rise,” WXhington POSZ July 8, 1993,p. A3.


operating rules changed to better reflect currenteconomic realities, are now pitted against LowerMissouri River States, which want the rules toremain the same to protect the hydropower andnavigation purposes of the System. Similar con-flicts can be found in many places in the UnitedStates, and such conflicts are inevitably moreheated during drought.

ADAPTING WATER RESOURCE SYSTEMSTO CLIMATE AND OTHER CHANGES

Recreation is an important nonconsumptive use ofwater, and in many areas, one of its highest-valueduses.

use for irrigation or other purposes. Low lakelevels may leave recreational boating docks highand dry and may affect shoreline property values.Low flow conditions in mountain streams affectwhite-water rafting, fishing, and other types ofwater-related recreation.

Current allocation problems on the MissouriRiver illustrate the value of’ water-related recrea-tion, the considerable conflicts that can developbetween instream and offstream uses for water,and the conflicts that can arise among differentinstream purposes. The Upper Missouri RiverReservoir System (UMRRS) is operated by theArmy Corps of Engineers for a variety of pur-poses, chief of which are irrigation, navigation,and flood control. The Corps, however, is underpressure from upstream States to give greaterconsideration to recreation and fish and wildlifeinterests in operating the System. When priorityis given to navigation during drought periods,boating facilities in upstream lakes (for example,Fort Peck Lake in 1991) can be left high and dry,and fish habitat can suffer. Upper Missouri RiverStates (Montana and North and South Dakota)have decried this situation because, as the Corpsnotes, the recreational value of the UMRRS, at$65 million annually, is now roughly four timesthe economic value of navigation (2). UpperMissouri River States, which would like to seethe

Water resource planning is a complex political,economic, sociological, scientific, and technolog-ical endeavor (60). Therefore, adaptation tochange, whether climate or otherwise, will rarelybe straightforward. Adaptation measures mustaccomplish several objectives if they are to besuccessful. They must address the sources ofstress, whether due to short-term or long-termimbalances between supply and demand, threatsto water quality, high costs, or other factors. Theymust be politically and administratively feasible--water resource systems exist in complex institu-tional environments, and changes must be capa-ble of operating in conjunction with existing laws,agencies, and regulations. (Box 5-F describessome important water responsibilities of keyFederal agencies.) Changes should enhance theflexibility and robustness of water resource sys-tems because the timing and magnitude of re-gional climatic events may change in as yetundetermined ways. And, finally, costs and bene-fits arising from institutional changes must beperceived as equitable if they are to be supportedand remain successful in the long run (23).

Adaptation measures in the near future arelikely to be taken in response mainly to problemsmore pressing than climate change, but many ofthese measures could also address climate changeconcerns. Consideration of the potential forclimate change in water resource planning couldsometimes make a difference in the choice amongtypes and timing of new policies or projects.Hence, even without sufficient regional da@ it


Box 5-F-important Water-Related Responsibilities of Key Federal Agencies

The Federal Government is involved in virtually every aspect of water resource planning, managementregulation, and development. In all, at least 35 units-including agencies, bureaus, and services-within 10different Federal departments, as well as 7 independent agencies and several bilateral organizations, currentlyexerase some responsibility for water programs and projects(4). These programs are governed by more than 200Federal rules, regulations, and laws. Some 7 House committees and 13 subcommittees, plus 6 Senate committeesand 10 subcommittees exerase responsibility over distinct aspects of water resource development andmanagement (13) (see table 5-3). Responsibilities of some Federal agencies with important water-relatedprograms are listed below.

Department of Agriculture (USDA)Soii Conservation service (SCS)-Heips faimers deveiop soii and water conservation pians and arrange

for cost-share funding for implementation of conservation practices. In cooperation with other agencies, offersadvice to farmers on pesticide and fertilizer use and land management. Severai programs promote water quaiity,including the Conservation Reserve Program, the wetlands Reserve Program, the Agricuiturai Water QualityProtection Program, and the Smail Watershed Program.

Department of the Army (DOA)Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)-In budgetary terms, the most important Federal water resources

development agency. Responsible for planning, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of projects forfiood control and floodplain management water suppiy, navigation, hydroelectric power, shoreiine protection,recreation, fish and vddlife management, and environmental enhancement. Reservoirs managed by the Corps,which inciude most of the iargest reservoirs in the United States, hold atmt 65 percent of the Nation’s storedsurface water. The Corps has undertaken several climate-change-related studies, including analysis of deasionmaking about water resources given the uncertainty of climate change.

Department of Commerce (DOC)Nationai Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)-Within the context of its coastal zone and

fisheries management responsibilities, concerned with watershed management and non-point-source poiiution;Office of Hydrology provides streamflow and fiood-forecasting services.

Department of Energy (DOE)Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-issues licenses for nonfederal hydropower projects;

considers measures to preserve environmental quality, protect fish and wiidiife, and maintain scenic values, asweii as those to maintain dam safety, flood control, and recreational opportunities.

Federal Power Administrations (FPAs)-Five Federal power administrations market hydroelectric power,inciuding Bonneville, Southeastern, AlaslGL Southwestern, and Western Area Power Administrations.

Department of the Interior (lX)i)Bureau of Reciamatlon (the Bureau)--suppiies municipal water to 25 million peopie in 17 western States,

provides irrigation water for 10 miilion acres (4.05 miiiion hectares)l of western farmland, and operates 52hydroeiectricfaciiities that generate 46 biilion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually (making the Bureau the Nation’s1 lth iargest electric utility). The facilities operated by the Bureau provide iocal flood controi, fish and wiidlife


(Continuedon next page)

234 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat*Volume 1

Box 5-F–important Water-Related Responsibilities of Key Federal Agencies=(Continued)

enhancement and recreation. The Bureau has established the Global Climate Change Response Program tostudy the potential impacts of global climate change on water resources in the 17 W@stern States.

Geological Survey (USGS)-Conducts assessments of the quality, quantity, and use of the Nation’s waterresources; produces annual state-by-state summaries on special topics (e.g., floods and droughts). USGS hasinitiated a Global Change Hydrology Program, the objectives of which include improving methods for estimatingthe sensitivity of water resource systems to climate variability and change across the range of environmentalconditions existing in the United States and improving understanding of the effects of climate change on thehydrology of watersheds.

Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)-bad Federal agency for conservation of fish and wildlife and theirhabitats; responsible for endangered species, freshwater and anadromous fisheries, certain marine mammals,and migratory birds. Manages 700 national wildlife refuges; assesses environmental impact of hydroelectric dams,stream channelization, and dredge and fill operations. An FWS goal is to assess the significance of gtobal climatechange on fish and wildlife.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)Plays a major role regulating water quality by issuing permits for discharge of pollutants into navigabte waters,

developing criteria that enable States to set waterquality standards, administering State grant programs tosubsidize costs of building sewage treatment plants, setting national drinking-water standards, and cooperating

with the Corps to issue permits for the dredging and filling of wetiands, for example. Mkxks wfth States to promotewatershed management and reduction in non-point-source poilution. EPA is the lead agency for the NationalEstuary Program.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)Undertakes hazard mitigation, preparedness planning, relief operations, and recovery assistartce for floods

and droughts and other natural and humanmade disasters; has undertaken a study of the possible impact of sealevel rise on the National Flood Insurance Program.

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)Government-owned corporation that conducts a unified program for advandng resource development and

economic growth in the Tennessee River Valley region. ll!A manages the 50 dams and reservoirs that makeupthe TVA system. Its activities include flood control, navigation development, and hydroelectric power production.TVA is studying the sensitivity of its reservoir and power-supply systems to extreme weather.

may be important to take some actions soon or in (e.g., building in flood-prone areas) until betterthe relatively near future to avoid clirnate-change- information about climate change, future waterrelated regrets later. Projects that require long demand,12 and other factors is available. A fewlead times for construction or implementation measures might be motivated solely in antici-may deserve special attention with respect to pation of a changing climate, but most are likelyclimate change. In some instances, it may be to be taken primarily in response to otheradvantageous to avoid taking certain actions stresses.

12 ~j=~g fi~e de~d ~ ~~ excqtio~ly dif&dt, and studies have shown tM most fo==ts me in tie 196@ ~ 1~~ of

current water use have been substantially in error (60). Projecting demand is complicated because the future regulatory fkamework for waterresource management and the types of adaptation that will be politically, economically, socially, and environmentally feasible am unctdn.The importance of climate change in water resource planning relative to these other sources of uncertainty is diftkult to gauge.


Potential adaptation measures are consideredin several categories below: demand manage-ment, water reallocation, and supply managementall deal with using existing supplies more effi-ciently. Supply augmentation increases the amountof water available by developing new sources.Flood and drought contingency planning intro-duces more flexibility during emergency situa-tions and helps to mitigate damages.

H Demand Management and WaterReallocation

Until relatively recently, the preferred ap-proach to satisfying the water needs of growingcommunities has been to develop untapped sup-plies. As new water-supply sources have becomeless accessible, and as developing them hasbecome more expensive and less acceptableenvironmentally, managing demand and enablingvoluntary water reallocation have taken on in-creasing importance. Demand management andwater marketing could be very important incoping with climate change, both because theypromote efficiency and because they enable aconsiderable amount of flexibility in water re-source management.

The objective of demand management is to usewater more efficiently, and many regulatory andwater-pricing options can be used to promote thedevelopment and use of more-efficient water-usetechnologies and practices. Demand-managementoptions include such measures as: 1) modifyingrate structures, 2) reducing landscape water use,3) modifying plumbing and irrigation systems,4) conducting educational programs, and5) metering. Temporary measures can providegreat flexibility in relieving stress duringdroughts. Efficiency gains from permanent meas-ures could offset or postpone the building of largeand costly structures that might otherwise beneeded to deal with climate change and otherfactors leading to increased demand.

Demand-management measures are also im-portant because they often have short payback

periods and lead to reduced capital and operatingcosts for water supply and wastewater treatmentfacilities. Water saved through demand manage-ment can be made available to protect wetlandsand fish and wildlife habitats, and reducedwastewater and drainage flows can yield addi-tional environmental advantages.

The important question is not whether demand-management practices should be pursued, buthow conserved water will be used. If the water isto be used entirely to meet the needs of unlimitedurban growth, for example, water-use problemsare likely to recur at a later date. Flexibility can bemaintained by reserving some conserved waterfor instream purposes.

Likewise, the primary objective of enablingwater reallocation is to promote more-efficientwater use. Water reallocation is facilitated byallowing water to be marketed, that is, transferredfrom willing sellers to willing buyers. Watermarketing is an important means of transferringaccurate price signals regarding the value of waterand is therefore closely linked to demand man-agement (65). If owners of inexpensive water areallowed to sell it at higher market prices, they willhave an incentive to conserve, and those willingto pay higher prices for water are unlikely to do soonly to use it inefficiently.

Water Reallocation Through Marketingand Other Transfers

Water has very different costs depending on itsuse and typically has the lowest value in thosesectors that consume the most of it. The disparitybetween the relatively high prices paid by urbanentities and the low prices paid by agriculturalusers suggests that opportunities exist to usemarkets to allow more-efficient allocation ofwater.

However, the lack of institutional and legalmechanisms for facilitating markets has so farlimited their development. Other types of transferarrangements that may or may not be considered‘‘marketing can also be effective. Most of thewater trades and transfers occurring to date have


The California State Water Project currently transfersabout 2.5 million acre-feet (3 billion cubic meters) ofwater annually from northern to southern California.Together with California’s Central Valley Project, itcomprises one of the most massive water-redistribu-tion systems in the world. Shown is the CaliforniaAqueduct and the Ira J. Chrisman Wind Gap PumpingPlant near Bakersfield, California.

involved the transfer of water from rural agricul-tural uses to municipal or industrial uses; sometrades, however, have been made between agri-cultural regions.

Properly implemented, water markets and trans-fers can serve to reallocate: water quickly andefficiently under current climatic conditions.Marketing arrangements can vary from “perma-nent’ sales13 of water to short-term, seasonal, ordry-year agreements. Box 5-G illustrates a perma-nent transfer in which California’s MetropolitanWater District agreed to improve the ImperialIrrigation District’s canal system in exchange forthe water saved by these improvements. Box 5-Hillustrates an innovative dry-year agreement, alsoin California, designed to meet demand duringdroughts.

Each of the types of reallocation agreementsdescribed in boxes 5-G and 5-H could also serveto provide more-efficient and flexible use ofwater in the event the number, duration, orintensity of extreme events increases. Indeed,severe drought conditions in the West between1987 and 1992 may offer a glimpse of whatproblems a future, drier region would encounterand of some of the measures that might be takenin response. Approaches similar to California’sDrought Water Bank are likely to be useful inother regions and could eventually become per-manent institutions. Such sales of water tohigher-value uses would ensure that as mucheconomic productivity is maintained in a regionas possible.

An additional characteristic of water markets isthat they do not inherently require long leadtimes to establish, such as are required of newdams. California’ s Drought Water Bank, forexample, although not without problems and nota full-fledged market, was implemented in severalmonths. Water markets and market-like transfersmay allow society to delay or avoid more-costlyor less-flexible adaptation options.

Despite the advantages of water reallocation,the possibility that water transfers could ad-versely affect parties not directly involved inthem has left some people wary. Several issuesthat often arise are: What review process orstandard should be used to balance the benefits tofarmers from water trades against the secondaryeconomic effects on the local community? Whatare the obstacles facing a sale or trade whenfarmers receive their water from an irrigationdistrict or pursuant to a contract with a Federalwater project? How will transactions cope withsurface-water return flows and groundwater re-charge? Who protects freshwater fisheries, recr-eational white water, and other ecologic andaesthetic values of rivers (65)? Some States havetaken steps to modify their water codes to address

13 Pmmn@ that is, from the point of view of the entity selling the wata. Such a transfer would not~ prohibit the wat= ilombeing resold.


Box 5-G-Permanent Transfer: Conserving Water In California’s Imperiai Valley

Southern California has four major water sources, and aii are threatened to some degree. increasingly strictwaterquaiity regulations threaten the use of some iocai water supplies (9O percent of which is groundwater);importation of Colorado River suppiies is being scaled back as Arizona’s Central Arizona Prqect comes on iine;litigation is forcing Los Angeies to reduce importation of water from the Owens Vaiiey and Mono Lake Basin; andin 1982, the future of obtaining additional water from northern California was clouded as voters rejected thePeripheral Canal across the Sacramento-San Joaquin Deita (29).

Southern California’s population is expanding even as its traditional water supplies contract. Los Angeies andSan Diego are two of the country’s IO fastestgrowing counties (44), and the region’s population of 14 miilion couldgrow to 18 miiiion by the year 2010 (29). Because population growth is expected to outstrip recent declines in percapita water use, Southern California couid soon face severe water shortages. As part of its efforts to avoid suchshortages, the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) has been active in pursuing opportunities for water trans-fers. One of the iargest transfers pursued by MWD isaconservation agreement with the imperiai irrigation District(iID).The ilDdiverts 2.9 miiiion acre feet per year (af/year)l from the Coiorado River and is Caiifornia’siargest wateruser, but in the early 1980’s, ilD was criticized by State Government and the courts for wasting water. The CaliforniaDepartment of Water Resources was able to identify operational and physicai improvements in iiD’swater-distribution system that couid save an estimated 438,000 af of water per year (54).

in 1988, after years of intense and sometimes acrimonious negotiation, MWD and iiD reached an agreementin which MWD agreed to fund iiD conservation projects in return for an estimated 100,000 af of saved water peryear (54). MWD is to contribute money directiy to the iiD Conservation Fund, which is controlled entireiy by iiD.Projects must be approved by a program coordinating committee appointed by MWD and iiD. Projects wili includeiining canais; installing gates and automation equipment; constructing spiii-interceptor canais, regulatoryreservoirs, and taii-water recovery systems; and other monitoring and management measures. The ProgramCoordinating Committee is responsible for seeing that ail projects are operating within 5 years of the effective dateof the agreement (54).

in addition to construction costs for the originai prqects, MWD is to pay for any conservation structures thatneed to be replaced during the term of the agreement. MWD is also to pay ongoing direct annuai costs ofnonstructural programs, such as those invoiving monitoring and management, and $23 miiiion for indirect costs,inciuding costs of environmental damage, lost income from hydroelectric generation, public-information programs,and litigation on reiated issues. in return, MWD expects to receive approximately 100,000 af of conserved waterper year for 35 years at an average total cost of approximately $128/af (Pius $20/af for pumping (54)).

Many iegal and institutional obstacles had to be overcome to conclude the transfer agreement. Controversysurrounded the issue of whether or not iiD was Iegaiiy abie to seii conserved water; some argued that underanti-waste provisions of California State iaw, the conserved water should automatically revert to holders of the nextpriorities for Colorado River water. The issue was eventually sidestepped by referring to the agreement as a“watersaivage arrangement” rathert han a saie, but t he issue may stiii be raised in future litigation (54). Agreements aisohad to be reached with the Coacheiia and Paio Verde irrigation districts to ensure that MWD would be aiiowedto receive the conserved water because these irrigation districts’ Colorado River priorities are iowerthan iiD’s buthigher than MWD’S.

Despite the numerous institutional obstacles and other difficulties, the MWD-ilD transfer arrangement is seenas a success by both parties. MWD is satisfied to receive additional water suppiies at a reasonable price, and ilDhas been pleased to receive an improved distribution system at MWD’S expense (54).

13.6 billion cubic meterwyear; to convert from acre-feet to cubic meters, multiply by 1,234.


Box 5-H—A Drought-Year Option: California’s Drought Water Bank

In December 1990, California was in the midst of its fourth consecutive year of drought Reservoir storage

was only 32 percent of capacity, statewide precipitation averaged only 28 percent of normal for the 1990-1991water year, and most snowpacks were less than 30 percent of normal. Both the State Water Project (SWP) andthe Central Valley Project (which, respectively, account for about 7 and 22 percent of California’s water supplies)

were forced to cut back sharply in water deliveries. SWP, for example, announced cutbacks of 90 percent tomunicipal users and was forced to suspend all deliveries to agricultural users. The State Department of WaterResources (DWR) was predicting that the drought would likely continue into the new year, and the State WaterResources Control Board had prepared a list of draconian regulatory measures that might need to be taken tomitigate the crisis (30).

On February 15,1991, with no expectation of sufficient rain for the season, C%vernor Pete Wilson anmxmceda four-~”nt plan to deal with the drought. As part of the plan, he established the Drought Water Bank. Intendedto operate only during the emergency, its charge was to purchase water from willing sellers and sell it to entitieswith critical needs (7). Bank members could be coprations, mutual water companies, or public agencies (otherthan DWR) that had responsibility to supply water for agricultural, municipal and industrial, or fish and wildlifeneeds. Members were required to meet rigorous criteria (e.g., they must have already made maximum use of allavailable supplies) to qualify as having critical needs. Sellers were assured that transfers would be considered areasonable beneficial use of water, not constitute evidence of waste and not be evidence of surplus water beyondthe terms of the agreement. The Bank was not intended as a precedent for California water policy or law, but wasundertaken solely to help cope with 1991 drought conditions.

Water for the Bank was acquired through land fallowing (i.e., not planting or irrigating a crop), usinggroundwater instead of surface water, and transferring water stored in local reservoirs. Most of the 351 contractsnegotiated were for fallowing land, but the Iargestacquisition came from transferring stored water. The Bank init”dtypaid sellers $125/per acre-foot (af)l but after rainfall in March exceeded expectations, estimates of water needswere lowered, and a few sellers were offered $30/af. The bank, in turn, sold the water for $175/af (sometimes

1 TO convert acre-feet to cubic mOtWS, mdidy @ 1,234.

these issues, but State water codes are not uniform environmental impact on Owens Viilley wasand not equally conducive to transfers.

Water transfers have a controversial history toovercom~the earliest often took place withoutadequate consideration for equity, regional eco-nomics, the environment, or areas of origin.Water transfers have sometimes been refemxl toas ‘‘water grabs” because gains to the receivingwater users have often come at the expense of aloss of water security and opportunity for waterusers in the area of origin. The classic example isthe Owens Wiley of eastern California, whereearly this century agents for the City of ImsAngeles made several disguised purchases of landfor the purpose of diverting the associated waterhundreds of miles to the south. The economic and

devastating, and the Valley has never recovered(53). Box 6-D describes how water transfers havehastened the decline of farmingin Colorado.

Transfers do not necessarily result in losses,however, and the transfers described in boxes 5-Gand 5-H contain features that make them benefi-cial to buyers and sellers, and they have generallybeen successful in increasing available supplieswithout significantly endangering “third-party”interests. As experience is gained with transfermechanisms and States ensure protection ofthird-party interests, some current concernsshould be allayed (50).

Promotion of interstate, as well as intrastate,transfers could help make management of water


the amount paid to sellers, contract administration costs, and conveyance iosses. Buyers also paid the cost ofconveying water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Deita to their service area

Surprisingly, the Bank was able to purchase about 820,000 af of water in about 45 days. Eventuaiiy, about400,000 af were disbursed to Bank members for critical needs, and 260,000 af were carried over into 1992 forSWP. Some of the excess water acquired wasiost in conveyance or was used to maintain waterquaiity standardsin the Delta The rest was used to replenish carry-overcapacity as insurance against the possibiiitythat the droughtcouid continue into 1992.

in ail, particularly ghen the lack of experience California had with water trading and the crisis nature of theprogram, the Water Bank was cons”~red very effective in reallocating water. Many were concerned, however,that water trading would have adverse impacts on iocal economies and on the environment. indeed, there weresome iosers; however, the adverse economic impacts were minimai, and overaii, the Bank created substantialgains for Caiifornia’sagricuiture and economy. Failowed iand accounted for only about 10 percent of planted areain major counties, and even where fallowing represented the iargest portion of decline in planted area the overaiinet effect on county personal income and total employment was reiativety smaii. The jobs that were lost in exportingregions were more than offset by the jobs gained in importing agricultural regions. Estimated income gains inimporting agricultural regions ($45 miiiion) were more than thr~ ti~s greater than estimat~ inco~ iOSSeS inexporting regions ($13 miiiion) (30). Estimatti ~t ~~fits in urban areas were OVer $~ miiiion) even withoutaccounting for the value of increased carry-over storage.

Many people beiieve that the Bank has just scratched the surface of its potentiai for facilitating transfers.Some, however, are concerned with this success. Environmentaiists worry that there is currently no mechanismfor allocating water to fish and wiidiife. Imcai offidais remain concerned about the possible impact an expandedwater bank could have on their tax base and on social-services budgets. Rurai communities fear that banking couldaccelerate either their demise or their development into suburban areas. Considerable disagreement exists aboutwhether the Water Bank shouid be permanent or implemented onty during emergencies. Neither rural areas norenvironmentalists want urban areas to use the Water Bank as an excuse for forgoing water deveiopmemconservation, or reclamation programs. Minimizing future Bank impacts on Iocai economies may be possible by,among other things, ensuring a wide regional distribution of faiiowed area increasing reiiance on groundwaterexchanges, and switching to less-water-intensive crops (30).

resources more flexible and efficient, especially Demand Management Through IWchg Reform

where infrastructure for transftig the water Water conservation could be promoted notalready exists. Such transfers, for example, couldbe useful in the Colorado River Basin. Without

only by allowing markets to provide accurateprice signals, but by changing some pricing

some vehicle for transmitting price signals across t)ractices that lead to inefllcient water use. Per-State borders, low-value irrigation uses in theUpper Basin States have the potential to displacehigh-value urban uses in the Lower Basin, wherewater may have 10 times the value. Severalproposals for interstate marketing of ColoradoRiver water have already been made, includingrecent ones motivated by the California droughtthat began in 1986 (9). Increased aridity in theSouthwest, possibly as a result of climate change,will likely focus additional attention on interstatetransfers in the future.

~aps one of the biggest obstacles to more-efficientwater use is that Americans are frequentlycharged much less for water than it costs to supplyit. Water is usually treated as a free resource in thesense that no charge is imposed for withdrawingwater from a surface or underground source.Users may pay for storing water and for transport-ing it to where it is used (although sometixnes athighly subsidized rates), and also for treatment ofthe water and disposal of the return flows, butthere is rarely any charge to reflect the value of


water for a given use, that is, the opportunity costsof putting water to one use at the expense ofanother (22). As a result, few people haveincentives to use water efficiently. Policies thatunderprice water have been much criticized fornot promoting efficient use in urban areas and onlands irrigated with federally supplied water (91).

Urban pricing structures often include sucheconomically inefficient practices as: 1) usingaverage-cost rather than marginal-cost pricing,142) using decreasing block rates—in which thecost of the last units consumed is lower than thecost of initial blocks, 3) recouping a significantfraction of facility costs through property taxesrather than through charges based on water use,4) failing to meter individual consumers, and5) failing to use seasonal pricing if marginal costvaries by season. These common practices pro-vide inappropriate price signals to consumers andlead to overuse of water. They also result inoverinvestment in water-supply facilities relativeto investment in other methods of providing orconserving water and relative to expenditures onother goods and services (92).

The large Federal subsidies received by farm-ers who contract for water with the Bureau ofReclamation (the Bureau) likewise lead to over-use of water. The Bureau, which was establishedin 1902 with the principal goal of assisting thedevelopment of family farms in the arid West,now supplies about 30 million af of water per yearin the 17 Western States-—about 25 percent ofwestern irrigation. The cost-recovery provisionsin reclamation law provide Federal subsidies forirrigation, and these have grown substantiallyover time. Subsidies on irrigation capital costs,such as interest-free repayment of capital, havereached levels of over 90 percent, and histori-cally, program-wide subsidies of irrigation capi-tal costs have been estimated at 85 percent (91).

Interest-free repayment for irrigation appearsto be an anachronism in the 1990s. The West has

been settled, and States now have their own waterresource programs. Where farmers must payprices that reflect the market value of water, therewill be greater motivation to use water moreefficiently. However, small price increases willlikely do little to motivate changes in use if thegap between the price paid and the market priceremains large.

Improvhg Conservation PracticesMany technical and regulatory possibilities

exist for using water more efficiently (see table5-2). Additional water-conservation research couldalso help realize new savings opportunities andbring down costs of existing ones.

Conservation is likely to have more potentialfor reducing water use in irrigated agriculturethan in cities, given that 85 percent of all waterconsumed is for irrigation. Moreover, in theagricultural sector in Western States, traditionalwater law has been a powerful disincentive forpracticing conservation. For example, where theprior-appropriation doctrine is practiced, farmersmust use the water they have appropriated or theyface losing it. Savings of agricultural water can beobtained by such practices as lining canals,recovering tail water at the end of irrigated fields,and better scheduling of water deliveries. Savingsmight also be made possible by developing morewater-efficient crop varieties or crops with ahigher tolerance for salt (18).

The High Plains of Texas illustrate the poten-tial for conservation in agriculture (see box 6-Gfor details). Here, the high costs of pumpinggroundwater for irrigation motivated a substantialpublic education program and widespread use ofwater-saving technologies. Where irrigation costsare low, as in much of California’s CentralWiley, there is little incentive to spend money onwater conservation.

Significant savings are available through urbanconservation efforts as well, and the rate of


demand growth in this sector is much higher thanit is for agriculture. Municipal water-conservationprograms are in operation in cities from Boston toSan Diego, yet in most parts of the country, astrong water-conservation ethic has not devel-oped. Nevertheless, examples of innovative mu-nicipal programs abound, and many of theseprograms could be applied more broadly. Oneinnovative and flexible program is the Conserva-tion Credits Program of Southern California’sMWD. Under the terms of this program, MWD,a wholesale water corporation, pays $ 154/af (lessthan its cost for developing other new supplies)for demonstrable water savings from qualifyinglocal-agency conservation programs, with anupper limit of one-half of the program cost, Toqualify, local-agency projects must result indecreased demand for MWD imported water, betechnically sound, and have local support (44).

Many of the approved conservation projectsare aimed at implementing the 16 Best Manage-ment Practices (BMPs) proposed by MWD andother urban water districts.15 These include retro-fitting showerheads and toilets; conductinghome-water audits, distribution-system audits,and large-landscape-water audits; finding leaksin distribution systems; instituting landscapingrequirements; and several other practices ex-pected to save substantial amounts of water (44).MWD’s goal is to conserve 830,000 af/year by theyear 2010.16 If conservation programs are per-ceived as equitable and fair, people are morelikely to support them.

As important as conservation can be, it doeshave its limits. In areas where comprehensiveconservation has begun, demand managementmay not yield large additional savings (47). Tothe extent that conservation is successful andgrowth in demand continues (e.g., through in-creases in population), long-term water-management flexibility through decreased wateruse will be harder to achieve. The limits of

Table 5-2—Ways to Use Water More Efficiently

Effective water-saving measures for urban areasModify rate structure to influence consumer water use,including:

■ shifting from decreasing block rates to uniform block rates■ shifting from uniform rates to increasing block rates■ increasing rates during summer months■ imposing excess-use charges during times of water short-

age.

Modify plumbing system, including:■ distributing water-saving kits, including replacement show-

erheads and flow restrictors■ changing plumbing standards■ requiring or offering rebates for ultra-low-flow toilets.

Reduce water-system losses, including:■ using watermain-leak-detection survey teams followed by

water main repair or replacement as necessary to reducesystem losses

■ monitoring unaccounted-for water■ conducting indoor-outdoor audits■ starting a meter-replacement program■ recycling filter plant backwash water■ recharging groundwater supplies.

Meter all water sales and replace aging or defective meters ina timely way.

Reduce water use for landscaping, including:■ imposing lawn watering and other landscape-irrigation

restrictions■ developing a demonstration garden■ publishing a xeriscape manual9 using nonpotable water for irrigation■ imposing mandatory water-use restrictions during times of

water shortage.

Conduct water-conservation education of the public and ofschool children, including special emphasis during times ofwater shortage,

Effective water-saving measures for farmsUse lasers for land leveling.install return-flow systems.Line canals or install piping to control seepage.Control phraetophytes (although these plants may beconsidered valuable habitat). Use sprinkler and drip irrigation systems.Schedule irrigation by demand.Use soil-moisture monitoring.Use deep pre-irrigation during periods when surplus wateris available.improve tillage practices.Use evaporation suppressants.Use lower-quality water.install underground pipelines.Grow drought or salinity-tolerant crops.

SOURCE: W. Anton, “implementing ASCE Water Conservation Pol-k-y,” in: Water Resources Planning and Management: Proceedings ofthe Miter Resources Sessions at Water Forum '92, Water Forum '92,Baltimore, MD, Aug. 2-6, 1992.

15 M. Mo- Me&opoli~ Water District of Southern Californ@ personal Co-tication, AuWt 1~.

‘6 Ibid.


conservation are far from being reached, but in theabsence of new developments in conservationtechnology, conservation can be expected to havediminishing returns. ultimately, additional solu-tions may be needed. Moreover, once the easyoptions have been implemented, additional con-servation may require higher costs and importantlifestyle changes, and these may be resisted by thepublic.

Policy Options: Improving Demand ManagementDemand management, where practiced, has

generally been a State or local concern rather thana Federal one. However, if it chooses to do so,Congress and/or the Executive Branch couldstimulate demand management in various ways.

Option 5-1: Amend the Clean Water Act toallow Federal grants to States for wastewatertreatment projects to be used for conservationinvestments. These State revolving funds (SRFS)can now be used for sewage treatment facilitiesbut generally not for conservation. However, tothe degree that conservation reduces the volumeof water that needs to be treated, the cost ofsewage treatment is reduced. Grants for SRFS areset to expire in 1994. Congress could continuethis funding when it reauthorizes the Clean WaterAct and, in Title VI of the Act, could makeconservation explicitly eligible for revolving-fund loans. States might, in turn, offer favorableloan terms to communities that achieve suggestedwater-efficiency goals.

Option 5-2: Lead by example by promotinggreater water-use efficiency in Federal facilities.The Federal Government owns or leases about500,000 buildings of various sizes and some422,000 housing units for military families. Italso subsidizes utility bills for some 9 millionhouseholds of low-income families (77). Thus,Federal facilities and subsidized housing repre-sent an opportunity for the U.S. Government toplay an important role in promoting water-useefficiency. Currently, however, Federal agencieshave little incentive to conserve water. Mostagencies do not even meter their water use or have

the baseline data needed to determin e the paybackperiod and cost-effectiveness of efficiencymeasures.

The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486)does encourage water conservation in Federalfacilities, but, in contrast to the act’s detailedtreatment of energy conservation, it treats wateras an afterthought. Congress should clarify itsintent regarding water conservation, including,for example, how funds authorized for efficiencyprograms are to be divided between energy andwater conservation. Congress might directagencies to: 1) establish programs to rewardinnovative and/or cost-effective water-conserva-tion measures, 2) use models that predict wateruse [e.g., the Army Corps of Engineers Institutefor Water Resources Municipal and IndustrialNeeds (IWR-MAIN) model (73) to identify op-

portunities for improved water-use efficiency,and 3) amend Federal acquisition regulations tofacilitate Federal procurement of efficient water-Use technology.

Option 5-3: Increase funding for the devel-opment and use of water-saving technologies.The Water Resources Research Act of 1984 (P.L.98-242) authorizes funding for such purposes.However, no funds were appropriated for the act’scompetitive matching-grant fund in 1993. More-over, no funds have ever been appropriated undersections 106 and 108 of the act, which specificallyauthorize grants for water-related technologydevelopment, including conservation and water-reuse technologies.

Option 5-4: Reform tax provisions to promoteconservation investments. The Tax Reform Act of1986 (P.L. 99-514) clamped down on the abilityof cities and States to use tax-exempt bonds tofinance any projects except those that clearlybenefit the public (72). The benefits of mostconservation technology (e.g., plumbing retrofitsand advanced irrigation systems) have beenconsidered to be mostly private and, hence, thetechnology has not been eligible for tax-exemptfinancing. To promote more conservation invest-ment, Congress may wish to revise the tax code to


define conservation investments as having sub-stantial public benefits and, hence, to be eligiblefor tax-exempt-bond financing.

Option 5-5: Reform pricing in Federal waterprojects. Although it may be difficult to reformthe pricing of water supplied by existing Federalprojects, Congress could eliminate subsidies onfuture projects, such as for interest-free repay-ment of construction costs or loans. Alternatively,Congress could require, through legislation, thatall entities that stand to benefit from new,subsidized, federally developed water study and,if necessary, reform their current pricing struc-tures before water is delivered (92). Ignoringpossible price reforms would result in inefficientexpenditure of Federal funds.

Policy Options: Facilitating Water MarketingAs with demand management, Federal law

usually defers to State law regarding watermarketing and other transfers. However, theFederal Government could help facilitate mutu-ally beneficial transfers in several ways. It couldprovide stronger leadership, improve the imple-mentation of its own policies, influence StateGovernments through the use of incentives ordisincentives, and clarify some ambiguous ele-ments of reclamation law. Present uncertaintyover the rules governing a market can slow andraise the effective costs of transactions. TheFederal Government could also have some influ-ence in helping to ensure that transfers are fair forthose not directly involved in the exchange andthat they do not adversely affect instream uses ofwater.

Option 5-6: Urge the Department of theInterior (DOI) to provide stronger leadership infacilitating water transfers. In December 1988,DOI adopted a set of principles for facilitatingvoluntary water transfers involving Bureau ofReclamation facilities. However, the Bureau hasnot effectively implemented these directives, and

they have not been applied consistently in allregions (42). Stronger leadership could include anunambiguous public statement by DOI and Bu-reau officials endorsing water transfers as a meansof solving water resource problems, moreemphasis within the Bureau on transfers, andconsideration of the recommendations made bythe Western Governor’s Association (WGA).WGA recommended that DOI work with it todevelop a package of amendments to reclamationlaw to facilitate transfers (%).

Option 5-7: Clarify reclamation law on tradesand transfers. Reclamation law was written whenwestern settlement and water development werebeing emphasized and when little or no considera-tion was given to the transfer of water rights or tocontractual entitlements on federally constructedwater projects. There are several ambiguities inthis body of law regarding the transferability ofwater. For example, can conserved water betransferred, or does a farmer who saves water byusing it more efficiently lose rights to it?17 It isalso at times unclear whether State or Federal lawgoverns transfers on Federal projects. Clarifica-tion might be accomplished through a formalsolicitor’s opinion by DOI or, alternatively,through new legislation.

Option 5-8: Clarify rules regarding the mar-keting of Indian water. The nature of water rightsfor many Indian tribes is still open to question. Akey issue is whether Indian water rights, oncequantified, will be salable or leasable, and, if so,with what restrictions. Allowing water entitle-ments of Indian reservations to be leased with nomore restriction than non-Indian rights wouldfacilitate greater efficiency and flexibility ofwater use. Equity issues regarding Indian waterare important and usually controversial. Indianshave often been treated unfairly. At the sametime, many non-Indians have come to depend oninexpensive water that may legally belong toIndian tribes, and current users could, in theory,

17 At issue is whe~er the 1902 Reclution Act (32 Stat. 388) imposes any additional requirements, beyond thOSe Of Stite law, for wateron Federal projects.


be required by Indians to pay significantly morethan they do now. Indian claims have often beensettled through legislation, and in some cases, thelegislation has specified the degree to whichIndian water is leasable (21). Language ensuringthe ability of Indians to market water or transferentitlements could be included in all future Indianwater settlements.

Option 5-9: Provide ways for Federal agen-cies to buy water for environmental purposes.Federal participation in water markets could playa role in preserving or enhancing instream uses, agoal that could become increasingly difficult toachieve if water demand increases and/or supplydecreases. Water rights for instream-flow pur-poses are usually held by States but are oftenjunior in nature and could thus be the first to becurtailed during a drought. Stronger protectioncould be acquired by allowing public agenciescharged with protection of fish and wildlife andother instream uses of water to participate inwater markets. In States that allow non-Stateagencies to acquire instream rights, Federalagencies such as the Fish and Wildlife Servicecould be funded to acquire water rights whereexisting statutes afford inadequate protection.Flexibility would be enhanced by allowing agen-cies to make not only permanent purchases ofwater rights but also short-term purchases duringdrought periods, when instream uses of water aremost likely to be under stress (92).

~ Supply ManagementOpportunities exist for signicant gains in

water-use efficiency through better managementof existing (i.e., developed) water supplies. Suchopportunities may be realized by: 1) improvingcoordination of water resource management,2) enhancing the flexibility of reservoirreservoir-system operations, 3) expandingconjunctive use of ground and surface water,4) taking advantage of new analytical toolsforecast systems.

andthe

andand

Improving CoordinationIn large part, water resource systems through-

out the United States have developed independ-ently of one another, their geographical limitsusually coincident with political rather thanwatershed boundaries. Not surprisingly, waterresource management in the United States hasevolved in a fragmented and uncoordinated fash-ion. Coordination has not mattered greatly wherewater is abundant, but it is becoming increasinglyimportant in those parts of the United Stateswhere water resources are becoming relativelymore scarce and/or polluted. It will become evenmore important if global climate change results indecreased water supplies in some areas.

The most efficient way to manage waterresources is the comprehensive river basin orwatershed approach. At its best, such an approachwould entail managing reservoirs in the water-shed to meet multiple demands as a single systemrather than individually, managing groundwaterand surface water jointly, managing water-quantity and water-quality issues together, andintegrating floodplain and wetland managementwith other aspects of water resource management.Managing in this way would not only increaseusable water supplies but would also benefit othervaluable uses for water (e.g., for habitat andwetlands preservation and for recreation). Riverbasin management would also improve the flexi-bility and efficiency desirable in policies suited toa changing climate. Comprehensive planning andmanagement is likely to become increasinglyimportant wherever opportunities for developingnew supplies grow scarce and water becomessubject to greater competition among competinguses.

The concept of river basin management is notnew and, in fact, is widely accepted in theoryamong water resource professionals, ecologists,and others. However, such management practicesare the exception rather than the rule. Althoughmany are aware of the benefits of more-integratedmanagement, coordination and cooperation tothis end have been very difficult. Responsibilities


for water supply are generally separate from thosefor water quality; responsibilities for groundwaterare often separate from those for surface water;Federal goals and responsibilities within a basinmay conflict with State or local ones; and Federaland State boundaries seldom coincide with ground-water basins or surface watersheds. The diversityand inflexibility of water-rights laws, inadequateincentives for efficiency in water use, and inade-quate research, information, and training supportfor improved water resource coordination prac-tices can also make river basin planning difficult(72).

Nevertheless, river basin and watershed plan-ning is attracting renewed attention. The U.S.Environmental Protection Agency strongly sup-ports the approach, and its regional offices arenow participating in about 35 small watershedprojects around the country (82). Moreover,legislation recently introduced to reauthorize theClean Water Act (S. 1114, the Water PollutionPrevention and Control Act of 1993) containsimportant watershed-management provisions, in-cluding some for designating areas for watershedmanagement, developing watershed-managementplans, and providing for incentives and publicparticipation.

Reservoir and Reservoir-Systern ManagementIndividual reservoirs are often designed and

constructed by one jurisdiction (e.g., a waterdistrict). The operating rules for the reservoir arealso usually centered around meeting the needs ofthe clients of the constructing agency, given thestorage and delivery constraints imposed on thereservoir when it was constructed. Where thereare several reservoirs on a river system (possiblyoperated by different jurisdictions or even indifferent States), yield of the system as a wholecan often be increased if joint operational rulesare considered. For example, rather than meetingthe downstream demands of a particular areasolely from the reservoir owned by that jurisdic-tion, more than one upstream reservoir may often

be used. If the timing and amount of releases canbe coordinated, often everyone can gain.

Discovering and taking advantage of theseopportunities involve a good deal of coordinationamong different water agencies and include suchtasks as developing flow and storage models thatare accepted by all of the jurisdictions involved;simulating likely stress events, such as floods anddrought; studying trial responses to such simu-lated events; and developing written agreementsfor joint operation of facilities. It often takes yearsand the commitment of key individuals to imple-ment these steps, but the effort can be verysuccessful.

For example, starting in 1977, the InterstateCommission on the Potomac River Basin (ICPRB)sponsored several studies of the potential forjoint, rather than independent, operations duringdrought periods among the three principal Wash-ington, DC, water suppliers. Using a river-simulation model developed at Johns HopkinsUniversity, ICPRB determined that existing res-ervoir capacity was underutilized, and that if thelocal water suppliers would coordinate the timingof withdrawals from upstream reservoirs, theywould be able to increase system yields dramatic-ally and avoid spending large sums on construc-tion of new reservoirs. A series of writtenagreements was approved in 1982 specifying howjoint operations would be carried out duringdroughts. Joint management of existing facilitiesin the Potomac River Basin increased systemyields by over 30 percent (about 90 milliongallons per day). Between $200 million and$1 billion was saved, compared with previouslyevaluated structural alternatives for meeting fu-ture supply needs, and environmental impactswere substantially reduced (63).

The potential exists throughout the Nation forimproving operational efficiencies of multi-reservoir systems through systems analysis. More-over, the Federal role in contingency planningand systems-analysis studies could be largebecause federally constructed reservoirs are oftenintermingled with nonfederal reservoirs on the


same river system. The Colorado River System isone important prospect for application of more-efficient operating rules. The Bureau of Reclama-tion operates all major storage facilities on thisriver, whose water is so crucial to the aridSouthwest. Potentially, results of Federal simula-tions of long-term water availability on theColorado (including analysis of various climatechange scenarios) could ease the way for Colo-rado River Basin States to begin considering newoperating rules of mutual benefit.

An important reason for the difficulty inmaking efficiency and flexibility improvementsin the management of reservoir systems (andindividual reservoirs) pertains to the process bywhich Federal water projects are authorized andregulated. The two agencies responsible for mostlarge Federal water projects are the Army Corpsof Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation.Both the studies and the projects these agenciesundertake are authorized by Congress. The pro-jects are usually based on a detailed feasibilitystudy by one of the two agencies. Both the studyand the subsequent congressional authorizationtypically emphasize individual projects, and theoperating agencies are closely bound to useprojects only for the original purposes specified inauthorizing legislation. Rarely do the computedbenefits from a project reflect what might beachieved if the operation of the project wereintegrated in a systematic way with other existingand proposed projects, either Federal or local.

Initially, most new projects are more thanadequate to serve the existing demands. Overtime, however, demands may increase, and struc-tural or operational changes may be required.Historically, structural changes (i.e., constructionof new storage facilities) have been emphasized,and opportunities for ‘‘creating’ more waterthrough better management and/or reallocationhave received little attention. This may occurbecause there is no regular review process de-voted to finding such opportunities and becausewhenever changes in operating policies are pro-posed, there are inevitably people who believe

their interest lies in maintaining the status quo(64).

Conjunctive Use of Groundwater andSurface Water

Groundwater and surface supplies are managedindependently inmost States and are governed bydifferent legal systems and separate agencies. Theintegrated management of ground and surfacewater, often referred to as conjunctive manage-ment, has the potential to significantly improvewater-system performance and increase the flexi-bility and reliability of water resource manage-ment (see box 5-I).

