G.R. No. 116751 August 28, 1998ORIENTAL TIN CAN LABOR UNION, petitioner, vs.SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ORIENTAL TIN CAN WORKERS UNION — FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS [OTCWU-FFW] and ORIENTAL TIN CAN AND METAL SHEET MANUFACTURING, respondents.G.R. No. 116779 August 28, 1998ORIENTAL TIN CAN AND METAL SHEET MANUFACTURING CO., INC., petitioner, vs.HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ORIENTAL TIN CAN WORKERS UNION — FFW and ORIENTAL TIN CAN LABOR UNION, respondents. ROMERO, J.:

Respondent (in G.R. No. 116751) and petitioner (in sister case G.R. No. 116779), Oriental Tin Can and Metal Sheet Manufacturing Company, Inc. (the company) is engaged in the manufacture of tin can containers and metal sheets. On March 3, 1994, it entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with petitioner Oriental Tin Can Labor Union (OTCLU) as the existing CBA was due to expire on April 15, 1994. Four days later, 248 of the company's rank-and-file employees authorized the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) to file a petition for certification election. 1 On March 10, 1994, however, this petition was repudiated via a written waiver 2 by 115 of the signatories who, along with other employees totalling 897, ratified the CBA on the same date.On March 18, 1994, armed with Charter Certificate No. IV-MEE-089, respondent Oriental Tin Can Workers Union — Federation of Free Workers (OTCWU-FFW) filed a petition for certification election with the National Capital Region office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), pursuant to Article 256 of the Labor Code. Purporting to represent the regular rank-and-file employees of the company, the petition was accompanied by the "authentic signatures" of 25% of the employees/workers in the bargaining unit.The OTCLU filed a manifestation and motion on April 15, 1994, praying for the dismissal of the petition for certification election on the ground that it was not endorsed by at least 25% of the employees of the bargaining unit. Some of the employees who initially signed the petition had allegedly withdrawn in writing such support prior to the filing of the same.The OTCWU-FFW filed a reply to said manifestation and motion, claiming that the retraction of support for the petition was "not verified under oath" and, therefore, had no legal and binding effect. It further asserted that the petition had the required support of more than 25% of all the employees in the bargaining unit.For its part, the company filed a comment alleging inter alia that the new CBA was ratified by 897 out of the 1,020 rank-and-file employees within the bargaining unit. The OTCLU then filed a motion to dismiss and/or position paper reiterating its position that the petition did not comply with the 25% signature requirement and maintaining that the new CBA was a bar to a certification election.To said comment and motion to dismiss, the OTCWU-FFW filed a consolidated reply, alleging that "an employer has no legal personality to oppose a petition for certification election; that there are only 882 rank and file workers in the bargaining unit and not 1,020 which included supervisors and workers hired after the filing of the petition; that those who gave their support to the filing of the petition did not withdraw or retract the same before or after the petition was filed; the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between respondent company and Forced Intervenor (OTCLU) is a sweetheart contract and concluded within the freedom period; and that additional employees gave their support to the petition after the same was filed." 3

The company filed a rejoinder to said consolidated reply, asserting its objection to the petition for certification election because the case at bar "involves a collective bargaining agreement which was ratified by 897 employees including the 245 workers who had earlier given their consent to the filing of the petition; that the benefits provided for therein are being enjoyed by the workers themselves; that a certification election would impair the said contract; that the officers of (OTCWU-FFW) were among those who ratified the CBA; and (OTCWU-FFW) failed to name the supervisors and workers hired after the filing of the petition that were allegedly included in the list of rank and file employees." 4

In the meantime, on April 18, 1994, the DOLE issued a certificate of registration of the CBA pursuant to Article 231 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715. It showed that the CBA between the company and the OTCLU would have the force and effect of law between the parties that had complied with the requirements and standards for registration thereof.On June 1, 1994, the officers of the OTCWU-FFW walked out of their jobs, prompting the company to require them to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for walking out en masse. The following day, said union filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) grounded on the alleged dismissal of union members/officers. Two days later, the company directed said officers to report back to work within 48 hours, but none of them did.In an order dated June 7, 1994, Med-Arbiter Renato D. Paruñgo dismissed the petition for certification election for lack of merit. Noting that the petition was filed after the valid retractions were made, he concluded that by the withdrawal of support to the petition by 115 workers, the remaining 133 of the 1,020 employees were clearly less than the 25% subscription requirement. Thus, he opined:There is merit to the Company's contention that by subsequently ratifying the CBA, the employees in effect withdrew their previous support to the petition. Thus, when the petition was filed on March 18, 1994, it did not have the required consent of the employees within the bargaining unit. Another factor which militates against the petition is the fact that actually there are 1,020 rank and file workers in the bargaining unit. Twenty-five percent (25%) of this is 255, but admittedly only 248 union members had originally authorized the filing of the petition. The law expressly requires that a petition for certification election should be supported by the written consent of at least 25% of all the employees in the bargaining unit at the time of the filing thereof.In view of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we are constrained to order the dismissal of the instant petition. Furthermore, it would be in the interest of industrial peace to deny the holding of a certification election among the rank and file workers of respondent Company during the effectivity of the new CBA it appearing that out of 1,020 rank and file employees, 897 have ratified the same and the benefits of which are currently being enjoyed by all covered employees of respondent Company. 5

The OTCWU-FFW appealed this ruling to the Labor Secretary. On June 18, 1994, however, during the pendency of the appeal, said union staged a strike that prevented the free ingress and egress of non-striking employees, delivery trucks and other vehicles to and from the company's premises. Upon complaint of the company, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) issued a writ of preliminary injunction on July 19, 1994, on the ground that the strike caused the company to incur daily losses amounting to P3.6 million.Meanwhile, on July 15, 1994, Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, acting on the appeal of the OTCWU-FFW, issued a resolution 6 holding that:An examination of the records of this case shows that the subject CBA was concluded during the 60-day freedom period of the old CBA which expired on 15 April 1994, and registered with the Regional Office of this Department on 18 April 1994 while the petition for certification

election was filed on 18 March 1994. It is therefore, crystal clear that, the present petition was filed during the freedom period and no registered CBA in the respondent establishment could be invoked (to) pose as a bar to the holding of a certification election. In other words, when the said CBA was registered there was a pending representation case. Consequently, said CBA cannot bar the election being prayed for. This is the rule contained in Section 4, Rule V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, which provides that:Sec. 4. Effects of early agreements. — The representation case shall not, however, be adversely affected by a collective bargaining agreement registered before or during the last sixty (60) days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case. (Emphasis supplied)

On the issue of whether the 25% support requirement for filing the petition for certification election had been met, Undersecretary Laguesma opined thus:The rule being followed in case of alleged retractions and withdrawals, as appellant correctly pointed out, is that the best forum for determining whether there was (sic) indeed retractions is the certification election itself wherein the workers can freely express their choice in a secret ballot. (Atlas Free Workers Union vs. Noriel, et al., 104 SCRA 565) The argument of (OTCLU) that since the withdrawal was made prior to the filing of the petition it should be presumed voluntary and therefore, has adversely affected the petition, lacks merit. The Supreme Court ruling cited in support of the argument (i.e. La Suede Cigar and Cigarette Factory, et al. vs. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, et al., 123 SCRA 679) is not squarely applicable in the present case. For while in the said case it was undisputably (sic) shown that 31 members have withdrawn their support to the petition, in the present case, the employees who supposedly withdrew from the union executed joint statements (Sama-samang Pahayag) declaring that the "WAIVER" document they signed has no force and effect considering that it was the product of duress, force and intimidation employed by the company after it learned of the petition for certification election, and reiterating their wish to be given the opportunity to choose the union of their choice. Said statements raised doubts on the voluntariness of the retractions, destroyed the presumption that retractions made before the filing of the petition are deemed voluntary and consequently brought the present case outside the mantle of the Atlas ruling

He added that even if there were 1,020 rank-and-file employees in the bargaining unit, the signatures gathered sufficed to meet the 25% support requirement because the Sama-samang Pahayag invalidating the previous "Waiver," contained 359 signatures which, when added to the 165 signatures submitted by the OTCWU-FFW on May 27, 1994, brought the total to 524, much more than the required 25% of the alleged 1,020 rank-and-file employees. Moreover, in case of doubt, the DOLE tends to favor the conduct of certification election, for the rule on simultaneous submission of the consent signatures and the petition should be liberally interpreted. As such, "contracts where the identity of the authorized representative of the workers is in doubt must be rejected in favor of a more certain indication of the will of the workers. Any stability that does not establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by the law must be subordinated to the employees' freedom to choose their real representative." Accordingly, Undersecretary Laguesma disposed of the appeal as follows:WHEREFORE, the appeal of the petitioner is hereby granted and the Order of the Med-Arbiter is hereby set aside. In lieu thereof, a new order is hereby issued directing the conduct of a certification election among the regular rank and file employees of the Oriental Tin Can and Metal Sheet Manufacturing, with the following as choices:1. Oriental Tin Can Workers Union — Federation of Free Workers (OTCWU-FFW);2. Oriental Tin Can Labor Union (OTCLU);3. No Union.Let therefore, the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Regional Office of origin for

the immediate conduct of certification election, subject to the usual pre-election conference. The payrolls three (3) months before the filing of the petition shall be the basis of the list of eligible voters.SO RESOLVED.

Herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution, but this was denied for lack of merit in the resolution dated August 22, 1994. From this resolution, the company and the OTCLU filed separate petitions for certiorari before this Court.G. R. No. 116779In assailing the resolution of July 15, 1994, the company raises in issue the following grounds to show that the Labor Secretary, through Undersecretary Laguesma, gravely abused his discretion in: (a) ordering the conduct of a certification election even though the employees who signed the petition therefor had withdrawn their support by ratifying the CBA and even though no certification election could be conducted without the written consent of at least 25% of all the employees in the bargaining unit, and (b) ruling, in effect, "that the provision of Article 256 of the Labor Code takes precedence over that of Article 253 of the same Code."The company concedes that, as an employer, it should "remain a bystander in the entire process of selection by the employees of their bargaining representative, since the exercise is indisputably an all-employee affair." Nonetheless, it justifies its "right to question the filing of the petition for certification election" by the situation "where, the small number of employees, the very ones who had earlier supported the petition for certification election, subsequently changed their mind, and ratified the CBA and thereafter reaped from its bounty." 7 Thus, in its desire to maintain industrial peace, the company deemed it necessary to challenge the propriety of holding a certification election.This argument is misleading.It is a well-established rule that certification elections are exclusively the concern of employees; hence, the employer lacks the legal personality to challenge the same. 8 In Golden Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 9 the Court declared:. . . Law and policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of management. A labor bargaining representative, to be effective, must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other.

The only instance when an employer may concern itself with employee representation activities is when it has to file the petition for certification election because there is no existing CBA in the unit and it was requested to bargain collectively, pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor code. 10 After filing the petition, the role of the employer ceases and it becomes a mere bystander. 11 The company's interference in the certification election below by actively opposing the same is manifestly uncalled-for and unduly creates a suspicion that it intends to establish a company union. 12 On this score, it is clear that the perceived grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Secretary is non-existent and G.R. No. 116779 should, consequently, be dismissed. This case will now proceed and decided on the merits of the issues raised in G.R. No. 116751.G.R. No. 116751

The OTCLU contends that the Labor Secretary acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion: (a) in "imposing upon the employees the manner of choosing their collective bargaining representative by ordering a certification election notwithstanding the fact that the overwhelming majority of the employees have already decided to retain the petitioner (OCTLU) as their collective bargaining representative," and (b) in giving due course to the petition for certification election even though it lacked the required support of 25% of the employees.

(a) The OTCLU maintains that the Labor Secretary improperly prescribed the mode of picking a collective bargaining agent upon the employees who effectively repudiated the "notion" of a certification election by ratifying the CBA entered into during the freedom periodThis contention is without merit as it runs counter to the policy of the State on the matter.Undersecretary Laguesma, by authority of the Secretary of the DOLE, was exercising the function of the Department to "(e)nforce social and labor legislation to protect the working class and regulate the relations between the worker and his employee" 13 when he issued the resolution being assailed in the instant petition. As will be shown shortly, he was merely applying the law applicable to the appeal raised before his office.The Labor Code imposes upon the employer and the representative of the employees the duty to bargain collectively. 14 Since the question of right of representation as between competing labor organizations in a bargaining unit is imbued with public interest, 15 the law governs the choice of a collective bargaining representative which shall be the duly certified agent of the employees concerned. An official certification becomes necessary where the bargaining agent fails to present adequate and reasonable proof of its majority authorization and where the employer demands it, or when the employer honestly doubts the majority representation of several contending bargaining groups. 16 In fact, Article 255 of the Labor Code allows the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit to designate or select the labor organization which shall be their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective bargaining.The designation or selection of the bargaining representative without, however, going through the process set out by law for the conduct of a certification election applies only when representation is not in issue. There is no problem if a union is unanimously chosen by a majority of the employees as their bargaining representative, but a question of representation arising from the presence of more than one union in a bargaining unit aspiring to be the employees' representative, can only be resolved by holding a certification election under the supervision of the proper government authority. Thus:It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections, for it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. We have held that whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular union represents the majority of the rank-and-file employees, in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of a certification election is the most democratic method of determining the employees' choice of their bargaining representative. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the employees themselves. Indeed, it is the keystone of industrial democracy. 17

Given these premises, the filing of a petition for certification election by one of the two unions in the bargaining unit is enough basis for the DOLE, through its authorized official, to implement the law by directing the conduct of a certification election.Art. 253-A of the Labor Code explicitly provides that the aspect of a union's representation of the rank-and-file employees contained in the CBA shall be for a term of five (5) years and that "(n)o petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement." Accordingly, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides that "(i)f a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement."It is uncontroverted that the petition for certification election in this case was filed on March 18, 1994, twenty-eight days before the expiration of the existing CBA on April 15, 1994, and well within the 60-day period provided for by the Code. The OTCLU, however, is concerned

with the effect of the employees' ratification of the new CBA on the timely filing of the petition for certification election. Would such ratification nullify the petition?The law dictates a negative reply. The filing of a petition for certification election during the 60-day freedom period gives rise to a representation case that must be resolved even though a new CBA has been entered into within that period. This is clearly provided for in the aforequoted Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The reason behind this rule is obvious. A petition for certification election is not necessary where the employees are one in their choice of a representative in the bargaining process. Moreover, said provision of the Omnibus Rules manifests the intent of the legislative authority to allow, if not encourage, the contending unions in a bargaining unit to hold a certification election during the freedom period. Hence, the Court held in the case of Warren Manufacturing Workers Union (WMWU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 18 that the agreement prematurely signed by the union and the company during the freedom period does not affect the petition for certification election filed by another union.(b) As regards the 25% support requirement, we concur with public respondent's finding that said requisite has been met in this case. With regard to the finding that the "waiver" document executed by the employees "was the product of duress, force and intimidation employed by the company after it learned of the petition for certification election," 19 the following pronouncement of the Court is relevant:. . . Even doubts as to the required 30% being met warrant (the) holding of the certification election. In fact, once the required percentage requirement has been reached, the employees' withdrawal from union membership taking place after the filing of the petition for certification election will not affect the petition. On the contrary, the presumption arises that the withdrawal was not free but was procured through duress, coercion or for a valuable consideration. Hence, the subsequent disaffiliation of the six (6) employees from the union will not be counted against or deducted from the previous number who had signed up for certification . . . 20 (Citations omitted)

The support requirement is a mere technicality which should be employed in determining the true will of the workers 21 instead of frustrating the same. Thus, in Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) v. Laguesma, 22 this Court declared that:In line with this policy (that the holding of a certification election is a certain and definitive mode of arriving at the choice of the employees' bargaining representative), we feel that the administrative rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing of the petition for certification election should not be strictly applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate representative of the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at best be given only a directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a certification election, subject to the submission of the consent signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.

All doubts as to the number of employees actually supporting the holding of a certification election should, therefore, be resolved by going through such procedure. It is judicially settled that a certification election is the most effective and expeditious means of determining which labor organizations can truly represent the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of the company. 23 If the OTCLU wanted to be retained as the rank-and-file employees' bargaining representative, it should have sought their vote, not engaged in legal sophistry. The selection by the majority of the employees of the union which would best represent them in the CBA negotiations should be achieved through the democratic process of an election. 24

The fear expressed by the OTCLU that granting the petition for certification election would be

prejudicial to all the employees since the new CBA would run the risk of being nullified and the employees would be required to restitute whatever benefits they might have received under the new CBA, is to be dismissed as being baseless and highly speculative.The benefits that may be derived from the implementation of the CBA prematurely entered into between the OTCLU and the company shall, therefore, be in full force and effect until the appropriate bargaining representative is chosen and negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement is thereafter concluded. 25 A struggle between contending labor unions must not jeopardize the implementation of a CBA that is advantageous to employees.WHEREFORE, both petitions for certiorari are hereby DISMISSED. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDEREDG.R. No. 73681 June 30, 1988COLGATE PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, Inc., petitioners, vs.HON. BLAS F. OPLE, COLGATE PALMOLIVE SALES UNION, respondents. PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for certiorari seeking to set aside and annul the Order of respondent Minister of Labor and Employment (MOLE) directly certifying private respondent as the recognized and duly-authorized collective bargaining agent for petitioner's sales force and ordering the reinstatement of three employees of petitioner.Acting on the petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from enforcing and/or carrying out the assailed order.The antecedent facts are as follows:On March 1, 1985, the respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair labor practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing employees to retract their membership with the union and restraining non-union members from joining the union.After efforts at amicable settlement proved unavailing, the Office of the MOLE, upon petition of petitioner assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code, Thereafter the case was captioned AJML-3-142-85, BLR-3-86-85 "In Re: Assumption of Jurisdiction over the Labor Dispute at Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc." In its position paper, petitioner pointed out that —(a) There is no legal basis for the charge that the company refused to bargain collectively with the union considering that the alleged union is not the certified agent of the company salesmen;(b) The union's status as a legitimate labor organization is still under question because on 6 March 1985, a certain Monchito Rosales informed the BLR that an overwhelming majority of the salesmen are not in favor of the Notice of Strike allegedly filed by the Union (Annex "C");(c) Upon verification of the records of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, it appeared that a petition for cancellation of the registration of the alleged union was filed by Monchito Rosales on behalf of certain salesmen of the company who are obviously against the formation of the Colgate Palmolive Sales Labor Union which is supposed to represent them;(d) The preventive suspensions of salesmen Peregrino Sayson, Salvador Reynante and Cornelio Mejia, and their eventual dismissal from the employ of the company were carried out pursuant to the inherent right and prerogative of management to discipline erring employees; that based on the preliminary investigation conducted by the company, there appeared substantial grounds to believe that Sayson, Reynante and Mejia violated company rules and regulations necessitating their suspension pending further investigation of their respective cases;(e) It was also ascertained that the company sustained damages resulting from the

infractions committed by the three salesmen, and that the final results of the investigation fully convinced the company of the existence of just causes for the dismissal of the three salesmen;(f) The formation of the union and the membership therein of Sayson, Reynante and Mejia were not in any manner connected with the company's decision to dismiss the three; that the fact that their dismissal came at a time when the alleged union was being formed was purely coincidental;(g) The union's charge therefore, that the membership in the union and refusal to retract precipitated their dismissal was totally false and amounted to a malicious imputation of union busting;(h) The company never coerced or attempted to coerce employees, much less interferred in the exercise of their right to self-organization; the company never thwarted nor tried to defeat or frustrate the employees' right to form their union in pursuit of their collective interest, as long as that right is exercised within the limits prescribed by law; in fact, there are at present two unions representing the rank and file employees of the company-the factory workers who are covered by a CBA which expired on 31 October 1985 (which was renewed on May 31, 1985) and are represented by Colgate Palmolive Employees Union (PAFLU); whereas, the salaried employees are covered by a CBA which will expire on 31 May 1986 represented by Philippine Association of Free Labor Union (PAFLU)-CPPI Office Chapter. (pp. 4-6, Rollo)The respondent Union, on the other hand, in its position paper, reiterated the issue in its Notice to Strike, alleging that it was duly registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations under Registry No. 10312-LC with a total membership of 87 regular salesmen (nationwide) out of 117 regular salesmen presently employed by the company as of November 30, 1985 and that since the registration of the Union up to the present, more than 2/3 of the total salesmen employed are already members of the Union, leaving no doubt that the true sentiment of the salesmen was to form and organize the Colgate-Palmolive Salesmen Union. The Union further alleged that the company is unreasonably delaying the recognition of the union because when it was informed of the organization of the union, and when presented with a set of proposals for a collective bargaining agreement, the company took an adversarial stance by secretly distributing a "survey sheet on union membership" to newly hired salesmen from the Visayas, Mindanao and Metro Manila areas, purposely avoiding regular salesmen who are now members of the union; that in the accomplishment of the form, District Sales Managers, and Sales Supervisors coerced salesmen from the Visayas and Mindanao by requiring them to fill up and/or accomplish said form by checking answers which were adverse to the union; that with a handful of the survey sheets secured by management through coercion, it now would like to claim that all salesmen are not in favor of the organization of the union, which acts are clear manifestations of unfair labor practices.On August 9,1985, respondent Minister rendered a decision which:(a) found no merit in the Union's Complaint for unfair labor practice allegedly committed by petitioner as regards the alleged refusal of petitioner to negotiate with the Union, and the secret distribution of survey sheets allegedly intended to discourage unionism,(b) found the three salesmen, Peregrino Sayson, Salvador Reynante & Cornelio Mejia "not without fault" and that "the company 1 has grounds to dismiss above named salesmen"

and at the same time respondent Minister directly certified the respondent Union as the collective bargaining agent for the sales force in petitioner company and ordered the reinstatement of the three salesmen to the company on the ground that the employees were first offenders.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by respondent Minister in his assailed Order, dated December 27, 1985. Petitioner now comes to Us with the following:Assignment of ErrorsIRespondent Minister committed a grave abuse of discretion when he directly certified the

Union solely on the basis of the latter's self-serving assertion that it enjoys the support of the majority of the sales force in petitioner's company.IIRespondent Minister committed a grave abuse of discretion when, notwithstanding his very own finding that there was just cause for the dismissal of the three (3) salesmen, he nevertheless ordered their reinstatement. (pp. 7-8, Rollo)Petitioner concedes that respondent Minister has the power to decide a labor dispute in a case assumed by him under Art. 264 (g) of the Labor Code but this power was exceeded when he certified respondent Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the company's salesmen since this is not a representation proceeding as described under the Labor Code. Moreover the Union did not pray for certification but merely for a finding of unfair labor practice imputed to petitioner-company.The petition merits our consideration. The procedure for a representation case is outlined in Arts. 257-260 of the Labor Code, in relation to the provisions on cancellation of a Union registration under Arts. 239-240 thereof, the main purpose of which is to aid in ascertaining majority representation. The requirements under the law, specifically Secs. 2, 5, and 6 of Rule V, Book V, of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code are all calculated to ensure that the certified bargaining representative is the true choice of the employees against all contenders. The Constitutional mandate that the State shall "assure the rights of the workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane conditions of work," should be achieved under a system of law such as the aforementioned provisions of the pertinent statutes. When an overzealous official by-passes the law on the pretext of retaining a laudable objective, the intendment or purpose of the law will lose its meaning as the law itself is disregarded. When respondent Minister directly certified the Union, he in fact disregarded this procedure and its legal requirements. There was therefore failure to determine with legal certainty whether the Union indeed enjoyed majority representation. Contrary to the respondent Minister's observation, the holding of a certification election at the proper time is not necessarily a mere formality as there was a compelling legal reason not to directly and unilaterally certify a union whose legitimacy is precisely the object of litigation in a pending cancellation case filed by certain "concerned salesmen," who also claim majority status. Even in a case where a union has filed a petition for certification elections, the mere fact that no opposition is made does not warrant a direct certification. More so as in the case at bar, when the records of the suit show that the required proof was not presented in an appropriate proceeding and that the basis of the direct certification was the Union's mere allegation in its position paper that it has 87 out of 117 regular salesmen. In other words, respondent Minister merely relied on the self-serving assertion of the respondent Union that it enjoyed the support of the majority of the salesmen, without subjecting such assertion to the test of competing claims. As pointed out by petitioner in its petition, what the respondent Minister achieved in rendering the assailed orders was to make a mockery of the procedure provided under the law for representation cases because:(a) He has created havoc by impliedly establishing a procedural short-cut to obtaining a direct certification-by merely filing a notice of strike.(b) By creating such a short-cut, he has officially encouraged disrespect for the law.(c) By directly certifying a Union without sufficient proof of majority representation, he has in effect arrogated unto himself the right, vested naturally in the employees, to choose their collective bargaining representative.(d) He has in effect imposed upon the petitioner the obligation to negotiate with a union whose majority representation is under serious question. This is highly irregular because while the Union enjoys the blessing of the Minister, it does not enjoy the blessing of the employees. Petitioner is therefore under threat of being held liable for refusing to negotiate with a union whose right to bargaining status has not been legally established. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)The order of the respondent Minister to reinstate the employees despite a clear finding of

guilt on their part is not in conformity with law. Reinstatement is simply incompatible with a finding of guilt. Where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the employees the law warrants their dismissal without making any distinction between a first offender and a habitual delinquent. Under the law, respondent Minister is duly mandated to equally protect and respect not only the labor or workers' side but also the management and/or employers' side. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. To order the reinstatement of the erring employees namely, Mejia, Sayson and Reynante would in effect encourage unequal protection of the laws as a managerial employee of petitioner company involved in the same incident was already dismissed and was not ordered to be reinstated. As stated by Us in the case of San Miguel Brewery vs. National Labor Union, 2 "an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interest."In the subject order, respondent Minister cited a cases 3 implying that "the proximity of the dismissal of the employees to the assumption order created a doubt as to whether their dismissal was really for just cause or due to their activities." 4

This is of no moment for the following reasons:(a) Respondent Minister has still maintained in his assailed order that a just cause existed to justify the dismissal of the employees.(b) Respondent Minister has not made any finding substantiated by evidence that the employees were dismissed because of their union activities.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the Order of the respondent Minister, dated December 27, 1985 for grave abuse of discretion. However, in view of the fact that the dismissed employees are first offenders, petitioner is hereby ordered to give them separation pay. The temporary restraining order is hereby made permanent.SO ORDERED.FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-51602 January 17, 1985GEORGE & PETER LINES, INC., petitioner, vs.ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) HON. CARMELO NORIEL, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, MINISTRY OF LABOR, respondents.Manuel B. Pastrana for petitioner.Gerardo E. Gestopa Jr. for private respondent. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:Petitioner George and Peter Lines, Incorporated, is a domestic corporation engaged in shipping, while respondent Associated Labor Unions (ALU) is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor.On July 6, 1978, a Petition for Direct Certification was filed by respondent ALU with Region VII, Cebu City, of the Ministry of Labor, praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of petitioner corporation there being no labor union organized thereat.Petitioner corporation OPPOSED the petition stating that respondent Union does not represent the majority of the employees concerned; and that more than 80% of the licensed and unlicensed crew of its vessels claim that they are not members of any union and have no desire to join any. It then filed on August 17, 1978, a Petition for Certification Election to determine once and for all whether the employees concerned wanted respondent ALU to be their sole bargaining representative.On August 25, 1978, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order directly certifying respondent ALU as

the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the licensed and unlicensed employees of petitioner corporation, opining that the majority membership status of any union is determined before or at the time of filing of the petition and not thereafter, otherwise, the union can be ousted anytime.Petitioner corporation moved for reconsideration alleging that the employees concerned, consisting of about 80%, denied their membership with respondent Union, and that a certification election should be called in the interest of fairness and justice.The entire records of the case were forwarded to the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. On February 5, 1979, the BLR Director modified the Order of August 25, 1978 by directing a certification election among the rank and file employees of petitioner corporation. Reconsideration sought by respondent Union was denied by the BLR Director on May 31, 1979, on the ground that there exists a doubt regarding the majority status of respondent ALU because of the withdrawal of membership by the workers, and directing the Labor Relations Division of the Regional Office of origin to hold a pre-election conference, and to conduct the certification election.Respondent Union, in its Second Motion for Reconsideration, argued that public respondent erred in finding its majority status doubtful as the same was proven during the hearing of the case before the Med-Arbiter.The BLR Director, in its questioned Decision of August 13, 1979, reconsidered its Resolution of May 31, 1979, and directly certified respondent ALU as the sole bargaining age it of all the rank and file employees of petitioner corporation Thus, this Petition for certiorari wherein petitioner seeks to set aside the said Decision, posing the following issues.(1) Did the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Ministry of Labor commit grave abuse of discretion by abruptly reversing his two previous resolutions for the holding of a certification election?(2) Are petitioner's employees entitled to choose their sole and exclusive bargaining representative with petitioner thru a certification election? and(3) Is petitioner entitled to file the petition for certification election?It is not disputed that after the filing of the petition for direct certification by respondent Union, a written manifestation duly signed by about 80% of the employees concerned, retracting their membership from said union, was submitted by them to the MOLE. Respondent Union submits, however, that the employees were merely pressured by management into withdrawing their membership. On the other hand, petitioner corporation argues that the retraction by the employees cast a serious doubt on the alleged majority representation of the Union. In ultimately resolving the issue in the Union's favor, public respondent held that the withdrawal of membership from the Union subsequent to the filing of the petition for direct certification did not affect the same nor did it divest it of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition.We find for petitioner.The employees have the constitutional right to choose the labor organization which it desires to join. 1 The exercise of such right would be rendered nugatory and ineffectual if they would be denied the opportunity to choose in a certification election, which is not a litigation, but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character, 2 the bargaining unit to represent them. 3

The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. 4

As the right of respondent Union to represent the employees is seriously put in doubt by the withdrawal of 80% of the membership, which the Union claims to be involuntary, the best forum to determine if there was, indeed, undue pressure exerted upon the employees to retract their membership is in the certification election itself, wherein they can freely express their choice in a secret ballot. 5 Certification election is the best and most appropriate means of ascertaining the will of the employees as to their choice of an exclusive bargaining representative. 6 That there are no competing Unions involved should not alter that principle, the freedom of choice by the employees being the primordial consideration besides the fact

that the employees can still choose between ALU and No Union. Even if the withdrawals of the employees concerned were submitted after the Petition for direct certification had been filed, the doubt as to the majority representation of the Union has arisen and it is best to determine the true sentiment of the employees through a certification election. If respondent Union is confident that it commands the majority of the workers, there is no reason why it should object to the holding of a certification election.WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of August 17, 1979 is hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Office concerned of the Ministry of Labor and Employment is hereby directed to cause the holding of a certification election within thirty (30) days from notice.SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 96425 February 4, 1992PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER EDGARDO DELA CRUZ and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)-TUCP, respondents.Beltran, Bacungan & Candoy for petitioner.Jimenez & Associates co-counsel for petitioner. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:The controversy in this case centers on the requirements before a local or chapter of a federation may file a petition for certification election and be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the petitioner's employees.Petitioner Progressive Development Corporation (PDC) filed this petition for certiorari to set aside the following:1) Resolution dated September 5, 1990, issued by respondent Med-Arbiter Edgardo dela Cruz, directing the holding of the certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of PDC:2) Order dated October 12, 1990, issued by the respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment, denying PDC's appeal; and3) Order dated November 12, 1990, also issued by the respondent Secretary, denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.On June 19, 1990, respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP (hereinafter referred to as Kilusan) filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner alleging that it is a legitimate labor federation and its local chapter, Progressive Development Employees Union, was issued charter certificate No. 90-6-1-153. Kilusan claimed that there was no existing collective bargaining agreement and that no other legitimate labor organization existed in the bargaining unit.Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss dated July 11, 1990 contending that the local union failed to comply with Rule II Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, which requires the submission of: (a) the constitution and by-laws; (b) names, addresses and list of officers and/or members; and (c) books of accounts.On July 16 , 1990, respondent Kilusan submitted a rejoinder to PDC's motion to dismiss claiming that it had submitted the necessary documentary requirements for registration, such as the constitution and by-laws of the local union, and the list of officers/members with their addresses. Kilusan further averred that no books of accounts could be submitted as the local union was only recently organized.In its "Supplemental Position Paper" dated September 3, 1990, the petitioner insisted that upon verification with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), it found that the alleged minutes of the organizational meeting was unauthenticated, the list of members did not bear the corresponding signatures of the purported members, and the constitution and by-laws did not

bear the signature of the members and was not duly subscribed. It argued that the private respondent therefore failed to substantially comply with the registration requirements provided by the rules. Additionally, it prayed that Med-Arbiter Edgardo dela Cruz inhibit himself from handling the case for the reason that he allegedly had prejudged the same.In his September 5, 1990 resolution, Med Arbiter dela Cruz held that there was substantial compliance with the requirements for the formation of the chapter. He further stated that mere issuance of the charter certificate by the federation was sufficient compliance with the rules. Considering that the establishment was unorganized, he maintained that a certification election should be conducted to resolve the question of representation.Treating the motion for reconsideration filed by the PDC as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary, Undersecretary Laguesma held that the same was merely a "reiteration of the issues already ventilated in the proceedings before the Med-Arbiter, specifically, the matter involving the formal organization of the chapter." (Rollo, p. 20) PDC's motion for reconsideration from the aforementioned ruling was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.In an order dated February 25, 1991, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the public respondents from carrying out the assailed resolution and orders or from proceeding with the certification election. (Rollo, pp. 37-39)It is the petitioner's contention that a labor organization (such as the Kilusan) may not validly invest the status of legitimacy upon a local or chapter through the mere expedient of issuing a charter certificate and submitting such certificate to the BLR (Rollo, p. 85) Petitioner PDC posits that such local or chapter must at the same time comply with the requirement of submission of duly subscribed constitution and by-laws, list of officers and books of accounts. (Rollo, p. 35) PDC points out that the constitution and by-laws and list of officers submitted were not duly subscribed. Likewise, the petitioner claims that the mere filing of the aforementioned documents is insufficient; that there must be due recognition or acknowledgment accorded to the local or chapter by BLR through a certificate of registration or any communication emanating from it. (Rollo, p. 86)The Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondent, avers that there was a substantial compliance with the requirements for the formation of a chapter. Moreover, he invokes Article 257 of the Labor Code which mandates the automatic conduct by the Med-Arbiter of a certification election in any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agreement.The Court has repeatedly stressed that the holding of a certification election is based on a statutory policy that cannot be circumvented. (Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 180 SCRA 749 [1989]; Belyca Corporation v. Ferrer-Calleja, 168 SCRA 184 [1988]; George and Peter Lines, Inc. v. Associated Labor Unions, 134 SCRA 82 [1986]). The workers must be allowed to freely express their choice in a determination where everything is open to their sound judgment and the possibility of fraud and misrepresentation is eliminated.But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the automatic conduct of a certification election in an unorganized establishment, it also requires that the petition for certification election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. Article 242 enumerates the exclusive rights of a legitimate labor organization among which is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.Meanwhile, Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE andincludes any branch or local thereof." (Emphasis supplied) Rule I, Section 1 (j), Book V of the Implementing Rules likewise defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch, local or affiliate thereof. (Emphasis supplied)The question that now arises is: when does a branch, local or affiliate of a federation become a legitimate labor organization?Ordinarily, a labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration with the BLR. Under Article 234 (Requirements of Registration):

Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements:(a) Fifty-pesos (P50.00) registration fee;(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational meeting and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty 20% percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seek to operate;(d) If the applicant has been in existence for one or more years, copies , of its annual financial reports; and(e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, the minutes of its adoption or ratification and the list of the members who participated in it.And under Article 235 (Action on Application)The Bureau shall act on all applications for registration within thirty (30) days from filing.All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the organization, as the case may be, and attested to by its president.Moreover, section 4 of Rule II, Book V of the Implementing Rules requires that the application should be signed by at least twenty percent (20%) of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and be accompanied by a sworn statement of the applicant union that there is no certified bargaining agent or, where there is an existing collective bargaining agreement duly submitted to the DOLE, that the application is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the agreement.The respondent Kilusan questions the requirements as too stringent in their application but the purpose of the law in prescribing these requisites must be underscored. Thus, in Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Secretary of Labor, 27 SCRA 40 (1969), the Court declared:The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis. The registration prescribed in Paragraph (b) of said section is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with or without said registration. The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by the labor organizations, associations or unions and the possession of the "rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations." The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and the privileges, much less said personality, which are mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of which registration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses, fraud or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly accredited agents of the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and unions of workers are engaged affect public interest, which should be protected. Furthermore, the obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition for the non-cancellation of a certificate of registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the members of the organization, considering that the same generally solicits funds or membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts of money due to them or to the organization. (Emphasis supplied)But when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter of a federation, some of the aforementioned requirements for registration are no longer required. The provisions governing union affiliation are found in Rule II, Section 3, Book V of the Implementing Rules, the relevant portions of which are cited below:Sec. 3. Union affiliation; direct membership with national union. — An affiliate of a labor federation or national union may be a local or chapter thereof or an independently registered union.

a) The labor federation or national union concerned shall issue a charter certificate indicating the creation or establishment of a local or chapter, copy of which shall be submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations within thirty (30) days from issuance of such charter certificate.b) An independently registered union shall be considered an affiliate of a labor federation or national union after submission to the Bureau of the contract or agreement of affiliation within thirty (30) days after its execution.xxx xxx xxxe) The local or chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a constitution and by laws, set of officers and books and accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall be observed.Paragraph (a) refers to the local or chapter of a federation which did not undergo the rudiments of registration while paragraph (b) refers to an independently registered union which affiliated with a federation. Implicit in the foregoing differentiation is the fact that a local or chapter need not be independently registered. By force of law (in this case, Article 212[h]); such local or chapter becomes a legitimate labor organization upon compliance with the aforementioned provisions of Section 3.Thus, several requirements that are otherwise required for union registration are omitted, to wit:(1) The requirement that the application for registration must be signed by at least 20% of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit;2) The submission of officers' addresses, principal address of the labor organization, the minutes of organizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;3) The submission of the minutes of the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by the laws and the list of the members who participated in it.Undoubtedly, the intent of the law in imposing lesser requirements in the case of the branch or local of a registered federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a local union with the federation or national union in order to increase the local union's bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions of labor.The petitioner maintains that the documentary requirements prescribed in Section 3(c), namely: the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts, must follow the requirements of law. Petitioner PDC calls for the similar application of the requirement for registration in Article 235 that all requisite documents and papers be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the organization and attested to by the president.In the case at bar, the constitution and by-laws and list of officers submitted in the BLR, while attested to by the chapter's president, were not certified under oath by the secretary. Does such defect warrant the withholding of the status of legitimacy to the local or chapter?In the case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that the submitted documents and papers be certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, and attested to by president is apparent. The submission of the required documents (and payment of P50.00 registration fee) becomes the Bureau's basis for approval of the application for registration. Upon approval, the labor union acquires legal personality and is entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor organization. The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it is dealing with is a bona fideorganization, one which has not submitted false statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The inclusion of the certification and attestation requirements will in a marked degree allay these apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of any false statement and misrepresentation a ground for cancellation of registration (see Article 239 (a), (c) and (d)); it is also a ground for a criminal charge of perjury.The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures against the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole

purpose is to control union funds or to use the union for dubious ends.In the case of the union affiliation with a federation, the documentary requirements are found in Rule II, Section 3(e), Book V of the Implementing Rules, which we again quote as follows:(c) The local chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall be observed. (Emphasis supplied)Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions" refers to the certification and attestation requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter must likewise comply with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists in the case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact compliance with the certification and attestation requirements because, as previously mentioned, several requirements applicable to independent union registration are no longer required in the case of formation of a local or chapter. The policy of the law in conferring greater bargaining power upon labor unions must be balanced with the policy of providing preventive measures against the commission of fraud.A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon submission of the following to the BLR:1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president.Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization.In the case at bar, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the required documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate status.We observe that, as borne out by the facts in this case, the formation of a local or chapter becomes a handy tool for the circumvention of union registration requirements. Absent the institution of safeguards, it becomes a convenient device for a small group of employees to foist a not-so-desirable federation or union on unsuspecting co-workers and pare the need for wholehearted voluntariness which is basic to free unionism. The records show that on June 16, 1990, Kilusan met with several employees of the petitioner. Excerpts of the "Minutes of the Organizational/General Membership Meeting of Progressive Development Employees Union (PDEU) — Kilusan," are quoted below:The meeting was formally called to order by Bro. Jose V. Parungao, KILUSAN secretary for organization by explaining to the general membership the importance of joining the union. He explained to the membership why they should join a union, and briefly explained the ideology of the Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa-TUCP as a democratically based organization and then read the proposed Constitution and By-Laws, after which said Constitution and By-Laws was duly and unanimously ratified after some clarification.Bro. Jose Parungao was also unanimously voted by the group to act as the chairman of the COMELEC in holding the organizational election of officers of the union.Bro. Jose Parungao, officially opened the table for nomination of candidates after which the election of officers followed by secret balloting and the following were the duly elected officers. (Original Record, p. 25)The foregoing shows that Kilusan took the initiative and encouraged the formation of a union which automatically became its chapter. On June 18, 1990, Kilusan issued a charter certificate in favor of PDEU-KILUSAN (Records, page 1). It can be seen that Kilusan was moving very fast.On June 19, 1990, or just three days after the organizational meeting, Kilusan filed a petition

for certification election (Records, pages 2 and 3) accompanied by a copy each of the charter certificate, constitution and by-laws and minutes of the organizational meeting. Had the local union filed an application for registration, the petition for certification election could not have been immediately filed. The applicant union must firstly comply with the "20% signature" requirement and all the other requisites enumerated in Article 234. Moreover, since under Article 235 the BLR shall act on any application for registration within thirty (30) days from its filing, the likelihood is remote that, assuming the union complied with all the requirements, the application would be approved on the same day it was filed.We are not saying that the scheme used by the respondents is per se illegal for precisely, the law allows such strategy. It is not this Court's function to augment the requirements prescribed by law in order to make them wiser or to allow greater protection to the workers and even their employer. Our only recourse is, as earlier discussed, to exact strict compliance with what the law provides as requisites for local or chapter formation.It may likewise be argued that it was Kilusan (the mother union) and not the local union which filed the petition for certification election and, being a legitimate labor organization, Kilusan has the personality to file such petition.At this juncture, it is important to clarify the relationship between the mother union and the local union. In the case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512 [1975]), the Court held that the mother union, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, had the status of an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the association, free to serve the common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the association. Thus, where as in this case the petition for certification election was filed by the federation which is merely an agent, the petition is deemed to be filed by the chapter, the principal, which must be a legitimate labor organization. The chapter cannot merely rely on the legitimate status of the mother union.The Court's conclusion should not be misconstrued as impairing the local union's right to be certified as the employees' bargaining agent in the petitioner's establishment. We are merely saying that the local union must first comply with the statutory requirements in order to exercise this right. Big federations and national unions of workers should take the lead in requiring their locals and chapters to faithfully comply with the law and the rules instead of merely snapping union after union into their folds in a furious bid with rival federations to get the most number of members.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution and orders of respondent Med-Arbiter and Secretary of Labor and Employment, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order dated February 25, 1991 is made permanent.G.R. Nos. 113204-05 September 16, 1996BARBIZON PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs.NAGKAKAISANG SUPERVISOR NG BARBIZON PHILIPPINES, INC. — NAFLU AND THE HON. UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, respondents. KAPUNAN, J.:This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside and annul the decision and orders of the public respondent dated 11 February 1993, 4 March 1993, 16 June 1993 and 25 November 1993, respectively.The facts which gave rise to the present petition are as follows:On 27 June 1988, petitioner (formerly the Philippine Lingerie Corporation) filed a petition for certification election among its rank-and-file employees (docketed as NCR-OD-M-6-349-88). As a consequence thereof, two (2) unions sought recognition, namely: PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB and BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA NG PHILIPPINE LINGERIE CORPORATION.In one of the pre-election conferences, PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB

moved for the exclusion of a number of employees who were allegedly holding supervisory positions.Only 28 July 1988, Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah issued an order denying the motion of PHILIPPINE LINGERIE CORPORATION WORKERS UNION-ALAB for lack of merit. Said order was appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) which issued an Order on 16 November 1988, the dispositive portion of which declares:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 28 July 1988 is hereby affirmed. Accordingly, to ensure fairness to all the parties and in order to hasten the proceedings, let the election be conducted under the supervision of the Labor Organization Division, this Office, which is hereby directed to immediately set this case for pre-election conference.SO ORDERED. 1

PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB filed two (2) separate motions for reconsideration of the above order which were consolidated and treated in an Order dated 22 December 1988, the decretal portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the twin motions for reconsideration are hereby deemed denied for lack of merit. Accordingly, let the pre-election conference preparatory to the certification election proceed without further delay.No further motion of similar nature shall be hereafter entertained.SO ORDERED. 2

