Government Information Quarterly 29 (2012) S32–S42

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Organizational structure and ICT strategies in the Brazilian Judiciary System

André Andrade a,⁎, Luiz Antonio Joia a,b,1

a Getulio Vargas Foundation, Praia de Botafogo 190, room 526 Rio de Janeiro, RJ, 22250-900, Brazilb Rio de Janeiro State University, Rua Carvalho Azevedo 40/501, Lagoa Rio de Janeiro, RJ, 22471-220, Brazil

⁎ Corresponding author. Fax: +55 21 2551 5945.E-mail addresses: andre.andrade@fgv.br (A. Andrade

1 Fax: +55 21 2551 5945.

0740-624X/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Inc. Aldoi:10.1016/j.giq.2011.08.003

a b s t r a c t

a r t i c l e i n f o

Available online 16 September 2011

Keywords:Information and communication technologyE-governmentOrganizational structureStrategyJusticeJudiciary systemBrazil

In this case study, we analyze the influence of the organizational structure in the definition andimplementation of information and communication technology (ICT) strategies in the Brazilian JudiciarySystem. The analysis shows that the existing organizational structure favors uncoordinated actions, thoughthe role of the National Council of Justice (NCJ) as protagonist in the process of coordinating the strategicplanning of the Brazilian Judiciary System (and strategic ICT planning) might change this reality, allowing theBrazilian Judiciary System to reap the full benefits of ICT.

), luiz.joia@fgv.br (L.A. Joia).

l rights reserved.

© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The automation of the Brazilian Judiciary System is a process thathas spannedmore than three decades. However, its trajectory is as yetinaccurately recorded, as it is based mostly on statistics of computerspurchased as being the history of the modernization of all judiciaryunits (Andrade, Mallet, & Fleury, 2008). These distorted statistics donot include an analysis of the strategy of implementation ofinformation and communication technology (ICT). Moreover, manyof the implementation efforts were made without any long termplanning or a clear definition of project scope.

Federal laws 11.280/06 and 11.419/06 contributed to changingthis scenario by establishing the electronic lawsuit as a viable way ofmodernizing the Brazilian Judiciary System. The specific use of ICT canbroaden the provision of e-government services to the citizens by theBrazilian Judiciary System. Meanwhile, the growth of internet usageby the Brazilian population indicates that “the public policiesdeveloped to include Brazilian citizens in the information societyare on the right track” (Santos, 2008, p. 35).

The definition and implementation of ICT strategies in theBrazilian Judiciary System becomes more important as ICT has severalimportant roles to play concomitantly. It needs to be a useful tool tohelp modernize the Brazilian Judiciary System (automation), a newaccess point to government services (e-government), and anopportunity to promote digital inclusion.

The creation of the National Council of Justice (NCJ) represents aturning point in the automation process of the Brazilian JudiciarySystem. It provides the research question for this paper, namely how

the organizational structure has influenced the definition andimplementation of ICT strategies in the Brazilian Judiciary System.

Regarding the structure of this paper,firstly there is a bibliographicalreview section for defining the theoretical background from which thisresearch is based. This includes a discussion about e-governmentmaturitymodels and the presentation of thematuritymodel selected asthe theoretical framework for this study. Secondly, the background forthe analysis of the case study is presented, including the organizationalstructure of the Brazilian Judiciary System and internet and e-government usage in Brazil. Thirdly, there is a methodology section, inwhich themethod used by the researchers is set forth. The case study isthen presented encompassing two sections, namely automation phasesand automation initiatives in the Brazilian Judiciary System. An analysisof the case was then performed in order to reveal the critical points andrelate them to the theoretical background. Finally, besides the researchlimitations identified by the authors, some conclusions are drawn andrecommendations made by the researchers to practitioners, academics,public administrators, and policy-makers in order to enable them tocomprehend more clearly the dynamics and peculiarities of ICTstrategies and e-government implementation.

2. Bibliographical review

The experiences of e-government are usually based on theimplementation of advanced applications of ICT in the highly complexcontext of public organizations. The need to provide prescriptiveindications generatedmodels for comparative analysis of experiences,based on parameters of maturation or development (Accenture, 2002;Delloite Research, 2000; Heeks, 2001; PWC, 2002; UN-ASPA, 2002).The enhancement of these models depends on the incorporation oforganizational factors and dimensions, and especially a strategic

S33A. Andrade, L.A. Joia / Government Information Quarterly 29 (2012) S32–S42

perspective, considering that it involves longitudinal experiences ofprolonged maturation (Davison, Wagner, & Ma, 2005).