Storage of water underground is desirablebecause it makes possible the use of water thatotherwise would not be captured (20). Conjunc-tive management can be used to balance seasonalvariations in water supply and demand, enablinggroundwater to be used in lieu of surface waterduring dry periods; to eliminate the need foradditional treatment and surface-distribution fa-cilities; to allow water suppliers to meet customerdemands more cheaply and easily than would bepossible through independent management ofseparate systems; and to enhance yields throughless-conservative operation of existing storagefacilities (e.g., a conjunctive management studyof Houston found that system yields could beincreased by 20 percent (63)). Another conjunc-tive use is blending surface and groundwater toproduce an overall usable medium-quality supply(e.g., by blending high-quality surface water withbrackish groundwater not otherwise usable).

Cities such as Los Angeles, Phoenix, Al-buquerque, and Houston already have conjunctive-use plans, but conjunctive management is still notused in most major population centers (72). Notall communities have access to groundwatersupplies, but conjunctive management may befeasible for some that do not, as long as they arelinked to a river or distribution system. Each planis unique, and the most equitable and efficientapproaches are closely tailored to the physicalcharacteristics of the water resources (e.g., rates


Box 5-l-Seasonal Storage: The Metropolitan Water District’s InterruptibleWater Service and Seasonal Storage Programs

Rainfall and snowmelt tend to be seasonal events, so the availability of water supplies in communities thatrely on surface water can vary wtdely during the course of the year. Water demand also varies with the seasons,typically being much higher during the summer and lower during the winter. Balancing supply and demand in theface of these variations is possibte only with the use of storage facilities. Southern California’s Metropolitan WaterDistrict (MWD) has used its Interruptible Water Service (IWS) Program and its Seasonal Storage Program (SSP)to encourage conjunctive management as a method of enlarging local storage capacity.

The IWS Program began in 1981 when MWD offered to sell water at discounted rates to member agenaesthat could demonstrate an ability to continue serving customer needs in the event that water deliveries from MWDwere interrupted (44). Operation of the program allowed MWD to take advantage of exms supplies in theCotorado River and the State Water Project by delivering the water to local agencies when it was available andceasing the deliveries when it was not. Most of the local agencies chose to meet the IWS requirements bydeveloping new artificial-recharge and pumping faaiities to store the water underground and then pump it backout during suppJy interruptions.’

The IWS Program led to problems for some participating agencies, however. Retail agencies were requiredoniy to demonstrate sufficient local production capacity to continue ti”ng customer deliveries in the event ofMWD interruptions, rather than agreeing to actually store the water in new or underutilized facilities. Someagencies found thatthey were able todemonstratethis capacity on paper much more easily than they were actuallyable to produce the water when needed.2

MWD discontinued the IWS Program and replaced it with the SSP in 1989. The concept is the same:discounted water is used to encourage MWD’S retail-agency memtws to develop local facilities for storing excesswinter flows for subsequent use during low-flow, high-demand summer months. But terms of the SSP require localagencies to actually store the water, either directly in surface reservoirs and aquifers or indirectly by using the waterin lieu of existing groundwater pumping (44). MWD has found that the SSP has encouraged development of localstorage capacity, eased peak demands on the MWD delivery system, and worked better for the retail agenciesthan the program it replaced. An additional benefit is that MWD’senergy costs for pumping the water to its servicearea are lower in the winter than in the summer.3

1 D. Adams, Directorof Resources, MetropoHtan Water Districtof Southern California, LosAngeles, personalcommunication, July 1992.

2 l~dm

3 [~dm

of discharge, the degree to which groundwater is sion of ground and surface-water laws, regula-connected to surface supplies, the rate and amountof lateral movement within the groundwaterbasin, and the susceptibility of the basin todegradation from saltwater intrusion or others o u r c e s ) .

As with integration of surface-reservoir sys-tems, conjunctive management can provide therobustness and flexibility desirable for adaptationto climate change. Similarly, however, a profu-

tions, and agencies may be involved in a shgleconjunctive management project, so agreementscan take a great deal of time to negotiate. ‘l%isamount of time may diminish as experience withdifferent schemes grows.

Analytical Tools and Forecast SystemsThe state of the art of analytical tools used by

water resource managers has improved signifi-


cantly in recent years. Various types of modelscurrently being developed or refined could dra-matically improve water resource decisionmak-ing, for example, by providing information abouthow benefits from competing demands for watercould be optimized, how pursuit of a particularwater-management goal could affect competinggoals, how major land-use changes in a basin(e.g., urbanization) could affect water availabil-ity, or how environmental quality could beimproved. Many of these tools, however, are notyet available or are not being used routinely.

Several agencies have small programs or initia-tives to develop and implement tools for ad-vanced hydrologic and climate forecasting toreduce risk in water-management decisions. Forexample, both the U.S. Geological Survey and theBureau of Land Management have been workingwith the University of Colorado’s Center forAdvanced Decision Support for Water and Envi-ronmental Systems (CADSWES). CADSWES ishelping the agencies develop anew generation ofwater resource modeling systems. A joint pilotproject using these new systems has recently beenplanned to study the sensitivity of several westernareas-the Gunnison River Basin and the Ameri-can, Carson, and Truckee Basins-to climatechange (51).

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-ministration’s (NOAA’s) National Weather Serv-ice also has an advanced modeling initiative, theWater Resources Forecasting System (WARFS).The goal of this program is to provide improvedstream-flow forecasting, building on existingriver and flood-forecasting services and NOAA’sweather- and climate-forecasting capabilities, itsplanned Next Generation Weather Radar pro-gram, and its Automated Surface ObservingSystem. The Denver Water Department and theBureau of Reclamation, among other groups,have recently used the methodology in a pilotprogram to increase water yields from threereservoirs serving the Denver area while optimiz-

ing benefits from other competing demands suchas hydropower and recreation (39). The ExtendedStreamflow Prediction component of WARFSwill allow a hydrologist to make extended proba-bilistic forecasts of values of stream flow andother hydrological variables, which can be usedfor flood-control planning, drought analysis andcontingency planning, and hydropower planning.

The Army Corps of Engineers has developedseveral models that, among other things, enablecommunities to evaluate demand-managementprograms and allow systems operators to consideralternative operating strategies (e.g., the Corp’sIWR-MAIN model). Much of the new softwareavailable is significantly more uier-friendly thanearlier versions, enabling models to be builtquickly, more easily, and at a fraction of the cost.The Corps’ research laboratories have also beendeveloping innovative methods and models foranalyzing water-environment problems that arenot traditionally part of its mission.

The new analytical tools, promising as they arefor improving water resource management, arebased on the assumption that the climate of thefuture will be similar to the climate of the past.Thus, historic patterns of temperature and rainfallhave been assumed to provide a good indicationof the range of expected future values. Climatechange may mean that the assumption of astationary climate may no longer be the bestpredictor of future conditions. Hence, someprocedures currently used to plan and designdams and other structures and to conduct hydro-logic analyses may need to be modified to accountfor this additional source of uncertainty. Amongthese procedures may be those used in flood-frequency analysis for floodplain planning, indetermining g the probable maximum flood ordesign flood for darn design and darn-safetyanalysis, in statistical analyses of historic runoffpatterns for reservoir-system planning, and instream-flow forecasting for reservoir operationsand flood control.18


Policy Options: Improving Supply Management

Systems integration and the reallocation ofsupplies based on current needs could providesignificant gains in water-management efficiencyand flexibility, and there appear to be manyopportunities for such gains. Several ways thatthe Federal Government could promote bettermanagement are considered below.

Option 5-10: Resurrect the former WaterResources Council or create a similar high-levelcoordinating body. A new council or committeecould play an important role in improving cooper-ation and coordination among the many Federalagencies with water-related responsibilities andamong Federal, State, and local governments andthe private sector. The new council might bestrengthened relative to the original one byappointing a full-time chair, who would reportdirectly to the President. It could be charged withreviewing interagency and intergovernmental pol-icies and programs to promote consistency, fair-ness, and efficiency and, more generally, withelaborating and overseeing national water policy.The original council was established by the WaterResources Planning Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-80).Legislatively, this council still exists, but Con-gress would need to restore funding for it.

Option 5-11: Promote the reestablishment andstrengthening of Federal-State river basin com-missions as another way to improve coordinationamong agencies. River basins, not political juris-dictions, are the natural management units forwater. Integrated management can only work ifthe multiple parties with jurisdiction in any givenwatershed can be brought together in some way toexplore common problems and pursue jointsolutions. Section 321 of the Water PollutionPrevention Control Act of 1993 addresses water-shed management and could be broadened, ifdesired, to explicitly address the formation of newFederal-State commissions. The Interstate Com-mission on the Potomac River Basin (ICPRB) orthe Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC)could serve as models.

ICPRB is jointly funded by member States andthe Federal Government. It serves as a neutralground for the basin States and the FederalGovernment to discuss mutual problems. Al-though ICPRB has no regulatory authority, it doesprovide sophisticated technical assistance in solv-ing problems around the basin. The combinationof political neutrality and technical competencehas allowed ICPRB to successfully mediate manydisputes. To promote establishment of this type ofriver basin commission, Congress could establisha grant program to make funds available (e.g., forestablishing technically competent staffs) togroups of States that choose to negotiate suchcompacts.

DRBC, in contrast, was established with con-siderable authority to control the diversion ofsurface and groundwater within the DelawareRiver Basin; coordinate Federal, State, and pri-vate reservoir releases during droughts; and limitpollution discharges. Individual States have re-tained veto power over all decisions, but DRBChas proved relatively effective as a setting fornegotiating disputes. A Federal representative isa co-equal member of the commission. TheDBRC policy was fully implemented only aftermany years and much controversy, but in itspresent shape, it could serve as a model for otherStates.

Option 5-12: Require the Army Corps ofEngineers and the Bureau of Reclamation toundertake periodic audits to improve operationalefficiency. Currently, the agencies do not system-atically reassess project operations to meet chang-ing social and economic trends (although extremeevents may trigger a reallocation study), nor islegislation authorizing a project systematicallyreviewed to determine whether it needs to beupdated. Congress would need to give the operat-ing agencies a clear mandate to do such studies,and appropriate additional money for this task.

Option 5-13: Enhance the ability of the ArmyCorps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclama-tion to modify operations of projects to meetchanging conditions. Currently, operating rules


based on project authorizations going back manydecades appear to give the operating agencieslittle latitude to improve operations or to respondin the most effective manner to droughts, andwhat little flexibility exists is difficult to exercisewhen water is in short supply (64). Many changeseither require or are perceived to require legisla-tion before they can be legally implemented. Theauthorization for a project need not require thatthe expected benefits of the project be derivedfrom that project alone.

To fully achieve the potential benefits ofoperating several reservoirs as a system, either fordealing with the possible impacts of climatechange or for simply improving the currentmanagement of water resources, Congress couldgive the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureauof Reclamation the administrative flexibility todeliver the expected benefits in the most effectivemanner (or, in cases where such flexibility isavailable, clarify its extent). New legislation,perhaps as part of the next omnibus water bill,likely in 1994, would probably be required.Where additional benefits can be created throughsystems management (e.g., additional water andincreased power revenues). Congress would needeither to direct the agencies in how to distributethese benefits or direct them to develop a proce-dure for doing so.

Option 5-14: Tie funding of Federal waterprojects to adoption of improved water-management practices by the States-such asdeveloping State groundwater management plans,facilitating transfers, and improving demand man-agement. There is some precedent for usingincentives or disincentives to encourage desirableactivity. For example, in exchange for supportingfunding of the Central Arizona Project, theSecretary of the Interior required that the State ofArizona adopt a groundwater law aimed atreducing pumping to a safe annual yield (92).Similarly, it may be possible for the FederalGovernment to require a State to adopt laws thatfacilitate water transfers before the State can

receive Federal funding for projects or otheractivities.

Option 5-15: Increase finding for the devel-opment and promotion of new analytic tools insystems-analysis studies. These new tools prom-ise a substantial payoff in improved water re-source management, but funding for agencies todevelop them has been inadequate. NOAA, forexample, has so far been unsuccessful in gettingsufficient funds for its WARFS initiative. Waterresource research funding for the U.S. GeologicalSurvey (USGS) has been cut substantially inrecent years. Congress might also want to con-sider facilitating the development of analyticaltools that incorporate climate uncertainty intotraditional hydrologic analyses.

Available modeling and forecasting tools (e.g.,the IWR-MAIN model) have not been widelydisseminated and used by State and local agen-cies. If Congress wishes to promote the greaterdissemination of these tools, it could increasefunding under Section 22 of the Water ResourcesDevelopment Act of 1974 (WRDA, P.L. 93-251).These funds are available for “training and techni-cal assistance to States and water utilities for avariety of traditional water resource managementneeds. Section 22 could also be extended to coverproblems that cross over from water resourcemanagement to environmental systems manage-ment (e.g., watershed management and wetlandrestoration).

1 Extreme-Events Management:Droughts and Floods

Natural climate variability almost guaranteesthat the signal of climate change will be difficultto detect. Drought and floods are among the mostextreme expressions of this variability, and whetheror not climate change is definitively detected,they will continue to occur. However, more-intense, longer-lasting, or more-frequent extremeevents such as these could occur in some areas in

. -—

a warmer climate (43).19 If this happens, societalvulnerability would increase and would pose newchallenges for public institutions and the privatesector.

Both floods and droughts cause significantlosses to human and natural systems. For exam-ple, costs and losses from the 1988 drought,

during which roughly 40 percent of the UnitedStates was severely affected, have been estimatedto be at least $39 billion (57). For this reason,potential changes in the extremes of these eventsare perhaps of even more concern than arelong-term changes in temperature and precipita-tion averages. Effective management of floodsand drought is extremely important if theirimpacts are to be minimized. Just as in thesupply-management issues discussed above, lackof coordination among and within levels ofgovernment has been and continues to be a keyconstraint to more-effective management. Somenear-term improvements in how extreme eventsare managed would help mitigate any surprisesthat climate change could bring.

Droughts

Drought, although difficult to define precisely,is generally the consequence of a natural reduc-tion in the amount of precipitation received overan extended period of time (usually at least aseason). A drought’s severity can be classified byits duration, intensity, and geographical extent.Factors such as high temperatures, high winds,and low relative humidity are often associatedwith the occurrence of a drought and can signifi-

cantly aggravate its severity. The demands madeby human activities and vegetation on a region’swater supplies are sinificant factors affectinghow large the societal and ecological impacts ofa drought will be. Population growth and increas-ing competition for water will lead to greatervulnerability to drought; the potential for climate


Six years of drought in the western United Statesreduced water supplies stored in reservoirs and ma&water resource management much more difficult. Lowwater levels are conspicuous in the amount of bareearth exposed in this aerial view of Luke Oroville. TheCalifornia State Water Project begins here, wherewater from the Feather River watershed is stored.

change provides an additional incentive to im-prove drought management.

Drought impacts are usually less obvious thanflood impacts (e.g., drought rarely results instructural damage). Impacts typically accumulateslowly over a considerable period of time, andthey may linger for years after the drought itselfhas ended. For these reasons, the effects ofdrought on society, the economy, and the environ-ment are more difficult to quantify, and theprovision of disaster relief is thus more challeng-ing. Droughts can provide instructive, if imper-fect, analogs to climate change, illustrating prob-lems that could occur more often in a warmerclimate (24, 57).

Government responses to previous droughts(e.g., in allocating water from Federal multipur-pose reservoirs, providing disaster assistance,

19 fi~eme CWXMS could also become less intense, shorter, or less fr~uent in different areas-the picture is not yet clear-but the resultswould be of less coneem and are not pursued further here.


fighting fires, and protecting wildlife refuges)suggest that drought policies could be much moreeffective than they are now (100). U.S. droughtpolicy is essentially based on the sentiment thatdrought is a rare and random event rather than onthe reality that it is a normal part of climatevariability. As such, Government response todrought has typically been reactive rather thanproactive, usually focused on crisis managementrather than risk management. Significantly, only23 States had drought plans in 1992, and most ofthese were inadequate (99, 100). The weakness ofthe reactive approach is evident in the uncoordi-nated, untimely, and largely ineffective responseefforts that have characterized past droughts(101). Drought relief, at least as it is usuallyprovided now, has often been a disincentive toadopting strategies to minimize risks associatedwith drought, such as purchasing crop insurance,and may unintentionally reinforce some poormanagement practices (see ch. 6).

Many studies, including, those of the WesternGovernors Policy Office (1978), the GeneralAccounting Office (1979), the National Academyof Sciences (1986), the American MeteorologicalOrganization (1990), and the Interstate Councilon Water Policy (1987, 1991), summarized in arecent report (100), have called for improvementof drought contingency planning. Most haveurged development of a national drought plan thatwould better define the respective roles of thevarious agencies that have drought-managementresponsibilities; promote coordination among Fed-eral agencies and among Federal, State, and locallevels of government; establish eligibility, repay-ment, and other requirements for drought assist-ance; and provide such assistance in a moretimely, consistent, and equitable manner. Al-though such objectives appear to have consider-able merit, not much progress toward meetingthem has been made to date. A new study by theU.S. Army Corps of Engineers-a recently com-pleted 4-year assessment of drought management—could provide the basis for developing a national

policy for improving water management duringdrought (95).

The United States may benefit from studyingthe new Australian drought policy. It applies onlyto agricultural drought and is based on thephilosophy that drought should not be considereda natural disaster but, rather, as part of a highlyvariable climate and one of the risks farmers facein managing farm operations. Rather than empha-size drought relief, the Australian Governmentstresses provision of high-quality information sofarmers can make better decisions, offers incen-tives to farmers to adopt sound drought-management practices, and discourages farmerswho pursue unsustainable farming practices indrought-prone areas from relying on droughtrelief (98). The long-term goal of this policy,which could also be used to promote soundpractices in other sectors affected by drought(e.g., urban areas), is to reduce vulnerability todrought, increase productivity, improve the allo-cation of resources, and enhance self-reliance.

Executive Order 12656, signed by PresidentReagan in November 1988, is intended to guideemergency water planning and management re-sponsibilities of Federal agencies. The orderspecifies a lead role for the Corps of Engineers fornational security emergency preparedness for theNation’s water resources, including coordinationof planning activities at the national, regional,State, and local levels (75). This order couldprovide a vehicle for bringing together relevantagencies to focus on both drought and floodmanagement. However, it has thus far had littleimpact. The Corps’ own 1992 study of the statusof emergency preparedness concluded that, de-spite the order, coordination of activities had notimproved. Among other things, the study notedthe absence of an overall Federal frameworkclearly defining the agency responsibilities de-scribed by the order, an absence of a cleardefinition of the types of disasters for which plansare to be developed, the low level of staffing andfunding assigned to emergency planning, and,perhaps most significantly, resistance on the part


of other Federal agencies and State officials togiving the Corps control over emergency plan-ning (75).

FloodsFloods affect smaller areas than do droughts

and are shorter-lived events but are, along withdroughts, among the most costly of weather-related phenomena.20 The importance and chal-lenge of managing floodplains and mitigatingflood losses are underscored by the costs of floodsin dollars and lives: between 1979 and 1988,average damages from flooding amounted toabout $2.4 billion per year, and an average of 95deaths each year is related to flooding (102). Partsof each of the 50 States have experienced flooding(28) and, in all, about 7 percent of the U.S. landarea is subject to occasional flooding. Principalareas subject to flooding are along rivers andadjacent to lake shores and sea coasts. Flashflooding along arroyos and ephemeral streams isof special concern in the arid Southwest (102).

Since the 1930s, considerable progress inmitigating flood damages has been made. Bothstructural (e.g., building reservoirs and levees)and nonstructural approaches (including floodforecasting and implementing floodplain regula-tions) have been used. The success of the NationalFlood Insurance Program (NFIP), created in1%8, is supported by the fact that more than18,000 of the 22,000 flood-prone communities inthe Nation now participate in the program, andmost of the 40,000 stream miles in the UnitedStates have been mapped for flood risk (103).Also, important technical improvements in floodforecasting and warning systems have been made.

Despite the progress, however, flood darnage isincreasing at about 1.5 percent every year (about$200 per 1,000 people per year) (19). An updateof a 1987 study for the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency estimated that 9.6 millionhouseholds and $390 billion in property are at riskfrom flooding (5). Mitigation has fallen well short

Every State has experienced some flooding at one timeor another, and as more people move into flood-proneareas, the exposure of people and property to potentialflood risks increases. The homes shown here wereflooded in 1986 when the Yuba and Bear Riversoverflowed their banks near Marysville, California.

of what was expected when current policies andactivities were initiated. Also, some trends anddisturbing problems indicate that despite recentefforts, vulnerability to flood damages is likely tocontinue to grow: 1) populations in and adjacentto flood-prone areas, especially in coastal areas,continue to increase, putting more property andgreater numbers of people at risk, 2) flood-moderating wetlands continued to be destroyed(see vol. 2, ch. 4), 3) little has been done to controlor contain increased runoff from upstream devel-opment (e.g., runoff caused by paving over land),4) many undeveloped areas have not yet been

mapped (mapping has been concentrated in already-developed areas), and people are moving intosuch areas without adequate information concer-ning the risk, 5) many dams and levees arebeginnin g to deteriorate with age, leaving property owners with a false sense of security about


how well they are protected, and 6) some policies(e.g., provision of subsidies for building roadsand bridges) tend to encourage development infloodplains (38).

Climate change could increase flood risk.Although considerable uncertainty exists, climatechange could bring more-frequent and/or more-intense floods. Given that development in andnear floodplains is expected to last a considerableperiod of time and that ‘the Nation’s ability topredict the magnitude and frequency of futureevents is still limited, it may be prudent toconsider the potential effects of climate changewhen decisions are made (or revised) about thetype and amount of development allowed invulnerable areas. In the absence of sufficient data,flexible and cautious policies are preferred.

An important constraint to better floodplainmanagement mirrors a common constraint inother areas of water resource management: manyFederal agencies have some flood-control respon-sibilities, and they are often unable to work in acoordinated fashion. The four principal Federalagencies involved in construction, operation, andmaintenance of flood-control facilities are theArmy Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Recla-mation, the Soil Conservation Service, and theTennessee Valley Authority. The multiple mis-sions of these agencies overlap, and agencies maydisagree on who is in control and what structuresshould be built and for what purposes. TheFederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)plays an important role in administering the NFIPand disaster assistance. The involvement of Stateand local agencies, the private insurance industry,and developers, all with different goals, adds tothe difficulty of coordination (19).

In practice, no truly unified national programfor floodplain management exists, nor are theremany examples of effective regional bodies. Sucha unified plan could be of” great value in sortingout the respective roles of” each level of govern-ment and the private sector, in establishing therelative importance of multiple floodplain man-agement objectives (including flood-loss reduc-

tion and natural-value protection), and in promot-ing implementation strategies.

An even broader problem is that floodplainmanagement is usually addressed separately fromother aspects of water resource planning andland-use policy. Ideally, regional floodplain man-agement would be considered as part of a broaderplan addressing in addition water-quality and-quantity issues, habitat and open-space preserva-tion, and other land-use and development con-cerns (19) (see vol. 2, chs. 4, 5, and 6).

Policy options for Improvlng Drought ManagementPrevious drought-assessment and -response

efforts have suffered from the lack of coordina-tion of activities at the Federal level and from lackof coordination among Federal, State, and re-gional drought-management activities. Greaterintegration of activities could be fostered inseveral ways and could help reduce vulnerabilityto future droughts and enable scarce resources tobe used more effectively.

Option 5-16: Create an interagency droughttaskforce with the authority to develop a nationaldrought policy and plan. Congress could do thisor the authority of existing Executive Order12656, which was established to guide emer-gency water planning and management responsi-bilities of Federal agencies, could be used. Sucha plan should define specific, action-orientedresponse objectives and contain an integratedstrategy for implementing them. Leadership ofthe task force could be either a designated leadagency or the Office of the President. All Federalagencies with drought-related missions and repre-sentatives of State Government, regional organi-zations, and the private sector should be included.Results of the Corp’s National Drought Manage-ment Study, the most recent Federal effort, wouldprovide a good point of departure (95).

As part of the development of national policy,Federal agencies’ drought-relief programs shouldbe reviewed, including, for example, soil- andwater-conservation programs and the FederalCrop Insurance Program. These reviews should


Table 5-3—Possible Risk-Management and Risk-Minimization Measures the FederalGovernment Could Consider to Lessen the Effects of Drought

Assessment programsDevelop a comprehensive, integrated national drought-watch system (NDWS)Inventory data availability in support of an NDWSDevelop new indexes to assist in the early estimation of drought impacts in various sectorsEstablish objective “triggers” for the phase-in and phase-out of relief and assistance programs

Legislation, public policyDevelop a national drought policy and planExamine Federal land-use policies to ensure appropriate management of natural resources and

consistency with national drought policyReview all Federal drought-relief-assistance programs, Federal crop-insurance program, and other

agricultural and water policies for consistency with national drought policy

Public-awareness programsEstablish a national drought-mitigation center to provide Information to the public and private sectorsImprove data information products and delivery systems to provide timely and reliable information to

usersDevelop and implement water-conservation-awareness programs

Drought-preparedness planningPromote the establishment of comprehensive State drought plansPromote intergovernmental cooperation and coordination on drought planningEvaluate worst-case scenarios for drought managementEvaluate the potential effects of climate change on regional hydrology and its implications on Federal

and State water policiesPromote the establishment of drought plans by public water suppliersConduct post-drought audits of Federal drought-assessment and -response efforts

—— —SOURCE: D. Wilhite, “Drought Management and Climate Change,” contractor report prepared for the Office of TechnologyAssessment, December 1992.

include taking an inventory of current assistanceprograms and their eligibility requirements, iden-tifying overlapping responsibilities, and examin-ing the distribution of financial resources to reliefrecipients. Reviews could also examine the tim-ing and effectiveness of relief.

Additional components of a national droughtpolicy could also include:

1. Adopting risk-management and risk-minimization practices such as those listedin table 5-3. Federal agencies could con-sider following the lead of Australia, wherethe government does not ignore the need forassistance during severe drought but pro-motes more self-reliance while at the sametime protecting the natural and agriculturalresource base. Drought relief, for example,could be made contingent on adopting ways

2.

to minimize drought risk (e.g., buying cropinsurance) (see ch. 6).

Supporting post-drought audits of assess-ment and response efforts. All episodes ofsevere drought in the United States provokesome degree of response from the FederalGovernment. At times, such as during the1974-77 and 1988-89 droughts, massivelevels of drought relief are targeted for thestricken area. However, comprehensive post-drought audits of assessment and responseefforts are not routinely conducted. Auditscould identify successes and failures ofrecent efforts and provide a basis for revis-ing drought policies to improve futureresponses. An interagency task force mightdirect university or private research groupsto conduct the audits to avoid appearance ofbias.


3. Developing a national drought-watch sys-tem. The climate-related monitoring activi-ties of the Federal Government are splitamong many agencies and subagencies,which means that a comprehensive nationalassessment of drought conditions does notexist. Given that recognition of drought canbe slow, a national early-warning systemwould be useful to support a more proactivenational drought policy and plan. Severalspecific actions might be considered:1) create a national drought-watch team,possibly under the authority of the intera-gency drought task force, to routinely assessprecipitation, temperature, soil moisture,groundwater levels, stream flow, snowpackconditions, runoff potential, and reservoirand lake levels, and 2) create a nationalagricultural weather-information office withinthe U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)to address more adequately the needs of theagricultural community for climate-relatedinformation. Such an office would providea focus for existing USDA weather-relatedprograms and would oversee needed newones.

Policy Options for Improving Flood ManagementThe Federal roles in flood management include

overseeing national flood policy, coordinatingfloodplain management efforts, providing techni-cal guidance and education, and regulating andfunding some State, local, and private activities.Some options that may promote these roles andintroduce greater efficiency and flexibility intoflood management are considered below. Others,including possible reforms of the NFIP, arediscussed in the context of coastal development involume 2, chapter 4.

Option 5-17: Create a national flood-assessment board, to consist of representatives ofFederal, State, and local agencies and the privatesector. The board could establish a set of nationalgoals for floodplain management together with atimetable for their achievement, assess existing

Federal flood programs and responsibilities, rec-ommend changes in missions of Federal agenciesto eliminate overlap, and assign responsibilitieswhere gaps occur.

Such a board could also promote the refine-ment and implementation of State floodplainmanagement plans. Much energy has alreadybeen expended on developing State and localmitigation plans, but these plans are often morepaper exercises than practical guides to action.Plan implementation could be aided by develop-ing a model floodplain management plan, con-ducting regional training programs, and expand-ing efforts to educate the public about the natureof flood hazards and the natural values offloodplains.

The board could facilitate multiobjective floodplain management. Floodplains may contain homes,businesses, recreation sites, fish and wildlifehabitats, and historic sites, among other things.Each of these features is usually managed sepa-rately rather than as an integrated package, andconflict among different interests is often theresult. The Federal Government could do more tofacilitate State and local programs to manage in amore integrated fashion by, for example, provid-ing technical assistance and grants-in-aid. As partof the Clean Water Act reauthorization, Congresscould provide incentive grants to States or com-munities that undertake multiobjective watershed-management initiatives.

Finally, the board might be directed to conductan evaluation of various programs and activities(such as FEMA’s) to determine their effective-ness or to assess how to improve the acquisitionand utilization of data on flood damages. Aninteragency flood-insurance task force has beenproposed in Title V of H.R. 62, the National FloodInsurance Compliance, Mitigation, and ErosionManagement Act of 1993, that could, as currentlyenvisioned, undertake this activity. However,State, local, and private participation on theflood-assessment board would, in general, im-prove its effectiveness.


Option 5-18: Direct the National Flood Insur-ance Program to base risk calculations onanticipated development, rather than on currentdevelopment. Recognition of the impact of in-creased runoff on flood damage is a weak area inthe National Flood Insurance Program. Currently,floodplain delineation is based on the develop-ment that exists in the basin at the time thehydrologic and hydraulic studies are done (19).As development in the basin increases, peakflows and volumes increase, which will result ina change in the 100-year flood, possibly turningit into a 50-year or lo-year event. A changingclimate would also alter future flood risks andmight similarly be considered to the extentpossible. The long-term benefit of this policywould be to prevent or alter construction in areasthat could become (or are likely to become)flood-hazard zones in the future.

9 Supply AugmentationSeveral alternatives exist for augmenting sup-

plies of water. These include, among others,expanding the capacity to store water that couldnot be used immediately and would otherwise notbe available for use later, desalting sea (orbrackish) water, diverting water through newpipelines and aqueducts from low- to high-demand areas, and treating and reusing waste-water.

Reservoirs and Climate ChangePeriods of high water demand rarely corre-

spond to times of high water supply. Buildingreservoirs has been a common solution to theproblem of storing water during high-flow peri-ods and releasing it for later use as needed.Currently, there are more than 2,650 reservoirs inthe United States with capacities of 5,000 af ormore. The combined capacity of these reservoirsis about 480 million af, of which 90 percent isstored by the 574 largest. There are also at least50,000 smaller reservoirs, with capacities rangingfrom 50 to 5,000 af (14).

After decades of reservoir building, the Na-tion’s reservoir infrastructure is largely in place.There are still opportunities to build additionalreservoirs, but the pace of new construction hasslowed dramatically in the past decade. Onereason for the slowdown is the high cost of newreservoirs and the scarcity of available funds. Asecond is the fact that there are relatively fewgood undeveloped sites left. In addition, publicattitudes about the environment have changed,and many people no longer believe that thebenefits of new-reservoir construction outweighthe costs. Reservoirs have destroyed substantialriparian habitat, blocked free-flowing sections ofrivers, interrupted migration corridors, and de-prived downstream wetlands of sediment. Conse-quently, it is now very difficult politically to buildmajor new dams.

Currently, climate change is not explicitlyconsidered by the Nation’s largest reservoiroperator-the Army Corps of Engineers, theBureau of Reclamation, the Soil ConservationService, or the Tennessee Valley Authority-inrenovating or managing existing reservoirs or inplanning and designing new ones. Uncertaintyabout the regional impacts of climate change onrunoff makes it difficult to justify changingdesign features or operating rules at this time (67).Also, the high fixed-discount rate used in cost-benefit analyses heavily discounts those benefitsof a new project that might occur several decadesin the future. Hence, when standard economicdiscounting rules are used, specific featuresintegrated into reservoir design to anticipateclimate change would be difficult to justifyeconomically. Finally, the Corps argues thatreservoir-design criteria have been based on anengineering-reliability -based strategy that buildsin considerable buffering capacity for extrememeteorologic and hydrologic events. Thus, manyof the 500 largest existing reservoirs may alreadyhave the capacity and operating flexibility desira-ble to cope with a changing climate (27).

Still, many existing reservoirs are currently inneed of major or minor rehabilitation. As rehabil-


itation work is undertaken, engineers could con-sider whether regional climate change data orcosts justify modifications based on anticipatedclimate change. The need for more storage spaceor flood-control capacity could sometimes besatisfied by undertaking such structural modifica-tions as increasing the height (which often alsorequires increasing the bulk) of a dam andenlarging its spillway. (Even without consideringclimate change, many small, nonfederal dams anda few Federal ones lack adequate spillway capac-ity.) Enlarging a reservoir is not without environ-mental costs because additional land would beinundated. Where feasible, temperature-sensitive

fish species downstream from a dam could beaccommodated by mixing the colder, deeperwater in a reservoir with warmer, surface water.Such temperature control can be accomplished byretrofitting multiple-level outflows to a dam’soutlet works .21 Enlarging one reservoir in areservoir system may also allow the entire systemto be operated more flexibly (see Supply Manage-ment, above).

Despite concerns about reservoirs, some newones are likely to be required (even if notspecifically in response to climate change). Gen-erally, anew reservoir would be a robust responseto the uncertainty of climate change-it would

21 w Would cost abut $85 million for Sbasta Darn in Northern Ctioti, for ex~ple.


allow greater operational flexibility whether thefuture brought more intense droughts or morefloods. However, a reservoir is also a fixed,permanent structure, so before large amounts arespent on an irreversible decision, the costs andbenefits of a new reservoir should be weighedagainst those of other adaptation options. Forthose new reservoirs required, overbuilding as aresponse to uncertainty may no longer be appro-priate or feasible. Given high costs, the trendtoward reduced Federal contributions to water-project construction, and upfront financing re-quirements, new reservoirs are likely to besmaller and will probably be designed with lessbuffering capacity for extreme events (56). Withless margin for error, complementary strategies,such as emergency evacuation and flood-warningplans and water conservation and reallocation,become relatively more important (67). Thesestrategies, however, incur greater residual risks topeople, the consequences of which must be takeninto account in a full analysis of social, economic,and environmental benefits and costs.

DesalinizationDesalination is not likely to be an important

water-supply option in the United States in thenext two decades. The costs of desalinating water,especially sea water, are still very high relative tomost other options. However, desalination hasseveral characteristics that make it worth consid-ering as a supplementary source of reliablewater, especially in water-short coastal cities.

Desalination plants are currently very expen-sive to build and operate relative to most otheroptions. High energy costs are an especiallysignificant constraint. However, in principle,desalination of sea water offers consumers accessto an inexhaustible and noninterruptible source ofsupply that is free of competition for water rights(46). Desalination offers a flexible way to main-tain deliveries during prolonged dry periods. It iscompletely independent of rainfall or of deliver-

The Yuma Desalting Plant is the world’s largestreverse osmosis unit. Located in southwestern Arizonajust north of Mexico, the plant desalts highly salinedrainage water from farmlands east of Yuma beforethe water enters the Colorado River. This operationlowers the overall salinity of the Colorado and enablesthe United States to meet its treaty obligation to deliverwater of acceptable quality to Mexico.

ies from outside the service area. When notneeded, a desalination plant can be shut off,saving some operational expenses. Desalinationplants can also be used in conjunction withtraditional stored supplies to allow more-efficientuse of these supplies during wet or normal years(e.g., more water can be drawn from a reservoirthan might otherwise be safe). Incremental adjust-ments to the size of a plant can be made to respondto changing circumstances.

The case of the City of Santa Barbara illustratesthe potential of desalination to provide flexibilityduring prolonged dry periods. Santa Barbara hasvery little groundwater and is not yet connected tothe California State Water Project (SWP), so itnormally relies on local surface-water sources tomeet 90 to 100 percent of its 16,000-af/year waterdemands. 22 This reliance on local surface-water

22 B, Fawmq @ of SaU@ Barbara Water Department pCrSOd cOmmtication, JUIY 1992.


sources left Santa Barbara quite vulnerable to therecent California drought. To reduce its vulnera-bility to future droughts, city voters-by a widemargin-approved plans to build a small ($40million) reverse-osmosis plant to convert seawater to fresh water. Despite its cost, the city seesits desalination plant as a good way todroughtproof its water-supply system. The 7,500-af/year plant has been operational since March1992. It was operated briefly during its commis-sioning period but has been on standby since localwater-supply reservoirs have filled because offavorable weather conditions.

The siting of desalination plants is not asconstrained to specific locations as are reservoirs.Because desalination plants occupy much lessspace than dams and reservoirs, it may be easierto find suitable land for them. On the other hand,desalination plants can still be sizable industrialfacilities, which some find objectionablein coastalsettings. In most cases, the high capital andenergy costs of desalinated water constrain thenear-term penetration of this technology in theUnited States. Brine disposal is also of someconcern and may add to the long-term operatingcosts of such a facility.

Interregional Diversions

Over the years, many ideas have been proposedfor diverting large amounts of water from water-surplus to water-deficit areas of the continent.Many plans have been proposed to bring waterfrom the Pacific Northwest via pipelines andaqueducts to the populated regions of the South-west. Among these have been proposals to divertwater from the Columbia River, the MississippiRiver, and several Canadian rivers. None of theseproposals are currently being seriously consid-ered by water planners. All are prohibitivelyexpensive, most would likely entail unacceptableenvironmental impacts, and the massive quanti-

ties of water that they could supply are probablyunnecessary. Politically, such projects are notnow feasible. Few, if any, potential water-exporting areas are willing to give up water thatmay ultimately affect their growth potential orthat may be needed for instream uses. Conversely,it is debatable whether additional growth shouldbe subsidized in water-short areas, especially ifthere are indications that those regions couldbecome drier as a result of climate change.

Interrgional diversions should not be ruled outcompletely, however. Climate change could causea reconsideration of major diversions in the moredistant future.23 Moreover, in areas of increasedprecipitation, “high-flow- “slumming” diversionsmay be attractive. Many of the existing plans aretechnically feasible, and although currently un-likely, some rivers now classified as wild andscenic could, in theory, be diverted. As long asother less-expensive and environmentally moresound options are available, little support ofinterregional diversions is likely to develop.

Reclaiming Water

Traditionally, water has been supplied to mu-nicipal residents, used, treated, and then dis-charged as wastewater effluent (12). Much of thiswastewater could be recovered and reused wherepotable-quality supplies are not needed. Land-scape watering, industrial cooling, groundwaterrecharging, and toilet flushing are among themany uses to which reclaimed water could be put.Reclaimed water could be treated to drinking-water standards at greater cost, but this may not benecessary because its use on golf courses and thelike would enable high-quality water now usedfor these purposes to be shifted to potable uses.

The use of reclaimed water is one of the mostpromising new sources of water supply, espe-cially because virtually all water uses createwastewater and, therefore, generate a reliable


Box 5-J-The Use of Reclaimed Water in St. Petersburg

Freshwater suppiies for the city of St. Petersburg, Florida are limited because it is located at the end of apeninsula. The city’s growing population led the Southwest florida WWer Management District to declare St.Petersburg a “water shortage area” in the early 1970s. At about the same time, the State legislature mandatedthat wastewater treatment plants discharging to polluted Tampa Bay start to treat their wastewater to a qualityequal to that required for drinking water. St. Petersburg responded to these two actions by initiating a program toterminate disposal of wastewater into Tampa Bay and at the same time to ensure an adequate drinking supplythrough the year 2020 by recycling the city’s wastewater (71).

Several financial, institutional, and educational barriers had to be overcome before the reclaimed-waterprogram could be implemented. Because it proved to be too expensive to treat wastewater to potable standards,the city decided to use reclaimed water only for irrigation and industrial-cooling purposes. This required not onlyupgrades to existing treatment plants aml storage facilities, but a new distribution system completely separate fromthe potable-water system. St. Petersburg was able to afford the cost of building a separate water-delivery systemonly because Federal (i.e., Environmental Protection Agency) and State funding was available to offset some ofthe planning, design, and construction costs (71).

The city had to work closely with the State Department of Environmental Regulation to write regulations thatwould aflow for the distribution of reclaimed water, and it had to overcome initial public skeptidsm. Apublic-education campaign resulted in both acceptance and pride in the innovative program on the part of cityresidents.

Since 1992, St. Petersburg has had four treatment plants, which treat and chlorinate water to a high standardof quality, with all pathogens being completely removed. Approximately 10 million gallons per day (mgd)l ofreclaimed water is routed through a separate distribution system to 7,340 customers who use the water forirrigation and cooling. The city hires inspectors to ensure that cross-connections between the two systems do notoccur, but the reclahned water is of high enwgh qualit y that occasional mistakes have not resulted in any adversehealth effects to consumers.

The reclaimed-water treatment and distribution system has the capacity to reach 11,000 customers withpotential demand of 20 mgd; the dty feels that it can reach this level of service in another 5 years. Total waterdemand in the city (potable and nonpotable) is approximately 42 mgd, so reclaimed water for nonpotable usescould eventually account for half of all St. Petersburg water deliveries.

By substituting reclaimed water for potable water in irrigation and cooling, the aty estimates that it haseliminated the need for expansion of its potable-water-supply system until the year 2030 (59). St. Petersburg pridesitself on becoming “the first major municipality in the United States to achieve zero waste-water discharge tosurrounding surface waters” (71), and now receives money for water that it previously had to pay the State forpermission to dump into the bay. Other communities in the United States and beyond have recognized the city’saccomplishments by sending a steady stream of visitors to iearn firsthand about the aty’s dualdistribution system

138 million iiters per day; to oonvert from gallons to liters, multiply w 3.785.

supply. Many communities are already using or about the quality of reclaimed water. Compliancearming to use reclaimed water (see box 5-J), butpl with environmental and health regulations is

the costs of reclaimin g water are high. Moreover, currently a major source of delay for reclamationcosts may not decline much with advances in projects, but as wastewater reclamation and reusewater-treatment technology because a major ex- become more common, these delays are likely topense is for construction of separate distribution diminish.systems. Development of this new source often The Metropolitan Water District (MSVD) ofrequires an active campaign to educate the public Southern California has sought to encourage


development of wastewater reclamation facilitiesand to help its member agencies overcomefinancing problems by offering agencies $154 foreach acre-foot of “new water” produced, pro-vided that this water replaces an existing demandfor imported water from MWD. Together with the$322/af it would cost local agencies to buy anequivalent amount of imported water from MWD,the subsidy makes reclamation projects economi-cal for many local agencies.24 MWD also financesup to 25 percent of the cost of initial feasibilitystudies in order to encourage consideration ofreclamation possibilities. California hopes to beusing 500,000 af of reclaimed water per year by2010 (6).

Policy Options for EncouragingStructural Improvements

Option 5-19: Require that the potential forclimate change be considered in the design of newstructures or the rehabilitation of old ones.Climate change uncertainty adds another com-plex dimension to project scaling. Because cli-mate could potentially change during the longlifespan of these structures, steps taken now toincrease flexibility could prevent problems fromdeveloping decades in the future. In particular, theNation’s water agencies could be directed toevaluate the costs and benefits of adding addi-tional volume, spillway capacity, or temperaturecontrols to existing or new structures.

Option 5-20: Appropriate funds for waste-water reclamation, desalination, or other water-supply research. Congress could consider usingthe authority of sections 106 and 108 of the WaterResources Research Act of 1984.

FIRST STEPSWater resource management has two essential

objectives: to ensure that enough water of ade-quate quality is available during normal anddrought periods for all necessary demands--including environmental ones-and to ensure

that water in the form of life- and property-threatening floods does not get out of control.Growing stress on water resource systems and thepossibility that new stresses such as climatechange will arise make these objectives increas-ingly difficult to accomplish. The demand- andsupply-management options discussed in thischapter (table 5-4) are likely to be increasinglyimportant as means to cope with growing stresson water supplies. These options contributegreater flexibility, greater efficiency, or both towater resource management and thus aid, gener-ally, adaptation to climate change.