No further appeal of the above-quoted order was interposed, thus it became final and executory.On 3 May 1989, a certification election was conducted with the votes of "supervisors and confidential" employees being challenged. Thus, the certification election showed the following results:1. Philippine Lingerie Workers Union-ALAB 318 votes2. Buklod Ng Manggagawa Ng PhilippineLingerie Corporation 412 votes3 No Union 17 votes4. Challenged Supervisors/ConfidentialEmployees 99 votes————TOTAL VALID VOTES CAST 855 votesSPOILED BALLOTS 12 votesPHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB filed an election protest which was later formalized on 25 May 1989. In the meantime, on 9 May 1989, BUKLOD moved for the opening of the challenged ballots.On 20 July 1989, the BLR, through its director Pura Ferrer-Calleja, issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the protest and challenged (sic) of the Alyansang Likha Ng Mga Anak Ng Bayan (ALAB) are hereby denied for lack of merit.Accordingly, let the challenged votes of the supervisors and confidential employees be opened in the presence of the parties under the supervision of the Labor Organization Division (LOD) on 26 July 1989 at 9:00 A.M., Bureau of Labor Relations.SO ORDERED. 3

With the above-quoted order, the challenged votes were opened on 3 August 1989 and the results were as follows:Philippine Lingerie Workers Union-ALAB 4 votesBuklod Ng Manggagawa Ng Phil. Lingerie

Corp. 84 votesNo Union 6 votesSpoiled 5 votesTOTAL VOTES CAST 99 votes

PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB filed a motion for reconsideration of the BLR's Order of 20 July 1989 which, however, was denied in an Order dated 22 August 1989, the pertinent portion of which states:xxx xxx xxxThis time movant should now be convinced that the alleged supervisory and confidential employees are more rank-and-file employees.As early as Resolution dated 16 November 1988, the Bureau had already ruled that the alleged supervisors are not managerial employees (rec. p. 154, First Folder). On motion for reconsideration the Bureau affirmed the aforementioned Resolution in its Order dated 22 December 1988 (rec. p. 302. First Folder). And on 20 July 1989, when R.A. 6715 was already in full force and effect, the Bureau in resolving the protest of ALAB declared that the job descriptions of the alleged supervisors and confidential employees do not in any way suggest that they are indeed supervisors or managerial employees (rec. p. 39, Second Folder).xxx xxx xxxWHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and the Buklod Ng Manggagawa Ng Philippine Lingerie Corporation (now, Barbizon Philippines, Inc.) is hereby certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file employees of Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (formerly Philippine Lingerie Corporation).The management of Barbizon Philippines, Inc. is hereby directed to immediately start negotiating for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the said union.No further motion of any nature shall hereinafter be entertained by this Office.SO ORDERED. 4

Not satisfied with the aforequoted order, PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB appealed to the Secretary of Labor but on 26 September 1989, the same was withdrawn and a motion to dismiss appeal with prejudice was filed by the same union. There being no more obstacle to collective bargaining, petitioner negotiated with BUKLOD as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative.A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) was signed by petitioner and BUKLOD which was effective for five (5) years or until 18 November 1994. 5

While the CBA was still in force, several employees organized themselves into the Nagkakaisang Supervisors Ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NSBPI) and the 0Nagkakaisang Excluded Monthly Paid Employees Ng Barbizon, Philippines, Inc. (NEMPEBPI) allegedly because they were excluded from the coverage of the existing CBA between petitioner and BUKLOD.Two (2) separate petitions for certification election were filed by NSBPI and NEMPEBPI. The petition of the former was raffled to Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parungo and the latter to Med-Arbiter Paterno D. Adap. Both cases were dismissed 6

NSBPI appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor. On 29 December 1992, public respondent Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma denied the same for lack of merit. NSBPI moved for reconsideration on 15 January 1993.On 11 February 1993, the Office of the Secretary of Labor, through public respondent rendered the questioned Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE the Motion for Reconsideration of Nagkakaisang Superbisor ng Barbizon

Philippines, Inc. (NSBPI) and the appeal of Nagkakaisang Excluded Monthly Paid Employees ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NEMPEBPI) are hereby granted and the Orders of this Office and the Med-Arbiter dated 29 December 1992 and 01 September 1992, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE.Accordingly, a new Order is hereby entered in the above-captioned cases directing the conduct of certification election among the subject employees excluded from the coverage of the bargaining unit of the existing CBA of rank and file employees aforestated, not otherwise excluded/disqualified by law. The choices are as follows:1. Nagkakaisang Superbisor ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NSBPI)2. Nagkakaisang Excluded Monthly Paid Employees ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NEMPEBPI); and,3. No Union.Let, therefore, the entire records of these consolidated cases be forwarded to the Regional Office of origin for the immediate conduct of certification election, subject to the usual pre-election conference.SO ORDERED. 7

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied 8 A second motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was likewise denied, this time, with finality. 9

Undaunted, petitioner filed a third motion for reconsideration which was also denied for lack of merit. 10

Hence, this petition wherein the following issues were raised:ATHE RESPONDENT "SUPERVISORS" LOCAL UNION CANNOT FORM A SUPERVISORS UNION, WHEN THEIR MEMBERS ARE INCOMPATIBLY "RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES"; MUCH LESS, CAN IT SEEK REPRESENTATION STATUS FOR SUPERVISORS, WHEN THE EMPLOYEES THEY WANT TO REPRESENT FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PURPOSES BELONG IN THE "APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT" OF RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES ON THE "EMPLOYER WIDE UNIT", WHICH ALREADY HAS A CERTIFIED BARGAINING AGENT: BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA NG PHILIPPINE LINGERIE CORPORATION.BWORSE, SINCE THE MEMBERS OF THE RESPONDENT LOCAL UNION BELONG TO THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT OF RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES, THE EXISTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT WHICH COVERS THEM, IS (A) "BAR" TO ITS CERTIFICATION ELECTION PETITION 11

Barbizon Philippines, Inc. alleges that this petition only assails the resolution of the public respondent regarding NSBPI and does not include the NEMPEBPI, the union of the excluded monthly paid employees because the separate motion for reconsideration it filed in connection with the latter has not yet been resolved by the NLRC.On 8 February 1994, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the Bureau of Labor Relations from setting the pre-election conference in Case No. OS-MA-A-215-92-93 entitled "In Re: Petition for Certification Election among the Supervisory Employees of Barbizon Philippines, Inc., Nagkakaisang Supervisor Ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. — OBRERO" and from conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid cases. 12

During the pendency of the petition, the CBA expired. However, no other agreement between the parties was made known to this Court, thus, in accordance with Article XX of the CBA, it continues to be in force and shall govern the relations between the parties thereto. 13

We find no merit in the petition.Petitioner maintains its stance that the petition for certification election filed by the Nagkakaisang Supervisor ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. — NAFLU (NSBPI) must necessarily fail because the employees designated as "supervisors" cannot legally form a supervisors' union by virtue of the BLR's final decision dated 22 August 1989 declaring the abovementioned employees mere rank and file workers. Being part of the rank and file, petitioner avers that said employees belong to the "employer wide unit," which is the appropriate bargaining unit of all its rank and file employees and which is represented by the Buklod ng Manggagawa ng Philippine Lingerie Corporation (BUKLOD) as the sole certified bargaining agent.Petitioner further asserts that the Undersecretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in granting NSBPI's petition for certification election as this was tantamount to an unjustifiable reversal of the BLR's final ruling that the subject employees are not supervisory employees, but merely rank and file, due to the nature of their duties and functions.Petitioner's reasoning is flawed, proceeding as it does from the wrong premise. Petitioner obstinately believes that NSBPI's petition for certification election was granted because the employees carrying the appellation "supervisor" were deemed supervisory employees. The status of the subject employees, however, is not the issue in the case at bar. Their status as "supervisors" is not in dispute. The aforestated decision of the BLR dated 22 August 1989 has settled with finality that said employees are merely rank and file and this fact has been accepted by the petitioning union NSBPI. 14 NSBPI's petition for certification election was granted because the subject employees, including petitioner's monthly paid employees, were expressly excludedfrom the bargaining unit and from the coverage of the CBA executed between petitioner and BUKLOD, as clearly stated therein. 15 This is the real reason behind the certification election in question. Unfortunately, this was not successfully debunked by petitioner, which chose to focus, albeit erroneously, on the status of the subject employees.The exclusion of petitioner's "supervisors" from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees indiscriminately curtailed the right to these employees to self-organization and representation for purposes of collective bargaining, a right explicitly mandated by our labor laws 16 and "accorded the highest consideration." 17 In the recent case of Golden Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 18 we aptly declared:In the case at bench, the evidence established that the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of petitioner primarily perform administrative or clerical work. In contradistinction, the petitioner's daily paid rank-and-file employees mainly work in the cultivation of bananas in the fields. It is crystal clear the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of petitioner have very little in common with its daily paid rank-and file employees in terms of duties and obligations, working conditions, salary rates, and skills. To be sure, the said monthly paid rank-and-file employees have even been excluded from the bargaining unit of the daily paid rank-and-file employees. This dissimilarity of interests warrants the formation of a separate and distinct bargaining unit for the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. To rule otherwise would deny this distinct class of employees the right to self-organization for purposes of collective bargaining. Without the shield of an organization, it will also expose them to the exploitations of management. . . . (Emphasis ours)In the case at bar, BUKLOD cannot successfully act as the bargaining agent of and duly represent petitioner's "supervisor" employees since the latter were expressly excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit.Petitioner's reliance on the case of Pagkakaisa ng mga Manggagawa sa Triumph Int'l.-United Lumber and General Workers of the Phils. v. Ferrer-Calleja 19 is misplaced. The aforecited case upholds the "one union-one company" policy, thus:Once again, we enunciate that the proliferation of unions in an employer unit is discouraged as a matter of policy unless compelling reasons exist which deny a certain and distinct class

of employees the right to self-organization for purpose of collective bargaining. (See General Rubber & Footwear Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 155 SCRA 283 [1987].) 20(Emphasis ours.)

As clearly indicated in the aforequoted decision, the "one union — one company" rule is not without exception. The exclusion of the subject employees from the rank-and-file bargaining unit and the CBA is indefinitely a "compelling reason" for it completely deprived them of the chance to bargain collectively with petitioner and are thus left with no recourse but to group themselves into a separate and distinct bargaining unit and form their own organization. The rationale behind the exception to the aforementioned policy is further elucidated in Knitjoy Manufacturing, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja: 21

1. The suggested bias of the Labor Code in favor of the one company-one union policy, anchored on the greater mutual benefits which the parties could derive, especially in the case of employees whose bargaining strength could undeniably be enhanced by their unity and solidarity but diminished by their disunity, division and dissension, is not without exceptions.xxx xxx xxxThe usual exception, of course, is where the employer unit has to give way to the other units like the craft unit, plant unit, or a subdivision thereof; the recognition of these exceptions takes into accountant the policy to assure employees of the fullest freedom in exercising their rights. Otherwise stated, the one company-one union policy must yield to the right of the employees to form unions or associations for purposes not contrary to law, to self-organization and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations, among others, which the Constitution guarantees. (Emphasis ours.)The receipt by petitioner's "supervisor" employees of certain benefits under the CBA between BUKLOD and petitioner is not sufficient to deny the petition for certification election filed by the labor organization formed by the excluded employees. It is not equivalent to and does not compensate for the denial of the right of the excluded employees to self-organization and collective bargaining. We concur with the findings of the Undersecretary of Labor, thus:It is not disputed that the members of both petitioning unions NSBPI and NEMPEBPI are excluded from the coverage of the existing CBA entered into between the respondent BPI and Buklod ng mga Manggagawa ng Barbizons Philippines, Inc. (BUKLOD) (pp. 84-85, folder II, records). Thus, respondent BPI being privy to the said exclusion has to accept the inescapable consequences of its act of depriving the excluded employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining. We find immaterial and irrelevant the allegation of hereby respondent BPI to the effect that the benefit being enjoyed by the rank and file employees covered by the existing CBA are extended/accorded to the excluded employees. Indeed, what is crucial and of paramount consideration is the fact that the excluded rank and file employees are afforded the right to bargain collectively.The Supreme Court in the cases of General Rubber and Footwear Corporation vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, et al., G.R. No. 74262, October 29, 1987; and Manila Bay Spinning Mills, J and P Coats, Manila Bay, Inc. vs. Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 80910, August 1, 1988, ruled that the employees excluded from the coverage of the CBA, who not being excluded by law, have the right to bargain collectively. Further, the Supreme Court aptly stated that:The allegation that some benefits under the existing CBA were extended to the monthly paid employees, even if true will not preclude them from entering into a CBA of their own. Neither is the inconvenience that may befall petitioner for having to administer two CBAs an excuse for depriving the monthly paid employees of their constitutionally guaranteed right to collective bargaining. (Emphasis supplied.) 22

The petition for certification election cannot likewise be deterred by the "contract-bar rule," 23

which finds no application in the present case. The petitioning union NSBPI is not questioning the majority status of Buklod as the incumbent bargaining agent of petitioner's rank and file employees. The petition for certification election is addressed to a separate bargaining unit — the excluded employees of petitioner. We agree with the ruling of the Undersecretary of Labor, thus:Certainly, one who has been instrumental in the denial of a right otherwise enjoyable by a rank and file, as in membership in its appropriate bargaining unit, cannot now say that he ought to be included in the existing bargaining unit of the rank and file just because that "rank and file" employee is now seeking representation for himself as well as those who like him were specifically excluded from the coverage of the CBA. A rank and file employee, irrespective of his job designation and in whatever form his wages are paid has the unbridled right to the exercise of self-organization. This right cannot, like a chattel, be compromised in the bargaining table so as to deprive him of the same in violation of the constitutional mandate. In this wise, the claim as to the applicability of the contract bar doctrine could have not gained ground. A contract bar applies in a situation where the petition is directed towards one and the same bargaining unit. This does not appear to be so in the case considering the built-in-limitation in the CBA excluding the workers sought to be represented by herein petitioner from its coverage, albeit, their being admittedly rank and file employees. On the same line of reasoning, neither would the substantial mutual interest test hold. So too, is the claim against union turncoatism. In the latter case, the emergence thereof is farfetched considering the defined boundaries of the bargaining units concerned. Let it be stressed, that the certification election as ordered would only affect those rank and file employees who are excluded from the coverage of the existing CBA. Those who are already represented in the existing collective bargaining agreement may rest secured in the bargaining unit that considers them as members of its family. 24 (Emphasis ours.)

The right to self organization and collective bargaining is an integral part of the protection to labor provision embodied in our Constitution, the essence of which is aptly expressed in Tropical Hut Employees' Union-CGW v. Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc.: 25

All employees enjoy the right to self-organization and to form and join labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. This is a fundamental right of labor that derives its existence from the Constitution. In interpreting the protection to labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution and the labor laws or rules or regulations, we have always adopted the liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor rights.Finally, we take this opportunity to reiterate the standing rule that a certification election is the sole concern of the workers, hence, an employer lacks the personality to dispute the same. In Golden Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 26 we held:Finally, we note that it was petitioner company that filed the motion to dismiss the petition for election. The general rule is that an employer has no standing to question a certification election since this is the sole concern of the workers. Law and policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of management. A labor bargaining representative, to be effective, must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 8 February 1994 is hereby LIFTED.G.R. No. 106446 November 16, 1993

NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU-MIF), petitioner, vs.SECRETARY OF LABOR, FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS - SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA QUALITY CONTAINER CORPORATION AND QUALITY CONTAINER CORPORATION, respondents.Padilla & Associates Law Office for petitioner.Gancayco Law Offices for Quality Container Corporation.FFW Legal Center for private respondent union.The Solicitor General for public respondent. QUIASON, J.:This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision dated August 4, 1992 of the secretary of Labor in Case No. OS-A-4-102-92. In said decision, the Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter in Cases No. NCR-OD-M-91-09-106 and NCR-OD-M-91-10-131, which granted the petition of respondent Federation of Free Workers-Samahang Mangagawa sa Quality Container Corporation (FFW-SMQCC), for a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file employees of respondent Quality Container Corporation (QCC).Petitioner and respondent FFW-SMQCC are local chapters of labor federations duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Petitioner is the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file workers of respondent QCC, a domestic corporation engaged in the metal industry.On September 27, 1991, 38 days before the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and respondent QCC, respondent FFW-SMQCC through Reynito de Pedro filed with the DOLE Industrial Relations Division, National Capital Region (NCR-OD-M-91-09-106) a petition for certification election. The petition was accompanied by a list of signatures of company employees, who signified their consent to a certification election among the rank and file employees of QCC (Rollo, pp. 79-83).Petitioner herein moved to dismiss the petition of respondent FFW-SMQCC on the grounds that: (a) the required consent to the certification election of at least 25% of the rank and file employees had not been met; (b) the petition was not verified as required by law; and (c) Reynito de Pedro, who was also the president of petitioner, had no personality to file the petition on behalf of FFW-SMQCC.On October 30, 1991, respondent FFW-SMQCC, filed a second petition for certification election, this time signed and verified by De Pedro (NCR-OD-91-10-131).On January 24, 1992, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election of respondent FFW-SMQCC in a decision, the dispositive portion of which, reads as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a certification election be conducted among the rank-and-file employees of Quality Container Corporation within twenty (20) days from receipt hereof with the usual pre-election conference of the parties to thresh out the mechanics and other details of the election. The payroll of the company three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition shall be used as the basis in determining the list of eligible voters.The choices are:a) Federation of Free Workers (FFW)- Samahang Mangagawa sa Quality Container Corporation Chapter;b) National Mines and Allied Workers' Union (NAMAWU); andc) No union (Rollo, pp. 24-25).Petitioner appealed this decision to the Secretary of Labor (OS-A-4-102-92). On June 17, 1992, the Secretary of Labor rendered a decision, denying the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the order of the Med-Arbiter.Hence, this petition.Petitioner contends that the assailed decision was issued in grave abuse of discretion for the

following reasons: (1) that Reynito de Pedro is not the authorized representative of respondent FFW-SMQCC, he being the duly elected president of petitioner; (2) that the filing of the second petition for certification election did not cure, much less correct, the defects in the first petition; and (3) that in the first and second petitions, the signatures of the 141 employees, who signified their support thereto, were either forged or pre-maturely obtained prior to the 60-day period before the expiration of the existing collective bargaining agreement.The petition is not impressed with merit.First, although Reynito de Pedro was the duly elected president of petitioner, he had disaffiliated himself therefrom and joined respondent FFW-SMQCC before the petition for certification election was filed on September 27, 1991. The eventual dismissal of De Pedro from the company is of no moment, considering that the petition for certification election was filed before his dismissal on August 22, 1992.Second, verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite (Buenaventura v. Uy, 149 SCRA 22 [1987]; In the Matter of the Change of Name of Antonina B. Oshita, 19 SCRA 700 [1967]). Even if verification is lacking and the pleading is formally defective, the courts may dispense with the requirement in the interest of justice and order of correction of the pleading accordingly. Generally, technical and rigid rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases; and this rule is specifically applied in certification election proceedings, which are non-litigious but merely investigative and non-adversarial in character (Associated Labor Unions v. Ferrer-Calleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989]); Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC, 149 SCRA 470 [1987]). Nevertheless, whatever formal defects existed in the first petition were cured and corrected in the second petition for certification election.Third, attached to the original petition for certification election was a list of 141 supporting signatures out of the 300 employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit to be represented by respondent FFW-SMQCC. Respondent QCC sought to delete from the list some 36 signatures which are allegedly forged and falsified. Petitioner, likewise, submitted a joint affidavit of 13 employees, disclaiming the validity of the signatures therein.Granting that 36 signatures were falsified and that 13 was disowned, this leaves 92 undisputed signatures which is definitely more than 75 — i.e., 25% of the total number of company employees required by law to support a petition for certification election. The disclaimer of 13 employees by their respective signatures covers only their own personal participation and cannot in any way be extended to include the rest of those who did not question the same.Moreover, the fact that the list of signatures is undated does not necessarily mean that the signatures were obtained prior to the 60-day period before the expiration of the existing collective bargaining agreement. What is important is that the petition for certification election must be filed during the freedom period and that the 25% requirement of supporting signatures be met upon the filing thereof. These requirements have been compiled by respondent FFW-SMQCC in their first and second petitions, and it was thus incumbent upon the Med-Arbiter to order a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file employees of the company (Labor Code of the Philippines, Art. 256; Warren Mfg. Workers' Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 159 SCRA 387 [1988]; Samahang Mangagawa ng Pacific Mills v. Noriel, 134 SCRA 152 [1985]).If indeed there are employees in the bargaining unit who refused to be represented by respondent FFW-SMQCC, with all the more reason should a certification election be held where the employees themselves can freely and voluntarily express by secret ballot their choice of bargaining representative. A certification election is the most effective and expeditious way to determine which labor organization can truly represent the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of the company (Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sec. of Labor, 201 SCRA 584 [1991]; National Association of Free Trade Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 164 SCRA 12 [1988]).We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Labor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.KATIPUNAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA DAUNGAN (KAMADA), petitioner, vs. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA and ASSOCIATED SKILLED AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES UNION (ASTEUO), respondents.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN, J.:

May a new labor union be organized and granted registration during the lifetime of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the company and another union?

The Case

This is the simple query brought before this Court by Petitioner Katipunan ng mga Manggagawa sa Daungan (KAMADA) via a petition[1] for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Order[2] dated February 27, 1992 of Public Respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), in BLR Case No. A-4-12-91 (NCR-0D-M-90-10-007) which reversed the resolution[3] of Med-Arbiter Edgardo De la Cruz. Public respondent disposed as follows:[4]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office having found that no ground exists for the cancellation of the union registration of ASTEOU [sic], the decision of Med-Arbiter de la Cruz is hereby reversed. Let, therefore, the certificate of registration of ASTEOU [sic] (Associated Skilled and Technical Employees Union of OTSI) be reinstated in the registry of Unions.The subsequent appeal filed by the counsel for the petitioner was treated as a motion for reconsideration and denied in the other assailed Order[5] dated March 20, 1992. Hence, this petition before us.

The Facts

Petitioner claims to be the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all workers in Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI).[6] After a certification election, it concluded a collective bargaining agreement with the company. Soon thereafter, in September 1990, private respondent union (ASTEUO) -- allegedly composed also of OTSI workers -- was registered.

Upon learning of such fact, Petitioner KAMADA filed a suit to cancel the registration of ASTEUO on the ground that the latters members were already covered by the existing collective bargaining agreement. Private respondent, on the other hand, claimed that its existence as a union could not be disturbed, as its registration was made during the freedom period when there was no collective bargaining agreement concluded as yet.

Private respondents registration was cancelled by the med-arbiter in his resolution dated November 27, 1990, finding that the organization of another union covering the same workers can no longer be considered as a labor protective [sic] activity under P.D. 1391[7] and that this will even be against the present policy of one union in one company.[8]

Private respondent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. As earlier stated, Public Respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja, director of the said office, reversed the decision of the med-arbiter and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

Petitioner accuses public respondent of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction and gross ignorance of the law. It argues that private respondent, contrary to Section 4 (f), Rule II, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, obtained its union registration beyond the last sixty (60) days of the existing CBA, and after participating in the certification election where it lost.

More specifically, petitioner raises in its Memorandum dated May 3, 1993, the following three grounds to reverse public respondents Order:[9]

1. That there was already an existing certified bargaining agent when it obtained its registration;2. The same cannot be considered as a labor productive activity under PD 1391; and3. It is against the policy of one union in one company.The Courts Ruling

Petitioners contentions are utterly devoid of merit.

First Issue: Timeliness of Registration

We quote hereunder public respondents disquisition which clearly shows the untenable position of petitioner:[10]

A perusal of the arguments advanced in this suit shows that some clarification is necessary regarding the present laws on union registration. First, nowhere does the law contemplate or even intimate that once a union of a bargaining unit has registered with the DOLE, this prevents all other would-be union from registering. The reasons are obvious. To establish such a rule would render superflous (sic) certification elections, and would establish in perpetuity anyone who had the good fortune, means or scheme to beat everyone else to the punch. Second, in order to establish order and effectively exercise this right, certain policies have been instituted. One such policy, taken from letter (f) of Section 4 of Rule II of Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, is that applications for union registration are not valid if filed within one year from certification elections and/or are done during the effectivity of a CBA unless filed within the freedom period.Anent the above, and the facts of this case, ASTEOUs [sic] union registration issued last September, 1990 cannot be assailed. The period of prohibition of union registration in relation to certification elections starts from the final proclamation of certification election results in a final decision of the DOLE or the Supreme Court. In the present case, the Order of the Secretary of DOLE was issued last October 31, 1990, a month after the registration of ASTEOU [sic]. Moreover, KAMADAs previous CBA expired on March 23, 1989, while its new CBA was not signed until April 25, 1991.It is settled that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, like the Labor Department,[11] which have acquired expertise in matters entrusted to their jurisdiction, are accorded by this Court not only respect but finality if supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence refers to that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[12]

In this case, the findings of the public respondent, particularly those on the dates of the registration and the signing of the CBA, are supported by substantial evidence. In fact, petitioner does not even contradict these findings.

Having ruled on the factual findings, we now take up the relevant labor regulations. Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,[13] prohibits not the registration of a new union but the holding of a certification election within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result. Clearly, private respondents

registration is not covered by the prohibition. In any event, the union registration was effected in September 1990, a month before the secretary of labor issued his decision on the result of the certification election on October 31, 1990. Hence, there was yet no certified bargaining agent when the private respondent was registered as a union.

Second Issue: Labor Productive Activity

Petitioner argues that private respondents registration cannot be considered a labor productive activity under PD 1391, specifically under paragraph 6 thereof which reads:

6. No petitions for certification election, for intervention or disaffiliation shall be entertained or given due course except within the 60-day freedom period immediately preceding the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.Very clearly, the foregoing provision does not help petitioner. It has nothing to do with the registration of a union. It deals only with petitions for certification election, intervention or disaffiliation and not -- we hazard being redundant -- to applications for registration of a new union.

Third Issue: One Union in One Company

As regards petitioners battle cry of one union in one company, this Court has already laid down in Knitjoy Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja[14] the exceptions to that policy. The Court, through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., held:

1. The suggested bias of the Labor Code in favor of the one company-one union policy, anchored on the greater mutual benefits which the parties could derive, especially in the case of employees whose bargaining strength could undeniably be enhanced by their unity and solidarity but diminished by their disunity, division and dissension, is not without exceptions.The present Article 245 of the Labor Code expressly allows supervisory employees who are not performing managerial functions to join, assist or form their separate union but bars them from membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees. It reads:ART. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. -- Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.This provision obviously allows more than one union in a company.Even Section 2 (c), Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, which seeks to implement the policy, also recognizes exceptions. It reads:SEC. 2. Who may file. -- Any legitimate labor organization or the employer, when requested to bargain collectively, may file the petition.The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor organization shall contain, among others:x x x

(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)The usual exception, of course, is where the employer unit has to give way to the other units like the craft unit, plant unit, or a subdivision thereof; the recognition of these exceptions takes into account the policy to assure employees of the fullest freedom in exercising their rights. (PASCUAL. C., Labor Relations Law, 1986, ed., 109) Otherwise stated, the one company-one union policy must yield to the right of the employees to form unions or associations for purposes not contrary to law, to self-organization and to enter into collective

bargaining negotiations, among others, which the Constitution guarantees. (Section 8, Article III and Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution).Moreover, the issue of which union truly represents the working force should be raised during the certification election, not during the registration period. Indeed, a certification election provides the most effective and expeditious mode to determine the real representatives of the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit.[15] It may be well to add that Section 5, Rule II, Book V[16] of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, enumerates the grounds for the denial of registration to local unions, and the existence of another union is not one of these grounds.G.R. No. 107610 November 25, 1994CRUZVALE, INC., petitioner, vs.HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER ANGELI M. TUYAY AND UNION OF FILIPINO WORKERS (UFW), respondents.Soo, Gutierrez, Leogardo & Lee for petitioner. QUIASON, J.:This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, to reverse and set aside the Decision dated September 25, 1992 of respondent Undersecretary of Labor and Employment and his Order dated October 13, 1992 in OS-MA-A-11-334-91.IOn July 23, 1991, private respondent, a labor union, filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office No. IV, a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file workers of petitioner, docketed as Case No. RO-400-9107-RU-0107.On August 27, 1991, petitioner filed its comment to the petition for certification election. It sought the denial of the petition on the following grounds:(a) That no charter certificate evidencing the organization of a local union therein was attached to the petition or submitted to the DOLE at the time the petition was filed;(b) That the respondent Union has not presented any proof that it is a legitimate labor organization; and(c) That the Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE has no jurisdiction over the petition since petitioner Company's place of business is located at Cubao, Quezon City, which is outside the jurisdiction of the said Regional Office. Consequently, it is the National Capital Region or NCR of the DOLE which has jurisdiction over said petition (Rollo, p. 7).On September 27, 1991, respondent Med-Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of private respondent, pertinent portion of which reads as follows:Anent the first issue on the status of the petitioner, it is established that the petitioner is a legitimate organization with Dole Registration Certificate No. 11106 LC (FED) and has a local chapter in the respondent's company located at Cainta, Rizal. The existence of a local union is likewise undisputed as the same is evidenced by Charter Certificate No. 82 issued to it by the petitioner, United Filipino Workers, and submitted to this Office which automatically forms part of the records of this case.As regards the second and third issues on whether or not the herein petition is duly filed or not, the allegation of the respondent that the same is defective in form and substance since no charter certificate and signatories were attached thereto at the time of filing of this petition is unmeritorious and without legal basis.The respondent is an unorganized establishment which is governed by Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, which read as follows:Petitions in unorganized establishments. — In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization (Rollo, pp. 74-75).

Petitioner appealed the said order to the DOLE. The latter, thru respondent Undersecretary, upheld the order of respondent Med-Arbiter.Not satisfied with the decision of the DOLE, petitioner filed the instant petition and assigned the following errors:1RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING A PATENTLY NULL AND VOID DECISION OF THE MED-ARBITER HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION WAS FILED BY A LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION.2RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN LIMITING THE CERTIFICATION ELECTION TO PETITIONER'S EMPLOYEES AT CAINTA, THEREBY DISENFRANCHISING THE OTHER REGULAR RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF PETITIONER COMPANY AND INSPITE OF A FINAL ORDER CALLING FOR A CERTIFICATION ELECTION TO BE PARTICIPATED IN BY ALL REGULAR RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES.3RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE AMENDED OUT OF HIS OWN WILL AND DERIVED A PROVISION OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES WITHOUT ANY BASIS OR AUTHORITY IN THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED.IIAs to the first assigned error, petitioner avers that private respondent is not a legitimate labor organization, "considering that its local or chapter, at the time said petition was filed, did not undergo the rudiments of registration required under Section 3, Rule II, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code and the pronouncements made by this Court in Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment (205 SCRA 802) . . ." (Rollo, pp. 13-14).The Med-Arbiter found that private respondent was issued Certificate of Registration No. 11106 and Charter Certificate No. 82.Findings of fact of labor officials are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court when supported by substantial evidence (Five J Taxi v. National Labor Relations Commission, 212 SCRA 225 [1992]).Progressive Development Corporation, (supra.) is inappropriate to the case at bench. Thereat, the union failed to show that it had complied with the statutory requirements of Section 3, Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The copy of the constitution and by-laws and list of officers submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations by the union were not certified under oath by the union secretary.As to the second assigned error, petitioner claims that respondent Undersecretary should not have limited the certification election to petitioner's employees at the garment factory in Cainta but should have also covered those employed in the cinema business.We agree with the following observation made by respondent Undersecretary in his Decision dated September 25, 1992:As regards the question on the composition of the bargaining unit, we stress once more that the call for the conduct of election covers all the regular rank-and-file employees of Cruzvale, Inc. at its garment manufacturing corporation. The use of the pronoun "all" in our decision dated 16 December 1991 refers to all aforementioned employees at the garment manufacturing operation based on the finding that they were the ones sought to be represented by the petitioner as clearly reflected on the face of the petition and as embodied in the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 24 April 1992 which was affirmed by this Office on appeal.Moreover, as stated in the questioned Decision the employees at the Cinema operation and those at the garment manufacturing operation do not share commonality of interest as the

former clearly perform work entirely different from that of the latter. Thus, their separation into two (2) distinct bargaining units is proper. This is in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Belyca Corporation v. Dir. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, et al., G.R. No. 77395, 26 November 1988 (Rollo,p. 42; Emphasis supplied).As to the third assigned error, petitioner contends that the petition for certification election should have been filed with the regional office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the employer in accordance with Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Rollo, p. 27). Said section provides:Where to file. A petition for certification election shall be filed with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the Employer. The petition shall be in writing and under oath (Emphasis supplied).The word "jurisdiction" as used in said provision refers to the venue where the petition for certification must be filed. Unlike jurisdiction, which implies the power of the court to decide a case, venue merely refers to the place where the action shall be brought (Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. v. Araneta, Inc., 72 SCRA 347 [1976]). Venue touches more the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case (Consolidated Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 198 SCRA 34 [1991]).Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code refers only to cases where the place of work of the employees and the place of the principal office of the employer are within the same territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Office where the petition for certification election is filed. The said provision does not apply to the filing of petitions for certification election where the place of work of the employees and the place of principal office of the employer are located within the territorial jurisdictions of different regional offices. We assume that in the drafting of the Omnibus Rules, the Secretary of Labor and Employment took into consideration the fact that there are many companies with factories located in places different from places where the corporate offices are located.The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as complainant, petitioner or respondent, as the case may be, the nearest governmental machinery to settle a labor dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal and the employer must in no case be allowed a choice in favor of another competent agency sitting in another place to the inconvenience of the worker (Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 209 SCRA 834 [1992]).Petitioner has not shown how it will be prejudiced by the hearing on the petition for certification election before the Regional Office No. IV, which has its offices in Quezon City, the same city where the principal place of business of petitioner is located. Petitioner is, therefore, being unreasonable in demanding that the petition for certification election be filed with the National Capital Region Office, which holds offices in Manila.Unlike in the Rules governing the procedure before Regional Offices, the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission prescribes that all cases in which labor arbiters have jurisdiction should be filed in the branch office which has territorial jurisdiction over the "workplace of the complainant/petitioner" (Rule IV, Sec. 1[a]). The NLRC Rules defines the workplace as follows:For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment or travel. . . .The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code has no provision as to when an objection to improper venue may be raised. The Med-Arbiter ruled that where the employer had appeared twice at the hearing of the petition for certification election without questioning the venue, said employer was barred from raising the issue in the subsequent proceedings. He observed:. . . This practice of deliberately delaying the legal proceedings cannot be countenanced any

further, otherwise, the ends of justice will forever be defeated. We don't see any reason for the respondent to delay as it did, the proceedings of the case only to assail later on the jurisdiction of the office. This issue could have been brought up or objected to during the initial hearing (Rollo, p. 77).The stance of the Med-Arbiter, that the question of the venue in representation cases should be raised at the first hearing, was accepted by respondent Undersecretary. We are not prepared to say that said administrative Officials have gravely abused their discretion.G.R. No. 93117 August 1, 1995LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP) and COMMERCIAL AND AGRO-INDUSTRIAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (CAILO),respondents. VITUG, J.:The decision of public respondent, assailed in this petition for certiorari, is anchored on Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides:Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. — In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization.The Med-Arbiter, sustained by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, has ruled that the above provision is mandatory and gives him no other choice than to conduct a certification election upon the receipt of the corresponding petition.On 26 July 1989, private respondent National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines-TUCP ("NACUSIP-TUCP") filed with the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") Regional Office No. VI, Bacolod City, a petition for direct certification or for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the supervisory employees of herein petitioner, Lopez Sugar Corporation ("LSC"), at its sugar central in Fabrica, Sagay, Negros Occidental.In its petition, docketed Case No. RO6-MA-021-89, NACUSIP-TUCP averred that it was a legitimate national labor organization; that LSC was employing 55 supervisory employees, the majority of whom were members of the union; that no other labor organization was claiming membership over the supervisory employees; that there was no existing collective bargaining agreement covering said employees; and that there was no legal impediment either to a direct certification of NACUSIP-TUCP or to the holding of a certification election. 1

In its comment and opposition, dated 14 August 1989, LSC contended, among other things, that the petition was bereft of any legal or factual basis; that the petition was nothing more than a useless scrap of paper designed to harass the company; and that its employees above the rank-and-file category were in truth unaware of the petition. 2

On 18 August 1989, the Commercial and Agro-Industrial Labor Organization ("CAILO"), a registered labor organization also claiming to count substantial membership among the LSC supervisory employees, moved to intervene. 3 The motion was granted. 4

On 22 August 1989, NACUSIP-TUCP submitted Charter Certificate No. 003-89, dated 20 July 1989, of the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter. 5 LSC, on its part, submitted a list of its employees above the rank-and-file status preparatory to the inclusion/exclusion proceedings. 6

On 13 September 1989, one Carlos S. Gevero, asserting a right to represent the "supervisors of LSC," filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of interest on the part of the supervisory employees. 7

At the hearing of 20 September 1989, both NACUSIP-TUCP and CAILO failed to appear. Hearing was re-set for 29 September 1989 8 but, again, neither NACUSIP-TUCP nor CAILO appeared. On 16 October 1989, nonetheless, Med-Arbiter Felizardo T. Serapio issued an Order 9 granting the petition. He ruled that under Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended, the Med-Arbiter was left with no option but to order the conduct of a certification election immediately upon the filing of the petition, holding that the subsequent disaffiliation or withdrawals of members did not adversely affect the standing of the petition. The dispositive portion of his Order read:VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of the Lopez Sugar Central, filed by the NACUSIP-TUCP is, as it is hereby GRANTED with the following choices:1) National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Phils. (NACUSIP-TUCP);2) Commercial and Agro-Industrial Labor Organization (CAILO);3) No Union.The designated representation officer is hereby directed to call the parties to a pre-election conference to thresh out the mechanics of the certification election, including the inclusion and exclusion of voters and to conduct the election within twenty (20) days from receipt by the parties of this Order. The list submitted by the Employer (LSC Employees other than rank and file) shall be used to determine the eligible voters.SO ORDERED. 10

LSC appealed to the DOLE and asseverated that the order was a patent nullity and that the Med-Arbiter acted with grave abuse of discretion. 11

In denying the appeal, the Secretary of Labor, in his Decision of 06 March 1990, has likewise ruled that the holding by the Med-Arbiter of a certification election is mandatory under Article 257 of the Labor Code; that the subsequent withdrawals and disauthorization/disaffiliation of some supervisory personnel in the petition for certification election could not bar its being granted; and that a certification election is still the most appropriate means to finally settle the issue of representation. 12

Hence, this petition for certiorari; it is argued that —Public Respondent Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment (has) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it refused to dismiss a petition for certification election despite clear lack of legal and factual basis for holding the same. 13

The Solicitor General agrees with public respondent in arguing that the tenor of Article 257 (supra) of the Labor Code is one of command. He cites paragraph 2, Section 6, Rule V, Book V, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, to the effect that once "a petition (is) filed by a legitimate organization involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a certification election," which is designed, he continues, to give substance to the workers' right to self- organization. 14 Petitioner promptly retorts that it has no quarrel with public respondent on the objectives of the law but it points out that the application of Article 257 clearly must first be occasioned by a genuine petition from a legitimate labor organization.Not too long ago, the Court already had an opportunity to pass upon this very issue in Progressive Development Corporation vs. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, 15 where we said:But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the automatic conduct of a certification election in an unorganized establishment, it also requires that the petition for certification election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. Article 242 enumerates

the exclusive rights of a legitimate labor organization among which is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.Meanwhile, Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE andincludes any branch or local thereof." (Emphasis supplied) Rule I, Section 1(j), Book V of the Implementing Rules likewise defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch, local or affiliate thereof." (Emphasis supplied)Indeed, the law did not reduce the Med-Arbiter to an automaton which can instantly be set to impulse by the mere filing of a petition for certification election. He is still tasked to satisfy himself that all the conditions of the law are met, and among the legal requirements is that the petitioning union must be a legitimate labor organization in good standing.The petition for certification election, in the case at bench, was filed by the NACUSIP-TUCP, a national labor organization duly registered with the DOLE render Registration Certificate No. FED-402-6390-IP. The legitimate status of NACUSIP-TUCP might be conceded; being merely, however, an agent for the local organization (the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter), the federation's bona fide status alone would not suffice. The local chapter, as its principal, should also be a legitimate labor organization in good standing. Accordingly, in Progressive Development, we elucidated:In the case of union affiliation with a federation, the documentary requirements are found in Rule II, Section 3(e), Book V of the implementing Rules, which we again quote as follows:(c) The local or chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall be observed. (Emphasis supplied)Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions" refers to the certification and attestation requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter must likewise comply with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists in the case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact compliance with the certification and attestation requirements because, as previously mentioned, several requirements applicable to independent union registration are no longer required in the case of the formation of a local or chapter. The policy of the law in conferring greater bargaining power upon labor unions must be balanced with the policy of providing preventive measures against the commission of fraud.A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon submission of the following to the BLR:1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president.Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization.16

The only document extant on record to establish the legitimacy of the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter is a charter certificate and nothing else. The instant petition, at least for now, must thus be GRANTED.WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Secretary of Labor, dated 06 March 1990, affirming that of the Med-Arbiter, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petition for certification election is dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 97020 June 8, 1992CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ABD FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (FFW), CALIFORNIA MFG. CORP. SUPERVISORS UNION CHAPTER (CALMASUCO), respondents. PARAS, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking to annul and set aside the (a) resolution * of the Department of Labor and Employment dated October 16, 1990 in OS-A-10-283-90 (NCR-OD-M-90-05-095) entitled "In Re: Petition for Certification Election Among the Supervisors of California Manufacturing Corporation, Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Mfg. Corp. Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), petitioner-appellee, California Manufacturing Corporation, employer-appellant" which denied herein petitioner's appeal and affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter Arsenia Q. Ocampo dated August 22, 1990 directing the conduct of a certification election among the supervisory employees of California Manufacturing Corporation, and (b) the Order ** of the same Department denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.As culled from the records, the following facts appear undisputed:On May 24, 1990, a petition for certification election among the supervisors of California Manufacturing Corporation (CMC for brevity) was filed by the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) — California Manufacturing Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), alleging inter alia, that it is a duly registered federation with registry certificate no. 1952-TTT-IP, while FFW-CALMASUCO Chapter is a duly registered chapter with registry certificate no. 1-AFBI-038 issued on May 21, 1990 (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 63); that the employer CMC employs one hundred fifty (150) supervisors; that there is no recognized supervisors union existing in the company; that the petition is filed in accordance with Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715; and that the petition is nevertheless supported by a substantial member of signatures of the employees concerned (Annexes "E" and "F", Ibid., pp. 28-29).In its answer, CMC, now petitioner herein, alleged among others, that the petition for the holding of a certification election should be denied as it is not supported by the required twenty-five percent (25%) of all its supervisors and that a big number of the supposed signatories to the petition are not actually supervisors as they have no subordinates to supervise, nor do they have the powers and functions which under the law would classify them as supervisors (Annex "D", Ibid., P. 25).On July 24. 1990, FFW—CALMASUCO filed its reply maintaining that under the law, when there is no existing unit yet in a particular bargaining unit at the time a petition for certification election is filed, the 25% rule on the signatories does not apply; that the "organized establishment" contemplated by law does not refer to a "company" per se but rather refers to a "bargaining unit" which may be of different classifications in a single company; that CMC has at least two (2) different bargaining units, namely, the supervisory (unorganized) and the rank-and-file (organized); that the signatories to the petition have been performing supervisory functions; that since it is CMC which promoted them to the positions, of supervisors. it is already estopped from claiming that they are not supervisors; that the said supervisors were excluded from the coverage of the collective bargaining agreement of its rank-and-file employees; and that the contested signatories are indeed supervisors as shown in the "CMC Master List of Employees" of January 2, 1990 and the CMS Publication (Annex "G", Ibid., p 30).On August 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order, the decretal portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that a certification election be

conducted among the supervisory employees of California Manufacturing Corporation within twenty (20) days from receipt hereof with the usual pre-election conference of the parties to thresh out the mechanics of the election The payroll of the company three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition shall be used as the basis in determining the list of eligible voters.The choices are:1. Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California Manufacturing Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter (CALMASUCO); and2. No union.SO ORDERED. (Annex "H" Ibid., p. 33).CMC thereafter appealed to the Department of Labor and Employment which, however, affirmed the above order in its assailed resolution dated October 16, 1990 (Annex, "B", Ibid, a 18) CMC's subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied in its order dated November 17, 1990 (Annex "A", Ibid., p. 15), hence, his petition.a) whether or not the term "unorganized establishment' in Article 257 of the tabor Code refers to a bargaining unit or a business establishment;b) whether or not non-supervisors can participate in a supervisor's certification election; andc) whether or not the two (2) different and separate plants of herein petitioner in Parañaque and Las Piñas can be treated as a single bargaining unit.The petition must be denied.The Court has already categorically ruled that Article 257 of the Labor code is applicable to unorganized labor organizations and not to establishments where there exists a certified bargaining agent which had previously entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the management (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja, G.R. No. 85085, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 127) (Emphasis supplied). Otherwise stated, the establishment concerned must have no certified bargaining agent (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja G.R. No. 82260, July 19, 1989, 175 SCRA 490). In the instant case, it is beyond cavil that the supervisors of CMC which constitute a bargaining unit separate and distinct from that of the rank-and-file, have no such agent. thus they correctly filed a petition for certification election thru union FFW-CALMASUCO, likewise indubitably a legitimate labor organization. CMC's insistence on the 25% subscription requirement, is clearly immaterial. The same has been expressly deleted by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6715 and is presently prescribed only in organized establishments, that is, those with existing bargaining agents. Compliance with the said requirement need not even be established with absolute certainty. The Court has consistently ruled that "even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% (now 25%) of the labor force asking for a certification election had not been strictly compiled with, the Director (now the Med-Arbiter) is still empowered to order that it be held precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which of the contending labor organizations shall be the exclusive collective bargaining agent (Atlas Free Workers Union (AFWU)-PSSLU Local v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-51905, May 26, 1981, 104 SCRA 565). The requirement then is relevant only when it becomes mandatory to conduct a certification election. In all other instances, the discretion, according to the rulings of this Tribunal, ought to be ordinarily exercised in favor of a petition for certification (National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU-UIF) v. Luna, et al., G.R. No. L-46722, June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA 607).In any event, CMC as employer has no standing to question a certification election (Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation v. Calleja, et al., G.R. No. 77415, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 477). Such is the sole concern of the workers. The only exception is where the employer has to file the petition for certification election pursuant to Article 259 (now 258) of the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain collectively. Thereafter, the role of the employer in the certification process ceases. The employer becomes merely a bystander. Oft-quoted is the pronouncement of the Court on management interference in certification elections, thus:On matters that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a collective

bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an intruder, His participation, to say the least, deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference with purely internal affair of labor. (Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano. G.R. No. L-61153 January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA 64 citing Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, G.R No. L-47752 July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469, 473).G.R. No. 96635 August 6, 1992ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, INC., petitioner, vs.HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT; HON. TOMAS F. FALCONITIN MED-ARBITER, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, DEPT. OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT; LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA AG & P-SMSG-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (LAKAS-NFL), respondents.Herrera, Laurel, De los Reyes, Roxas & Teehankee for petitioners.Jose C. Espinas for private respondent. NOCON, J.:This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order to annul and set aside the Order dated December 11, 1990 of the Department of Labor and Employment affirming its Resolution dated November 22, 1990 and the Order of the Med-Arbiter in ordering that a certification election among the regular project employees of the herein petitioner Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. at its Steel and Marine Structures Group (AG&P-SMSG) be conducted immediately.The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:Petitioner Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. is engaged in the construction and fabrication business and conducts its construction business in different construction sites here and abroad while its fabrication operations are conducted by its Steel and Marine Structures Group at its Batangas Marine and Fabrication Yard ("BMFY," for brevity) in Bauan, Batangas where the steel structures and other heavy marine works are fabricated.In the exercise of its management prerogative, petitioner has adopted the practice of hiring project employees when existing fabrication capacity cannot absorb increases in job orders for steel structures and other heavy construction works. Said project employees are covered by the Project Worker/Reliever Employment Agreements which indicate the specific projects to which they are assigned and the duration of their employment. Upon the expiration of their contracts/agreements, the employment of these employees is automatically terminated unless the projects to which they are assigned have not yet been completed, in which case, they are rehired for the remainder of the project. The positions occupied by the regular rank-and-file employees and the project employees are basically similar in nature and are directly related to the main line of petitioner's business.On June 8, 1990, petitioner executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the AG&P United Rank & File Association ("URFA," for brevity) which is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. 1 Said Collective Bargaining Agreement was subsequently registered on July 9, 1990 with the Bureau of Labor Relations and Certificate of Registration No. BLR-90-0131 was issued.On June 29, 1990, private respondent Lakas ng Manggagawa sa AG&P-SMSG-National Federation of Labor ("LAKAS-NFL," for brevity) filed a Petition for Certification Election with the Med-Arbitration Unit to be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the regular non-project employees of the Steel and Marine Structure at the BMFY representing approximately 1,000 employees or that a certification be conducted among said employees. 2