Considering climate change alone, there are nocompelling arguments why any one supply- ordemand-management option should be preferredto another. All are important and would contrib-ute, if sometimes only in small ways, to improvedwater resource management in a changed climate.However, the system is very inefficient now,given numerous institutional obstacles, lack ofincentives to conserve water, overlapping andsometimes conflicting responsibilities of Federalagencies, and lack of coordination among levelsof government. Fundamental changes are neededin the way water is valued and used; thosechanges can begin with steps that both relieveexisting stresses and make sense for climatechange. Implementing the suggestions below—drawn from the whole range of options discussedabove-would likely create the conditions forfuture progress in water resource planning andmanagement.

■ Improve extreme-events management.Perhaps the most important actions thatshould not be delayed concern improving themanagement of extreme events. Floods anddroughts will continue to occur even if theycannot be linked definitively to climatechange. Improving flood and drought man-agement now could help minimize bothnear-and long-term losses. Important first

m D. m, Dirmtor of Resources, Metropolitan Water District of Southern _O1l’l& h A.t@s, PUWlld ~mmdMtioQ J~y lm.


Table 91-Summary of Options to Improve Water Resource Management

InstitutionalResurrect the former Water Resources CouncilReestablish and strengthen Federal-State river basin commissionsCreate an interagency task force to develop a national drought policyCreate a national flood-assessment boardIntegrate floodplan management into basin-scale planning

Research and developmentFund the development and use of water-conservation technologiesFund the development and use of waste-water-reclamation technologyIncrease funding for development and promotion of new analytic toolsIncorporate flexibility into the design of new structures or the rehabilitation of old ones

Direct Federal leversRevise the tax code to promote conservation investmentProvide stronger leadership to facilitate water transfersClarify reclamation law on trades and transfersReduce Federal obstacles to Interstate transfersClarify the rules regarding the marketing of Indian waterAllow Federal agencies to buy water for environmental purposesExpand the scope and/or nature of the Western Water Policy ReviewConduct post-drought auditsDirect the Interagency floodplain Management Task Force to promote the preparation of State

floodplain management plans

Economic Incentives and disincentivesAllow state revolving-loan funds to be used for conservation investmentsReform pricing in Federal water projectsTie funding of State water projects to adoption of Improved water-management practicesEncourage adoption of risk-management and -minimization practics to mitgate drought effects

OperationalEncourage water conservation in Federal facilitiesRequire operating agencies to undertake periodic audits to Improve efficiencyGive Federal operating agencies greater ability to modify project operations to meet changing

conditions

a An order of priority has not been established.


steps could be for Congress to direct the mexecutive branch to create an interagencydrought task force with authority to developa national drought policy and, similarly, anational flood-assessment board to establishnational goals for floodplain management.Title V of H.R. 62, the National FloodInsurance Compliance, Mitigation, and Ero-sion Management Act of 1993, establishes aflood-insurance task force. This bill could bebroadened to create a more comprehensiveflood-assessment board. The President couldestablish an interagency drought task forcewithout additional authority, but Congressmay wish to direct the Administration to do so.

Promote management of reservoirs on abasin-wide level. Operation of reservoirswithin the same basin as a single systemrather than individually, as is often the case,could greatly improve the efficiency andflexibility of water-quantity management.Making such operations easier would alsoassist development of the more integratedapproach desirable for managing water qual-ity, wetlands, flooding, and drought. Newlegislation, perhaps as part of the nextomnibus water bill, could grant the ArmyCorps of Engineers and the Bureau ofReclamation greater administrative flexibil-ity to do this.


■

■

m

Promote water marketing. Among manyinstitutional problems that Congress maywish to consider are those related to watermarketing. As long as adequate attention isgiven to protecting third-party interests,water markets could provide an efficient andflexible means of adapting to various stresses,including a changing climate. Of the severaloptions identified in this report for reducingimpediments to creating water markets, earlyaction to clarify reclamation law on tradesand transfers and to define the FederalGovernment’s interest in facilitating thecreation of markets would be most useful.Congress could urge the Department of theInterior to provide stronger leadership toassist transfers. Evaluation of water market-ing should also be thoroughly considered inthe Western Water Policy Review, authori-zed in late 1992 by P.L. 102-575, theCentral Wiley Project Improvement Act.Promote use of new analytical tools. Fur-ther development, dissemination, and use ofnew modeling and forecasting tools couldgreatly assist water resource management.Some current development efforts (e.g.,NOAA’s WHS initiative) have not beenadequately funded, and the most advancedtools now available are not yet being used bymany States or water utilities. Small sumsspent now promoting dissemination and useof these tools could save substantial sumslater. Section 22 of the Water ResourcesDevelopment Act of 1974 authorizes fund-ing for training and technical assistance toStates and could be used to promote use ofanalytical tools. Congress may also want toconsider providing funds to develop orrefine tools that incorporate climate uncer-tainty into traditional hydrologic analyses.Promote demand management. Several‘‘targets of opportumity” for improving water-use efficiency are likely to present them-selves in the 103d Congress. The upcomingreauthorization of the Clean Water Act

stands out. State revolving funds (createdunder Title VI of the act) have been asuccessful means for funding wastewatertreatment plants. In CWA reauthorization,Congress could consider making conserva-tion projects eligible for revolving-fundloans. This would not only promote demandmanagement but would reduce the amountof water that needs treating. The FederalGovernment could also make a contributionto promoting efficient water-use practices bysetting an example in its own numerousfacilities. The Energy Policy Act of 1992proposes just this but concentrates primarilyon energy conservation rather than waterconservation. A technical-adjustment bill tothe Energy Policy Act may be considered inthe 103d Congress and would provide a wayto clarify and underline congressional intenttoward water conservation in Federal facili-ties.Expand the scope of the Western WaterPolicy Review. With the enactment of TitleXXX of the Reclamation Projects Authori-zation and Adjustment Act of 1992 (P.L.102-575), Congress authorized the Presidentto oversee a major water-policy study. Underthe heading Western Water Policy Review,Title XXX directs the President to undertakea comprehensive review of Federal activitiesin the 19 Western States that affect theallocation and use of water resources and tomake a report to appropriate congressionalcommittees by the end of October 1995 (87).

Congress has authorized or undertakenmore than 20 major studies since 1900 toprovide a basis for improving national poli-cies that affect water management. Somehave led to important changes in policy;others have been largely ignored. Despite theuneven record of these studies, a new studyis warranted: two decades have lapsed andmany demographic, economic, environmental,and attitudinal changes have occurred sincethe last comprehensive study of water

. —.——

resource problems was completed by thepresidentially appointed National Water Com-mission (NWC) in 1973. Some of the areasthat need detailed attention now includedemand management, quality-vs.-quantityissues, instream-water values, social andenvironmental impacts, water marketing andpricing, land use in relation to water re-sources, cost sharing and upfront financing,comprehensive urban water planning, waysto promote integrated river basin planning,and development of analytical tools. Climatechange is not mentioned as a factor motivat-ing the Western Water Policy Review, butthe study could provide an opportunity toassess more fully how climate change mayaffect water resources and to evaluate policyoptions that might help with adaptation to awarmer climate.

Congress could expand the scope and/ornature of the Western Water Policy Review.Water problems are not all in the West, so amore general review of national water policy

Chapter 5-Water Im 265

may make sense. Expanding the currentlyauthorized study would, however, greatlyincrease its complexity. Also, other committ-ees of Congress may want to becomeinvolved, and broader State or regionalrepresentation would probably be required.Broadening the study could be accomplishedby amending the legislation or by ExecutiveOrder. If the Western Water Policy Reviewis not expanded to include the entire UnitedStates, Congress could authorize a similarfollow-on study of eastem water issues.

The Western Water Policy Review mayalso provide an opportunity to explicitlyconsider land-use practices and water re-source issues jointly. One shortcoming ofmost previous water-policy studies is thatland and water use were not consideredtogether. However, the relationship betweenthe two is a close one, and there appear to besignificant opportunities to improve bothwater-quantity and water-quality manage-ment by improving land-use practices. Fur-

WATER-FIRST STEPS8 Improve extreme-events management

Direct the executive branch to create an interagency drought task force with authority to develop a national drought policy.Direct the executive branch to create a national flood assessment board to establish national goals for floodplain

management.m Promote management of reservoirs on a bssin-wide level

--Grant the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers greater administrative flexibility to manage reservoirsbasin-wide in the next 1994 Omnibus Water Bill.

m Promote water marketing--Clarify reclamation law on trades and transfers-Urge the Department of the interior to provide stronger leadership to assist transfers.--Require evaluation of water marketing in the Western Water Policy Review, authorized by P.L 102-575.

■ Promote use of new analytical tools for water modelling and forecasting

-Use funds under Section 22 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1974 to promote use of analytical tools as part of thetraining and technical assistance to States.

E Promote demand management--Make conswvation projects eligible for revolving-fund loans in the Clean Water Act reauthorization.-Clarify the stated congressional intent of promoting water conservation in Federal facilities with a technical-adjustment bill to

the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L 102-486).● Expand the scope of the Western Water Policy Review

--Evaluate land-use practices and water resource issues jointly.--Include an analysis of the eastern States now or authorize their study after the western review is completed.


thermore, any study focused exclusively onwater resources might fall short of providinga basis for coping with all of the problemsthat could arise if climate changes.

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We-stern States Water Counc& ‘61nterregional Water Trans- 101.fers,’ a report requested by the Nevada State @#ature, May1991. From remarks by former Arizona Governor BruceBabbitt before the Seventh Annual We-stem States Water 102.Council Wates Management Symposium in Scottsdale, AZ,Oct. 10, 1990.White, D., D. Collins, and M. Howdm “Drought in Austmlia:Prediction, Monitoring, Management and Policy,” in:DroughtAssessment, Management, and Planm”ng: Theory andCase Studies (Bostom MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 103.1993).Wilhite, D., “Drough4” in: Encyclopedia of Earth SystemScience, Volume 2 (New York: Academic Press, Inc.,1992),Wilhite, D., “Drought Management and C&ate Change, ”

Wi.lhite, D., N, Rosenberg, and M, Glantz, ‘Improving FederalResponse to Droughc” Journal of Climate and AppliedMeteorology, vol. 10, 1986.Wingerd, D., and M. Tseng, ‘ ‘Flood and Drought Functions ofthe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, ” ti National Watersumma ry 19&8~My&ologic Events and Floo& andDroughts, U.S. Geological Survey Water-Supply Paper2375 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Offke,1991).Wrigh4 J,, and D. porter, ‘‘Floodplain Management andNatural Systems,” paper presented at the National Forum onWater Management Policy, Anerican Water Resources Asso-ciation Washington DC, 1992<

contractor report prepared for the 0fi3ce of ‘IkdmologyAssessmenfl December 1992,

APPENDIX 5.1–WATER RESOURCE CONCERNS:REGION BY REGION AND STATE BY STATE

New England Region

Development of surface and groundwater is substantial here. Municipal and industrial pollution is localized. Drought is rare. The lack ofredundancy of water supplies indicates vulnerability.

Connecticut--Small reservoirs susceptible to below-average rainfall are networked with larger, robust reservoirs; point and non-pointcontamination; potential flooding due to convective storms in the summer, hurricanes in the fall, and snowmelt in the spring.

Main--Abundant water resources; localized groundwater pollution due to urbanization agriculture, and industrial-municipal waste;saltwater intrusion potential in coastal areas with high groundwater withdrawals; drought rare, but characterized by low stream flows, lowgroundwater levels, and high forest-fire risk 20 percent of Maine’s electricity is derived from hydropower flooding possible during springsnowmelt.

Massachusetts-plentiful water resources, but not well-distributed in proportion to population density (large cities in the east and reservoirsin the west); quality of certain supply lakes and reservoirs threatened by high sodium concentrations; Boston supply particularly susceptibleto drought; potential widespread flooding caused by spring snowmelt with rain and tropical storms.

New Hampshire-Abundant water resources; summer stream flows and groundwater supplies rely on seasonal snowmelt tourism-recreation industry dependent on water resources; regional drought rare, but droughts do affect public water supply occasionallly, possibleflooding due to spring snowmelt tropical storms, ice jams, and intense thunderstorms.

Rhode Island--Generally sufficient water supply; most feasible supplies already developed and groundwater pumped at capacity, soredistribution possibly ncessary to meet future water demand; coastal aquifers and reservoirs endangered by saltwater intrusion othersendangered by contamination wetlands (10 to 30 percent of the State) susceptible to prolonged drought potential flooding due to convectivestorms, tropical storms, and snowmelt with rainfall.

Vermont—Abundant water resources of generally good quality; some localized groundwater contamination in areas of high populationdensity, severe drought rare, but even short droughts can affect agriculture and livestock-public supply storage capacity provides l-yearbuffer, flooding potential from tropical storms, intense frontal systems, or snowmelt with rainfall,

Mid-Atlantic Region

Water supply is becoming an issue in some metropolitan areas, saltwater intrusion is occurring along coasts, and industrial and municipalpollution is an issue.

Delaware--Municipal and industrial usage causing increased water-supply pressure in heavily populated regions; peak usage coincides withlow-flow periods, causing capacity problems; Dover relies exclusively on groundwater in a region subject to overdraft (northernmost andcentral Delaware); saltwater intrusion in coastal areas; toxics in the sediments, water column, and biota of Delaware estuary, but improving,regional flooding potential due to tropical storms and local flooding by convective storm.


Maryland--Water supply well-managed for heavy reliance on surface water, drought stresses domestic supply, groundwater use on coastalplain subject to saltwater intrusion; point and non-point pollution; Hurricanes and convective storms potentially cause floods.

New Jersey-surface water in New Jersey wed extensively, but supply development outpaced by demand, making drought dangerous;surface-water quality threatened by agricultural runoff and industrial-municipal dischharge as well as saltwater intrusion in coastal areas;groundwater quality threatened by toxins (l,224 known or suspected hazardous waste sites in 1986); potential flooding due to frontal systemsand tropical and convective storms.

New York-Demand in New York City significantly exceeds safe yield; Long Island depends solely on aquifers susceptible to saltwaterintrusion and drought historic water rights create competition and restrict reallocation non-point sources of pollution threaten surface andgroundwater quality in several areas; toxic plumes from inactive hazardous waste sites are mobilized by increased precipitation; sea level risewould affect the New York City and Long Island metropolitan areas and the lower Hudson River estuary (Poughkeepsie supply intake and NewYork City emergency pumping station); potential regional flooding from frontal systems, spring snowmelt, and tropical storms, local floodingdue to convective storms.

Pennsylva nia-Water supply potentially a critical problem; although supply is adequate under normal conditions, drought causes problems,especially for smaller supply systems; quality of surface and groundwatar jeopardized by drainage from coal-mining areas and non-pointsources in agricultural areas, all compounded by acid precipitation convective storms, tropical storms, rain on frozen ground or snow pack,and ice jams all potential instigators of flooding.

Virginia--Considered to be a water-rich state; still, some community-supply systems face insufficient capacity (especially along thesoutheastern coast); saltwater intrusion potential in coastal areas; localized pollution of surface and groundwater, possible flooding caused bytropical and convective storms.

South Atlantic Region

Here, the use of available water resources is increasing, and municipal and industria 1 development causes shortages in some cities.

Alabama-Abundan t water resoume& some highly industrialized areas risk shortages during drought if development continues; localizedgroundwater contamination due to mine-tailing leaching. saltwater intrusion, and waste sites; potential flooding due to tropical storms orhurricanes and frontal systems.

Florida --State’s water resources are a source of competition between municipal, industrial environmental and recreational uses;population pressure in some areas; coastal aquifers subject to saltwater intrusion, so sea level rise would reduce safe yield; need for increasedstorage capacity western and southwestern Florida particularly vulnerable to drought sensitive ecosystems and brackish water subject toflooding; Everglades National Park is entirely below the 8.5-foot (2.5-meter)l contour, 34 percent below l-foot contour majority of populationlives on coastlines , very low elevation so sea level rise could be devastating, frequent flooding usually along the coast due to hurricane andtropical-storm surges; most thunderstorms per year in the Nation

Georgia-Surface water extensively used in the northern parts of the State and groundwater in the south; high-growth areas with increasingmunicipal, industrial environmental, and downstream “- requirements susceptible to drought; saltwater encroachment on coastal aquifers (wouldbe exacerbated by sea level rise); competition for water stored in major reserving groundwater overdraft in southwestern corner due toagriculture; potential flooding due to frontal systems, convective storms, tropical storms and hurricanes.

North Carolina--Abundant,water resources some areas approaching limits of available supply; localized pollution by toxins, nutrients,and sediments; flooding and coastal erosion potential, saltwater intrusion from sea level rise, drought impacts agricultural and domestic use,exacerbates increasing competition for water regional flooding potential associated with tropical storms and hurricanes.

South Carolina --Plentiful water resources; need management and coordination of surface and groundwater resources; quality generallygood, some nutrient, dissolved oxygen, saltwater intrusion and suspended solids problems locally, development pressure on wetlands;potential flooding caused by hurricanes, tropical storms, and thunderstorms.

Lower Mississippi Basin

Water supplies here for medium- to small-sizedcomntuni$aare vulnerable to drought, and industrial pollution on and salinity present problems.

Arka nsas-Abundant water resoures dissolved solids sediment and saltwater intrusion in the southeast comer restrict use in some areas;groundwater overdraft in some areas; agriculture susceptible to drought; possible flooding from tropical and convective storms.

Louisiana—Water resources for municipal and indusdtrial supply, agriculture, navigation, environmental uses, and recreation; d u e t o r e l i a n c eon rain and shallow water tables, even short droughts greatly affect agriculture; coastal erosion, l0SS of marshes, and subsidence claim largeamounts of state land annually, more than half of the state is a floodplain so hurricanes and tropical storms, convective storms, or upstreamevents can endanger large parts of State.

1 To convert feet to meters, multiply by 0.305.


Mississippi-Abundant water resources; agricultural base of the State economy(and catfish farming) creates large drought risk (1988drought was devastating); saltwater intrusion of aquifers; desire to tap into Tennessee and Tombigbee Rivers for more supply; potentialflooding due to frontal systems in the winter and hurricanes and tropical storms in the summer.

Ohio River BasinMunicipal water supplies fir median-and small-sized communities and Ohio River flows are vulnerable to drought here.

Indiana--Abundant water resources; self-supplied industry is the major user; quality problems downstream from municipal and industrialdischarge points; low flows of drought hamper navigation on Ohio River possible flooding from frontal systems, convective storms, and rainwith snowmelt.

Kentucky--Abundan t water resourccs during most of the year, seasonal and areal variation; competition between municipal water supplyand irrigated agriculture during low flows; coal mining oil and gas operations, agriculture and domestic waste discharge adversely affect waterquality; agricultural loss and forest-fire danger during drought; possible flooding from frontal systems and convective storms.

Ohio-Ample surface-water supplies; municipal supply for medium-sized communities fragile during drought agricultural runoff,sedimentation, mining, and hazardous-waste-disposal sites create quality problems; instream flows for navigation are an importantconsideration during drought despite public works, floods from frontal systems and convective storms affect the State every year.

Tennessee--Generally considered a water-rich State, but limitations visible during drought; smaller supply systems of eastern Tenesseesusceptible to drought non-point-source pollution and toxic-waste sites affect quality of surface waters; low dissolved-oxygen concentrationsin reservoir releases; localized groundwater contamination some localized overdraft during drought; hydroelectric-power generation at 24dams susceptible to drought thermal-power generation suffers from increased surface water temperatures during low flows; lack of irrigationinfrastructure stresses agriculture during drought; flooding potential due to frontal systems and thunderstormsgreatly mitigated byflood-control works.

West Virginia--Abundant water resources; some localized water-quality problems due to non-point sources such as manufacturing,municipal waste, coal mines, and farms; drought not a major concern, but potential flooding of flat and narrow valley floors due to frontalsystems and cyclonic and convective storms is a major problem.

Upper Great Lakes-Upper Mississippi Basin RegionManagement of the Mississippi and Missouri River systems is difficult during drought. Additional problem arise as a result of fluctuatingGreat Lakes levels and of impacts on water quality. The heavy chemical and biological loading of the upper Mississippi due to industrial,municipal, and agricultural pollution is a problem.

Illinois-Abundant water resources; self-supplied industry is major user; small community water supplies susceptible to drought;point-so-pollution prevention improving, non-point Sources Such as agriculture harmful; drought impacts navigation on the Mississippi;potential flooding due to rainfall with snowmelt or stalled frontal systems.

Iowa--Municipal water supply generally sufficient even under drought conditions; agricultural and livestock production would suffersignificant losses in any drought; water-quality problems caused by agrochemicals leached into ground and surface water; many naturallytainted aquifers; potential flooding due to rapid spring snowmelt or convective storms.

Michigan-Abundance of water reaources; industry is major user; competition between upstream and downstream users; potential droughtimpacts on water level in Great Lakes and diversion practices; control of toxics in surface and groundwater and Great Lakes water quality hasbecome prioriy, flooding infrequent, but usually due to rainfall during snowmelt.

Minnesota-Abundant water resources; drought affects Mississippi River management for water supply and navigation; Minneapolis-St.Paul needs alternative veto Mississippi for water supply; rural withdrawals depend on groundwater; potential flooding due to convective stormsand snowmelt with rain in the spring.

Mis sou r i -Abundant water resources; northwestern water supplies subject to drought stress; increased groundwater withdrawals and impacton water-baaed recreation during drought saltwater intrusion into aquifers; Occasional flooding due to Thunderstorms and stalled frontalsystems.

Wisconsin--Water-rich state; industry is largest user; agriculture and tourism affected by drought 5 percent of State energy fromhydropower, increasing competition for use; potential flooding caused by frontal systems, snowmelt, and convective storms.

Plains States RegionDrought is a frequent problem in this region. Competing uses of Missouri reservoirs--agricultural, tribal, recreational, anddownstream--have led to management stresses. Small-community water supplies are vulnerable, water tables are low due to intenseagricultural and urban consumption and groundwater depletion. Agricultural runoff has caused pollution, and the salinity of surface wateris high.

Ka nsas--Water resources distributed unevenly, surface water in the east and groundwater in the west; most diversions are for irrigation;groundwater overdraft (e.g., the Ogallala Aq uifer) is occurring, and many areas are closed to further appropriation; adverse water-quality


impacts due to irrigation, petroleum production, agrochemicals, waste sites; agricultural droughts fairly routine; potential flooding due tostalled frontal systems, intense convective and tropical storms.

Nebraska-Abundant water supply although quantity varies anally, seasonally, and annually; irrigation is major user, localizedgroundwater overdraft; salinity problems in the South Platte River and canal systems originating in Colorado; interstate legal compacts anddecrees on North and South Platte, Republican, and Blue Rivers; reservoir releases necessary to navigation on the Missouri; significant droughtimpact on agriculture, small community supplies, older well systems, and fish and wildlife; potential flooding due to thunderstorms, ice jams,and snowmelt in the RockyMountains.

North Dakota--Water is an important but scarce resource; reservoir system is critical due to seasonality of flows; limited water-distributionsystems from reservoirs; agriculture, tourism, and recreation affected by drought high salinity of surface water agricultural drainage ofwetlands; potential flooding due to spring snowmelt with rainfall.

South Dakota-Missouri River is the only reliable stream flow because of seasonal variability; demands on reservoir system fromrecreation, downstream navigation, agriculture, and future users--strong desire to stabilize agricultural production with reservoir system;drought disastrous for agriculture industry; eastern half of State vulnerable to groundwater overdraft interstate water resource conflicts on theMissouri; potential flooding due to snowmelt with rainfall, frontal systems.

Southwest Region

The agricultural economy here is vulnerable to drought.

Oklahoma-substantial water resources, unevenly distributed; groundwater in the west, surface water and reservoir storage in the eastdrought detrimental to agriculture, industrial-municipal water supply, tourism and recreation, instream flows, and hydropower, salinityproblems in the Arkansas and Red Rivers; water-rights-allocation controversy; potential flooding due to convective and tropical storms.

New Mexico--Water scarce in generally arid state; surface water is completely appropriated and any supply reduction brings shortages;agriculture vulnerable to drought extensive storage capacity on perennial streams; groundwater overdraft in aquifers not associated withstreams; irrigation is the largest user of water, quality degraded by municipal-industrial discharge into Rio Grande, saline and contaminatedagricultural runoff, urban conlamination of some groundwater, most water use governed by interstate compacts, Supreme Court decrees,international treaty; intrastate conflict over instream-offstream uses; potential flooding due to local thunderstorms, melting snowpack withrainfall frontal systems from Pacific.

Texas-A semiarid to arid state; only eastern third of State has sufficient water on dependable basis; Houston, Corpus Christi, Dallas, andFort Worth dependent on surface reservoirs of limited capacity Ogallala Aquifer of High Plains very slow recharge, substantial overdraft,Seymour Aquifer contaminated by oil-drilling activities; saltwater intrusion possible in coastal aquifers, salinity problems in Ogallala Aquiferand Rio Grande; low and hypersaline flows into coastaI estuaries and wetlands threaten species; agriculture and livestock losses due to drought;increasing competition between irrigation, urban uses, recreation, wildlife, tourism, and saltwater-intrusion correction; potential flash floodsdue to convective storms and regional flooding due to tropical storms and hurricanes; potential conflict with Mexico over allocation ofgroundwater.

Rocky Mountain Region

In this region, competition between instream and offstream users is growing, and water rights are controversial--American Indians vs. Statesvs. Federal Government. The salinity of surface and groundwater is high, agriculture in the region is vulnerable to drought, and there areshortages in municipal water supplies during low flow.

Colorado-Rapidly approaching maximum utilization of water resources; increasing conflicts among urban, agricultural, recreational andenvironmental uses of water, especially during drought; downstream States claim rights to water originating in Colorado; groundwateroverdraft problems in arid eastern Colorado; conlamination of ground and surface water near toxic-waste sites; salinity problems in lowerArkansas River and in the San Luis and Grand Valleys; potential flooding due to thunderstorms, snowmelt, rain on saturated ground.

Monta na-Abundant water in major rivers; seasonal flow in smaller eastern rivers, so supply can be a problem; persistent water shortagein some areas; competition between irrigators and instream users (especially trout fishers); competition with downstream states; dependenceon surface water makes agriculture more vulnerable; potential quality degradation due to mining, agriculture, forest practices; potential floodingdue to snowmelt with rainfall, spring runoff.

Utah--Relatively scarce water resources; supply sources near population writers exhausted; variability of supplies (6 years of droughtpreceded by 4 wettest years on record); water-quality problems with seasonal low flows; localized drought at least once a year affects smallcommunities, agriculture (especially grazing), instream flow for fish and wildlife; salinity high in lower reaches of streams; potential floodingdue to rapid snowmelt with rainfall, intense thunderstorms, and lake rise.

Wyoming--Water resources dispersed unevenly, perennial streams in the west and ephemeral streams in the east; extended droughtwell-known affects agriculture and forest-fire hazard; most surface water committed under interstate compacts and court decrees; competitionfor surface waters between agriculture, municipalities, and industry; thunderstorms, snowmelt with rainfall, and stalled frontal systems cancause flooding.


Lower Colorado River Basin South Pacific Coast RegionThe competition between municipal supply and irrigation in this region is increasing, as are conflicts between instream and offstream usesand over Indian, State, and Federal water rights. Salinity problems occur with surface and groundwater.

Arizona-Water a limited resource; shortages on Colorado River system (water apportioned to Arizona by the Colorado River Compact);groundwater overdraft due to both agricultural and population growth; industrial wastes, agrochemicals, salinity, and mining contaminationof groundwater, 30 Superfund sites; Colorado River desalinization at national border, drought impact on rangeland, agriculture, recreationaluse of reservoirs; potential flooding due to snowmelt with rainfall, thunderstorms.

California-Most water in the north, most use in the south; entire State susceptible to drought (central and southern especially), whichaffects every use, from irrigation to municipal-industrial supply; population pressures in south and central; drought exacerbates groundwateroverdraft, increases forest-fire potential, harmful to recreation and tourism; significant hydroelectric-power generation groundwater supplypressured by toxic contamina“ tion and coastal saltwater intrusion salinity problems in parts of San Joaquin Valley due to irrigration saltwaterintrusion of Sacrament@ San Joaquin Delta interstate agreements and water-law constraints; growing competition between instream andoffstream uses; potential flooding due to frontal systems from Alaska meeting moist tropical air.

Nevada-A very arid state; municipal water supplies insufficient in some cities, such as Las Vegas, Reno-Sparks, Lovelock, Wendover,Dayton, and Incline Village; agricultural demand relies on surface water, so is susceptible to drought competition among urban agricultural,municipal, tribal, and environmental uses; Colorado River withdrawals governed by Colorado River Compact and Nevada has inadequateshare; bi-state agreements on three western rivers; widespread groundwater overdraft due to municipal and agricultural use; localized aquifercontamina“ tion; salinity high in Virgin River; wetlands and fisheries susceptible to drought; low flows create water-quality problems;endangered fish in some Great Basin lakes; potential flooding due to snow-melt and rain, localized thunderstorms.

Northwest and Pacific Region

In this region, municipal supplies for smaller communities are susceptible to drought, and competition among power-generation, fish andrecreation, and instream and offstream uses generally is intense. Drought has had significant impacts on forest health.

Alaska-Water abundant overall; local supplies not sufficient for Anchorage and Juneau; sources not dependable during the winter whenstreams freeze or stop flowing, but drought not a major concern; suspended sediments in glacially fed rivers; ground and surface water pollutionin populated areas; ice-jam floods common, intense storms and snowmelt occasionally bring floods.

Hawaii--Abundant water for size; small communities have only short-term water supply, but most droughts are short-term events;population and economic stress on island of Oahu leads to pollution; drought affects agriculture; major storms or hurricanes can bring flooding.

Idaho--Seasonality of surface water is major constraint on use, reservoirs supplement low flows; smaller communities have supplyproblems during drought; competition between municipal-industrial withdrawals and irrigation; drought affects agriculture, hydropower,tourism, recreation, forest-fire hazard; local pollution due to irrigation return flow, mine tailings, municipal-industrial waste; potential floodingdue to snowmelt with rain, thunderstorms, ice jams.

Oregon-Abundant water in the west, limited water in the east; reservoir storage augments summer low flows, allows enormoushydroelectric production; coastal communities lack storage to deal with drought drought impacts on power production, fish, recreationagriculture, and forest-fire hazard; water-quality degradation from pasture and agricultural runoff, municipal and industrial discharge;groundwater overdraft in the east exacerbated by drought potential flooding due to snowmelt and rain in the west, convective storms in theeast.

Washington--Water supply adequate, but unevenly distributed areally and seasonally; heavily populated areas of western Washingtonreaching limits of municipal-industrial supply; drought affects agriculture, hydropower (Washington produces 30 percent of U.S.hydroelectricity), tourism and recreation fisheries, wetlands, and navigation 60 percent of annual river flow through hydrological system issnowmelt; saltwater intrusion in San Juan and Island Counties, potential for all coastal areas; localized groundwater contamination potentialflooding due to snowmelt with rain, thunderstorms in the east.

SOURCES: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), National Water Summary, 1985--Hydrologic Events and Surface Water Resources, Water-Supply Paper2300 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986); USGS, National Water Summary 1986-Hydrologic Events and GroundwaterQuality, Water-Supply Paper 2325 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988); USGS, National Water Summary 1987-HydrologicEvents and Water Supply and Use, Water-Supply Paper 2350 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990); USGS, National WaterSummary 1988 -89--Hydrologic Events and F1oods and Droughts, Water-Supply Paper 2375 (Washington, DC: U.S. Governme nt Printing Office,1991); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, The National Study of Water Management During Drought: Report of the First Year of Study (Fort Belvoir,VA: U.S. Army, Institute for Water Resources, 1991); National Regulatory Research Institute, Compendium on Water Supply, Drought, andConservation, NRRI 89-15 (Columbus, OH: National Regulatory Research Institute, October 1989); letters from State water resource agencies.

Agriculture 6Statusw Adaptable private sector in a very competitive and growing world

market.■ High payoffs to public investment--but declining public interest.■ Increasing environmental restrictions.

Climate Change Problemg Potential changes in crop and livestock productivity.■ Market-driven responses may alter regional distribution and

intensity of farming.

What Is Most Vulnerable?■ The long-term productivity and competitiveness of U.S. agricul-

ture are at risk.■ Consumers and farm communities face high costs if the process

of adaptation is slowed.

Impediments■ Institutional rigidities and disincentives (e.g., commodity pro-

grams, disaster assistance, water-marketing restrictions).■ Uncertainty makes it hard for farmers to respond effectively.m Potential environmental restrictions and water shortages.■ Technical limits-availability of suitable crops and practices for

new climate.■ Declining Federal interest in agricultural research and extension

Types of Responses■ Remove institutional impediments to adaptation (in commodity

programs, disaster assistance, water-marketing restrictions).w Improve knowledge and responsiveness of farmers to speed

adaptation (informational support, knowledge transfer, processinnovation).

■ Support research to enhance productivity through improved cropsand farming practice (either directed at a general expansion inproductivity or targeted to specific constraints and risks). I 275

NOTE: Parts of this chapter are drawn from a paper prepared by W.E. Easterling for theOffice of Technology Assessment (27).


OVERVIEWIn contrast to many natural resource systems

examined elsewhere in this report, agriculture isan intensively managed, market-based system.Worldwide agricultural systems have evolvedand adapt continuously to wide geographic differ-ences in climate and to the risks associated withnormal climate variability. In the past, agriculturehas also been able to adjust to changes ineconomic conditions-such as the rapid changesin energy prices and export markets over the pasttwo decades. There can be little doubt that theAmerican agricultural sector will make furtheradaptations in response to changing climateconditions, with market forces rewarding andencouraging the rapid spread of successful adap-tation. Yet, the possibility of unavoidable warm-ing and drying in the major agricultural regions ofthe United States (see ch. 2,) argues for examiningthe potential for coping with climate change andfor considering what public action might beappropriately taken in anticipation of an uncertainclimate change.

For some farmers, simple adjustments in farm-ing practices or crop selection may transformpotential yield losses into gains. But for others,available responses will not compensate for theeffects of harsher climates and water scarcity. Thecurrent limits to adaptation are well-illustrated bythe geographic limits of where crops can begrown now. Without adequate moisture, farmingbecomes economically impractical. Increases inthe intensity of conflicts between agriculture andthe natural environment may also limit the extentto which adaptation is possible. For example, if awarmer climate leads to the expansion of inten-sive farming north into the Great Lakes States,land drainage could threaten ponds and wetlands,and increased use of farm chemicals could add towater pollution. In the arid West, greater demandsfor irrigation water could aggravate existingconflicts over the use of scarce supplies. Environ-mental concerns, whether aggravated by climatechange or not, appear likely to constrain futureexpansion of agricultural production. Thus, de-

spite adaptation, the possibility that agriculturalyields will be threatened, particularly if climatebecomes warmer and drier, cannot be discounted.

In a world where population growth is steadilyincreasing the need for food, any threat to growthin agricultural productivity must be taken seri-ously. For American farmers, already facingincreasingly competitive world markets, any de-cline in productivity relative to the rest of theworld could mean lost markets. For consumers, adecline in farm productivity growth could meanrising food prices. Estimates of economic effectsof climate change on the United States rangefrom damages of $10 billion to benefits of $10billion (4). If the United States is to have a marginof security against the uncertainties of climatechange, continued support is essential for re-search that enhances agricultural productivity andexpands future options for farmers (e.g., newcrops and improved farming systems).

Given the scale of the agricultural economy, aseries of even small missteps and delays in theprocess of adaptation could, in the aggregate,prove very costly. Limited information and insti-tutional impediments seem likely to restrict thefarmer’s ability to respond efficiently to a chang-ing climate. The capability of the agriculturalsector to respond to climate change can beimproved through efforts to speed the movementof research results and new technologies into farmpractice. In a future in which farmers must beincreasingly responsive to change, the removal ofunnecessary institutional impediments to adapta-tion is essential. For example, the framework ofU.S. farm-support and disaster-assistance pro-grams-which in many cases limit the farmer’sincentives to change crops or farming practicesrapidly and efficiently-should be reconsidered.

Climate change is almost certain to create bothwinners and losers, despite agricultural adapta-tion. Consumers will bear much of the cost of anydecline in agricultural yields through higherprices. Some farmers might benefit from highercommodity prices, despite generally decliningyields. Even so, other farmers will suffer because

Chapter 6--Agriculture I 277

of relatively severe local climate changes andbecause of the inability--caused by a variety offactors-to respond effectively to change. Adap-tation might itself result in some undesirablesocial and environmental impacts, particularly ifclimate change leads to rapid shifts in thegeographical range of crops or in the intensity offarming practice. If climate warms considerably,the range over which major U.S. crops are plantedcould shift hundreds of miles to the north. Rapidgeographical shifts in the agricultural land basecould disrupt rural communities and their associ-ated infrastructures. With agriculture and the ruraleconomy already changing rapidly, and with theadded uncertainties of climate change, it isimpossible to do more than speculate about whateffects climate change might have on ruralcommunities.

This chapter provides a brief overview of U.S.agriculture and of the major trends facing it,examines the role that climate plays in agricul-tural production, and considers whether or notU.S. agriculture can be maintained under achanging climate. The nature of adaptation possi-bilities and the constraints that may limit theability of the farm sector to respond successfullyto a changing climate are considered. Finally, apotential role for the Federal Government insustaining or improving agriculture’s ability tocope with the uncertainties of a changing climateis discussed.

U.S. AGRICULTURE TODAYThe United States has an abundance of good

agricultural land and a favorable climate forproducing food, feed grains, and fiber. Croplandaccounts for about 22 percent of the total U.S.land base (110). An additional 27 percent of theland base is in pasture and rangeland.1 In 1990,

Past plant-breeding efforts have been successful inincreasing productivity of crops such as wheat. Effortsto develop varieties that are better able to withstandenvironmental stresses, such as pests and droughts,may reduce the use of agrochemical inputs that areneeded partly to compensate for unfavorableenvironments.

the food sector2 accounted for 17 percent of thecivilian labor force, provided 15 percent of grossnational product, and accounted for 11 percent oftotal U.S. exports (109). Although the relativeimportance of agriculture to the U.S. economyhas declined steadily over time as the rest of theeconomy has grown in scale and complexity,agriculture remains of substantial economicimportance.

1 Cropland is land used for the production of cultivated crops (e.g., grains, hay, fruits, and vegetables) for barvest. Pusfureland is land usedfor grazing, including once-forested land converted to forage cover and natural grasslands that are productive enough to support activeqement of fomge plants. Rangelands are natural grasslands of low productivity.

z The food sector includes farm production plus the associated processing, manufacturing, transport, and marketing industries. Thefarm-production sector itself employs just 1.5 percent of the U.S. civilian labor force and provides 1.2 percent of the gross national product.


Figure 6-1—U.S. Production, DomesticConsumption, and Exports of Wheat, Corn,

and Soybeans

I

G- ‘oor==n

K~ 50

(!Y

n I_____L JiiiiLUI

Wheat Corn Soybeans

NOTE: Three-year average based on 1989, 1990, and 1991 data.

The capacity of U.S. farmers to produceagricultural products far exceeds domestic needs.The United States produces more than half of theworld’s soybeans and 40 percent of the world’scorn (maize). Much of the U.S. farm output isexported (fig. 6-l), and about 30 percent of theNation’s cropland is now producing for export(110). Even these statistics understate the currentcapacity to produce food. Of some 400 millionacres (160 million hectares)3 of cropland, about65 million acres were withdrawn from productionin 1991 (109) under various acreage-reductionprograms, including the Conservation ReserveProgram (CRP) (see box 6-A). Approximately 80million acres now in pasture or forests could beconverted to productive cropland if needed

Exports and domestic consumption sum to U.S. production. (112).4

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics (Wash- The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992). divides the country into 10 regions for the

—3 lb convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

d This includes lands tbat have high or medium potential for conversion to agriculture (see table 7 in the appendix of ref. 112).

Chapter 6-Agriculture 1279

intended to result in the enrollment of 10 million acres. Limited appropriations have so far resulted in a smallerprogram than was initially authorized.The Environmental Easement Program provides annual payments and mst sharing forupto 10 years to farmerswho agree either to have easements that provide long-term protection for environmentally sensitive lands orlong-term reduction of water degradation. Participants must agree to a conservation plan to be developed in

consultation with the Department of the Interior. Payment cannot exceed fair market value, No implementation

has occurred to date.

Pesticide Provisions require that producers (under threat of financial penalties) must now maintain records onthe application of restricted-use pesticides for2 years. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act(FIFRA) (P.L. 100-532) was amended to make USDA responsible for programs on the use, storage, and disposalof agricultural chemicals.The Sustainable Agricultural Research and Education Program (SARE), also referred to as the Low-InputSustainable-Agriculture Program (LISA), is a competitive grants program designed to respond to the need fora more cost-effective and environmentally benign agriculture, [t is unique in blending research on farmingsystems with strategies for ensuring that findings are made usable to farmers, Emphasis is placed on farmerparticipation and on-farm demonstrations. The program is currently funded at $6,7 million, although funding ofup to $40 million is authorized.

Continuing USDA Assistance Programs

The Agricultural Conservation Program, initiated in 1936, provides financial assistance of upto$3,500 annuallyto farmers who implement approved soil- and watermnservation and pollution-abatement programs. Anincreasing emphasis is being placed on water quality projects.Conservation Technical Assistance, also initiated in 1936, provides technical assistance through the Soil Con-servation Service to farmers for planning and implementing soil and water conserva tion andwaterquality practices.The Great Ptains Conservation Program, initiated in 1957, provides technical and finandal assistance in GreatPlains States for conservation treatments that cover the entire farm operation. Assistance is Iimitedto $35,000per farmer. The program emphasizes reducing soil erosion caused by wind through the planting of windbreaksor the conversion of croplands to grass cover,The Resource Conservation and Development Program, initiated in 1962, assists multicounty areas inenhancing conservation, water quality, wildlife habitat, recreation, and rural development.The Water Bank Program, initiated in 1970, provides annual payments for reserving wetlands in importantnesting, breeding, or feeding areas of migratory waterfowl,The Rural Clean Water Program, initiated in 1980, is anexperfmental program implemented in 21 project areas.It provides cost sharing and technical assistance to farmers who voluntarily implement approved best-management practices to improve water quality.The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) Soil and Water ban Program provides loans to farmers and farmassociations for sdl and water conservation, pollution abatement, and improving water systems that serve farms.FmHAmayalso acquire 50-year conservation easements as ameansto help reduce outstanding farmer loans.

Research and Extension Activities- The Agricultural Research Service conducts research on newandalternative crops and agricultural technology

to reduce agriculture’s adverse impacts on soil and water resources,■ The Cooperative State Research Service coordinates conservation and water quality research conducted by

State Agricultural Experiment Stations and allocates funds for competitive grants, including those related towater quality research.

■ The Soil Conservation Service (SCS) monitors the condition of agricultural soil and water resources, providesinformation to encourage better soil management, and supervises conservation-compliam plans.

s The Extension Service provides information and recommendations on soil conservation and water qualitypractices to farmers, in cooperation with State extension services and SCS.



Box 6-A–Major Federal Programs Related to Agriculture and the Environment-(Continued)Environmental Protection Agency Programs

H 1987 Water Quality Act Section 319 Programs (P.L. 95-217) require States and Territories to fileasssmed reports with

the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to identify the navigable waters where water quality standards cannot beattained without reducing non-point-source pollution, including pollution from agricultural sources. States are alsorequired to file management plans with EPA that identify steps that will be taken to reduce non-point-source pollution.All States have now filed assessment reports and management plans. The act authorizes up to $400 million forImplementing these plans, with $52 million awarded in 1992.

■ The 1987 Water Quality Act National Estuary Program provides for the identification of nationally significant estuariesthreatened by pollution, for the preparation of conservation and management pfans, and for Federal grants towater-pollution-control agencies for the purposes of preparing plans. Under this program, USDA technical assistance tofarmers has helped to reduce nitrogen and phosphorous discharges into the Chesapeake Bay by about 20,000 tons(1.8 million kilograms)2 annually.

■ The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodentidde Act (P.L. 100-532) gives EPA responsibility for regulating pesticides,including agricultural insecticides and herbicides. EPA registers new pesticides and reviews existing pesticides to ensurethat they do not present an unreasonable risk. The Agency may restrict or ban the use of pesticides determined to bea potential hazard to human health or the environment.

● The Safe Drinking Water Act (P.L. 93-523) requires EPA to publish drinking water standards for contaminants that canhave adverse health effects in public water systems. These same standards are being used to assess contamination ingroundwater supplies in private wells. The act also established a weflhead-protection program to protect sole-sourceaquifers from contamination by pesticides and agricultural chem”mls.

z To convert tons to kilograms, multiply W W7.SOURCE: Office of Technology AssesernenL 1993; U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Service (ERS),Agricultural Resoum#: Cmpland, Water, and Conservation SituatiorrandOutlook, ERS AR-27 (Washington, DC: USDA).

presentation of farm statistics, as illustrated in regional distribution of cropland and irrigatedfigure 6-2. About 65 percent of U.S. cropland isfound in the Corn Belt region, the NorthernPlains, the Lake States, and the Southern Plains(112). Of all the States, California, Iowa, Illinois,Minnesota, Texas, Nebraska, and Florida have thehighest cash revenue horn farming. Irrigation,rather than extensive farm acreage, accounts forthe high value of farm production in several ofthese States (California, Texas, and Florida). The17 Western States, Arkansas, Florida, andLouisiana account for 91 percent of irrigatedacreage. California, Nebraska, Texas, Idaho, andColorado account for almost half of the irrigatedacreage. Overall, irrigation agriculture makes uponly 5 percent of the land in farms and 15 percentof the harvested cropland, but provides a striking38 percent of crop production, by dollar value(109). Much of this value is from fruits, vegeta-bles, and special~ crops. Figure 6-3 illustrates the

crop acreage in the United States.

I Crop and Livestock Productionin the United States

Agriculture varies considerably across theNation due to differences in climate, geography,and economic conditions. Figure 6-4 showsseveral distinctive farming areas that differ signif-icantly in farm size, income, and production (57).Although not exhaustive in covering the Nation’sfarm lands, this characterization of farms gives afair sense of the diversity in U.S. agriculture.Farms of the Corn Belt and Great Plains providethe largest share of the Nation’s grains andlivestock products. Farms there tend to be large,and farmers rely on farming for most of theirincome. California produces fruits and vegeta-bles, dairy products, livestock, and grains, withmost crops coming from large, irrigated farms.

Chapter 6-Agriculture I 281

Figure 6-2-The USDA Agricultural Regions of the United States

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, The Second RCA Appraisal: Soil, Water, andRelated Resources on Nonfederal Land in the United States-Analysis of Conditions and Trends, MiscellaneousPublication No. 1482 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, June 1989, slightly revised May 1990).

The Mississippi Delta region produces cotton,soybeans, and rice. Farms of the Coastal Plainsproduce mostly poultry, dairy products, cattle,and soybeans. The Wisconsin-Minnesota Dairyarea provides dairy products, cattle, and corn,with most production coming from small farms.Tobacco, poultry, cattle, dairy, and soybeans aretypical farm outputs of the Eastern Highlands andthe Southeast Piedmont. Farms in these two areastend to be small and often provide only a part ofthe farmer’s total income.

The primary annual crops grown in the UnitedStates in terms of economic value and area of landuse are the grain crops-corn, soybeans, andwheat (table 6-l). Although grown across thecountry, most of the output of these three cropscomes from the Corn Belt, the Lake States, andthe Great Plains. Box 6-B outlines how climateinteracts with major U.S. grain crops. The cash

value of fruits and vegetables (combined) is aboutequal to that of grains. Fruits and vegetables arelargely grown under irrigation,5 require a rela-tively small amount of land, and exist in suchextensive variety that it is hard to imagine climatechange threatening overall supplies-as long aswater is available. However, individual growersof these crops maybe at some risk of losses underrapid climate change.

1 Trends in U.S. AgricultureA general overview of major U.S. agricultural

trends forms a baseline against which to measurethe effects of climate change. Technical, social,and economic change have greatly transformedU.S. agriculture over the past 40 years. Regard-less of climate change, U.S. agriculture facesseveral trends in the coming decades that willalmost certainly persist.

s About 65 pereent of ve&table CIVpS snd 80 p~t of orchard crops are irrigated (107),


Figure 6-3--Regional Distribution of Cropland and Irrigated Cropland in the United States

’ 0 0 ‘~

,,vNorth- Appalachian South- Lake Corn Belt Delta N. Plains S. Plains Mountain Pacificeast east States

NOTE: To convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, The Second RCA Appraisal: Soil, Water, and Related Resources onNonfederal/Land in the UnitedStates--Analysis of Conditions and Trends, Miscellaneous Publication No. 14S2 (Washington, DO: U.S. Departmentof Agriculture, June 1989, slightly revised May 1990).

M!

it

A center pivot irrigation system. The sprinkler systemrotates to irrigate about 130 acres.

SlOW Growth in Domestic DemandDomestic demand for agricultural products

will grow slowly, probably at no more than 1percent per year (24). Population growth in theUnited States, the major determinant of domesticdemand for agricultural products, is now at about1 percent per year, and is expected to drop lower(114). Per capita income growth in the UnitedStates, even if it proves to be substantial, is unlikelyto add much demand for agricultural products.6

Increasing World DemandWorldwide growth in population and per capita

income are such that world agricultural demandmay increase by almost 2 percent a year over thenext 50 years (20). Much of this new demand will

6 B~ 1970 and 1992, the average consumer’s food budget declined from 22 to 16 percent of total purchases (113). Only oncqmmxof the eonsum er’s food budget now pays for the cost of basic agricultural commodities, as compared with one-third in 1970 (113).

Figure 6-4-Characteristics of Nine Farming Regions

Western Great Plains. Typical farms have large Western Corn Belt-Northern Plains. Most farmers Wisconsin-Minnesota Dairy Area. This area reliesacreages. The farm population relies more heavily here work full-time on their farms. The area relies on heavily on dairy sales. A relatively low proportion ofon farming for income than in seven of the eight farming for income more so than any of the other production comes from Iarge farms. Fewer than 30other regions. There are low rates of part-tlme region;. Farmers comprise the largestfarming and off-farm employment. total rural population (almost a third) in

proportion of the percent of farmers hold full-time jobs off the farm. Thethis region. farm population IS more dependent on farming income

than in many other regions.\

California Metro. Farmincome IS derived mostlyfrom sales of fruits,vegetables, and othercrops not covered by majorFederal commodityprograms. Average farmsize IS very large. Thefarm population IS very =mobile in comparison toother regions.

Core Corn Belt. Farmprogram crops providemost farm sales. Mostfarmers are full-timeoperators. The farmpopulation (everyone wholives on a farm) earns morethan half its income fromnonfarm sources, but manyrely mainly on farmincome. Farm familiesmake up much of the ruralpopulation.

Eastern Highlands. Thisregion IS characterized by verylow sales per farm, and a highpercentage of sales comingfrom small farms. Farmoperators are most Iikely hereto work full-time off the farm, sofarm households are not verydependent on farm Income.

Southeast Piedmont. Thisarea relies less on farmprogram crops or dairyproducts than other areas. Ithas the h!ghest proportion offarmers with full-time off-farmjobs. Farming provides lessthan the average portion oftotal household income.Farmers make up only a smallpart of the rural population.

g

~@

/Coastal Plains. Farms in this regionrely somewhat more heavily on Tprogram crops and less on dairy sales

Delta. This region IS the most dependent on sales of farmg

than the national average. Theprogram crops, which provide 85 percent of gross farm percentage of farmers working full-time ~-Income. Although less than 30 percent of farm operators off-farm IS about average, but the cwork full-time off the farm, 54 percent have some areas IS less dependent on farm =employment outside agriculture, the national average. income than are most other regions. c

z

wSOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, adapted from D. Martinez, “Wanted: Policies to Cope with Differences in Farming Regions,” Farmline, vol. 8, No. 11, 1987, pp. 11-13. m

u


Table 6-1--Harvested Acreage and Value ofPrincipal Crops, 1991

Acreage Crop value(millions of acres) ($ billion)

Corn for grain . . . . . . . . . . .Hay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Soybean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Wheat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Cotton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Sorghum for galn. . . . . . . .Vegetables . . . . . . . . . . . . .Fruits and nuts... . . . . . . .Rice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Peanuts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Sugar beets and cane.. . .Tobacco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

746258771211

743221

181111

751

1081123

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agrfculture, Agricultural Statistics (Wash-ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992).

come from developing countries. Meeting thegrowing need for food will require substantialgains in farm production throughout the world.

lncreasing Productiviy and OutputU.S. agricultural productivity and yields are

likely to continue to grow, but there is muchdisagreement over whether growth will remain asrapid as it has been in the past. Over the past fourdecades, U.S. farm yields increased at an annualrate of about 2 percent (24). Future gains in outputare expected to be harder to achieve than they havebeen in the past (83), and gains averaging just1 percent a year are predicted (1 12). For the UnitedStates, the best prospects for continuing to increaseoutput lie in improved farm productivity. Conven-tional breeding strategies, more-efficient use oftechnical inputs, new biological technologies, andnew information technologies may all con-tribute to improvements in farm productivity (103).

Competition for World MarketsWith relatively stable domestic demands, U.S.

farmers will increasingly look toward exportmarkets. The best opportunity for growth in U.S.exports will be in the rapidly developing, popu-

lous countries of Asia and Latin America (24).However, uncertainty about future levels ofagricultural production abroad leave it somewhatunclear whether foreign demand for U.S. agricul-tural products will increase. The advantage thatU.S. farmers have long enjoyed in export marketscould weaken as gains in productivity in foreigncountries lower production costs relative to thosein the United States.

Increasing Environmental ConcernsStrong environmental concerns could limit

U.S. agricultural output and increase productioncosts. 7 A portion of the past gain in U.S. agri-cultural productivity has come at the expense ofthe environment. Salinization of soils, ground-water contamination, excessive erosion, and lossof wildlife habitat hav--in some areas-beenthe direct result of poor farm-management prac-tices (112). Partially offsetting this has been thedecline in land use for agriculture. As crop yieldsper acre increase, the total land area needed forU.S. agricultural production could decrease by asmuch as 30 percent over the next 40 years (112),thus reducing many land-use conflicts.

Society’s increasing interest in protecting andpreserving environmental values has led to strongerenvironmental policies. In the United States, thishas meant taking some agricultural lands out ofproduction (through the Conservation Reserveand Swampbuster Programs) and requiring changesin farming practices (Sodbuster Program). (Box6-A describes Federal environmental programsrelated to agriculture; see also vol. 2, ch. 4, of thisreport.) The trend toward stronger environmentalregulation will probably continue, with a likelyincrease in control overwater pollution from agri-cultural sources (e.g., fertilizers and pesticides).Stronger environmental protection policies maycause agricultural costs to rise, unless technolo-gies that help farmers reduce environmentaldamage and land-use conflicts are developed.

T Although with other competing industrialized countries likely to be faced with similar environmental regulation it is somewhat unclearhow Us. competitiveness might be &ffected.


Box 6-B–Primary US. Farm Products

Corn-4orn is the principal crop of the United States, grown on more farms than any other crop and with anannual production value of $18 billion in 1991 (table 6-l). Production is concentrated in the Corn Belt, whichaccounts for over half of U.S. corn acreage. Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska, Minnesota, Indiana, Wisconsin, Ohio,Michigan, South Dakota, and Missouri are the leading producer States, together accounting for over 80 percentof U.S. production. Corn yields are very susceptible to dry weather conditions, with drought-related losses oftenhigh. Water supply is most critical in the few weeks just before and after tasseling, which is when the tassel-likemale flowers emerge. A dry spring t hat allows early planting can be important for maximum yields. Cool nights arealso important for maximum corn yields; the warm night temperatures are a major reason the corn yields of theSouthern Piedmont States are smatlerthan the Corn Belt’s.l Reflecting the dependence on reliable moisture, farmsthat grow corn under irrigation have average yields almost 60 percent higher than do farms without irrigation inthe same region. Irrigation is most common in the M&tern Great Plains States of Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado,and Texas. The United States exports over 20 percent of its corn and produces 40 percent of the world’s supply.Most corn is used as livestock and poultry feed.

Soybean-oybeans are the second most valuable crop in the United States.2 The primary soybean-producing region overlaps the Corn Belt. Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Indiana, Ohio, and Missouri are the leadingproducers. The soybean has a great ability to recover from ctimate stresses because of its indeterminate(continuous) flowering. The wide variety of genetic types available has allowed the crop to be grown in manyclimatic zones. Although grown in the South, soybeans do better in the cool-weather States. Melds in the Southare hurt by uneven patterns of rainfall, diseases associated with dampness, and hot and dry conditions during theAugust pod-filling period. The United States exports 35 percent of its soybean production and provides over halfof the world’s supply. Soybeans are used in cooking oils, livestock feed, and several industrial applications.

Wheat—Wheat is the third-largest field crop in terms of total production value. Wheat is grown across theUnited States, although a large area of the Great Plains running from North Dakota and Montana down tothe Texaspanhandle accounts fortwo-thirds of U.S. production. The Pacific States are also major producxws. Kansas, NorthDakota Oklahoma, Washington, and Montana are generally the leading producers. Wheat infrequently grown inareas where there are few profitable alternatives. In dry areas, it is common to leave land fallow in alternate yearsto allow soil moisture to accumulate. Late spring freezes and inadequate moisture after flowering are the primarythreats to yields. Winter wheat varieties are planted in the fall and harvested in spring or early summer-avoidingthe threat of hot summer temperatures. These varieties account for about 75 percent of U.S. production. Wherethere is sufficient moisture and long growing seasons, winter wheat is sometimes double-cropped, with sorghumor soybeans grown during the summer. Spring wheats are planted in spring and harvested in late summer. Thesevarieties are grown along the nort hem U.S. border, especially in Nort h Dakota, where winters are long and harsh.The United States produces about 10 percent of the world’s wheat supply and exports half of its production.

Livestock and poultry—Livestock products (including poultry and dairy) account for about 53 percent of thetotal value of U.S. farm sales. Sales of cattle and dairy products are by far the largest component (almost 70percent) of these livestock-related sales. The primary cattle regions are located west of the Mississippi and eastof the Rocky Mountains, where t here is access to both grazing lands and feed grains. Much of t he U.S. productionof earn and a large portion of soybean production goes to animal feed. Texas, Nebraska and Kansas are leadingcattle producers. Hog production is strongly linked to the corn-producing regions, with most production occurringin Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Indiana. Poultry production is widespread, with much of it in the South.

1 R.S. Loomis, Department of Agronomy, University of Californlaat Davis, personal Communication, Apr.22,1993.

2 Excluding hay, which includes various grasses and @JUmOS (Such as alfalfa) grown for ani~l ‘Od*r.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993; U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Servkx, Agr?kultural/rrigation and 14@ter Use, Agrlculturai Information Bulletin 636 (Washington, DC: USDA).


Changing Farm StructureThe traditional small farm is gradually being

replaced by the large, technologically sophisti-cated agribusiness.8 Farms producing under $40,000in annual revenues still account for almost 71percent of the 2.2 million farms in the UnitedStates. 9 However, large farms-the 14 percent offarms with annual sales of over $100,000-nowaccount for almost 80 percent of farm production(91). Small farming enterprises are increasinglyless significant to the business of producing food.

Overall, farms are declining in number at 1 to2 percent per year, with neighboring farm landsbeing consolidated into single, larger farms (91).As a result, average farm size has been increasing,rising from 213 acres in 1950 to 460 acres by1990.10 The trend toward consolidation of U.S.agricultural production into larger businesses willlikely continue (24). Along with the increasingconcentration of farm production on fewer largefarms, there has been a decline in the ruralpopulation that depends on farming. on-farmpopulations declined from 15 percent of the U.S.population in 1950 to less than 2 percent in 1990.The declines in farm and rural populations areexpected to continue (62, 101). By the time sig-nificant climate change might occur, farming willlook much different from the way it looks today.

THE PROBLEM OF CLIMATE CHANGEClimate and climate variability are already

major risks to agricultural production. Agricul-tural losses due to climatic fluctuation are anexpected part of farming. Farmers plant knowingthat in some years, weather will cause poor yields.To minimize their exposure to climate risk,farmers take steps such as planting an appropriatecrop, using water-conserving land-management

practices, and diversifying sources of income.Such responsiveness suggests that farmers willadjust to perceived changes in climate variability,regardless of whether this is due to climate changeor recognized as such by the farmer. However,future climate changes could present agriculturewith unprecedented risks and circumstances.

Climate change, if it occurs, will be global,perhaps with large-scale winners and losers.There will be regional differences in the pace,direction, and extent of climate changes. Someregions are likely to be helped by climate change,while others are harmed. There is no way ofknowing whether gains would offset the losses,but a changing climate would surely affect worldagricultural markets and regional patterns of landuse on a long-term basis. Not only will there bechanges in average climatic conditions, but theremay also be a change in the frequencies of rainfalland temperature-related extreme events. Althoughit is not clear that climate variability will increase,increases in mean temperature alone can lead tomore-frequent periods of extended high tempera-tures (59). The changing frequency of extremehigh-temperature events, rather than a gradualrise in average temperature, may present thegreatest threat to farmers.

Adaptations made on the farm will be impor-tant in offsetting potential declines in yield. Insome cases, simple adjustments in farming prac-tices may transform potential yield losses intoyield gains. Still, the extent to which adaptationwill fully offset any negative effects of climatechange might be constrained by cost and by limitsto the availability of water and fertile soils.Conflicts over the environmental consequencesof agriculture and the use of scarce water re-sources may become increasingly contentious(see ch. 5), limiting the possibilities for adapta-

S It is unclear how climate chaqye might affect farm structure. The large, specialized farming enterprises may prove to be fmanc ially and_eWy better prepared to respond to climate changes than the typical smaller farm. On the other han~ it could be that smaller farms withlow capitalizatio~ high diversification in source of income, and low input requirements will prove less vulnerable to climate change.

9 F- produc~ ~der $40,M) in gross sales do not produce enough income to SUppOfi a ftiy by today’s living s~~s. *Y of

these farms are owned by individuals who work full time in other jobs (91).10 F- producing ova $loo,M@” in KWXIU(X aver~e over 1!500 ~ra.


tion. Warming could eventually shift the potentialrange of crops hundreds of miles to the north (7).If crop ranges shift significantly and rapidly undera changing climate, communities that depend onagriculture could be greatly affected. Althoughmost studies have concluded that there is noimmediate threat to U.S. food supplies (4, 87), thepossibility of even moderate reductions in long-terrn food supplies cannot be ignored as anunderlying cause for public concern.

9 Sensitivity of Crops andLivestock to Climate Change

Virtually every aspect of farming is affected byweather and climate. If soils are too dry or toocold, seeds will not germinate. If soils are too wet,farmers have difficulty getting equipment intomuddy fields to plant or harvest. Most import-antly, climate controls biological productivity. Inmost plants, the process of flowering and devel-oping harvestable organs depends in a complexway on the seasonal patterns of temperature anddaylength. Crop yields are sensitive to daily andseasonal levels of solar radiation, maximum andminimum temperatures, precipitation, and carbondioxide (C02), and to the soil-drying effects ofwinds and high temperatures. All of these factorscould be altered under climate change. Wheneverclimatic conditions depart from those expected,they pose some risk to agriculture.

For agricultural crops, beneficial effects fromincreasing concentrations of atmospheric CO2 areexpected. Crops respond to increased concentra-tions of atmospheric CO2 with greater photosyn-thetic efficiency, improved water-use efficiency,and greater tolerance for heat, moisture, andsalinity stresses (1, 49, 52). The greater photosyn-thetic and water-use efficiencies result in largerand more-vigorous plants and increased yields(78).11 It is not known precisely how the direct

effects of higher C02 concentrations will influ-ence crop yields under actual field conditions.Experimental results suggest that under a dou-bling of atmospheric CO2 (and otherwise idealconditions), yields may improve by 20 to 60percent for crops such as wheat, soybeans, andrice--the C3 crops (5, 49).12 Yield increases ofperhaps no more than 20 percent are expected forcorn, sugar cane, and sorghum--the C4 crops. Theactual extent of the beneficial impacts fromelevated CO2 will depend on there being suitabletemperatures and adequate supplies of nutrientsand soil moisture.

Several factors may complicate the predictionthat rising C02 will be a blessing for agriculture.The relative growth advantage of C3 plants overthe C4 crops could change regional patterns ofcrop production. If C3 weeds start growing faster,C 4 crops like corn and sugarcane could faceincreased competition from them. (The converseis alSO true, of course; C3 plants could face reducedcompetition from C4 weeds.) The nutritionalquality of plants and grain might decline becauseof the changing balance of carbon and nitrogen (aresult of increased uptake of carbon). This, inturn, might lead to increased insect damage, withinsects consuming more plant material to compen-sate for lower nutritional quality (6).

Regional warming itself can be either benefi-cial or harmful. In more northern regions, wherecool temperatures result in short growing seasons,the beneficial effects of increased seasonalwarmth may dominate. Irrigated crops, whichinclude most of the Nation’s fruits and vegeta-bles, should also benefit, especially if longergrowing seasons allow double-cropping. Water,if available, can compensate for the stress of hightemperatures. But warming tends to speed up thedevelopment of plants, shortening the period inwhich fruit formation and grain filling occurs, and

11 Note tit despite improv~ water-use eftlcimcy, crop water r~tiernent.s may increase because of tie kgcr ptit Siu.[z me catego~tion of plants as CJ or Cg is based on the mechanism by which COZ is used in the cell (see Ch. 2). At Ckvated C02

concentrations, the inefllciency of the C3 process in producing sugars is overcome, and Cq plants respond with greater growth improvementthan do C4 plants.


so reduces yields. This effect on yields is espe-cially notable in wheat and corn (2). Warmernighttime temperatures, even in the absence ofwarmer daytime temperatures, will increasetranspiration and can reduce a plant’s ability torecover from the rigors of high daytime tempera-tures. High temperatures can damage the processof pollination (corn pollen begins to lose viabilityat 97 OF (36 ‘C)) and can damage fruit and flowerformation (cotton fruit aborts after 6 hours attemperatures over 104 OF (40 ‘C)). High tempera-tures can stress plants directly, reducing growthrates in most crops at temperatures above 95 OF(35 ‘C). Finally, higher temperatures lead toincreased evaporation, reducing water availabil-ity unless drying is offset by greater precipitation.Because water is generally the limiting factor inagricultural production, any soil drying tends toreduce yields. Corn yields are especially sensitiveto moisture stress in the weeks around tasseling.13

Crop yields and farm-management costs can beinfluenced in other, less-direct ways. Changes inthe frequency or range of insects and fungaldiseases seem likely to result from warmerclimates, longer growing seasons, and changes inmoisture levels. Pollination may be affected if thetiming of plant development is out of phase withthe presence of pollinating insects. Climate warm-ing may alter the geographical distribution ofexisting pests now limited by winter temperaturesand may allow for increased rates of successfulinvasion by exotic migrants. The severity ofexisting pest problems could be increased aslonger growing seasons allow for the develop-ment of extra pest generations and as warmertemperatures raise the likelihood that pests willsurvive through the winter (70; see also ch. 2).Several pests, such as the southwestern corn borerand the corn earworm, could pose a greater threatto Corn Belt production. As a result, pest-

management costs may rise. Farmers may alsoface changes in the costs of drying, storing, andtransporting grain. A longer growing seasonmight allow grains to be more fully dried in thefields, thus reducing costs. Grain-transport costscould be increased if reduced water flows limitbarge traffic on the Mississippi River, as hap-pened during the drought of 1988 (12) (see box5-L). Livestock and poultry would also be af-fected by a warmer climate. Continued exposureof cattle to temperatures above 86 OF (30 ‘C) canslow weight gain, reduce milk production, andincrease mortality (39, 50). Problems can beamplified if night temperatures rise dispropor-tionately more than day temperatures (47) be-cause animals need cool nights to recover fromhot days. Livestock and poultry farming may alsobe affected indirectly, through changes in theprice of feed, in water availability, in diseases,and in the availability and productivity of grazinglands. For example, any decline in acreageplanted with crops in the Great Plains would leadto a corresponding increase in the land availablefor grazing. For the existing grazing lands,changes in soil moisture will have the greatesteffect on the plant species composition andproductivity (16).14

Climate change will threaten agriculture mostin areas such as the western Great Plains, whereheat stress and droughts are already problems andwhere increased irrigation would be costly. Theextreme crop losses that occur during droughtsprovide a striking illustration of potential vulner-ability. During the drought year of 1988, Illinoiscorn yields were almost 45 percent lower thanprevious years’ (110). Figure 6-5 shows thesensitivity of U.S. corn yield to drought and otherweather-related factors. Cropland now underirrigation in arid regions facing reduced watersupplies and increased competition for water will

13 m tie flowers that form on the top of com plants are commonly referred to ss ~sek.

14 Direct eff~~ of elevated C02 may not be significant on _ lands constrained by moisture and nitrogen. It is possible, however, thatincreased carbon uptake by forage plants without corresponding increases in the amount of nitrogen assimilated by those plants could reducetheir nutritional value for livestock (40).


Figure 6-5-Corn Yields in the United States, 1950-91

140 —

I120

-@ 1 0 0

:

-1 60/0

20

I

o I I I I I

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990

NOTE: To convert bushels of corn per acre to metric tons per hectare, multiply by 0.063.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,annual).

be at risk and will likely require increasinglysophisticated water-conserving technologies. InWestern States, for example, warming could leadto a reduction or earlier melting of the wintersnowpack that now provides much of the region’sirrigation water (see ch. 5). On the other hand, ifmoisture levels increase and allow a northwestshift of the Corn Belt into the deep, fertile soils ofthe Dakotas, there might be little threat to yields.An expansion of the Corn Belt into that region isalready under way (84). Over the past decade,plant breeders have developed corn varieties witha shorter growing season and thus have extendedthe corn region several hundred miles to the north.

The various effects of climate changes onagricultural yield are only suggestive of thepotential economic harm from climate change.Exactly how consumer food prices and theprofitability of agriculture are affected by climatechange will depend on the aggregation of farm-level responses to changes in climate. Large-scale

adjustments in the location and intensity of foodproduction have the potential to offset much ofthe direct effect of climate change. Box 6-C de-scribes some studies that have looked at the marketresponses and economic effects of climate change.

I Conflicting Goals and CompetingDemands for Water

Agriculture’s attempts to adjust to climatechange could have several potentially undesirableconsequences. The U.S. Environmental Protec-tion Agency (EPA) warns that environmentalconcerns and constraints on the availability ofland and water could add to the difficulty ofmaintaining agricultural yields under a climatechange (87). Any increased use of irrigationwater would be in conflict with the growingdemand for other uses of water. The potential fora shift in the Corn Belt into northern areas of theLake States raises particular concern. This is anarea of thin soils, with poor drainage and uneven


Box &C-Previous Studies ofAgriculture and Climate Change

In the 1980s, the Environmental Pro-tection Agency (EPA) commissioned manymajor studies of the potential effects ofclimate change on U.S. agriculture (87)1.The Agency emphasized the use of cropsimulation models to predict the effects ofvarious climate-warming scenarios on cropyields (75, 80), and gave little attention totechnical changes in agricultural systemsor the adaptive responses of farmers. Thewarm ing scenarios were generated by gen-eral circulation model (GCM) experimentsunder the assumption of doubled atmos-pheric carbon dioxide (C02). The GCMsused predict eventual atmospheric temper-ature increases of 7 to 9 ‘F (4 to 5 ‘C) formany regions of the United States, and oneof the models predicts severe drying formost of the agricultural land in the UnitedStates (see ch. 2). Representative projec-tions of yieid changes from two GCMs arepresented in the figure at right.

EPA found that climate change wouldaffect crop yieids and livestock productivityand would result in a northward shift in thecrop production zones. Although warmingalone might lead to sharply reduced agri-cultural yields (over 50 percent decline insome regions), the direct effects of doubledCOZ could offset much of the potentialdecline in crop yields. Still, EPA predictedthat yieidswouiddecline substantially underthe more-severe climate scenarios, es-pecially where droughts become more fre-quent. Yields across the Southern andCentral States were considered particularlyvulnerable, largely because of drying. Afew northern locations, such as Minnesota,were expected to show yield improvements

1 ~ Council for Agricultural SclenOe andT*nology(18) drew together perhaps the bestoverview of agriculture under climate ohange.Rosenberg and Grosson (79) investigated on-farm adaptation to climate change in the U.S.Midwest. A National Academy of Sdenoe study(65) reviewed the possible ways that agrloulturecould adapt to climate change.

50 ,

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SOURCE: C. Roeenzweig, “Potential Effects of Climate Change onAgricultural Production in the Great Ptains: A Simulation Study,” in:T% Potential Effects of Globai Climate Change on the Unit& States,Appendix C, Wlume 1, J. Smith and D. Tlrpak (ede.) (Waehlngton, OC:U.S. Environmental protection Agency, 19S9).

NOTE: Yietds reflect COa fertilization effect. GFDLGeophysicaI FiuidDynamice Laborato~; GISS-Goddard Institute for Space Studies.

Chapter 6--Agriculture 1291

(in some cases, by more than 40 percent). Including COZ effects and assuming no adaptive response, a reductionin the Nation’s agricultural yields was projected as the most iikely outcome of climate change.

Projected yieid changes such as those described in the EPA studies suggest potential harmful effects ofciimate change but, ultimately, cost changes to consumers and agricultural producers are the concern. Exactlyhowconsurnerfood prices and the profitability of farm production are affected will depend on farm-level reactionsand market adjustments to climate change. Indeed, it is often not understood that farmers could benefit from thehigher prices that would result from a reduction in all farm yieids. Farming systems wili change in response to cropproductivity shifts and changes in commodity prices. Market-level adjustments in the location and intensity of foodproduction worldwide wili determine the prices faced by individual farmers and consumers.

Aithough the EPA studies did not explicitly consider farm-level adaptations, they suggested that farmers couldact to offset some of the projected yield declines (3, 26,80). A few basic agronomic adjustments were considered(80). For drytand corn (i.e., corn that is not irrigated) in the Southern Plains, altered planting dates showed littleeffect in offsetting the yield reduction caused by CJirnate warming. More dramatic effects of short-term adaptationswere found for dryland and irrigated wheat. A switch in cultivars led to improved wheat yields in most of thesimulations.

Others studies took a more comprehensive look at on-farm adaptation. One examined the natural resourcebase of the Missouri-Iowa-Nebraska-Kansas (MINK) region, investigating the effectiveness of several farmpractices and innovations in offsetting effects of climate change (79), In the absence of adaptive response, theyfound that a permanent shift to warmer and drier climate conditions reduces net regional income by 1.3 percent.After ac~nting for direct C02 effects and short-term adaptations by farmOrS, regionai economic losses are

reduced to 0.3 percent(11 ). More significantly, the study considers plausibie innovations in crop genetics and farmmanagement that could further reduce the risks to the region’s future economy t hat are posed by climate change.

Effects of economic adjustments through shifts in the location and intensity of production were consideredin one study (3). Shifting crops to better-suited locations would be an important adaptive mechanism that wouldoffset much of the potential economic cost of ciimate change. The study used a regional-market model of U.S.agriculture to examine the economic effects of changes in crop productivity due to climate change. Economicdamages were significantly less than would have resulted in t he absence of shifts in the location and intensity ofproduction. Economic effects range from damages of $10.3 billion to benefits of $10.9 billion, depending on whichGCM scenario is considered (4). Depending on the climate scenario, overall crop production decreases by 20percent or increases by 9 percent. Corresponding to these supply changes, commodity prices increase by 34percent or decrease by 17 percent. In either case, farmers benefit while consumers bear the burden of higherprices under the harsher climate scenario.

One assessment of the world trade in agricultural products under climate change found that despite apotential for substantial effects of climate change on crops, interregional shifts in location and intensity ofproduction and the opportunity for trade very much buffer the world from the threat of climate change (46). Pricechanges in international markets promote interregional adjustment in production and consumption. Essentiality noaggregate economic effect on the United States results, and economic effects on the overall world economy areestimated to be similarly small. Another assessment of world agricultural trade under a climate change foundbeneficial effects from world trade, with interregional adjustments offsetting 70 to 80 percent of the potential yieiddeclines (81). Despite this finding, that assessment reached an important and less-than-optimistic conclusion:although the United States itself may not face market losses, some parts oft he developing wortd t hat must importfood could suffer from higher food prices and an increased risk of hunger.

SOURCE: Office of Twhnology Assessment, 1993; W.E. Easterling, “Adapting United States Agriculture to Climate Change,” contractorreport prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, January 1993.


terrain, raising the possibility of reduced produc- Costs of main taining farm production. Increasedtivity and increased environmental damage. In- use of chemical pesticides to counter these threatstensifkd farming in these northern lands would could add to water pollution problems. In areaschange the nature of an area now rich in forests, where farming activity declines, there could bewetlands, and other natural habitats. Crop pests, dislocations in local and regional economies (seeif they expand in range or severity, might raise the box 6-D).

Box 6-D-Water Transfers in the West: Winners and lasers

Colorado provides a good illustration of the complexities surrounding already scarce water supplies in theM&t. Many climate models predict drying in the central parts of North America. With growing urban demands forwater, increasing environmental cxmcerns related to instream flows, and less water to go around, future conflicts overwater seem likely to increase in intensit y. An examination of existing conflicts related to water transfers in Coloradoillustrates some important social impacts that need to be considered when climate change policy is formulated.

Water transfers in Colorado are gradually moving water from irrigated agricultural to urban use. Over the pasttwo decades, dties have purchased water rights on some 80,000 acres (24,300 hectares)l of agricultural land (outof some 3 million acres total irrigated land). The transfers are driven by economics. As costs for developing newmunicipal water supplies have increased, Colorado’s cities have found it cheaper to purchase water rights fromnearby agricultural areas. For farmers or ranchers, the sale of water rights has provided a desperately neededfinancial windfall at a time when the agricultural economy has been severely strained by high debt, poor weather,and low commodity prices. Faced with a sagging rural economy, the farmer who is offered by a city two to five timesmore than the value of water in agriculture sees a deal that is too good to refuse. For example, landowners in theArkansas River Basin, who might lease a 40-acre field to a farmer for a profit of $2,500 per year, were able to sellthe water rights to that land for $200,000 to the city of Aurora.

It would seem that such water transfers are awin-win situation. With farmers accounting for only 2 percent ofthe population and contributing 3 percent of economic output, yet consuming 92 percent of Colorado’s water, smalltransfers of water from agriculture seem to offer the right solution to urban water shortages. The acre-foot of waterthat allows production of about $90 of wheat or $250 of beef will provide 4 years of water for a typical urban familyof four. The farmer makes money by selling, and the city gets more than enough water to support a growingpopulation. However, there are losers in almost every water transfer. The losers in Colorado have been the alreadypoor counties and communities left with no future economic base after water sales to cities.

In the seven counties of the Arkansas River Basin in southeastern Coiorado (see figure), large amounts ofwater have already been transferred to urban use. Prolonged droughts in the 1950s devastated the farm economyand triggered the first water sales to the city of Pueblo. In the 1970s and 1980s, there were major sales of waterto the cities of Pueblo, Colorado Springs, and Aurora, spurred first by speculatively high water prices and later byeconomic troubles in the farm economy. By 1985, about 14 percent of the water rights in the seven-county basinhad been sold for urban use. The dry climate of this area offers little opportunity for profitable farming unless landis irrigated. The decline in farm production has meant local suffering.

Particularity hard hit is Crowley County<tiich has seen 85 percent of its water rights transferred to cities.IJttfe of the money received by farmers was reinvested in the local area Rather, about 80 to 75 percent of the moneywent to pay taxes and debts of farmers who were already on the verge of bankruptcy. Crowley County already hasthe lowest assessed value of any Colorado county. Within the next few years, all land that has Iostirrigation will bereassessed and the tax base will decline further. lhe burden of funding schools, local government and other publicservices has shifted to the rernahing few residents and farmers who chose not to sell their water. Colorado waterlaw allows the transfer of water without regard to secondary consequences within the community. Despite attemptsto jump-start the local economy with construction of a new prison, most prison employees have chosen not to live

1 To convert acres to hectares, multiply by O.aos.


The Arkansas River Basin ofSoutheastern Colorado

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So much land and water is used for agriculturethat any climate-induced changes to agriculturewould have profound effects on competing usesfor these resources (see ch. 5 and vol. 2, chs. 4and 6). Cropland and pasture account for 30percent of land use, and irrigation of agriculturalland accounts for 84 percent of consumed water(88). Land and water resources are particularlyvulnerable to expansion of agricultural activityand to increases in the intensity of irrigation or inthe use of farm chemicals. Many agriculturalStates have already lost much of their originalwetland area (see vol. 2, box 4-E) and forest coverto agriculture.

Competition for scarce water is likely to beparticularly important under climate change (3,4). Whether increases in irrigation are possiblewill depend on water availability and costs. Ifwithdrawal of water for agriculture does increase,wildlife habitat and other services that depend on

freshwater flows will be increasingly threatened,particularly if climate change reduces or alters theseasonal timing of stream flows. On the otherhand, without sufficient water for agriculture,farm yields will be reduced. The western regions,already facing water shortages, may see renewedpressures to construct large water-resource-development projects (see ch. 5). These projectshave in the past been in conflict with the goal ofprotecting natural habitats.

Water quality may also be affected by achanging climate. Farm chemicals and wastes caninfiltrate groundwater, and surface-water runoffand drainage can carry salts, farm chemicals, andsediments to adjacent water bodies (see box 6-E).With altered patterns of precipitation and regionalagricultural activity and with altered dilutionrates in streams and aquifers, the nature of thewater pollution problem on a regional scale couldchange substantially. Concern over pollution

Box 6-E—irrigated Agriculture and Water Quality: The Kesterson Case

Climate change models suggest that many parts of the interior United States will become hotter and drier. Onepotential response to this is to increase the area of cultivated land under irrigation. Although increased irrigation mayprove to be attractive to farmers, it is not without environmental costs-including potential damage to soils, waterquality, and wildlife. The case of the Kesterson National wildlife Refuge shows how failure to antiapate potentialwaterquality problems can lead to severe contamination and suggests that future public efforts to support irrigationshould proceed with caution and a thorough understanding of risks.

The Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge was established in 1970 along the San Joaquin River in California’sintensively farmed Central Valley (figure). The 5,900-acre (2,390-hectare)i refuge harbored a diverse array ofmigratory and resident waterfowl, including ducks, geese, herons, and coots, as well as an assortment of fish,mammals, and raptors. Located in a State that is estimated to have lost more than 90 percent of its wetlands overthe past two centuries, Kesterson appeared to be a crucial part of efforts to conserve California’s biological heritage.In the spring of 1983, some of the ducks, coots, grebes, and stilts born at Kesterson Reservoir at the southeasternedge of the refuge emerged from their eggs deformed and crippled-with oddly shaped beaks, missing wings,twisted legs, and unformed skulls. Many died shortiy after hatching. The U.S. fish and Wildlife Service, which hadinvestigated fish die-offs at Kesterson in 1982, conducted laboratory analysis that suggested that the disappearanceof fish and the deformities of birds stemmed from a common cause+musually high concentrations of selenium inthe Kesterson Reservoir water. Trace amounts of selenium occur naturally in the soils of central California, as inmany parts of the arid Southwest. The contamination of Kesterson Reservoir was caused by a combination of waterdevelopment projects and irrigation practices. Selenium had leached from agricultural soils, moved throughdrainage systems, and became concentrated in the Kestereon Reservoir. At high concentrations, the seleniumproved deadly. Kesterson Reservoir lies at the drainage end of the San Luis Unit of the V&tiands Water DistriiLoperated by the Bureau of Reclamation as part of the huge Central Valley Project. The saline soils of large sectionsof the San Luis area were not easily used for irrigated agriculture. The success of irrigated agriculture in saline soils

1 To convert acres to hectares, multiply by 0.405.


depends on the application of enough water toflush salts out of the upper layers of soil. But thesoils of San Luis presented an additional com-plicatiorw+hey are underlain by an impenetra-ble layer of day that prevents the drainage ofirrigation water. If the soils were irrigated enoughto flush away salts, the poor drainage wouldcause the water table to rise, drowning roots ofcrop plants and depositing more salts in surfacesoils. Subsurface drainage was necessary tomake the cropland productive.

As part of larger efforts to bring water to theCentral Valley, the Bureau of Reclamation

_ 0annin9 water sup@y systems in the SanLuis Unit starting in the 1950s, and by 1960, wasauthorized to begin construction of a system thatcame to include the San Luis Dam, Canal, andReservoir. To achieve the proper balance ofirrigation and drainage for agricultural produc-

tion, the Bureau of Reclamation planned anextensive 188-mile (300 -kilometer)2 drainage

system to take drainage flows from the San LuisUnit into the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.Only the first 85 miles of the drain were evercompleted. By 1975, the drain had reachedKesterson Reservoir—and that is where it

stopped. Controversy over potential effects onwater quality in the Delta and lack of Federalfunds prevented completion of the full drainage

system.Since 1975, drainage water carrying sele-

nium and other salts leached from the San Luissoils have emptied into the Kesterson Reservoir.

Over the years, selenium and other potentiallytoxic trace elements concentrated in reservoirwaters. The selenium was further concentrated

Kesterson Reservoir and Surrounding Areas

Sacramento-San

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SOURCE: Office of Technology Aseesernent, 1993, adapted from R.W.Wahl, Markets for Federal Water: Subsides, Property Righte, and theBureau of Reclamation (Washington, DC: Reeources for the Future,19s9).

in vegetation and small organisms on which waterfowi feed-a process known as bhconcer)tfat~o=ventuallyproducing the startling birth defects and mortality among young birds seen in 1983. Concern over possible risks to

humans led the State to issue a health advisory, warning against eating duck hunted on the refuge. California’s State

Water Resources Control Board found concentrations of selenium up to 10 times higher than permitted by publichealth standards and other trace elements in amounts that exceeded Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

water-quality standards. By 1985, the Board declared the San Luis drainage water a hazardous waste that wouldhave to be treated and cleaned up accordingly. Drainage into the reservoir was finally halted in 1988. [n less thana decade, Kesterson went from being a cornerstone of California’s wildlife conservation program to a nationalsymbol of environmental disaster. The Kesterson case is an extreme exampie of how irrigated agriculture may harmwater quality-a particularly ill-fated confluence of FederaJ water projects, natural soil properties, and conflictinggoals. However, the Kesterson problems are not unique. In the East, soluble salts have long ago been washed from

z To ~nvert miles to kilometers, multiply @ 1.609.(Continued on next page)


Box 6-E-irrigated Agriculture and Water Quality: The Kesterson Case-(Continued)the soils by rainfall. But in the VW@ the accessibility of salt-bearing formations and iow rates of precipitationcombine to make much of the region subject to salinity probiems (figure below). Even on nonirrigated c@and,saline deposits can develop in areas of poor drainage. Drylandfarmingpractices, alternating crop artdfaiiowyears(apossibleadaptation toclimatechange), maythemseivesaddto saiinityprobiems. Crop-faiiowrotations uselesswater than would natural vegetation, and the unused soil water can carry salts to Iow-iying areas.

Can a case like Kesterson happen again? Federal actions at water projects around the Nationwil undoubtedlybe more cautious in the future. However, in most Western States, irrigation and consumptive use still take priority,whiie protection of adequate water flows and water quality forwiidiife, fish, recreation, and other naturaiuses remiveshort shrift (see ch. 5). Climate change may well increase the demand forwaterdiversions for irrigation, potentiallyieading to increased conflicts over water use and environmental quality.

SOURCES: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993; A. Dinar and D. Zbrrnan (ede.), Tbe f%onornlcg amfhf~t of ~tia~Dndna@ /n AgrkxNure (Boeton, MA: Kluwer Academic Publlehers, 1991); R.W. Wahl, Matke& Ibr Fe&m/ Waten Sub8Jdha9, Pro@yR/@aJ, and the Bureau of Redamatlon (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 19S9).

The Potentiai for Water-Salinit y Problems

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Servioe, The Sacond RCA ~radaaf, Miacetlaneouepublication No. 14S2, 19S9.

horn agricultural sources may limit the extent to lands of the Northern Plains. As a result ofwhich agriculture can adjust to climate change. climate change, economic forces could bring an

Although an overall expansion in cropland additional 3 million acres into new production inseems unlikely (112), spatial shifts in the pattern the South, with much of this cropland created byof land use may still be disruptive to natural the clearing of forests (23). Such an expansion ofenvironments (4). For example, increases in farm farmin g into highly erodible or environmentallyacreage are projected in the environmentally sensitive lands would be inconsistent with envi-sensitive lands of the Lake States and the erodible ronmental goals (see box 6-A).


TECHNOLOGIES FORCLIMATE CHANGE

ADAPTATION TO

Past experience suggests that U.S. farming isflexible and innovative enough to permit rela-tively quick changes in management practicesand in crop choice. History is replete withexamples that illustrate the responsiveness ofagriculture and agricultural research to challenges(see boxes 6-F and 6-G). In responding to climatechange, farmers can draw on the large array oftactics and strategies they already use to protectthemselves against climate risk (see box 6-H).Many tactics, such as changing planting dates orcultivars, require little change in the nature offarm management and can be implemented rap-idly. Other adjustments, such as adding irrigationor switching crops, require substantial changes infarm equipment and management, and will occursomewhat more gradually. Together, these mayprovide the first line of defense against climatechange.