On September 25, 1990, public respondent Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin of the

Department of Labor and Employment issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that certification election among the regular "Project Workers"/employees of Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. at its Steel and Marine Structures Group (AG&P-SMSG) be conducted immediately. The Representation Officer is hereby directed to conduct the usual pre-election conference in connection thereof with the following choices to consider:1 Lakas Ng Manggagawa Sa AG&P-SMSG National Federation of Labor (LAKAS-NFL); and2 No Union.SO ORDERED. 3

On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed an appeal with the Department of Labor and Employment. 4

On October 26, 1990, 691 alleged project employees sought to be represented by private respondent LAKAS-NFL were formally issued regular employment appointments by the petitioner effective November 1, 1990 which were accepted by said project employees.Thereafter, in a Resolution dated November 22, 1990, public respondent Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit.On November 28, 1990, petitioner's project employees at its SMSG site who were not given regular employment appointment on October 26, 1990 went on strike and completely paralyzed petitioner's operations in Bauan, Batangas. Said strike was settled in a conciliation conference convened by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board on December 8, 1990 when an Agreement was reached by the petitioner and private respondent LAKAS-NFL wherein petitioner agreed to formally regularize all the remaining alleged project employees with at least one year of service pending the final outcome of the certification election case. 5

Thereafter, 686 additional regular project employees were regularized effective December 1, 1990 in pursuance to said Agreement.On December 6, 1990, petitioner received a letter from URFA informing the former about the admission into URFA of the membership of 410 regular project employees who were formally regularized by the petitioner effective November 1, 1990.On that same date, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the Resolution dated November 22, 1990 alleging that the employees sought to be represented by the private respondent LAKAS-NFL are regular employees of the petitioner and are deemed included in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement of the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner which motion was subsequently denied by the public respondent Undersecretary Laguesma in an Order dated December 11, 1990.Hence, this petition assailing said Order and Resolution on the following grounds:I. RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTION DATED 22 NOVEMBER 1990 AND THE ORDER DATED 11 DECEMBER 1990 IN THAT THEY FAILED TO HOLD THAT THE CONTRACT-BAR RULE APPLIES TO THE INSTANT CASEII. RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTION DATED 22 NOVEMBER 1990 AND THE ORDER DATED 11 DECEMBER 1990 IN THAT THEY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE SUPERVENING FACT THAT THE BARGAINING UNIT OF THE ALLEGED REGULAR PROJECT WORKERS HAS CEASED TO EXIST BY VIRTUE OF THE REGULARIZATION OF ALL THE ALLEGED PROJECT WORKERS WITH AT LEAST ONE YEAR OF SERVICE 6

The contentions of the petitioner are meritorious.Section 1 of Article II of petitioner's Collective Bargaining Agreement with URFA defined appropriate bargaining unit as follows:ARTICLE IISCOPESec. 1. Appropriate Bargaining Unit — The appropriate bargaining unit covered by this Agreement consists of those regular rank-and-file employees of the COMPANY who have remained as such up to the date of execution of this Agreement, as well as those who may hereafter acquire the same status. It is hereby understood and agreed that the following are not within the appropriate bargaining unit and, therefore, this Agreement is not applicable to them, to wit:a Executives, division department and section heads, staff members, managerial employees, and executive secretaries;b Workers hired by the COMPANY as project employees as contemplated by existing laws including relievers of regular employees who are sent abroad are not covered by this Contract. Provided, however, that regular employees who are assigned as relievers shall continue to be covered by this Contract, and provided further that relievers who are assigned to regular positions which may become vacant shall be duly considered for such regular positions after attaining the six months probationary period.c Security personnel. 7

Although the aforementioned definition does not include petitioner's regular project employees in the coverage of the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and the URFA, the regularization of all the regular project employees with at least one year of service and the subsequent membership of said employees with the URFA mean that the alleged regular project employees whom respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to represent are, in fact, regular employees by contemplation of law and included in the appropriate bargaining unit of said Collective Bargaining Agreement consequently, the bargaining unit which respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to represent has already ceased to exist.The Labor Code provides:Art. 232. Prohibition on Certification Election. — The Bureau shall not entertain any petition for certification election or any other action which may disturb the administration of duly registered existing collective bargaining agreements affecting the parties except under Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code.Paragraph 2 of Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations likewise provides:If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.Consequently, the existence of a duly registered Collective Bargaining Agreement between the petitioner and URFA, which is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner including the regular project employees with more than one year of service, bars any other labor organization from filing a petition for certification election except within the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.To rule otherwise would negate the legislative intent in the enactment of Article 232 of the Labor Code which was designed to ensure industrial peace between the employer and its employees during the existence of the collective bargaining agreement.WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious, the assailed Resolution of November 22, 1990 and the Order dated December 11, 1990 are hereby annuled and set aside. This temporary restraining order issued is made permanent. Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 85085 November 6, 1989ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), petitioner, vs.HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), respondents. GANCAYCO, J.:Is the contract bar rule applicable where a collective bargaining agreement was hastily concluded in defiance of the order of the med-arbiter enjoining the parties from entering into a CBA until the issue on representation is finally resolved? This is the primary issue in this special civil action for certiorari.The Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR) is a corporation established and existing pursuant to Philippine laws and is engaged in the manufacture and processing of copper cathodes with a plant operating in Isabel, Leyte. It employs more or less eight hundred fifty (850) rank-and-file employees in its departments.Petitioner Associated Labor Union (ALU) had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with PASAR which expired on April 1, 1987. Several days before the expiration of the said CBA or on March 23, 1987, private respondent National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) filed a petition for certification election with the Bureau of Labor Relations Regional Office in Tacloban City docketed as MED-ARB-RO VII Case No. 3-28-87, alleging, among others, that no certification election had been held in PASAR within twelve (12) months immediately preceding the filing of the said petition.Petitioner moved to intervene and sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that NAFLU failed to present the necessary signatures in support of its petition. In the order dated April 21, 1987, 1 Med-Arbiter Bienvenido C. Elorcha dismissed the petition. However, the order of dismissal was set aside in another order dated May 8, 1987 and the case was rescheduled for hearing on May 29, 1987. The said order likewise enjoined PASAR from entering into a collective bargaining agreement with any union until after the issue of representation is finally resolved. In the order dated June 1, 1987, 2 the petition for certification was dismissed for failure of NAFLU to solicit 20"7c of the total number of rank and file employees while ALU submitted 33 pages containing the signatures of 88.5% of the rank and file employees at PASAR.Private respondent appealed the order of dismissal to the Bureau of Labor Relations. While the appeal was pending, petitioner ALU concluded negotiations with PASAR on the proposed CBA. On July 24, 1987, copies of the newly concluded CBA were posted in four (4) conspicuous places in the company premises. The said CBA was ratified by the members of the bargaining unit on July 28, 1987. 3 Thereafter, petitioner ALU moved for the dismissal of the appeal alleging that it had just concluded a CBA with PASAR and that the said CBA had been ratified by 98% of the regular rank-and-file employees and that at least 75 of NAFLU's members renounced their membership thereat and affirmed membership with PEA-ALU in separate affidavits.In a resolution dated September 30, 1987, the public respondent gave due course to the appeal by ordering the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of PASAR with ALU, NAFLU and no union as choices, and denied petitioner 's motion to dismiss. 4

Both parties moved for reconsideration of the said resolution. However, both motions were denied by public respondent in the order dated April 22, 1988.Hence, the present petition. 5

The petition is anchored on the argument that the holding of certification elections in

organized establishments is mandated only where a petition is filed questioning the majority status of the incumbent union and that it is only after due hearing where it is established that the union claiming the majority status in the bargaining unit has indeed a considerable support that a certification election should be ordered, otherwise, the petition should be summarily dismissed. 6 Petitioner adds that public respondent missed the legal intent of Article 257 of the Labor Code as amended by Executive Order No. 111. 7

In effect, petitioner is of the view that Article 257 of the Labor Code which requires the signature of at least 20% of the total number of rank-and-file employees should be applied in the case at bar.The petition is devoid of merit.As it has been ruled in a long line of decisions, 8 a certification proceedings is not a litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character. As such, it is not covered by the technical rules of evidence. Thus, as provided under Article 221 of the Labor Code, proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not covered by the technical rules of procedure and evidence. The Court had previously construed Article 221 as to allow the NLRC or the labor arbiter to decide the case on the basis of position papers and other documents submitted without resorting to technical rules of evidence as observed in regular courts of justice. 9

On the other hand, Article 257 is applicable only to unorganized labor organizations and not to establishments like PASAR where there exists a certified bargaining agent, petitioner ALU, which as the record shows had previously entered into a CBA with the management. This could be discerned from the clear intent of the law which provides that —ART. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. — In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, the petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least twenty per cent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt and verification of such petition, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order the conduct of a certification election.Said article traverses the claim of the petitioner that in this case there is a need for a considerable support of the rank-and-file employees in order that a certification election may be ordered. Nowhere in the said provision does it require that the petition in organized establishment should be accompanied by the written consent of at least twenty percent (20%) of the employees of the bargaining unit concerned much less a requirement that the petition be supported by the majority of the rank-and-file employees. As above stated, Article 257 is applicable only to unorganized establishments.The Court reiterates that in cases of organized establishments where there exists a certified bargaining agent, what is essential is whether the petition for certification election wasfiled within the sixty-day freedom period. Article 256 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, provides:ART. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. — In organized establishments, when a petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the Department within the sixty-day period before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. To have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the unit. When an election which provides for three or more choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast, a run-off election shall be conducted between the choices receiving the two highest number of votes.Article 256 is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. The mere filing of a petition for certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the respondent Director

to order the holding of a certification election.Was the petition filed by NAFLU instituted within the freedom period? The record speaks for itself. The previous CBA entered into by petitioner ALU was due to expire on April 1, 1987. The petition for certification was filed by NAFLU on March 23, 1987, well within the freedom period.The contract bar rule is applicable only where the petition for certification election was filed either before or after the freedom period. Petitioner, however, contends that since the new CBA had already been ratified overwhelmingly by the members of the bargaining unit and that said CBA had already been consummated and the members of the bargaining unit have been continuously enjoying the benefits under the said CBA, no certification election may be conducted, 10 citing, Foamtex Labor Union-TUPAS vs. Noriel, 11 and Trade Unions of the Phil. and Allied Services vs. Inciong. 12

The reliance on the aforementioned cases is misplaced. In Foamtex the petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the order of the Director of Labor Relations which in turn affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter calling for a certification election was dismissed by the Court on the ground that although a new CBA was concluded between the petitioner and the management, only a certified CBA would serve as a bar to the holding of a certification election, citing Article 232 of the Labor Code.Foamtex weakens rather than strengthens petitioner's stand. As pointed out by public respondent, the new CBA entered into between petitioner on one hand and by the management on the other has not been certified as yet by the Bureau of Labor Relations.There is an appreciable difference in Trade Unions of the Phil. and Allied Services (TUPAS for short). Here, as in Foamtex the CBA was not yet certified and yet the Court affirmed the order of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations which dismissed the petition for certification election filed by the labor union. In TUPAS, the dismissal of the petition for certification, was based on the fact that the contending union had a clear majority of the workers concerned since out of 641 of the total working force, the said union had 499 who did not only ratify the CBA concluded between the said union and the management but also affirmed their membership in the said union so that apparently petitioners therein did not have the support of 30% of all the employees of the bargaining unit.Nevertheless, even assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner herein has the majority of the rank-and-file employees and that some members of the NAFLU even renounced their membership thereat and affirmed membership with the petitioner, We cannot, however, apply TUPAS in the case at bar. Unlike in the case of herein petitioner, in TUPAS, the petition for certification election was filed nineteen (19) days after the CBA was signed which was well beyond the freedom period.On the other hand, as earlier mentioned, the petition for certification election in this case was filed within the freedom period but the petitioner and PASAR hastily concluded a CBA despite the order of the Med-Arbiter enjoining them from doing so until the issue of representation is finally resolved. As pointed out by public respondent in its comment, 13 the parties were in bad faith when they concluded the CBA. Their act was clearly intended to bar the petition for certification election filed by NAFLU. A collective bargaining agreement which was prematurely renewed is not a bar to the holding of a certification election. 14 Such indecent haste in renewing the CBA despite an order enjoining them from doing so 15 is designed to frustrate the constitutional right of the employees to self-organization. 16

Moreover, We cannot countenance the actuation of the petitioner and the management in this case which is not conducive to industrial peace.The renewed CBA cannot constitute a bar to the instant petition for certification election for the very reason that the same was not yet in existence when the said petition was filed. 17

The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. 18

Petitioner posits the view that to grant the petition for certification election would open the

floodgates to unbridled and scrupulous petitions the objective of which is to prejudice the industrial peace and stability existing in the company.This Court believes otherwise. Our established jurisprudence adheres to the policy of enhancing the welfare of the workers. Their freedom to choose who should be their bargaining representative is of paramount importance. The fact that there already exists a bargaining representative in the unit concerned is of no moment as long as the petition for certification was filed within the freedom period. What is imperative is that by such a petition for certification election the employees are given the opportunity to make known who shall have the right to represent them thereafter. Not only some but all of them should have the right to do so. 19 Petitioner's contention that it has the support of the majority is immaterial. What is equally important is that everyone be given a democratic space in the bargaining unit concerned. Time and again, We have reiterated that the most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force is by certification election. 20

Finally, petitioner insists that to allow a certification election to be conducted will promote divisiveness and eventually cause polarization of the members of the bargaining unit at the expense of national interest. 21

The claim is bereft of merit. Petitioner failed to establish that the calling of certification election will be prejudicial to the employees concerned and/or to the national interest. The fear perceived by the petitioner is more imaginary than real. If it is true, as pointed out by the petitioner, that it has the support of more than the majority and that there was even a bigger number of members of NAFLU who affirmed their membership to petitioner-union, then We see no reason why petitioner should be apprehensive over the issue. If their claim is true, then most likely the conduct of a certification election will strengthen their hold as any doubt will be erased thereby. With the resolution of such doubts, fragmentation of the bargaining unit will be avoided, and hence coherence among the workers will likely follow.Petitioner's claim that the holding of a certification election will be inimical to the national interest is far fetched. The workers are at peace with one another and their working condition is smooth. There has been no stoppage of work or an occurrence of a strike. With these facts on hand, to order otherwise will be repugnant to the well-entrenched right of the workers to unionism.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court in the resolution dated October 10, 1988 22 is hereby lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.SO ORDERED

PAMBANSANG KAPATIRAN NG MGA ANAK PAWIS SA FORMEY PLASTIC NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR, SECRETARY BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, FORMEY PLASTIC, INC., KALIPUNAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMAPI) and MED-ARBITER RASIDALI C. ABDULLAH, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The rank and file workers of Formey Plastic, Inc. (FORMEY), formed a local union known as Pambansang Kapatiran ng mga Anak Pawis sa Formey Plastic (KAPATIRAN) under the auspices of the National Workers Brotherhood (NWB). They ratified their Constitution and By-Laws on 4 April 1993.

On 22 April 1993 KAPATIRAN filed a Petition for Certification Election[1] with the Department of Labor and Employment Med-Arbiter Division alleging that there was no existing and effective Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between FORMEY and any union; neither was there any recognized union within the company.

FORMEY moved to dismiss the petition[2] while Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI) intervened and likewise moved to dismiss[3] on the ground that there was already a duly registered CBA covering the period 1 January 1992 to 31 December 1996 hence the contract bar rule[4] would apply. KAPATIRAN opposed both motions to dismiss[5] with an Addendum[6]thereto claiming that the CBA executed between FORMEY and KAMAPI was fraudulently registered with the Department of Labor and Employment and that it was defective since what was certified as bargaining agent was KAMAPI which, as a federation, only served as mere agent of the local union hence without any legal personality to sign in behalf of the latter.

Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah found that a valid and existing CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI effectively barred the filing of the petition for certification election.[7]

KAPATIRAN appealed[8] imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Med-Arbiter in applying the contract bar rule and in not adopting the case of Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment,[9] as authority to disregard the CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI. The Secretary of Labor acting through Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma upheld the decision of the Med-Arbiter. [10] The Motion for Reconsideration having been denied[11] KAPATIRAN now files this Petition for Certiorari[12] charging the Secretary of Labor with grave abuse of discretion in applying the contract bar rule literally and in ruling that the Progressive Development Corporation [13] case could not be invoked.

Pending resolution of the petition KAMAPI filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss[14] the instant petition contending that it had become moot and academic due to the cancellation of NWBs[15]certificate of registration and its delisting from the roll of labor federations. [16]

KAPATIRAN opposed the motion[17] claiming that the cancellation and delisting were not yet final and executory considering that it had filed a motion for reconsideration [18] with the Bureau of Labor Relations.

The rule is that findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies will not be disturbed unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion. We find none in the case at bench. We therefore affirm that there is a validly executed collective bargaining agreement between FORMEY and KAMAPI.

Art. 253-A of the Labor Code provides that (n)o petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty (60) day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five-year term of the collective bargaining agreement. Sec. 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides that x x x (i)f a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article .231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.

The subject agreement was made effective 1 January 1992 and is yet to expire on 31 December 1996. The petition for certification election having been filed on 22 April 1993 it is therefore clear that said petition must fail since it was filed before the so-called 60-day freedom period. KAPATIRAN insists that the CBA was a fake it having been surreptitiously registered with the Department of Labor and Employment.

The resolution of this issue hinges on the determination of factual matters which certainly is not within the ambit of the present petition for certiorari. Besides, the contention is without any legal basis at all; it is purely speculative and bereft of any documentary support. Petitioner itself even admitted the existence of an agreement but argued that its provisions were not being implemented nor adhered to at all. Suffice it to mention that the filing of the petition for certification election is not the panacea to this allegedly anomalous situation. Violations of collective bargaining agreements constitute unfair labor practice as provided for under Art. 248, par. (i), of the Labor Code. In consonance thereto, Art. 261 equips petitioner with the proper and appropriate recourse

-Art. 261. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement x x x Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provision of such agreement.

The CBA entered into between FORMEY and KAMAPI stipulates among others

Article IX - GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

Sec. 1. Any complaint, grievance, difficulty, disagreement or dispute arising out of any section taken (sic) by the Company and/or by the Union concerning the interpretation of the terms and conditions of the agreement and/or which may arise regarding (sic) the terms and conditions of employment shall be settled in the manner provided for under this Article.Sec. 2. The Company and the Union agree to create and establish a Grievance Committee composed of two (2) representatives from the Company and two (2) from the Union to receive complaint, grievance or dispute from the workers and/or from the Company with the view to settle it amicably.Sec. 3. In case a complaint or grievance has been filed by either the Union or the Company, the grievance committee shall discuss the same and have (sic) to settle it. If after the meeting of the grievance committee no satisfactory settlement is reached the matter shall be referred to the top officers of the Union and the Company for the settlement of the said grievance or dispute.Sec. 4. Within five (5) days from the time the top officers of the Union and the Company has (sic) failed to reach an amicable settlement of the grievance or dispute, the same shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration. The arbitrator or arbitrators shall be chosen by lottery and the union and the Company shall avail (sic) the list of arbitrators of the Honorable Bureau of Labor Relations.Sec. 5. The mutually agreed or chosen arbitrator shall proceed to try and hear the case and for (sic) the reception of evidence and to call witnesses to testify and after the submission of the case by both parties an award or order shall be issued in accordance with the rules and guidelines promulgated by the Honorable Department of Labor and Employment based on the pertinent laws and established jurisprudence. The expenses of the arbitration proceedings shall be borned (sic) equally by the Company and the Union.[19]

By filing the petition for certification election it is clear that KAPATIRAN did not avail of the abovementioned grievance procedure.

It is further argued that the CBA has no binding force since it was entered into by KAMAPI as a federation and not by the local union. Perusal of the agreement proves the contention flawed. The signatories for KAMAPI consisted of its national president and of the duly elected officers of the local union. Thus the fact that KAMAPI was particularly

mentioned as the bargaining party without specifying the local union cannot strip it of its authority to participate in the bargaining process. The local union maintains its separate personality despite affiliation with a larger national federation.[20]

The doctrine laid down in Progressive Development Corporation[21] is a mere clarification of the principle enunciated in Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc.[22]Both cases have provided that the mother union acting for and in behalf of its affiliate ha(s) the status of an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the association free to serve the common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-Laws of the association. Nonetheless, the facts and principles laid down in both cases do not jibe squarely with the case at bench. The controversy in Progressive Development Corporation[23] centered on the requirements before a local or chapter of a federation may file a petition for certification election and be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, while in Liberty Cotton Mills Workers[24] the issue involved was the disaffiliation of the local union from the federation The question of whether there was a valid and existing CBA, which is the question being resolved in the case at bench, was never raised in the two cited cases since it was already an accepted fact that the CBA was validly executed and existing.

Anent the Urgent Motion to Dismiss[25] filed by KAMAPI on the ground that the instant petition had become moot and academic due to the cancellation by the Bureau of Labor Relations of NWBs certificate of registration and its consequent delisting from the roll of labor federations, suffice it to state that at this juncture we cannot properly rule on the issue considering that KAMAPI has not proven that the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations has become final and executory taking into account KAPATIRANs filing of a motion for reconsideration with the Bureau. This notwithstanding, Sec. 9, Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Cose requires that an appeal be filed with the Bureau, or in case of cancellation by the Bureau, with the Secretary of Labor and Employment whose decision shall become final and no longer subject of appeal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated 15 August 1993 sustaining the order of the Med-Arbiter dated 31 May 1993 is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 89609 January 27, 1992NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP)-TUCP, petitioner, vs.HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, in her capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations; and the NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW)-FGT-KMU, respondents.Zoilo V. De la Cruz, Jr., Beethoven R. Buenaventura and Pedro E. Jimenez for petitioner.Manlapao, Drilon, Ymballa and Chavez for private respondent. MEDIALDEA, J.:This is a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the resolution issued by the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations Pura Ferrer-Calleja dated June 26, 1989 setting aside the order of the Med-Arbiter dated February 8, 1989 denying the motion to dismiss the petition and directing the conduct of a certification election among the rank and file employees or workers of the Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co. situated at Kabankalan, Negros Occidental.The antecedent facts giving rise to the controversy at bar are as follows:Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP) is a legitimate national labor organization duly registered with the Department of

Labor and Employment. Respondent Honorable Pura Ferrer-Calleja is impleaded in her official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor and Employment, while private respondent National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW-FGT-KMU) is a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment.Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., Inc. (Dacongcogon) based in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental employs about five hundred (500) workers during milling season and about three hundred (300) on off-milling season.On November 14, 1984, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and employer Dacongcogon entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for a term of three (3) years, which was to expire on November 14, 1987.When the CBA expired, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon negotiated for its renewal. The CBA was extended for another three (3) years with reservation to negotiate for its amendment, particularly on wage increases, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment.However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued on the matter of wage increases and optional retirement. In order to obviate friction and tension, the parties agreed on a suspension to provide a cooling-off period to give them time to evaluate and further study their positions. Hence, a Labor Management Council was set up and convened, with a representative of the Department of Labor and Employment, acting as chairman, to resolve the issues.On December 5, 1988, petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP filed a petition for direct certification or certification election among the rank and file workers of Dacongcogon.On January 27, 1989, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds, to wit:IThe Petition was filed out of time;IIThere is a deadlocked (sic) of CBA negotiation between forced intervenor and respondent-central. (Rollo, p. 25)On February 6, 1989, Dacongcogon filed an answer praying that the petition be dismissed.By an order dated February 8, 1989, the Med-Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and directed the conduct of certification election among the rank and file workers of Dacongcogon, the dispositive portion of which provides as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss the present petition is, as it is hereby DENIED. Let therefore a certification election among the rank and file employees/workers of the Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., situated at Kabankalan, Neg. Occ., be conducted with the following choices:(1) National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP);(2) National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW);(3) No Union.The designated Representation Officer is hereby directed to call the parties for a pre-election conference to thresh out the mechanics of the election and to conduct and supervise the same within twenty (20) days from receipt by the parties of this Order. The latest payroll shall be used to determine the list of qualified voters.SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 34)On February 9, 1989, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal alleging that the Honorable Med-Arbiter misapprehended the facts and the law applicable amounting to gross incompetence. Hence, private respondent prayed that the order of the Med-Arbiter be set aside and the motion to dismiss be reconsidered.On February 27, 1989, petitioner filed its opposition to the motion for reconsideration praying that the motion for reconsideration and/or appeal be denied for lack of merit.

On June 26, 1989, respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered a resolution reversing the order of the Med-Arbiter, to wit:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 8 February 1989 is hereby set aside and vacated, and a new one issued dismissing the above-entitled petition for being filed out of time.SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 46)Hence, this petition raising four (4) issues, to wit:I. RESPONDENT HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RENDERING HER RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989 REVERSING THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 8, 1989 OF MED-ARBITER FELIZARDO SERAPIO.II. THAT THE AFORESAID RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989 OF RESPONDENT PURA FERRER-CALLEJA IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.III. THAT THE AFORESAID RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989 OF RESPONDENT DIRECTOR PURA FERRER-CALLEJA DENIES THE RANK AND FILE EMPLOYEES OF THE DACONGCOGON SUGAR & RICE MILLING COMPANY, AND THE HEREIN PETITIONER NACUSIP-TUCP, THEIR LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.IV. THAT RESPONDENT DIRECTOR PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, IN RENDERING HER SAID RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989 WAS BIASED AGAINST PETITIONER NACUSIP-TUCP. (Rollo,p. 2)The controversy boils down to the sole issue of whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed after the 60-day freedom period.Petitioner maintains that respondent Director Calleja committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in rendering the resolution dated June 26, 1989 setting aside, vacating and reversing the order dated February 8, 1989 of Med-Arbiter Serapio, in the following manner:1) by setting aside and vacating the aforesaid Order dated February 8, 1989 of Med-Arbiter Felizardo Serapio and in effect dismissing the Petition for Direct or Certification Election of Petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP (Annex "A" hereof) without strong valid, legal and factual basis;2) by giving a very strict and limited interpretation of the provisions of Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, as amended, knowing, as she does, that the Labor Code, being a social legislation, should be liberally interpreted to afford the workers the opportunity to exercise their legitimate legal and constitutional rights to self-organization and to free collective bargaining;3) by issuing her questioned Resolution of June 26, 1989 knowing fully well that upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6715 on 21 March 1989 she had no longer any appellate powers over decisions of Med-Arbiters in cases of representation issues or certification elections;4) by ignoring intentionally the applicable ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa sa La Suerte-FOITAF vs. Noriel, L-45475, June 20, 1977;5) by clearly failing to appreciate the significance (sic) of the fact that for more than four (4) years there has been no certification election involving the rank and file workers of the Company; and,6) by frustrating the legitimate desire and will of the workers of the Company to determine their sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative through secret balloting. (Rollo, pp. 9-10)However, the public respondent through the Solicitor General stresses that the petition for certification election was filed out of time. The records of the CBA at the Collective Agreements Division (CAD) of the Bureau of Labor Relations show that the CBA between Dacongcogon and private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU had expired on November 14, 1987, hence, the petition for certification election was filed too late, that is, a period of more than

one (1) year after the CBA expired.The public respondent maintains that Section 6 of the Rules Implementing Executive Order No. 111 commands that the petition for certification election must be filed within the last sixty (60) days of the CBA and further reiterates and warns that any petition filed outside the 60-day freedom period "shall be dismissed outright." Moreover, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code enjoins the filing of a representation question, if before a petition for certification election is filed, a bargaining deadlock to which the bargaining agent is a party is submitted for conciliation or arbitration.Finally, the public respondent emphasizes that respondent Director has jurisdiction to entertain the motion for reconsideration interposed by respondent union from the order of the Med-Arbiter directing a certification election. Public respondent contends that Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6715 is not applicable, "(f)irstly, there is as yet no rule or regulation established by the Secretary for the conduct of elections among the rank and file of employer Dacongcogon; (s)econdly, even the mechanics of the election which had to be first laid out, as directed in the Order dated February 8, 1989 of the Med-Arbiter, was aborted by the appeal therefrom interposed by respondent union; and (t)hirdly, petitioner is estopped to question the jurisdiction of respondent Director after it filed its opposition to respondent union's Motion for Reconsideration (Annex 'F,' Petition) and without, as will be seen, in any way assailing such jurisdiction. . . ." (Rollo, p.66)We find the petition devoid of merit.A careful perusal of Rule V, Section 6, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by the rules implementing Executive Order No. 111 provides that:Sec. 6. Procedure — . . .In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a certification election if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the collective bargaining agreement. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright.The sixty-day freedom period based on the original collective bargaining agreement shall not be affected by any amendment, extension or renewal of the collective bargaining agreement for purposes of certification election.xxx xxx xxxThe clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that the petition for certification election filed by the petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP should be dismissed outright, having been filed outside the 60-day freedom period or a period of more than one (1) year after the CBA expired.It is a rule in this jurisdiction that only a certified collective bargaining agreement — i.e., an agreement duly certified by the BLR may serve as a bar to certification elections. (Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Estrella, G.R. No. 45323, February 20, 1989, 170 SCRA 378, 382) It is noteworthy that the Bureau of Labor Relations duly certified the November 14, 1984 collective bargaining agreement. Hence, the contract-bar rule as embodied in Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the rules implementing the Labor Code is applicable.This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty days prior to the expiry date of an existing collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within the freedom period, as it is called, when the said agreement is about to expire. The purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period. (Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) v. Trajano, G.R. No. 77539, April 12, 1989, 172 SCRA 49, 57 citing Associated Trade Unions (ATU v. Trajano, G.R. No. L-75321, 20 June 1988, 162 SCRA 318, 322-323)

Anent the petitioner's contention that since the expiration of the CBA in 1987 private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon had not concluded a new CBA, We need only to stress what was held in the case of Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers, Philippine Labor Union Association (G.R. No. 75700-01, 30 August 1990, 189 SCRA 179, 191) quoting Article 253 of the Labor Code that "(i)t shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties." Despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly executed. Hence, the contract bar rule still applies.Besides, it should be emphasized that Dacongcogon, in its answer stated that the CBA was extended for another three (3) years and that the deadlock was submitted to the Labor Management Council.All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the order of the Med-Arbiter.ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the resolution of the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations is hereby AFFIRMED.G.R. No. 115077 April 18, 1997PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION-PIZZA HUT, petitioner, vs.HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, in his capacity as Undersecretary of Labor, and NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA (NLM)-KATIPUNAN, respondents. KAPUNAN, J.:On July 9, 1993, Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan (respondent Union) filed a petition for certification election with the Department of Labor (National Capital Region) in behalf of the rank and file employees of the Progressive Development Corporation (Pizza Hut) docketed as NCR Case No. NCR-OD-M-9307-020. 1

Petitioner filed on August 20, 1993, a verified Motion to Dismiss the petition alleging fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in the respondent. Union's registration making it void and invalid. The motion specifically alleged that: a) respondent Union's registration was tainted with false, forged, double or multiple signatures of those who allegedly took part in the ratification of the respondent Union's constitution and by-laws and in the election of its officers that there were two sets of supposed attendees to the alleged organizational meeting that was alleged to have taken place on June 26, 1993; that the alleged chapter is claimed to have been supported by 318 members when in fact the persons who actually signed their names were much less; and b) while the application for registration of the charter was supposed to have been approved in the organizational meeting held on June 27, 1993, the charter certification issued by the federation KATIPUNAN was dated June 26, 1993 or one (1) day prior to the formation of the chapter, thus, there were serious falsities in the dates of the issuance of the charter certification and the organization meeting of the alleged chapter.Citing other instances of misrepresentation and fraud, petitioner, on August 29, 1993, filed a Supplement to its Motion to Dismiss, 2 claiming that:1) Respondent Union alleged that the election of its officers was held on June 27, 1993; however, it appears from the documents submitted by respondent union to the BIR-DOLE that the Union's constitution and by-laws were adopted only on July 7, 1993, hence, there was no bases for the supposed election of officers on June 27, 1993 because as of this date, there existed no positions to which the officers could be validly elected;2) Voting was not conducted by secret ballot in violation of Article 241, section (c) of the Labor Code;3) The Constitution and by Laws submitted in support of its petition were not properly

acknowledged and notarized. 3

On August 30, 1993, petitioner filed a Petition 4 seeking the cancellation of the Union's registration on the grounds of fraud and falsification, docketed as BIR Case No. 8-21-83. 5

Motion was likewise filed by petitioner with the Med-Arbiter requesting suspension of proceedings in the certification election case until after the prejudicial question of the Union's legal personality is determined in the proceedings for cancellation of registration.However, in an Order dated September 29, 1993, 6 Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah directed the holding of a certification election among petitioner's rank and file employees. The Order explained:. . . Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa ng Pizza Hut is a legitimate labor organization in contemplation of law and shall remain as such until its very charter certificate is canceled or otherwise revoked by competent authority. The alleged misrepresentation, fraud and false statement in connection with the issuance of the charter certificate are collateral issues which could be properly ventilated in the cancellation proceedings. 7

On appeal to the office of the Secretary of Labor, Labor Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma in a Resolution dated December 29, 1993 8 denied the same.A motion for reconsideration of the public respondent's resolution was denied in his Order 9

dated January 27, 1994, hence, this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court where the principal issue raised is whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Med-Arbiter's order to conduct a certification election among petitioner's rank and file employees, considering that: (1) respondent Union's legal personality was squarely put in issue; (2) allegations of fraud and falsification, supported by documentary evidence were made; and (3) a petition to cancel respondent Union's registration is pending with the regional office of the Department of Labor and Employment. 10

We grant the petition.In the public respondent's assailed Resolution dated December 29, 1993, the suggestion is made that once a labor organization has filed the necessary documents and papers and the same have been certified under oath and attested to, said organization necessarily becomes clothed with the character of a legitimate labor organization. The resolution declares:Records show that at the time of the filing of the subject petition on 9 July 1993 by the petitioner NLM-KATIPUNAN, for and in behalf of its local affiliate Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa ng Pizza Hut, the latter has been clothed with the status and/or character of a legitimate labor organization. This is so, because on 8 July 1993, petitioner submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), this Department, the following documents: Charter Certificate, Minutes of the Organizational Meeting, List of Officers, and their respective addresses, financial statement, Constitution and By-Laws (CBL, and the minutes of the ratification of the CBL). Said documents (except the charter certificate) are certified under oath and attested to by the local union's Secretary/Treasurer and President, respectively.As to the contention that the certification election proceedings should be suspended in view of the pending case for the cancellation of the petitioner's certificate of registration, let it be stressed that the pendency of a cancellation case is not a ground for the dismissal or suspension of a representation proceedings considering that a registered labor organization continues to be a legitimate one entitled to all the rights appurtenant thereto until a final valid order is issued canceling such registration. 11

In essence, therefore, the real controversy in this case centers on the question of whether or not, after the necessary papers and documents have been filed by a labor organization,

recognition by the Bureau of Labor Relations merely becomes a ministerial function.We do not agree.In the first place, the public respondent's views as expressed in his December 29, 1993 Resolution miss the entire point behind the nature and purpose of proceedings leading to the recognition of unions as legitimate labor organizations. Article 234 of the Labor Code provides:Art. 234. Requirements of registration. — Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements:(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual financial reports; and(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the members who participated in it.A more than cursory reading of the aforecited provisions clearly indicates that the requirements embodied therein are intended as preventive measures against the commission of fraud. After a labor organization has filed the necessary papers and documents for registration, it becomes mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to check if the requirements under Article 234 have been sedulously complied with. If its application for registration is vitiated by falsification and serious irregularities, especially those appearing on the face of the application and the supporting documents, a labor organization should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization. And if a certificate of recognition has been issued, the propriety of the labor organization's registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance with Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code, or indirectly, by challenging its petition for the issuance of an order for certification election.These measures are necessary — and may be undertaken simultaneously — if the spirit behind the Labor Code's requirements for registration are to be given flesh and blood. Registration requirements specifically afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or use the labor organization for illegitimate ends. 12 Such requirements are a valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and unions of workers are engaged directly affect the public interest and should be protected. 13

Thus, in Progressive Development Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 14

we held:The controversy in this case centers on the requirements before a local or chapter of a federation may file a petition for certification election and be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the petitioner's employees.xxx xxx xxxBut while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the automatic conduct of a certification election in an unorganized establishment, it also requires that the petition for certification election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization . . .xxx xxx xxx. . . The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it is dealing with is a bona-fide organization, one which has not submitted false statements or misrepresentations to the

Bureau. The inclusion of the certification and attestation requirements will in a marked degree allay these apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of any false statement and misrepresentation or ground for cancellation of registration (see Article 239 (a), (c) and (d)); it is also a ground for a criminal charge of perjury.The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures against the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or to use the union for dubious ends.xxx xxx xxx. . . It is not this Court's function to augment the requirements prescribed by law in order to make them wiser or to allow greater protection to the workers and even their employer. Our only recourse is, as earlier discussed, to exact strict compliance with what the law provides as requisites for local or chapter formation.xxx xxx xxxThe Court's conclusion should not be misconstrued as impairing the local union's right to be certified as the employees' bargaining agent in the petitioner's establishment. We are merely saying that the local union must first comply with the statutory requirements in order to exercise this right. Big federations and national unions of workers should take the lead in requiring their locals and chapters to faithfully comply with the law and the rules instead of merely snapping union after union into their folds in a furious bid with rival federations to get the most number of membersFurthermore, the Labor Code itself grants the Bureau of Labor Relations a period of thirty (30) days within which to review all applications for registration. Article 235 provides:Art. 235. Action on application. — The Bureau shall act on all applications for registration within thirty (30) days from filing.All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the organization, as the case may be, and attested to by its president.The thirty-day period in the aforecited provision ensures that any action taken by the Bureau of Labor Relations is made in consonance with the mandate of the Labor Code, which, it bears emphasis, specifically requires that the basis for the issuance of a certificate of registration should be compliance with the requirements for recognition under Article 234. Since, obviously, recognition of a labor union or labor organization is not merely a ministerial function, the question now arises as to whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Med-Arbiter's order in spite of the fact that the question of the Union's legitimacy was squarely put in issue and that the allegations of fraud and falsification were adequately supported by documentary evidence.The Labor Code requires that in organized and unorganized 15 establishments, a petition for certification election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. The acquisition of rights by any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a petition for certification election, first and foremost, depends on whether or not the labor organization has attained the status of a legitimate labor organization.In the case before us, the Med-Arbiter summarily disregarded the petitioner's prayer that the former look into the legitimacy of the respondent. Union by a sweeping declaration that the union was in the possession of a charter certificate so that "for all intents and purposes, Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa sa Pizza Hut (was) a legitimate labor organization." 16

Glossing over the transcendental issue of fraud and misrepresentation raised by herein petitioner, Med-Arbiter Rasidali Abdullah held that:The alleged misrepresentation, fraud and false statement in connection with the issuance of the charter certificate are collateral issues which could be ventilated in the cancellation proceedings. 17

It cannot be denied that the grounds invoked by petitioner for the cancellation of respondent Union's registration fall under paragraph (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code, to wit:

(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, the list of members who took part in the ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, the list of members who took part in the ratification;xxx xxx xxx(c) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses within thirty (30) days from election.xxx xxx xxxThe grounds ventilated in cancellation proceedings in accordance with Article 239 of the Labor Code constitute a grave challenge to the right of respondent Union to ask for certification election. The Med-Arbiter should have looked into the merits of the petition for cancellation before issuing an order calling for certification election. Registration based on false and fraudulent statements and documents confer no legitimacy upon a labor organization irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds on to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the labor organization, not being a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights, particularly the right to ask for certification election in a bargaining unit.As we laid emphasis in Progressive Development Corporation Labor, 18 "[t]he employer needs the assurance that the union it is dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has not submitted false statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau." Clearly, fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in obtaining recognition as a legitimate labor organization are contrary to the Med-Arbiter's conclusion not merely collateral issues. The invalidity of respondent Union's registration would negate its legal personality to participate in certification election.Once a labor organization attains the status of a legitimate labor organization it begins to possess all of the rights and privileges granted by law to such organizations. As such rights and privileges ultimately affect areas which are constitutionally protected, the activities in which labor organizations, associations and unions are engaged directly affect the public interest and should be zealously protected. A strict enforcement of the Labor Code's requirements for the acquisition of the status of a legitimate labor organization is in order.Inasmuch as the legal personality of respondent Union had been seriously challenged, it would have been more prudent for the Med-Arbiter and public respondent to have granted petitioner's request for the suspension of proceedings in the certification election case, until the issue of the legality of the Union's registration shall have been resolved. Failure of the Med-Arbiter and public respondent to heed the request constituted a grave abuse of discretion.WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED and the Resolution and Order of the public respondent dated December 29, 1993 and January 24, 1994, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE.The case is REMANDED to the Med-Arbiter to resolve with reasonable dispatch petitioner's petition for cancellation of respondent Union's registration.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-45057 February 28, 1977TODAY'S KNITTING FREE WORKERS UNION, petitioner, vs.DIRECTOR CARMELO C. NORIEL of the Bureau of Labor Relations, TODAY'S KNITTING COMPANY, INC., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL UNION COUNCIL respondents.Julius A. Magno for petitioner.Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Joselito B. Floro for respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel, etc.Federico Director Carmelo C. Noriel, for respondent Today's Knitting Company, Inc.Roberto B. Capoon Phil. National Union Council.

FERNANDO, J.:What is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition petition is an order of respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel requiring the holding of a certification election to determine who shall be the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in respondent's Today's Knitting Company, Inc. There was the imputation of arbitrariness in its issuance, raising a procedural due process question. Petitioner Union premised its claim on the contention that it has been the duly recognized bargaining agent with an existing collective bargaining contract. Respondents 1 were required to comment. On January 27, 1977, respondent Director did so in a pleading filed by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Reyanto S. Puno. Such comment as well as that submitted by respondent Philippine National Union Council were considered as answers, and the petition was deemed submitted for decision. It is quite evident even from a cursory perusal of the responsive pleadings filed by the respondents that the challenged order is precisely in accordance with Article 257 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is thus free from any infirmity. Much less could the allegation of arbitrariness be taken seriously. There was in addition the minor point raised that a memorandum circular of the Department of Labor was not observed by respondent Director. Outside of the well-settled principle that in certiorari proceedings, only a grave abuse of discretion would call for a reversal of the actuation complained of, a mere error of law not sufficing, it has likewise been pointed out in the comment of the Solicitor General that such memorandum circular, even on the assumption that there was no compliance with it, was issued on September 5, 1974 prior to the effectivity of the present Labor Code 2 which came into force on November 1 of that year. Clearly, the petition lacks merit. It could be that in its attempt to impart some measure of plausibility, petitioner Union was far from precise in its allegation of facts. Such a deficiency was remedied in the comment filed on behalf of respondent Director. The matter in controversy started with the Philippine National Union Council, on April 1, 1976, filing with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for the holding of a certification election. It set forth therein that its ranks comprise a majority of membership at the Today's Knitting C company, Inc. It was also stated that at the hearing of such petition, the signatures of its members authorizing the filing of the petition would be submitted. There was, on May 4, 1976, a petition for intervention on behalf of petitioner Today's Knitting Free Workers Union. It saw no need for a certification election, asserting that it had already been voluntarily recognized by the management as the bargaining representative. The Bureau of Labor Relations received on the same day ten one-page resolutions by the rank-and-file employees of respondent Today's Knitting Company, Inc. authorizing the filing of the petition for certification election with a total of two hundred (200) signatures. Respondent Company apparently looked with favor on the claim of petitioner as shown by a pleading dated June 21, 1976. It affirmed the assertion that intervenor union, now petitioner, had been recognized by management as representing the minority of the workers. Respondent Union countered with the allegation in a pleading dated June 29, 1976 that there was no legal bar to the petition for certification. On July 19, 1976, the Med-Arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez issued an order granting the petition for certification election. The matter was then appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. On September 9, 1976, respondent Director issued the challenged order denying the appeal. It ordered a certification election to be conducted by the Bureau within twenty days from receipt of the resolution. Hence this certiorari and prohibition petition with this Court. 3

As set forth at the outset, the petition cannot prosper.1. To sustain what on its face appears to be an insubstantial claim of failure to abide by statutory command as set forth in the Labor Code, petitioner would interpret its Article 257 of requiring that it be afforded the right to examine the alleged signatures of the employees comprising at least the 30% of the bargaining unit desirous of holding a certification election. That is a rather strained construction. The statutory provision reads:Requisites for certification election.—Any petition for certification election filed by any

legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least 30% of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt and verification of such petition, it shall be mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification election for the purpose of determining the representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all the employees in the unit. it speaks clearly and categorically. There is no element of ambiguity. What is required is that the petition for certification election should have in its favor "the written consent of at least 30% of all the employees in the bargaining unit. 4 The duty then cast on the Detector of Labor Relations is to ascertain whether there has been such a compliance. There is no doubt in this case there was evidence that more than a total of two-hundred signatures were obtained by respondent Union in seeking such a certification election. The respondent Director having satisfied himself that the codal requisite had been met, he had no choice but to order such certification. In the language of the above provision, "it shall be mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification election for the purpose of determining the representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all the employees in the unit." There is, therefore, no basis for the contention that a duty is cast on respondent Director to allow a rival labor organization, such as petitioner, to verify the authenticity of such signatures. At any rate, if there is any doubt as to the required number having been met, what better way is there than the holding of a certification election to ascertain which union really commands the allegiance of the rank-and-file employees.2. The comment of the Solicitor General likewise included this excerpt from this Court's recent decision in Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations: 5 "Petitioner's contention to the effect that the 30% requirement should be satisfied suffers from an ever graver flaw. It fails to distinguish between the right of a labor organization to be able to persuade 30% of the labor force to petition for a certification election, in which case respondent Bureau is left with no choice but to order it, and the power of such governmental agency precisely entrusted with the implementation of the collective bargaining process to determine, considering the likelihood that there may be several unions within a bargaining unit to order such an election precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which of them shall be the exclusive bargaining representative. The decision of respondent bureau of April 14, 1975 was intended for that purpose. That was why not only petitioner but also the Philippine Federation of Labor, the National Labor Union, the National Federation of Labor Unions and the Samahan ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani sa AG&P were included in the list of Labor Unions that could be voted on. To reiterate a thought already express what could be more appropriate than such a procedure if the goal desired is to enable labor to determine which of the competing organizations should represent if for the purpose of a collective bargaining contract? How then can it be seriously asserted that the decision now appealed could be stigmatized as contrary to law?"6

3. Such a holding reinforces the correctness of a decision arrived at by respondent Director and negates even more conclusively the imputation of arbitrariness. It is not amiss to state that petitioner has the same office address as Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions in Tondo, Manila. So with its counsel, Attorney Julius A. Magno. While it is a different member of the bar who appeared for such labor organization in the case abovecited, it thus appears that a more diligent study of pertinent decisions could have avoided the filing of this suit and thus hasten the effective and speedy implementation of the statutory scheme to have a certification election conducted precisely for the purpose of living true to the concept of industrial democracy. For the present, it suffices tip call the attention of counsel to the desirability of being acquainted with applicable decisions, especially one that strikes so close to home, even if, or perhaps more precisely when, the ruling is adverse to one's claim. That is to live true to his duty as an officer of the court on whose trustworthiness reliance may be placed.4. No much attention need be paid, as pointed out in the comment of the Solicitor General, to

the allegation in the petition that a memorandum circular of the Secretary of Labor dated September 5, 1974 was disregarded by respondent Director. It is true there was therein stated that where there is a bona fide union comprising the majority voluntarily recognized and in the process of negotiating a contract, an application for a certification election should not be entertained. In the first place, a memorandum circular certainly cannot prevail as against the very language of the statute. That is merely to state the obvious. In the second place, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, from and after November 1, 1974 when the present Labor Code became effective, previous circulars of the secretary of labor to take care of the transitional stage prior to its coming into force, certainly were deemed superseded. From any standpoint then, it cannot be gainsaid that the petition certainly lacks juridical basis. This Court is not called upon then to exercise its power to grant certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion. No abuse has been shown, much less one amounting to arbitrariness of sufficient gravity to call for the issuance of the writs prayed for.G.R. Nos. 94929-30 March 18, 1992PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PWUP), petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ATTY. ANASTACIO L. BACTIN, MED-ARBITER NCR-DOLE, Public Respondents; INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., (ICTSI) and ASSOCIATED PORT CHECKERS AND WORKERS UNION (APCWU), Private Respondents; SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA DAUNGAN (SAMADA) and PORT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND LABOR UNION (PEALU), Nominal Private Respondents, respondents. CRUZ, J.:There was muffled excitement among the workers of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) because its collective bargaining agreement with private respondents Associate Port Checkers and Workers Union (APCWU), the incumbent union, was due to expire on April 14, 1990. Other unions were seeking to represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA and were already plotting their moves.The first challenge to APCWU was hurled on March 14, 1990, when the Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition for certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the employees in the bargaining unit were submitted on March 26, 1990, or eleven days after the petition.On April 2, 1990, herein petitioner Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention.Still another petition for certification election was filed by the Port Employees Association and Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6, 1990. The consent signatures were submitted on May 11, 1990, or thirty-five days after the filing of the petition.The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated for joint decision. On April 26, 1990, APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on the ground that they did not comply with the requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted in part as follows:In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned through a verified petition by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the certification election by secret ballot if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the collective bargaining agreement and supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright. The twenty-five percent (25%) requirement shall be satisfied upon the filing of the petition, otherwise the petition shall be dismissed . (Emphasis supplied.)Specifically, APCWU faulted both petitions for non-compliance with the requirement for the

25% consent signatures at the time of filing. This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter in an order dated June 5, 1990, dismissing the consolidated petitions.1

PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor on June 28, 1990, arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not require the written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition for certification election. The principal petitioners did not appeal. On August 21, 1990, DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter and dismissed PWUP's appeal. 2

Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, which was concluded on September 28, 1990. This was ratified on October 7, 1990, by a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit, i.e., 910 out of the 1,223 members, and subsequently registered with the DOLE.PWUP is now before us, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent in the application of Article 256 of the Labor Code. The article provides in part as follows:Art. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. — In organized establishments, when a verified petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-day period before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot when the verified petition is supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five (25%) percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. . . .The petitioner argues that under this article, the Med-Arbiter should automatically order election by secret ballot when the petition is supported by at least 25% of all employees in the bargaining unit. SAMADA and PEALU substantially complied with the law when they submitted the required consent signatures several days after filing the petition. The petitioner complains that the dismissal of the petitions for certification election, including its own petition for intervention, had the effect of indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the ICTSI employees.Private respondent ICTSI maintains that the dismissal was based on Article 256 of the Labor Code as implemented by Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted above. Moreover, under Section 10, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, decisions of the Secretary in certification election cases shall be final and unappealable.ICTSI also cites the following ruling of this Court in Tupas v. Inciong: 3

We find no merit in the petition. As observed by the Solicitor General, while the petition of TUPAS for a certification election may have the written support of 30 per cent of all the workers of the bargaining unit, it is also an undisputed fact that UMI (the rival union of TUPAS) has a clear majority of the said workers, as shown by the fact that 499 workers out of the total working force of 641 have not only ratified the collective bargaining agreement concluded between UMI and LUSTEVECO, but also affirmed their membership in UMI so that there is no more need for holding a certification election. (Emphasis supplied.)For its part, APCWU questions PWUP's personality in these proceedings in view of the lack of consent signatures in its petition, and argues as well that the petitioner has no authority to represent SAMADA or PEALU, which had not appealed. The private respondent also invokes Tupas and maintains that the ratification of the new CBA by the majority of the workers was an affirmation of their membership in the union that negotiated that agreement.In his own Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner that there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. He submits that Article 256 should be liberally interpreted pursuant to Article 4 of the Labor Code, stating as follows:Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. — All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of

the provisions of this Code including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.The Court has deliberated on the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings and finds for the petitioner.We have held that pursuant to the constitutional provision guaranteeing workers the right to self-organization and collective bargaining, "the constant and unwavering policy of this Court" has been "to require a certification election as the best means of ascertaining which labor organization should be the collective bargaining representative." 4

The certification election is the most democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as their representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are working. 5 As we stressed in Belyca Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 6 the holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.This Court also held in Western Agusan Workers Union-Local 101 of the United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines vs. Trajano: 7

. . . it has long been settled that the policy of the Labor Code is indisputably partial to the holding of a certification election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and certain concerning the choice of the labor organization to represent the workers in a collective bargaining unit. Conformably to said basic concept, this Court recognized that the Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of sound discretion, may order a certification election notwithstanding the failure to meet the 30% requirement. (Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College v. Noriel, 85 SCRA 494 [1978]; Vicmico Industrial Wokers Asso. v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569 [1984])In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election should not be strictly applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate representative of the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at best be given only a directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a certification election, 8 subject to the submission of the consent signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.This interpretation is consonant with Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 9 where we declared:. . . even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% of the labor force asking for a certification election had not been strictly complied with, respondent Director is still empowered to order that it be held precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which (of the contending labor organizations) shall be the exclusive collective bargaining representative. (National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Luna, et al., 83 SCRA 607)It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did not carry the 25% consent signatures, but that the requirement is in fact not applicable to a petition in intervention. We so held in PAFLU v. Ferrer-Calleja thus: 10

It is crystal clear from the said provisions that the requisite written consent of at least 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit applies to petitioners for certification election only and not to motions for intervention. . . . As long as the motion for intervention has been properly and timely filed and the intervention would not cause any injustice to anyone, it should not be denied and this is so even if the eventual purpose of the Motion for Intervention is to participate in the Certification Election. After all, the original applicant had already met the 20% requirement.

The contention that the petitioners had no right to represent the principal petitioners which had not appealed the dismissal order is also not acceptable. We repeat that the certification election is not litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character where the rules of procedure are not strictly applied. 11 Technical rules and objections should not hamper the correct ascertainment of the labor union that has the support of confidence of the majority of the workers and is thus entitled to represent them in their dealings with management.The above-quoted decision affirms the right of PWUP to call for the holding of the election although it was initially only an intervenor. That recognition should not be defeated by the circumstance that the other petitioning unions have not seen fit to appeal the dismissal of their petitions even if such dismissal was questionable and is in fact being reversed here. The petition for intervention was viable at the time it was filed because the principal petitions had complied with the requirement for the consent signatures as specified by Article 256. Hence, its intervention should not be disallowed simply because of the withdrawal or failure to appeal of SAMADA and PEALU.It is correct to say that as a matter of strict procedure, a petition for intervention should be deemed automatically dismissed where the principal petition itself fails. However, that technical rule should be allowed to prevent a correct determination of the real representative of the workers in line with their constitutional rights to self-organization and collective bargaining.Regarding the invocation of Inciong by the private respondents, the Court has modified that decision in Associated Labor Unions vs. Calleja, 12 where we held:Finally, the petitioner assails the decision of the respondent Director on the ground that "the ratification of the collective bargaining agreement renders the certification election moot and academic."This contention finds no basis in law.The petitioner was obviously referring to the contract-bar rule where the law prohibits the holding of certification elections during the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement. Said agreement was hastily and prematurely entered into apparently in an attempt to avoid the holding of a certification election.Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the need for industrial stability is clearly shown to be imperative. 13Subject to this singular exception, contracts where the identity of the authorized representative of the workers is in doubt must be rejected in favor of a more certain indication of the will of the workers. As we stated in Philippine Association of Free Labor Union vs. Estrella, 14any stability that does not establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by the law must be subordinated to the employees' freedom to choose their real representative.The private respondents contend that the overwhelming ratification of the CBA is an affirmation of their membership in the bargaining agent, rendering the representation issue moot and academic and conclusively barring the holding of a certification election thereon. That conclusion does not follow. Even Tupas did not say that the mere ratification of the CBA by the majority of the workers signified their affirmation of membership in the negotiating union. That case required, first, ratification of the CBA, the second, affirmation of membership in the negotiating union. The second requirement has not been established in the case at bar as the record does not show that the majority of the workers, besides ratifying the new CBA, have also formally affiliated with APCWU.Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides that the representation case shall not be adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before or during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement orduring the pendency of the representation case. As the new CBA was entered into at the time when the representation case was still pending, it follows that it cannot be recognized as the final agreement between the ICTSI and its workers.On the allegation that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on certification election is final and inappealable, this Court held inSan Miguel Corp. v. Secretary of Labor 15 that:

It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. (73, C.J.S. 506, note 56). . . . judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion. error of law, fraud or collusion (Timbancaya v. Vicente, 82 O.G. 9424; Macatangay v. Secretary of Public Works and Communication, 63 O.G. 11236; Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440).There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondents when they dismissed the petitions for certification election because the consent signatures had not been submitted simultaneously with the petition. The issue of majority representation thus remains open and awaits settlement. Following the rulings above-quoted, we hereby declare that the newly-concluded CBA cannot constitute a bar to the holding of a certification election.It is possible that the APCWU will prevail in the certification election, in which event the new CBA it concluded with ICTSI will be upheld and recognized. It is also possible that another union will be chosen, in which event it will have to enter into its own negotiations with ICTSI that may result in the adoption of a new CBA. In the meantime, however, the old CBA having expired, it is necessary to lay down the rules regulating the relations of the workers with the management. For this reason, the Court hereby orders that the new CBA concluded by ICTSI and APCWU shall remain effective between the parties, subject to the result and effects of the certification election to be called.The certification election is the best method of determining the will of the workers on the crucial question of who shall represent them in their negotiations with the management for a collective bargaining agreement that will best protect and promote their interests. It is essential that there be no collusion against this objective between an unscrupulous management and a union covertly supporting it while professing its loyalty to labor, or at least that the hopes of labor be not frustrated because of its representation by a union that does not enjoy its approval and support. It is therefore sound policy that any doubt regarding the real representation of the workers be resolved in favor of the holding of the certification election. This is preferable to the suppression of the voice of the workers through the prissy observance of technical rules that will exalt procedure over substantial justice.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged order dated August 21, 1990, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the public respondent is DIRECTED to schedule and hold certification election among the workers of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc., this to be done with all possible dispatch. No costs.SO ORDERED.SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 80612-16 December 29, 1989AIRTIME SPECIALISTS, INC., ABSOLUTE SOUND, INC., COUNTRY WEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORP., AD PLANNERS & MARKETING COUNSELLORS, INC., and ATLAS RESOURCES & MANAGEMENT GROUP, petitioners, vs.HON. DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, LABOR REGULATION OFFICER EUSEBIO JIMENEZ, MED-ARBITER MANASES T. CRUZ, SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA ASIA (SAMA-ASIA)-FFW CHAPTER and PINAGBUKLOD NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA ATACO (PMA)-FFW CHAPTER, respondents.Ruben F. Santos Law Office for petitioners. PARAS, J.:This certiorari proceeding was filed by petitioners to assail the orders of respondent Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz and Director of Labor Relations Pura Ferrer-Calleja ordering a certification election.

The pertinent background facts are as follows:Respondent Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Asia-FFW Chapter (SAMA-ASIA, for short) filed with the National Capital Region, Ministry of Labor and Employment, on May 22, 1986, two separate petitions for direct certification and/or certification election on behalf of the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioners Airtime Specialists and Absolute Sound, Inc. The other respondent Pinagbuklod ng Manggagawa sa Ataco-FFW Chapter (PMA for short) also filed with the same office, on the same day, similar separate petitions in behalf of the regular rank and file employees of petitioners Country Wealth Development, Ad Planner and Marketing Counsellors and Atlas Resources.All these five cases were consolidated.Petitioners filed their position paper with motion to dismiss on the following grounds-disaffiliation of the rank and file employees, ineligibility of some signatories because they had less than one (1) year of service resulting in the non-compliance with the 30% requirement.On March 9, 1987, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order the dispositive portion of which reads —WHEREFORE, premises considered, a certification election is hereby ordered conducted among the rank and file employees of the Airtime Specialists, Inc.; Absolute Sound, Inc.; Commonwealth Development Corporation; Ad Planners & Mktg. Corp.; and Atlas Resources & Management Group, within 20 days from receipt of this Order. The parties are:1. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Asia (SAMA-ASIA) FFW Chapter & Pinagbuklod ng mga Manggagawa sa Ataco (PMA-FFW); and2. No union.Pre-election conference shall be conducted to thresh out the details of the election.SO ORDERED. (p. 25, Rollo)Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied, they filed the instant petition for "Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction" with a Prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining public respondents from conducting any further proceedings in the said five cases.The petition was given due course and the parties were required to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda.In assailing the aforesaid Order of public respondents, petitioners alleged that —I. Public respondents (Director Calleja and Med-Arbiter Cruz) gravely erred in considering employees with less than one year of service, and even probationaries as qualified participants in a certification election process; in direct violation of the ruling of this Honorable Court in the Tarnate vs. Noriel case;II. Public respondents gravely erred in not considering proven disaffiliation and resignations from a petitioning union worse, from the company, and valid termination for cause from the service as material consideration to support a petition for certification and/or election.III. Public respondent Director Calleja gravely misinterpreted the ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of Albano vs. Noriel, 85 SCRA 499, even as she held that, notwithstanding the absence of the statutory consent requirement of 30% (now 20%), the Bureau of Labor Relations can in every such case still order a certification election, giving the wrong impression that such exercise of discretion is absolute. (pp. 12-15, Rollo)Thus, petitioners argue that the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion when they considered (a) employees with less than one year of service and even (b) probationary employees as qualified participants in the certification election process. They contend that "by the very fact that such (probationary)-employees have not earned regular status, they are not of the bargaining unit". (Reply, p. 21). Petitioners maintain that this, "directly violates" the ruling of this Court in Tarnate vs. Noriel, (100 SCRA 93) where it held that "at least one year of service is required for an employee to enjoy the benefits of membership in any labor union."Petitioners' contentions are untenable. It is Our holding in the case of B.F. Goodrich Phils., Inc. vs. B.F. Goodrich Confidential & Salaried Employees Union-NATU (49 SCRA 532) that the objectives of the Industrial Peace Act would be sooner attained if at the earliest

opportunity the employees, all of them, in an appropriate bargaining unit be pooled to determine which labor organization should be its exclusive representative. This Court had made it clear that We should give discretion to the Court of Industrial Relations, or in this case, the Bureau of Labor Relations in deciding whether or not to grant a petition for certification election considering the facts and circumstances of which it has intimate knowledge. Moreover, a perusal of Art. 258 of the Labor Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 442 reveals that compliance with the 30% requirement (now 20%) makes it mandatory upon the Bureau of Labor Relations to order the holding of a certification election in order to determine the exclusive-bargaining agent of the employees. Stated otherwise, it means that with such, the Bureau is left without any discretion but to order the holding of certification election. Parenthetically, where the petition is supported by less than 30% (now 20%) the Bureau of Labor Relations has discretion whether or not to order the holding of certification election depending on the circumstances of the case. Thus, it is Our holding in LVN Pictures vs. Musicians Guild, et al. (1 SCRA 132) that in connection with certification election, the Court of Industrial Relations enjoys a wide discretion in determining the procedure necessary to insure a fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees, and having exercised its sound discretion, this Court cannot interfere. (Arguelles v. Young, 153 SCRA 690).In a certification election all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank-and-file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit.".The case of Tarnate vs. Noriel relied upon by petitioners has no application in certification election. That case involves the right of probationary employee to vote in the election of union officers.Petitioner argue at length that more than a majority of the signatories to the petitions for certification election "have disaffiliated from the two private respondent unions (PMA-FFW and SAMA-ASIA-FFW) and have joined another union (ADLO)." Petitioners then contend that, with the mass disaffiliation the petition for certification would fall short of the 20% consent requirement of the Labor Code.Even assuming the fact of such disaffiliation and even assuming further that the 20% requirement is not reached, this will not defeat the petition for certification election. On the contrary, it becomes more imperative to conduct one. The alleged disaffiliation from the petitioning unions (PMA-FFW and SAMA-ASIA-FFW) in favor of the ADLO-KMU raised a genuine representation issue which can best be tested in a certification election. In VICMICO Industrial Workers Association (VWA) vs. The Honorable Carmelo Noriel, et al. (131 SCRA 569) this Court ruled upon the same argument. Thus:On the issue that more than 600 bona fide rank and file members of VIWA had disaffiliated with respondents NFSW, this Court had occasion to state what should be followed in case of withdrawal or retraction of signatures. In National Mines and Allied Workers Union vs. Luna, 83 SCRA 607, it was held that the " best forum for determining whether there were indeed retractions from some of the laborers is the certification election itself wherein the workers can freely express their choice in a secret ballot ... To hold otherwise would be violative of the liberal approach constantly followed by this Court in matters of certification elections.In the same vein, in George and Peter Lines, Inc. vs. ALU, et al., 134 SCRA 82, where it was alleged that 80% of the membership of the Union had withdrawn but the union claimed that

the withdrawals were involuntary, the Court held that "the best forum to determine if there was indeed undue pressure exerted upon the employees to retract their membership is in the certification election itself."The employees have the constitutional right to choose the labor organization which they desire to join. The exercise of such right would be rendered nugatory and ineffectual if they would be denied the opportunity to choose in a certification election, which is not a litigation, but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character, the bargaining unit to represent them (NAMAWUMIF vs. Estrella, 87 SCRA 84). The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented (ATU vs. Noriel, 89 SCRA 264).

G.R. No. 79347 January 26, 1989

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (SEPTEMBER CONVENTION), petitioner, vs.DIRECTOR PURA FERRER CALLEJA of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical Corporation and Hundred Island Chemical Corporation, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a special civil action for certiorari, questioning the order of respondent Director dated 27, July 1987,.which in part states:

x x x

Without going into the merits of the above-entitled case this office finds that the best forum to determine once and for all whether or not herein appellant-intervenor commands support of the rank-and-file in the unit is through the process of a certification election.

WHEREFORE, in view thereof, Appellant-Intervenor, Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino is hereby included as one of the contending unions.

Let, therefore, a certification election proceed without any further delay, with the following choices:

1. Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical Corporation;

2. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (September Convention) and 3. Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 26-27, Rollo)

The basic facts of this case are undisputed:

A petition for certification election among the rank-and-file workers of the Hundred Island Chemical Corporation was filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) by respondent Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical Corporation (Samahan, for short) and was docketed as BLR Case No. A-6-201-87. A motion to intervene, accompanied by the written consent of twenty percent (20%) of the rank-and-file employees of the said corporation was filed by petitioner Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (September Convention), or PAFLU, on 27 April 1987, Likewise the Katipunan ng

Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI, for brevity) flied its motion to intervene on 1 June 1987 but unaccompanied by a similar written consent of the employer's workers. Due to such want of a written consent, PAFLU moved for the striking out of KAMAPI's motion for intervention. Acting on said motion, Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parungo issued an order dated 8 June 1987 denying KAMAPI's motion for intervention and allowing PAFLU's inclusion in the certification election. On 17 June 1987, KAMAPI appealed the said Med-Arbiter's order to the respondent Director of the BLR, who issued the afore-quoted order. Thus, on 17 August 1987, this petition was filed. And as prayed for in the said petition, We issued a temporary restraining order dated 24, August 1987. Respondent Samahan has contested the issuance of said restraining order and has prayed that it be lifted since the delay of the certification election only defeats the constitutional right of labor to organize.

The main issue in this petition was aptly deposited by the Solicitor General in his consolidated comment; Whether or not KAMAPI should be allowed to participate in a certification election thru a motion for intervention without a prior showing that it has the required support expressed in the written consent of at least twenty (20%) percent of all employees in the collective bargaining unit. In taking the negative stance, petitioner cites Section 6, Rule V of the Rules Implementing Executive Order No. 111, which reads:

SEC. 6. PROCEDURE. Upon receipt of a petition, the Regional Director shall assign the case to a Med-Arbiter for appropriate action. The Med-Arbiter shall have twenty (20) working days within which to grant or dismiss the petition. In a petition filed by a legitimate organization involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall grant the petition upon verification that the same is supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%) of all the employees in the collective bargaining unit, the twenty (20%) support shall be satisfied upon the filing of the petition for certification election, otherwise, the petition shall be dismissed. In either case, he shall cite the ground.

Pertinent to the above rule is Section 7 of E.O. 111 to which the former relates, and which provides:

SEC. 7. Articles 257 and 258 of the Labor Code of the Philippines are hereby amended to read as follows:

x x x

Art. 258. Petitions in unorganized establishments. — In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, the petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%) percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt of such petition, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order the conduct of a certification election.

Considering the above provisions of law, We rule to dismiss the instant petition for certiorari. The respondent Director did not abuse her discretion in issuing the contested order. It is crystal clear from the said provisions that the requisite written consent of at least 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit applies to petitioners for certification election only, and not to motions for intervention. Nowhere in the aforesaid legal provisions does it appear that a motion for intervention in a certification election must be accompanied by a similar written consent. Not even in the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code (see Rule V, Rules Implementing the Labor Code). Obviously, the percentage requirement pertains only to the petition for certification election, and nothing else.

This leads Us to the question of purpose. the reason behind the 20% requirement is to

ensure that the petitioning union has a substantial interest in the representation proceedings ** and, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, that a considerable number of workers desire their representation by the said petitioning union for collective bargaining purposes. Hence, the mere fact that 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit signify their support to the petition by their written consent, it becomes mandatory on the part of the Med-Arbiter to order the holding of a certification election in an unorganized establishment (Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Noriel, 134 SCRA 152). The 20% requirement, thereof, is peculiar to petitions for certification election.

In the light of the foregoing, KAMAPI must be allowed to participate in the certification election since the essence of such proceeding is to settle once and for all which union is preferred by the workers to represent them (PAFLU vs. BLR, 69 SCRA 132; PAFLU vs. BLR, 72 SCRA 396). As long as the motion for intervention has been properly and timely filed and the intervention would not cause any injustice to anyone, it should not be denied and this is so even if the eventual purpose of the motion for intervention is to participate in the certification election. After all the original applicant had already met the 20% requirement.G.R. No. 97568 February 4, 1992CELINE MARKETING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and CONFEDERATION OF FILIPINO WORKERS (CFW), respondents.Jesus C. Gentiles for petitioner. GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:Celine Marketing Corporation filed a petition for certiorari to review the resolution dated March 5, 1991, of the Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, Bienvenido Laguesma, ordering the holding of a certification election among its rank-and-file employees, as prayed for in a petition filed on August 26, 1990, by the Confederation of Filipino Workers (or CFW), praying that it be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner.On September 10, 1990, the petition was amended to include all the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner in its outlets at Landmark-Makati; Shoppesville-Greenhills; SM-North: Ginza-Esperanza-Shoe Mart; SM Car Park-Celine Marketing; Gold Crest-Makati; Greenbelt-Celine: Makati Ginza-Esperanza-Tesoro Building; Mabini-Celine, Mabini; Escolta-Celine, Escolta; and Escolta Ginza-Esperanza Escolta, comprising more or less 100 employees.The petitioner moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the CFW had not been authorized by a majority of the rank-and file employees, and that it failed to submit a copy of the charter certificate issued to the local union.At the hearing before the Labor Arbiter on October 16, 1991, CFW submitted a xerox copy of the charter certificate issued to its local union, "Celine Marketing Corp. Workers Chapter-CFW."The petitioner moved to strike it from the records for non-production of the original and for lack of proof that the organizational documents of the union had been filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations.On October 19, 1990, the Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on those grounds.The union appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, who, on March 5, 1991, through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma, granted the appeal. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the order appealed from set aside. A new order is hereby entered directing the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of Celine Marketing Corporation/Ginza Esperanza, and all its outlets at Landmark-Makati; Shoppesville-Greenhills: SM-North. Ginza Esperanza Shoe Mart, SM-Car Park-Celine Marketing; Gold Crest-Makati-Celine Makati; Greenbelt-Celine; Makati Ginza

Esperanza-Tesoro Building; Mabini-Celine Mabini; Escolta-Celine Escolta; Escolta Ginza Esperanza Escolta with the following choices:1. CFW-Celine Marketing Corp. Workers Chapter: and2. No Union.The payroll three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition shall be the basis for determining the list of eligible voters.Let therefore, the pertinent records of the case be forwarded to the Office of origin for the conduct of certification election."(pp. 12-13, Rollo.)Hence, this petition for certiorari in which petitioner assails the resolution of respondent Undersecretary Laguesma on the grounds that:1. The Undersecretary of Labor and Employment acted in excess of jurisdiction in setting aside the Med-Arbiter's order to conduct a certification election because the appeal of CFW was addressed to the Secretary of Labor & Employment himself who could not delegate the power of review to the Undersecretary.2. The Undersecretary of Labor & Employment erred in setting aside the Med-Arbiter's order despite the failure of the private respondent to comply with the mandatory requirements in Section 3. Rule II. Book V of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code as amended.The petition has no merit.The issuance of the questioned resolution by Undersecretary of Labor Laguesma was not irregular for he did so authority of the Secretary of Labor & Employment. Not having been repudiated or reversed by the head of office, that resolution has the force and effect of a resolution of the Secretary himself. (Hannibal Bridge Co. vs. U.S., 221 U.S. 194, 55 L. ed. 699, 31 CT. 603; Alvord vs. U.S., 95 U.S. 356, 24 L. ed. 414; pp. 53-54, 2 Am. Jur. 2d.)While it may be true that the petition for certification election did not carry the authorization of a majority of the rank-and file employees of the petitioner, their consent is not necessary when the bargaining unit that the union seeks to represent, is still unorganized. The petition for certification election may be filed by any union, not by the employees. Thus, Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, provides:Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. — In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization.The law assumes that the union is the real party in interest in a petition for certification election. Anyway, the certification election itself is the appropriate forum for the employees to express their choice of a bargaining representative or none at all.G.R. No. 92391 July 3, 1992PHILIPPINE FRUITS AND VEGETABLE INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner, vs.HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and TRADE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS), respondents. PARAS, J.:This petition for review on certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction assails the following:(1) The Resolution dated December 12, 1989 of public respondent Secretary of Labor 1

affirming on appeal the Order dated March 7, 1989 issued by Med-Arbiter Danilo T. Basa, and certifying private respondent Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (or TUPAS) as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all regular rank-and-file and seasonal workers at Philippine Fruits and Vegetable Industries, Inc. (or PFVII), petitioner herein; and(2) The Order dated February 8, 1990 issued by public respondent Secretary of Labor 2

denying petitioner's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.Petitioner PFVII contends the questioned resolution and order are null and void as they are

contrary to law and have been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and having no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, it filed with this Court the petition now at hand.The facts of the case are well-stated in the Comment filed by the Solicitor General, and are thus reproduced hereunder, as follows:On October 13, 1988, Med-Arbiter Basa issued an Order granting the petition for Certification election filed by the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Said order directed the holding of a certification election among the regular and seasonal workers of the Philippine Fruits and Vegetables, Inc. (p. 42, NLRC, Records).After a series of pre-election conferences, all issues relative to the conduct of the certification election were threshed out except that which pertains to the voting qualifications of the hundred ninety four (194) workers enumerated in the lists of qualified voters submitted by TUPAS.After a late submission by the parties of their respective position papers, Med-Arbiter Basa issued an Order dated December 9, 1988 allowing 184 of the 194 questioned workers to vote, subject to challenge, in the certification election to be held on December 16, 1989. Copies of said Order were furnished the parties (p. 118, NLRC, Records) and on December 12, 1988 the notice of certification election was duly posted. One hundred sixty eight (168) of the questioned workers actually voted on election day.In the scheduled certification election, petitioner objected to the proceeding, through a Manifestation (p. 262, NLRC, Records) filed with the Representation Officer before the close of the election proceedings. Said Manifestation pertinently reads:The posting of the list of eligible voters authorized to participate in the certification election was short of the five (5) days provided by law considering that it was posted only on December 12, 1988 and the election was held today, December 16, 1988 is only four days prior to the scheduled certification election.By agreement of petitioner and TUPAS, workers whose names were inadvertently omitted in the list of qualified voters were allowed to vote, subject to challenge (p. 263, NLRC, Records). Thirty eight of them voted on election day.Initial tally of the election results excluding the challenged votes showed the following:Total No. of the Votes 291Yes votes 40No votes 38Spoiled 7Challenged (Regular) 38——Total No. of Votes Cast 123On January 6, 1989, Management and TUPAS agreed to have the 36 challenged votes of the regular rank-and-file employees opened and a canvass thereof showed:Yes votes 20No votes 14Spoiled 4——Total 38Added to the initial election results of December 16, 1988, the canvass of results showed:Yes 60No 52Spoiled 11——Total 123Based on the foregoing results, the yes votes failed to obtain the majority of the votes cast in said certification election, hence, the necessity of opening the 168 challenged votes to determine the true will of the employees.On January 20, 1989, petitioner filed a position paper arguing against the opening of said

votes mainly because said voters are not regular employees nor seasonal workers for having allegedly rendered work for less than 180 days.Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS), on the other hand, argued that the employment status of said employees has been resolved when Labor Arbiter Ricardo N. Martinez, in his Decision dated November 26, 1988 rendered in NLRC Case No. Sub-Rab-01-09-7-0087-88, declared that said employees were illegally dismissed.In an Order dated February 2, 1989 (pp. 278-280, NLRC, Records) Med-Arbiter Basa ordered the opening of said 168 challenged votes upon his observation that said employees were illegally dismissed in accordance with the foregoing Decision of Labor Arbiter Martinez. As canvassed, the results showedYes votes 165No votes 0Spoiled 3——Total 168On February 23, 1989, petitioner formally filed a Protest (pp.284-287, NLRC, Records) claiming that the required five day posting of notice was not allegedly complied with and that the list of qualified voters so posted failed to include fifty five regular workers agreed upon by the parties as qualified to vote. The Protest further alleged that voters who were ineligible to vote were allowed to vote.Med-Arbiter Basa, in his Order dated March 7, 1989, dismissed said Protest which Order was affirmed on appeal in the Resolution dated December 12, 1989 of then Secretary of Labor, Franklin Drillon.Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit in public respondent's Order dated February 28, 1990.(pp. 84-88, Rollo) 3

The instant petition has, for its Assignment of Errors, the following:(1) The Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and committed manifest error in upholding the certification of TUPAS as the sole bargaining agent mainly on an erroneous ruling that the protest against the canvassing of the votes cast by 168 dismissed workers was filed beyond the reglementary period.(2) The Honorable Secretary of Labor committed an abuse of discretion in completely disregarding the issue as to whether or not non-regular seasonal workers who have long been separated from employment prior to the filing of the petition for certification election would be allowed to vote and participate in a certification election. 4

The Court finds no merit in the petition.For it is to be noted that the formal protest of petitioner PFVII was filed beyond the reglementary period. A close reading of Sections 3 and 4, Rule VI, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, which read as follows:Sec. 3. Representation officer may rule on any-on-the-spot questions. — The Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question arising from the conduct of the election. The interested party may however, file a protest with the representation officer before the close of the proceedings.Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protest shall be contained in the minutes of the proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)Sec. 4. Protest to be decided in twenty (20) working days. — Where the protest is formalized before the med-arbiter with five (5) days after the close of the election proceedings, the med-arbiter shall decide the same within twenty (20) working days from the date of formalization.

If not formalized within the prescribed period, the protest shall be deemed dropped. The decision may be appealed to the Bureau in the same manner and on the same grounds as provided under Rule V. (Emphasis supplied)would readily yield, as a matter of procedure, the following requirements in order that a protest filed thereunder would prosper, to wit:(1) The protest must be filed with the representation officer and made of record in the minutes of the proceedings before the close of election proceedings, and(2) The protest must be formalized before the Med-Arbiter within five (5) days after the close of the election proceedings.The records before Us quite clearly disclose the fact that petitioner, after filing a manifestation of protest on December 16, 1988, election day, only formalized the same on February 20, 1989, or more than two months after the close of election proceedings (i.e., December 16, 1988). We are not persuaded by petitioner's arguments that election proceedings include not only casting of votes but necessarily includes canvassing and appreciation of votes cast and considering that the canvassing and appreciation of all the votes cast were terminated only on February 16, 1989, it was only then that the election proceedings are deemed closed, and thus, when the formal protest was filed on February 20, 1989, the five-day period within which to file the formal protest still subsisted and its protest was therefore formalized within the reglementary period. 5

As explained correctly by the Solicitor General, the phrase "close of election proceedings" as used in Sections 3 and 4 of the pertinent Implementing Rules refers to that period from the closing of the polls to the counting and tabulation of the votes as it could not have been the intention of the Implementing Rules to include in the term "close of the election proceedings" the period for the final determination of the challenged votes and the canvass thereof, as in the case at bar which may take a very long period. 6 Thus, if a protest can be formalized within five days after a final determination and canvass of the challenged votes have been made, it would result in an undue delay in the affirmation of the employees' expressed choice of a bargaining representative. 7

Petitioner would likewise bring into issue the fact that the notice of certification election was posted only on December 12, 1988 or four days before the scheduled elections on December 16, 1988, instead of the five-day period as required under Section 1 of Rule VI, Book V of the Implementing Rules. But it is not disputed that a substantial number, or 291 of 322 qualified voters, of the employees concerned were informed, thru the notices thus posted, of the elections to be held on December 16, 1988, and that such employees had in fact voted accordingly on election day. Viewed thus in the light of the substantial participation in the elections by voter-employees, and further in the light of the all-too settled rule that in interpreting the Constitution's protection to labor and social justice provisions and the labor laws and rules and regulations implementing the constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court adopts the liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor rights, 8 We find the lack of one day in the posting of notices insignificant, and hence, not a compelling reason at all in nullifying the elections.As regards the second assignment of error, the public respondent Secretary of Labor did not completely disregard the issue as to the voting rights of the alleged separated employees for precisely, he affirmed on appeal the findings of the Med-Arbiter when he ruledThe election results indicate that TUPAS obtained majority of the valid votes cast in the election — 60 plus 165, or a total of 225 votes out of a possible total of 291.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby denied and the Med-Arbiter's order dated 7 March 1989 affirmed. Petitioner TUPAS is hereby certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all regular rank-and-file and seasonal workers at Philippine Fruits and Vegetable Industries, Inc. 9 (p. 26, Rollo)

At any rate, it is now well-settled that employees who have been improperly laid off but who have a present, unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in certification elections. 10 Thus, and to repeat, if the dismissal is under question, as in the case now at bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal and/or unfair labor practice was filed, the employees concerned could still qualify to vote in the elections. 11

And finally, the Court would wish to stress once more the rule which it has consistently pronounced in many earlier cases that a certification election is the sole concern of the workers and the employer is regarded as nothing more than a bystander with no right to interfere at all in the election. The only exception here is where the employer has to file a petition for certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because it is requested to bargain collectively. Thus, upon the score alone of the "Bystander Rule", the instant petition would have been dismissed outright.WHEREFORE, the petition filed by Philippine Fruits and Vegetable Industries, Inc. (PFVII) in hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA FILSYSTEMS (SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU), petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and FILSYSTEMS, INC., respondents.

D E C I S I O NPUNO, J.:

Assailed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Resolution and Order[1] of the public respondent, dated June 28, 1996 and November 18, 1996, respectively, dismissing petitioner's petition for certification election.

It appears that petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Filsystems (SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU) is a registered labor union with Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-10-1575-95 issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on October 25, 1995. On November 6, 1995, petitioner union filed a Petition for Certification Election among the rank-and-file employees of private respondent FILSYSTEMS, Inc. before the DOLE - National Capital Region (NCR).[2] Attached as annexes to the petition are the Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE, copies of union membership signed by thirty three (33) rank-and-file employees of respondent company, the Charter Certificate showing its affiliation with the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU-KMU), the list of union officers, the certification of the union secretary of the minutes of the general membership meeting, the Books of Accounts and its Constitution and By-Laws.[3]

Private respondent opposed the petition. It questioned the status of petitioner as a legitimate labor organization on the ground of lack of proof that its contract of affiliation with the NAFLU-KMU has been submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within thirty (30) days from its execution.[4]

In reply, petitioner averred that as a duly registered labor union, it has "all the rights and privileges x x x to act as representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining with employers."[5]

On January 12, 1996, Med-Arbiter Paterno D. Adap dismissed the petition for certification election. He ruled that petitioner, as an affiliate of NAFLU-KMU, has no legal personality on account of its failure to comply with paragraphs (a), (b) and (e) of Section 3, Rule II of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code,[6] viz:

"x x x"In matters of affiliation of an independently registered union, the rules provide that the

latter shall be considered an affiliate of a labor federation after submission of the contract or agreement of affiliation to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within thirty (30) days after its execution.

"Likewise, it mandates the federation or national union concerned to issue a charter certificate indicating the creation or establishment of a local or chapter, copy of which shall be submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations within thirty (30) days from issuance of such certificate.

"A close examination of the records of the case does not reveal that the federation and the independent union have executed a contract or agreement of affiliation, nor had it shown that it has submitted its charter certificate to the Bureau of Labor Relations, within thirty (30) days from issuance of such charter certificate as amended by the rules.

"Petitioner argued that it has complied with all the requirements for certification election pursuant to the mandate of Sec. 2, Rule V of Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code; that the rule cited by respondent is not included in the Rule citing the requirements for certification election.

"We disagree with petitioner's contention. The rule cited by the petitioner, Sec. 2, Rule V, Book V, sub-paragraphs A, B, C, D, E, F and G, refers to an independently registered labor organization which has filed a petition for certification election.

"In the case at bar, an independently registered union has affiliated with a federation, hence, strict compliance with the requirements embodied in Sec. 3, paragraphs A, B and E of Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code should be complied with.

"Record discloses that petitioner has not shown to have executed a contract or agreement of affiliation nor has it established that is has submitted its charter certificate to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within thirty (30) days from its execution.

"Thus, petitioner in this case having failed to comply with the mandatory requirement, there was no valid affiliation. Consequently, petitioner has no legal personality because the union failed to attain the status of legitimacy for failure to comply with the requirements of law."

Petitioner appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. It reiterated its contention that as an independently registered union, it has the right to file a petition for certification election regardless of its failure to prove its affiliation with NAFLU-KMU.[7]

On February 26, 1996, private respondent opposed the appeal. It argued that petitioner should have filed its petition for certification election as an independently registered union and not as a union affiliated with NAFLU-KMU.[8]

Meanwhile or on February 7, 1996, another union, the Filsystem Workers Union (FWU), filed a Petition for Certification Election in the same bargaining unit. On March 22, 1996, the Med-Arbitration - NCR Branch granted the petition. The certification election held on April 19, 1996, was won by FWU which garnered twenty six (26) votes out of the forty six (46) eligible voters. The FWU was certified on April 29, 1996, as the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of private respondent. Eventually, FWU and the private respondent negotiated a CBA.[9]

On June 11, 1996, the private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal of petitioner as it has become moot and academic. It also invoked Section 3, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code stating that "once a union has been certified, no certification election may be held within one (1) year from the date of issuance of a final certification election [result]."[10]

In opposing the Motion to Dismiss Appeal, petitioner contended that its appeal is not

moot as the certification election held on April 19, 1996, was void for violating Section 10, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code,[11] viz:

"SEC. 10. Decision of the Secretary final and inappealable. - The Secretary shall have fifteen (15) calendar days within which to decide the appeal from receipt of the records of the case. The filing of the appeal from the decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of any certification election. The decision of the Secretary shall be final and inappealable."