Agricultural adaptations that draw on currentpractices may be effective for a time in dealingwith climate change. There is a reasonablechance, though, that climate change couldeventually overwhelm the effectiveness of cur-rent adaptation possibilities. That is a compellingreason to consider the long-term prospects fornew technologies. Long-term adaptation mayrequire fundamental improvements in the tech-nologies available to farmers. In the past, expan-sion of agricultural technology has occurred bothas a market-induced response to a changingenvironment and through publicly supportedefforts aimed at overcoming perceived resourceconstraints. U.S. farming has been supported inthis by: 1) a sophisticated system of agribusiness;2) a publicly supported land-grant university,research, and extension system that channelstechnology to farmers; 3) a transportation infra-structure organized to move food rapidly from thefarm to an interlocking system of local, regional,national, and world markets; and 4) a marketeconomy that quickly rewards successful adapta-

,.

: . . ,. .

w.-.

. . .

An ARS soil scientist inspects severely salt-damagedfarmland in California’s San Joaquin Valley.

tion. These institutions have provided U.S. agri-culture with the ability to adapt to rapidlychanging economic conditions and should, ifwell-maintained and directed, provide the basisfor future adaptation to climate change.

Adaptation may be slowed by impediments toflexibility in crop choice, such as those imposedby Government farm-support programs (54). Thenet effect may be to discourage transition tocropping systems that are better suited to thechanged climate. Uncertainty and inadequacies inthe information available to farmers, both aboutclimate change and effective responses to it,could slow the rate of adaptation. Policies thatrestrict or distort agricultural markets are alsoimportant constraints to effective adaptation(18, 20). The subsidies provided to farmers insome countries tend to discourage farming inregions where agriculture is more productive, andso raise overall costs of world food production.


Box 6-F--tiistorical Examples of Adaptability in Agriculture

Adaptation of crops to different climatic regimes: the case of wheat and corn

Expansion of a crop into anew region often requires that the crop tM adapted to a newdimatic regime. Herewe describe how hard red winter wheat and dryfand corn have undergone such adaptation.

Hard red winter wheat—Hard red winter wheat has accounted for about half of all wheat produced in theUnited States. The figure below shows how much the production zone for hard red winter wheat expanded from1920 to 1980 (76). Once limited primarily to Nebraska and Kansas, the crop is now grown as far north as theCanadian Prairie Provinces and as far south as the Rio Grande River. This process of expansion hasocwrredevenduring times of hardship in the farm economy (such as the prolonged drought and economic depression h the 1930sand the su@us production and depressed crop prices in recent years).

Through the efforts of crop breeders and agronomists, hard red winter wheat has been effectively adapted tocolder temperatures and drier conditions. lhe crop is now grown in northern locations that are about6°F (3.5°C)cooler and 15 percent drier than where growth was possibie in 1920. The southward expansion of the crop has notbeen as striking as the northward spread. Still, average annual temperatures at the current southern boundary ofthe crop are almost 3.5 ‘F (2 ‘C) higher than they are at any location in the crop zone of 1920. The expansion inthe hard red winter wheat range has come about from steady improvements in productivity made possible by thedevelopment of improved wheat varieties and farm-management practices (42).

Extent of the Hard Red Winter Wheat Zone in 1920 and 1980

SOURCE: N.J. Rosenberg, ‘The Increasing C02 Concentration in the Atmosphere and Its Implication on Agricultural Productivity, Part 11:Effecta Through C02-induced Climatic Change,” C/hnat/c Change, vol. 4, 1982, pp. 239-254.

Chapter 6--Agriculture 1299

—————. —.1

The development and adoption of semi-dwarf Proportion of Wheat Planted to

varieties in the 1940s (varieties whose stalks Leading Varieties in the United States

support heavier, grain-laden heads) boosted wheat ~0productivity (21). Continued breeding efforts sincethe 1940s have resulted in the great diversity of 70

r~’

Top 10 varietieswheat varieties now being used by US. farmers. 60The progression to greater varietal diversity over ~ s.

Y/

time (see figure) has been associated with better ~ Top 5 varieties

adaptation] of wheat to local growing conditions. ~ 40Breeding for disease resistance helped the expan-

‘: -~~ -~ ;

siontothe south. Selective breeding forcold-hardy ~varieties of hard red winter wheat helped theexpansion of wheat to the north. 10

Improved farming practices, especially the use o1 - - - — - 1———7--——of nitrogen fertilizers, better soil-moisture manage- 1919 1929 1939 1949 1959 1969 1979

ment practices, and large self-propelled machin-

ery, have increased the productivity of wheatSOURCE: D.G. Dalrymple, “Changes in Wheat Variet:es and Yields inthe United States, 1919-1984,” Agricu/fura/ History, vol. 62, 1988, pp.

growers. The practices of stubbling-in (i.e., direct 20.36,

seeding of winter wheat into untilled fields immedi-ately after harvest of the previous crop) and snowtrapping (e.g., using snow fences to collect snowon fields) have reduced the risk of winterkill and permitted an expansion of the crop northeastward into Canada’swestern agricultural Provinces (86).

The past performance of the research community in developing new ways for wheat to overcome climaticconstraints suggests the enormous capacity of the community to respond in the future. For example, as aconsequence of breeding programs, the genetic diversity of hard red winter wheat is increasing; this greatergenetic diversity should provide the raw material for further progress in crop development (19). This is but oneexample of the promise for future progress in adaptive agricultural research.

Dryiand corn—Perhaps even more remarkable t han the spread of hard red winter wheat into the CanadianPrairie Provinces is the recent adaptation of dryland corn to that same region. Farming systems in the semiaridnorthern Great Plains have historically suffered from overdependence on a narrow range of crops, especiallywheat (56). This overdependence made the region vulnerable during times when wheat prices were depressed.Recognition of this problem caused farmers, working in concert with the local agricultural research establishment,to seek an alternative crop.

The Lethbridge Research Station devoted 8 years of research to adapting corn to the climate of southernAlberta (56). Relative to regions of t he United States that produce significant quantities of dryland corn, southernAlberta is drier, the frost-free season is shorter, cumulative seasonai warmth is lower, and day length (period ofdaylight) is longer. The long day length can delay flowering, and the short growing season then provides little timefor maturation.

In response to these challenges, plant breeders at bthbridge have deveioped hybrids that have reducedsensitivity to day length and a short juvenile phase, so that the tassei starts to grow within a week of plantemergence. Moreover, breeders have successfully selected for varieties with a short interval between the openingof the mrn tassels and the production of silk, which appears to give corn plants increased tolerance to drought.In dryland trials, corn yields from these new varieties are competitive with those of barley and wheat (56). Theseresults dearly illustrate how directed research (i.e., the desire to diversify cropping systems in sout hem Alberta)can overcome major climatic constraints on crop production.


Box 6-F-Historical Examples of Adaptability In Agrlculture-(Contlnued)

Rapid Introduction of new crops: the CM8 of soybeans ~lImAtA MAIVIA mIW ~tAtA ~ AM ..... thMlvlA,.. ...... lntM ~1II1Wnfta1!l"""" M'ftIIIft ........................ ,..- .. _, ---..-........ - •• .. ..-.. r· ............. ·,. ... · ............. _·, ·~~,.,· ....... ·1(11· ...... ..,,.,... ...... ...,....,~ .. ,... .. 6 .........

In the United States. How easily such a shift eouId beeccompll ..... ~~tbe~pooIofcropethat win flourish under the changing dlmate and on their prodUctIon COllI .ntI':marb18. lit ~ of IOybeana Into U.S. agricultural production, eapecIaIIy since \\Q1d War II, .a YIYId -.ample of the rapidity with which the Nation's production systems can be modlfled to accommodate a new crop.

Soybeans have been cultivated In the United States since the earfy 18008,. although moet were used for forage until the middle of this century (71). In 1920, there was no ........ .,... plantedlnqbeanslnthe ".IV" ~+ Qla+a_ A,..a __ Nant..,.'" -maaft6 • ..-InaA ~d+a '-u ....... L"'~ ~\Ah .. H ~\ .A ......... ~ ..,VI ..... v"v'u'vo;Jl.'"""~v ....... 'v¥ ... vvl_·IV.v .. __ 'tU"v_"" ... 'JUIR_ • • _"" ..... I'\~/."''' .. '''' .... the Urited States Imported tNer 40 percent of the soybeans that ware uaed domNtIcaIIy.

Durlng'Mlrld War II, a growing demand for margarine created a market far aoybean 011 (34). Soybeans rapIdy began to oompete with other 011 seeds, and cropland was shifted Into qbeans.lnthe mldwtet.-n UNted State., Increases In soybean production came at the expenae of corn, wheat. and oat production, For the South; the soybean was a savior, replacing cotton as cotton prices plummeted In the wake of declining world demand. By 1949, the United States became a net exporter of soybeans. In leas than 80 ye8rs.1Oybeana had become a major cash Ciop kii U.S. faiiiiiii.

Since Y1brId War II, continuous growth in the 1lve8fDck and poultry Induttrtee hat further Increased the demand for the hlgh-proteln soybean meal. By 1982, more than one-thlrd d the cropland In the Corn Belt was planted In soybeans (4). The Increase In midwestern soybean acreage between 1949 and 198218 shown below. The rapidity of the spread of soybeans In the United Stateals algntftcantfor 88IM8Ing the proepecta ~ aaucce88ful shift to alternative crops under climate change. It demonstrates the capacity of thl farming sector to convert equipment, management, and marketing to graN and process a new crop In a short period of time. It afao shows thewiiiingnesa ofiarmers to experiment with a new crq> as the crop d preferenoe (catton, In the South) became uneconomical.

Th«e are limits, however, to the usefulnese of the U.S. soybean experience as an analogy to the shifting of crops to adapt to climate change. A major Incentive to growing soybeans was the rapid growth of demand for oii and meai woriciwide. Tne oomblned attributes of oil-bearing aeeda and high-protein residual meal gave soybeans a dear advantage over oornpetlng aopa. There do not appear to be crops waiting In the wlnga that could generate the Idnd of market that soybeans did. On a amaller scale, new crops may provide alternativea to farmers. For example, several droughttolerant crop speciea, such as paIoverde, joJoba. and mesquite, may be useful In dealing with Increasingly scarce water !n the aouthwMtern United States (58, 102). These crops have low water requirements and proclIoe harveatable quantities of valuable botanochemlcals and other plant products.

Mlclwe8tern SOybean Acreage In 1M9 and 1982

NOTE: Cot.mhIt with more than 10 PM*'t of t.nd In.,.,.. ... SOUROli: OftDat,.,..1aIogy AI •••• 1Mftt. 1 ...... fran J.P. twt, -a..lnt .... Oorn Bel,," n..~"...,vaL 7e,No. 1 1CUMl _ .... _~ " . .....,.,.., . ..,,-, ...

SOURCE: W.E. Eutertklg, "AdaptIng UnltedStatee AgrIcutturetoCiImate Change," oontrwJeDrNlpGl'tprtpaNdfortheOfftoeofTtIChnoIogy Aaaetsrnent, January 1995; Office 01 Technology AIMeaIMnt, 1 ••


Box 6-G—Adaptation to Declining Groundwater Isels in the High Plains Aquifer

The High Ptains, or Ogallala, Aquifer is a large The Ogallala Aquifergeologic formation of porous sand that underliesapproximately 200,000 square miies (520,000 hec-tares)l in the U.S. Great Plains (see figure). Thevast aquifer supplies water for most of this region’sagricultural, domestic, and industrial uses. Theresponse to growing water scarcity in this regionmay serve as a useful model for adaptation toclimate change (37).

By 1980, some 150,000 agricultural irrigationwells were pumping water from the High PlainsAquifer. Use of groundwater rose steadily from 7million acre-feet (18.6 billion cubic meters)2in195

0

to 21 million acre-feet by 1980 (117). In these eatlydays of irrigation, publicinformation about irrigationtechnology and the status of the aquifer was limited(118). Waste was obvious, and widespread pump-ing from the aquifer was causing groundwatertables to drop. Serious declines in groundwateroccurred in the southern Plains, with water tablesdropping more than a 100 feet (30 meters) in partsof Texas (43). in Kansas, almost 40 percent of

MT

‘havailable groundwater had been withdrawn by1980. With dedining groundwater in Kansas came \rincreased threats to critical wetland habitats usedby the whooping crane. A groundwater resourcethat once seemed inexhaustible appeared, by SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

1980, to be in danger of eventually running dry.Declines in the aquifer resulted in increased irrigation-pumping costs because it takes more fuel to pump from

lower depths. This increased cost has in turn prompted technical and institutional adaptations. A survey ofagricultural water users across the High Plains Aquifer region found that the preferred technical adaptations todedining grwndwater Ieveis were increased irrigation efficiency and the practice of conservation tillage (51). Underconservation tiilage (e.g., no-till and reduced-till management), crop stubble is left on the field after harvesting,shielding soils from sun and drying winds. A switch to low-pressure irrigation systems in the southern Plains States(53) increased irrigation efficiency by greatly reducing evaporative water losses. Overall irrigated acreage has alsodeclined, and many farmers have switched to low-water-intensity crops such as wheat cotton, and sorghum (66).

Institutional responses to scarcer groundwater on the High Plains have occurred at local and regionai levels(48). The effectiveness of local poiicy has varied from State to State. Kansas, for example, passed a groundwater=nagement law that made possible the formulation of regionally controlled groundwater management units (66).These units provide orderly development of the High Plains Aquifer with tools such as the spacing of wells, limitson numbers of wells, metering of water use, and promotion of water conservation. Areas of Nebraska have imposedsimilar restrictions and metering requirements. The Cheyenne Bottoms Wildlife Area of Kansas is a 13,000-acre(5,200-hectare)3 wetiand that provides critical habitat for the wtmoping crane and some 5 million other migra-

1 TO ~nvert square miles to hectares, multiply by 2.590.

2 TO convert acre-feet to cubic meters, multiply by 1,230.3 TO convert acres to heotares, multiply by 0.@5. (Continued on next page)


tory waterfowl that pass through each spring. The Kansas State Engineer has been able to impose restrictions ongroundwater pumping in order to protect recharge rates into this wetland.

Texas, the State that could benefit most from strong groundwater governance, has rather weak groundwatermanagement institutions (92). Unlike the other 49 States, Texas uses an absolute ownership rule in determiningrights to groundwater. The rule, based on English common law, states that an owner of a parcel of land owns fromthe “sky above to the depths below” (92), which includes the water on, above, and below the surface. The absoluteownership rule has proved to be a formidable disincentive for landowners to agree to regulation of their water atthe local level. Nevertheless, in the High Plains of northwest Texas, increasing water scarcity has resulted ininnovations in the institutions for coordinating groundwater use and promoting water conservation.

The 5.5 million acres in the 15 northwest Texas counties that constitute the High Plains GroundwaterConservation District No. 1 (44) receive just 12to 16 inches (30to 41 cm) of precipitation per year, but overlie partof the Ogallala Aquifer. Irrigation with groundwater pumped from the aquifer has allowed the region to grow largequantities of cotton, barley, sorghum, and corn for many years (74). The High Plains District was created in 1951largely to address the needs for groundwater conservation. The District has been “dedicated to the principle thatwater conservation is best accomplished through public education” (44). Accordingly, the District focuses its effortson research and demonstration projects, publishing free information about groundwater use and methods forconserving water, performing on-farm water-efficiency testing, and carefully monitoring groundwater levels andwater quality.

One of the earfiest District efforts was to reduce open-ditch losses. Water losses from open ditches were ashigh as 30 percent per 1,000 feet of ditch (44). The District performed ecanomic analyses that showed farmers itwould be cost-effective to stop losses (1 18). As of 1989, 12,097 miles (1 9,500 kilometers)4 of underground pipelinehad been laid to replace open ditches (44). Cost-effective systems for recovering irrigation tail water were alsodeveloped and demonstrated by the District (74). New technology in the form of time-controlled surge valves forfurrow irrigation and low-energy precision-application (LEPA) methods for spray irrigation systems were widelydemonstrated and promoted by the District. Surge valves and shortened furrows resulted in 10 to 40 percentimprovements in furrow-irrigation water losses, while LEPA systems reduced center-pivot irrigation losses fromaround 40 percent to as low as 2 percent (W. Wyatt, ated in ref. 74; 44). In 1978, the High Plains District inconjunction with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Soil Conservation Service initiated an on-farm water-efficiency-evaluation program. In many cases, suggested water and energy savings were sufficient to pay back farmers’ costswithin 1 or 2 years (74).

The High Plains District has a goal of reaching an equilibrium between groundwater withdrawals and aquiferrecharge, as measured during a 5- or 10-year average. So far, net groundwater depletions in the Ogallala Aquiferunderlying the District have declined from a 5-year average of 1.4 billion gallons per day (bgd) (15.3 billion litersper day)5 in 1966-71 to an average of 0.43 bgd in 1981-86 and 0.16 bgd in 1986-91. A 25 to 40 percent cutbackin groundwater use has been achieved (74); part of the cutback can tM attributed to reductions in irrigated andplanted area and several years of above-average rainfall (118, 44). Nevertheless, improvements in water-useefficiency and aquifer sustainability have led District officials to conclude that their voluntary, education-basedapproach to water conservation has been successful (44, 119).6

The various societal and individual responses to growing water scarcity suggest that farming regions mayadapt well to a slowly changing climate. Perhaps more impressive than the ability of farmers to undertake technicaladaptation has been the relative ease with which institutions have developed to promote more effiaent use of scarcewater resources. Still, despite the positive changes that have occurred in this region, one should not be overlyoptimistic. Groundwater depletion continues in much of the aquifer--even though at reduced rates-and manyfarmers face a reduction in future farm income as they decrease their water use.

4 TO convert miies to kilometers, multiply by 1.609.5 TO ~nvert gallons to liters, muitiply by 3.785.

6 B. Williams, Director of Administration, High Plains Water Conservation District, Lubbock, TX, personalcommunication, July 1992.


Chapter &–--Agriculture 1303

Box 6-H--Current Technologies for Adapting to Climate Change

Changes in planting and harvesting practices

Climate warming may allow farmers to plant earlier in the spring. Earlier planting could lessen the chancesof damage from heat waves at critical stages of plant growth. Shifting the period when a crop’s leaf area is largestso that it matches the months of rwudmum sunlight would increase growth rates. Earlier planting would also allowearlier harvesting because warmer temperatures speed up plant development. Earlier harvesting reduces the risksof late-season field losses. Earlier maturation may also allow grain crops to dry more completely in the field,eliminating or reducing the need for artificial drying.

Warmer springs imply a longer growing season. Early planting in combination with a longer-season cultivarmay allow farmers to increase yields by taking advantage of the longer season-provided that moisture isadequate and the risk of heat damage is not too great. For risk-averse producers, earlier planting combined witha shorter-season cultivar may give the best assurance of avoiding the large losses associated with hot summertemperatures. Planting a mix of cultivars with different maturation times could increase the probability that someportion of the crop is exposed to the most favorable dirnate during a growing season (93).

Planting seeds deeper in the soil and reducing planting densities (plants per acre) are two simple ways ofevading drought stresses. Planting seeds deeper may give them access to more moisture, which would facilitatesuccessful germination. Smaller pfant populations reduce competition among plants for available soil moisture.

Tactics for conserving moisture

Several moisture-conserving practices have been used to combat drought and aridit y (77, 94, 97) and maybe useful in adjusting to climate change. Conservation tillage is the practice of leaving the residue of the previousseason’s crop on the surface of the field, rather than plowing it under the surface. Conservation tillage protectsfields from water and wind erosion and can help retain moisture by reducing evaporation and increasing theinfiltration of preapitation into the soil. Conservation tillage also decreases soil temperature. Furrow diking is theplacing of small dikes across the furrows of the field to aid the capture of rainfall. Terracing, or contouring, can beused to more efficiently trap precipitation on sloped fields. However, the construction of terraces can be costly.

Crop substitution is potentially a way to conserve m“sture. some crops require less water and tolerate warm,dry weather conditions better than others. For example, wheat and sorghum are more tolerant of heat and drynessthan is cwn. Microdirnate modification can be achieved through the use of shelterbdts, or windbreaks. Shelterbeltsystems are linear configurations of trees or tall annuals surrounding one or more sides o? agricultural fields.’ Theygreatly reduce wind speed across the protected field, benefiting plant growth by reducing evaporative-moisturelosses (77). They are particularly effective in windy regions that otherwise have little natural woody vegetation, butthey are costly in terms of land use.

Irrigation scheduling is the practice of supplying crops with irrigation water only when t hey need it. It adjuststhe timing of the irrigation and the amount of water to match actual field conditions. Irrigation scheduling requiressources of information about soil-moisture conditions and, when using ditch irrigation, close cooperation amongfarmers. A study of four Nebraska counties found that irrigation scheduling on center-pivot systems reducedirrigation-water use by 9 percent and saved farmers an average of $2.10/acre in pumping @sts (8). Low-energyprecision application (LEPA) is an adaptation of the center-pivot irrigation system; low-pressure application ofwater near ground level results in less water loss to evaporation. Trickte irrigation applies water as drops or tricklesthrough pipes on or below the soil surface. These very efficient but high-cost irrigation systems are now in common

use only for fruit crops and highly valued vegetable crops.

1 sunflower and corn have been used In California and Arizona, respectively, as wincfbr=lw around highlyvalued crops.

(Continued on next page).. -—..- _ — -----


.——— ——

Box 6-H-Current Technologies for Adapting to Climate Change-(Continued)

Increased irrigation

Increased irrigation is one obvious means of coping with drier conditions. However, inadequate water

supplies and high costs will limit this option in some regions. Regions that are currently reaching the limit of existing

irrigation-water supplies (e.g., the Southern Plains and California) will be unlikely to support additional

irrigation-water use (35, 69). Irrigation may decline because of increased urban competition for water and because

of possible reductions or seasonal changes in the timing of stream flows. Irrigated acreage may increase only in

eastern regions, where water supplies are adequate. Under a climate change, irrigated acreage as a percentageof total cultivable land could increase by perhaps 3 percent in the eastern t hird of the United States (69). The trendtoward increased irrigation in the eastern United States is already under way.

Equipment purchase and increased farming intensity

Ciimate change may cause the quantity and quaiity of production inputs to change. Severai agriculturalexperts argue that climate change may encourage farmers to aiter their investments in on-farm infrastructure inorder to: 1) purchase equipment necessary to change cropping systems, 2) expand the size of operations in orderto offset ciimate-induced yieid reductions, and 3) eniarge storage facilities to provide a buffer against extremeevents such as drought and pest and disease outbreaks (68). Others note that farmers make investments inapparently excess equipment capacity to better ensure that farm activity can be compieted before a period ofunfavorable weather (90). intensification of farming in areas beneficially affected by climate can be a way tomaintain overaii farm yieids.

Reduced farming intensity

if the frequency of poor yieids increases, some farmers may reduce the amounts or quaiity of inputs toproduction (89). One exam pie wouid be to make fewer passes over the fieid for cultivation in order to hold downenergy costs. Aiiowing irrigated acreage to revert to dryiand farming or grasslands may occur when water is shortor when water deiivery costs rise, as has aiready happened in the southern Ogaiaiia Aquifer (see box 6-G).Faliowing (hoiding iand out of production for a year in order to accumulate sufficient soii moisture) is often anecessary practice in dryiand wheat farming. in the extreme, acreage abandonment (inciuding not harvestingpianted acreage and converting to woodiands) can be the most effective cost-cutting response to an unfavorableciimate (60). Successful adaptation from t his perspective means finding t he most profitable means of farming; itdoes not mean that past production ieveis are necessarily maintained.

Heiping iivestock adjust

Severai tactics may be used to heip iivestock adjust to excessive heat (38). The temperature of animais’surroundings can be reduced by providing shade or partiai sheiters. Trees make the best shade because theyprovide protection from direct sunlight and beneficial cooiing as moisture is transpired from ieaves. During a3-dayheat wave in Chino Vaiiey, California, in 1977, more t han 700 dairy cattle died (38). Deaths in lots with adequateshade were aimost 70 percent iower than those in iots where cattie had inadequate shade. Evaporative cooiersthat iower air temperature in animal sheiters can be effective in iimiting productivity iosses under high temperatureconditions (38). Anirnai wetting is an effective way to iower the surface temperature of animais. This can beaccomplished with a sprinkler system controlled by a timer. Maintaining iarge feed reserves is another tactic thatiivestock farmers use to iower their risk of facing feed shortages during ciimate extremes (9).

Farm structure and marketing practices

Increasing the scaie of farming operation may in some cases effectively reduce the variabiiit y in income andyieids. Strategic specialization can be an advantage in a smaii number of safe crops (55). Efficient farming in the“safest” crop is certainiy a f requent+md perhaps t he best-defense against climate risk. On dryland farms in the


——

Western Great Plains, where crop failures from drought occur regularly, farmers grow wheat or sorghum, usingconservative and low-cost methods. To the east, where rainfail is more abundant, corn and soybeans are thedominant crops. Large-scale farming enterprises can hedge against localized c4imate risks by diversifyinggeographically, spreading their farm holdings across climate zones. In the face of increasing climate uncertainty,the value of crop diversification on individual farms through the addition of less-risky crops may increase. A 1985survey of farmers in Florida and Alabama found that they deal with variable climate risk by keeping their operationsdiversified (9). The large variability from decade to decade in Illinois corn yields can be seen as an example of aresponse to climate change, and farmers there have responded to the perception of increasing climatic risks bydiversifying.

Owners of citrus groves in north-central florida adapt to the risks of w“nterfreezes by diversifying their sourcaof income more than do the citrus growers to the south, whc face less risk (61). Corporate ownership orpartnerships allow each investor to risk relatively little income. The fruit is often sold through vertically integratedcooperatives, rather than in on-the-spot markets, as in the south. This marketing practice allows for speedyprocessing of freezedamaged fruit, a benefit that compensates for lower average prices. Changes in the structureof farm ownership and vertical integration through contractual marketing arrangements can be effectiveinstitutional ways to spread the risk inherent in farming.

SOURCES: W.E. Easteriing, “Adapting United States Agriculture to Climate Change,” contractor report prepared for the Office ofTechnology Assessment, January 1993; Offica of Technology Assessment, 1993.

—

Ultimately, the ability of agriculture to adapt toa changing climate may be most dependent oncontinued success in expanding the variety ofcrops and techniques available to farmers. Bio-technology appears to offer hope of continuedimprovement in agricultural productivity wellinto the next century. Expected improvements inoverall agricultural productivity and plants withincreased tolerance to pests, drought, and heat alloffer the chance for increased buffering againstthe direct risks of Mure climate change. Thesuccess of these and other potential improve-ments in farm management and productivity willbe increasingly sensitive to how well new knowl-edge is transmitted to the farmer. The role ofagricultural reseaxch and extension in conveyinginformation to farmers and in promoting innova-tion is likely to take on increased importanceunder conditions of changing climate. Researchmust be tied to the development of informationand management technologies if it is to remain asource of improved productivity (85). In theabsence of such a focused effort to tie research tothe needs of farmers, promised gains from newtechnology may not materialize.

II Current Technologies for Adaptation toClimate Change

Approaches that can be used now to adapt toclimate change range from changing planting andharvesting times to increasing-or decreasing—the intensity of farmin g (see box 6-H). Some ofthese approaches are technical, such as irrigationscheduling or the use of evaporative coolers tohelp livestock adapt to the warmer temperatures.Others involve changes in farm scale and owner-ship as ways to reduce exposure to risk. Stillothers are straightforward changes in agronomicpractices, such as earlier planting or reducedtillage. These may provide the first line of defenseagainst climate change.

I Prospects for Future TechnologiesThe impressive past productivity gains in

American agriculture do not guarantee continuedtechnological improvement, but biotechnology,computerized management, and other technolo-gies could usher in an era of new advances. TheOffice of Technology Assessment (OTA) (103)reports that projected plausible increases in an-nual rates of yield for major agricultural commod-


Table 6-2—Projected Annual Rates of Growthin Agricultural Yields (percent)

Less new Most likely More newtechnology technology technology

Corn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -0.2Soybeans. . . . . . . . . . . 0.1Wheat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8Cotton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . NABeef (meat/feed). . . . . . 0.2Swine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2Dairy (milk/feed) . . . . . . 0.2Poultry (meat/feed) . .. 0.1

1.00.42.01.70,71,60,40.5

2.01.24.4NA1.72.40.51.5

NA -Not available.

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, A NewTechnology Era for American Agriculture, OTA-F-474 (Washington,DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1992).

ities range from 0.4 to 2 percent (table 6-2), butsuch future advances cannot be taken for granted.Some analysts are concerned that if farmerscontinue to use conventional technologies, yieldsof many important crops (e.g., rice, corn, soy-beans, and cotton) may reach their maximumpotential within the foreseeable future (83, 85).Yield increases from conventional breeding andincreased efficiencies in farm managementshould continue over the next few decades.Breeders continue to be successful in findingways to redistribute a plant’s energy into grainproduction rather than leaf production, for exam-ple. Other gains continue from more-intensivemanagement and from the breeding of plants thatrespond well to the use of fertilizer and irrigation.Further success with these approaches may beincreasingly difficult to achieve (83, 85). Al-though average yields achieved by farmers arestill less than record and potential yields, that gaphas closed steadily. Biotechnology could speedup the process of cultivar development (25), andinnovative farm management could reduce theenvironmental costs previously associated withintensive farm practices.

BiotechnologyBiotechnology involves the use of molecular

genetic tools to mod@ plants, animals, or micro-organisms. By using recombinant-DNA15 andcell-fusion techniques, scientists can isolate, clone,and study individual genes. Such knowledgeallows for direct modification of the geneticstructure of plants and the development of microo-rganisms or biochemical products, such asenzymes and hormones, that will improve thegrowth and performance of agricultural crops andlivestock. Biotechnology does not itself providenew cultivars, but rather provides the sourcematerial for more-rapid advances through con-ventional plant breeding. A National ResearchCouncil study suggested that Federal support ofbiotechnology needs to be expanded if long-termadvances are to be achieved by the time they areneeded (63).

New tissue-culturing and genetic-engineeringtools combined with traditional agricultural breed-ing methods are allowing scientists to alter plantsto incorporate greater disease, insect, and weedresistance, and to better withstand environmental

An insect-ravaged cotton leaf is compared with onethat has been genetically engineered with a protectivegene from Bacillus thuringiensis.

15 Deoxyribonucleic acid.


stresses such as cold, drought, and frost. Thesetechniques are also improving the understandingof plant resistance and are allowing the develop-ment of improved pest-control agents. Crops thatexhibit increased insect resistance and herbicidetolerance are expected to be commercially avail-able by the middle to late 1990s (103). Plants withimproved resistance to diseases should becomecommercially available over the next decade or so.

Improved insect resistance in plants has beenachieved by introducing genes that produce thetoxin from the bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (anatural insecticide). Some success is also occur-ring in attempts to develop crops that are resistantto the broad-spectrum, environmentally safe her-bicide glyphosate. Soil microorganisms that cancontrol weeds and soil-borne nematodes andinsects are also being developed. All of these newways to control pests biologically offer hope forreduced use of herbicides and insecticides.16

Progress in improving tolerance to water andheat stress is complicated by a lack of knowledgeabout the physiological mechanisms of stress.Thus, genetically engineered plants tolerant tosuch climate stresses are unlikely to be developedin this decade (103). Development of commercialplant varieties with improved nutrient intake (i.e.,they use fertilizers more efficiently) also appearsunlikely within the next two decades. A betterunderstanding of the key roles that associationsbetween microbes and plant roots play in the useof nutrients--often supplied in the form offertilizers-is still needed. If nutrient uptake canbe improved, a secondary benefit would accrue inwater-quality improvements because fertilizerlosses to surface and groundwater are a signifi-cant source of pollution problems (as well asbeing costly to farmers),

Precise application offertilizers is possible using theexperimental global positioning unit being installedon this tractor.

Information and Management TechnologiesFuture improvements in productivity may in-

creasingly rely on the development of informa-tion and management technologies and the effec-tive transfer of knowledge to farmers (85).Improvements in information technologies andthe technology of farm management offer altern-atives to the intensified use of traditional farminputs as the basis for expanded agriculturalproduction. Improved efficiency in the use offarm inputs and practices can increase productiv-ity and has the potential to reduce the environ-mental costs associated with farming. Central tothis is improved understanding of plants, animals,and farming systems, which may rely on theincreased use of computers, better computersoftware, the use of smart machines and controlsystems, in-field and remote sensing, geographi-cal information and imaging systems, and elec-tronic networks or other communication technol-ogies.

16 some fe~ tit the development of herbicide-tolerat plants ~~ lead to ~ inc,re~~ use of h~bicides, SO far, howevti, efforts have&n

focused on developing plants that tolerate one of the more benign herbicides, allowing less use of persistent and toxic herbicides (30). Seereference 103 for a discussion of the risks related to the uses of biotechnology,


Farmer and engineer check automated weather stationthat feeds data into the COMAX software system toupdate its prediction of cotton yield and to suggest aharvest date.

Although computers have already had animpact on farm management, they could contrib-ute a lot more. Systems for livestock managementand for access to weather and marketing informa-tion are the best-developed applications to date.The earliest new applications of computer-software technology to attain broad use may besimple ‘‘expert systems’ that help the farmerdiagnose and respond to very specific productionproblems, such as disease (103). More completedecision-support packages for farm managementmight begin to be available within a decade (103).Much effort is still needed in the development ofcrop-simulation models to support integrated-decision-management software.

The potential for the use of advanced technolo-gies is already being demonstrated on farms thatgrow highly valued crops. The means exist forsensing temporal and spatial variations in fieldconditions and delivering irrigation water, fertil-izer, and pesticides to each area of the fieldprecisely as needed. Irrigation of highly valuedcrops is now automated on some farms; it relieson computer programs, soil-moisture sensors, andweather-data networks (17). Farm machinery thatcan selectively till, weed, or fertilize only thoseareas in need of attention is also being producedcommercially. Widespread use of advanced agricul-tural technologies and computerized informationservices is not likely to occur until costs declinesignificantly and the technologies have beenadapted for a wider range of production systems.

Information-retrieval systems, allowing farm-ers access to electronic networks and collectionsof farm-management information based oncompact-disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), arelikely to be available by the mid-1990s. Thepackaging of information and decision-supporttechnology in a manner that makes it useful tofarmers will be critical to enhanced farm produc-tivity. The extension services and the privatesector will need to be prepared to take advantageof the new communications techniques to delivereffective and integrated decision-support serv-ices. The USDA Agricultural Research Servicehas recognized the importance of research intointegrated management systems and informationtechnologies. However, research on and teachingof computer software and computer-assisted-management tools are not yet well-established inagricultural schools (103).

New Crops and Cropping SystemsThe idea that new crops could help stabilize

and diversify the farm economy is hardly new.Only a handful of crops is being readied forpossible commercialization in the near future (72,102). Cuphea is an oilseed that can replaceimported coconut oil in soaps and detergents, butcommercialization will depend on the develop-


ment of varieties that retain their seeds better.Crambe and winter rapeseed provide erucic acid,used to produce plastics and lubricants. Crambetolerates climate conditions similar to wheat.Winter rapeseed can be double-cropped, grownover the winter in the Southeast and southernMidwest. 17 Both could be commercialized quiterapidly under current conditions. Guayule pro-duces a high-molecular-weight rubber that iswell-suited for use in tires. The guayule planttolerates the arid conditions of the Southwest, butproblems with low yields must still be overcome.

Jojoba is a desert evergreen with seeds thatprovide a substitute for sperm oil and for somepetroleum-based oils. Jojoba oil is already used inthe cosmetics industry and may be useful incommercial waxes, lubricants, and polishes. Blad-derpod tolerates low annual rainfall, and its seedscontain oils that substitute for castor oil in plasticsproduction. Continued efforts in plant breedingare necessary to increase the oil content andyields. Kenaf is a warm-weather plant thatproduces a fiber with a cellulose content similarto that of wood. The fiber can be used inhigh-quality newsprint, cardboard, and high-quality paper. Late-season dryness and somesalinity are tolerated, but there must be adequatewater during the initial period of germination andgrowth. Kenaf appears to have considerablepromise for commercialization.

New crops have their own drawbacks, however.It is difficult to develop new markets when exist-ing crops or synthetic chemicals are competing forthem. A limited genetic base can slow crop-breeding advances and may leave crops vulnerableto unanticipated pests and disease. By and large,new crops succeed only when they are safer andcheaper than the old or fit a unique market niche.

Several Federal programs fund research anddevelopment of new crops or new uses forexisting crops. The Food, Agriculture, Conserva-

A stand of Kenaf, a fibrous plant with potential tosupplement wood-based paper pulp, is inspected atRio Farms in Texas’ Rio Grande Valley.

tion, and Trade Act of 199018 (P.L. 101-624), forexample, established the Alternative AgriculturalResearch and Commercialization Center withinUSDA to provide research and financial assist-ance in commercializing new nonfood productsfrom agricultural commodities. Less attention isgiven to new food crops because these tend tocompete with existing farm products. There are,however, various food crops grown elsewhere inthe world or with limited production in the UnitedStates (e.g., sorghum and various minor grainsand grain legumes) that may offer opportunitiesunder climate change. New specialty crops, multi-cropping approaches, and integrated agro-forestry

17 ~uction of can04 a qring rapeseed low in erucic acid developed in Cana& and suitable for human and animal foods, is nowexpanding rapidly in the Northern Plains States.

18 Ref~ to SU~CI_I~y u tk 1990 F= Bill.


and livestock operations may become viable futureoptions for smaller farmers who do not have thecapital to rely on high-technology farming.

THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGReducing risks associated with variability in

farm yields has become a central part of U.S.agricultural policy. Various institutional and struc-tural measures are designed to support the farmsector and buffer the consumer from fluctuationin supplies and prices of farm commodities.These include commodity support programs,disaster-assistance programs, and subsidized irri-gation. (See box 6-I for discussions of theseprograms.) In addition, the agricultural sector issupported by an extensive research and extensionnetwork.

Commodity programs are of three types: pricesupport, income support, and supply manage-ment. Although not viewed as buffers againstclimate risk, the commodity programs do provideparticipating farmers with protection against theloW prices that result from bumper-crop yields.The costs of these commodity programs areshown in figure 6-6.

The disaster-assistance programs, includingdisaster payments, crop insurance, and emer-gency loans, provide direct relief to farmerssuffering weather-related losses. In recent years,Congress has provided disaster payments forlosses beyond some specified percentage ofnormal yields (35 to 40 percent in 1992), provid-ing partial compensation to any farmer sufferinglosses in excess of that amount. low-interestemergency disaster loans are available to familyfarmers experiencing crop losses of at least 30percent. Individual farmers become eligible foremergency loans once their county has beendeclared a disaster area by the President or theDepartment of Agriculture. Federally subsidizedcrop insurance is also available to almost allfarmers. Farmers may insure up to 75 percent oftheir average crop yield, receiving payment onadditional losses if weather causes yields to fall

below the insured level. Up to 30 percent of thecost of insurance is paid for by USDA. Federalexpenditures on disaster-assistance programs areshown in figure 6-7.

U.S. public-sector agricultural research andextension is a dual Federal-State system that iscredited for much of the remarkable growth inAmerica’s agricultural productivity. Public re-search expenditures in agriculture have producedhigh returns (32). Much of this success can beattributed to the effective transfer of knowledge tofarmers and to a decentralized structure that hasmaintained a focus on practical research problems(82). The public agricultural research systemincludes the State Agricultural Experiment Sta-tions (SAESs) and USDA’s Agricultural Re-search Service (ARS) and Economic ResearchService (ERS). The Cooperative Extension Serv-ice (CES) is the network of Federal, State, andlocal experts that delivers research results tofarmers and feeds problems back to researchers.USDA’s Soil Conservation Service (SCS) alsoserves a technology-transfer role, encouragingsoil and water conservation in farm management.(Box 6-J discusses the USDA departments andtheir activities in more detail.)

Private research by food and agricultural indus-tries and innovation by farmers have also playeda significant role in sustaining agricultural pro-ductivity. Increasingly, agricultural industries areconducting their own research whenever there isthe possibility for developing proprietary prod-ucts. However, industry has relied on the publicsector to provide funds for much of the basicresearch and evaluation.

Despite the strength of the overall agricultural-research establishment, there has been somedebate about how well it is prepared to deal withthe future (10, 73, 99). Federal funding foragricultural research has seen little or no increase(in deflated dollars) over the past two decades(see fig. 6-8). Hope for future improvements inagricultural productivity has increasingly come torely on advances in basic science achievedoutside the traditional agricultural-research struc-


Box 6-l-The Institutional Setting for Agricultural Adaptation to Climate Change

Commodity support programs

A major goal of current agricultural policy is the achievement of stability in farm incomes and commodity prices.The 1990 Farm Bill authorizes through 1995 continuation of the various commodity programs that support farmincomes and crop prices. The commodity programs are administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s(USDA’s) Commodity Credit Corporation.f It provides support to producers of about a dozen commodities. Theso-called program cfops+vheat, corn, sorghum, barley, oats, rice, and cotton-are covered by defidency-paymen~ nonrecourse-loan programs and by acreage-reduction programs. Other commodities, such as soybeansand other oilseeds (e.g., sunflower and canoia), are covered only by the nonrecourse-loan programs. Meat poultry,fruits, and vegetables receive no direct support. Total support expenditures of the Commodity Credit Corporationare shown in figure 6-6. The commodity programs have at times been very costly, vAth outlays reaching a high ofalmost $26 billion in 1989. By 1990, commodity-program payments and related expenses had declined to just over$6 billion. Annual progr~ payments were pro@cted to remain below $12 billion under the provisions of the 1990Farm Bill (95). However, FY 1993 payrrwnts are now estimated at $17 billion because of bumper corn yields andhigh outputs of other program crops.

Price support-Price support is provided through r?onrecourse bans. In essence, the Government sets a floorprice (the /oan rate) for covered crops-guaranteeing farmers this prica for their crop. In practice, farmers borrowat the loan rate, with their crop as collateral against the loan. The loan is intended to be a marketing tool that allowsfarmers to temporarily store some of their crop and to sell it over a period of a few months, thus avoiding any gluton the market and the resulting steep drops in market prices. If market priis remain below the loan rate, a farmercan choose to forfeit the crop instead of repaying the loan.

Income support—income support is provided to farmers through direct payments called c%fkkmypaymenfs.Payment is provided whenever market prices fall below a target price, which is typically set above recent ma~etprices. Deficiency payments make up the difference between the target price and the market prii (or the loan rateif that is higher). Farmers are guaranteed at least the target price for the portion of their crop that is eligible. To qualifyfor adefidency payment a farmer nwst have planted that crop on some portion of the farm for the past 5 consecutiveyears. A farmer’s crop acreage base for a commodity is the 5-year average of acreage planted in that crop. Onlythe crop acreage base is eligible for deficiency payments, with payment made on average yields from the 1981-85period.

Supply management-Participation in the price-and income-support programs is voluntary (for most crops),although participating farmers can be required to reduce the acreage they @ant.2 Acreage reduction programs,under which some land is removed from production or is otherwise restricted in use (i.e., planted to soil-conservingcrops), are set for each commodity by USDA. Acreage reduction is intended to restrict supplies, thus holding upfarm prices and limiting Federal expenditures under the support programs.

A growing criticism of the deficiency-payment programs has been the inflexibility they impose on the farmer.A farmer loses base acreage and eligibility for deficiency payments when program acreage is planted in a crop otherthan the crop for which the farmer is enrolled. Establishing eligibility in a new crop takes 5 years of continuedproduction. lltus, a farmer could sacrifice considerable income in order to sw”tch crops. Previous OTA reports havenoted how this has inhibited the introduction of new industrial crops (102), discouraged conservation rotations (100),and favored the production of quantity rather than qualit y in crops (98).

Partly in response to these concerns, the 1990 Farm Bill (as amended by the Omnibus Budget ReconciliationAct, or OBRA, of 1990; P.L. 101-508) introduced some degree of flexibility into the defiaency-payment programs.

1 IJSDA’s Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Servioe (ASCS) administers and finanoes ~mmodltyprograms through the Commodity Credit Corporation.

2 certain other crops, such as sugar and peanuts, have mandatory supply-control programs that operate atIittte or no cost to the Federal Government but do impose higher crests on consumers by restricting supply in orderto maintain high prices.



Box 6-l—The Institutional Setting for Agricultural Adaptationto Climate Change-(Continued)

Farmers may now shift up to 25 percent of their cropacreage base to the production of other crops,3 without havingthat acreage removed from their program base. Under the 1990 Farm Bill, the defidency payments are now madefor only 85 percent of base acreage. On the 15 percent of the base acreage (nofrm# flex acres) on which paymentis not received and, optionally, on an additional 10 percent (optkma/ ~lexacres) of the base acreage, farmers canplant most other crops without loss of their program base! An increase in the normal flex acres to 20 or 25 percentis being considered in the FY 1994-98 budget reconciliation.