Petitioner further argued that the CBA executed between the FWU and the private respondent could not affect its pending representation case following Section 4, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code[12] which states:

"SEC. 4. Effects of early agreements. - The representation case shall not, however, be adversely affected by a collective bargaining agreement registered before or during the last 60 days of the subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case."

On June 28, 1996, respondent Secretary dismissed the appeal interposed by petitioner on the ground that it has been rendered moot by the certification of FWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of respondent company. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in an Order dated November 18, 1996.[13]

Before this Court, petitioner contends:

IPublic respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to acting without or

in excess of jurisdiction in holding that the pending appeal in the representation case was rendered moot and academic by a subsequently enacted collective bargaining agreement in the company.

IIPublic respondent committed a serious legal error and gravely abused its discretion in

failing to hold that the legal personality of petitioner as a union having been established by its Certificate of Registration, the same could not be subjected to collateral attack.

The petition is meritorious.

I

We shall first resolve whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when he effectively affirmed the Resolution dated January 12, 1996 of the Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioner's petition for certification election for failure to prove its affiliation with NAFLU-KMU.

The reasoning of the public respondent and the Med- Arbiter is flawed, proceeding as it does from a wrong premise. Firstly, it must be underscored that petitioner is an independently registered labor union as evidenced by a Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE. As a legitimate labor organization, petitioner's right to file a petition for certification election on its own is beyond question.[14] Secondly, the failure of petitioner to prove its affiliation with NAFLU-KMU cannot affect its right to file said petition for certification election as an independent union. At the most, petitioner's failure will result in an ineffective affiliation with NAFLU-KMU. Still, however, it can pursue its petition for certification election as an independent union. In our rulings, we have stressed that despite affiliation, the local union remains the basic unit free to serve the common interest of all its members and pursue its own interests independently of the federation.[15] In fine, the Med-Arbiter erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for certification election on account of its non-submission of the charter certificate and the contract of affiliation with the NAFLU-KMU with the BLR. The

public respondent gravely abused his discretion in sustaining the Med-Arbiter's Resolution.

II

We shall now resolve the issue of whether the appeal filed by the petitioner was rendered moot and academic by the subsequent certification election ordered by the Med-Arbiter, won by the FWU and which culminated in a CBA with private respondent.

Public respondent's ruling is anchored on his finding that there exists no pending representation case since the petition for certification election filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Med-Arbiter. According to the public respondent, the legal effect of the dismissal of the petition was to leave the playing field open without any legal barrier or prohibition to any petitioner; thus, other legitimate labor organizations may file an entirely new petition for certification election.

We reject public respondent's ruling. The order of the Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioner's petition for certification election was seasonably appealed. The appeal stopped the holding of any certification election. Section 10, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code is crystal clear and hardly needs any interpretation.

Accordingly, there was an unresolved representation case at the time the CBA was entered between FWU and private respondent. Following Section 4, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code, such CBA cannot and will not prejudice petitioner's pending representation case or render the same moot.[16] This rule was applied in the case of Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) v. Trajano[17] where we held that "[t]here should be no obstacle to the right of the employees to petition for a certification election at the proper time, that is, within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the life of a certified collective bargaining agreement x x x, not even by a collective agreement submitted during the pendency of the representation case." Likewise, in Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer-Calleja,[18] we held that a prematurely renewed CBA is not a bar to the holding of a certification election.

Finally, we bewail private respondent's tenacious opposition to petitioner's certification election petition. Such a stance is not conducive to industrial peace. Time and again, we have emphasized that when a petition for certification election is filed by a legitimate labor organization, it is good policy for the employer not to have any participation or partisan interest in the choice of the bargaining representative. While employers may rightfully be notified or informed of petitions of such nature, they should not, however, be considered parties thereto with an inalienable right to oppose it. An employer that involves itself in a certification election lends suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a company union. Thus, in Consolidated Farms, Inc. II v. Noriel,[19] we declared that "[o]n a matter that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to say the least, deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference with a purely internal affair of labor. x x x [While] it is true that there may be circumstances where the interest of the employer calls for its being heard on the matter, x x x sound policy dictates that as much as possible, management is to maintain a strictly hands-off policy. For if it does not, it may lend itself to the legitimate suspicion that it is partial to one of the contending unions. That is repugnant to the concept of collective bargaining. That is against the letter and spirit of welfare legislation intended to protect labor and promote social justice. The judiciary then should be the last to look with tolerance at such efforts of an employer to take part in the process leading to the free and untrammeled choice of the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers."

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the public respondent are set aside. The Bureau of Labor Relations is ORDERED to hold a certification election in respondent company with petitioner as a contending union. No costs.

SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 101730 June 17, 1993PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PT & T SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES UNION-APSOTEU, respondents.Leonard U. Sawal for private respondent. BELLOSILLO, J.:Can a petition for certification election filed by supervisory employees of an unorganized establishment — one without a certified bargaining agent — be dismissed on the ground that these employees are actually performing managerial functions?This is the issue for reconsideration in this petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, of the Resolution of 11 June 1991 1 of then Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment Nieves D. Confesor dismissing the appeal from the Order of 11 December 1990 2 of the Med-Arbiter which granted the petition for certification election, and of the Order of 15 August 1991 3

denying reconsideration.On 22 October 1990, private respondent PT&T Supervisory Employees Union-APSOTEU (UNION, for brevity) filed a petition before the Industrial Relations Decision of the Department of Labor and Employment praying for the holding of a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T, for brevity). On 29 October 1990, UNION amended its petition to include the allegation that PT&T was an unorganized establishment employing roughly 100 supervisory employees from whose ranks will constitute the bargaining unit sought to be established.On 22 November 1990, PT&T moved to dismiss the petition for certification election on the ground that UNION members were performing managerial functions and thus were not merely supervisory employees. Moreover, PT&T alleged that a certified bargaining unit already existed among its rank-and-file employees which barred the filing of the petition.On 27 November 1990, respondent UNION opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that under the Labor Code supervisory employees are not eligible to join the Labor organization of the rank-and-file employees although they may form their own.On 4 December 1990, PT&T filed its reply to the opposition and manifested that it is the function of an employee which is determinative of whether said employee is a managerial or supervisory employee.On 11 December 1990, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition and ordered that "a certification election . . . (be) conducted among the supervisory personnel of the Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T)." 4 Petitioner PT&T appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.On 24 May 1991, PT&T filed its supplemental appeal and attached copies of the job descriptions and employment service records of these supervisory employees, including samples of memoranda and notices they made which purportedly illustrate their excercise of management prerogatives. On 31 May 1991, petitioner submitted more job descriptions to further bolster its contention.On 11 June 1991, the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment Nieves R. Confesor denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. However, she did not rule on the additional

evidence presented by PT&T. Instead, she directed that the evidence "should be scrutinized and . . . considered during the exclusion-inclusion proceedings where the employees who should be part of the bargaining unit . . . will be determined." 5

On 15 August 1991, respondent Undersecretary of Labor and Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma denied reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the appeal. Hence, the instant petition anchored on the ground that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to rule on the additional evidence submitted by petitioner which would have buttressed its contention that there were no supervisory employees in its employ and which, as a consequence, would have barred the holding of a certification election.The petition is devoid of merit.The applicable provision of law in the case at bar is Art. 257 of the Labor Code. It reads —Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. — In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization (emphasis supplied).The supervisory employees of PT&T did not yet have a certified bargaining agent to represent them at the time the UNION, which is legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, 6 filed the petition for certification election. Since no certified bargaining agent represented the supervisory employees, PT&T may be deemed an unorganized establishment within the purview of Art. 257 of the Labor Code.The fact that petitioner's rank-and-file employees were already represented by a certified bargaining agent doe not make PT&T an organized establishment vis-a-vis the supervisory employees. After all, supervisory employees are "not . . . eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees." 7

Consequently, the Med-Arbiter, as sustained by public respondent, committed no grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for certification election among the supervisory employee of petitioner PT&T because Art. 257 of the Labor Code provides that said election should be automatically conducted upon filing of the petition. In fact, Sec. 6 of Rule V, Book V, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations makes it mandatory for the Med-Arbiter to order the holding of a certification election. It reads —Sec. 6. Procedure. — Upon receipt of a petition, the Regional Director shall assign the case to a Med-Arbiter for appropriate action. The Med-Arbiter, upon receipt of the assigned petition, shall have twenty (20) working days from submission of the case for resolution within which to dismiss or grant the petition.In a petition filed by a legitimate organization involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a certification election . . . (emphasis supplied)Furthermore, PT&T did not possess the legal personality to file a motion to dismiss the petition for certification election even if based on the ground that its supervisory employees are in reality managerial employees. It is well-settled that an employer has no standing to question a certification election 8 since this is the sole concern of the workers. 9 The only exception to this rule is where the employer has to file the petition for certification election itself pursuant to Art. 258 10 of the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain collectively. But, other that this instance, the choice of a collective bargaining agent is purely the internal affair of labor. 11

What PT&T should have done was to question the inclusion of any disqualified employee in the certification election during the exclusion-inclusion proceedings before the representation officer. Indeed, this is precisely the purpose of the exclusion-inclusion proceedings, i.e., to determine who among the employees are entitled to vote and be part of the bargaining unit sought to be certified.

Then Acting Secretary Nieves D. Confesor therefore did not abuse her discretion when she opted not to act upon the additional evidence by petitioner PT&T. For, the holding of a certification election in an unorganized establishment is mandatory and must immediately be ordered upon petition by a legitimate labor organization, which is the case here.At any rate, the additional evidence presented by petitioner failed to sufficiently show that the supervisory employees who sought to be included in the bargaining unit were in fact performing managerial functions. On the contrary, while these supervisory employees did excercise independent judgment which is not routinary or clerical in nature, their authority was merely recommendatory in character. In all instances, they were still accountable for their actions to a superior officer, i.e., their respective superintendents. The Solicitor General succinctly puts it thus —A perusal of petitioner's annexes . . . would readily show that the power of said supervisors in matters relating to the excercise of prerogatives for or against rank-and-file employees is not absolute but merely recommendatory in character. Note that their reports recommending or imposing disciplinary action against rank-and-file employees always bore the concurrence of one or two superiors . . . and the job descriptions . . . clearly stated that these supervisors directly reported to a superior and were accountable to the latter 12 (emphasis supplied).

As the Med-Arbiter himself noted, "It is incredible that only rank-and-file and managerial employees are the personnel of respondent firm, considering the line of service it offers to the public" 13 and the fact that it employed 2,500 employees, more or less, all over the country.A word more. PT&T alleges that respondent UNION is affiliated with the same national federation representing its rank-and-file employees. Invoking Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma, 14 PT&T seeks the disqualification of respondent UNION. Respondent, however, denied it was affiliated with the same national federation of the rank-and-file employees union, the Associated Labor Union or ALU. It clarified that the PT&T Supervisory Employees Union is affiliated with Associated Professional, Supervisory Office, Technical Employees Union or APSOTEU, which is a separate and distinct national federation from ALU.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order is DENIED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 106830 November 16, 1993R. TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.HON. BIENVIENIDO E. LAGUESMA. in his capacity as Undersecretary of the

Department of Labor and Employment, CHRISTIAN LABOR ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CLOP), NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), and ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU-TUCP), respondents.

Gaspar V. Tagalo for petitioner.Jose Torregoza for Christian Labor Organization of the Philippines.Joji Barrios for intervenor ALU-TUCP.Villy Cadiz for National Federation of Labor Unions. QUIASON, J.:This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to set

aside the Resolutions of the Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) dated July 22, 1992, affirming the order of the Med-Arbiter calling for the conduct of the certification election, and August 25, 1992, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On January 4, 1991, respondent Christian Labor Organization of the Philippines

(CLOP), filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE a petition for certification election among the rank and file employees of the petitioner (NCR-OD-M-91-01-002).

On April 8, 1991, Med-Arbiter A. Dizon dismissed the petition on the ground that the bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent did not include all the eligible employees of petitioner but only the drivers, conductors and conductresses to the exclusion of the inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers, mechanics and washerboys.

On May 10, 1991, respondent. CLOP rectified its mistake and filed a second petition for certification election,which included all the rank and file employees of the company, who hold non-managerial. and non-supervisorial positions.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the second petition and contended that the dismissal of the first petition constituted res judicata. Petitioner argued that respondent CLOP should have interposed an appeal to the dismissal of the first petition and its failure to do so barred it from filing another petition for certification election.

On July 3, 1991, Med-Arbiter R. Parungo rendered a decision, which ordered that a certification election among the regular rank and file workers of petitioner company be conducted (Rollo, pp. 87-91).

On October 16, 1991, the Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) filed a motion for intervention (NCR OD-M-91-01-002) and alleged that it has members in the proposed bargaining unit. Subsequently, the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) filed a separate petition for certification election (NCR-OD-M-91-10-058) and a motion to consolidate related cases to avoid confusion.

Dissatisfied with the Decision dated July 3, 1991 rendered by Med-Arbiter R. Parungo, petitioner appealed to the DOLE Secretary, who, through Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, affirmed the Med-Arbiter in its Resolution dated July 22, 1992 calling for the conduct of the certification election (Rollo, pp. 25-28). The Resolution, in pertinent part, reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxxThe defense of res judicata is not obtaining in the present petition for certification

election. It is settled that for res judicata to apply there must be a final judgment on the merits on matters put in issue. In the instant case, it could not be said that there is a final judgment on the merits of the petition simply because the composition of the present proposed bargaining unit is different from that in the first petition. Moreover, there are now other parties involved, and therefore, it would not be correct to say that the parties in the said two cases are identical.

xxx xxx xxxWith regard however, to the question on propriety of consolidation, there is merit in the

argument of respondent-appellant on the need to consolidate the separate petitions for certification election because they involve the same bargaining unit. Case No. NCR-OD-M-91-10-058 should be consolidated with that of Case No. NCR- OD-M-91-05-062, where the petition of NAFLU should be treated as an intervention and resolved by the Med-Arbiter together with the intervention of ALU-TUCP.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Order of the Med-Arbiter calling for the conduct of the certification election is hereby affirmed subject to the resolution of the Med-Arbiter of the motions for intervention aforementioned (Rollo, pp. 27-28; emphasis supplied).

On July 31, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, again stressing the principle of res judicata. Petitioner further argued that the second petition for a certification election by respondent CLOP, NAFLU and ALU-TUCP were barred at least for a period of one year from the time the first petition of CLOP was dismissed pursuant to Section Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code as amended.

On August 25, 1991, Undersecretary Laguesma denied the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 32-34).

On September 3, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Questions as an Addendum to the Motion for Reconsideration filed on July 31,

1992. Petitioner argued that the present case must be indefinitely suspended until the following cases are resolved by the NLRC and the Supreme Court: a) NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-04708-91 entitled "R". Transport Corporation v. Jose S. Torregaza, et. al., wherein Labor Arbiter de Castro declared the strike staged by respondent CLOP illegal and ordered the strikers to pay petitioner the amount of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; b) NLRC-NCR Case No. 06-03415092 filed by respondent CLOP and its members for illegal dismissal; and NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-04389-92 filed by respondent CLOP in behalf of its affected members for illegal dismissal (Rollo, pp. 139-145).

On September 29, 1992, Undersecretary Laguesma in a resolution denied the motion to suspend the conduct of the certification election. The pertinent portion of said resolution reads as follows:

The pendency of NLRC-NCR Cases Nos. 00-08- 04708-91, 06-03415092 and 00-08-04389-92 before the NLRC is not a valid ground for the suspension of the already stalled petition for certification election which must be resolved with dispatch.

This must be so, because the employees subject of the pending cases before the NLRC legally remain as employees of respondent until the motion to declare them as having lost their employment status by reason of the illegal strike or their complaint for illegal dismissal is finally resolved. (Rollo, pp. 181-182; emphasis supplied)

On October 14, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 29, 1992 which was subsequently denied by Undersecretary Laguesma on October 29, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 29-31).

Petitioner filed a Comment and Objection to the Order dated October 29, 1992 with Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Certification Election. Without waiting for the resolution of the motion to dismiss, petitioner resorted to this Court by way of the instant special civil action.

This petition is without merit.Before the principle of res judicata can be operative, the following requisites must be

present: a) the former judgment or order must be final; b) it must be a judgment ororder on the merits; c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties; and d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).

In the case at bench, it cannot be said that the parties in the first and second actions were identical. The first action was dismissed by the Med-Arbiter because it excluded parties essential to the bargaining unit such as inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers and washer boys. The second petition included all the employees who were excluded in the first petition. Therefore, the Med-Arbiter was correct when he gave due course to the second petition for certification election after respondent CLOP corrected its mistake.

Likewise untenable is petitioner's contention that the second petition for certification election should have been filed after one year from the dismissal of the first petition certification election under Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code as amended. Said section provides as follows:

When to file — In the absence of collective bargaining agreement duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed any time. However, no certification election may be held within one year from the date of the issuance of a final certification election result (Emphasis supplied).

Apparently, petitioner misread the above-mentioned provision of law. The phrase "final certification election result" means that there was an actual conduct of election i.e. ballots were cast and there was a counting of votes. In this case, there was no certification election conducted precisely because the first petition was dismissed, on the ground of a defective petition which did not include all the employees who should be properly included in the collective bargaining unit.

Devoid of merit is petitioner's contention that the employment status of the members of respondent CLOP who joined the strike must first be resolved before a certification election

can be conducted.As held in the case of Philippine Fruits and Vegetables Industries, Inc. v. Torres, 211

SCRA 95 (1992):At any rate, it is now well-settled that employees who have been improperly laid-off but

who have a present, unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in certification elections (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 548). Thus, and to repeat, if the dismissal is under question, as in the case now at bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal and/or unfair labor practices was filed, the employees concerned could still qualify to vote in the elections.

Therefore, the employees of petitioner who participated in the strike, legally remain as such, until either the motion to declare their employment status legally terminated or their complaint for illegal dismissal is resolved by the NLRC.

It should be noted that it is the petitioner, the employer, which has offered the most tenacious resistance to the holding of a certification election. This must not be so for the choice of a collective bargaining agent is the sole concern of the employees. The employer has no right to interfere in the election and is merely regarded as a bystander (Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 213 SCRA 759 [1992]).

Finally, petitioner's Comment and Objection to the Order dated October 29, 1992 with Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Certification Election is still pending with the Undersecretary of Labor. The resort to judicial action by petitioner is premature. Hence, it is also guilty of forum-shopping in pursuing the same cause of action involving the same issue, parties and subject matter before two different fora.

G.R. No. L-48931July 16, 1979ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), petitioner, vs.DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS, TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, and ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS, respondents.Feliciano C. Tumale & Leonardo C. Rodriguez for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General for the Public respondents. AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñëtThis is a certification election case. On June 24, 1976, or within sixty days prior to the expiration on August 19, 1976 of the unregistered collective bargaining agreement between the Associated Labor Unions and the General Milling Corporation, the Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa, a duly registered labor union, filed with Regional Office No. 7 at Cebu City of the Ministry of Labor a petition for certification election.The med-arbiter in his order of October 12, 1976 granted the petition. He ordered the holding of a certification election within twenty days from notice among the rank-and-file employees of the company at Lapu-Lapu City. The Associated Labor Unions appealed from that order to the Director of Labor Relations.Instead of deciding the appeal promptly, the Director turned over the record of the case to the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines TUCP a federation of labor unions, allegedly by virtue of an arrangement between the Ministry of Labor and the said federation that cases involving its member-unions must first be referred to it for possible settlement in accordance with its Code of Ethics.The TUCP has not decided the controversy. On September 14, 1978, or more than twenty months after the federation received the record of the case, the Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa filed in this Court the instant petition for mandamus to compel the Director of Labor Relations to decide the case, or, in the alternative, to require the TUCP to return to the Director the record of the case.The petitioner accused the TUCP of sitting indefinitely on the appeal because its president and the president of appellant Associated Labor Unions are the same person. The TUCP

admits that its president is also the president of the Associated Labor Unions but it clarifies that its executive board, not its president, will decide the controversy.The Director of Labor Relations manifested in his comment that he is willing to decide the appeal. He prays that the TUCP be ordered to return to him immediately the record of the case.Respondent employer, the General Milling Corporation, revealed in its comment that it has a registered collective bargaining agreement with the Associated Labor Unions which will expire on August 19, 1979. Presumably, that agreement was a renewal of the unregistered collective bargaining agreement which expired on August 19, 1976. It was the impending expiration of that agreement which provoked the Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa to file its petition for certification election in June, 1976.The petitioner in its reply to the TUCP's comment alleged that it was affiliated with the TUCP only in 1978 or long after the certification case was appealed to the Director of Labor Relations.The petitioner further manifested that other certification cases referred in 1976 to the TUCP have not been acted upon by it up to this time and that the delay is a denial of labor justice.The issue is whether it was legal and proper for the Director of Labor Relations to refer to the TUCP the appeal of the Associated Labor Unions in a certification election case.We hold that the referral of the appeal to the TUCP is glaringly illegal and void. The Labor Code never intended that the Director of Labor Relations should abdicate delegate and relinquish his arbitrational prerogatives in favor of a private person or entity or to a federation of trade unions. Such a surrender of official functions is an anomalous, deplorable and censurable renunciation of the Director's adjudicatory jurisdiction in representation cases.Article 226 of the Labor Code provides in peremptory terms that the Bureau of Labor Relations and the labor relations divisions in the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor "shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration."Article 259 of the Labor Code provides that "all certification cases shall be decided within twenty (20) working days." Article 260 of the same Code provides that the Bureau of Labor Relations should decide appeals in representation cases, within fifteen (15) working days", or twenty working days, according to section 10, Rule V, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. Section 10 further provides that "the decision of the Bureau in all cases shall be final and unappealable."Those provisions are mandatory and should be strictly adhered to. They are part and parcel of the adequate administrative machinery established by the Labor Code for the expeditious settlement of labor disputes. The Director's act of referring the appeal of the Associated Labor Unions to the TUCP is not only contrary to law but is a patent nullification of the policy of the Labor Code to avoid delay in the adjudication of labor controversies.There is another aspect of this case which should be underscored. And that is that the Labor Code never intended that the original record of a labor case, an official public record, should be removed from the legitimate custodian thereof and entrusted to a private person or entity. It should be obvious that the delivery of an official public record to a private person is fraught with mischievous consequences. (See sec. 27, Rule 132, Rules of Court on irremovability of public record.)Respondent Director of Labor Relations in imprudently and illegally delivering to the TUCP the record of the certification election case (instead of a transcript thereof) placed himself in the pitiable, lamentable and ridiculous situation of having to beg the TUCP for the return of the record and then to ask for a court order to compel its return since the TUCP has cavalierly not heeded its request.

The petitioner and the Director could have reconstituted the record and the Director could have decided the appeal on the basis of the reconstituted record instead of awaiting the pleasure of the TUCP's officers for the return of the original record.WHEREFORE, the president, secretary, or any responsible officer of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Marvex Bldg., South Harbor, Port Area, Manila, is ordered to return to the Director of Labor Relations within forty-eight hours from notice the original record of BLR Case No. A-536-76 (LRD Case No. CE-0018).The Director is directed to decide the appeal within ten days from the receipt of the record. Costs against respondent TUCPG.R. No. 79025. December 29, 1989.BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner, vs.HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and BENECO EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION,respondents.E.L. Gayo & Associates for petitioner. CORTES, J.:On June 21, 1985 Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of Democratic Labor Organizations (hereinafter referred to as BWLU- ADLO) filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as BENECO) at Alapang, La Trinidad, Benguet alleging, inter alia, that BENECO has in its employ two hundred and fourteen (214) rank and file employees; that one hundred and ninety-eight (198) or 92.5% of these employees have supported the filing of the petition; that no certification election has been conducted for the last 12 months; that there is no existing collective bargaining representative of the rank and file employees sought to represented by BWLU- ADLO; and, that there is no collective bargaining agreement in the cooperative.An opposition to the petition was filed by the Beneco Employees Labor Union (hereinafter referred to as BELU) contending that it was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the subject workers pursuant to an order issued by the med-arbiter on October 20,1980; that pending resolution by the National Labor Relations Commission are two cases it filed against BENECO involving bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice; and, that the pendency of these cases bars any representation question.BENECO, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition claiming that it is a non-profit electric cooperative engaged in providing electric services to its members and patron-consumers in the City of Baguio and Benguet Province; and, that the employees sought to be represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing because they are members and joint owners of the cooperative.On September 2, 1985 the med-arbiter issued an order giving due course to the petition for certification election. However, the med-arbiter limited the election among the rank and file employees of petitioner who are non-members thereof and without any involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative. Based on the evidence during the hearing the med-arbiter found that there are thirty-seven (37) employees who are not members and without any involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative. The dispositive portion of the med-arbiter's order is as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, a certification election should be as it is hereby ordered to be conducted at the premises of Benguet, Electric Cooperative, Inc., at Alapang, La Trinidad, Benguet within twenty (20) days from receipt hereof among all the rank and file employees (non-members/consumers and without any involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative) with the following choices:1. BENECO WORKERS LABOR UNION-ADLO2. BENECO EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION3. NO UNION

The payroll for the month of June 1985 shall be the basis in determining the qualified voters who may participate in the certification election to be conducted.SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 22-23.]BELU and BENECO appealed from this order but the same was dismissed for lack of merit on March 25,1986. Whereupon BENECO filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and /or restraining order, docketed as G.R. No. 74209, which the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of merit in a minute resolution dated April 28, 1986.The ordered certification election was held on October 1, 1986. Prior to the conduct thereof BENECO's counsel verbally manifested that "the cooperative is protesting that employees who are members-consumers are being allowed to vote when . . . they are not eligible to be members of any labor union for purposes of collective bargaining; much less, to vote in this certification election." [Rollo, p. 28]. Petitioner submitted a certification showing that only four (4) employees are not members of BENECO and insisted that only these employees are eligible to vote in the certification election. Canvass of the votes showed that BELU garnered forty-nine (49) of the eighty-three (83) "valid" votes cast.Thereafter BENECO formalized its verbal manifestation by filing a Protest. Finding, among others, that the issue as to whether or not member-consumers who are employees of BENECO could form, assist or join a labor union has been answered in the affirmative by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 74209, the med-arbiter dismissed the protest on February 17, 1987. On June 23, 1987, Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) director Pura Ferrer-Calleja affirmed the med-arbiter's order and certified BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of BENECO.Alleging that the BLR director committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction BENECO filed the instant petition for certiorari. In his Comment the Solicitor General agreed with BENECO's stance and prayed that the petition be given due course. In view of this respondent director herself was required by the Court to file a Comment. On April 19, 1989 the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent director committed grave abuse of discretion in certifying respondent BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representtative of the rank and file employees of BENECO.Under Article 256 of the Labor Code [Pres. Decree 442] to have a valid certification election, "at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all workers in the unit." Petitioner BENECO asserts that the certification election held on October 1, 1986 was null and void since members-employees of petitioner cooperative who are not eligible to form and join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining were allowed to vote therein.Respondent director and private respondent BELU on the other hand submit that members of a cooperative who are also rank and file employees are eligible to form, assist or join a labor union [Comment of Respondent Director, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125; Comment of BELU, pp. 9-10; Rollo pp. 99-100].The Court finds the present petition meritorious.The issue of whether or not employees of a cooperative are qualified to form or join a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining has already been resolved and clarified in the case of Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer Calleja, et al. [G.R. No. 7795, September 26,1988] and reiterated in the cases of Batangas-Electric Cooperative Labor Union v. Young, et al. [G.R. Nos. 62386, 70880 and 74560 November 9, 1988] and San Jose City Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, et al. [G.R. No. 77231, May 31, 1989] wherein the Court had stated that the right to collective bargaining is not available to an employee of a cooperative who at the same time is a member and co-owner thereof. With respect, however, to employees who are neither

members nor co-owners of the cooperative they are entitled to exercise the rights to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiation as mandated by the 1987 Constitution and applicable statutes.Respondent director argues that to deny the members of petitioner cooperative the right to form, assist or join a labor union of their own choice for purposes of collective bargaining would amount to a patent violation of their right to self-organization. She points out that:Albeit a person assumes a dual capacity as rank and file employee and as member of a certain cooperative does not militate, as in the instant case, against his/her exercise of the right to self-organization and to collective bargaining guaranteed by the Constitution and Labor Code because, while so doing, he/she is acting in his/her capacity as rank and file employee thereof. It may be added that while the employees concerned became members of petitioner cooperative, their status employment as rank and filers who are hired for fixed compensation had not changed. They still do not actually participate in the management of the cooperative as said function is entrusted to the Board of Directors and to the elected or appointed officers thereof. They are not vested with the powers and prerogatives to lay down and execute managerial policies; to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees; and/or to effectively recommend such managerial functions [Comment of Respondent Director, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125.]Private respondent BELU concurs with the above contention of respondent director and, additionally, claims that since membership in petitioner cooperative is only nominal, the rank and file employees who are members thereof should not be deprived of their right to self-organization.The above contentions are untenable. Contrary to respondents' claim, the fact that the members-employees of petitioner do not participate in the actual management of the cooperative does not make them eligible to form, assist or join a labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining with petitioner. The Court's ruling in the Davao City case that members of cooperative cannot join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining was based on the fact that as members of the cooperative they are co-owners thereof. As such, they cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for "certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners." [Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, et al., supra]. It is the fact of ownership of the cooperative, and not involvement in the management thereof, which disqualifies a member from joining any labor organization within the cooperative. Thus, irrespective of the degree of their participation in the actual management of the cooperative, all members thereof cannot form, assist or join a labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining.Respondent union further claims that if nominal ownership in a cooperative is "enough to take away the constitutional protections afforded to labor, then there would be no hindrance for employers to grant, on a scheme of generous profit sharing, stock bonuses to their employees and thereafter claim that since their employees are not stockholders [of the corporation], albeit in a minimal and involuntary manner, they are now also co-owners and thus disqualified to form unions." To allow this, BELU argues, would be "to allow the floodgates of destruction to be opened upon the rights of labor which the Constitution endeavors to protect and which welfare it promises to promote." [Comment of BELU, p. 10; Rollo, p. 100].The above contention of respondent union is based on the erroneous presumption that membership in a cooperative is the same as ownership of stocks in ordinary corporations. While cooperatives may exercise some of the rights and privileges given to ordinary corporations provided under existing laws, such cooperatives enjoy other privileges not granted to the latter [See Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8, Pres. Decree No. 175; Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra]. Similarly, members of cooperatives have rights and obligations different from those of stockholders of ordinary corporations. It was precisely because of the special nature of cooperatives, that the Court held in the Davao City case that members-employees thereof cannot form or join a labor union for purposes of collective

bargaining. The Court held that:A cooperative ... is by its nature different from an ordinary business concern being run either by persons, partnerships, or corporations. Its owners and/or members are the ones who run and operate the business while the others are its employees. As above stated, irrespective of the number of shares owned by each member they are entitled to cast one vote each in deciding upon the affairs of the cooperative. Their share capital earn limited interest. They enjoy special privileges as-exemption from income tax and sales taxes, preferential right to supply their products to State agencies and even exemption from the minimum wage laws.An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners.It is important to note that, in her order dated September 2, 1985, med-arbiter Elnora V. Balleras made a specific finding that there are only thirty-seven (37) employees of petitioner who are not members of the cooperative and who are, therefore, the only employees of petitioner cooperative eligible to form or join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining [Annex "A" of the Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 22]. However, the minutes of the certification election [Annex "C" of the Petition: Rollo, p. 28] show that a total of eighty-three (83) employees were allowed to vote and of these, forty-nine (49) voted for respondent union. Thus, even if We agree with respondent union's contention that the thirty seven (37) employees who were originally non-members of the cooperative can still vote in the certification election since they were only "forced and compelled to join the cooperative on pain of disciplinary action," the certification election held on October 1, 1986 is still null and void since even those who were already members of the cooperative at the time of the issuance of the med-arbiter's order, and therefore cannot claim that they were forced to join the union were allowed to vote in the election.Article 256 of the Labor Code provides, among others, that:To have a valid, election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all workers in the unit . . . [Italics supplied.]In this case it cannot be determined whether or not respondent union was duly elected by the eligible voters of the bargaining unit since even employees who are ineligible to join a labor union within the cooperative because of their membership therein were allowed to vote in the certification election. Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent director committed grave abuse of discretion in certifying respondent union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of petitioner cooperative.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed resolution of respondent director is ANNULLED. The certification election conducted on October 1, 1986, is SET ASIDE. The Regional Office No. 1 of San Fernando, La Union is hereby directed to immediately conduct new certification election proceedings among the rank and file employees of the petitioner who are not members of the cooperative.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-20307 February 26, 1965YOUNG MEN LABOR UNION STEVEDORES, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., respondents.Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner.Doyon, Clarin and Ruiz for respondent Victory Stevedoring and Labor Union.Emiliano Morabe for respondent Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc.Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:On April 25, 1961, Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. (NALCO) entered into a contract with both Young Men Labor Union Stevedores (YMLUS) and Victory Stevedoring and Labor Union (VISLU) whereby the two unions bound themselves to undertake on a 50-50 basis the

stevedoring or loading jobs of the NALCO's export products from the Port of Nasipit, Agusan. Said agreement was concluded in a conference called for such purpose in the presence of the Philippine constabulary officials stationed at Butuan City, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan, the Justice of the Peace and Chief of Police of Nasipit, Agusan, and the officials and representatives of NALCO and the two unions.On July 20, 1961, the YMLUS sent a letter to NALCO demanding the withdrawal of the loading job from the VISLU on the ground that the registration permit granted to the latter by the Department of Labor had been cancelled, and when VISLU was notified by the NALCO of such demand, it refused to abandon the 50% loading job granted to it under the agreement on the ground that the order of cancellation had not yet become final. On August 2, 1961, the YMLUS sent a notice of picketing to NALCO in which the former threatened to carry out to "our picket line beginning August 9, 1961 to continue uninterrupted until you make up your mind to stop the loading of cargos by the defunct VISLU or reassign the same to us, the YMLUS,"On August 9, 1961, the NALCO filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations which, as amended, prayed, among others, that pending final determination of the case the court issue an order enjoining both unions to observe the status quo; and, after due hearing, to decide which of the two unions should be given the stevedoring job in controversy or whether the 50-50 arrangement which was arrived at on April 25, 1961 should be followed and complied with by the parties.On August 23, 1961, after a series of bloody incidents resulting from the picketing by the members of the YMLUS and retaliation from the members of the VISLU, the NALCO filed a petition before the Court of Industrial Relations praying, among others, (1) to issue a temporary restraining order against the officials, members and agents of the YMLUS, ordering them to refrain from blocking, obstructing, stopping, coercing, intimidating, or in any manner preventing the loading or unloading operations then assigned to the VISLU; (2) issue a similar temporary restraining order to the officers, members, and agents of the VISLU ordering them to desist in retaliating from the coercive acts of the YMLUS by any violent means; and (3) after the hearing, to issue an order making the two abovementioned injunctions permanent as to both unions.At this stage of the proceedings both unions filed separate motions to dismiss mainly on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations to act on the controversy. Subsequently, however, both unions withdrew their respective motions to dismiss and voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the industrial court. On May 16, 1962, Judge Arsenio Martinez, to whom the case was assigned, rendered a decision enjoining the parties to continue observing the 50-50 basis agreement entered into between them until it shall have been decided in a certification election to be undertaken by the Department of Labor which of the two unions should have direct relationship, thru collective bargaining, with the NALCO. The YMLUS and the NALCO filed each a motion for reconsideration only insofar as the decision ordered the holding of a certification election, and when both motions were denied by the court en banc, the YMLUS interposed the present petition for review.1äwphï1.ñëtIn assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, petitioner anchors his argument primarily on the doctrine enunciated by this Court in the case of PAFLU v. Tan, L-9115, wherein this Court enumerated the cases over which said court can exercise jurisdiction. While said case does not include a controversy of this nature among those enumerated therein, it does not follow that the industrial court is bereft of jurisdiction over it for the same involves a certification election. It is clear from the provisions of Republic Act No. 875 that matters pertaining to certification election involving two or more unions is one that is addressed to the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations [Section 12(b), Republic Act 875]. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped to question the jurisdiction of the lower court for it is undisputed that it withdrew its motion to dismiss raising that issue and voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction and presented its evidence. And so it has been held

that "One who subjects himself to the jurisdiction of a court, even where he would not otherwise be subject to suit, becomes subject to any valid claim asserted against him directly relating to the subject matter of his voluntarily initiated proceeding. ... To permit one to invoke the exercise of jurisdiction within the general powers of the court and then to reverse its orders upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction would be to allow one to trifle with courts. The principle is one of estoppel in the interest of a sound administration of the laws ... closes the mouth of the complainant" (Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, et al., L-1981-82, May 28, 1954).We find no error in the order issued by respondent court requiring the Department of Labor to hold a certification election to determine which of the two unions should be the one to undertake the stevedoring job of the company. This is sanctioned by Section 12(b) of Republic, Act 875. Moreover, this is the only expedient way by which the rivalry between the two unions may be solved to avoid friction and other unfortunate incidents. And considering that certification proceedings are investigatory in nature which had been entrusted exclusively to the Court of Industrial Relations, we do not feel justified to interfere, unless a grave abuse of discretion is shown. Such is not the case here.Considering that certification proceedings are investigatory in nature since —the object of the proceedings is not the decision of any alleged commission of wrong nor asserted deprivation of rights but is merely the determination of proper bargaining units and the ascertainment of the will and choice of the employees in respect of the selection of a bargaining representative. The determination of the proceedings does not entail the entry of remedial orders or redress of rights, but culmination solely in an official designation of bargaining units and an affirmation of the employees' expressed choice of bargaining agent. (Rothernberg on Labor Relation, pp. 514-515; Labor Laws by Francisco, 3rd ed., Vol. I, p. 458);taking into account that the conduct of such proceedings has been entrusted specifically to the Court of Industrial Relations (R.A. 875, sec. 12), and that they should be expedited as much as possible, this Court should not interfere with the discretion and judgment of that specialized tribunal in connection with such proceedings, at least in the absence of clear and patent abuse that in this case has not been shown to exist." (Benguet Consolidated, Inc., et al. v. Bobok Lumber Jack Association, et al., L-11029 & L-11065, May 23, 1958)The claim that respondent court prohibited petitioner from exercising its constitutional right to picket is not correct. What the court prohibited was the commission of illegal acts in connection with picketing which under our jurisprudence can be lawfully done. As a matter of fact, the picketing has resulted in many bloody incidents because of the acts of retaliation on the part of the other rival union.Finally, respondent court did not hold that petitioner is only entitled to 50% of the stevedoring work. What it declared was that the 50-50 arrangement concluded between the parties should continue until the result of the certification election shall have become final and executory and a collective bargaining contract entered into between the parties. This step is proper considering the situation then obtaining.WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed. Costs against petitioner.G.R. No. L-48007 December 15, 1982PLUM FEDERATION OF INDUSTRIAL AND AGRARIAN WORKERS, petitioner, vs.DIRECTOR CARMELO C. NORIEL, of the Bureau of Labor Relations; MANILA JOCKEY CLUB RACE DAY OPERATION EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-PTGWO and MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., respondents.The Solicitor General for petitioner.Pedro A. Lopez for respondent MJCRDOELU-PTGWO.Armando V. Ampil for respondent Manila Jockey Club. DE CASTRO, J.:

Petitioner seeks to set aside the Order and Resolutions dated May 6, 1977, September 17, 1977 and March 14, 1978 of the Bureau of Labor Relations for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. It, likewise, prays for an order directing respondent director to hold a certification election so that the employees in the company can elect a union representative to negotiate an improved connective bargaining agreement to replace the agreement which has expired on February 1, 1976.On May 5, 1976, Plum Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers filed a petition, praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of Manila Jockey Club, Inc.On June 18, 1976, the Manila Jockey Club Race Day Operation Employees Labor Union-PTGWO filed a motion to intervene and opposition to said petition and alleged among other things, that it is the recognized collective bargaining representative of all the employees of the company and that it is in the process of negotiating a modification of the collective bargaining agreement.On August 30, 1976, another supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by intervenor PTGWO, this time invoking the "No Union Raiding Clause" of the "Code of Ethics" adopted by the members of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (T.U.C.P.) wherein both petitioner and intervenor are members, and claiming that the petition failed to satisfy the 30% requirement of the law. The entire record of the case was forwarded to the Office of the President of the T.U.C.P. for the purpose of submitting the matter to the Congress for decision.On March 16, 1977, the entire record of the case was returned by the T.U.C.P. President to the Office of then Secretary of Labor which in turn transmitted the same to the Bureau of Labor Relations Office with a forwarding letter signed by the late Roberto S. Oca in his capacity as President of the Congress, stating, among other things, the following: 1

In a National Executive Board meeting of the Katipunang Manggagawang Pilipino (TUCP) held last March 7, 1977 at the Army & Navy Club, it was duly approved that the above-captioned case be referred back to the BLR and that MJCR-OELU-PTGWO be declared as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, thus dismissing the petition of PLUM.On March 22, 1977, the BLR endorsed the case to Officer-in-Charge Vicente Leodegardo, Jr., of Region IV for appropriate action.On May 5, 1977, Atty. Luna C. Piezas, Chief, Med-Arbiter Section of Region IV, Department of Labor, promulgated an order 2dismissing the case pursuant to the letter of the President of the T.U.C.P.Petitioner PLUM filed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations predicated on the ground that TUCP has no authority in law to grant or deny election under the Labor Code which mandated the secret ballot to elect the true union representative.On September 17, 1977, the Bureau Director issued a resolution' dismissing the appeal. Pertinent portions 3 of said resolution read thus:While it may be true that the facts of the case may warrant the holding of a certification election in the bargaining unit concerned, to sustain first the decision arrived at by the National Executive Board of TUCP appears of indispensable importance. Contenders in the case at bar are both members of TUCP. Undeniably, there are internal rules including their Code of Ethics to keep them intact, to govern their actions and finally to preserve the Congress. It is therefore, a matter of utmost necessity that a decision arrived at by the National Executive Board be respected and enforced not only by the members of the Congress themselves but also by this Bureau and the Department if necessity arises,The appealed order has the letter of Roberto Oca as its basis. It is worthy to note that the letter sent said communication in his capacity as President of the TUCP and nothing else. Whether or not he happens also to be the president of intervenor union is of no legal significance since the decision of the TUCP was handed down by its National Executive Board and not by him alone.Other recourse could have been taken by appellant. Very much aware of the Decision of the

National Executive Board on March 7, 1977, it could have asked for a reconsideration of the same. As shown by the records, the first decision of the National Board was for the holding of a certification election. But intervenor asked for a reconsideration hence the March 7, decision. Appellant's failure however could unequivocably be interpreted as satisfaction of the Decision. For this Office now, to sustain appellant's stand and re-open the case again by giving due course to the instant appeal is not only an open manifestation of non-recognition of the existence of TUCP but a further obstruction to the goal of the Department to establish one-union in one industry; thus at the end, to attain industrial peace.xxx xxx xxxPetitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied by public respondent for being pro-forma, hence the present recourse by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus.It was asserted by petition that nowhere in the Labor Code or in the new Constitution has TUCP been granted any authority to supersede or impair the holding of a certification election or deny the majority employees of their right to elect their own union; that public respondent and the PTGWO acted without jurisdiction in defiance of the rule of law and popular democracy, that it, is not within the Code of Ethics to suppress the employees' freedom to choose their own union; and that the TUCP, while asserting itself to be a Labor Center did not call the parties involved for conference, to submit evidence or to make a fair judicious and rational evaluation of the dispute.The Solicitor General in his manifestation and motion prayed that he be relieved from filing the required answer to the instant petition for the reason that he was unable to sustain respondent bureau director's questioned orders and resolution. The records of the case were returned to said public respondent and he was granted an extension of time within which to submit his own answer to the petition.Respondent Noriel in his comment (answer) made it clear that he is not opposed to the conduct of a certification election, and in fact he is ready to hold such election if the case is returned to the jurisdiction of his office. However, he stressed that the TUCP Code of Ethics and General Council Resolution No. 76-2 are clear expressions of consent by the signatory members, including their locals or affiliates, to settle their disputes among themselves in accordance with the decision of the National Executive Board and the decision he made was made pursuant to such an agreement.On the other hand, private respondent union maintained its stand that no certification election should be held because the petition was not supported by the written consent of at least 30% of all the employees in the bargaining unit, and that this requirement is mandatory.A letter from the president of respondent union reveals the present state of affairs of the employees wherein they are deprived of the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement, for management refused to bargain with the union. If this situation continues, the employees would stand to lose a long-line of cases that the workers' welfare can be promoted through the bargaining process. Certification election is the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the win of the majrity if given expression in an honest election� with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling. 4 Protection to labor and freedom of peaceful assembly and association are guaranteed by the Constitution.As to the issue of whether or not the 30% minimum subscription requirement was met, it was held that the Director is still empowered to call for a certification election provided there was no abuse of discretion. However, in the case at bar, instead of ordering an election, respondent Director dismissed the appeal of PLUM based on the decision of the TUCP, which the Court considers an impairment of the freedom of the workers to voice out their choice of the union to represent them. If there is any doubt as to the required number having met, there would be no better way than the holding of a certification election to ascertain which union really commands the allegiance of the rank-and-file employees. 5 If the desired goal is for the execution of a collective bargaining contract to protect the workers, then certification election is the most appropriate means to attain said end.