Disaster-assistance programs

Disaster payments-Disaster-payment programs provide farmers with partiat compensation forcroplossessuffered due to natural disasters or adverse weather. Since 1990, partial compensation (up to 65 percent) hasbeen provided to all farmers for crop losses greater than 40 percent (35 percent for holders of crop insurance).Certain other permanently authorized programs, such as the livestock programs, provide assistance onty tofarmers in counties that have been dedared eligible by the President or the Secretary of Agriculture.

Before 1985, various omnibus farm bills authorized continuing disaster-payment programs. Since 1985,disaster payments have been provided annually through ad hoc congressional legislation. The Federal CropInsurance Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-365), which broadened the availability of crop insurance, was intended as the firststep away from the disaster-payment programs. The Food Security Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-198) sought to furtherdiscourage the use of disaster payments as the primary means of farm risk management However, politicalpressures led to passage of supplemental disaster-assistance acts and appropriations for disaster payments ineach year from 1986 to 1992(15). After the drought year of 1988, the Federal Government paid out nearly $4 billionin disaster payments to farmers and livestock producers (fig. 6-7). The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and TradeAct of 1990 (the 1990 Farm Bill, P.L. 101-624) offered no new policy for disaster-assistance programs.

Critics of disaster-payment programs have argued that much of the risk inherent in farm production is unfairlytransferred to the general public (e.g., see ref. 36). Past programs were also considered unfair because they werenot equally availabie to atl who suffered crop losses; only farmers growing program crops or farmers within countiesdeclared to be disaster areas were eligible for payment. Some argue that disaster payments reduce the farmer’sincentive to limit exposure to risk encouraging production of high-risk crops in marginal areas. Such programs arethought to perpetuate marginal and inefficient farming practices.

Crop insurance-Federally subsidized crop insurance is available to almost all farmers. It provides a meansfor the farmer to spread the cost of occasional crop losses overtime, reducing annual fluctuations in farm income.Under the crop insurance program, farmers may insure up to 75 percent of their average crop yield, receivingpayment on additional losses if natural disasters or adverse weather causes yields to fall below the insured level.Up to 30 percent of the cost of insurance is paid for by the USDA for coverage up to 65 percent. No additionalsubsidy is provided on extra coverage.

Federal crop insurance has been available to farmers since 1939, although restrictions on coverage limitedits use until 1980. The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 represented an attempt to expand the crop insuranceprogram. Under this legislation, crop insurance was subsidized for the first time, and the eligibility for insurance

3 There are SOme restrictions on the orops that can be planted. Fruits and vegetables are not aJlowed. @rt~nother crops are excluded at the discretion of the Seoretary of Agriculture. These exclusions have included peanuts,tobacoo, trees, and tree crops.

4 in 1991, 8outof 41 million potential flexaores were oonverted fromtheoriginal program wops. ~odefid-ypayment is provided for aops grown on flex aores, although loan support is provided. The loss of defidenoypayments on optional flex acreage reduces the kwentive for their use.

5 Disaster payments were authorized only Acre crop inSWanCO was Unavakdie. -use crop Insufanawas available in all counties, this essentially meant that disaster payment could be authorized only throughsupplemental legislation.

Chapter 6--AgricuIture 1313

was greatly expanded. Despite the stated goal that crop insurance would replace disaster payments as the primarytool of farm risk management, participation in the program was disappointing.G The intent of the 1980 Act and theFood Security Act of 1985 to encourage the purchase of crop insurance was undercut by subsequent disasterpayment programs.

Incentives to participate in the crop insurance program have been diminished by high premium rates,inadequate coverage, perceived administrative problems, and expectations of continued disaster payments(13,14). Many farmers choose instead toself-insure through savings or by otherwise acting to reduce the variabilityof farm income through pooled ownership or conservative management practices. The farmers who do purchasecrop insurance tend to be those facing the highest risks, keeping program costs and premiums high.7

Even with what many farmers find to be high premium rates, crop insurance in the United States has beenheavily subsidized. From 1980 to 1990, the Federal Government paid farmers $3.3 billion more than it received inpremiums (96). In addition, the Government spent more than $2 billion on administrative expenses over this period.Since 1980, premiums have covered IittJe more than 40 percent of total program costs. In 1988, the Federal cropinsurance payout to farmers exceeded premium receiptsbyarecord$616 million. As with disaster payments, theunintended consequence of crop insurance has been the encouragement and subsidy of farmers most at risk.

The 1990 Farm Bill called for a move toward an actuarially sound insurance program (i.e., one with premiumssufficient to cover expected losses) but postponed the decision on a major overhaul of crop insurance and disasterassistance programs. Despite Administration and House proposals to eliminate funding, the 1991 AgriculturalAppropriations Act (P.L. 101-506) maintained funding for the crop insurance program.

Low-interest loans-Emergency loans are provided through USDA’s Farmers Home Administration (FmHA)to eligible producers who have sustained losses due to natural disasters. The emergency loans are offered at asubsidized interest rate to farmers experiencing crop losses in counties that have been dedared disaster areas bythe President, the Secretary of Agriculture, or the Administrator of FmHA. In the 1970s and early 1980s, some$2 billion of new loans were made annually under this program. [n recent years, the importance of the program asa source of new loans has been greatly decreased. Eligibility is now restricted to family farms experiencing croplosses of more than 30 percent, having crop insurance, and otherwise unable to find credit. Despite the reductionin new loans, program expenses have increased significantly throughout the decade. Costs have risen (pealdng at$2.2 billion in FY 1989; see fig. 6-7) because of the interest subsidy on existing loans and because of rapidlyincreasing default rates on earlier loans.

Subsidized irrigation water

The application of irrigation water to crops to supplement precipitation has been a powerful tool for stabilizingcrop yields in the face of climatic variability in both humid and semiarid regions. The Reclamation Act of 1902mandated several federally sponsored irrigation projects, ~“nly in the form of large reservoirs (36). Prices forFederal irrigation water have been subsidized at less than the full costs of storage and conveyance and well belowthe market value of water in alternative uses. According to the Bureau of Reclamation, almost 10 million acres ofland in 17 V&tern States received project irrigation water in 1985 (17 percent of the total irrigated acres in theUnited States). The Congressional Research Service (119) estimates that the subsidy ranges from $60 to $1,800per acre, depending on the irrigation district. Such water-pricing policies, coupled with the institutional cx)nstraintsfarmers face in marketing the water they do conserve, have discouraged the efficient use of irrigation water. VVdhthe increasing demand for water for nonagricultural uses, the opportunity costs of restricting Federal-project waterto irrigation are increasing. (See ch. 5 for more details on water issues.)

6 By FY 1988, particip~tjon in crop insurance was 23 percent of eligihle acres, well below the target rate of50 percent. In 1989, participation In the insurance program rose to 40 percent of the eligible acres. The increaseoccurred beoause many producers who participated In disaster assktance programs in 1988 were required to buycrop Insurance.

7 A recent survey in Virginiaand Montana found that insured farmers were In a riskier situation than uninsuredfarmers. Insured farmers were less likely to have irrigation and had less income and savings and greater debt (36),

SOURCE: Offica of Technology Assessment, 1993.


[7 - un

Price suppori

Income support

Other expenses

n

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

‘1---- -

iiiii- 0L’

2

0L

Emergency loans

Dlsmter payments

Crot3 Insurance

Il__O_R1980 1981 1982 1983

—.—

n

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990


Box 6-J-Structure of the Agricultural Research and Extension System

The Agricultural Research Service (ARS)of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) conducts basic andapplied research in agricultural sciences and technology and also maintains extensive collections of seeds, clonalmaterials, and genetic stocks of farm animals. ARS research is in such areas as environmental quality, agriculturalsustainability, rural development, food safety, nutrition, marketing, soil and water cxmservation, and the biology andproduction of crops and livestock. Research is conducted at five ma@r regional centers in Mar~and, Pennsylvania,Illinois, Imuisiana, and California, and at about 130 other locations, many of which are assoaated with universities.The regional centers are concerned primarily with the development of new products that will result in alternativemarkets for agricultural commodities. A national program staff is responsible for pianning and coordinating theresearch program and for allocating funds to the agreed-upon national research priorities. Research is generallydirected toward basic science that is national in significance, long term in nature, and unlikely to be adequatelyaddressed by private or State research efforts. For example, ARS has de-emphasized the breeding of most cropvarieties on the assumption that private and State efforts are adequate. Instead, emphasis has turned to geneticsand the development of germ plasm that can be used by industry to develop new varieties. ARS employsapproximately 2,700 scientists and research engineers and had an H 1993 budget of $695 million. In FY 1991,ARSexpenditures on biotechnology were about $81 million, and expenditures on sustainable-agriculture researchwere estimated to be about $120 million.’

The Land-Grant Colleges of Agriculture were established with the passage of the Merrill Act in 1862. TheMerrill Act provided Federal grants to States to fund creation of colleges that would offer practical programs of highereducation focused on agriculture and the mechanical arts. In many States, the original land-grant college grew tobecome the foundation for the State University system. In 1890, Congress passed the second Merrill Act, whichprovided additional yearty Federal funds to the Iandgrant institutions and required that States provide college-levelagricultural education to biack as well white students. Seventeen Southern and border States created separateblack agricultural schools.

The State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAESS) were established with the passage of the Hatch Actof 1887. The act created the agricultural experiment stations as departments within the college of agriculture atland-grant institutions and provided annual Federal funding to support agricultural research and experimentation.Today, there are 57 SAESS, one in each State and Territory. These institutions include laboratories, field sites, andresearch farms. Roughly 12,000 State+mployed agricultural researchers work in the network of land-grant schoolsand the associated Agricultural Experiment Stations. Overall, the SAES system spends about $1.6 billion (~ 19w)on research, most coming from State funds. In 1990, USDA provided $224 million to State Agricultural ExperimentStations. Other Federal agencies provided an additional $144 million in agricultural research money.2

The Cooperative State Research Service (CSRS) is a coordinating agency within USDA charged withdispersing Federal funds to SAES and to the State land~rant institutions. CSRS also administers grants programsthat fund agricultural research. Each SAES receives Federal funds through CSRS according to a formula firstspecified in the Hatch Act of 1887.3 The formula funds have been valuable as a stable funding base for long-termand applied research. Additional Federal funding is provided through competitive grants to individual researchers.Competitive grants have been used to strengthen the scientific foundations of agricultural research and to directbasic scientific research to areas of national interest. These grants are based on scientific merit, as determined by

1 J. van schilfgaarde, Associate Deputy Administrator, Agricultural Research %WiOO, person~ ~mmuni-cation, May 27, 1993.

2 The National Sdence Foundation, the National Institutes for Health, and the Department of Ener9y areamong the largest of the many other sources of Federal funds for the agricultural research stations.

3 Hat& Act funds are allocated by a formula: 20 percent of the money is allooated equally among SAESS,at least 52 percent is allocated In proportion to the State’s share of overall farm and rural population, and theremainder-if not needed for administration costs-ca n be allocated to cooperative researoh between States.



ture. As funding goes increasingly to new and broadening of the capabilities and reach of thespecialized areas of scientific research, traditionalresearch addressing the day-to-day problems thatplague agricultural production may be neglected(100). Federal funding for the extension serviceshas also declined (in deflated dollars), while theirmission has broadened beyond providing for thetraditional family-farm constituency (73). Ob-servers question whether the State or countyextension service agents still have the expertise toassist farmers in undertaking new technologies.Encouraging basic science while maintaining aneffective link between scientific research and realfarm problems is a challenge that will require a

existing research and extension system.

POLICY OPTIONSThe resiliency of the farm sector will be

enhanced by broadening and improving thechoice of crops and technologies on whichfarmers can draw. In particular, advances thatimprove farm yields and efficiency in inputuse-that is, use of water, energy, fertilizers,pesticides-offer hope for meeting the growingdemands for food and for resolving conflictsbetween agriculture and the natural environment.In a future that will be increasingly competitive


1400 -

I

1000 1

400 ;

Figure 6-8—Appropriations for USDA Agricultural Research andExtension Programs for FY 1972-93

+ ‘R s + C S R S

—

+ ES ~ Total

II

Current Issues,” 93-83 ENR, January 1993.

and uncertain, the roles of the educated farmerand of the agricultural research and extensionservices in speeding the transfer of knowledge tofarmers become more important. The potentiallyhigh costs of climate change can be reduced byimproving the capability of farmers to success-fully adapt.

The ability of farmers to adapt to climatechange may be constrained by several factors:1) inflexibilities imposed by commodity supportprograms, 2) inflexibilities in disaster-assistanceprograms, 3) increasing competition for scarcewater, 4) technical limits to increased productiv-ity, and 5) an inadequate framework for planningthe long-term needs of the agricultural sector.Each of these factors and related policy optionsare discussed below.

H Commodity Support ProgramsCommodity support programs are designed to

stabilize farm supply and maintain farm incomes

(see box 6-I). The means by which they currentlydo this may discourage the changeover from onecropping system to another that is better suited toa changed climate. For example, if climate changecreates a situation in which crops are shifted to thenorth, the financial penalties imposed undercurrent programs on farmers who change cropswill slow the rate of adjustment and so add to thecost of climate change (54). On the other hand, ifelevated C02 results in enhanced crop yield butno shift in range, there may be more-frequentbumper crops and low commodity prices, butsubstantially higher costs in farm-income support.

The deficiency-payment programs result in thegreatest disincentive for farmers to switch crops(see box 6-I). First, crop choice is often driven bythe level of support payments rather than bymarket prices. Relatively high target prices, suchas those seen in the past decade for corn,discourage a switch to crops that might otherwisebe more profitable at market prices. Second,


because support is linked to establishing andmaintaining a record of continued production ina particular commodity, farmers are penalizedwhen they do switch crops. With the distortion ofunderlying market-price signals and penalties forcrop switching, farmers may persist in growingcrops that are not well suited to changed climateconditions. The public will bear the costs of thismisallocation of productive effort through highercommodity prices or program costs.

The deficiency-payment programs have alsobeen criticized for discouraging sound manage-ment and leading to an expansion of farming intomarginal lands, many of which are highly erodi-ble or otherwise environmentally sensitive.l9

Because traditional rotation. crops such as legumin-ous forages, are not covered by any supportprograms and detract from the acreage in programcrops, farmers are discouraged from engaging insound rotation practices (100). This exacerbateserosion and encourages the use of chemicalfertilizers.

Equally serious are the problems that resultfrom coupling deficiency payment to farm yields.Because deficiency payments are directly relatedto output, farmers have a strong incentive tomaintain high yields through the intensive use offarm chemicals. The price subsidy also encour-ages an expansion of agriculture into marginallands. At the same time, under the ConservationReserve Program, the Wetlands Reserve Progam,and various water-quality incentive programs,farmers are paid to remove erodible lands fromproduction and to reduce environmental damages.This is why the farm programs have beencompared with ‘driving a car with one foot on thegas and the other on the brake.”20 The expansionof farming into marginal lands and the discour-

agement of conservative farming practices ex-pose the public to risks of higher program costsand greater disaster-assistance needs under cli-mate change, along with the likelihood of in-creased environmental damage.

Partly in response to these concerns, the 1990Farm Bill as amended by the Omnibus BudgetReconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508) intro-duced some degree of flexibility into the deficiency-payment programs. Farmers may now shift up to25 percent of their program acreage base to theproduction of other crops, without having thatacreage removed from the program base-that is,from the total acreage used to calculate theirbenefits. On 15 percent of the base acreage(normal flex acres), there are no deficiencypayments but the farmer is free to switch to othercrops. 21 An additional 10 percent of the base

acreage (optional flex acreage) may also beswitched to other crops, but deficiency paymentsare lost if the land is planted in other crops (seebox 6-I). As a budget-reducing measure, anincrease in the normal flex acres to 20 or 25percent is being considered in the FY 1994 budgetreconciliation.

I Policy Options: Commodity SupportPrograms

Option 6-1: Allow fiull flexibility (normal cropacreage). The Bush administration and othershave suggested that farmers be allowed to growany program crop they choose on all acreagenormally planted in program crops and be eligiblefor deficiency payments on whichever crop isgrown. This approach, known as normal cropacreage (NCA), eliminates most of the inflexibili-

19 ficvio~ @I’A reports hvc noted how this Mexibility in farm programs has inhibited the introduction of new ~usti CrOps (102),discouraged conservation rotations (100), and favored the production of greater amounts of-rather than higher-quality~ PS (98).

~ se~tor Rudy Boschwi~ R-MN. Address presented at a conference held by the Cent= for t.hc Study of FoR@i Affti, A@ltOL VANOV. 25, 1986.

ZI ~em are Some restictiom on tine crops that can be planted. Fruits ~d vegetables ~ ~t d10w4 ~d ~“ other crops are excludedat the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture. These exclusions have included peanuts, tobacco, trees, and tree crops.


ties in crop selection.22 However, fully reducing

the inflexibilities also requires an adjustment inthe methods by which target prices or farm-in-come-support payments are set, perhaps by mak-ing farm-income support independent of cropproduction. Without this, crop choice will still belargely driven by target prices, and not responsiveto climate change. Congress could incorporate theNCA approach into the definition of the farmer’sbase acreage in the 1995 or subsequent farm bills.

A concern with the NCA approach is that itreduces USDA’s control over the supply ofindividual crops because acreage set-aside re-quirements can no longer easily target specificcrops. This lack of control raises concerns aboutincreased instability in farm prices. Farmers nowgrowing crops without program support haveexpressed concern that they will be unfairlyexposed to new competition from supportedfarmers who switch crops (participation in mostcommodity programs is voluntary). Another con-cern is that farmers’ crop choices may still bedriven largely by the target prices set for individ-ual crops, thus limiting responses to climatechange and market prices. To deal with this, someuniform method for setting target prices is needed.Alternatively, the current deficiency-payment pro-grams could be replaced with an income-supportprogram that is not coupled to crop production.23

Option 6-2: Increase flex acreage. The flex-acreage approach appears to have been successfulin introducing some flexibility in crop choice24

and in reducing the potential costs of commodityprograms (through the elimination of deficiencypayments on normal flex acres). Congress couldgradually increase normal or optional flex acre-

age in successive farm bills, further adding tofarmers’ flexibility in crop choice.

Normal flex acreage could be increased to atleast 25 percent in the next farm bill. Becausedeficiency payments are withdrawn on normalflex acres, the costs to the Government ofcommodity programs would also be reduced.25

Subsequent farm bills could further increasenormal flex acreage. Gradually phasing out farmsupport in this manner appears to follow thedirection set by the 1990 Farm Bill, avoiding thesubstantial difficulties associated with any fullrestructuring of commodity programs. However,linking increased flexibility to reduced farmsupport may prove hard for farmers to accept.

An alternative would be to increase optionalflex acreage. So far, however, farmers haveshown little interest in using the optional-flex-acreage allowance because program support islost when the acreage is planted to new crops (anindication of how much the support programs doinfluence the behavior of farmers). Still, anincrease in the optional flex acres may offersomewhat more flexibility than now exists, all-owing farmers to respond to significant changesin market prices and growing conditions. Afarmer who uses optional flex acres maintainseligibility for program support, regaining supportif the land is replanted to the program crop. Thisprotection somewhat reduces the risks involved inchanging cropS.

H Disaster-Assistance ProgramsPeriodic losses caused by climate variability

are inherent to farming. Farm prices, land values,and farming practices adjust so that farmers, on

~ me NCA appro~h WaS brkfly used by USDA in 1978 and 1979. Although there is little indiCdOn that there W~ my funmen~

problems, it was Iater abandoned by the agency and the Senate Agricultural Committee. See reference 29 for details on NCA programs.

~ See reference 28 for discussion of proposals to decouple farm-income-support payments from yields. Even with payments tit meunrelated to farm yields, any subsidy will tend to encourage a higher level of farming activity than would othenvise be profitable (28). Farmemhave been reluctant to accept income support that is independent of farm yields, perhaps fearing that such an approach seems more like welfare.

~ IrI 1991, 8.3 of 41.3 million potential flex acres were converted horn the Ori@ pro~~ C~PS.2S It amm ~ely tit ~ a budget-cutti.rlg measure, normal flex acreage will be incmwxl to 20 Punt under the lW4B@@ R~ncfl~tion

Bill.


average, are adequately compensated for climaterisk under competitive market conditions. Subsi-dies and disaster assistance have distorted themarket, encouraging expansion of farming intomarginal lands and reducing incentives to under-take safe farming and sound financial practices(54). Much of the burden of increased risk-boththe monetary costs and any environmental costsassociated with conversion of marginal lands tofarming-is placed more broadly on society. TheAustralian Government, faced with similar con-cerns, is moving to eliminate all agriculturaldisaster payments and to replace them withprograms that encourage self-sufficiency andinformation on sound farming practice (116).

The costs of disaster-assistance programs (cropinsurance, disaster payment, and emergency loans;see box 6-I) can be expected to rise if climatechange leads to more-frequent episodes ofdrought and related crop losses. The subsidiesprovided by these programs reduce farmers’incentives to recognize and adapt to increasingclimate risks, which imposes further costs on thegeneral public. Reducing these subsidies willbetter prepare the farm sector to respond tochanging climatic risks and should also provebeneficial in reducing conflicts between agricul-ture and the natural environment.

Society does benefit from stable food prices,and well-designed risk-spreading programs con-tribute to this stability. Disaster-assistance pro-grams should be restructured-not eliminated—to encourage farmers to limit their exposure toclimate risk and thus to lower the costs of theprograms to society.

1 Policy Options:Disaster-Assistance Programs

Option 6-3: Define disasters formally, withassistance provided only for unusual losses.Congress could formalize the criteria for receiptof disaster payments and eliminate the cropinsurance program. Currently, disaster-paymentprograms are provided each year in ad hoc

legislation passed in somewhat pressured situa-tions and driven by immediate needs. It isunlikely that disaster payments will be elimi-nated. Farmers have come to rely on this protec-tion, and Congress faces considerable pressure toprovide it. If requirements for disaster-paymentprograms were form W, some of the moreundesirable features might be controlled. Forexample, all farmers could be provided with freecoverage against truly catastrophic climate events,but otherwise would receive no disaster pay-ments. With this change, farmers’ incentives toundertake precautionary farm-management andfinancial practices could be greatly increased, andbuffering against climate change risks would beimproved.

Currently, disaster-assistance programs com-pensate farmers who have experienced croplosses of at least 35 to 40 percent. Partialcompensation is received

amount.

Congress could setpensation to a levelexceeded (say, a loss

for losses greater than

the trigger for com-that is less frequentlyof 55 or 60 percent).-- .

A .

Alternatively, coverage could be eliminatedfor farmers who have repeated losses. Forexample, farmers might be limited to receiv-ing payments two times within any 10-yearperiod.

A permanent disaster-payment program couldbe authorized, providing payment to any farmerwho experiences significant weather-relatedlosses. With universal coverage, potential inequi-ties that result if eligibility is limited to farmers indeclared disaster areas are removed. One of thestrongest objections to eliminating crop insurance(that to do so strips farmers of individual protec-tion against climate risks) would thus be re-moved. However, with a permanent and universalprogram of disaster payments, expenses mightbecome less controllable.

■ To reduce budget expenses, farmers or farmcounties could be required to contribute to a


disaster-assistance fired in order to be eligi-ble for disaster payments.

Recent disaster-payment programs have setpayments based on losses relative to “normal”production. This is usually based on averageyields over a period of years, with extreme yields(either high or low) excluded from the average. Itwould seem unwise to exclude ‘‘abnormal’ yearsfrom the average if climate change is in factaltering normal climate.

■ Congress could require that a moving aver-age of crop yields over the past 5 years beused to determine normal output.

Option 6-4: Combine disaster-payment andcrop insurance programs. Congress could com-bine disaster payments and crop insurance, givingall farmers free catastrophic-loss coverage (par-tially compensating for losses beyond some highlimit) and offering additional coverage to thosewho are willing to pay. The Federal CropInsurance Reform Act of 1990 considered by the101st Congress would have provided such acombined disaster-assistance program. All farme-rs would have received disaster protection forlosses exceeding 50 to 70 percent (depending onparticipation in other farm programs), The cropinsurance program would have remained essen-tially unchanged, with subsidized coverage avail-able for crop losses greater than those covered bythe catastrophic policy.

Proponents of the plan argued that it wouldeliminate the pressure for supplemental disasterlegislation and would encourage farmers to pro-tect themselves against ordinary climate risks.Opponents were fearful of the potential costs.Although administrative expenses and the insur-ance subsidy would be largely unchanged, expen-ditures on disaster payments could increase withuniversal coverage. Opponents also expressedconcern that the proposed plan would eliminate

any chance of making the crop insurance programsound.

Option 6-5: Improve the crop insurance pro-gram. In principle, crop insurance provides anattractive mechanism by which farmers canreduce the inherent variability in farm income.However, few would argue that the goals of theFederal crop insurance program have been met.Participation is limited, program costs are high,and disaster payments remain a primary cushionagainst climate risks. Because of the high cost ofinsurance and the expectation of continued disas-ter payments, participation in the crop insuranceprogram is primarily limited to farmers in high-risk areas.

Several potential reforms of the crop insuranceprogram were suggested to Congress duringdebate of the 1990 Farm Bill (13, 14).26 Someanalysts and researchers have sought to reducesubsidies on crop insurance, hoping to make theprogram actuarially sound (i.e., self-supporting).Many have sought to encourage greater programparticipation through increasing subsidies, reduc-ing deductibles,27 improving administrative pro-cedures, modifying in the means by which lossesare calculated, or requiring crop insurance foreligibility in other farm programs. A more radicalreform would combine crop insurance and income-support programs into a revenue insurancescheme that would guarantee a minimum farmrevenue.

Congress could choose to revisit the manyreforms that have been suggested in the past. Thesuccess of any reforms in the crop insuranceprogram would be contingent on expanded partici-pation, which would allow crop insurance toreplace disaster payments. The resulting restruc-tured program might then offer both improvedrisk management and reduced costs over thecurrent combination of crop insurance and disas-

X w Fed~al crop hwance commission Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-546) authorized the formation of a 25-member commission to identifyproblems with the crop insuran ce program and to make recommendations for increasing farmer participation.

27 me hi@es[ level of coverage that can be purchased requires farmers to absorb the fmt 25 percent of losses. Many farmers consider suchlosses sufficiently rare that insurance is an unneeded expense.


ter assistance programs. However, if greaterparticipation is achieved through higher subsidiesand lower deductibles, these benefits might wellbe lost.

Option 6-6: Provide a self-insurance programfor income stabilization. Congress could considera program modeled roughly on individual retire-ment accounts (IRAs), under which farmerswould be encouraged to self-insure against cli-matic risks. The program could be supplementedwith catastrophic coverage either through cropinsurance or disaster payments, and it wouldallow farmers to smooth the fluctuation in theirincome over time.28 Farmers would be allowed toset aside income, tax-free, into a self-insuranceaccount. Annual deposits up to a maximumamount (say, $15,000) would be allowed, with nofurther deposits allowed once the account reachessome maximum cap (say, $150,000). The capwould encourage active use of the account forincome smoothing, and the tax-free status wouldencourage participation. Withdrawals could bemade at any time, subject to income tax paymentat that time (with no penalty for early withdrawal,in contrast to the IRA model). Existing disasterprograms might be gradually phased down, untilthey provide only protection against truly cata-strophic events.

B Water-Use EfficiencyMany climate-change forecasts suggest that

agricultural regions of the United States couldbecome hotter and drier, so efficient use ofirrigation water might be required to maintainfarm production (see box 6-I). Farmers who canmanage water efficiently would be better pre-pared to respond to harsher climate conditions.Unfortunately, many farmers have little incentiveto conserve water because of subsidized prices,

inadequate institutional arrangements for regulat-ing access to groundwater, and limited market-ability of conserved water. Farmers who receivewater from Federal irrigation projects generallypay less than the water costs (see box 5-F). Thesubsidized price encourages high levels of agri-cultural water use. Farmers who do conservewater may be inadequately rewarded for doing soor may actually be penalized under some Statelaws. Water saved may even be forfeited.

1 Policy Options: Water-Use EfficiencyChapter 5 provides a thorough discussion of

water issues. Agricultural water use is one com-ponent of several broader options discussed inthat chapter. Among them are the options involv-ing: 1) reform in pricing in Federal water projects(option 6-7, or 5-5), 2) clarification of reclamationlaw on trades and transfers of water (option 6-8,or 5-7), and 3) reform of tax provisions to promoteconservation investments (option 6-9, or 5-4).Incentives for installing efficient irrigation equip-ment and for undertaking water-conserving farm-management practices could be implementedthrough direct subsidy or in exchange for eligibil-ity in existing commodity-program or watersubsidies. 29 Soil Conservation Service standardsfor soil suitability and irrigation efficiency couldbe used to determine eligibility for incentiveprograms (see ch. 5 for details).

1 Agricultural ProductivityBroad-based research directed at enhancing the

long-term basis for increased agricultural yields isan essential element of a public research strategy.Public efforts should be directed at those areas notadequately handled by the private sector. In otherwords, the Federal effort may be best directed atbasic science, long-term or high-risk technology

2s &forc the ‘fhx Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514) was passed, taxes could be computed on the basis of “hwOmC ave. “ Farmers,who regularly experience fluctuating incomes, have felt they were unfairly treated by the elimination of this provision (31). The approachoffered here provides the bentilts of income averaging, plus a strong incentive to actually smooth fluctuations in income.

29 Subsidies tit lowm the c~iM cost ofinstallingnewi rrigationequipment may emo~gt!com~ationby f~ersti*dyus@ mtio~

they could also lead to the undesirable! outcome of more overall irrigation. This should not be an insurmountable problem.


development, and other areas where private profitis limited but public value is high. Biotechnologyand related genetics research may offer at least apartial solution to the problem of sustainin g theability to produce food over the long term.Continued public research is needed to build anunderstanding of the genetic and biological basesof nitrogen fixation, drought and heat tolerance,and pest and weed resistance. Efforts are neededin the development of new germ plasm that couldbe the basis for subsequent commercial develop-ment of plant varieties. Protection of existinggerm plasm in traditional and nontraditionalcrops is also important because it ensures theability to develop new crops and strains in thefuture.

Conventional breeding efforts should not beignored as a source of productivity gains in thenear term. The ability to manipulate complexgenetic characteristics through biotechnology re-mains limited.30 For example, conventionalbreeding may offer the best immediate hope forimproving drought and heat tolerance in crops.Efforts to expand the diversity of availablecultivars through crop breeding may provideinsurance against an uncertain future climate.Attention to the development and commercializa-tion of new crops may become more important ina future under which climate change mightthreaten the competitiveness of traditional crops.Public efforts will be needed for those crops andmarket or climate niches that receive little atten-tion from commercial breeders. It may be impor-tant to develop crops and cultivars that areadapted to warmer or drier climate conditions.Efforts toward developing cultivars that requiresmall amounts of farm chemicals would helprelax the environmental constraints that mightotherwise limit expansion of farm output.

Equally important are efforts to enhance theknowledge and skills of farmers and the technol-ogy of farming. Farmers face a future in whichthey must be increasingly responsive to world

competition, environmental concerns, and theuncertainties of climate change. The competitive-ness of the U.S. farm sector will increasinglycome to rely on its ability to farm with greaterskills than the rest of the world. One of the mostimportant attributes of future technologies will bethe ability they give farmers to deal with unantic-ipated changes. Information and managementtechnologies in the form of computer software,sensors, robotic and control equipment, and otherpackaged-knowledge products can provide thisflexibility. These intelligent farm technologiesoffer the potential for substantial gains in effi-ciency of farm management and for reductions inagriculture’s undesirable environmental conse-quences. The role of technology transfer alsotakes on increased value under a changing cli-mate. If farmers are to adapt to any sort of changein a timely manner, efforts must be made toprovide them with accurate, convincing informat-ion on the effectiveness of new farmin g systems,crops, and technologies. The private market mayrespond to meet some of these needs, but a publicrole seems imperative.

B Policy Options: Agricultural ProductivityOption 6-10: Enhance research on and devel-

opment of computerized farm-management sys-tems. Congress could act to enhance the role ofthe Agricultural Research Service (ARS) as thecenter of excellence in design and integration ofnew information and management technologies

ement systems.into farm-manag Increased competitive-grant funds could be provided to universities andprivate researchers to carry out the researchneeded to fill critical knowledge gaps that arebarriers to delivery of new agricultural technolo-gies to the farmer.

The potential to develop and expand the use ofintelligent information and management (i.e.,using land-based or remote sensors, robotics andcontrols, image analysis, geographical informa-


tion systems, and telecommunications linkages-packaged into decision-support systems or em-bodied in intelligent farm equipment) to improvecrop and livestock production and farm-resourcemanagement is considerable. Tractors are nowproduced commercially that can plant, till, orapply chemicals as needed to specific areas of afield. There are also commercial packages (in-cluding computer hardware and software, sen-sors, and telecommunications linkages) that cancontrol irrigation and provide decision support forfertilization and pest-control application. Onlyfarmers growing the highest-valued crops (suchas fruits and vegetables) can afford these systemsnow.

Long-terrn public funding has been essential tothe development of the few existing commercialpackages. Enhancing these systems and reducingequipment costs to allow broader application willrequire considerable research and developmenteffort. ARS proposed a program of research onintelligent farm-management systems under theFederal Coordinating Council for Science, Engi-neering, and Technology’s (FCCSET’S) 1994Budget Initiative on Advanced Manufacturing.ARS expects that $1 million will go to integrated,

or intelligent, farm-management-systems research.ARS had initially hoped for a larger role in theFCCSET initiative, sufficient to provide $6 mil-lion for intelligent farm-management-systemsresearch. The strategic plan for the State Agricul-tural Experiment Stations also considers this ahigh-priority area for new research, suggesting aneed for $47 million in new funding (33). Noother single area was considered to need this largea funding increase.

Option 6-11: Improve the research and exten-sion process by expanding farmer input. Con-gress could support an expanded role for farmersin assessing the effectiveness of farming practicesand in disseminating results of research oninnovative farm practices. A broad-based pro-

gram of grant support for systematic on-farmexperimentation and a database on farmers’financial successes and failures under differentfarming systems could help farmers adapt toclimate change.

Farmers are most convinced by the success ofother farmers-rather than by information fromexperiments conducted on university lands underideal management conditions. State experimentstations have already found that demonstrationplots on farms are excellent teaching aids andsucceed in getting farmers to more quickly adoptcertain practices. The willingness of farmers totake up new techniques (including techniquesdesigned to reduce the environmental costs offarming) could be further enhanced if farmerswere more extensively included in the research,experimentation, and inforrnation disseminationprocess.

Support on-farm experimentation. Abroad-based program of support for on-farm exper-imentation in new cropping practices wouldbe useful in providing the information thatwould help farmers adapt to climate change.A model that could be built on for thispurpose can be found in the SustainableAgricultural Research and Experiment(SARE) program funded under the 1990Farm Bill (see box 6-A). Under this program,Federal funding is provided to experiment

stations to support farmer participation inresearch and on-farm demonstration pro-jects. One possibility is to pay farmers forconducting field tests to demonstrate thesuccess or failure of new farming systems inreal-world situations, working with experi-mentstation, Soil Conservation Service(SCS), or extension-service personnel.31

Farmers could be compensated if they bearthe risks of trying unproven technologies.Develop a database on successful prac-tices. In conjunction with a program of

31 U~y, Only now ren~ mtlst be paid for setting up experimental plots on farmwa’ fields. ‘IIM State of Illinois IUM found it dl=~

to use farmers’ fields than to own eropland and has been able to sell some research facilities as a result.


on-farm experimentation, there could besupport for a wider program of recordkeep-ing to establish a database on the financialsuccesses and failures of farming systems.An easily accessed database, giving farmersaccess to records and information on suc-cessful farm-management practices, couldhelp speed adoption of successful practices.Such databases could be developed andmaintained at State experiment stations (ordistributed on compact disk) and be madeaccessible by phone line to personal com-puter users, Software that could provide easyaccess to the database and efforts to organizethe database into a useful format would berequired. Cooperative support for farmer-initiated networks and information exchangesmight be another way to increase the effi-ciency with which farmers accept innova-tions in farming practices,

Option 6-12: Support agricultural biotech-nology and genetics. Congress could maintain orincrease funding for regional centers of excel-lence in agricultural genetics and biotechnologyresearch. Increases in competitive grants in areasof particular interest could be used to direct theresearch effort. Areas of obvious long-term na-tional interest include programs addressing theunderstanding of photosynthetic efficiency, nitro-gen fixation, tolerance to heat and drought, andthe development of crops that require reducedherbicides or pesticides. Although climate changedoes raise the importance of research aboutdrought and heat tolerance, this area should bepromoted in tandem with pursuing broader gainsin productivity, where the probability of successand the ultimate payoff may be higher.

Option 6-13: Support conventional crop-breeding programs. Congress could encourageUSDA to sustain or increase public, conventionalcrop-breeding efforts. Crop breeding offers themost immediate hope for providing improvedcultivars that are adapted to particular climaticniches. This may be especially so given thenumber of ‘‘wild” varieties that have yet to be

studied and that could improve the existingdomestic crops. Efforts at expanding diversity incultivars are not adequately supported by theprivate sector unless investors anticipate pro-fitable markets. Conventional breeding is alsoconsidered necessary for the maintenance ofdesirable cultivar attributes. One consequence ofignoring this maintenance effort can be an in-creased need for pesticides to compensate fordeclining resistance to pests. This unglamorousside to breeding has been underfunded. Further,breeding of minor but potentially valuable crops,such as forages, small grains, and oats, may begetting too little attention from either the Govern-ment or the private sector.

Option 6-14: Increase support for the devel-opment of new commercial crops. Developmentand introduction of new commercial crops can bea slow process. Successful commercializationrelies on a combination of farmer and marketreadiness that may be difficult to achieve. Availa-bility of new crops might provide U.S. farmerswith opportunities to diversify to counter thethreat of climate change or a chance for profitablespecialization. Congress could expand ongoingUSDA research aimed at improving the commer-cial characteristics of several promising alterna-tive crops. Priorities should be given to crops forwhich there are potentially profitable markets andperhaps to crops suited to hot or dry conditions.Congress could authorize assistance to businessesto establish crops and product markets, once thedevelopment of commercially stable varieties hasbeen demonstrated.

~ Planning NeedsBy improving the process of agricultural re-

source assessment and program evaluation, USDAcould improve its ability to develop responses tomajor issues like climate change. A model mightbe the program and assessment process that isundertaken by the USDA Forest Service under theForest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Plan-ning Act (RPA) of 1974 (P.L. 93-378). (See vol.

326 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climate--VoIume 1

2, ch. 6, for a more complete discussion of OTA’SRPA assessment.)

USDA currently provides periodic assessmentsof agricultural soil and water conditions andtrends under the appraisal process, authorized bythe Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act(RCA) of 1977 (P.L. 95-192). Despite the consid-erable background effort that goes into theseanalyses, the assessments are narrowly focusedon the specific concerns of USDA’s Soil Conser-vation Service. With little extra effort, USDAcould provide a full assessment of trends in theagricultural resource, farm ownership, rural eco-nomic conditions, agricultural technologies, sup-ply and demand, and the impact of farm programsand subsidies. Included in this evaluation couldbe an assessment of climate change as one ofmany possible significant future disturbances tosupply and demand, as the Forest Service hasbeen doing. On the basis of this assessment,USDA could develop a program document thatclarifies the agency’s direction and justifies itsprograms as a whole.

1 Policy Option: Planning NeedsOption 6-15: Broaden the focus of the current

Resources Conservation Act appraisal. Congresscould amend the current authorization for theRCA appraisal process, creating a new agricul-tural program and assessment process modeled onthe RPA program and assessment of the USDAForest Service. As in the Forest Service, theassessment should be made by staff members whoare not tied to a specific: action agency withinUSDA (currently, the RCA is tied to the SoilConservation Service).

FIRST STEPSIf public policy aims to ensure that U.S.

agriculture can adapt to climate change andmaintain its competitiveness in world markets,there is a wealth of policy options, as outlinedabove. However, the most pressing targets forpolicy appear to be:

—removing the impediments to adaptation thatare created by commodity support programs,disaster assistance, and irrigation subsidies;

—improving technology and information trans-fer to farmers in order to speed the process ofadaptation and innovation in farm practice;and

—supporting research and technology that willensure that the food-production sector candeal successfully with the various challengesof the next century.

The agricultural sector of the U.S. economy isalready unusual in the great amount of publicmoney spent in support of research, development,and technology transfer. The steady stream oftechnological improvements that have resultedhas allowed the United States to feed a growingworld population at increasingly low cost. Inrecent yearn, the focus has shifted away from howeffective the effort has been, pointing instead tothe expense of farm programs and the environ-mental consequences of intensive farming. How-ever, if the United States wants to remaincompetitive in the world market even thoughrapid population growth is increasing the demandfor food while biological limits to productivitygrowth seem ever closer, public efforts to supportthe continued growth in agricultural yields remainnecessary. With its technological and institu-tional strengths, the Nation should be in a positionto enhance its role in a growing world agriculturalmarket. But in the competitive world market,success will rely on continued improvements inproductivity and on the skills of U.S. farmers asthey innovate and adapt to changing marketconditions.

Climate change adds to the importance ofefforts to increase agricultural productivity, toimprove the knowledge and skills of farmers, andto remove impediments to farmer adaptability andinnovation. Efforts to expand the diversity ofcrops and the array of farm technologies ensureagainst a future in which crops or farming systemsfail. Efforts to enhance the adaptability of farm-ers—to speed the rate at which successful farming


systems are adopted--can lower the potentiallyhigh costs of adjusting to climate change.

All of the options described in the previoussection are of some value if implemented today,even if no climate change occurs. Many options,particularly those related to research and exten-sion, are being pursued to some degree. Others,such as the options to modify commodity supportprograms, disaster assistance, and irrigation sub-sidies, have been much discussed. In general,climate change strengthens the case for actionsalready being considered or underway rather thansuggesting new directions of effort.

Several of the options we have suggestedshould be addressed promptly. Research on infor-mation and management technologies is impor-tant now because of the time needed to developand implement new technologies and because ofthe lack of effort now being made (33). Modifica-tions to the farm commodity program are in-cluded as first steps because there appears to be awindow of opportunity to implement changes.Disaster programs fit in much the same category;frustration with current programs makes somepolitical action likely. The difficulty experiencedin redesigning the agricultural programs suggestsall the more that these reforms be placed on theagenda early so the process of change can begin.Although conventional crop breeding has notbeen included in the list of first steps, it is an areathat merits more attention. Efforts to improve ormaintain the desirable cultivars appear to beunderfunded for many crops-as more glamorousresearch areas have attracted public funds andprivate efforts have focused on larger markets.

Some areas of obvious concern, such as bio-technology research and new-crop development,have not been included as first steps. This is notbecause they are unimportant or not urgent, butrather because there is considerable effort underway already. Improvement in the effectiveness ofthe extension process, through more deliberateinclusion of farmers and better dissemination ofdata, may ultimately be of great importance.However, there seems to be little cost to waiting

before implementing such actions. Perhaps mostimportant here is that existing technology-transfer services should not be allowed to declineto the point that they cannot be rebuilt. Institu-tional changes that will encourage the conserva-tion and efficient use of irrigation water will alsobe important in buffering agriculture against thethreat of climate change. (See ch. 5 for a dis-cussion of water issues.)

Revise the commodity support programsto encourage responsiveness to changingclimate and market conditions Congressaddresses farm issues every 5 years inomnibus farm bills, with the next one likelyto be debated for passage in 1995. Theannual budget-reconciliation process andagricultural appropriations bills offer inter-mediate opportunities for revisions in com-modity support programs. The high expendi-tures on commodity support programs andthe previously successful implementation ofthe flex-acreage program have made it verylikely that flex acreage will be increased inthe current budget-reconciliation process.This revision provides the opportunity forreducing expenditures on commodity sup-port and increasing the adaptability of farme-rs to climate change. A further increase inflex acreage or other more substantial revi-sions in commodity programs (e.g., intro-duce normal crop acreage) would probablyhave to be considered in the 1995 Farm Bill.

Use the 1995 Farm Bill to modify disaster-assistance programs. Since the late 1970s,Congress has been considering how to beststructure the crop insurance and disaster-payment programs. After a flurry of propos-als and studies before the passage of the 1990Farm Bill, the programs were left essentiallyunchanged. There is, however, an ongoingsense of frustration with the current systemthat suggests that major revisions are likelyto be considered in the 1995 Farm Bill. Itremains unclear what the best option is for


revising these programs. However, any pro-gram that provides a. greater incentive forfarmers to reduce their exposure to riskshould help in preparing for the risks of aclimate change. Features of a restructuredsystem might include:

-defining disasters formally, with assistanceprovided only for unusual losses;

-eliminating either crop insurance or disasterpayments (i.e., do not have one programundercut the incentives to participate in theother);

—limiting the number of times a farmer couldcollect disaster payments; and

—requiring farmers to contribute to a disaster-payment fund (payment could be related topast claims), thus providing an incentive toreduce exposure to risks.

■ Enhance the agricultural technology base.Congress could act to enhance research incomputerized farm-management systems. Thecompetitiveness of the farm sector will

increasingly depend on technological ad-vances that improve the efficiency of U.S.farmers-rather than on further increases inmechanization and intensity of input use.Computerized farm-management systems willbe increasingly important to the farmer’sability to increase yields, control costs, andrespond to environmental concerns. Limiti-ng the runoff and leaching of farm chemicalsdepends most on careful timing of applicationand on applying only what is needed.

ARS has suggested that about $6 millionannually would allow considerable improvem-ent in its current program.32 Funding this full$6 million program or similar support byCongress would provide for the developmentand broader use of technologies that have thepotential to greatly enhance the efficiency offarming and increase the flexibility withwhich farmers can respond to climate condi-tions. ARS already provides leadership in thisarea.

32 J. Vm Schilfga,arde, Associate: Deputy ~“ “ trator, Afyicultural Research Senicc, U.S. Deptient of Agriculture, personalcommunication, July 1993.

Chapter 6-Agriculture [ 329

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Appendix A:List ofTables

andFigures

TABLES

Chapter l---Summary PageTable l-l—List of Boxes in Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Table inbox l-A—The Sensitivity and Adaptability of Human Activities and Nature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Table in box l—B-Potential Climate Change Impacts for Various Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Chapter 3—ResearchTable 3-1—List of Departments and Agencies or Bureaus Involved in USGCRP Research. . . . . . . . . . . . 119Table 3-2---Congressional Authorization Committees and Appropriations Subcommittees with

Significant Legislative Authority over Agencies with a USGCRP Component. . . . . . . . . . . . 124Table 3-3A—FY 1991 and 1992 Focused Research by Agency and Function...,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134Table 3-3B—FY 1991 and 1992 Focused Adaptation Research by Agency and Element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134Table 3-4A-Percent of Total FY 1992 USGCRP Budget for the Third Science Element, Ecological

Systems and Dynamics (ESD), Compared with Percent of Each Agency’s GCRPBudget for E-SD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Table 3-4B--Percent of Total FY 1992 USGCRP Budget for the Fifth Science Element, HumanInteractions (HI), Compared with Percent of Each Agency’s GCRP Budget for HI...... 135

Table in box 3-A--Potential Uses of Remote-Sensing Data, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Volume 1

Chapter4--CoastsTable 4-1—Estimates of Insurance-Industry Potential Losses in 1987 Resulting from a Recurrence

of Past Hurricanes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164Table 4-2-Estimated Cost of a Major Hurricane Striking Densely Populated Areas (or Major Cities). . 165Table 4-3—Insured Losses Likely To Be Experienced Under Different Maximum-Wind-Speed

Scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166Table 4-4--Estimated Probabilities of Exceeding Given Levels of Flood-Insurance Losses.. . . . . . . . . . 170Table 4-5—Results of a Mail Survey of 132 Owners of Beachfront Property in South Carolina After

Hurricane Hugo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

For a list of boxes, see chapter l, pages 8-9.

1333


Table 4-6--Community Rating System Designed by the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency to Encourage Communities to Minimize Flood Damage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

Table 4-7—Premium Reductions for Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAS) and Non-SFHAs inthe Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Community Rating System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

Table 4-8—Rank of Project Categories by Dollar Amount and Percent of EstimatedObligations in the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (January 1989 to August 1992) . . . . . . 184

Table 4-9—Status of U.S. Setback Authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187Table 4-l--Federal Programs and Laws Influencing Coastal Development:

Status and Potential Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

Chapter 5—WaterTable 5-1—Federal Offices Involved in Water Resource Planning, Development, or Management . . . . . 226Table 5-2—Ways to Use ‘Water More Efficiently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241Table 5-3—Possible Risk-Management and Risk-Minimization Measures the Federal Government

Could Consider to Lessen the Effects of Drought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255Table 5-4--Summary of Options to Improve Water Resource Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

Chapter 6-AgricultureTable 6-1—Harvested Acreage and Value of Principal Crops, 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284Table 6-2—Projected Annual Rates of Growth in Agricultural Yields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

Volume 2

Chapter 4-WetlandsTable 4-1-Wetland Vulnerabilities to Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177Table 4-2—Responding to Climate Change Impacts on Wetlands: Summary of Reported

State Wetland Protection Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196Table 4-3-Examples of Laws and Agencies That May Be Affected by Various Policy Options . . . . . . . 197Table in box 4-D--Economic Values of Wetlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

Chapter 5—PreservesTable 5-1—National Parks, Wildlife Refuges, and Wilderness Areas in the United States.. . . . . . . . . . . . 227Table 5-2—Management Goals for Some Federally Protected Natural Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230Table 5-3—Examples of Benefits from Ecosystem, Species, and Genetic Diversity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239Table 5-4--Species and Ecosystem Most at Risk from Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259Table 5-5--Options for Strategic Information Gathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280Table 5-6—Options for Enhanced Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

Chapter 6-ForestsTable 6-1—Human Values Associated with Forest Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304Table 6-2—Area of Timberland in the United States by Major Forest Type, 1987. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306Table 6-3—Forest Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326Table6-4--Ch aracteristics of Higher-Risk Forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327Table 6-5—Major Federal Acts or Programs Affecting the Use of Forest Lands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331Table 6-&Suitability of Silvicultural Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

FIGURES

Chapter l-SummaryFigure l-l-Potential Soil-Moisture Changes Under Two GCM Climate Change Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Figure 1-2-Soil-Moisture Changes for Agricultural Lands and Areas of Natural Cover, by GCM

Climate Change Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Appendix A–List of Tables and Figures I 335

Figure l-3-The Delaware River Basin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Figure l-4--An Assessment of Coastal Hazards: Texas and Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40Figure l-9--Water Withdrawals and Consumption in the Coterminous United States, 1985......,.. . . . 43Figure l-6--Preserves and Climate Change, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Figure l-7-Current and Projected Range of Beech Under Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Chapter 2-PrimerFigure 2-1—Long-Term Global Temperature Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Figure 2-2-The Greenhouse Effect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72Figure 2-3-Measured and Equivalent C02 Concentrations in the Atmosphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73Figure 2-4--Expected C02 Concentrations in the Atmosphere According to Various Emissions

Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73Figure 2-5--GCM-Estimated Changes in Temperature and Precipitation from a Doubling of CO2 . . . . . 76Figure 2-6-Potential Soil-Moisture Changes Under the GISS climate Change Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. 77Figure 2-7-Potential Soil-Moisture Changes Under the GFDL Climate Change Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78Figure 2-8-Approximate Distribution of the Major Biotic Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80F i g u r e 2 - 9 - - L o n g - T e r m T e m p r a t m e m d C 0 2RecOrds t i rnAt~ t i c1ceCO ms md R=ent

Atmospheric Measurements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80Figure 2-10-The Distribution of Holdridge Life Zones Under Current Climate conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . 95Figure 2-11-Percent of U.S. Land Area Shifting HoldridgeLife Zones After C02 Doubling.. . . . . . . . . 96Figure 2-12-The Hydrologic Cycle Shows How Water Moves Through the Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . 97Figure 2-13-Soil-Moisture Changes Under the GFDL and GISS Climate Change scenarios,

by Land-Use and Cover ~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101Figure in box 2-A-Modeled Topography of the United States by Use of Two Different Grid Sizes. . . . 69Figure in box 2-C--U.S. Coastal Marine Fisheries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Chapter 3-ResearchFigure3-lA--Organizational Chart for the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering,

and Technology (FCCSET). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Figure 3-lB--Organizational Chart for the Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES)..Figure 3-2-Priority Framework for USGCRP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Figure 3-3-Functional Architecture of USGCRP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Figure 3-4--U.S. Global Change Research Program Budget by Agency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Figure 3-5-USGCRP Focused Budget by Activity Stream. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Figure 3-6--USGCRP Budget by Science Element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Figure 3-7-FY 1993 USGCRP Budget of Focused and Contributing Programs by Agency . . . . . . . . . . .Figure 3-8-Alternative Organizational Schemes for Global Change Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Figure in box 3-A-Incoming, Reflected, and Scattered Solar Radiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

113114116117120121122123145128

Volume 1

Chapter 4-CoastsFigure 4-1-Historical Land Loss of Poplar Island in Chesapeake Bay as a Result of

Sea Level Rise and Erosion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157Figure 4-2-Schematics of a Developed and an undeveloped Barrier Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158Figure 4-3A-Intensity of Historic Hurricanes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160Figure 4-3B--Damage-Producing Potential of Historic Hurricanes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161Figure 4-4-Coastal Hazard Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167Figure 4-5-FEMA’s Criteria for Imminent-Collapse and Setback Determinations Under the

Upton-Jones Amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181Figure 4-&New Zones Established by Beachfront Legislation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191Figure in box 4-A--Saffir-Simpson Hurricane-Intensity scale.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162


Chapter 5—WaterFigure 5-l—Water Withdrawals and Consumption in the Coterminous United States, 1985. . . . . . . . . . . 211Figure 5-2—Average Consumptive Use and Renewable Water Supply by Water Resource Region . . . . . 214Figure 5-3-U. S. Groundwater Overdraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223Figure in box 5-B-The Rio Grande Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217Figure in box 5-E-Navigable Waters of the Mississippi River System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Chapter 6-AgricultureFigure 6-1-U.S. Production, Domestic Consumption, and Exports of Wheat, Corn, and Soybeans. . . . 278Figure 6-2-The USDA Agricultural Regions of the United States.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281Figure 6—3-Regional Distribution of Cropland and Irrigated Cropland in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . 282Figure6-4--Characteristics of Nine Farming Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283Figure 6-5-Corn Yields in the United States, 1950-91. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289Figure 6-6-Net Outlays of the Commodity Credit Corporation, 1982-91. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314Figure 6-7-Costs of Federal Disaster-Assistance Payments Over the Period 1980-90. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314Figure6-8-Appropriation for USDA Agricultural Research and Extension Programs for

FY 1972-93. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317Figure in box 6-C-Change in Simulated Crop Yields After Doubling of CO2, by Region,

Under Two GCM Climate Change Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290Figure in box 6-D-The Arkansas River Basin of Southeastem Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293Figure in box 6-E--Kesterson Reservoir and Surrounding Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295Figure in box 6-E-The Potential for Water-Salinity Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296Figure in box 6-F-Extent of the Hard Red Winter Wheat Zone in 1920 and 1980. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298Figure in box 6-F-Proportion of Wheat Planted to Leading Varieties in the United States... . . . . . . . . 299Figure in box 6-F-Midwestern Soybean Acreage in 1949 and 1982. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300Figure in box 6-G-The Ogallala Aquifer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

Volume 2

Chapter4--WetlandsFigure 4-1-Cross-Sectional Diagrams of a Northeaster Salt Marsh and a Riparian Wetland System. . 167Figure 4-2-General Distribution of Wetlands in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169Figure 4-3-Wetland Acreage Lost in the United States, 1780s to 1980s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170Figure 4-4-Extent and Location of Artificially Drained Agricultural Land in the United States, 1985. 171Figure in box 4-D---Relationship Between Wetland Processes and Values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163Figure in box4-F--Wetland Changes in the Mississippi River Active Delta (1956-78) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Chapter 5-PreservesFigure 5-1-Preserves and Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222Figure 5-2-Landownership of the U.S. Land Base. . . . . . . . . . . ,.,.,... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225Figure 5-3-Habitat Needs of Elk, Eagles, and Grizzly Bears in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. . 226Figure 5-4A-Federally Owned Lands: Agency Jurisdiction,..,,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232Figure 54B-Federally Owned Lands: Percentage of State Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233Figure 5-5-Recreational Visits to National Parks.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234Figure 5-6-Geographical Distribution of Some Federal Natural Areas, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240Figure 5-7-Authorizations and Total Annual Appropriations of Land and Water Conservation Fund.. 267Figure 5-8-Ecosystem Types Represented on Federal Land.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286Figure 5-9—Ecosystem Types Represented in National Wilderness Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287Figure in box 5-F-Biosphere Reserve Sites in the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247Figure in box 5-G--Stillwater National Wildlife Management Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253Figure in box 5-L-GAP Analysis Example: Distribution of Endangered Hawaiian F inches in

Relation to Existing Nature Reserves on the Island of Hawai in 1982. . . . . . . . . . . . 271Figure in box 5-L-The National Science Foundation’s Long-Term Ecological Research Network. . . . 272

Appendix A–List of Tables and Figures I 337

Chapter 6--ForestsFigure 6-l-USDA Forest Regions of the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302Figure 6-2-Forest Density Within Advanced Very-High-Resolution Radiometer Pixels . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303Figure 6-3-Area of Forest and Nonforest Land by Region, 1987.,.,...,...,., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304Figure 6-4-Major Forest Types of the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305Figure 6-5-Status of U.S. Forest Land and Distnbution of Timberland Ownership, 1987. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308Figure 6-6--Timberland Ownership by Region, 1987. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308Figure 6—7-Forest Area Planted or Seeded in the United States by Section and by Ownership. . . . . . . . 309Figure 6-8---Forest Fires in the United States, 1924-87. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319Figure 6-9--Current and Projected Range of Sugar Maple under Two Models of Global Warming. . . . 322Figure in box 6-B-Average Carbon Storage per Acre of Forestland in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310

—

Appendix B:Acknowledgments

In addition to the workshop participants and the advisory panel listed in the front of this Report, OTA wishesto thank the individuals and organizations listed below for their assistance with this Report. These individuals andorganimations do not necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this Report. OTA assumes full responsibility forthe Report and the accuracy of its content.

Joe AbeEPA

Carlton AgeeOTA

Dave AlmandBLM

Patricia AndersonNSF

Cecil ArmstrongUSFS

Dick ArnoldUSDA

Marilyn ArnoldEnvironmental and Energy

Study Institute

Adela BackielCongressional Research Service

Tom BaerwaldNSF

Dick BallDOE

Robert BarbeeNPS

Mary BarberScience & Policy Associates, Inc.

Keith BeaCongressional Research Service

Michael BeanEnvironmental Defense Fund

Barbara BedfordCornell University

James BeeverFlorida Game & Freshwater

Fish Commission

Michael BesslerBOR

Clark BinkleyUniversity of British Columbia

H. Suzanne BoltonNOAA

Mark BrinsonEast Carolina University

Blabby BrownOTA

Mike BuckleyFEMA

Bill BuschNOAA

Dixon ButlerNASA

I 339


Anne CareyUSDA

Katherine DuffyDuffy and Associates

Indur GoklanyDOI


Pete CarlsonAlaska Division of Tourism

Julie GorteOTA

John ElkindCouncil on Environmental

Quality

Ross GorteCongressional Research Service

Barbara CherryNASA

James GosselinkLouisiana State University

Elizabeth ChorneskyOTA Joanna Ellison

Bermuda Biological Stationfor Research, Inc. James Gosz

NSFJames ClarkDuke University

Gary EvansUSDA William Gregg, Jr.

NPSStan ColoffBLM

Jack FellowsOMB Dennis Grossman

The Nature ConservancyPeter ComanorNPS

Arthur FeltsUniversity of Charleston Howard Gruenspecht

DOECharles CooperSan Diego State University

Robert FischmanIndiana University Joan Ham

OTALynne CornCongressional Research Service

Len FiskNASA Frank Harris

NSFPierre CrossonResources for the Future Wendell Fletcher

OTA Chuck HassebrookCenter for Rural Affairs

Jim CurlinOTA Mike Fosberg

USFS Jimmy HickmanUSFS

William DavisEPA Carl Fox

University of Nevada Robert HirschUSGS

Todd DavisonFEMA Doug FOX

USFS Donald HodgesMississippi State University

John DennisNPS Jerry Franklin

University of Washington Marjorie HollandEcological Society of America

A.V. DiazNASA Bob Friedman

OTA John HousleyCOE

Erich DitschmanClinton River Watershed

councilMary GantHHS Lee Ischinger

FWSBert DrakeSmithsonian Environmental

Research Center

Thomas GednaOklahoma School of Electrical

and Computer EngineeringDale JamiesonUniversity of Colorado

Paul Dressier Tom GeorgeUSDA

Anthony JanetosNASA

Appendix B–Acknowledgments I 341

Katherine JeschUSFS

Larry LarsonAssociation of State Floodplain

Managers, Inc.

Paul McCawleyUSDA

Stanley JohnsonInstitute for Policy Studies

John McShaneF E M ADon Laurine

NOAAWilliam Jordan IllUniversity of Wisconsin

Arboretum

Gary McVickerBLMSteven Weatherman

University of MarylandMark MeoUniversity of OklahomaLinda Joyce

USFSEugene LeComteNational Committee on

Property Insurance Jerry MeillioWoods Hole Ecosystems CenterFred Kaiser

USFS Bob LedzionBOR Robert Mendelssohn

Yale UniversitySally KaneNOAA Simon Levln

Princeton University Ben MieremetN O A AKerry Kehoe

Coastal States Organization Roy Lewis IIILewis Environmental Services, Inc. Hal Mooney

Stanford UniversityJohn KelmelisUSGS Steven Light

South Florida WaterManagement District

Lewis MooreBOR

Paul KettyUniversity of Ottawa

David MouatDesert Research Institute

Harry LinsUSGS

John KirkpatrickUSFS

Tom MuirUSGS

Orie LoucksUniversity of Miami

Robert KnechtUniversity of Delaware

Kit MullerBLM

Jane LubchencoOregon State University

Gordon KnightBLM

Alan LucierNational Council of the Paper

Industry for Air and Streamimprovement

Mary Fran MyersUniversity of Colorado

Marge KolarFWS

Dan NewlonNSF

Paul KomarOTA

Ariel LugoPuerto Rico Department of

Natural Resources

Elvia NieblaUSFS

Stanley KrugmanUSFS

Stephen NodvinNPS

James KushlinUniversity of Mississippi

Kathy MaloneyUSFS

Maria Lacayo-EmeryUSFS

John NordinUSFS

Stephanie MartinUniversity of Washington

Larry LangnerUSFS

Douglas NortonNASA

Mark MaurielloNew Jersey Department of

Environmental Protectionand Energy

Edward LaRoeDOI

John PastorUniversity of Minnesota


Ari PatrinosDOE

Robert SchallenbergerFWS

Steven SonkaUniversity of Illinois

Jon PershingDepartment of State

Joel ScheragaEPA

Raymond SquitieriCouncil of Economic Advisors

Rob PetersConsultant

Karen SchmidtEnvironmental and Energy

Study Group

Eugene StakhivCOE

Mike PhillipsOTA

Linda StanleyDOIRust y Schuster

BORRutherford PlattUniversity of Massachusetts

at Amherst

Marty StrangeCenter for Rural AffairsJ. Michael Scott

University of Idaho Norton StrommenUSDA

Boyd PostU.S. Department of Agriculture

Cooperative State ResearchService

Fran SharpelsOak Ridge National Laboratory Byron Tapley

University of Texas at AustinEileen SheaNOAABrooks Preston

Senate Committee on Agriculture,Nutrition, and Forestry

Eugene TehruD O TDavid Shriner

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Jack Ward ThomasPacific Northwest Forest and

Range Experiment Station

J.C. RandolphIndiana University

Max SimmonsCongressional Research Service

Peter RavenMissouri Botanical Garden

Shelby TilfordNASA

Benjamin SimonD O I

Steve RawlinsUSDA Dennis Tirpak

EPADavid SmithSoutheast Regional Climate

CenterFrancis ReillyF E M A Don Trilling

DOTJoel SmithEPAJohn Reilly

USDA Dennis TruesdaleUSFSLowell Smith

EPACourtney RiordanEPA Eugene Turner

Louisiana State UniversityWilliam SmithYale University

Steve RagoneUSGS Lim Vallianos

COEDave SolenbergerGeneral Accounting Office

Michael RuggieroNPS Jan van Schilfgaarde

USDAWayne SolleyUSGS

Nora SabadellNSF Virginia Van Sickle-Burkett

FWSBill SommersUSFS

R. Neil SampsonAmerican Forestry Association Hassan Virgi

Working Group on GlobalChange, Executive Secretary

David SandbergUSFS

Jack Sommers

Charles WahleCongressional Research Service

Geoffrey WallUniversity of Waterloo

Jonathon WeinerDOJ

Rodney WeirNOAATrina WellmanNOAA

William WerickCOE

Robin WhiteOTA


Jeffress WilliamsUSGS

Paul WindleEPA

Appendix B–Acknowledgments 1343

Phyllis WindleOTA

Frank YoungHHSMike YoungUSDA

Joy ZedlerSan Diego State University

Jeffery ZinnCongressional Research Service

Index

adaptation to climate changeagricultural, 6, 13, 18-19,44-46 I/II]; 276-277,

286-328 V]anticipatory actions, 3 ~choosing strategies, 15-16 ~/111coastal areas, 6, 18, 40 U/D]; 154-204 ~communication of risk and, 25-26 ~contingency p] a.nning, 26-27defined, 2-3 w]flexibility in policy making, 16-17, 18 ~forests, 6, 15, 19,23,55 ~; 320-330,347-349 @l]fragmentation, 19,23,25historical examples, 298-300 ~managed vs. unmanaged systems, 102-103 ~]photoperiod and, 87 fl~; 287,299,303 ~preserves, 19, 53 [I/H]; 235-238, 244-250, 258-268,

276-277,279-291 ~]rate of change and, 4 U/n]research, 16-17, 23, 27, 30, 35, 111, 132-139, 147-

148 11/’I1]species adjustments, 91-95 [~; 179-181 ~water resources systems, 6, 18,42 ~; 232-235 ~]wetlands, 12, 111 ~/ii]; 172-185 ~

agricultureadaptability, 6, 13, 18-19,44-46 ~; 276-277,

286-328 ~]biotechnology applications, 284,306-307,315,323,

325 [r]

climate change effects, 5, 13, 15, 45 ~; 286-296 D]commodity support programs, 17, 19, 45, 46 ~; 276,

297, 310,311-312,317-319, 326,327 ~competition for world markets, 284 D]crop insurance, 21, 26, 33, 36-37, 45 ~; 254-255,

312-313,320,321,328 ~]cropping systems, 46 ~; 287, 308-309 ~

disaster assistance, 19, 26, 36-37,45-47 ~I]; 276, 310,312-313,319-322,326-328 ~]

domestic demand, 282 ~]drought and, 13,45 ~]; 288,293,304-305 ~@land, 33 ~; 218,291,296,299 ~economic issues, 276, 277-278, 280, 288, 291, 292 ~environmental concerns, 284, 289, 292,294-296 ~farm structural changes, 286,304-305 ~Federal programs, 278-280,284 ~fertilizers, 88 ~; 219,307 u]growing season, 13,33 ~; 287,303 ~]information and management technologies, 46 ~; 284,

305,307-308,323-328 ~institutional setting, 310-316 illintensive farming practices, 33,46,87-88 ~; 304 ~legislation, 46-47 ~; 278-279,311,312,318, 321 ~]rnicroclime modification, 303 ~policy options, 46=47 fl/ii]; 316-328 ~]in prairie pothole region, 26, 33-34 11/111regions of United States., 281, 283 U]research and extension, 16-17, 22, 26, 35, 46, 133, 135

~]; 279,297,299,305,308, 309,310,317,323-324,326 ~

salinization problerns, 259, 284, 294-296, 297 (11Sodbuster Program, 284 ~soil conservation, 278, 279, 301, 310, 322, 324 u]soil moisture and, 10, 11 ~; 303 ~subsidies, 17, 19 ~; 192, 297, 310, 312-313, 318,

320 ~Swarnpbuster Program, 284 ~; 192-194,201 ~technologies, 45,46 ~; 297-309 ~trends, 281-286 ~water demand and supply, 31,45 ~/Il_j; 288-289,292-294,

296,300,313, 322 ~

NOTE: Volumes 1 and 2 of the report are indicated by ~] and [II], respectively.

I 345

346 I Preparing for an Unwrtain Climate-Volume 1

water pollution, 29,32 ~; 217,219,278-279,284, 292,294,296,328 ~; 168, 17’0-171, 251 ~

wetlands, 26, 28, 31, 33-34, 47 ~; 276, 278 U];170-171, 192-194, 199,200 ~]

world demand, 282-284 ~see alko crops; irrigation; livestock; U.S. Department of

AgricultureAlabarn& 270,273,305 ~Alaska, 13,50-52,81,82 ~]; 166,221 ~; 161, 163, 168,

185,209,221 ~alpine areas, 91 ~]; 181,225 1~American Indians, 212,222,243 ~Antarctic

ice cores, 80 ~ozone layer hole, 73 ~]

arid Westagricuhww, 276 ~drought, 210,288 ~irrigation subsidies, 240, 313 ~precipitation pattern shifls, 9 [~1protected natural areas, 52 ~qsnowmelt, 213 ~water supplies, 212 ~water transfers, 18 ~]; 292-;!93 ~wetlands, 13, 47, 125 ~; 167, 176, 178-179, 181,

184-186,201,202,209 ~]&iZOM, 215,223,224,237, M, 250,272-273 ~Arkansas, 13 ~]; 270,280 ~Arkansas River Basin, 228,292,293 ~Association of State Floodplain Managers, 184 ~]

Babbitt, Bruce, 30,37 ~bamier islands, 39, 79 ~]; 154, 156, 158, 165, 176-178,

185-186, 199-200 ~; 194 ~Battelle Paci.tic Northwest Laboratory, 141, 143 ~bears, 225,226,2411111biodiversity

conservation, 49, 55-56, 109 ~~; 220, 232-233 ~; seeaho natural areas

Everglades, 29 ~forests and, 336-342 ~Gap Analysis Project, 129 ~]; 270-271 I?IlNational Biological Survey, 37,48,53,129,137,149, 150

~; 283-284 ~preserves and, 19,49 ~]; 239,258 ~protection, 53 ~; 258 ~]wetlands, 167, 172, 178, 180, 182-183, 186 ~]

Biosphere Reserves, 29 ~; 230,246-248,275,288,289 ~

biotechnology, 23 ~; 284,306-.307,315,323, 325 ~birds, 29,33,51,93, % ~; 218,226,301 ~; 165,

226-228 ~Brown, George, 117 ~Bureau of Land Management, 50 ~; 222, 248 ~; 188,

222,224,225,229,231, 235,237,240,242-244, 261,270,277,279,289,313, 33;!-334, 336,338,340,344,347 ~

Bureau of Reclamation, 43, 136 ~]; 233-234, 240, 243,246, 248,249-250,254, 257,263, 294,295, 313 ~;204,252 ~

California, 273 ~]agriculture, 31 ~; 280, 294-297, 304, 315 ~Central Wley Project, 31 w]; 219,223,224,236,238,

241,296-297 ~; 209,252,255 ~]coastal population, 31 ~drought, 22,32 ~; 238-239,261 ~Drought Water Bank, 236,238-239 ~fins, 1,90 ~, 261 ~f100dS, 253 ~Imperial %lley, 237 ~]irrigation districts, 237-238 ~Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge, 294-296 ~Metropolitan Water District, 224, 236, 237, 241, 247,

261-262 U]Owens Mey, 216,237,238 ~Peripheral Canal, 32 ~; 237 ~San Joaquin Viilley, 294-296,297 ~San Luis Dam, Canal, and Reservoir, 295 ~State Water Project, 31 ~; 236,238,251,259 ~water issues, 13,31-32 ~]; 214-215,216,219,222, 223,

224, 227, 236, 237, 240-241, 246, 247, 259-262,294-2% ~; 210 ~

wetlands, 155, 160-161, 183,209, 277 ~Canada, 33 ~; 230-231,260,298,299 ~; 190 ~carbon dioxide, 71-74, 75, 87-89,94,98 ~

Antarctic ice cores, 66,71,80 ~atmospheric concentrations, 50, 65,66,73, 80, 89 ~doubling effects, 70,75,76,93 ~; 166,290 ~ecosystem productivity, 88-89 ~emission scenarios, 72, 73 ~fertilization effect, 11, 66, 70, 87-89 ~; 287 ~;

175-176,323 ~long-term records, 71,80 ~SinkS, 51 ~; 165, 168, 185, 310-311 ~

CtibOU, 50 ~; 185,225 ~]Carnegie Cornmis sion, 143 ~]Carnegie Mellon University, 140, 143 ~]Carson River Basin, 248,251 ~Chesapeake Bay, 81,87 ~; 157 n]; 163, 175, 176, 183,

199 mchlorofluorocarbons, 65,72, 73, 112 ~Clean Water Act

fuhery improvement, 82 ~municipal sewage treatment funding, 197-198, 202, 220-

221,242 ~non-point-source pollution, 215, 220 ~]; 200 ~reauthorization, 44 ~]; 219,220-221 ~water conservation, 44 ~; 264 ~watershed management, 25,48 ~]; 205, 206, 209, 210,

220,215,256 ~wetlands protection, 36,48 ~; 202, 221 ~; 154, 155,

157, 159,178-179,188, 189, 191, 195-196, 198,200,203,205-206,209-212 ~]

clouds and cloud cover, 68, 87 ~

Index 1347

coastal areasbarrier islands, 39,79 ~; 185-186,199-200 ~beach nourishment and shoreline protection, 41-42 ~;

154, 168, 172-176,202,204 ~building codes, 199 ~demographic trends 155-156 ~]development pressures, 39,40 ~; 166 ~]development subsidies, 17, 18,21 ~; 172, 176,177 ~]disaster assistance, 21,41 ~; 171-173, 198-199 ~erosion, 9,26,39,41,51,79 ~; 155,156, 157,170-171,

181, 187-188, 191, 194-195, 201 ~; 173, 182, 183,186 ~]

flood insurance, 18, 21, 26, 41 ~; 168-171, 180-182,194-198 ~]

flooding, 155, 156, 157 ~]; 186 @IJhazard assessment and mitigation, 26,40 ~]; 166, 167,

174-175, 183-185, 198-199,200,201,203 (J]hurricanes and coastal storms, 13, 39,90 ~]; 154, 155,

159-166, 171, 188-191 ~]institutional fragmentation and regulatory obstacles, 18

~]; 178-179 ~]land acquisition, 200,201 ~management legislation and programs, 21, 41 ~]; 154,

178-179, 185-194, 196,201 ~]; 193 ~mangroves, 29, 99 I?/II]; 160, 172 I?Upolicy options, 4042 ~]; 194-204 U]population pressures, 5, 13,31,39,82 ~; 154,156 ~retreat policies, 175, 179, 188, 192-193, 197 ~; 207 ~risk allocation and management, 154 ~; 201 ~saltwater intrusion, 13,32,96 ~; 215 ~; 176, 182 ~sea level rise, 8-9, 13, 39, 79,93,94 ~; 154, 155-157,

159, 197 ~; 173-174, 182, 186 ~]setback provisions, 175, 179, 181, 187, 196,201,202 ~;

193, 195,206 ~“takings” issue, 177-178, 191 ~tax code subsidies, 21-22 ~; 168, 176,200 ~V zones, 168, 169, 171, 181, 196 ~vulnerability, 5,6, 13, 15,39 ~]; 154-166 ~wetlands, 9, 12, 15, 21,47 ~; 159, 160, 165, 190, 202

~]; 169-170, 180-183,186,193,201 ~]Coastal Barrier Resources System, 185,200 ~Colorado, 213,215,238,246,248, 272,280,285,292,293

~]; 179,257 ~]Colorado River Compact, 224-225 ~]Colorado River Basin, 13 ~; 216,224-225,237,239, 246,

259 ~Columbia River, 260 fl]; 175 ~Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES),

113-115, 118, 121, 132, 133, 136, 138, 146 ~Committee on Science, Engineering, and public Policy

(COSEPUP), 4,6,110 ~Comecticut, 269 ~]consenfation

biological diversity, 49,55-56, 109 ~Federal programs, 278-280 ~]forest, 55-56 [I/II]; 346 ~funding, 54 ~]; 265-266 ~habitat, 236-238 ~

incentives, 21 ~; 287-288 ~SOil, 278, 279, 301 ~species, 54, 127 ~]; 235-238 ~wetlands, 278 ~]; 192-193 ~]see also water conservation

Conservation Reserve Program, 233,278,284,318 ~; 190,191, 194,268,287 ~]

Consortium for International Earth Science Information,274 ~

conventions and treatiesBiodiversity Convention, 109 WII]Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2, 109 U/II]Montreal Protocol, 73, 109 ~]

crop insurance, 21, 26, 33, 36-37,45 [I/II]; 172, 199,254-255,312-313,320, 321,328 ~]

crophmddistribution and land area, 277,282,294 [1]forest clearance for, 296 D]hatvested acreage, by crop, 284 ~irrigated, 282, 287-289, 294-296, 301-302 ~]soil moisture, 100 ~]

cropsadaptation to climate change, 1’7 w]; 291, 298-300,

308-309 ~barley, 302,311 ~breeding, 277,289,298-299,306, 323,325, 327 Q]contingency plarming, 22 ~corn, 278,284,285,287,288, 289,291,298,299,300, 302,

303,305,306,311 ~cotton, 87 ~; 284, 301, 302, 306, 308, 311 ~disease- and pest-resistant, 299,306-307 U]drought-tolerant species, 300 U]exports, 277-278 ~genetically engineered, 307,325 U]Kenaf, 309,311 ~new crops, 300, 308-309, 325 ITJnutritional quality, 287 ~oats, 300, 311 ~oilseeds, 309, 311 ~range, 9 ~]; 276, 277 ~rice, 284, 287, 611 ~sensitivity to climate change, 13,45, 81 ~]; 287-289 ~simulation, 290, 308 ~]sorghum, 284, 287, 301, 302, 303, 305, 309, 311 U]SOJ&MllS, 45,81 ~; 278,284,285, 287, 300, 305, 306,

311 ~sugar cane, 287 ~]wheat, 33, 34 ~]; 277, 278, 284, 285, 287, 288, 291,

298-299,300,301,303, 305,306,311 ~]yields, 290,305,306,322-323 ~see also crop insurance

Crown of the Continent Project, 249 [H]

dams, 17 ~]; 215,258,293 U]Delaware, 269 ~]Delawiue River Basin, 23,24 w]Delmarva Peninsula, 157 ~desalination, 259-260111


disaster assistanceagricultural programs, 19, 26, 36-37, 45-47 ~]; 276,

310,312-313,319-322, 3:26-328 ~]congressional oversight, 199 [1]for crop losses, 7,21,45,46-47 ~;deftig disasters, 21,46-47 11/IIJ; 320,328 ~Federal share, 198,310 ~CrOp iIISUHUICe, 21, 26, 33, 36-37, 45 ~; 172, 199,

254-255,312-313,320, 321,328 ~]emergency loans, 173, 176,279, 313 ~]hazard-reduction programs and, 166, 198-199111for hurricanes, 7 fl/II]; 154, 172 ~legislation, 41,46-47 ~]; 17’1, 183-185,203,312,313,

321 ~Mississippi River floods, 7 WDJ, 228-231 ~, 175 ~payments, 7,47 ~]; 154, 172,310,312,321,328 U]policy options, 4748 ~; 198-199,203,310,319-322,

326,327 ~]Pxtsidential disaster declarations, 178, 185, 199,312 ~public assistance grants, 168-169,171-172, 198,199 ~]reforms, 19,21,40,4647 ~; 154,172-173,198-199 ~risk perception and, 21,26 ~~self-insurance program, 322 CIl

disease, 14,88-89 ~]; 224 ~drought

agricultural effects, 13,45 ~]; 288,293,304-305 ~]assessment programs, 255 ~Australia, drought policy, 252, 320 ~Cab.forni% 22,32 ~]; 238-239 ~economic effects, 228 ~Florid% 28-29 ~fiequcncy, 69 ~government assistance, 34 ~]inland water transportation and, 227-231 ~, 288 ~interagency task force, 22,43 [~legislation, 255 ~management, 27, 42 ~; 251-256 ~pests and, 94 ~]policy options, 43 ~; 254-2i6 ~prairie potholes and, 33-34 ~]precipitation pattern shifts and, 9 ~preparedness plsnnin g, 255 mpublic-awareness programs, 255 ~]severity index, 69 ~; 228 ~State plans, 27 ~, 252 ~water bank, 236,238-239,279 IU]water resources and, 42 ~]; 210, 251, 293 ~; 179 ~]

Ducks Unlimited, 129 ~; 195 [lTJ

Earth Day 1993,2 ~Ecological Society of America, 138 ~; 268,269 ~economic issues

adaptation nxearch, 133-134 ~11’1in agriculture, 276-278,280,288, 291 ~drought, 228 U]fisheries, 31 ~; 163-lW, 183 ~forests, 302, 316, 328-330, 332, 335-336, 341-342,

345-349 IJI-J

gross national product, 10 ~preserves, 232 ~]transportation, 14, 15 ~; 227, 231 ~water quality and quantity, 5,7 ~]wetlands, 154-155, 162-164, 166, 178, 183 ~

ecosystemsadaptability to climate change, 6,79-80 ~anthropogenic stresses, 66, 88, 90-91 ~arctic, 87 ~]corridors, 242-243 ~declines and diebacks, 93-94 ~direct climate impacts, 91-96 ~fragmentation, 19,49,66,90 ~; 239-240 ~Greater Yellowstone, 19 ~; 226,243-245, 2S0 @IJHoldridge Life Zones, 91, 95, % ~management models, 244-250 @IJresearch, 35,53-54, 111, 148-150 ~; 269 ~restoration, 17 ~; 154-156,276-277 ~water resources and, %-98 ~

education, see public educationElectric Power Research Institute, 143 ~endangered and threatened species, 29, 30, 31, 47, 53, 93

~]; 219,221,235-238 ~; 162,165,183,186,190,192,208,221,225,232-233, 241,258,268 ~

energy usesensitivity and adaptability, 6, 14, 15 ~water resources and, 211-213, 227 ~

Environmental and Energy Study Institute, 150 ~Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve pro-

268 ~Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

adaptation march, 133, 135 ~agriculture-related programs, 280 ~]assessments of climate change, 100, 102-103, 110,

143 ~climate change research, 75, 133 ~; 289, 290 ~;

207 ~]Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Program, 193,

199,200,210-211,268, 270 ~watershed management, 245 ~wetland management, 48 ~; 178 ~; 155, 157,179,188,

189, 193,205,206 ~evapotranspiration, 13,33,65,69,77,97,98 ~Executive Orders

Executive Order 11988 (Flood Plain Management), 192,198 ~]

Executive Or&r 11990 (Protection of Wetlands), 155,192, 198 ~

Executive Order 12656,252,254 ~Experimental Forests, Ranges and Watersheds, 23,56 ~;

231 ~extreme events

climate change and fkequency of, 1,66 ~; 250-251 ~contingency planning, 5,22-23,26-27 ~management, 4243 ~; 250-257,262-263 ~@iCy O@OIIS, 22-23 ~; 194-202, 254-257, 319-322

~; 342-347 ~]uncertainty about, 10-11 ~

Index 1349

wetlands effects, 172, 176, 183-184 IITjsee also droughts; f~es; floods

farms, see agriculture; cropsFarmers Home Administration, 173, 176, 279, 313 ~]; 192,

201,203,212 ~Federal Coordinating Council on Science, Engineering, and

Technology (FCCSET), 20, 30 n.7, 38-39, 110, 113,139, 146, 148 ~; 324 ~

Federal Crop Insurance Program, see crop insuranceFederal Emergency Management Agency, 156, 168 ~

Community Rating System, 180, 182 ~; 208 ~]disaster assistance, 171-173, 179, 198-199,254 ~flood insurance, 178-179, 180, 197 [Ii; 193 ~]floodplain mapping, 171, 197 ~hazard-mitigation requirements, 41 ~; 198-199,203 ~

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 233 ~]Federal Insurance &-hm.ru‘ “stration (FM), 168, 171, 196 ~Fim Island, 171 ~fms

ecological benefits, 51,90, 100 ~]forest, 1,9, 12,22,26,27, 100 ~], 317, 32AI, 325,327,

329, 330,342-347management in protected areas, 261-263 ~

fisheriesAleutian-North Pacific, 13,50,51-52,81-82,86 ~;

185 ~]anadromous species, 82,95 ~commercially important species, 83-85 ~]die-offs and declines, 29, 31,81 [~effects of climate change, 13,51-52,81-82 ~]; 173-174,

183 ~]endangered and threatened, 31 ~~estuarine-dependent, 81 ~~industry, 50, 81-82 w]; 190 ~Imuisiana-Gulf of Mexico, 84 [I/II]; 173-174 ~overfishing of, 51-52 ~]oysters, 81 ~; 186 ~regional charactetitics of, 83-85 11/Il_jSacramento-San Joaquin River System, 31 ~salmon, 31, 50, 81, 82 ~; 215 ~]; 226Shlimp, 29 ~]; 174, 186 ~striped bass, 31, 81 ~; 183 ~]temperature effects, 81 ~]; 215, 219 ~wetlands role, 47, 81 ~~; 163-164, 174, 181 ~

Fish and Wildlife 2000,277 ~]flood-control measures

coastal areas, 174-175 [Ii; 183 ~Federal agencies involved in, 254 ~]jurisdictional fragmentation, 25 ~]; 233-234 U]migration of wetlands and, 12 ~/lIl; 182 ~and storm surges, 213 ~water resource plarming and, 42 ~and wetlands, 47 ~; 162, 164, 166, 168, 174, 182,

183 ~]floodplain

development, 10 ~/II]; 253 ~]; 192 ~management, 43 ~; 168, 179-180,253,256 ~]; 208 ~

mapping, 171, 197 ~wetlands, 161 ~1]

floodscoastal areas, 39 [I/II]; 155111infrastructure aging and, 227 ~]insurance, 168-171, 180-182 ~]land area subject to, 253 ~]management, 253-254, 256-257 U]Midwest (1993), 1,7, 10, 15, 22 ~; 231 ~; 203 ~national assessment board, 22,43 ~]; 256 ~policy options, 22 ~; 256-257 ~vulnerability to, 253-254 ~see also National Flood Insurance Program

Floridaagriculture, 280, 285, 305 ~barrier islands, 39 w]building codes, 179, 193 ~coastal management, 187, 191, 193, 200 ~]coastal population and development, 155, 156, 164, 174,

179 ~droughts, 28-29 ~endangered species, 241 ~]Everglades, 25,28-30 D/II]; 219 U]; 205,209 ~fisheries, 84 ~flood control, 28 ~]hurricanes, 1,7,22,28,29 ~]; 154-156,163-165,171 [1]mangroves, 172 ~]protected areas, 257 ~]sea level rise, 79 ~]; 156, 157 ~water issues, 28, 42 ~]; 215, 219, 223, 261, 270 ~;

210 m]wetlands, 160, 161, 164, 175, 182, 207, 209 ~]

Forest I.zgacy Programs, 57 ~/H]; 335,341,341 ~]forest management, 6 [I/II]

even-flow-harvest requirement, 22 ~; 347-348 ~private lands, 56 ~]; 334-336 ~]protection of forest health, 22,56 ~/IIl; 343-347 ~public lands, 332-334 [II]risk communication, 22,26 ~]response to climate change, 17, 55, 56 ~; 330-336 ~trends, 27 ~]; 317, 319-3201111

Forest Stewardship Program, 57 ~/II]; 335,341,342 ~]Forestry Incentives Program, 57 ~~; 335,341,342,346 ~forests

adaptability, 6, 15, 19,23,54,55 11/II]; 320-330 ~]Blue Mountains, 27 ~; 318-319, 329 ~]boreal, 50,51 ~]carbon releases, 51 ~]COZ concentrations and, 66 ~/II]; 323 ~]conservation and preservation methods, 55-56 ~]declines and dieback, 9, 12, 54, 55, 56, 93-94 ~;

342-346 ~dispemal and colonization rates, 12 ~; 304-305,

308-309,311,315 ~fins, 1,9,12,22,26,27,100 ~; 261-263,317,324,325,

327, 329, 330, 342-347 ~forest health, 22,56 ~]; 343-347 ~]fragmentation, 21, 55 ~~; 326 ~]


hurricane darnage, 189-190 [1]incentive programs, 56-57 ~TI]; 342, 346-349land area, 54 ~; 303-304,308-309,311, 315 ~legislation, 56-57 ~]; 312-314,343,346,348 ~]migration, 12, 14,52,54,94 [I/II]; 321-323,332-333,336monitoring, 125 ~]policy options, 21,22 ~; 336-349 ~precipitation pattern shifts and, 9 ~private lands, 21 ~; 341-342,346-347,348-349research, 23, 55 ~resources, 301-303, 315-317 ~seed banks, 23, 55-56 ~/II]; 336-338 ~vulnerability, 6, 15, 19,54-55 fl/11’l; 324,326-328 ~types, 304 ~]see afso timberlandfossil fuels, 2 ~]; 212,227 ~