Since there has been no certification election for the past three (3) years as well as a certified collective bargaining agreement which should govern the economic and working conditions of the workers, a certification election should immediately be ordered. This Court had repeatedly made it clear that in labor controversies, time is of the essence. 6

Accordingly, the questioned order and resolutions dated May 5, 1977, September 17, 1977 and March 14, 1978 are nullified and set aside. Respondent Director is hereby ordered to hold a certification election forthwith. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 97189 May 11, 1993JISSCOR INDEPENDENT UNION, petitioner, vs.HON. RUBEN TORRES and BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, in their capacity as Secretary and Undersecretary of Labor, respectively; ASSOCIATED LABOR UNI0N (ALU) and SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG JISSCOR, respondents.Romeo B. Igot Law Office for petitioner.Joji L. Barrios for private respondents. GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:On June 27, 1990, petitioner JISSCOR Independent Union (JIU) filed a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the Jacinto Iron and Steel Sheets Corporation (JISSCOR) before the Med- Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region, Manila.By agreement of the petitioner, JIU, the intervenor SMJ-ALU and the JISSCOR management, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order on August 29, 1990, setting the certification election on September 4, 1990.However, on the appointed date, instead of an election, as previously agreed upon by all the parties, another pre-election conference was held in the Department of Labor and Employment. Another agreement was entered into by JIU, JISSCOR and SMJ-ALU, providing that the election would be conducted on September 6, 1990 from 8:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M., and that "the mandatory five (5) days posting is hereby waived by agreement of the parties" (p. 172, Rollo).The results of the certification election held on September 6, 1990 were the following:JISSCOR Independent Union 46Samahang Manggagawa ng JISSCOR-ALU 50No Union 0Spoiled 3Total Votes Cast 99 (p. 21, Rollo.)The JIU, which obtained only the second highest number of votes, registered a protest in the minutes of the election stating that: "we file protest on the following grounds using visor, emblem" (p. 174, Rollo).On September 11, 1990, the JIU filed a formal protest before the Department of Labor, National Capital Region, on the following grounds:I. The election was conducted very disorderly and irregular (sic) as there was no compliance of (sic) mandatory posting of notice of certification election and necessary list of qualified voters in accordance to (sic) Section 1 of Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations;II. The lack of the required posting had mislead (sic) and/or misinformed the voters/workers of the manner of voting, thus it resulted to some spoiled votes;III. Escorting of workers by SMJ-ALU officers and members, especially a certain Rene Tan from their place of work to the election registration;IV. Forcing the workers to vote for SMJ-ALU by posting of a very big streamer with printed words: Vote! Samahang Manggagawa Ng JISSCOR-ALU at the entrance front door of the chapel where the election was held;

V. Forcing the workers to vote for SMJ-ALU by wearing of sunvisors and pins with printed words: Vote! SMJ-ALU before and during voting inside the polling place (chapel). (pp- 45-46, Rollo.)On November 21, 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin issued an Order declaring the September 6, 1990 certification election null and void.On December 12, 1990, the winner, respondent SMJ-ALU appealed to the DOLE Secretary and prayed that it be declared the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of JISSCOR.On January 18, 1991, a decision was rendered by the Secretary of Labor and Employment granting the appeal of SMJ-ALU and setting aside the Order dated November 21, 1990 of the Med-Arbiter. A new order was entered certifying SMJ-ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file workers of JISSCOR pursuant to the results of the certification election conducted on September 6, 1990.In due time, the JIU filed this petition for certiorari alleging that the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in certifying SMJ-ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of JISSCOR.The petition has no merit.Section 3, Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides that the grounds of a protest may be filed on the spot or in writing with the representation officer and shall be contained in the minutes of the proceedings. Protests not so raised are deemed waived.The minutes of the certification election show, however, that JIU only protested against the use of emblem, visor, pin. Hence, other "protests [such as the posting in the chapel entrance of a huge streamer with the words: "Vote! Samahang Manggagawa ng JISSCOR-ALU"]not so raised are deemed waived" (Sec. 3, Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code).There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the non-posting of the notice of the certification election as prescribed by Section 1, Rule VI, Book V of the Onmibus Rules Implementing the labor Code misled and confused the workers regarding the mechanics of the election. The petitioner is estopped from raising that issue for it signed an agreement with the private respondent to waive the mandatory five (5) days posting of election notices. The doctrine of estoppel is based on grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon (PNB vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 357).The results of the certification election belie the petitioner's allegation that the workers were misinformed about the election for the records show that out of 104 eligible voters, 99 were able to cast their votes and only 3 were spoiled ballots.On the alleged use of sunvisors, pins, emblems and the posting of a huge streamer, the Undersecretary found:. . . nothing in the records shows that the alleged wearing of sunvisors and pins, the posting of huge streamers, as well as the alleged escorting of voters by SMJ-ALU have unduly pressured, influenced, vitiated, or in any manner affected the choice of the workers of their bargaining agent. (p. 49, Rollo.)That finding of fact of the head of an administrative agency is conclusive upon the court (Reyes vs. Minister of Labor, 170 SCRA 134).WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondents, the Secretary and Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, in rendering the questioned decision, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the Undersecretary of Labor, by authority of the Secretary of Labor, is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-18848 April 23, 1963ACOJE WORKERS' UNION, petitioner,

vs.NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS' UNION (NAMAWU), ACOJE MINES COMPANY and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.Dator, Real and Reyes for petitioner.Jose C. Espinas and Associates for respondent National Mines and Allied Workers Union.Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for respondent Acoje Mines Company.Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.CONCEPCION, J.:Appeal by certiorari from an Order of the Court of Industrial Relations certifying:the National Mines and Allied Workers' Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the Acoje Mining Company at Santa Cruz, Zambales, excluding supervisors, confidential employees and security guards, for purposes of collective bargaining under Republic Act 875 as regards to wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other conditions of employment.Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñëtPursuant to an Order of the Court of Industrial Relations, dated May 19, 1961, and a Resolution thereof en banc, dated June 8, 1961, the Department of Labor, through the Bureau of Labor Relations, conducted on June 9, 1961, a "consent election" among the workers of the aforementioned Company, in which five (5) labor unions participated, namely, the Acoje United Workers' Union, the Acoje Labor Union (PELTA), the Acoje Labor Union (PLUM), respondent National Mines and Allied Workers' Union (NAMAWU), and petitioner Acoje Workers' Union. On June 21, 1961, the Department of Labor certified that the result of the election was as follows:No. of Valid Votes cast ...................................

874

No. of Spoiled Ballots ....................................

11

No. of Challenged Ballots .................................

19

Total No. of Votes Cast ...........................................

904

No. of Votes Cast for:Acoje United Workers Union ................................

8

Acoje Labor Union-Pelta ...................................

11

Acoje Labor Union-Plum ....................................

5

National Mines & Allied Workers' Union .............

560

Acoje Workers' 278

Union ..................................No Union desired ......................................

12

874Prior thereto or on June 12, 1961, petitioner Union — which had been defeated by respondent Union by a margin of 282 votes — had filed a motion to invalidate said election upon several grounds. After due hearing, the lower court issued, on July 21, 1961, the order appealed from holding that said motion was without merit, and certifying respondent Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers of the Company. A reconsideration of said order having been denied by the Court en banc, petitioner interposed the present appeal by certiorari, and now maintains that the lower court should have invalidated the aforementioned election for the same was "the result of acts of terrorism, force, threat and intimidation employed by" agents of respondent Union.More specifically, petitioner alleges that, "if heard or given its day in Court" it could have proven that: a) not less than 310 workers of the Company were threatened the night immediately preceding the election by agents of respondent Union individually "to cast their vote for said Union ... or else;" b) the agents of respondent Union were even aided by the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Zambales, and his policemen, and, as a consequence, said Municipal Mayor was suspended from office; c) the acts performed by said agents of respondent Union "resulted into unlawful disorder, damaged belongings, and physical injuries suffered by the workers"; d) many workers were unable to vote for justified causes; and e) many workers, subject of unfair labor practice case actually pending in Court, were not allowed to vote, contrary to law.The last two (2) grounds are clearly untenable. It appears that on April 24, 1961, the labor unions concerned agreed, not only to the holding of the aforementioned election, but, also, to the use of the Company payroll of March 31, 1961, as the basis for determining who are qualified to vote subject to the approval of the lower court. On May 8, 1961, the Company presented its aforementioned payroll to said court and stated that the labor unions had been furnished copy thereof, at least three (3) days prior thereto. Said labor unions were given an opportunity to make their comments and observations on the list of workers contained in the payroll and to ask or suggest the inclusion or exclusion of names therein or therefrom. Petitioner's representative then stated that it would abide by whatever ruling the court may make on the matter of inclusion and exclusion of voters. Indeed, on May 19, 1961, the court issued the corresponding order for the holding of the election and in made its ruling on the question as to who were qualified to vote, and petitioner did not move for a reconsideration of said ruling, although two (2) other Labor Unions and that Company did so, and their motions for reconsideration were denied by the Courten banc. Hence, petitioner may no longer contest the accuracy of the aforementioned voters list.Pursuant thereto that Company had 1,019 workers, excluding department heads foremen, but including 48 security guards. Excluding the latter, there were, therefore, only 971 qualified voters. Of these, 904 had voted, so that only 67 qualified voters had to cast their votes. It is obvious, that this number plus the 19 ballots challenged in the election are insufficient to offset the plurality of 282 votes obtained by respondent Union.In connection with the duress claimed to have been used upon the voters, it should be observed that in its motion dated June 12, 1961, petitioner maintained that the election should be invalidated because of alleged: a) insufficiency of the notice of said election; b) failure to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the list of qualified voters; c) inclusion among those who voted of confidential employees, supervisors and security or police officers; d) failure of many workers to vote due to said insufficient notice "as well as the cases of violence that occurred on the eve of election". None of these grounds is now invoked by

petitioner herein. Worthy of notice is the fact that petitioner did not claim that any voter had been coerced to vote for respondent Union.In fact, in its supplemental motion of June 22, 1961, petitioner made more specific allegations to bolster up its pretense "that the election held on June 9, 1961, is inconclusive because of the alleged "failure of more than 300 workers to vote which, as above indicated, is not a fact. It is true that the last ground — out of the seven (7) — relied upon in the aforementioned supplemental motion was to the effect that "there are many cases where the workers were threatened, coerced and intimidated to vote for the NAMAWU." But this general allegation, without anything to indicate the number of workers involved, without the supporting affidavit of any of them, and without an offer to introduce their testimony or the testimony of any of them was — in the light of the attending circumstances clearly insufficient to warrant the invalidation of the aforementioned election.As regards the disorder that had allegedly characterized the election, the minutes thereof suffice to refute petitioner's pretense. We quote from said minutes:Balloting went on smoothly up to closing time at 7:00 p.m. There was spirit of comraderie among the representatives of the contesting unions throughout the proceedings.Peace and order was maintained by the 18th PC Company at Iba, Zambales, graced by the presence of the Provincial Commander in person.

SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA PACIFIC PLASTIC, petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, Undersecretary of Labor, and MALAYANG NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG PACIFIC PLASTIC, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the resolution, dated May 14, 1993, of respondent Undersecretary of Labor and the order of the Med-Arbiter of January 31, 1993, dismissing the election protest of petitioner Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic (SAMAHAN) and upholding the election of respondent Malayang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Pacific Plastic (MNMPP) as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees at the Pacific Plastic Corporation.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner SAMAHAN and respondent MNMPP are labor unions of rank and file employees at the Pacific Plastic Corporation (PPC) in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1990, MNMPP filed a Petition for Certification Election, alleging that there were more or less 130 rank and file employees at the PPC whom it was seeking to represent. [1] SAMAHAN countered by seeking the cancellation of MNMPPs union registration. As a result, MNMPPs petition to be certified as the bargaining agent was dismissed. MNMPP appealed to the Secretary of Labor who, on March 5, 1991, reversed the decision of the Med-Arbiter and ordered the holding of a certification election among the rank and file employees of the PPC. The PPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but its motion was denied. Accordingly, the representation officer of the Secretary of Labor held a pre-election conference on May 6, 1991, during which the PPC was required to submit the list of its rank and file employees based on the company payroll three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition. As respondent company failed to submit the list, it was given a stern warning by the Department of Labor (DOLE) that should it fail to appear at the next conference on June 3, 1991, the list to be submitted by petitioner MNMPP would be used as basis for determining the eligible voters. [2] But the PPC again failed to appear at the conference, prompting the Department of Labor Industrial Relations Division (DOLE-IRD) to issue a final warning. [3]

Petitioner SAMAHAN also failed to appear at the June 3, 1991 conference. On June 18, 1991, it moved to defer the conference, alleging that proceedings for the cancellation of union registration of MNMPP were still pending resolution before the Med-Arbiter which constitute a prejudicial question and that there existed a collective bargaining agreement between PPC and SAMAHAN which was a bar to the certification election. [4]

MNMPP opposed the motion, contending that the cancellation case had already been finally decided by the DOLE and that the execution of the subject CBA during the pendency of the representation case did not bar the holding of a certification election. [5]

On August 23, 1991, the DOLE-IRD summoned respondent company once more, reiterating its warning that should the company fail to submit the list of its rank and file employees, the list to be submitted by private respondent MNMPP and petitioner SAMAHAN would be adopted as the list of qualified voters and the companys right to the exclusion proceedings would be deemed waived. [6]

But again PPC did not comply with the DOLE order. Meanwhile, on September 23, 1991, SAMAHAN and MNMPP agreed to hold the certification election on October 29, 1991 on the basis of the list of employees submitted by MNMPP, without prejudice to the submission by petitioner SAMAHAN of its own list on October 17, 1991. [7] Thereafter, they agreed to postpone election to await the list of employees requested from the Social Security System. [8]

On September 10, 1992, upon motion of MNMPP, the certification election was finally set for October 6, 1992. But SAMAHAN objected despite its agreement with MNMPP on September 23, 1991 to hold an election using the list furnished by the SSS. [9] It also objected to the participation of a third labor union, Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI) which in the meantime had filed a motion for intervention. Thereafter, SAMAHAN filed a Manifestation/Motion that it was not participating in the certification election and asked that the certification election held on the same day be nullified for the following reasons: (1) it did not receive notice of the certification as required by law; (2) its opposition to KAMAPIs motion to intervene and its opposition to setting the date of the certification election had not been resolved; (3) there were discrepancies in the list of voters submitted by the SSS; and (4) SAMAHANs President moved to strike out his signature at the back of the official ballot. [10]

The certification election was held on October 6, 1992. Over SAMAHANs objection KAMAPI was allowed to participate. The following were results of the election: [11]

No. of Eligible Voters..98Malayang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic,...56Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic..2Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino...0No Union1No. of Spoiled Ballots cast.3

Total no of Votes Cast..62

On October 9, 1992, SAMAHAN protested the result of the certification election alleging the same grounds alleged by it in its Manifestation/Motion of October 6, 1992. On October 15, 1992, MNMPP opposed the petition raising the following arguments: (1) that the mere filing of a motion for intervention will not suspend the holding of a certification election under Rule V, 5 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code; (2) that the results of the election showed that intervenor was resoundingly repudiated by the employees; (3) that it failed to specify the alleged discrepancies in the list of employees furnished by the SSS; and (4) that matters not raised during the election are deemed waived pursuant to Rule VI, 3 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. [12]

In his order dated January 31, 1993, the Med-Arbiter, Tomas F. Falconitin, dismissed the election protest of SAMAHAN and upheld the election of MNMPP as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees at the PPC. On March 12, 1993,

SAMAHAN appealed to the Secretary of Labor. It argued that its opposition to KAMAPIs Motion for Intervention should first be resolved before a certification election could be held and that the contract-bar rule should be applied. In addition, it contended that the use of the SSS list was in violation of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which prescribe the use of the company payroll as basis for the voters list.

On May 14, 1993, Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma denied the appeal of SAMAHAN and affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter. SAMAHAN moved for a reconsideration, but its motion was denied on July 29, 1993. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Petitioner contends:

1. The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is null and void on the ground that only 62 out of 130 employees participated in the activity.2. The SSS lists indicating 98 covered employees cannot be used as substitute for three (3) monthly payrolls [sic] required for the purpose of determining the qualified voters and the majority vote needed in an election.3. Hon. Bienvenido Laguesma committed a serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the election of respondent officers [sic] despite the absence of majority support which is 65 out of 130 admitted members in the bargaining unit.4. Hon. Bienvenido Laguesma had abused his discretion in sustaining the med-arbiter despite the absence of any legal or factual support when he could otherwise declare failure of an election, thereby constituting his acts to have been done in excess of his authority amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and therefore his resolution and order issued pursuant thereof are considered to be null and void. [13]

The petition has no merit.

First. The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is valid. Art. 256 of the Labor Code provides that in order to have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The certification election results show that more than a majority, i.e., 62 out of a total of 98 eligible voters included in the list of employees obtained from the SSS, cast their votes. Hence, the legal requirement for a valid election was met.

The bone of contention actually concerns the propriety of utilizing the list of employees furnished by the SSS as basis for determining the total number of eligible voters in the bargaining unit. Petitioner claims that, according to the Implementing Rules, the basis for the list of eligible voters should have been the payroll three (3) months preceding the filing of the petition for certification election and that if this was done the 62 votes cast would be short of the majority because, instead of only 98 employees as shown in the SSS list, there were actually 130 as alleged in MNMPPs petition for certification election.

The contention is without merit. As petitioner itself says, the figure 130 is based on the allegation that MNMPP made in its petition for certification election that it was supported by at least 25% of the members of the bargaining unit. [14] Such statement was a mere approximation of the size of the bargaining unit that the petitioning union seeks to represent and cannot be used against MNMPP for this reason.

It should ideally be the payroll which should have been used for the purpose of the election. However, the unjustified refusal of a company to submit the payroll in its custody, despite efforts to make it produce it, compelled resort to the SSS list as the next best source of information. After all, the SSS list is a public record whose regularity is presumed. In Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) v. Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, [15]

this Court underscored the policy of the Labor Code of encouraging the holding of a

certification election as the definitive and certain way of ascertaining the choice of employees as to the labor organization in a collective bargaining unit. In Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services World Federation of Trade Unions v. Laguesma, [16] we reiterated this policy thus:

It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections, for it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. We have held that whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular union represents the majority of the rank and file employees, in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of certification election is the most democratic method of determining the employees choice of their bargaining representative. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the employees themselves. Indeed, it is the keystone of industrial democracy.

Insistence on the application of the Omnibus Implementing Rules could defeat this policy. Worse, it could facilitate fraud by employers who can easily suppress the payroll to prevent certification elections from being held. This Court has therefore consistently adhered to the principle announced in U.E. Automotive Employees v. Noriel [17] that where it concerns the weight to be accorded to the wishes of the majority as expressed in an election conducted fairly and honestly, certain provisions that may be considered mandatory before the voting takes place become thereafter merely directory in order that the wishes of the electorate prevail. Considering all the arguments presented above, we find no substantial reason to nullify the certification election conducted on October 6, 1992 on the basis of a mere technicality which finds no justification considering the facts of the case nor upon close examination of the true intent of the law to remove all impediments to the conduct of certification elections.

At all events petitioner must be deemed to have waived the objection based on this ground, considering that this objection was raised for the first time in petitioners appeal from the decision of the Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioners protest. [18] Even then, petitioners objection to the use of the SSS list was not that this was contrary to the requirement of the Implementing Rules that the payroll three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition should be used but rather that the list contained some discrepancy [19] an allegation which petitioner failed to substantiate.

At the latest, petitioners objection to the use of the SSS should have been raised during the elections and formalized in its election protest. We agree with private respondent MNMPP in its Opposition to SAMAHANs election protest dated October 15, 1992 that under the Implementing Rules, grounds of protests not raised before the close of the proceedings and duly formalized within five (5) days after the close of the election proceedings are deemed waived. [20]

Second. Petitioners contention in its Motion for Deferment of Pre-election Conference was that the CBA between it and the PPC signed during the pendency of the representation proceedings, rendered the certification election moot and academic. Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, 4 provides:

The representation case shall not, however, be adversely affected by a collective bargaining agreement registered before or during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case.

This rule was applied in the case of ALU-TUCP v. Trajano [21] where we held that the representation case will not be adversely affected by a CBA registered before or during the freedom period or during the pendency of the representation case. In ALU v. Calleja, [22] we also held that a CBA, which was prematurely renewed, is not a bar to the holding of a

certification election.Hence, the CBA entered into between petitioner and PPC during the pendency of the representation case and after the filing of the petition for certification election on August 24, 1990, cannot possibly prejudice the certification election nor render it moot.

Third. With respect to petitioners claim [23] that the proceedings for the cancellation of MNMPPs union registration was a prejudicial question, suffice it to say that as held in Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Cal1eja, [24] certification election can be conducted despite pendency of a petition to cancel the union registration certificate. For the fact is that at the time the respondent union filed its petition for certification, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing its cancellation.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-32853 September 25, 1981JUAN S. BARRERA, (doing business under the firm and trade name, MACHINERY AND STEEL PRODUCTS ENGINEERING MASPE petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Philippine Associated Workers Union (PAWO) and MASPE WORKERS' UNION, respondents. FERNANDO C.J.:It was the absence of any definite ruling at the time this petition was filed on the question of whether or not a pending certification election proceeding may be dismissed or held in abeyance, there being such a motion on the part of the employer Juan S. Barrera, doing business under the firm and trade name of Machinery and Steel Products Engineering MASPE alleging an unfair labor practice against one of the contending parties, private respondent MASPE Workers Union, the other being private respondent Philippine Associated Workers Union, that led this Court to give it due course. The unfair labor practice imputed to such labor union consisted of failure to bargain collectively, aggravated by an illegal strike. Respondent Court of Industrial Relations denied such a motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds therein alleged "appear not to be indubitable A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, this petition was filed.Subsequently, to be precise, in 1973, in the case of B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. vs. Goodrich (Marikina Factory) Confidential and Salaried Employees Union-NATU. 1 such a question was given an answer by this Court, one adverse to the claim of petitioner. This petition, therefore, must be dismissed.The case for petitioner was put most vigorously in the exhaustive and scholarly brief of its counsel, Manuel M. Crudo To quote from its pertinent portion: "On September 22, 1970 the petitioner Barrera filed a motion to dismiss or hold case in abeyance, in CIR Case No. 2759-MC. In said motion, we called attention to the admission of MASPE Workers Union as intervenor in the case. We stated that the intervenor union, its officers and members had committed various acts of unfair labor practice and were on illegal strike punctuated by force, violence and intimidation. We called attention to our formal charge of unfair labor practice against the intervenor union. We called attention to the fact that in the charge of unfair labor practice among the reliefs prayed for were to declare respondents therein collectively and individually guilty of unfair labor practice; to declare the strike, and other concerted actions resorted to in pursuance of said unfair labor practice illegal to declare the MASPE Workers Union as consequently having lost all rights and privileges accorded by law to a legitimate labor union; and to declare all individual respondents therein and others as having lost their employment status by virtue of the illegality of the strike staged by them. We then pointed out that unless the case for unfair labor practice against MASPE Workers Union, its officers and

members is decided the status of that union and its members who are respondents would be uncertain (i.e., in relation to the requested certification election and the outcome thereof). * * * Unfortunately, the respondent Honorable Court of Industrial Relations denied our motion to dismiss or hold case in abeyance. * * * ." 2 It remains only to be added that subsequently the Court of Industrial Relations en banc denied a motion for reconsideration, failing "to find sufficient justification to alter or to modify the aforesaid Order." 3

To repeat, the petition cannot prosper.1. As set forth in the B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. decision: "There is novelty in the specific question raised, as to whether or not a certification election may be stayed at the instance of the employer, pending the determination of an unfair labor practice case filed by it against certain employees affiliated with respondent-unions. That is a matter of which this Court has not had an opportunity to speak on previously. What is settled law, dating from the case of Standard Cigarette Workers' Union v. Court of Industrial Relations, decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor organization objecting to the participation in a certification election of a company dominated union, as a result of which a complaint for an unfair labor practice case against the employer was filed, the status of the latter union must be first cleared in such a proceeding before such voting could take place." 4

2. This is the more relevant excerpt: "The unique situation before us, however, is exactly the reverse. It is management that would have an unfair labor practice case filed by it for illegal strike engaged in by some of its employees concluded, before it would agree to the holding of a certification election. That is the stand of petitioner. It does not carry conviction. The reason that justifies the postponement of a certification election pending an inquiry, as to the bona fides of a labor union, precisely calls for a different conclusion. If under the circumstances disclosed, management is allowed to have its way, the result might be to dilute or fritter away the strength of an organization bent on a more zealous defense of labor's prerogatives. The difficulties and obstacles that must be then hurdled would not be lost on the rest of the personnel who had not as yet made up their minds one way or the other. This is not to say that management is to be precluded from filing an unfair labor practice case. It is merely to stress that such a suit should not be allowed to lend itself as a means, whether intended or not, to prevent a truly free expression of the will of the labor group as to the organization that will represent it. It is not only the loss of time involved, in itself not likely to enhance the prospect of respondent-unions, but also the fear engendered in the mind of an ordinary employee that management has many weapons in its arsenal to bring the full force of its undeniable power against those of its employees dissatisfied with things as they are. There is no valid reason then for the postponement sought. This is one instance that calls for the application of the maxim, lex dilationes semper exhorret. Moreover, is there not in the posture taken by petitioner a contravention of what is expressly set forth in the Industrial Peace Act, which speaks of the labor organizations 'designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit [be the exclusive] representative of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.' The law clearly contemplates all the employees, not only some of them. As much as possible then, there is to be no unwarranted reduction in the number of those taking part in a certification election, even under the guise that in the meanwhile, which may take some time, some of those who are employees could possibly lose such status, by virtue of a pending unfair labor practice case." 5

3. Even on the assumption that the vigorous condenmation of the strike and the picketing were attended by violence, it does not automatically follow that thereby the strikers in question are no longer entitled to participate in the certification election for having automatically lost their jobs. So it was made clear in another B.F. Goodrich decision: 6 What was set forth in the facts as found by respondent Judge Salvador would indicate that it was during the picketing, certainly not peaceful, that the imputed acts of violence did occur. It cannot be ignored, however, that there were injuries on both sides because management did

not, understandably, play a passive role confronted as it was with the unruly disruptive tactics of labor. This is not, by any means, to condone activities of such character, irrespective of the parties responsible. It is merely to explain what cannot be justified. Nonetheless, did the acts in question call for an automatic finding of illegality? Again, the order issued on February 4, 1972 appeared to be oblivious of a 1971 decision of this Court, Shell Oil Workers' Union v. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. There it was clearly held: 'A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed.' It must be pointed out likewise that the facts as there found would seem to indicate a greater degree of violence. Thus: 'Respondent Court must have been unduly impressed by the evidence submitted by the Shell Company to the effect that the strike was marred by acts of force, intimidation and violence on the evening of June 14 and twice in the mornings of June 15 and 16, 1967 in Manila. Attention was likewise called to the fact that even on the following day, with police officials stationed at the strike bound area, molotov bombs did explode and the streets were obstructed witlh wooden planks containing protruding nails. Moreover, in the branches of the Shell Company in Iloilo City as well as in Bacolod, on dates unspecified, physical injuries appeared to have been inflicted on management personnel. Respondent Court in the appealed decision did penalize with loss of employment the ten individuals responsible for such acts. Nor is it to be lost sight of that before the certification on June 27, 1967, one month had elapsed during which the Union was on strike. Except on those few days specified then, the Shell Company could not allege that the strike was conducted in a manner other than peaceful Under the circumstances, it would be going too far to consider that it thereby became illegal.' Then, mention was made of a decision in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees' Association vs. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. [where] there is the recognition by this Court, speaking through Justice Castro, of picketing as such being "inherently explosive." It is thus clear that not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of employment by the guilty party. " 7

G.R. No. L-46933June 30, 1980CONFEDERATION OF CITIZENS LABOR UNIONS (CCLU) and PACIFIC KNITTING WORKERS' ORGANIZATION, petitioners, vs.CARMELO C. NORIEL, as Director of Bureau of Labor Relations, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, VICENTE ARNIEGO LUZON FEDERATION OF LABOR ORGANIZATION, FUR CHAPTER, (LFLO-FUR) and PACIFIC MILLS, INC. respondents. FERNANDO, C.J.:An order by respondent Director Noriel 1 all the inclusion of respondent Union, Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) to participate in a certification election 2 is assumed in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding as amounting to a grave abuse of discretion. It was objected to on the ground that the motion to do so by such union "came too late for the order calling for a certification election has already become final without an appeal interposed by any party. 3 His order was justified by respondent Noriel thus: "It may not be disputed that the order for an election has already become final. But this per se did not eliminate PAFLU from the picture since its motion for intervention was interposed before the scheduled election. 4 A restraining order was issued by this Court and respondents were required to comment. The Solicitor General on behalf of respondent Noriel, submitted its

comment considered as the answer sustaining the issuance of the assailed order not only because no certification election had as yet been held but as the union in question had "established substantial interest in the ordered election. 5 It was likewise contended by respondent Noriel that the issue had become moot and academic as prior to the issuance of the temporary restraining order, a certification election among the rank and file employees resulted in respondent PAFLU receiving 254 votes out of the 401 total votes cast.Under the above circumstances, the petition cannot prosper.1. From United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries v. Noriel, 6 a 1975 decision, it has been the consistent ruling of this Court that for the integrity of the collective bargaining process to be maintained and thus manifest steadfast adherence to the concept of industrial democracy, all the workers of a collective bargaining unit should be given t he opportunity to participate in a certification election. The latest decision in point, promulgated barely a year ago, is United Lumber and General Workers v. Noriel. 7 This Court has resolutely set its face against any attempt that may frustrate the above statutory policy. 8 The success of this petition would, therefore, be an unwarranted departure from a principle that has been firmly embedded in our jurisprudence. We are not inclined to take that step.2. Petitioner must have realized the futility of insisting on its claim for on March 7, 1980, it filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of interest and recognizing the fact that respondent PAFLU "be certified as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent 9 of the employer firm, Pacific Mills, Inc.WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order issued on September 26, 1977 is lifted. No costs.G.R. No. L-77415 June 29, 1989ASIAN DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.HON. PURA FERRER- CALLEJA, in her capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), respondents.Salutario J. Fernandez and Emmanuel O. Sales for petitioner.Pedro A. Rosito for private respondents. MEDIALDEA, J.:This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking the annulment of the resolution (pp. 21-23, Rollo) dated November 24, 1986 of respondent Director in BLR Case No. A-10-247-85 which affirmed the appealed order of the Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioner's complaint to declare the certification election of May 21, 1986 as null and void and the resolution (p. 20, Rollo) dated January 21, 1987 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.Petitioner Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation (ADMACOR) is a corporation duly organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the Philippines. It operates a rattan furniture factory at Maguikay, Mandaue City, Cebu.Upon petition of Buklod ng Manggagawang Pilipino (BMP), one of several labor unions at ADMACOR'S factory, the Labor Relations Division, Regional Office VII (Cebu City) ordered a certification election to be conducted on May 21, 1986, a regular business day.On May 19,1986, several factory workers of ADMACOR held a strike. No previous notice of strike was filed by the factory workers with the Bureau of Labor Relations Regional Office. On May 20,1986, ADMACOR filed a petition (pp. 42-44, Rollo) for the indefinite resetting of the scheduled certification election, which petition was not acted upon by the Labor Relations Division.On May 21, 1986, the scheduled certification election was conducted, despite the strike. Of the 423 workers who voted, 413 voted for Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) as their exclusive bargaining agent (p. 82, Rollo), On the same day, ADMACOR filed a complaint for illegal strike (RAB Vll-0136- 88; pp. 37-41, Rollo) and for illegal picketing (RAB-040886; pp. 34-36, Rollo) with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII, Cebu City.

On May 23, 1986, ADMACOR filed a petition to declare the certification election conducted on May 21, 1986 as null and void on the ground that there being a strike by some workers in the premises of the factory on the day of the certification election, such day cannot be considered a regular business day, pursuant to Section 2, Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, to wit:Section 2. Election conducted during regular business day. - The election shall be set during the regular business day of the company unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties.On August 5, 1986, the Med-Arbiter dismissed ADMACOR's complaint to annul the May 21, 1986 certification election and certified SPFL as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of ADMACOR. This dismissal was appealed by ADMACOR to the Bureau of Labor Relations (Bureau) by way of a motion for reconsideration and docketed as BLR Case No. A-10- 247-85. On August 14, 1986, the Concerned Workers Association of ADMACOR filed a motion for intervention in the case appealed to the Bureau.On November 24, 1986, the public respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja acting as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dismissed the appeal of ADMACOR and affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter. The motion for intervention filed by the Concerned Workers Association of ADMACOR was denied for having been filed after the actual certification election had already been conducted (pp. 3-4, Resolution dated Nov. 24, 1986, pp. 2223, Rollo). The motion for reconsideration of the November 24, 1986 resolution was also denied in a resolution dated January 21, 1987. These two resolutions are assailed in this petition for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (p. 4, Rollo).Meanwhile, on January 26,1987, a decision (pp. 45-54, Rollo) on the twin complaints for illegal strike (RAB-0316-86) and illegal picketing (RAB-0408-86) was rendered by Labor Arbiter Bonifacio B. Tumamak declaring the strike held on May 20, 1986 against ADMACOR as illegal.In this petition, ADMACOR questions the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations (Bureau) to resolve or determine the factual and legal basis of a strike in relation to the question of representation of employees (p. 9, Rollo). It said:What is directly in issue is the jurisdiction of the Bureau to rule, as it did, on the protest filed after the election by the petitioner. Petitioner's protest involves the regularity of the election, due to the contemporaneous, in fact, even antecedent conduct of an illegal strike. Instead of holding in abeyance the election protest so that the Labor-Arbiter could properly resolve the pending complaints, the Bureau rendered its assailed Resolutions in excess of its jurisdiction. The Bureau had assumed on its own an implied determination of the legality or illegality of the complained strike (pp. 10-11, Petition; pp. 11-12, Rollo).Indeed, the question involving the legality of the strike which was conducted against ADMACOR is an independent issue, the resolution of which pertains to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to No. 5, Article 217 of the Labor Code. On the other hand, the issue of the validity of the certification election pertains solely to the Bureau of Labor Relations, originally, the Med-Arbiter and by way of appeal, to the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, pursuant to Section 7, Rule V, Book V of the Rules; to Implement the Labor Code. However, We find no overlapping by the Bureau of the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter on the question of legality, or illegality of the complained strike. The allegation that the Bureau assumed on its own an implied determination of said issue is belied by the fact that the assailed resolutions of respondent Director confined itself to the issue of the validity of the certification election. There was nothing in the assailed resolutions which contain any conclusion or ruling by the Bureau that the alleged strike was legal or illegal.What was resolved was whether or not there was compliance with the procedural requirement set by Section 2, Rule VI, Book VI of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code that the election shall be set during a regular business day. In answer to petition's contention that there being a strike on May 21, 1986, the day the certification election was held, said day cannot be considered a regular business day, the respondent Director ruled:

Furthermore, anent complainant's contention that the certification election was conducted not on regular business day, the same is devoid of merit. The records further show that during the pre- election conference the contending parties agreed that the election should be conducted on May 21, 1986 winch was, on that time, a determined regular business day of the company. This was in accordance with Section 2, Rule VI Book V, of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code which explicitly provides:The election shall be set during the regular business day of the company unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties.The alleged strike and/or picketing of some employees at the company's premises which coincided with the actual conduct of certification election might, perhaps have affected the actual performance of works by some employees, but did not necessarily make said date an irregular business day of the company to go against the aforesaid Rule (p. 22, Rollo).We agree with the said ruling of respondent Director upholding the validity of the certification election despite the strike. In the first place, since petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Bureau when it filed its election protest before the Med-Arbiter, it cannot now be allowed to repudiate the same jurisdiction after failing to obtain affirmative relief. Moreover, it can not be denied that an actual election was conducted on said date where, of the 423 workers who voted, 413 voted for SPFL as its exclusive bargaining agent. In the "Minutes of the Certification Election among the Rank and File Employees of Asian Design Manufacturing Corp.", the representatives of the contending unions, and of the Ministry of Labor even attested that the election was peaceful and orderly (pp. 79-83, Rollo) and none of the parties registered any protest on any matter concerning the election proceedings. There is thus, no valid reason to annul the certification election.On the pretext that the issue deposited in this petition is the lack of jurisdiction of the Bureau in dismissing its protest against the certification election despite the pendency of the case before the Labor Arbiter on the validity of the strike, petitioner seeks exception to the rule that an employer has no standing to question a certification election. We reiterate the rule that such concern over the validity of certification election must come from the employees themselves. The case of Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and Allied Services vs. Trajano, G.R. No. 61153, January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA 64, 66, is clear on this point. This Court therein held:A certification election is the sole concern of the workers. The only exception is where the employer has to file a petition for certification election pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain collectively. Thereafter the role of the employer in the certification process ceases. It becomes merely a bystander.In the instant case, the petitioner for a certification election was filed by a legitimate labor organization as stipulated by Article 258 of the Labor Code. Such being the case, ROBINA should not have involved itself in the certification election. That it did gives rise to a well-founded suspicion that it wanted a company union which is a no, no in this jurisdiction.The pronouncement of this Court concerning management interference in certification elections is well worth repeating:On a matter that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to say the least, deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference with a purely internal affair of labor. (Consolidated Farms, Inc. vs. Noriel, L-47752, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469, 473. See also Filipino Metals Corp. vs. Ople, L-43861, Sept. 4, 1981, 107 SCRA 211)ACCORDINGLY, for the reasons above-stated, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.HERCULES INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, v. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNDERSECRETARY BIENVENIDO E. LAQUESMA, MED-ARBITER MELCHOR S. LIM AND THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, Respondents.

Demosthenes S. Baban for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR RELATIONS; CERTIFICATION ELECTION; AS A GENERAL RULE, EMPLOYER IS NOT A PARTY THERETO; EXCEPTION. — In a long line of decisions, this Court has undeviatingly ruled that the employer is not a party to a certification election which is the sole or exclusive concern of the workers (Rizal Workers Union v. Ferrer-Calleja, 186 SCRA 431). In the choice of their collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to put it mildly, deserves no encouragement (Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople, 107 SCRA 211). The only instance when the employer may be involved in that process is when it is obliged to file a petition for certification election on its workers’ request to bargain collectively pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code. After the order for a certification election issues, the employer’s involvement ceases, and it becomes a neutral bystander.

D E C I S I O N

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This petition for certiorari * seeks to set aside the resolution ** dated September 17, 1990 of the Undersecretary of Labor in the case entitled, "National Federation of Labor v. Hercules Industries, Inc." denying the herein petitioner’s appeal from respondent Med-Arbiter’s Order dated May 25, 1990 declaring the National Federation of Labor (NFL) as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file workers/employees of Hercules Industries, Inc.

Hercules Industries, Inc., herein petitioner, is a corporation duly registered under Philippine laws which employs more or less one hundred eighty (180) workers.

On July 30, 1987, private respondent National Federation of Labor (NFL), a legitimate labor federation, filed a petition for certification election alleging that the existing collective bargaining agreement would expire in August, 1987 and that it enjoys the support of more than twenty per cent (20%) of the rank and file employees in the bargaining unit.

On August 21, 1987, by agreement of the parties, the Med-Arbiter issued an order for the conduct of a certification election with the following choices:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) National Federation of Labor (NFL);

(2) Hercules Employees Labor Union (HELU); and

(3) No Union.

On September 21, 1987, a pre-election conference was conducted. The parties, however, could not agree on the list of qualified voters who would participate in the election. Specifically, Hercules Industries, Inc. charged that the list included ninety eight (98) scabs; sixteen (16) capatazes; eight (8) security guards; and nine (9) managerial employees.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On October 26, 1987, the Med-Arbiter issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, judgment should be, as it is hereby promulgated, ordering the immediate conduct of the Certification Election within fifteen (15) days from date hereof, at the premises of the Hercules Industries, Inc., Laih, Siay, Zamboanga del Sur, with all the regular rank and file workers appearing in the payroll of July, 1987, and the strikers, who have not executed ‘Quitclaim’ and voluntarily accepted separation pay, are eligible participants in the Certification Election, except those that are hereinbelow expressly and categorically excluded by virtue of their being classified as managerial employees, legally separated and barred under the contemplation of law.

"A. MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES (Excluded).

"x x x

"B. SECURITY FORCE DEPARTMENT (Excluded).

"x x x

"C. STRIKES EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE EXECUTED DEED OF QUITCLAIM AND VOLUNTARILY ACCEPTED SEPARATION PAY

(Excluded)

"x x x

"The representation officer-designate is hereby ordered to post immediately within five (5) days prior to the date of election the notices of Certification Election together with the master list of eligible voters in conspicuous places at the premises of the Respondent." (pp. 27-28, Rollo.)

On November 4, 1987, NFL appealed the order to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR Case No. A-1-10-88 LRD Case No. 014-87) on the following grounds:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"1. The Med-Arbiter erred in unqualifiedly accepting all the names appearing in the July 1987 payroll as eligible voters and in allowing the 98 contract replacement worker to vote; and

"2. The Med-Arbiter erred in disregarding the fact that an earlier order for certification election had already been handed down and that the workers were on strike." (p. 29, Rollo.)

Pending the resolution of the NFL’s appeal, a certification election was conducted on November 7, 1990.

On January 6, 1988, BLR Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of the DOLE rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby granted and the certification election held on 7 November 1987 declared null and void.

"Let a new certification election among the rank and file workers of Hercules Industries, Inc. be held. The payroll of July 1987 excluding the [ninety eight] 98 scab replacement, shall be the basis of the voters’ list." (p. 32, Rollo.)

On April 4, 1990, a pre-election conference attended by the management of Hercules Industries, Inc. and NFL’s representatives was held at the Department of Labor and Employment Regional Office in Zamboanga City. The NFL asked that a certification election be immediately scheduled on May 4, 1990 at 9:00 a.m. to be held in the Barangay Hall, Bato, Siay, Zamboanga del Sur.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Accordingly, a certification election was held on May 4, 1990 with the following results:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR 89 Votes

"2. HERCULES LUMBER & EMPLOYEES

LABOR UNION 0 (Zero)

"3. MANAGEMENT (NO UNION) 0 (Zero)

"4. SPOILED/INVALID VOTES 2 (Votes)

TOTAL VOTES CAST: 91 Votes"

(p. 188, Rollo.)

On May 25, 1990, Med-Arbiter Melchor S. Lim issued a resolution declaring and certifying the National Federation of Labor as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the petitioner.

On July 5, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with the DOLE. It was denied on September 17, 1990 by Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laquesma on the grounds that Sections 3 and 4, Rule 6, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code on protests had not been followed; that the records disclose that no protest was made before the election, nor formalized within five (5) days after the election, as provided for by the rules; and the DOLE has not found any legal obstacle to the proclamation of the NFL as the collective bargaining agent of petitioner’s workers.

On September 29, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on October 26, 1990 by Undersecretary Laquesma.

Hence, the present recourse.

On January 21, 1991, Zamboanga Rubber Workers Union, a duly organized labor union affiliated with the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union, filed a motion for intervention in this Court alleging that it had requested the petitioner in writing to recognize it as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of its workers. The motion was noted by this Court without action.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner, Hercules Industries, Inc., as employer, may question the validity of the certification election among its rank-and-file employees. The answer is no.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

In a long line of decisions, this Court has undeviatingly ruled that the employer is not a party to a certification election which is the sole or exclusive concern of the workers (Rizal Workers

Union v. Ferrer-Calleja, 186 SCRA 431). In the choice of their collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to put it mildly, deserves no encouragement (Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople, 107 SCRA 211).

The only instance when the employer may be involved in that process is when it is obliged to file a petition for certification election on its workers’ request to bargain collectively pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code. After the order for a certification election issues, the employer’s involvement ceases, and it becomes a neutral bystander. (Rizal Workers’ Union v. Calleja, supra.).

In this case, the Solicitor General correctly observed that while the employees themselves never requested the petitioner to bargain collectively, still, they did not object to the results of the certification election. Hence, petitioner’s appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations from the Med-Arbiter’s Order certifying the NFL as the exclusive bargaining agent of its rank and file employees, and its filing of this petition for certiorari with us, must be rejected. The employer’s intervention in the certification election of its workers is frowned upon by law.

In any event, petitioner’s challenge against the validity of the certification election of May 4, 1990 is devoid of merit. Its allegations that no notice of the certification election had been issued, hence, no copies of said notice were given to it, nor posted in conspicuous places within the company’s premises; that the payroll of July 1987 was not used as the basis of the voters’ list; and that only fifteen (15) out of the ninety eight (98) voters signed their names showing that they actually voted, were belied by the minutes of the pre-election conference (Annex "A" of Comment of private respondent) which showed that petitioner was duly notified of the conference and attended the same, and that during said conference the Med-Arbiter set the certification election on May 4, 1990.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

The minutes of the certification election (Annex "C" of private respondent’s Comment) also show that "the list of the names of the voters were (sic) copied from the payroll of 1987 per order of the Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, Manila, . . ." (p. 188, Rollo).

Finally, the same minutes certified that: "The certification election just concluded was conducted in the most just, honest and freely (sic) manner without untoward happening. Further, we certify that the result above is true and correct" (p. 188, Rollo) thereby refuting petitioner’s allegation that only fifteen (15) out of ninety eight (98) workers signed the master list to show that they actually voted again.

Besides, neither the records of the case nor the minutes of the certification election show that petitioner protested the conduct of the certification election as provided in Section 3 of Rule VI (ELECTIONS) of Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 3. Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot questions. — The Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question arising from the conduct of the election. The interested party may however, file a protest with the representation officer before the close of the proceedings.

"Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protests shall be contained in the minutes of the proceedings." (Emphasis ours.)chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On the basis of the election minutes, which are the only relevant and competent evidence on the conduct of the election, the Med-Arbiter did not err in declaring the NFL as the duly

elected exclusive bargaining agent of the petitioner’s rank and file workers. That finding should be accorded not only respect but also finality by this Court for it is supported by substantial evidence (Chua v. NLRC, 182 SCRA 354).

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed decision of the NLRC, the petition forcertiorari is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 76111 March 14, 1990EMMANUEL TIMBUNGCO, petitioner, vs.HON. RICARDO C. CASTRO, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge, Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment, and DELICANO PAJARES, respondents.Benjamin C. Sebastian for petitioner.B.B. Julve & Associates Law Offices for private respondent. NARVASA, J.:

The petitioner in the special civil action of certiorari at bar prays for nullification of the Resolutions of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated September 9, 1986 1 and September 30, 1986 2 — sustaining that of Med-Arbiter Danilo Reynante dated July 3, 1986,3 which granted the petition for election of officers of the labor organization known as Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Associated Anglo American Tobacco Corporation.The petitioner, Emmanuel Timbungco, was the president of the above named union (hereafter, simply Kapisanan), composed of employees of Associated Anglo American Tobacco Corporation. The union had a three-year collective bargaining agreement with said Corporation (hereafter, simply AAATC). The stipulated expiration date was August 24, 1984.On July 15, 1984 — or within the so-called "freedom period" of sixty (60) days — a general meeting of all the members of theKapisanan was convoked by Timbungco. At that meeting the body unanimously approved, among others, the disaffiliation of the Kapisanan from the mother union, Federacion FOITAF, and the amendment of its constitution and by-laws. A new set of officers was also elected which included Timbungco, who was re-elected president without opposition. These events are set forth in the minutes drawn up by the Kapisanan's Secretary, which also recorded that the body had agreed to dispense with the formation of a COMELEC (committee on elections) and the preparation of a tally sheet showing the number of votes received by each candidate, the members simply having entered individual nominations to the different positions and listed their choices therefor.On July 23, 1984 Timbungco submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations the following documents:1) a certified copy of the Kapisanan's amended constitution and by-laws;2) an affidavit jointly executed by him and the union secretary declaring that the Kapisanan was the sole collective bargaining agent in AAATC;3) a copy of the minutes of the meeting of July 15, 1984; and4) a copy of the Kapasiyahan (Resolution) of the rank and file members to disaffiliate from the Federacion FOITAF.A new registration certificate was thereafter issued in due course to the Kapisanan, indicating its independence of FederacionFOITAF.Then in the first week of September, 1985, Timbungco, as re-elected President of Kapisanan commenced negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement with the representatives of AAATC. The negotiations lasted for about a year and ultimately resulted in the execution by Kapisanan and AAATC of another three-year collective bargaining agreement. A copy of the agreement was filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations as required by Policy Instruction No. 17.

About seven months later, on April 8, 1986 to be exact, Leodegario L. Zapanta, 1st National President of the Association of Democratic Labor Organizations (ADLO, for short), sent a letter to the Bureau of Labor Relations advising that Bureau that the majority of the members of the Kapisanan had affiliated with ADLO. 4 And on April 10, 1986, ADLO's Executive National Vice-President Tayo, wrote AAATC to the same effect and requested — in view of the consequent loss by the Kapisanan of its status as recognized representative of the bargaining unit — that AAATC stop deduction of union dues and thenceforth ignore and otherwise refuse to deal with Timbungco and his group. 5 Another letter, also asking AAATC to stop deducting union dues, or hold such dues in trust pending resolution of the representation issue, was sent on April 12, 1986 by Delicano Pajares, a member of the Kapisanan. 6

AAATC replied to Tayo's letter. It stated that it could not accede to the request to stop deduction of union dues since it had been dealing over many years with the Kapisanan as its workers' authorized bargaining representative. 7

On April 23, 1986 Delicano Pajares filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for election of officers of the Kapisanan, which was docketed as Case No. NCR LRD-M-4-23486. He alleged that he and his co-workers numbered 700, 62% of whom had signed the petition; that the election of officers held on July 15, 1984 was invalid, and they wished to exercise their right to vote for and elect their union officers. He also adverted to the existing collective bargaining agreement between Kapisananand AAATC.After appropriate proceedings, Med-Arbiter L. Reynante issued an Order dated July 3, 1986 declaring invalid the election of union officers which took place on July 15, 1984 and ordering another election of union officers to be conducted in the premises of AAATC under the supervision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. 8 This Order was, on appeal, affirmed in toto in a Resolution rendered by Bureau of Labor Relations Director Cresenciano Trajano under date of September 9, 1986. 9 Timbungco's motion for reconsideration was denied on September 9, 1986, by OIC Director of Labor Relations, Ricardo Castro. 10

These are the orders which, in this special civil action of certiorari, Timbungco would have this Court invalidate.The case turns upon the issue of the validity of the election of officers of July 15, 1984 it appearing that, as private respondents argue, there is no record of the number of members who attended the meeting, the number of those who actually voted, and the number of votes obtained by each candidate, and that a COMELEC (committee on elections) had not been formed to supervise the election. Private respondents also argue that the "contract bar rule" — which proscribes any certification election during the life of a collective bargaining agreement or any other action which may disturb the administration of said agreement, except during the "freedom period" (i.e., the period of 60 days prior to the expiration of the agreement) 11 — has no application to the election of officers sought in the petition in accordance with the union's constitution and by-laws. 12

The petition has merit. The writ of certiorari prayed for will issue. In the first place, it does not at all appear that the dispensing by the membership of the Kapisanan with certain technical requirements or formalities in relation to the election of July 15, 1984 had resulted in the deprivation of any substantial right or prerogative of anyone, or caused the perpetration of a fraud or other serious anomaly, or more importantly, precluded the expression and ascertainment of the popular will in the choice of officers. In the second place, as the Office of the Solicitor General points out, the private respondents' objections to the elections of July 15, 1984 have come too late, and they must be deemed in the premises to have forfeited their right to impugn the same. Under the Rules implementing the Labor Code, protests against elections should be formalized before the med-arbiter within (5) days from the close

of the election proceedings and must be decided by the latter within twenty (20) working days. 13 In this case, the protest against the election was presented to the med-arbiter only after the lapse of almost two (2) years after it was held. And in that interval, no informal protest, oral or written, was ever presented against the election. Indeed, there was tacit acceptance of the regularity of the elections and the results thereof, for during that period of almost two (2) years, certain significant events took place without demur or objection of any sort on the part of private respondents and the rest of the members of the Kapisanan: Timbungco officially made known to the Bureau of Labor Relations the Kapisanan's disaffiliation from the Federacion FOITAF and obtained a new certificate of registration for the union after complying with the requisites prescribed therefor; he and the other officers of the Kapisanan negotiated with the AAATC management and succeeded in bringing about the execution of a new collective bargaining agreement which was afterwards filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations in accordance with pertinent regulations; and Timbungco and the entire membership of the Kapisanan accepted benefits granted and assumed the obligations set out in said collective bargaining agreement.WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated September 9, 1986 and September 30, 1986 — sustaining that of Med-Arbiter Danilo Reynante dated July 3, 1986, are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The officers of theKapisanan elected on July 15, 1986 shall continue to hold their respective positions in the union for the balance of the terms pertaning to them as of July 3, 1986, counted from the time of finality of this decision, and the collective bargaining agreement executed between the parties in 1986 shall also continue in force and effect for the balance of the three-year period still remaining as of July 3, 1986, counted from the time of finality of the decision, unless sooner amended or revised by voluntary covenant of the parties or by other mode authorized by law. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on November 17, 1986 is DISSOLVED.SO ORDERED.Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. G.R. No. L-40810 October 3, 1975UNITED EMPLOYEES UNION OF GELMART INDUSTRIES PHILIPPINES (UEUGIP), petitioner, vs.HON. CARMELO NORIEL, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS; GEORGE A. EDUVALA, REPRESENTATION OFFICER, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS; and NATIONAL UNION OF GARMENTS, TEXTILE, CORDAGE AND ALLIED WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (GATCORD), respondents.Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Romeo C. de la Cruz for respondents Carmelo Noriel, etc., et al.Hermon C. Lagman for respondents Unions. FERNANDO, J.:The plea for setting aside a certification election earnestly and vigorously pressed by petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding is predicated on the proposition that it was held under circumstances that manifested lack of fairness, thus raising a procedural due process question. There was an equally firm and vehement denial in a comprehensive comment filed on behalf of private respondent, National Union of Garments, Textile, Cordage and Allied Workers of the Philippines. The stress in the comment of respondent Director Carmelo Noriel 1 was on the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. As will be more fully discussed, a careful scrutiny of what transpired as revealed not only in the pleadings but in the oral argument will disclose that the attack on the certification election cannot succeed. The petition lacks merit.The petition sought to have the certification election declared null and void ab initio and thus

unenforceable, alleging that the contending parties in a pre-election conference conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations agreed that petitioner would be listed in the ballot as United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries Philippines (UEUGIP). 2 In the notice of the certification election, however, it was wilfully deleted and replaced by "a non-contending party, namely, Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU), which, although an existing labor federation ... has nothing to do and has no interest or right of participation [therein]." 3

So it did appear likewise in the sample ballot. 4 As a result, there was confusion in the minds of independent voters and demoralization in the ranks of those inclined to favor petitioner. 5

There was a protest but it was not based on this ground; instead the grievance complained of referred to the alleged electioneering of nuns and a priest as observers or inspectors on behalf of private respondent. 6 The above notwithstanding, the certification election took place "on the scheduled date, May 24, 1975 and respondent GATCORD garnered the highest number of votes ...." 7 It was then set forth that despite such defect in the mode of conducting the election which for petitioner sufficed to cause "the nullity of the election in question," respondent Director Carmelo Noriel of the Bureau of Labor Relations "[was] about to certify respondent GATCORD as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the rank and file employees [and] workers of Gelmart Industries Philippines, Inc." 8 Hence this petition with its overtones as indicated of an alleged violation of procedural due process.The comment to the petition filed on behalf of private respondent National Union of Garments, Textile, Cordage and Allied Workers of the Philippines (GATCORD) denied the imputation of irregularity and sought to clarify matters by a factual presentation of what did transpire. At the outset, however, it made clear that the petitioner, which garnered only 291 votes or 4.5% of the total number of votes cast as against the 3,970 or 63% of the votes in its favor, certainly could not be heard to challenge the validity of the certification election. Thus: "1. Pursuant to an order of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor, a certification election was conducted on 24 May 1975 in Gelmart Industries Philippines, Inc., South Superhighway, Parañaque, Rizal, to choose the collective bargaining agent of the company's rank and file employees; 2. The certification election was conducted and supervised by the Bureau of Labor Relations; it took almost the entire personnel of the Bureau, including the Director himself, to man the election, there were 11 precincts, each of which was presided over by a med-arbiter of the Bureau, as chairman, and another representation officer of the Bureau; there was also created a central election committee composed of four top personnel of the Bureau for optimum supervision; 3. There were some 8,900 eligible voters out of about 10,000 employees of the company; out of the 8,900 eligible voters, duly agreed upon by all the parties and approved by the Bureau, 6,309 or 79.7% voted; out of the 6,309 eligible voters cast, 3970 or 63% went to GATCORD, [with UEUGIP placing] only fifth with a measly 291 votes or barely 4.5% of the total number of votes cast. It may be noted that even if the votes of all seven losing unions[were added], their total would only be 2,057, which is still 1,823 votes short of GATCORD's 2,970 votes. It is thus clear that GATCORD won by an overwhelming majority:" 9 It characterized such votes as an "unassailable majority." 10 On the question of the alleged irregularity, the comment set forth the following: "Petitioner UEUGIP did not lodge any protest concerning the alleged misprinting or omission of its name in the Notice of Certification Election in the Sample Ballot ... before the election, during the election or shortly after the election, [but merely questioned] the presence of the priests and nuns, over which it filed a protest with the BLR, [not the alleged misprinting] or omission of its name in the election notice and the sample ballot; 10. The fact is, when GATCORD petitioned for the certification election (NLRC Case No. LR-4891, later numbered as BLR Case No. 256) in July, 1974, the United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries Philippines(UEUGIP) intervened, as represented by Ruben Escreza, the union's duly elected president, [with] Antonio Diaz, herein alleged representative of UEUGIP, [intervening] then not for UEUGIP but for UEUGIP-Workers' Faction; 11. Since Mr. Diaz was representing only a faction of UEUGIP, which faction had no

legal personality separate from UEUGIP which was duly represented by Mr. Escreza, the order of the Bureau dated 15 January 1975 included only UEUGIP as one of the contending unions, without including UEUGIP-Workers' Faction; 12. Subsequently, the Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO) intervened and, claiming that UEUGIP had affiliated with PTGWO, moved for a correction of the name UEUGIP in the order, making it UEUGIP-PTGWO, ...;13. During the first two pre-election conferences in connection with the certification election held on February 14 and 17, 1975, Mr. Diaz appeared, but he was no longer representing UEUGIP-Workers' Faction; he entered a new union - the Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU); ... 14. In the succeeding pre-election conferences, however, Mr. Diaz, apparently out to create trouble, began claiming to represent UEUGIP and abandoned representation of PSSLU [with the result that] UEUGIP had two representatives often clashing with each other; Mr. Escreza and Mr. Diaz; 15. On 19 May 1975 the Bureau of Labor Relations caused the posting of 'Notice of Certification Election' with a 'Sample Ballot', [with said posting being made at a time when] the parties had not yet agreed as to how their names should appear in the ballot, ... 16. It was only on 20 May 1974, after the election notice was already posted with the original sample ballot, that the parties came to discuss how their respective names should appear in the ballot,[at which time] the parties had agreed that the names of the contending unions should be printed in the ballots as they were printed, that is, with UNITED EMPLOYEES UNION OF GELMART INDUSTRIES PHILIPPINES (UEUGIP) there and without PSSLU." 11 Private respondent then considered the following as the pertinent questions: "If Mr. Diaz felt that the posting of the election notice and the original sample ballot was erroneous and it was prejudicial to his group, why did he not raise this question early enough? He could have raised it soon after the posting was made, especially considering that two more pre-election conferences, on May 20, 22 and 23 were held. Or he could have raised the question during the election day. But he did not. Is it because he did not really care then, is it because his people inside the company did not really care, or is it because he had really no people inside to bother at all about said 'error?' If they were that disinterested in correcting the 'error' at least during the last four days before the election, how could Mr. Diaz claim now that his group was adversely affected by the alleged 'error' and that if said 'error' was not made, his group could have won the election?" 12 The comment ended on a statement rather rhetorical in character: "The truth is, Mr. Diaz had but a droplet of support, which, dream as he would, could never match, much less overcome, the raging torrents of GATCORD." 13 The comment on behalf of respondent Director Noriel and the respondent Representation Officer Eduvala stressed a grave abuse of discretion to certify an action for certiorari. Petitioner sought permission to reply and was granted. There was, as could be expected, a stout denial of the recital of facts of private respondent, but it cannot be said that it is impressed with a high degree of persuasiveness..At any rate, after the Court considered the comments as answers and set the case for hearing, with arguments coming from both counsel Benito Fabie for petitioner and Jose W. Diokno for private respondent, and with the labor leader Antonio Diaz referred to in the comment of private respondent being questioned and presenting petitioner's side of the controversy, a much clearer picture emerged. It was none too favorable for petitioner.As noted at the outset, we find for respondents. The petition lacks merit.1. The institution of collective bargaining is, to recall Cox, a prime manifestation of industrial democracy at work. The two parties to the relationship, labor and management, make their own rules by coming to terms. That is to govern themselves in matters that really count. As labor, however, is composed of a number of individuals, it is indispensable that they be represented by a labor organization of their choice. Thus may be discerned how crucial is a certification election. So our decisions from the earliest case of PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Co. Free Telephone Workers Union 14 to the latest,Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers' Federation (PCWF) v. Court of Industrial Relations, 15 have made clear. Thus is one of the earliest cases, The Standard Cigarette Workers' Union v.

Court of Industrial Relations, 16 it was made clear in the opinion of Justice J. B. L. Reyes that "a complaint for unfair labor practice may be considered a prejudicial question in a proceeding for certification election when it is charged therein that one or more labor unions participating in the election are being aided, or are controlled, by the company or employer. The reason is that the certification election may lead to the selection of an employer-dominated or company union as the employees' bargaining representative, and when the court finds that said union is employer-dominated in the unfair labor practice case, the union selected would be decertified and the whole election proceedings would be rendered useless and nugatory." 17For it is easily understandable how essential it is, in the language of former Chief Justice Concepcion, in the leading case of LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild 18 "to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees." 19

There must be such an opportunity to determine which labor organization shall act on their behalf. 20 It is precisely because respect must be accorded to the will of labor thus ascertained that a general allegation of duress is not sufficient to invalidate a certification election; it must be shown by competent and credible proof. 21 That is to give substance to the principle of majority rule, one of the basic concepts of a democratic polity. 22 The matter is summarized thus in one of the latest decisions of this Court, Federation of the United Workers Organization v. Court of Industrial Relations: 23 "The slightest doubt cannot therefore be entertained that what possesses significance in a petition for certification is that through such a device the employees are given the opportunity to make known who shall have the right to represent them. What is equally important is that not only some but all of them should have the right to do so." 24 If heed be paid to the above well-settled principle and applied to the facts disclosed in the present petition, it would be apparent that the grievance spoken of is more fancied than real, the assertion of confusion and demoralization based on conjecture rather than reality. The mode and manner in which Antonio Diaz demonstrated how militant and articulate he could be in presenting his side of the controversy could hardly argue for the accuracy of his claim that his men did lose heart by what appeared at the most to be an honest mistake, if it could be characterized as one. Certainly then, the accusation that there was abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, falls to the ground.2. Nor need this Court pass upon the ground of protest based on the alleged participation by nuns and a priest who presumably aided the cause of private respondent. Petitioner did not choose to press this point. It is understandable why. In the leading case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 25 this Court, through Justice Zaldivar, left no doubt as to the privacy of religious freedom, to which contractual rights, even on labor matters, must yield, thus removing any taint of nullity from the amendment to the Industrial Peace Act, 26 which would allow exemption from a closed shop on the part of employees, members of a given religious sect prohibiting its devotees from affiliating with any labor organization. Subsequently, in Basa v. Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera, 27 such doctrine was reaffirmed, thus emphasizing that one's religious convictions may be the basis for an employee joining or refusing to join a labor union. Certainly, the wide latitude accorded religious groups in the exercise of their constitutional freedom would caution against reliance on such aground to invalidate a certification election. It thus appears that such an approach is reflected in the attitude adopted by petitioner, which in effect amounts to an abandonment of such a possible ground of protest, not at all lodged with this Court but merely mentioned in its recital of background facts.3. During the hearing of this case, reference was made to the registration of private respondent allegedly having been revoked. As the pleadings do not touch upon the matter at all, this Court is not in a position to rule on such a question. The decision therefore leaves that particular aspect of the litigation open.WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed for lack of merit. The restraining order issued by this Court is liftedG.R. No. 104556 March 19, 1998

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL), petitioner, vs.THE SECRETARY OF LABOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HIJO PLANTATION INC., (HPI),respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:Petitioner NFL (National Federation of Labor) was chosen the bargaining agent of rank-and-file employees of the Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) in Mandaum, Tagum, Davao del Norte at a certification election held on August 20, 1989. Protests filed by the company and three other unions against the results of the election were denied by the Department of Labor and Employment in its resolution dated February 14, 1991 but, on motion of the company (HPI), the DOLE reconsidered its resolution and ordered another certification election to be held. The DOLE subsequently denied petitioner NFL's motion for reconsideration.The present petition is for certiorari to set aside orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated August 29, 1991, December 26, 1991 and February 17, 1992, ordering the holding of a new certification election to be conducted in place of the one held on August 20, 1989 and, for this purpose, reversing its earlier resolution dated February 14, 1991 dismissing the election protests of private respondent and the unions.The facts of the case are as follows:On November 12, 1988, a certification election was conducted among the rank-and-file employees of the Hijo Plantation, Inc. resulting in the choice of "no union." However, on July 3, 1989, on allegations that the company intervened in the election, the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations nullified the results of the certification election and ordered a new one to be held.The new election was held on August 20, 1989 under the supervision of the DOLE Regional Office in Davao City with the following results:Total Votes cast 1,012Associated Trade Unions (ATU) 39RUST KILUSAN 5National Federation of Labor (NFL) 876Southern Philippines Federation of Labor 4SANDIGAN 6UFW 15No Union 55Invalid 13The Trust Union Society and Trade Workers-KILUSAN (TRUST-Kilusan), the United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP), the Hijo Labor Union and the Hijo Plantation, Inc. sought the nullification of the results of the certification election on the ground that it was conducted despite the pendency of the appeals filed by Hijo Labor Union and ULGWP from the order, dated August 17, 1989, of the Med-Arbiter denying their motion for intervention. On the other hand, HPI claimed that it was not informed or properly represented at the pre-election conference. It alleged that, if it was represented at all in the pre-election conference, its representative acted beyond his authority and without its knowledge. Private respondent also alleged that the certification election was marred by massive fraud and irregularities and that out of 1,692 eligible voters, 913, representing 54% of the rank-and-file workers of private respondent, were not able to vote, resulting in a failure of election.On January 10, 1990, Acting Labor Secretary Dionisio dela Serna directed the Med-Arbiter, Phibun D. Pura, to investigate the company's claim that 54% of the rank-and-file workers were not able to vote in the certification election.In his Report and Recommendation, dated February 9, 1990, Pura stated:1. A majority of the rank-and-file workers had been disfranchised in the election of August 20, 1989 because of confusion caused by the announcement of the company that the election had been postponed in view of the appeals of ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union (HLU) from the

order denying their motions for intervention. In addition, the election was held on a Sunday which was non-working day in the company.2. There were irregularities committed in the conduct of the election. It was possible that some people could have voted for those who did not show up. The election was conducted in an open and hot area. The secrecy of the ballot had been violated. Management representatives were not around to identify the workers.3. The total number of votes cast, as duly certified by the representation officer, did not tally with the 41-page listings submitted to the Med-Arbitration Unit. The list contained 1,008 names which were checked or encircled (indicating that they had voted) and 784 which were not, (indicating that they did not vote), or a total of 1,792. but according to the representation officer the total votes cast in the election was 1,012.Med-Arbiter Pura reported that he interviewed eleven employees who claimed that they were not able to vote and who were surprised to know that their names had been checked to indicate that they had voted.But NFL wrote a letter to Labor Secretary Ruben Torres complaining that it had not been informed of the investigation conducted by Med-Arbiter Pura and so was not heard on its evidence. For this reason, the Med-Arbiter was directed by the Labor Secretary to hear interested parties.The Med-Arbiter therefore summoned the unions. TRUST-Kilusan reiterated its petition for the annulment of the results of the certification election. Hijo Labor Union manifested that it was joining private respondent HPI's appeal, adopting as its own the documentary evidence presented by the company, showing fraud in the election of August 20, 1989. On the other hand, petitioner NFL reiterated its contention that management had no legal personality to file an appeal because it was not a party to the election but was only a bystander which did not even extend assistance in the election. Petitioner denied that private respondent HPI was not represented in the pre-election conference, because the truth was that a certain Bartolo was present on behalf of the management and he in fact furnished the DOLE copies of the list of employees, and posted in the company premises notices of the certification election.Petitioner NFL insisted that more than majority of the workers voted in the election. It claimed that out of 1,692 qualified voters, 1,012 actually voted and only 680 failed to cast their vote. It charged management with resorting to all kinds of manipulation to frustrate the election and make the "Non Union" win.In a resolution dated February 14, 1991, the DOLE upheld the August 20, 1989 certification election. With respect to claim that election could not be held in view of the pendency of the appeals of the ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union from the order of the Med-Arbiter denying their motions for intervention, the DOLE said: 1. . . even before the conduct of the certification election on 12 November 1988 which was nullified, Hijo Labor Union filed a motion for interventions. The same was however, denied for being filed unseasonably, and as a result it was not included as one of the choices in the said election. After it has been so disqualified thru an order which has become final and executory, ALU filed a second motion for intervention when a second balloting was ordered conducted. Clearly, said second motion is proforma and intended to delay the proceedings. Being so, its appeal from the order of denial did not stay the election and the Med-Arbiter was correct and did not violate any rule when he proceeded with the election even with the appeal. In fact, the Med-Arbiter need not rule on the motion as it has already been disposed of with finality.The same is true with the motion for intervention of ULGWP. The latter withdrew as a party to the election on September 1988 and its motion to withdraw was granted by the Med-Arbiter on October motion for intervention filed before the conduct of a second balloting where the choices has already been pre-determined.Let it be stressed that ULGWP and HLU were disqualified to participate in the election through valid orders that have become final and executory even before the first certification

election was conducted. Consequently, they may not be allowed to disrupt the proceeding through the filing of nuisance motions. Much less are they possessed of the legal standing to question the results of the second election considering that they are not parties thereto.The DOLE gave no weight to the report of the Med-Arbiter that the certification election was marred by massive fraud and irregularities. Although affidavits were submitted showing that the election was held outside the company premises and private vehicles were used as makeshift precincts, the DOLE found that this was because respondent company did not allow the use of its premises for the purpose of holding the election, company guards were allegedly instructed not to allow parties, voters and DOLE representation officers to enter the company premises, and notice was posted on the door of the company that the election had been postponed.Nor was weight given to the findings of the Med-Arbiter that a majority of the rank-and-file workers had been disfranchised in the August 20, 1989 election and that the secrecy of the ballot had been violated, first, because the NFL was not given notice of the investigation nor the chance to present its evidence to dispute this finding and, second, the Med Arbiter's report was not supported by the minutes of the proceedings nor by any record of the interviews of the 315 workers. Moreover, it was pointed out that the report did not state the names of the persons investigated, the questions asked and the answers given. The DOLE held that the report was "totally baseless."The resolution of February 14, 1991 concluded with a reiteration of the rule that the choice of the exclusive bargaining representative is the sole concern of the workers. It said: "If indeed there were irregularities committed during the election, the contending unions should have been the first to complain considering that they are the ones which have interest that should be protected." 2Accordingly, the Labor Secretary denied the petition to annul the election filed by the ULGWP, TRUST-KILUSAN, HLU and the HPI and instead certified petitioner NFL as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of private respondent HPI.However, on motion of HPI, the Secretary of Labor, on August 29, 1991, reversed his resolution of February 14, 1991. Petitioner NFL filed a motion for reconsideration but its motion was denied in an order, dated December 26, 1991. Petitioner's second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in another order dated February 17, 1992. Hence, this petition.First. Petitioner contends that certification election is the sole concern of the employees and the employer is a mere bystander. The only instance wherein the employer may actively participate is when it files a petition for certification election under Art. 258 of the Labor Code because it is requested to bargain collectively. Petitioner says that this is not the case here and so the DOLE should not have given due course to private respondent's petition for annulment of the results of the certification election.In his resolution of August 29, 1991, the Secretary of Labor said he was reversing his earlier resolution because "workers of Hijo Plantation, Inc. have deluged this Office with their letter-appeal, either made singly or collectively expressing their wish to have a new certification election conducted" and that as a result "the firm position we held regarding the integrity of the electoral exercise had been somewhat eroded by this recent declaration of the workers, now speaking in their sovereign capacity."It is clear from this, that what the DOLE Secretary considered in reversing its earlier rulings was not the petition of the employer but the letter-appeals that the employees sent to his office denouncing the irregularities committed during the August 20, 1989 certification election. The petition of private respondent was simply the occasion for the employees to voice their protests against the election. Private respondent HPI attached to its Supplemental Appeal filed on September 5, 1989 the affidavits and appeals of more or less 784 employees who claimed that they had been disfranchised, as a result of which they were not able to cast their votes at the August 20, 1989 election. It was the protests of employees which moved

the DOLE to reconsider its previous resolution of February 14, 1991, upholding the election.Nor is it improper for private respondent to show interest in the conduct of the election. Private respondent is the employer. The manner in which the election was held could make the difference between industrial strife and industrial harmony in the company. What an employer is prohibited from doing is to interfere with the conduct of the certification election for the purpose of influencing its outcome. But certainly an employer has an abiding interest in seeing to it that the election is clean, peaceful, orderly and credible.Second. The petitioner argues that any protest concerning the election should be registered and entered into the minutes of the election proceedings before it can be considered. In addition, the protest should be formalized by filing it within five (5) days. Petitioner avers that these requirements are condition precedents in the filing of an appeal. Without these requisites the appeal cannot prosper. It cites the following provisions of Book V, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:Sec. 3. Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question. — The Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question arising from the conduct of the election. The interested party may however, file a protest with the representation officer before the close of the proceedings.Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protests shall be contained in the minutes of the proceedings.Sec. 4. Protest to be decided in twenty (20) working days. — Where the protest is formalized before the med-arbiter within five (5) days after the close of the election proceedings, the med-arbiter shall decide the same within twenty (20) working days from the date of its formalization. If not formalized within the prescribed period, the protest shall be deemed dropped. The decision may be appealed to the Bureau in the same manner and on the same grounds as provided under Rule V.In this case, petitioner maintains that private respondent did not make any protest regarding the alleged irregularities (e.g., massive disfranchisement of employees) during the election. Hence, the appeal and motions for reconsideration of private respondent HPI should have been dismissed summarily.The complaint in this case was that a number of employees were not able to cast their votes because they were not properly notified of the date. They could not therefore have filed their protests within five (5) days. At all events, the Solicitor General states, that the protests were not filed within five (5) days, is a mere technicality which should not be allowed to prevail over the workers' welfare. 3 As this Court stressed in LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Phil. Musicians Guild, 4 it is essential that the employees must be accorded an opportunity to freely and intelligently determine which labor organization shall act in their behalf. The workers in this case were denied this opportunity. Not only were a substantial number of them disfranchised, there were, in addition, allegations of fraud and other irregularities which put in question the integrity of the election. Workers wrote letters and made complaints protesting the conduct of the election. The Report of Med-Arbiter Pura who investigated these allegations found the allegations of fraud and irregularities to be true.In one case this Court invalidated a certification election upon a showing of disfranchisement, lack of secrecy in the voting and bribery. 5 We hold the same in this case. The workers' right to self-organization as enshrined in both the Constitution and Labor Code would be rendered nugatory if their right to choose their collective bargaining representative were denied. Indeed, the policy of the Labor Code favors the holding of a certification election as the most conclusive way of choosing the labor organization to represent workers in a collective bargaining unit. 6 In case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the holding of a certification election.Third. Petitioner claims that the contending unions, namely, the Association of Trade Union (ATU), the Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), as well as the representation officers of the DOLE affirmed the regularity of the conduct of the election and they are now estopped from questioning the election.

In its comment, ATU-TUCP states,. . . The representative of the Association of Trade Unions really attest to the fact that we cannot really identify all the voters who voted on that election except some workers who were our supporters in the absence of Hijo Plantation representatives. We also attest that the polling precinct were not conducive to secrecy of the voters since it was conducted outside of the Company premises. The precincts were (sic) the election was held were located in a passenger waiting shed infront of the canteen across the road; on the yellow pick-up; at the back of a car; a waiting shed near the Guard House and a waiting shed infront of the Guard House across the road. Herein private respondents also observed during the election that there were voters who dictated some voters the phrase "number 3" to those who were casting their votes and those who were about to vote. Number 3 refers to the National Federation of Labor in the official ballot.ATU-TUCP explains that it did not file any protest because it expected workers who had been aggrieved by the conduct of the election would file their protest since it was in their interests that they do so.Fourth. Petitioner points out that the letter-appeals were written almost two years after the election and they bear the same dates (May 7 and June 14, 1991); they are not verified; they do not contain details or evidence of intelligent acts; and they do not explain why the writers failed to vote. Petitioner contends that the letter-appeals were obtained through duress by the company.We find the allegations to be without merit. The records shows that as early as August 22 and 30, 1989, employees already wrote letters/affidavits/manifestoes alleging irregularities in the elections and disfranchisement of workers. 7 As the Solicitor General says in his Comment, 8 these affidavits and manifestoes, which were attached as Annexes "A" to "CC" and Annexes "DD" to "DD-33" to private respondent's Supplemental Petition of September 5, 1989 — just 16 days after the August 20, 1989 election. It is not true therefore that the employees slept on their rights.As to the claim that letters dated May 7, 1991 and June 14, 1991 bear these same dates because they were prepared by private respondent HPI and employees were merely asked to sign them, suffice it to say that this is plain speculation which petitioner has not proven by competent evidence.As to the letters not being verified, suffice it to say that technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases.The allegation that the letters did not contain evidence of intelligent acts does not have merit. The earlier letters 9 of the workers already gave details of what they had witnessed during the election, namely the open balloting (with no secrecy), and the use of NFL vehicles for polling precinct. These letters sufficiently give an idea of the irregularities of the certification election. Similarly, the letters containing the signatures of those who were not able to vote are sufficient. They indicate that the writers were not able to vote because they thought the election had been postponed, especially given the fact that the two unions had pending appeals at the time from orders denying them the right to intervene in the election.WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the questioned orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-56902 September 21, 1982CONFEDERATION OF CITIZENS LABOR UNIONS (CCLU) and REDSON EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS ASSOCIATION,petitioners, vs.Hon. CARMELO C. NORIEL, Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, MARGARITA C. ENRIQUEZ, Election Supervisor of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) and REDSON TEXTILE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, respondents.

Oliver B. Gesmundo for petitioners.Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Asst. Solicitor General Ramon A. Barcelona and Solicitor Dennis M. Taningco for respondents. AQUINO, J.:These special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition deal with the alleged irregular holding of a certification election.Petitioner Confederation of Labor Unions (CCLU) was one of the four unions wanting to be certified as the collective bargaining representative of the employees in the Redson Textile Manufacturing Corporation with place of business at Brixton Hill Street, Capitolyo, Pasig, Metro Manila. Its co-petitioner, the Redson Employees and Laborers Association, is a CCLU local in the said corporation.The other unions aspiring to become the collective bargaining representative were the National Union of Garments Textile and General Workers of the Philippines (GATCORD) the National Trade Union (NATU) and the Associated Labor Unions (ALU).On August 7, 1980, a certification election was held in the premises of the corporation from eight-twenty in the morning to five-thirty in the afternoon. Out of the 831 votes cast, CCLU garnered 356 votes; ALU 338 votes; NATU, 82 votes and GATCORD 42 votes. Eight votes were spoiled and five votes were challenged or segregated.As no union obtained a majority vote, CCLU and ALU, which had the two largest number of votes, agreed in a pre-election conference on September 2, 1980 that a run-off election would be held on November 6, 1980 from six o'clock in the morning to six o'clock in the evening. CCLU requested that the certification election be conducted for two days but ALU objected to that request.On November 6, 1980, Margarita C. Enriquez, Reynaldo F. de Luna and one Francisco, three election supervisors from the Ministry of Labor and Employment, arrived at around seven o'clock in the morning near the Redson Textile compound but they were not allowed by the security guard to enter the company premises in spite of the heavy rain. So, after consulting through the phone with their chief, a certain Attorney Padilla. the said election supervisors decided to hold the certification election "outside the premises of the company in a small store outside of the annex building" (Annex C, Rollo, p. 27). They used as ballot box "an improvised carton box." The union representatives did not object to the improvised polling place and ballot box.Voting started at eleven o'clock. During the election and just before it was closed at six-thirty in the evening, the ALU representative, Sebastian P. Taneo, executed a written protest or manifestation, alleging that the management of Redson Textile did not allow the run-off election to be held within its premises; that the company prevented fifty percent of the workers from voting by not allowing them to get out of the company premises and inducing them to work overtime; that its security guards "manhandled" the ALU vice-president and that their "active intervention" caused "chaos and confusion" for around thirty minutes; that the company refused to furnish election paraphernalia like the polling place and the ballot box and that the election supervisors declared the election closed in spite of ALU's objection.Taneo prayed that the votes should not be counted, that another day be scheduled for the continuation of the election and that the company be ordered to allow its workers to vote (Rollo pp. 29-35).At around seven-thirty in the evening, the votes cast were canvassed. Of the 692 votes cast, ALU got 366 votes as against CCLU's 313 votes, or a margin of 53 votes. There were 1,010 voters. Because ALU won, its representative, Taneo, withdrew his protest or manifestation by writing on the minutes of the proceeding that his protest or manifestation was withdrawn "before the close of the proceedings". On the other hand, the CCLU representatives refused to sign the minutes of the election.On the following day, November 7, CCLU through its representative, Juan L. Fresnoza filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a protest wherein he prayed that the November 6

certification election as well as the "continuation of the election" on November 7 be annulled.Fresnoza alleged that the previous day's certification election was irregular and disorderly because (a) no booths were provided for by the company; (b) the election started much later than the hour agreed upon by the parties, and (c) ALU distributed white T-shirts printed with "ALU TAYO", gave free tricycle rides to ALU voters and hired around fifteen husky men and around twenty-five women who "forced" voters to vote for ALU.According to Fresnoza, when he and Oscar Sanchez, the acting president of Redson Employees and Laborers Association (RELA-CCLU), protested against those activities before election supervisor Margarita C, Enriquez, the latter allegedly retorted, "Wala akong magagawa, magagalit na naman si Mr. Taneo" (,Rollo, pp. 36-37).On November 10, 1980, Fresnoza and Sanchez filed with the Bureau of labor Relations a joint affidavit attesting to what transpired during the certification election as alleged in the aforesaid protest and added therein that when they protested before the election supervisors, the latter told them to "place their protest in writing so that they (supervisors) could consolidate the protests in their election report" (Rollo, pp. 38-39).On February 19, 1981, CCLU informed the Bureau of Labor Relations that the election was conducted without regard to the provisions of section 6, Rule VI, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.Carmelo C. Noriel, Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, in his resolution of February 26, 1981, dismissed CCLU's protest for lack of merit. He observed that CCLU failed to submit the pleadings and evidences required in the hearing on January 19, 1981 and that CCLU failed to file a protest either "before or during the election proceeding" and, therefore, pursuant to section 3, Rule VI, Book V of the aforementioned rules, CCLU is deemed to have waived its right to protest.Noriel in his resolution of March 26, 1981, denying CCLU's motion for reconsideration, certified ALU as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in Redson Textile Manufacturing Corporation.On June 6, 1981 CCLU and RELA-CCLU filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul the certification election. They complained that the certification election was conducted in violation of the following provisions of Rule VI, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code:SEC. 6. Duties of representation officer.— Before the actual voting commences the representation officer shall inspect the polling place, the ballot boxes, and the polling booths to insure secrecy of balloting. The parties shall be given opportunity to witness the inspection proceedings. After the examination of the ballot box, the representation officer shall lock it with three keys one of which he shall keep and the rest forthwith given one each to the employer's representative and the representative of the labor organization. If more than one union is involved, the holder of the third shall be determined by drawing of lots. The key shall remain in the possession of the representation officer and the parties during the entire proceedings and thereafter until all the controversies concerning the conduct of the election shall have been definitely resolved.The Solicitor General in his comment contends that the certification election should be upheld because CCLU, by not filing a protest with the election supervisor before the close of the election proceeding, waived its right to protest (Sec. 3, Rule VI, Book V of Implementing Rules and Regulations).We hold that the certification election is invalid because of certain irregularities such as that (1) the workers on the night shift (ten p.m. to six a.m.) and some of those in the afternoon shift were not able to vote, so much so that out of 1,010 voters only 692 voted and about 318 failed to vote (p. 88, Rollo); (2) the secrecy of the ballot was not safeguarded; (3) the election supervisors were remiss in their duties and were apparently "intimidated" by a union representative and (4) the participating unions were overzealous in wooing the employees to vote in their favor by resorting to such tactics as giving free tricycle rides and T-shirts.The purpose of a certification election is to give the employees "true representation in their

collective bargaining with an employer" (51 C.J.S. 969). That purpose was not achieved in the run-off election because many employees or union members were not able to vote and the employer, through apathy or deliberate intent, did not render assistance in the holding of the election.It should be noted that ALU's written protest (later withdrawn) was based on the same grounds invoked by CCLU in its protest. That fact alone should have alerted Noriel to disregard the technicality that CCLU's protest was not filed on time.WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated February 26 and March 19, 1981 are hereby set aside. Another run-off certification election should be conducted inside the premises of Redson Textile Manufacturing Corporation. The management is ordered to allow all its employees to participate in the certification election and to assist in the holding of an orderly election. The election supervisors or representation officers are also enjoined to fulfill their duties under the Labor Code and the rules and regulations implementing the same.SO ORDERED.mimiThe Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

MILITANTE VS NLRCThis is a petition for certiorari to reverse the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 004908-93, affirming the order of the Labor Arbiter which dismissed, for having been barred by prior judgment, NLRC-NCR Cases Nos. 00-01-00618-93, 00-03-01784-93, and 00-03-02073-93.IThe Golden Taxi Employees and Workers Union — ANGLO (GTEWU-ANGLO), represented by Ernesto Serrano, as union president, filed a case against respondent Golden Taxi Cab Co. (Company) and/or Lorenzo Zamora and Jose Zamora (NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-02875-90) for illegal lock-out, violation of B.P. Blg. 130, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, unfair labor practice, and payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. In his decision, Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on found that the closure of respondent company was illegal, and ordered private respondents to pay the members of GTEWU-ANGLO P22,947,200.00 as separation pay and the equivalent of 10% of the award as attorney's fees (Rollo, p.·48). Upon appeal, NLRC in NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92, reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and in lieu thereof directed private respondents to pay, as financial assistance, the workers named in the list attached to its decision the amount of P5,646,699.50 plus P564,669.95 as attorney's fees (Rollo, p. 69).On January 25, 1993, a complaint was filed by Danilo Q. Militante against Lorenzo Zamora, Doña Nena Zamora and Doña Pacing Zamora for illegal lockout, illegal dismissal, non-remittance of SSS deduction, deduction for burial benefits, non-payment of premium pay for rest day, thirteenth-month pay and separation pay with a prayer for reinstatement, upgrading of SSS payments, payment of separation pay, thirteenth-month pay and premium pay for rest day (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-01-00618-93).On March 9, 1993, another complaint was filed by Miguel C. Salonga against respondent Company, Lorenzo Zamora, Doña Nena Zamora and Doña Pacing Zamora, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of retirement benefits with a prayer for payment of retirement benefits and other benefits (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-01784-93).On March 15, 1993, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaints on the grounds of res judicata and prescription, arguing that the NLRC decision in NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92 barred these subsequent complaints.On March 19, 1993, another complaint was filed against respondent company, Lorenzo Zamora, Doña Nena Zamora and Doña Pacing Zamora by Bernardino O. Tejada again for illegal lockout, illegal deductions of SSS and burial benefits, illegal dismissal, non-payment of separation pay, holiday pay and thirteenth-month pay, and payment of moral damages

and attorney's fees with a prayer for upgrading of SSS payments, payment of separation pay, thirteenth-month pay, premium pay for rest day, attorney's fees, moral damages, holiday pay and reimbursement of illegal deductions (NLRC NCR CA No. 00-03-02073-93).On April 28, 1993, Labor Arbiter Ramon V. C. Reyes issued an order dismissing the three consolidated cases on the ground of bar by prior judgment. Upon appeal (NLRC NCR CA No. 004908-93), NLRC rendered a decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.IIPetitioners argue that NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (1) in holding that petitioner's causes of action are barred by the prior final judgment in NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92 despite the lack of jurisdiction of NLRC over the complaint therein and the lack of identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the two cases; (2) in not holding that the decision in the previous case did not prejudice but even entitled petitioners, who are members of the exclusive bargaining representative Philippine Agricultural Commercial and Industrial Workers Union — Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (PACIWU-TUCP), to the award of financial assistance; and (3) in failing to comply with its duty to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain speedily and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure the facts in each case.IIIWe find no grave abuse of discretion committed by NLRC in applying the principle of res judicata in NLRC NCR CA No. 004908-93 (NCR No. 00-01-00618-93; 00-03-01784-93; 00-03-02073-93), subject of this petition by reason of the previous judgment rendered in NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92 (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-02875-90).Res Judicata has the following elements: (1) that the previous judgment has become final; (2) that the prior judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) that the first judgment was rendered on the merits; and (4) that there was substantial identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action, as between the prior and subsequent actions (Diwa v. Donato, 234 SCRA 608 [1994]).It is undisputed that the NLRC decision in NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92 was decided on the merits and has already become final.Petitioners insist, however, that they, being members of the rival union PACIWU-TUCP, were not parties in the first case filed by GTEWU-ANGLO (Rollo, p. 12). Such claim is not supported by the records of the case. The Labor Arbiter' s decision in the subsequent consolidated cases, which was affirmed by NLRC, states:It is not disputed that on May 27, 1990, the date the company filed its notice of closure with the Department of Labor and Employment, copy furnished the complainant Union, the said Union was already "certified" (in fact more than a year earlier after winning the March 17, 1989 Consent election) as "the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees" of respondent company. The effect of such a certification brought about the legal mandate that henceforth, complainant Union "shall be the exclusive representative" (Art. 255, Labor Code) of all the "rank and file employees (take note, not just the union members) of respondent company not only for the purpose of entering into a collective bargaining agreement" on "terms and conditions of employment" (Arts. 251, 252, ibid), but also in the matter of "rights, benefits and welfare" (Art. 255, ibid) of the said represented workers. . . . (Rollo, p. 41).In their opposition to respondents' motion to dismiss filed in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-01-00618-93, petitioners apprised the Labor Arbiter thus:For the information of the Honorable Labor Arbiter, the herein mentioned case was initiated by Ernesto Serrano who was the union president of GTEWU-ANGLO for and in behalf of all the workers and employees of the Golden Taxi Co. numbering about 1649, whether or not the worker is a member of the union as the law on this point is clear that as the winner of the certification/consent Election on March 17, 1989, GTEWU-ANGLO, became the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of the respondent company. . . . (Rollo, p.