General Accounting Office (GAO), 186, 200, 252 ~; 189,264 ~]

general circulation models (GCMS), 78,91,99 ~]COZ doubling effect, 76 ~]; 166,290 U]global climate change predictions, 68-70 ~precipitation changes, 76 ~]principles, 68 ~]runoff predictions, 212-213 p]soil-moisture predictions, 9, 11,69,77-78,99, 101 ~~temperature predictions, 2, 29,67,76 ~uncertainties and generalities in, 68-70 ~]; 213 ~]vegetation shifts, 91 ~]

Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL), 9, 11,76,78,99-101 ~; 290 ~; 322 ~

Georgia, 157, 186, 194,215,270 ~; 164,210 ~Gibbons, John, 112 ~]Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS), 9, 11, 76-78,

100-101 ~; 290 ~; 322 ~]Gore, Albert, 147 ~/11]Great Lakes, 13,14,75 ~]; 166,186,192,228,230-231 ~;

186 ~]greenhouse gases

atmospheric concentrations, 65, 74,75 ~~Climate Convention and, 2 ~111emissions, 2, 74 ~feasibility of reduction, 2 ~/iI]predicted changes in, 71-73 fl,qSOU.KXS, 72, 73 ~]

groundwateradaptation to declines in, 301-302 ~]integrated management with surface water, 23, 25 ~];

210,250,246-247,301-302 ~overdrafts, 9 fl/H]; 212,218, 2!23-224 ~]pollution, 219,284 ~]precipitation pattern shifts and, 9 ~reasonable use doctrine, 222111saltwater intrusion, 29 ~; 155, 212, 213,217, 219 ~;

176 ~]Gulf Coast (U.S.), 12, 13, 39 [I/II]; 156, 159, 164, 167,

217-218 ~]

Gulf of Mexico, 79 ~]; 156-157 U]; 175 ~Gunnison River Basin, 248 ~]

habitatsconsemation plans, 236-238 ~]fragmentation, 3,5,13,19,86,92-93,96 ~needs of wildlife, 226 ~wetlands, 164-165 ~]

Hawaii, 1,71,85 ~]; 166,273 ~; 168 ~]hazard assessment, coastal, 26,40 ~; 166, 167,

183-185 U]Hazard Mitigation Grants program, 180, 183-185 ~health (human), 6, 14, 15 ~/ll”jHoMridge Life Zones, 91,95,96 ~hurricanes and storms

Andrew, 7,22,29 ~; 154-156, 163,165,168,171,172,179, 193 ~]

coastal effects, 13, 39 ~; 159-166, 189-191 ~contingency plans, 22 ~]damage-producing potential, 161, 163, 166,202 ~economic costs, 163, 165, 168, 172, 189-191 ~Federal disaster payments, 7 ~; 154, 172 ~flood-insurance claims and payments, 168 ~historic, 159-160 V]Hugo, 7,22 ~; 154, 155, 163, 165, 168, 172, 175-176,

188-191 ~]Iniki, 154, 155, 168 ~intensity, 11,75 ~; 159, 160, 162-163 ~]personal losses, 159, 191 ~property damages, 189 ~]redevelopment in high-risk areas, 25 ~]Saffi.r-Sirnpson scale, 162-163 ~

hydrologic cycle, 96-97 ~]; 212-213 ~]; 165, 174, 175,186 ~]

hydropower, 9 ~]; 211,227,231,233,248 ~

ice/snow meltsagricultural effects, 289 ~mountain snowpacks, 32, 67, ;oceanic effects, 79 m]IU1’10ff and, 213 ~]sea ice, 50-51,71, 79 ~]sea level rise and, 69, 79 ~temperature increases and, 70transportation and, 14 ~/11]

1 ml

156 ~w]

Idaho, 273,280 ~; 244,260 ~~OiS, 186,231,271,280,285, 288,305,315 ~]Illinois River, 228,230 ~]Indian Reservations, 222-223,243 ~]Indiana, 270,285 ~indigenous cultures, 50, 51, 83-85 ~]; 212 ~; 185 ~information technologies

agricultural applications, 46 ~/IIl; 284, 305, 307-308,323-328 ~]

Geographic Information Systems, 129 ~; 273 ~inland watemays

barge traffic, 227-228,288 ~dredge and fill activities, 188, 189, 198, 229-230 ~

Index I 351

drought effects, 227-231, 288 ~shipping, 14 ~/TI]

insects, 81, 86, 88-89, 94 ~/IIl; 288IntergovemmentaI Panel on CIimate Change (IPCC), 2,4,6,

72, 115 fl/11]climate change predictions, 10, 32, 68, 73, 111 ~]scientific assessment of climate change, 71,74, 100, 102,

103, 110, 118 [MUsea level predictions, 78-79 ~]; 156, 159 ~]

Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, 245,249 [1]

Interstate Council on Water Policy, 252 ~Iowa, 33 [I/In; 271, 280, 285 IIj; 181 (II]irrigation

adaptation to climate change, 303-304 ~]alternatives to, 296, 301 ~]conservation technologies, 4 ~; 282, 301-305 ~]cropland distribution and acreage, 280, 282, 294, 301 ~groundwater withdrawals for, 301 ~]moisture consewation and, 303 [1]Newlands Project, 252-253 ~]with reclaimed water, 261, 293 ~in saline soils, 294-296 ~]scheduling, 303, 305 ~]subsidies, 17, 26 ~/II]; 240, 310, 313, 322, 326, 327 ~;

200 @]water quality and, 294-296 ~water supplies and, 217, 237, 239, 276, 288-289, 304 ~wetlands losses and, 184 ~]

Kansa.s, 271,285, 298,301 [1]; 183 ~Kentucky, 271 ITlKiss immee River, 28, 29-30 ~; 204 ~]

Land Acquisition Priority System, 208,266 ~]Land and Water Conservation Fund, 230, 237 ~Land-use planning, 129 ~/II]; 201 ~]; 159, 206, 207, 229,

248 [II]Legislation

Acid Precipitation Act, 141 ~~Agricultural Credit Act, 203 ~]Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 221 [II]Baucus-Chafee Water Pollution Prevention and Control

Act, 220 P]Central VWey Projecl Improvement Act, 224,264 ~Clean Air Act, 314,318 [II]Clean Water Act, see Clean Water ActCoastal Barrier Improvement Act, 186 ~Coastal Barrier Resources Act, 40,48 ~; 180,185-186,

199-200 ~]; 193, 194,201, 212 ~]coastal development, 191 ~]Coastal Zone Management Act, 21,37,40,41 ~; 180,

186-188, 191-194, 199, 201 ~]; 192, 193 ~]Coastal Wetlands Pkmning, Protection and Restoration

Act, 192, 194,202 ~Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of 1978,56-57 ~],

335, 346 ~Dingell-Johnson Act, 191 IITJ

drought-related, 255 ~Duck Stamp kt (see Migratory Bird Hunting and

Conservation Stamp Act)Earthquake, Volcanic Eruption, and Hurricane Hazards

hlSUHiIICe Act of 1993,41 ~]; 203,204 ~Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, 48 ~;

190, 191-192, 194,208,209,212,267 ~]Endangered Species Act, 30, 31 ~; 219 ~; 192,

210,223,233,235-236, 255,258,267,288,313, 315,319 pI]

Energy Policy Act of 1992,44 ~; 242,264 ~Energy Security Act, 141 ~environmental impact assessments, 38 ~Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act,

29 ~existing statutory language, 37-39 ~Farm Bills, 36-37,46, 56 ~; 278-279, 312, 313, 321,

324,327 ~; 335,341,346,348 ~]Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937, 191,

267-268 ~Federal Aid in Fish Restoration Act of 1950, 191,267-

268 ~]Federal Crop Insurance Act, 312 ~Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1990,321 ~Federal Disaster Preparedness and Response Act of 1993,

41 ~; 203 ~Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 279,

280 ~Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 313,

334 ~Federal Power Act, 38 ~Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 189 ~Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act of 1980,54 ~; 291,

266,268,288 ~Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 38 ~; 192 @IlFlood Disaster Protection Act, 168 ~Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act, 309,312

~; 190, 192,194,268,335,341 ~Food Security Act of 1985,312 [~; 191, 192, 194 ~Forest Ecosystems and Atmospheric Pollution Act of

1988,279,343 ~Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Research

Act, 336,343 ~]Forest and Renewable Resources PI arming M of 1974,

312, 325 ~forest management, 56 ~]Hatch Act, 315 ~Henderson Wetlands Act of 1984,209 ~]Housing and Community Development Act, 180-181 ~Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 190 ~Magnuson Fishery Act, 82 ~Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 228 ~]Migratory Bird Hunting and Conservation Stamp Act

(Duck Stamp Act), 184,189,190, 194,200 ~Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 228 ~Merrill Act, 315 ~]Multiple Use and Sustained-Yield Act, 312 ~National Environmental Protection Act, 276 ~


National Environmental Policy Act, 38 ~]; 155, 192,199,255,312 ~

National Forest Management Act, 347 ~National Flood Insurance Act, 168, 180 ~; 193 ~]National Flood Insurance Compliance, Mitigation, and

Erosion Management Act of 1993,41,43 ~; 194,203, 256,263 ~

National Flood Insurance Reform Act, 194,203 ~National Forest-Dependent Rural Communities Economic

Diversification Act of 1990,336,348 ~]National Forest Management Act, 22 ~; 312 ~]National Park Service Organic Act of 1916,228,234,

314 ~]National Parks and Recreation Act, 245,314 ~National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of

1966,228 ~North American Wetlands Conservation Act of 1989, 190,

208 ~]Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 311,318 ~Open Space Preservation Act of 1991,200 ~]Pacdlc Northwest Electric Power Plannin g and Conserva-

tion Act, 38 ~Pittrnan-Robertson Act, 191 [D]protected natural areas, 228-230 ~]public land acquisition, 38 ~1.IJPublic Rangelands Improvement Act, 334 ~]Reclamation Act of 1902,313 ~Reclamation Projects Authorization and M@stment Act

of 1992,44 ~; 264 ~Refuge Recreation Act of 1962,228,264 ~research authorization, 38 MQRivers and Harbors Act of 1899189 ~]Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assist-

ance Act, 171, 180, 184, 1.98 ~Safe “Drinking Water Act, 227,280 ~Science Policy Act of 1976,20,38-39, 146-147 ~Smith-Lever Act, 316 ~Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act, 326 ~Tax Reform Act of 1986,242 ~]; 194,200 ~]Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake-Water Settlement Act,

254 ~]U.S. Global Change Research Act, 39, 113, 150 ~]Water Bank Act, 190, 194,200 ~]Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 219,245,249

I?J; 209 ~Water Quality Act, 280 ~Water Resources Development Act, 29,44 ~]; 250,264

~; 192 ~Water Resources Pl arming Ac1., 38 ~; 249 ~wetland protection, 47,48 ~Q; 188 ~]Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 1’79, 229,256 @l]Wilderness Act, 221,224,229,239,256, 267,312 ~]Wildlife Refuge Adrmms“ “ tration Act, 264 ~

livestock, 200, 202, 280-281, 285, 288-290, 300, 304, 306,309-310 ~; 178 ~

Long-Term Ecological Research Program, 268,271,283 ~huisiana, 39,40 ~; 156-157,166,215,270, 280,315 ~;

160, 163, 173-174, 182, 192, 194,204,209 ~

Maine, 159, 170, 188, 192,269 ~; 182,206,207 ~Man and the Biosphere Program, 246-247,275,288,289 ~;

see ako Biosphere Reservesmarine mammals, 50,51, 52 ~; 190-191 ~Marine Sanctuaries Program, 194 ~Maryland, 157, 176,269,315 ~]Massachusetts, 225,240,269 ~]; 164,210,259 ~Massachusetts Institute of ‘Ikchnology, 143 ~Mauna Loa Observatory, 71 ~methane, 51,65,72,73 ~Mexico, 215,217-218 ~]; 190 ~]Michigan, 192-193,271,285 ~; 189 ~migration

corridors, 12 ~]; 223-224, 242-244, 286, 287 ~facilitation of, 187,206-208 ~flyways, 183,227,247,253,255 ~forests, 12 ~]; 321-323,332 ~]fragmentation of habitats and, 92-93 ~; 181,242 ~obstacles to, 12, 93,94 ~; 180, 182, 186 ~preserves, 247,250-251 ~]wetlands, 12,47, 93,94,99, 100 ~; 166, 192 ~; 176,

180, 182, 186,206-208 ~Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, 189 ~Minnesota, 33 ~]; 271,280,285,290 ~; 173, 181 ~Mississippi, 270 ~; 164, 173, 174 ~Mississippi Delta, 12,79, 129 ~; 157,215 ~]; 173-175,

182, 183 ~Mississippi River

barge backups, 227-231,288 ~diversions, 260 D]drought effects, 10 ~; 228-231 ~; 175 ~flooding, 7, 10, 15,22 ~; 228-231 ~; 175,204 ~Gulf Outlet, 204 ~international controversy, 230-231 ~navigation on, 228-231 ~

MiSSOUli, 13 ~]; 229,230,271,285 ~Missouri River, 227,229,232 ~]Mitigation and Adaptation Research Strategies (MARS),

118, 132-134, 138 ~models/modeling

crop simulation, 290, 308 ~Extended Streamflow Prediction, 248 ~funding for, 250 ~hydrological, 38,44 ~; 248 D]Integrated Climate Change Assessment Model, 143 ~for water-management decisionmakm“ g, 248 ~]Weather Resources Forecasting System, 248 ~see also general circulation models

Montana, 33 ~; 232,272,285,313 ~; 173, 181,244,277 ~]

municipal sewage treatment, 220-221 ~; 155, 200-201 ~

National Academy of Sciences @JAS), 54, 100,102-104,140,143,149, 252 ~]; 157,166,185-186,281-282 ~

National Acid Precipitation Assessment program (NAPAP),140-142 ~]

Index 1353

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 119, 131,136, 141 ~/11]

ecological studies, 125, 134-135 ~]Global Climate Change Program, 274 ~]Mission to Planet Earth, 122-124 ~~

National Biological Suney, 37,48,53, 149, 150 ~; 199,200,210-211,283-284, 289-290 ~]

National Commission on the Environment, 145 fl/111National Committee on Propexty Insurance, 165 ~]National Estuary Program, 234,280 ~; 193 ~]National Flood Insurance Fund, 169-170 [1]National Flood Insurance Program, 166 ~

claims and payments, 163, 168, 170 ~]coastal high-hazard (V) zones, 168, 169, 171, 196-197 ~community participation, 168-169, 253 V]costs per structure, 170 D]disaster-assistance grants, 168-169, 172, 199 ~erosion zones and management standards, 170-171, 194-

195 ~Federal financial liability, 169, 196 ~flooded-properties-purchase program, 175, 180 ~floodplain-management standards, 168, 179-180 ~]hurricane damages, 163 ~legislation, 41,43 ~; 168, 194,203 ~mandatory participation, 168, 170 ~]mapping and rate structure, 197 ~]premium rates, 21 ~; 169, 194, 197 U]reform options, 21,22,40,41 ~/H]; 154, 194-198, 203 ~risk calculations, 257 ~]sea level rise and, 22 fl~; 197 ~]Section 1362 Flooded Properties Purchase Program,

180 ~Upton-Jones Relocation Assistance, 175, 178, 180-182,

197-198 ~]wetland development and, 193, 206, 208 ~

National Forest Genetic Resources Program, 56 ~]; 337 ~National Forests, 50 ~; 190, 222,223 [1]; 229, 230,231,

309 l-11]National Institutes of Health, 315 ~]National Marine Fisheries Service, 31 (I/II]; 155, 157, 188,

189 ~]National Marine Sanctuaries, 231 ~]National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adrmru“ “stration; 231 ~]

adaptation research, 133, 136-137 ~coastal-hazards-management program, 41 ~~; 178, 186,

194,201,203 ~Estuarine Habitat Program, 208-209 ~]Habitat Restoration Program, 203 ~National Acid Precipitation Assessment Plan, 141 ~]non-point-source-pollution-management program, 201 ~Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management,

188 ~]USGCRP research budget, 131 ~]Water Resources Forecasting System, 248,250,264 ~]wetlands protection, 188, 193, 194 ~]

National Park Service, 30,136 ~]; 188,220,221,223,224,226,228,233,243-245, 251,255,260,275,278, 285,313-315,332,334,344 ~

National Parksacquisition of sites, 266, 267, 286 ~]categories, 228 ~Everglades, 25,28-30 D/II]; 219 D]; 205,209,251 ~1Glacier, 238,249,251 ~Grand Canyon, 238 ~]endangered species, 235 ~land area and sites, 226 ~]legislative framework, 228,234 ~management philosophies and goals, 221, 223, 230,

262-263 ~research needs, 282 ~]Rocky Mountain, 257 ~]value, 232, 238 ~water rights, 222, 223 ~Yellowstone, 100, 132 ~/II]; 220, 227, 238, 251,

261-263 ~Yosemite, 238,251 ~]

National Research Council, 112,136-139,145 w]; 306 ~:181, 185 ~]

natural resourcesagriculture, 275-329 U]coasts, 153-204 ~]forests, 299-351 ~preserves, 219-291 ~water, 209-273 ~]wetlands, 153-213 ~]

National Science and ‘lkchnology Council, 147 ~National Science Foundation, 35, 133, 137, 141, 143, 149

W-m; 315 p]; 193 ~I.mng-Term Ecological Research Program, 271-272 ~]

National Water Coremission, 265 ~National Weather Service, 193 ~]National Wetlands Inventory Program, 125, 129 ~]; 162,

165, 199,200,278 ~]National Wetlands Policy Forurn, 185,200,208 ~National Wetlands Priority Consemation Plan, 190, 191 ~]National Wild and Scenic River System, 229, 230 ~]National Wilderness Presemation System, 221, 224, 228-

230, 243, 267, 278, 279, 285 ~]; see afso wildernessareas

National Wildlife Refuges, 50 ~; 220,227,279 ~]acquisitions, 190, 194, 266, 286 ~Balcones Canyonlands Conservation Plan, 238,247-

248 ~]Browns Park, 250 ~]Cheyenne Bottoms Wildlife Area, 301-302 [1]~S biCS, 250 ~Ding Darling, 257 ~]endange~d and threatened species, 235 ~Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, 243 ~]Kesterson, 294-296 ~; 251 ~land area, 226,240 ~legislative framework, 228 ~]management philosophies and goals, 221, 223, 225, 231,

238-239,260,264 ~]Pelican Island, 228 ~]policy options, 282,286 ~]

354 I Preparing for an Uncertain Climat&Volume 1

Stillwater, 251,252-254 ~water-allocation issues, 252-254 ~]wetlands, 171, 255 ~]

natural areasacquisition policies, 17,21,2,2,36,54 ~]; 222,264-268,

291 ~adaptability, 19,53 ~; 21!0, 258-264,266-268 ~Alaskan, 50 ~buffer zones, 242-243,244,245,246 ~climate change and, 49 ~; 222, 254, 256-258 ~defined, 224-225,227 ~distribution, 227,240,247 ~mdisturbance management challenges, 259-264 ~economic issues, 232, 236 ~IJand endangered species conservation, 235-238, 258 ~]exotic species, 260-261 ~fn management, 261-263 @IJhuman impacts, 248,250-251,263-264 ~institutional fragmentation, 20, 52 ~; 220, 222, 240,

243, 250 ~invento~ing, and monitoring, 22, 23 ~; 268-279,

280-285 ~land acquisition, 189-190 ~]landscape fragmentation, 23!~-240, 241-243 ~legislative framework, 228-2.30 ~management philosophies and goals, 52 ~; 220, 221,

222,223,230-231,244-246 ~]pest control, 260-261 ~protection strategies, 284-289 ~research, 22,23 ~]; 268-2’79, 280-284 ~shifling with climate change, 49 ~; 220 ~]size considerations, 5, 19,23 ~; 225-226, 241 ~]stresses (existing), 49 ~]; :220, 239-253 ~Sustainable Biosphere Initiative, 138 ~; 269 ~water allocation issues, 251, 252-256 ~see a/so national parks; naticml wildlife refuges; wilder-

ness areasme] Nattue Conservancy

Last Great Places Initiative, 246-248,273,283,288 ~National Natural Heritage Program, 230,273 ~wetlands protection, 195 ~]

Nebraska, 271,280,285,298,301 ~; 183 ~Nevada, 12 ~; 215,216,273 ~]; 183 ~New Hampshire, 269 ~New Jersey, 157, 176, 187, 269I ~]

Pine Barrens, 245-246 ~New Mexico, 216,217,246, 272 ~New York, 156, 157, 171, 173, 187,269 ~]

Adirondack Park, 248-249 ~lJnon-point-source pollution, 201, 220 ~]; 199, 200 ~North American Free Trade Agreement, 217 ~North Carolina, 133 ~; 172, 179,187,188,191,193, 195,

270 ~]; 161, 182 ~North Dakota, 33,34,48 ~]; 232,250,272,285,289 ~;

181 ~]Northern Forest Lands Study, 249 ~

Office of Management and Budget, 117, 121, 147 ~Office of Science and ‘Ikchnology Policy (OSTP), 20,38-39,

54, 113, 149 ~; 281-282 ~Ogallala Aquifer, 223,301-302,304 ~]Ohio, 271,285 ~Ohio River, 227-229 ~oil and gas exploration and development, 50,52 ~;

190 mOkefenokee Swamp, 90 ~Oklahoma, 272,285 ~; 183,259 ~Oregon, 159,273 ~; 155,210 ~

Blue Mountain forests, 27 ~; 318-319,329 ~Orovi.lle, Lake, 251 ~ozone layer depletion, 67, 73, 112 ~

Pennsylvania, 270,315 ~; 173 ~]pest control, 14,56,81,86,89 ~; 260-261,279,292,

307 ~]photosynthesis, 87$88,96 ~]; 175 ~policy issues and options

adaptation and mitigation mearchprogram, 147-148 ~agI’iCUkU.d, 4647 ~; 316-328 ~barrier island subsidies, 199-200 ~beach-nourishment and shoreline-protection programs,

202,204 ~]biodiversity protection, 336-342 ~]classiflca.tion criteria for research, 147 ~coastal zone management, 200, 201, 203-204 ~];

206-208 ~commodity support programs, 17, 19, 45, 46 ~;

317-319,326,327communication of risk, 19, 21-22, 25-26 ~consemation incentives, 21 ~; 287-288 ~]contingency plarming, 19,22-23,26-27 ~]cross-ageneycoordination, 48 ~]; 201 ~; 186-187,202,

282,288-289 ~disaster assistance, 47-48 ~]; 198-199, 203, 319-322,

326,327 ~drought management, 43 ~]; 254-256 ~flood insurance, 194-198,203 D]flood management, 256-257111forests, 21,55-56 ~]; 336-349 ~]geographic fragmentation, 19-21, 23 ~]; 186-187,

244-250 ~irrigation subsidies, 322, 326, 327 ~land acquisition, 21,54 ~]; 200 ~; 196-197,207,

291 ~National Biological Survey, 37, 48, 53, 149, 150 ~;

283-284,289-290 ~]protected areas, 21,53-54 ~]; 210,279-291 ~reauthorization cycle, 36-37 ~reseamh and information gaps, 19, 23, 27, 30, 35 ~research augmentation, 19, 20, 53-64 ~]; 144-150 ~;

210-211,213,281,290-291 ~science interface with, 117-119 ~statutory language, 37-39 ~U.S. Global Change Research Act amendments, 150 ~]water-demand management, 242-243 ~

Index 1355

water-marketing, 243-244 ~water-quality management, 48 ~11water-supply management, 249-250, 262 ~]wetlands protection, 21, 47-49 ~]; 200, 202 ~];

195-213 ~

poph.r Island, 157 ~]population growth

agricultural demand and, 282, 284 ~coastal areas, 5, 13, 31, 39 [~1water supplies and, 212, 214-215, 218 ~

Potomac River Basin, 245 ~]prairie potholes, 9, 12,26,33-34,47,48 ~; 160-161,181,

183-184, 186, 190,202 ~precipitation

distribution and forms, 79,98 w]predicted changes, 9,65,69,75-76,98 ~soil moisture and, 10, 77 w]temperature increases and, 10, 68 ~water resources and, 13 o~wetlands and, 19 ~; 175 ~]

presemes, see natural areasPresidential Initiatives, 113 ~1]public education

coastal hazards, 41 D/II]; 203-204 ~drought mitigation, 255 D]risk communication through, 26, 41 w]water conservation, 240, 302 ~

public landsacquisition policies, 17, 21,22,36 w]; 264-268 ~]administration of, 50 ~]; 226, 231 ~]for nature conservation, see natural areaswater rights, 222, 223 [1]

Puerto Rico, 189 [1]; 209 [II]Puget Sound, 159 [~; 175, 182 [II]

recreation, 6, 25 ~I]; 211-212, 228, 231, 232, 248 ~;162-164, 168, 183, 184, 202,232,239,328-330 ~

remote sensing, 123-132 [I/II]; see ako satellitesresearch

adaptation, 30, 111, 132-139, 147-148 u/TI]agricultural, 16-17, 22, 26, 46 C/II]; 279, 297, 299, 305,

308-310,317,323-324, 326 ~appropriations process, 35-36 fl/11]cross-agency coordination, 20, 22, 54, 131-132 ~/TI’j;

282-283 ~]ecosystem-scale, 35, 53-54, 111 ~/lI]; 290 ~integration of information systems, 270-274 ~]new developments, 115-117 w]policy options, 20, 53-64 ~/II]; 144-150 ~; 281,

290-291 ~in protected areas, 239 ~; 282 ~]satellite vs. nonsatellite measurements, 122-131 ~~wetlands, 23, 4849 ~/H]; 193-195, 210-211, 213 @l

see also U.S. Global Change Research ProgramResearch Natural Areas, 229,231, 272-273 ~]

reservoirs and reservoir systems, 7, 32, 43 ~]; 210, 227,232,244-246,251,257-259, 263-264,294-296,313 m

Resource Conservation and Development Program, 279 ~Rhode Island, 269 ~Rio Grande Basin, 13 ~]; 215,217-218, 249-250,298,

309 ~river basin management, 20 ~; 210,224-225,244,249 ~rivers, flood-control measures, 10, 12 ~IUIIOff, 69-70, 77, 86 ~; 212-213, 217 ~

Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, 159, 239,295 ~Sacramento-San Joaquin River System, 26,31-32 ~];

216 ~San Francisco Bay, 32 ~]; 159 ~]; 155-156, 175, 182 ~San Joaquin River, 294-296 ~satellites

Earth Observing System, 122-124, 127, 139, 140 ~Landsat, 126-127, 129, 130, 131, 132 ~]limitations of, 130-131 w]passive sensors, 126 n/111temperature measurement, 67 ~

sea level risecause, 68-69, 78-79 ~coastal effects, 8-9, 13,39, 79,93,94 w]; 155-157, 159,

213 ~f100d iIISUEUICe and, 197 ~historic, 78 ~]Louisiana, 173-174 ~]Poplar Island erosion, 157 w]predicted changes, 32,65,74,78-79 1111]saltwater intrusion, 13, 55 ~]; 213 ~]; 182 ~]setback legislation and, 187 U]storm surges and, 8-9 ~]; 155, 162-163,213 ~; 173 ~]wetlands and, 9, 12, 19, 29, 47 ~]; 192 ~]; 176 ~

seed banks, 23, 55-56 ~1(11Small Business Mn_unIs“ “ tration, 163, 173 ~]Small Watershed Program, 233 ~soil moisture

agriculture and, 10, 11, 34 ~; 303, 308 u]precipitation patterns and, 10,77,86 ~predicted changes, 11,69,77-78,99, 101 ~remote sensing, 127, 129, 131 ~]

soilscarbon emissions, 51, 98 ~]; 185 ~conservation, 233, 254, 279 m]erosion control, 284 ~]; 164 ~nutrient cycling, 88,96, 98-99 ~]; 175 ~]percolation rates, 77 D/II]salinization, 259, 284, 296, 297 ~vegetation changes and, 98-99 m]

Sou~ Carolina, 1;5, 157, 175, 177-179, 188-191, 193,270 ~

South Dakota, 272,285,289 ~]; 181 [II]South Florida Water Management District, 29 m]South Platte River, 293 ~species

adarXation to climate chamze. 49 ~/Hl; 179-181 ~


extinctions, 5, 17-18 ~; 224, 241-242 ~nonnative (exotic) and nuisance, 29,89,90,92 ~; 169,

223,260-261,288 ~]reproductive failure, 91, 94 @@]vulnerable, 259 ~]see also endangered and threatened species

StatesComprehensive Outdoor Recreation Plans, 190, 192 ~contingency plans for extreme events, 27 ~protected areas, 230 ~]wetlands protection, 195 ~]

statutes, see legislationsubsidies

a~cuhu.ral, 17, 19 ~/II]; 192, 297, 310, 312-313, 318,320 ~

coastal development, 17 Wl; 176, 177111forestxy, 56-57 ~~; 342,346-349 ~irrigation, 17, 26 ~; 240, 310, 313 ~]risk communication through reforms} 21 ~/11], 26

Superior, Lake, 230 ~]surface water

integrated management with groundwater, 210,246-247 ~]

prior appropriation doctrine, :222 ~]nparian doctrine, 222 ~]

Sustainable Biosphere Initiative, 268,268 ~

“takings” issue, 177-178, 191 II]; 159, 200 ~]taxes

casualty-loss deductions, 176, 186, 200 ~coastal development subsidies, 40 ~; 168, 176, 186,

200 ~losses due to hurricanes, 190 ~reforms, 40 ~; 242-243 ~,policy options, 21-22 ~]; 200,322 ~]risk communication through reforms, 21-22 ~]water-conservation incentives, 242 ~]wetlands conservation incentives, 190, 191, 194, 200,

212 ~]temperature

changes in, 1, 2, 10, 14, 65, 66, 68, 73, 75, 76, 91 ~]crop yields and, 288 ~]global long-term record, 67,80 ~plant productivity and survival and, 80-81 11~role of, 80-81, 86 ~]water, 81 fl/II]; 215, 217 ~

Tennessee, 126 [I/II]; 258, 227-;!31, 271 [1]Temessee Valley Authority, 133, 141 ~; 234, 254, 257,

258 [1]Terrestrial Ecosystems Regional Research and Analysis

Laboratory, 274 ~lkrrestrial Research Interest Grcup, 138-139 ~; 273-274

mTexas, 272,309 D], 209 ~}

agriculture, 240, 280, 285, 301 ~building codes, 179 (I]coastal hazards, 40 ~/H]; 156, 157, 179 ~]; 173 ~]coastal management program, 186, 194 U]

flooding, 157, 170 ~High Plains, 223,240 ~]hurricanes, 159, 163, 193 ~preserve, 248 ~sea level rise, 156, 157 ~]water issues, 13 ~; 215, 217, 222, 223, 240, 246, 301,

302 ~wetlands, 160, 182, 183 ~]

Tijuana River, 175, 182 ~timberland

farmer-owned, 308-309 ~hurricane damage, 189-190 ~]National Forest lands, 309,311ownership and management, 304-305, 308-309, 311,

315 ~private timber industry lands, 305,308 ~public lands, 311,315 ~]revenues for conservation, 202 ~]

tourism, 6, 50,52 ~]; 189 ~; 239 ~transportation, 14, 15 ~; 228-231,288 ~]; see aZso inland

watexwaystreaties, see conventions and treatiesTxuckee River Basin, 248,252 ~]tundra, 185 ~

adaptation to climate change, 185 ~]arctic, 178, 179, 181, 185 ~carbon releases, 51 ~]; 185 ~]C02 fertilization effect, 87 ~]indigenous people, 185 ~permafrost, 13,51 ~/IIl; 161, 175, 176, 185 ~vegetation changes, 51 ~]wetlands, 13, 47 ~/II]; 161, 175, 176, 179, 181, 185 ~

United NationsConference on Environment and Development, 2,

109 ~Educational, ScientKlc , and Cultural Organization,

246 ~]Environment Program, 71, 103 ~

U.S. Army Corps of EngineersDredged Materials Program, 204-205 ~drought-management assessment, 252, 254 ~flood control, 254 ~inland water projects, 175,229 ~]Institute for Water Resources Municipal and Industrial

Needs, 242 ~]Kissirnmee River restoration, 29-30 ~policy options for improvements in, 249-250 ~reservoir management, 43 ~]; 232,246,257,263-264 ~responsibilities, 233 ~shoreline protection and beach nourishment, 41-42 ~];

159, 173-175,202,204 ~]water demand-management evaluation program, 248 ~wetlands protection, 48 ~; 178, 202 V]; 155, 157, 158,

164, 174, 188, 189, 192-194, 199,203-206,210,212 pl]

U.S. Department of Agriculture, 141 ~agriculture regions, 278, 280, 281 ~

Index 1357

Agricultural Stabilization and Consemition Service, 311~]; 188, 191 ~

Alternative Agricultural Research and CommercializationCenter, 309111

assistance programs, 279 ~Commodity Ctedit Corporation,311, 314 ~drought-watch system, 256 [TJEconomic Research Service, 316 [1]Farmers Home Ad.num“ “stration, 173, 176, 279, 313 ~;

192, 201,203, 212 ~]National Resource Inventory, 193 ~]research and extension, 16-17, 22, 26, 35, 46, 133, 135

fl~l; 279,297,308,310,315-316, 323-325 ~resource assessment and program evaluation, 325-326 u]Soil Conservation Semice, 233,254, 157,279,302, 310,

316, 322, 324, 326 0]; 157, 188, 190, 193 ~Water Bank Program, 190 ~]water-related responsibilities, 190, 233 ~wetlands protection, 48 ~/H]; 157,171, 184, 188, 190, 191,

203, 212 ~see also U.S. Forest Service

U.S. Department of Commerce, 141 D/II]; 233 ~; 163 ~]U.S. Department of Defense, 133 ~]; 188 ~]U.S. Departxnent of Energy, 131, 133, 136, 141, 143 fl/II];

233,315 ~]U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 136, 141

11/11]U.S. Department of Housirtg and Urban Development, 133

ll~l; 176 KlU.S. Department of Interior

adaptation research, 133, 135 ~coastal barrier mapping, 186 ~conservation incentive programs, 287 ~ecosystems research, 274, 281 [~Everglades policy, 30 ~/H]global change research budget, 119-120 ~]interagency activities, 141 fl/II]; 245 w]land acquisition, 266 ~land-management agencies, 224,225,228,240-241 ~monitoring initiatives, 270, 274 ~]National Biological Survey, 37, 48, 53, 149-150 ~/IIJ;

199,200,268,278,283 [11]public lands, 35, 131-132 ~/11]water-marketing role, 44 ~]; 243, 264 ~]water-related responsibilities, 233-234 [1]see also National Park Service; U.S. Fish and Wildlife

ServiceU.S. Department of State, 141 ~U.S. Department of Transportation, 173, 176 ~U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 168, 176 ~]; 200 ~]U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 220,226,231 ~]

Endangered Species Program, 235-238 ~]f~hing limits, 31 ~/11]Gap Analysis Project, 129 ~; 193, 199, 208,

270-271 ~land acquisition, 200 U]; 190 ~1]lands administered by, 225,228, 244 ~]management philosophy, 221, 238-239 ~]

National Wetlands Inventory Program, 125, 129 l?/IIj;162, 192, 193, 199,200 ~

National Wetlands Research Center, 193,210 ~]North American Waterfowl Management Plan, 202,

208 ~]responsibilities, 234 ~“take” permits, 237 ~wetlands protection, 48 ~; 155,157,164,165,170, 179,

188-190, 192, 193, 199,212 ~]water rights, 244 D]

U.S. Forest Service, 56, 125 ~; 188, 222,225-227, 229,231,240,242,244,249-251, 261,263,266,270,274,279,289,309,312,313, 325,326,332,334,336, 338,340,343-345,347,349 m

U.S. Geological Survey, 136, 137 ~]; 166, 234,248,250u]; 193,199 m]

U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP)adaptation and mitigation research, 23, 110, 112, 116,

138-139, 147-148 ~]appropriations, 121-122 ~]Assessment program, 23, 111, 115-117 ~balance among participating agencies, 110, 131-132 ~broadening, 145-148 ~]budget, 23, 35, 112, 116, 119-132, 139, 143, 148 ~;

281 ~]Climate and Hydrologic Systems and Biogeochernical

Dynamics research, 120 ~Earth Process Research, 120, 136 [I/IIIEcological Systems and Dynamics research, 23, 53-54,

111,120,134-136,139, 148-150 ~]; 269,275,281,290-291 ~

Economics Initiative, 136 w]Human Interactions research, 120, 134, 136, 139 ~integrated assessments, 111, 112, 140-143, 146, 150 [T/lTJmission and priorities, 3, 4-5, 30, 49, 110-112, 114, 116,

118-133, 136-138, 139 ~Integrated Modeling and Prediction, 115, 120 ~oversight, 143-144, 150 ~policy options, 143-150 ~]; 281 ~]structure, 110, 112-115, 117 ~

Utah, 272 U]; 183 m]

Vermont, 269 ~Virgin Islands, 189 ~Virginia, 163, 198, 270,313 ~

Washington, 159,227,273,285 ~]water allocation

agricultural demand and, 288-289, 292-294, 296, 313 ~conservation practices and, 240-244 ~demand management and reallocation, 4243, 44 ~;

210,235-244,264 ~“dry-year” option contracts, 293 ~institutional problems, 18 ~]; 224-225 ~marketing and transfer arrangements, 32, 42, 4344, 45

~]; 210,235-239,243-244, 264,313,322 ~pricing reform, 21,42 ~; 210,218, 235,239-240,

243 ~


prior appropriation doctrine, 179, 251 ~Sacramento-San Joaquin River System, 31,32 ~transfers, 18 ~; 225, 250, Z!92-293, 322 ~

Water Bank Program, 279 ~water conservation, 210, 240-244 ~]

demand management and, 42 l~; 210,240-243,264 ~and drought management, 254. ~economic incentives and disincentives, 240-243, 263 ~in Federal facilities, 44 fl/II]; 242 ~]interruptible water service programs, 247 ~metering and use restrictions, 301-302 ~municipal programs, 241, 242 ~policy options, 242-244 ~]pricing reforms and, 239-240,243 ~public education and, 240-241,302 ~]reclamation and recycling, 4344 ~]; 210, 218, 243,

260-262,264,322 ~seasonal storage programs, 247 ~][supply management, 244-250 ~tax reforms and, 242-243, 322 ~technologies, 242-243,289,301 U]wetlands protection and, 184 [~

water qualityagriculture and, 29, 32 ~; 217, 219, 278-279, 284,

294-296 ~]drought and, 215 ~Federal programs, 279 ~f~h populations and, 215, 219 ~incentive programs, 318 ~]legislation, 29 ~; 219,220-221, 278-279p]non-point-source pollution, 215, 220 ~Rio Grande and, 217-218thermal pollution, 81 ~; 215,217,227 ~]

Water Quality Incentives Program, 278-279 ~water resource system stress

population, 214,216 U]water quality, 215-219 ~, 28-29 ~environmental needs and, 219 ~]reserved water rights, 221-222groundwater overdraft, 223-224outmoded institutions, 224-22!$ ~, 18 ~aging water tiastructure, 225climate change and, 210,212-213 ~, 15 ~, 75-78 ~

Water Resources Council, 249 ~j; 196 ~water rights, 18 ~]; 212, 221-2’23, 225,240,243-245,302

~]; 178,179,251,255 ~water supply augmentation, 257-:262 ~

reservoirs, 257-259desalination, 259-260intemgional diversions, 260wastewater reclamation, 260-262

water supply managementcoordination, 21,23-25,36,42 ~], 210,244-245,263 ~reservoir system management, 245-246 ~conjunctive use, 246 U]analytical tools and forecast systems, 247-248,250,264 ~]river basin commissions, 249 [~water resources council, 289 ~]

water project reassessment, 249-250 ~groundwater management, 250,301 ~]extreme events management, 250-257,262-263 ~floods, 253-254,256-257,262-263 ~CkOU@tS, 27,42,251-252,254-256, 262-263 ~

Wt@fOW1, 13, 29, 33,34, 126 ~; 235-238, 294, 301-302~; 155,162,164, 183-186, 194,218,221,228 ~

watershed management, 25,36 ~; 220,225,244-245,249,250 ~; 209-210 ~

West (U.S.), see arid WestWest Virginia, 190,271 ~Western Governor’s Association, 243,252 ~]Western Water Policy Review, 44 ~; 212,264-265 ~wetlands

adaptation to climate change, 12, 15, 111 ~];172-185 ~

agriculture, 26, 28, 47 ~; 276, 278, 294 ~; 170-171,192-193, 199,200 ~

alpine, 181 ~biodiversity, 167, 172, 178, 180, 182-183, 186 ~buffer zones, 192,200 ~]; 207 ~coastal, 9,12,15,47 ~; 159,190 ~; 160,169-170,179,

181-183, 186, 194 ~]conservation, 278 ~; 159, 192-193 ~]coordination of protective efforts, 48 ~]; 191-192,

212-213 ~deftition for regulatory purposes, 157-158, 165 ~distribution, 50 ~; 160-161,168, 170 ~economic issues, 154-155, 162-164, 166, 178, 183 ~extreme events and, 172, 175, 176, 183-184 ~Federal programs and legislation, 4748 ~; 154-159,

187-208,211-212,278 ~fberies, 81, % ~]; 163-1 (M, 174, 179, 181, 183,

185 ~]flood management and, 22,47 ~; 162, 166, 167, 174,

181-183, 186 ~forested, 129, 161 ~], 176, 183 ~]thgrnentation, 25 ~, 171-172, 176, 181, 186 @IJIkshwater nontidal, 160, 168 ~groundwater declines and, 301-302 ~importance, 47 ~; 162-166, 168,183, 188 ~interagency taak force, 198 ~inventory, 125, 129 ~]; 162, 199, 200 ~land acquisition, 189-190, 194, 198-199,207-209 ~]10ss, 19,47 ~]; 170, 179, 180-181, 184 ~management, 17 ~; 178 ~; 186-187, 208-210 ~mangroves, 160, 175 ~migration, 12,47,93,94,99, 100 ~; 192 ~]; 176, 180,

181, 182, 186, 187,206-208 ~mitigation and restoration, 12,48 ~]; 221 ~]; 154-155,

174, 188, 190-191, 194,201-206,250 ~monitoring, 23,47,48, 129, 131 ~; 186, 187, 193-194,

199-200,202,208-210, 213 ~“no-net-loss” policy, 5,47 ~; 185-186, 192, 195, 198,

209 mpolicy challenges and options, 47-48 ~]; 200,201 ~;

185-186, 195-213 ~]

e U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:l 993-301-804/96971

Index 1359

prairie potholes, 9, 12, 26, 33-34,47, 48 ~/II]; 160-161,181, 183-184, 186, 190, 202,208,278 ~]

priorities, 21,47 ~/H]; 157-158,206-209 ~protection, 48 fl/II]; 200-202 ~; 165, 178-179, 184,

195-201 ~1]research, 23,48-49, 111 ~/H]; 193-195,210-211, 213 ~]Iiparia, 13, 47, 125 ~/IIl; 167, 176, 178-179, 181,

184-186, 201, 202,206 ~salt marshes, 87 11/II]; 160, 167, 175 ~]saltwater intrusion, 176, 182 ~sea level rise and, 9, 12, 19, 47 ~/II]; 173-174, 182,

186 [n]species adaptation to climate change, 179-181 ~]State, local and private programs, 195 ~]tidal freshwater marshes, 160, 175, 182, 188 ~tundra, 13,47, 87 ~/Kj; 161, 175, 176, 179, 181, 185 ~]typeS, 160-161 ~

vegetation, 93, 94 ~; 160-161 ~]vulnerable areas, 12, 13,47 w]; 181-185 ~]

Wetlands Reserve program, 48 ~; 233,278,318 ~]; 190,191, 194,202,212,268,287 ~

White House Office of Environmental Policy, 196,212 ~wilderness areas, 50 ~]; 221,225-227,235,239, 243,246,

251,256,261,263,267, 278,279,282,286 ~]wildlife

adaptation, 92 ~habitat fragmentation, 86 ~management, 192 ~]migration ability, 92-93 ~trapping, 165 ~

Wisconsin, 271,285 ~]wise use movement, 178 ~World Meteorological Organization, 71, 103 ~/TIlWyoming, 272 ~; 244 ~]

OTA-O-567 NTIS order #PB94-134640 GPO stock #052-003 …Preparing for an Uncertain Climate—Vol. I...

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Transcript of OTA-O-567 NTIS order #PB94-134640 GPO stock #052-003 …Preparing for an Uncertain Climate—Vol. I...