103).Petitioners further explained in said opposition:What happened in this case was that, while the herein mentioned case was first filed before the Arbitration Branch of this Honorable Commission and assigned to the Honorable Labor Arbiter PATRICIO LIBO-ON, all the workers of respondent company were complainants until the case was decided in complainants' favor, but when the herein mentioned case was elevated on appeal by respondent company to the First Division of the Honorable Commission and was decided on 20 November 1992, the complainants in this instant case were no longer included, hence, this instant complaint (Rollo, p. 104).In the first case (NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92), NLRC resolved two issues insofar as the award is concerned: (1) the determination of the employees who are to receive financial assistance; and (2) the amount they are entitled to receive. In conclusion, NLRC took out those who no longer worked with respondent company before its closure, and favored only those who actively pursued the case. It limited the award of financial assistance only to those mentioned in the list attached to its decision resulting in the exclusion from the benefits of petitioners.We cannot simply disregard these factual findings made by the Labor Arbiter, as well as the conclusion arrived at by NLRC, inasmuch as the same are supported by the records of the case and in accord with law and jurisprudence. In Five J Taxi v. National Labor Relations Commission, 235 SCRA 556 (1994), we ruled:This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with abuse of discretion (at p. 560).The legal conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC on the binding effect of the judgment in the NLRC NCR CA No. 003194-92 on petitioners finds support in Article 255 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. Said article provides:Exclusive bargaining representation and workers participation in policy and decision making. — The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. . . . .Inasmuch as GTEWU-ANGLO was certified as the exclusive bargaining agent in the consent election conducted on March 17, 1989, petitioners cannot now claim that they were not parties in the first case filed by GTEWU-ANGLO, which represented not only PACIWU-TUCP but also GTEWU-ANGLO. Hence, all the requisites of res judicata being present, said principle should be made to apply, thus barring any subsequent action such as the consolidated cases subject of this petition.The Solicitor General, in his comment filed for NLRC, observes that with the exception of the complaint docketed as NLRC NCR No. 00-03-01784-93, charging private respondents with illegal dismissal and non-payment of retirement benefits, the other two complaints contained monetary claims such as non-remittance of SSS deduction and deductions for burial benefits, non-payment of holiday pay and thirteenth-month pay. However, inasmuch as these claims were neither raised nor determined in the first case, even indirectly, petitioners cannot be said to be precluded from filing and pursuing these claims. We agree with the Solicitor General.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without prejudice to petitioners' right to submit before the Labor Arbiter all the unresolved money claims.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 75810 September 9, 1991KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN), petitioner,

vs.HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, and VIRON GARMENTS MFG., CO., INC., respondents.Esteban M. Mendoza for petitioner. R E S O LU T I O N NARVASA, J.:p

The propriety of holding a certification election is the issue in the special civil action of certiorari at bar.By virtue of a Resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated February 27, 1981, the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) was declared the exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees of Viron Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. (VIRON).More than four years thereafter, or on April 11, 1985, another union, the Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL Katipunan filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification election among the employees of VIRON. The petition allegedly counted with the support of more than thirty percent (30%) of the workers at VIRON.NAFLU opposed the petition, as might be expected. The Med-Arbiter however ordered, on June 14, 1985, that a certification election be held at VIRON as prayed for, after ascertaining that KAMPIL had complied with all the requirements of law and that since the certification of NAFLU as sole bargaining representative in 1981, no collective bargaining agreement had been executed between it and VIRON.NAFLU appealed. It contended that at the time the petition for certification election was filed on April 11, 1985, it was in process of collective bargaining with VIRON; that there was in fact a deadlock in the negotiations which had prompted it to file a notice of strike; and that these circumstances constituted a bar to the petition for election in accordance with Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, 1 reading as follows:SEC. 3. When to file. — In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement submitted in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed at any time. However, no certification election may be held within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result. Neither may a representation question be entertained if, before the filing of a petition for certification election, a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.Finding merit in a NAFLU's appeal, the Director of Labor Relations rendered a Resolution on April 30, 1986 setting aside the Med-Arbiter's Order of June 14, 1985 and dismissing KAMPIL's petition for certification election. This disposition is justified in the Resolution as follows:... While it may be true that the one-year period (mentioned in Section 3 above quoted) has long run its course since intervenor NAFLU was certified on February 27, 1981, it could not be said, however, that NAFLU slept on its right to bargain collectively with the employer. If a closer look was made on the history of labor management relations in the company, it could be readily seen that the delay in the negotiations for and conclusion of a collective agreement — the object of the one-year period — could be attributed first, on the exhaustion of all legal remedies in the representation question twice initiated in the company before the filing of the present petition and second, to management who had been resisting the representations of NAFLU in collective bargaining.The one-year period therefore, should not be applied literally to the present dispute,

especially considering that intervenor had to undergo a strike to bring management to the negotiation table. ...KAMPIL moved for reconsideration, and when this was denied, instituted in this Court the present certiorari action.It is evident that the prohibition imposed by law on the holding of a certification election "within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result' — in this case, from February 27, 1981, the date of the Resolution declaring NAFLU the exclusive bargaining representative of rank-and-file workers of VIRON — can have no application to the case at bar. That one-year period-known as the "certification year" during which the certified union is required to negotiate with the employer, and certification election is prohibited 2 — has long since expired.Thus the question for resolution is whether or not KAMPIL's petition for certification election is barred because, before its filing, a bargaining deadlock between VIRON and NAFLU as the incumbent bargaining agent, had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout, in accordance with Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules above quoted.Again it seems fairly certain that prior to the filing of the petition for election in this case, there was no such "bargaining deadlock ... (which) had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout." To be sure, there are in the record assertions by NAFLU that its attempts to bring VIRON to the negotiation table had been unsuccessful because of the latter's recalcitrance and unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively; 3 but there is no proof that it had taken any action to legally coerce VIRON to comply with its statutory duty to bargain collectively. It could have charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a legitimate strike in protest against VIRON's refusal to bargain collectively and compel it to do so; but it did not. There are assertions by NAFLU, too, that its attempts to bargain collectively had been delayed by continuing challenges to the resolution pronouncing it the sole bargaining representative in VIRON; but there is no adequate substantiation thereof, or of how it did in fact prevent initiation of the bargaining process between it and VIRON.The stark, incontrovertible fact is that from February 27, 1981 — when NAFLU was proclaimed the exclusive bargaining representative of all VIRON employees — to April 11, 1985 — when KAMPIL filed its petition for certification election or a period of more than four (4) years, no collective bargaining agreement was ever executed, and no deadlock ever arose from negotiations between NAFLU and VIRON resulting in conciliation proceedings or the filing of a valid strike notice.The respondents advert to a strike declared by NAFLU on October 26, 1986 for refusal of VIRON to bargain and for violation of terms and conditions of employment, which was settled by the parties' agreement, and to another strike staged on December 6, 1986 in connection with a claim of violation of said agreement, a dispute which has since been certified for compulsory arbitration by the Secretary of Labor & Employment. 4 Obviously, however, these activities took place after the initiation of the certification election case by KAMPIL, and it was grave abuse of discretion to have regarded them as precluding the holding of the certification election thus prayed for.WHEREFORE, it being apparent that none of the proscriptions to certification election set out in the law exists in the case at bar, and it was in the premises grave abuse of discretion to have ruled otherwise, the contested Resolution of the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated April 30, 1986 in BLR Case No. A-7-139-85 (BZEO-CE-04-004-85) is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. Costs against private respondent.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-67485 April 10, 1992NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP)-TUCP, petitioner, vs.

DIR. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment, Manila, FEDERATION OF UNIONS OF RIZAL (FUR)-TUCP, and CALINOG REFINERY CORPORATION (NASUREFCO),respondents. MEDIALDEA, J.:This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision rendered by the respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment, dated November 18, 1983 affirming the order of Med-Arbiter Demetrio Correa dated May 2, 1983 giving due course to the petition for certification election filed by private respondent Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR)-TUCP; and the order dated March 21, 1984 denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.The antecedent facts are as follows:Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP)-TUCP is the certified exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file workers of Calinog Refinery Corporation. Private respondent Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR)-TUCP is a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment while private respondent Calinog Refineries Employees Union (CREU)-NACUSIP is the certified exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file workers of the private respondent Calinog Refinery Corporation by virtue of the certification election held on March 30, 1981.On June 21, 1982, petitioner union filed a petition for deadlock in collective bargaining with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (now Department of Labor and Employment). In order to obviate friction and tension, the parties agreed to submit the petition for deadlock to compulsory arbitration on July 14, 1982 and was docketed as RAB Case No. VI-0220-82.On July 21, 1982, private respondent FUR-TUCP filed with the Regional Office No. VI, MOLE (now DOLE), Iloilo City a petition for certification election among the rank and file employees of private respondent company, alleging that: (1) about forty-five percent (45%) of private respondent company's employees had disaffiliated from petitioner union and joined private respondent union; (2) no election had been held for the past twelve (12) months; and (3) while petitioner union had been certified as the sole collective bargaining agent, for over a year it failed to conclude a collective bargaining agreement with private respondent company. Petitioner union filed a motion to intervene in the petition for certification election filed by private respondent union.By order dated July 23, 1982, the Acting Med-Arbiter Pacifico V. Militante dismissed the petition for certification election for lack of merit since the petition is barred by a pending bargaining deadlock.On August 25, 1982, private respondent union filed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations, Manila.The Bureau of Labor Relations through respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano rendered a decision on September 30, 1982 setting aside the order of the Acting Med-Arbiter and remanding the case to Regional Office VI, Iloilo City for hearing and reception of evidence.On May 2, 1983, Honorable Med-Arbiter Demetrio Correa issued an order in LRD Case No. 4293 giving due course to the petition of private respondent FUR-TUCP and ordering that an election be held within 20 days from receipt of the order.From the order of Med-Arbiter Correa, petitioner interposed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations.During the pendency of the appeal or on September 10, 1983, a collective bargaining agreement was entered and executed by the management of the National Sugar Refineries Co., Inc. and petitioner union and was subsequently ratified by a majority of the rank and file employees. On the basis of the concluded CBA, the Honorable Executive Labor Arbiter Celerino Grecia II issued an award dated September 12, 1983 adopting the submitted agreement as the CBA between the parties.On November 18, 1983, respondent Director Trajano rendered a decision affirming with

qualification the order of Med-Arbiter Correa dated May 2, 1983, the pertinent portions of which provide as follows:It appears that the Calinog Refinery Employees, Union-NACUSIP-TUCP no longer commands the support of the majority of the employees. This observation is buttressed by the fact that more than seventy five percent (75%) of the workers have disaffiliated from the intervenor and joined the ranks of the petitioner. Thus, intervenor's status as sole and exclusive bargaining representative is now of doubtful validity.For the above-mentioned reason, we stand obliged to resort to the most expeditious, practical and democratic option open to us, that is, the conduct of a certification election. Through this forum, the true sentiments of the workers as to which labor organization deserves their loyalty can be fairly ascertained. In any event, it is our view that the 10 September 1983 collective agreement should be respected by the union that shall prevail in the election not only because it is an arbitration award but also because substantial benefits are provided thereunder. Otherwise stated, the winning union shall administer said agreement. In passing, it may be pointed out that CAREFCO has been included as one of the contending parties in the election. We feel that it is error for the acting Med-Arbiter to do so considering that the company is a mere bystander in this representation dispute.WHEREFORE, as above qualified, the Order dated 2 May 1983 is affirmed.SO DECIDED. (Rollo, pp. 40-41)From the decision of respondent Director Trajano, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated December 6, 1983.The respondent Director in his order dated March 21, 1984 denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed the Bureau's decision of November 18, 1983.Hence, this petition.This Court in a resolution dated December 10, 1984 resolved to grant the urgent motion of petitioner for the issuance of a restraining order and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from conducting and holding the certification election on December 17, 1984 among the rank and file employees of respondent company (see Rollo, p. 99).Petitioner maintains that respondent Director Trajano committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it rendered a decision affirming the order of Med-Arbiter Correa finding that the deadlock is "nothing but a mere subterfuge to obstruct the exercise of the workers of their legitimate right to self-organization, a last minute maneuver to deny the workers the exercise of their constitutional rights" (Rollo, p. 28) and ordering a certification election among the rank and file workers of respondent company.Furthermore, petitioner stresses that the finding that the contract (deadlock) bar rule has no room for application in the instant case, runs counter to the provision of Section 3 of the Rules Implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 which prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during the pendency of a bargaining deadlock.In conformity with the petitioner's contentions, the Solicitor General insists that the respondent Director has acted arbitrarily in issuing the assailed decision and order. In addition, it argues that the CBA concluded on September 10, 1983 has a life span of three (3) years and constitutes a bar to the petition for certification election pursuant to Section 3 of the Rules Implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 130.The pivotal issue therefore, is whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed during the pendency of a bargaining deadlock submitted to arbitration or conciliation.After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds the petition meritorious and holds that the respondent Director gravely abused his discretion when he affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter Correa calling for a certification election among the rank and file workers of private respondent company.The law on the matter is Section 3, Book V, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, to wit:Sec. 3. When to file. — In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement duly registered

in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed at any time. However, no certification election may be held within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result. Neither may a representation question be entertained if, before the filing of a petition for certification election, a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of valid notice or strike or lockout.If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that a petition for certification election may be filed at any time, in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election in the following cases:(1) during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within the freedom period;(2) within one (1) year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result; or(3) during the existence of a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party and which had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.The Deadlock Bar Rule simply provides that a petition for certification election can only be entertained if there is no pending bargaining deadlock submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout. The principal purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the workers and the management.In the case at bar, a bargaining deadlock was already submitted to arbitration when private respondent FUR-TUCP filed a petition for certification election. The same petition was dismissed for lack of merit by the Acting Med-Arbiter in an order dated July 23, 1982 on the sole ground that the petition is barred by a pending bargaining deadlock. However, respondent Director set aside the same order and subsequently affirmed an order giving due course to the petition for certification election and ordering that an election be held.The law demands that the petition for certification election should fail in the presence of a then pending bargaining deadlock.A director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, by the nature of his functions, acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. We find no reason why his decision should be beyond this Court's review. Administrative officials, like the director of the Bureau of Labor Relations are presumed to act in accordance with law but this Court will not hesitate to pass upon their work where there is a showing of abuse of authority or discretion in their official acts or when their decisions or orders are tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness.Noteworthy is the fact that a certification was issued by Executive Labor Arbiter Celerino Grecia II on October 21, 1982 certifying that the petition for deadlock in RAB Case No. VI-0220-82 was forwarded to the Executive Labor Arbiter for compulsory arbitration (see Rollo, p. 19). The respondent Director erred in finding that the order issued by the Med-Arbiter dismissing the petition for certification election was irregular and was merely based on information.All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the assailed decision and order of the respondent Director is tainted with arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED; the decision dated November 18, 1983 and order dated March 21, 1984 of the respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano are hereby nullified and the order of Med-Arbiter Militante dated July 23, 1982 dismissing the petition for certification election is hereby reinstated.SO ORDERED.G.R. Nos. L-38955-56 October 31, 1974CONFEDERATION OF CITIZENS LABOR UNIONS (CCLU), CONTINENTAL EMPLOYEES

AND LABORERS ASSOCIATION (CELA) AND REDSON EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS ASSOCIATION (RELA), petitioners, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, CONTINENTAL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND REDSON TEXTILE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,respondents.O. B. Gesmundo and R. E. Maderazo for petitioners.Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo for respondent Redson Textile Manufacturing Corporation.F. F Bonifacio, Jr. for respondent Federation of Free Workers.A. K. Tan for respondent Continental Manufacturing Corporation.Sol. Gen. E. P. Mendoza and Sol. Romeo C. de la Cruz for respondents Secretary of Labor and The Commission. FERNANDEZ, J.:p

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to have the respondents National Labor Relations Commission declared without jurisdiction over its cases Nos. LR-2751 and 2883 with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin said Respondent from proceeding with the scheduled certification election on July 23, 1974.G. R. No. L-38895. On February 15, 1974 the Continental Manufacturing Corporation, (hereinafter referred to as CMC) renewed for another three years or until February 15, 1977 its collective bargaining agreement with Continental Employees and Laborers Association (hereinafter referred to as CELA) an affiliate of petitioner Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions, (hereinafter referred to as CCLU) which is a legitimate labor organization. Copy of this collective bargaining agreement was attached to the petition as Annex A, and appears to have been acknowledged on February 21, 1974. Three days before February 15, 1974 however, that is, on February 12, 1974, respondent Federation of Free Workers (hereinafter referred to as FFW), another legitimate labor organization, filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter referred to as NLRC), a "Petition for Certification Election at the Continental Manufacturing Corporation", 1 and docketed as NLRC Case No. LR-2751. A copy of this petition was furnished CMC on February 22, 1974. Subsequently, on February 25, 1974 a copy of the CMC-CELA collective bargaining agreement was filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations for certification. The collective bargaining agreement was certified on March 4, 1974. 2 On February 28, 1974, CMC filed its answer to the petition praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of the contract-bar rule.G.R. No L-38956. A three-year collective bargaining agreement 3 was signed on March 4, 1974 4 but to be effective as of February 16, 1974 by Redson Textile Manufacturing Company (hereinafter referred to as REDSON) and Redson Employees and laborers Association (hereinafter referred to as RELA). Said agreement was filed with the NLRC on March 7, 1974, and certified on March 15, 1974. The FFW, however, had already filed on February 25, 1974 it, "Petition for Certification Election at Redson and Company, Inc." with the NLRC, and docketed as NLRC Case No. LR-2883. 5 REDSON was furnished a copy of the petition on March 7, 1974. On March 18, 1974 REDSON filed its answer praying for the dismissal of the petition principally on the ground that the petition was barred by the collective bargaining agreement which it had signed with RELA.The CELA-CCLU and RELA-CCLU filed on April 23, 1974 a motion to dismiss 6 the petitions for certification election, and on May 8, 1974 a supplemental motion to dismiss. 7

Respondent NLRC rendered its decision dated April 26, 1974, which consolidated the two petitions for certification election inasmuch as they raised identical issues, granted the petitions, and directed the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct the certification elections within ten days from receipt thereof. 8 Copy thereof was received by petitioners on May 11,

1974.Petitioners filed on May 15, 1974 their "Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal from the NLRC Decision of 26th of April 1974," 9 and their Appeal to the Secretary of Labor on May 16, 1974. 10

On July 6, 1974, petitioners, through counsel, received a telegram dated July 5, 1974 from the Bureau of Labor Relations, requesting them to attend the pre-election conference in LR-2751 and LR-2883 on July 15, 1974. 11 On July 12, 1974, petitioners filed a motion to cancel the pre-election conference. 12

Claiming that notwithstanding the fact that the NLRC's decision had not yet become final or they had not received a copy of the decision of the Secretary of Labor and that their motion to cancel the pre-election conference had not yet been acted upon, Respondent NLRC already scheduled the election on July 23, 1974, which unless enjoined, it intended to hold, petitioners filed on July 18, 1974 the instant petition, praying, on the basis of the irregularities allegedly committed by the NLRC, for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the NLRC from taking any action on the cases in question.On July 22, 1974, the Second Division of this Court, resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition, to set the date for the hearing of the matter of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and to allow the holding of the certification election on July 23, 1974. At the same time this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from opening the ballot boxes, canvassing the votes, and announcing the results thereof.In their comments, respondents CMC and REDSON, thru counsel, asserted that the scheduled certification elections on July 23, 1974 were cancelled until further orders from the NLRC at the pre-election conference called on July 18, 1974 by the Bureau of Labor Relations; that CMC signed with petitioner CELA a collective bargaining agreement on February 15, 1974; that REDSON and petitioner RELA also signed a collective bargaining agreement on February 15, 1974; that in both NLRC Cases Nos. LR-2751 and LR-2883, counsel submitted memoranda to sustain the proposition that both petitioners for certification election should be dismissed for the collective bargaining agreements of CMC and REDSON were in effect certified as of February 15, 1974, and no certification election could be entertained during the life of said bargaining contracts; that CMC and REDSON received copy of the NLRC decision on May 11, 1974 ordering an election within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to select an exclusive collective bargaining agent; that the Secretary of Labor denied in a resolution dated May 29, 1974 the appeal of CMC and REDSON; that CMC and REDSON filed with the Secretary of Labor on July 10, 1974 a manifestation to the effect that as long as their collective bargaining agreements were honored, an election might not jeopardize the rights of their employees who were already enjoying the benefits of the collective bargaining agreements; that CMC and REDSON would obey whatever may be the resolution of this Court regarding the holding of the certification elections during the life of the certified collective bargaining agreements. 13

Respondent FFW, in its comments, alleged that petitioners cannot legally avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari and/or prohibition as they did not raise the issue of jurisdiction in their motions to dismiss NLRC cases Nos. 2751 and 2883 and that petitioners did not move that respondent FFW be required to present evidence of its claimed 60% or 10% membership of the employees and workers; that neither the NLRC nor the Secretary of Labor had acted with grave abuse of discretion for their orders were issued pursuant to the rules of the Commission; that neither the NLRC nor the Secretary of Labor acted in excess of jurisdiction as the certification election order was issued pursuant to the Implementing Rules of the Commission issued under Presidential Decree No. 21; and that the certification election scheduled set for July 23, 1974 were cancelled. 14

The Solicitor General's Office, as counsel for respondents NLRC and the Secretary of Labor, refuted in its comments petitioners' contentions that said respondents did not have jurisdiction over the NLRC cases or that said respondents committed grave abuse of discretion, or that they committed the irregularities imputed to them. 15

ISSUES RAISED AND OUR RULINGS1. Petitioners contend, first, that respondent NLRC had no authority to modify the "contract-bar rule" by requiring that a collective bargaining agreement had to be certified before it could constitute a bar to a petition for certification election. 16 The contract-bar rule is a principle in labor law that a collective bargaining agreement of reasonable duration is, in the interest of the stability of industrial relations, a bar to certification elections.We think otherwise for the following reasons.The NLRC issued on October 18, 1972, Rules and Regulations Re Its Organization and Definition of Functions, which among other things, provided thus:Section 30. All collective bargaining agreements and other agreements settling or adjusting labor disputes must be filed with the Commission by the parties therein for certification. The widest publicity shall be given by the management and the union to such collective bargaining agreements for the information and guidance of the workers concerned.Section 31. During the life of a certified collective bargaining agreement, the Commission shall not entertain any representation issues which may in any manner affect the administration of the agreement.Labor Relations Implementing Instruction No. 2, dated December 21, 1972, establishing rules and regulations concerning certification elections provides thus:Section 3. When Petition May Be Filed. — Where the collective bargaining agreement is certified, a petition may be filed within sixty (60) days before its expiration date. In the absence of a certified collective bargaining agreement, a petition may be filed any time. If a petition is filed during the life of a collective bargaining agreement, the same shall be dismissed without prejudice to its refiling within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration date of the certified collective bargaining agreement.It shall be the duty of the petitioner to serve a copy of the petition to each of the interested parties either personally or by registered mail. Proof of such service must be shown in the petition.But where from does the NLRC's authority to promulgate its rules emanate? From Presidential Decree No. 21, dated October 14, 1972, section 2 whereof gave the NLRC, which the Decree created, original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving all disputes and grievances which may otherwise lead to strikes and lockouts under Republic Act No. 875. Section 9 thereof also enjoined the NLRC to promulgate rules and regulations governing collective bargaining.Petitioners, however, contend that respondent NLRC had no authority to promulgate Section 3 of Implementing Instructions No. 2 because it violates not only General Order No. 3 but also the existing jurisprudence on the matter. 17

We do not agree. The President in General Order No. 3, dated September 22, 1972, ordered "all executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government ... to function ... in accordance with existing laws, until otherwise ordered by me or by my duly designated representative," and the Judiciary to continue trying and deciding cases in accordance with existing laws. Assuming, gratia argumenti, that the existing law on collective bargaining at the time of the promulgation of Implementing Instructions No. 2 was that a collective bargaining agreement need not be certified in order to be a bar to a certification election, it does not mean that it could not be changed by virtue of General Order No. 3. This Order did not render unchangeable the existing law, for it is expressly provided therein that the executive departments and their agencies may function not in

accordance with the then existing law if so ordered by the President or by his duly authorized representative, and as stated above, the President granted the NLRC original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving employee-employer relationship, and the authority to issue rules and regulations concerning collective bargaining.Assuming arguendo, furthermore, that a non-certified collective bargaining agreement may serve as a bar to a certification election as petitioners would want us to hold, petitioners would still be bereft of cause to complain. The petition for certification election filed by FFW at the Continental Manufacturing Corporation (NLRC CASE No. LRO 2751) was filed, as shown by Annex C to the petition, on February 12, 1974. The collective bargaining agreement between the CMC and the CELA (Annex A) which, as claimed, should bar said petition, had not yet been filed as of that date for certification, for it was acknowledged before the Notary Public only on February 21, 1974.The petition for certification election at Redson and Company (NLRC Case No. LR-2883) was filed on February 25, 1974. As of said date, no collective bargaining agreement had been entered into between REDSON and RELA which could serve as a bar to the petition, for their collective bargaining agreement was signed only on March 4, 1974, as admitted by REDSON in its answer, 18 and acknowledged only on March 7, 1974. 19

We do not see, moreover, any violation of the existing law which NLRC allegedly committed when it gave due course to the petitions for certification election. Section 12 (b) of Republic Act No. 875 makes it plain that after a certification election has been made "the court shall not order certification in the same unit more often than once in 12 months," and under Section 12 (d) of the same law, "an employer may petition the court for an election if there has been no certification election held during the 12 months prior to the date of the request of the employees," which provision tends to show that after the lapse of such period of 12 months a certification election may be requested either by the employer or by the requisite number of employees of a particular union. 20 The petitions for certification election in both NLRC Cases Nos. 2751 and 2883 alleged "that there has been no certification election in the company for the last 12 months," 21 which allegation was not denied by CMC and REDSON in their answers.22

Section 12 (c) of the same law furthermore provides that it shall be mandatory on the Court to order an election for the purpose of determining the representative of the employees for the appropriate bargaining unit, where a petition is filed by at least ten per cent of the employees in the appropriate unit requesting an election. In LR No. 2751, FFW claimed that it represented 60% of the employees and workers in CMC, and in LR No. 2883, it claimed that it represented more than 10% of the employees in REDSON.II. Secondly, petitioners contend that inasmuch as the collective bargaining agreements (Annexes A and B to the Petition) contain standard and substantial benefits and their duration is reasonable, there was no reason why said agreements should still be certified before they could be considered bars to the petitions for certifications election. 23 In the light of what has been said above regarding NLRC's authority to promulgate Labor Relations Implementing Instruction No. 2 and the clear provisions of section 12 of Republic Act No. 875, it is obvious that petitioner's complaint on this point is not meritorious. Even if a certification of the collective bargaining agreements were not necessary, the certification elections could still be ordered by virtue of Republic Act No. 875.III. Petitioners complain, thirdly, that respondent NLRC favored FFW and allowed it to raid CCLU locals when it granted the petitions for certification elections. 24 It has been shown that FFW had legal right to petition for certification elections. If in exercising said right, FFW would reap benefits and petitioners would suffer damage, such damage would be no more than a damnum absque injuria, damage without legal injury.IV. Fourthly, petitioners also complain that the respondent NLRC committed an irregularity when it took cognizance of the petitions' for certification elections despite the fact that there

was no schism and the grievance procedure provided in the collective bargaining agreements 25 have not been resorted to. Assuming arguendo, that petitioners were correct on this point, NLRC's error would still be only an error in judgment and not of jurisdiction, hence, this petition for certification would still fail.For it is elementary that a petition for certiorari in order to succeed, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because as long as the respondent official acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. 26 It is true that an application for the issuance of the writ of certiorari may likewise be based on grave abuse of discretion. But it is equally true that there is grave abuse of discretion which justifies the issuance of the writ of certiorari only if and when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. 27 In other words, the writ of certiorari will lie when an inferior Court, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 28

In the case at bar, the alleged error of the respondent Commission is one of judgment. And as already pointed out, even assuming that such judgment is indeed erroneous, the same does not constitute a grave abuse of discretion within the meaning of the Rules and established jurisprudence, there being no showing that said Commission exercised its power on the matter "in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law." 29

The "grievance procedure" provided in the collective bargaining agreements Annexes A and B need not be resorted to in the instant cases for said procedure was not applicable. The collective bargaining agreements defines a grievance as a "controversy between the COMPANY and the UNION or any employee or employees covered by this Agreement." The instant cases do not involve a controversy between the company and the union, but between two unions.V. Fifth, petitioners contend that the decision (Annex H) dated April 26, 1974 was void for not having been personally and directly prepared by the members of the Commission, 30 alleging as reason therefor that the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners, being saddled with administrative duties, have no time to personally prepare decisions such that their decisions are prepared by other employees. 31

There was no evidence introduced that that particular decision complained of was not personally prepared by the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners. Because an official has much administrative work to do, and which he does, it does not follow that he does not have time to prepare decisions, for the preparation of the decisions is one of those duties he must do. Such bare allegation of petitioners cannot furthermore prevail over the presumption that "official duty has been regularly performed."32

This presumption is particularly strong as regards respondent Commission a government agency vested with quasi-judicial powers, in connection with the enforcement of labor laws and social legislations affecting particular fields of activity involving labor and capital. Thus, it was held that a legal presumption is particularly strong as regards administrative agencies vested with powers considered to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulations and/or promotion of which requires a technical or special training, aside from a good knowledge

and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said field, obtaining in the nation. 33

VI. The sixth alleged irregularity complained of by petitioners is that they were deprived of their day in court for the parties seeking certification elections were not required to prove the allegations in their petitions, particularly their claimed membership consisting of "more than 60% of the employees and workers" of CMC and "10% of the employees of Redson and Company." 34 We note that this question was not raised in the proceedings before the NLRC. It was not raised in the Answer in NLRC Case No. LR-2751 35 or in the Answer in NLRC Case No. LR-2883. 36 Too repeatedly enunciated as not to require citation of authorities is the rule that no issue may be raised on appeal which was not raised in the lower court. Moreover, before an act of an official may be questioned in certiorari proceedings, said official must first be given the opportunity to correct the error by moving that he reconsider the same. 37 The NLRC was not given this opportunity.VII. Petitioners' last complaint was that the NLRC attempted to implement its decision even before they received copy of the alleged resolution or decision on their "Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal." 38

Assuming that there was an irregularity on this point, it was corrected when the certification elections scheduled on July 23, 1974 as well as the pre-election conference set for July 18, 1974 were cancelled. 39

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued on July 22, 1974 is LIFTED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

BUKLOD ÑG SAULOG TRANSIT, Petitioner, vs. MARCIANO CASALLA, ET ALS., Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PADILLA, J.:

On 7 December 1953 the Respondents, 65 in number, employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc., filed in the Court of Industrial Relations a petition for a certification election, alleging that the total number of employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc. was 583; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat there were two labor organizations which represented the employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc., to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit and the Saulog Transit Employees Union (PFL); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that the certification election prayed for was for the purpose of determining the sole bargaining representative of the employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc. On 23 December 1953 the president of the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit filed its answer stating that on 1 (15) July 1953 a collective bargaining agreement had been entered into by and between the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit, a duly registered union with the Department of Labor, on the one hand, and the Saulog Transit, Inc., on the other; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat on 5 December an election was held peacefully and orderly, the result thereof having been forwarded to the Department of Labor, against which election and the result thereof no protest as regards the legality thereof was lodged; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat having acquired a juridical personality from the time of its registration, on 15 July 1953 the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit entered into a collective bargaining contract already referred to covering the well-being of the members of which the Respondentswere still members. On 16 February 1954 the Saulog Transit, Inc. filed a pleading entitled “Appearance and Manifestation” averring that the allegation that the Respondents constituted 10 per cent of the total number of employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc. was for the Court to determine; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that it

had dealt and had been dealing with the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement entered into by and between them, the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit representing the employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc. as an industrial unit.

After hearing, on 17 May 1954 the Court rendered judgment directing —

cralaw that a certification election be held among the employees and/or laborers of the Saulog Transit, Inc. at Pasay City, in accordance with section 12 of Republic Act No. 875, and in conformity with the Rules promulgated by this Court on September 4, 1953.

All the employees and/or laborers whose names appear in the list submitted by the company and marked as Exhibits “E” to “7”, attached to the records of this case, minus the supervisory personnel composed of the General Manager, Assistant General Manager, the two guards, one shift foreman, and one accountant, shall be eligible to vote.

Let a copy of this order be furnished the Department of Labor for its information and guidance.

A motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court in banc on 12 July 1954, the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit prays for a review of the order of the Court of Industrial Relations dated 17 May 1954 and the resolution of the Court in banc dated 12 July 1954 denying its motion for reconsideration.

The logical inference that may be drawn from the order appealed from is that the Court of Industrial Relations could not determine or at least was in doubt as to which of the two labor unions named in the petition was the true choice of the laborers or employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc. to represent them in all their dealings or for the purpose of collective bargaining with their employer as regards the “rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment,” and for that reason the trial court ordered a certification election pursuant to section 12(b), Republic Act No. 875.

The Court of Industrial Relations made the following findings:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

From the evidence, the following are explicit in the pleadings and documents as well as the testimonies submitted by the parties. It appears that the Saulog Transit, Inc. is engaged in the transportation business in Manila and surrounding cities and employs 583 workers including supervisory personnel; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat there exists in the company two unions, namely, the Buklod Ñg Saulog Transit, the intervenor in this case, and the Saulog Employees Union (PFL); chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat thePetitioners numbering 65 are all employees of the company; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat there exists a collective bargaining contract (Exhibit 10) dated July 15, 1953, between the Saulog Transit, Inc. and the Buklod Ñg Saulog Transit with a supplementary agreement (Exhibit “10-1”) entered into on January 10, 1954, a month after the petition for certification election was filed and already being investigated by this Court.

The fundamental issue to be resolved in the present case is whether or not an order of certification election shall issue on the basis of the evidence established.

By stipulation of the parties it was agreed in open Court that instead of a petition for certification election confined to drivers and conductors as the appropriate bargaining unit in the Saulog Transit, Inc., the parties have agreed on the employer’s unit.

At the hearing on January 16, 1954, counsel for Petitioner manifested in open Court that out of the 65 signatories to the petition, 3 are inspectors and inasmuch as the inspectors are supervisors he moved that they be stricken out of the petition, thereby leaving a total of 62 signatories to the petition.

x x x x x x x x x

The evidence show that a total of 583 are employed in the Saulog Transit, Inc. Out of said number, the Court holds that the following should be excluded as they come within the disqualifying category of “supervisors”, namely, one (1) assistant General Manager; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarytwo (2) guards; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryone (1) shift foreman; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand one (1) accountant. With regards to the 28 inspectors, which counsel for Petitioners contends to be supervisors without presenting evidence on the matter, the Court is of the opinion that inspectors in transportation business by the nature of their work do not fall within the category of supervisors under Section 2 (k) of Republic Act No. 875.

On the basis of those retractions, intervenor maintains that the Petitioner can only lay claim to forty-two (42) on their side and, therefore, this number no longer constitute ten (10%) per cent of all the employees in the company minus the supervisory personnel. On the subject of these retractions during the hearings of this case by the signatories to the petition, the Court cannot help but entertain doubts that it was their free and untrammeled will without pressure from without (within). It is to be noted that during one of the hearings of this case, counsel for intervenor presented a letter (Exhibit “A”) dated December 23, 1953, purportedly signed by 53 signatories to the petition addressed to Marciano Casalla, president of the Saulog Employees Union (PFL) and one of the Petitioners in this case, wherein it was stated that what they signed before Marciano Casalla was not what they really signed for. During the next hearing on January 19, 1954, counsel for Petitioners presented a document (Exhibit “B”) dated January 9, 1954, addressed to the Court and purportedly signed by 21 out of the 53 signatories of the letter marked as Exhibit “A”, wherein it was stated that when the company knew of their signatures to the petition for certification election, they were told to sign the letter (Exhibit “A”) or else they will lose their jobs.

Marciano Casalla testified at the hearings on January 19, 1954, when confronted with the aforementioned documents, that the signatories of Exhibit “A” told him that they were forced to sign said letter. Asked by counsel for intervenor how the signatories were forced to sign, he testified that some of the signatories told him that they did not like to sign; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat some told him they have to be rendered drunk first before they could sign; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that some could not ask for “vale” in the company unless they signed. (Recross examination of Marciano Cassalla, t.s.n., p. 27, hearing of January 19, 1954.).

Again at the hearing on February 4, 1954, 16 signatories to the petition for certification election present signified in open court their desire for a certification election. Counsel for intervenor in an effort to refute what they have previously testified regarding their desire for a certification election presented affidavit previously signed by some of them. Feliciano Ignacio when shown the affidavit (Exhibit “D-1”) he previously signed stated that he signed said affidavit in his desire to work; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP. de Luna testified that he signed the affidavit (Exhibit “3”) believing that it was for the return of the fund deposits and there was nothing mentioned about certification election; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryGallardo testified that he signed the affidavit (Exhibits “D-3” and “D-4”) in his desire to be employed; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryA. Alde testified that he signed the affidavit because he wanted to be assigned to a trip; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryN. Alcantara testified that he signed the affidavit because he was afraid to be rejected in his work.

From the demeanor of the witnesses in the witness stand and the testimonies of the above-mentioned witnesses, the Court believes that those retractions could not destroy the desire of all signatories constituting, at least, ten (10%) per cent of the employees in the appropriate unit desiring a certification election. The manner in which the retractions were obtained more than convinces the Court of the need for a certification election so that the doubt as to the true bargaining representative will be finally resolved. Republic Act No. 875 states the remedy - a certification election. Besides, it should be noted that section 12 of Republic Act

No. 875 speaks of the ten (10%) per cent at the time of the filing of the petition. Retractions and withdrawals, therefore, after the petition is filed cannot affect the number of the Petitioners at the time the petition is filed.

Intervenor also offered in evidence a collective bargaining agreement it had with the Saulog Transit, Inc., marked as Exhibit “10” and contends that it is a bar to the petition for certification election. A careful scrutiny of such contract reveals that it does not touch in substantial terms the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment of all the employees in the company but seeks to establish merely a grievance procedure for drivers, conductors and inspectors who are members of the Buklod ñg Saulog.

x x x x x x x x x

From the evidence on record, it appears that a supplementary contract (Exhibit “10-1”) providing for increase in pay, fixing of guarantee deposits nor conductors and drivers, granting of loans to immediate members of the family of the union employees in case of death, and granting daily bonus to drivers and conductors who have reached their daily quota of collection, have been executed between the Saulog Transit, Inc., and the Buklod Ñg Saulog Transit cralaw

In its brief the Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Industrial Relations erred in holding that it did not lose jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the fact that the Respondents (Petitionersin the court below) were reduced to less than 10 per cent of the appropriate unit; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) the Court of Industrial Relations erred in its interpretation of section 13, Republic Act No. 875, relative to the kind of collective bargaining agreement which would constitute a bar to a certification election, and in declaring that Exhibit 10 (whether by itself or as supplemented by Exhibit 10-1) did not constitute a sufficient bar to a certification election. In support of its petition filed in the Court of Industrial Relations the Petitioner Buklod ñg Saulog Transit raised the following questions:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Does the collective bargaining agreement between the Buklod and the Saulog Transit, Inc. (consisting of Exhibits 10 [and] 10-1) conform as to contents to the bargaining contract contemplated in Section 13 of Republic Act 875? If so, is it a bar to certification election? (Exhibits 10 and 10-1 are Annexes D and E, respectively.)

2. What is the effect of the holding of certification election on the collective bargaining agreement previously entered into by the parties mentioned in Question 1?

The first error the Petitioner claims the Court of Industrial Relations committed is not well taken, not only because of the rule laid down in cases decided under section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 559, consistently followed and maintained in this jurisdiction, 1 to the effect that the Court of Industrial Relations acquires jurisdiction of an industrial dispute upon the filing of a petition by 31 employees or laborers bringing such dispute to the Court for determination, and that a diminution in number by retraction or withdrawal of any of them does not divest it of its jurisdiction already acquired, but also because as found by the Court of Industrial Relations, the retraction by some members who originally had signed the petition was not of their own free will. The petition filed by 65 laborers or employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc., was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Industrial Relations, for their number was more than 10 percent of the laborers and employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc. 2

It is argued that under and pursuant to section 13, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 875, which provides that —

In the absence of an agreement or other voluntary arrangement providing for a more expeditious manner of collective bargaining, it shall be the duty of an employer and the

representative of his employees to bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Such duty to bargain collectively means the performance of the mutual obligation to meet and confer promptly and expeditiously and in good faith, for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours, and/or other terms and conditions of employment, and of executing a written contract incorporating such agreement if requested by either party, or for the purpose of adjusting any grievances or question arising under such agreement, but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make concession.

there was no need or reason for ordering a certification election, because on 15 July 1953 thePetitioner Buklod ñg Saulog Transit and the Saulog Transit, Inc. had already entered into a collective bargaining agreement, as shown by Exhibit 10.

The provisions of section 13, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 875, contemplate a situation not only where there had been no agreement entered into by and between employees or laborers and employer or management as to terms and conditions of employment, but also where there had been an agreement that leaves out many or some matters on which the parties should have stipulated, if the collective bargaining agreement is to achieve its purpose and aim — industrial peace. 1

The trial court found that the collective bargaining agreement entered into by and between the Saulog Transit, Inc. and the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit on 15 July 1953 (Exhibit 10; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex D) “does not touch in substantial terms the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment of all the employees in the company but seeks to establish merely a grievance procedure for drivers, conductors and inspectors who are members of the Buklod ñg Saulog.” And even in the supplementary agreement (Exhibit 10-1; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex E), there is no clear-cut stipulation as to “rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions or employment.” 2 In their reply the Respondents claim that such an agreement (Exhibit 10; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex D) and the supplementary agreement (Exhibit 11; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex E) have not been identified and offered in evidence and should not be taken into consideration. The trial court took, however, into consideration both agreements and found that the first agreement being incomplete does not bar a certification election; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand as to the supplementary agreement the Court held that it having been entered into after the filing of the petition for a certification election the same cannot and does not bar a certification election. The affidavit filed by the President of the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit (Annex F) is not mentioned in the order and resolution appealed from. It is clearly an effort on the part of the Petitioner to supply what was lacking in the two agreements already mentioned. The contention that as section 13, Republic Act No. 875, does not require that the agreement be in writing unless either party request that it be reduced to writing, thereby insinuating that there had been a verbal understanding before the written agreement was entered into, has no bearing and effect in a case where there is a written agreement which the Court of Industrial Relations found incomplete. In these circumstances we are of the opinion that the collective bargaining agreement entered into on 15 July 1953 is no bar to a certification election at the instance of at least 10 per cent of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit, pursuant to section 12, paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), Republic Act No. 875.

The second question raised by the Petitioner in support of its petition filed in the court below need not be passed upon. It has not arisen. Any pronouncement thereon would be obiter and not binding.

The order and resolution appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the Petitioner.