The application of ICT can work towards a change in processes andthe transformation of the organization, provided that it is geared tomeet the perceived needs for the achievement of institutional goalsand objectives (Davenport, 1994; Hammer & Champy, 1993). Asimilar approach is found in the literature on the public sector, as theintegration of ICT systems and infrastructure on the managementprocess is essential for effective results and reflects the strategic visionof the organization (Kraemer & Dedrick, 1997). However, theidentification of the needs of the organization is far from occurringin a straightforward manner, as the politics within the organizationand the interests and intentions of the participants affect thedissemination of innovations in ICT (Markus & Robey, 1988).

Clearly the success of e-government can only be achieved if statereform is undertaken concurrently (Fountain, 2001), since the twomustcomplement each other. In this respect, Homburg (2004) identified astrong linkage between e-government and new public management(NPM). However, as the author points out, this is not always a perfectmarriage and they may not walk hand in hand. One important point inNPM is the lean and decentralized organizational structure for publicadministration. However, this decentralized format may not favor theimplementation of new technologies that have a high organizationalimpact, as classic works have already pointed out (see, for instance,Argyres, 1995; Markus, Tanis, & Fenema, 2000).

Maturity models provide a systematic framework for carrying outbenchmarking and process improvement. Regarding e-government,there are numerous competing maturity models, each with a differentapproach. Some authors, such as Maumbe, Owei, and Alex (2008),Shahkooh, Saghafi, and Abdollahi (2008) and Valdés et al. (2011),present these models and their applications. Given their widespreadacceptance and use in the e-government realm, some models areworthy of mention. The Delloite Research (2000) model establishessix stages from publication to integration. The UN and ASPA (2002)model features five progressive stages: emerging; enhanced; interac-tive; transactional; and networked. The Layne and Lee (2001) modelidentifies four stages of growth focused on functionality and technicalcapability. The Riley (2001) model traces the path of e-governmenttowards comprehensive participation. The Davison et al. (2005)model uses five stages that range from rhetoric to integration,whereas the Andersen and Henriksen (2006) model extends theLayne and Lee model by incorporating a customer-centric approach.The Gottschalk (2009) model focuses on interoperability, while theKlievink and Janssen (2009) model introduces the notion of dynamiccapability theory. Finally, Lee (2010) presents a qualitative meta-synthesis of 11 maturity models, many of them mentioned above.

Government Sector

ExternalGovernment

StrategyGovern

Transformation ofGovernment

InternalInfrastructure of

Government, Processesand Culture

e-Gover

StrategInterlinkin

P

Fig. 1. e-Government mAdapted from Davison e

The theoretical reference base of this research applies a model ofstrategic alignment adapted to the organizational context and thecharacteristics of electronic government in the Brazilian JudiciarySystem. This integrated model developed by Davison et al. (2005)assesses e-government maturity in blending elements of traditionalmodels of maturity with the approach of strategic alignment in ICT asdeveloped by Henderson and Venkatraman (1993). The latter repre-sents an application in the ICT field of the theory of adjustment betweenthe organization's strategy and its internal structure — the classicreference of which is the work of Chandler (1962). Thus, besides theadjustment between the organization's strategy and its internalstructure, adjustment between the ICT strategy and the organizationalICT structure and management is also required. The imperative of thisdouble adjustment presupposes the organization's ability to coordinateand build support internally for sustaining a coherent orientation byaligning the ICT area with the overall strategy. Fig. 1 presents themodelof Davison et al. (2005), developed from the original approach ofstrategic ICT alignment (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1993) applied tothe public sector.

The aforementioned model assumes four critical areas for thealignment and sustainment of strategic coherence: (i) governmentstrategy; (ii) infrastructure, processes and organizational culture ofgovernment; (iii) e-government strategy; and (iv) infrastructure ande-government processes. The strategic fit is the core variable thatindicates the alignment between the (overall and e-government)strategies and the organizational (infrastructure, processes andorganizational culture) components.

Applying this approach to alternative trajectories of e-governmentdevelopment is the advance afforded by the integrated model. Thismodel analytically incorporates various combinations between thedevelopment of electronic government services – the subject ofseveral maturity models – and the construction and implementationof a strategy within the complex government context. The modelstipulates five stages of electronic government maturity, withdifferent configurations and alternative trajectories. Fig. 2 shows thepossible sequences of trajectories between the aforesaid stages and,for each of them, it presents (in the boxes) the matrix of alignmentbetween general strategy, e-government strategy, governmentinfrastructure and e-government infrastructure. Each domain isrepresented by the darkened box within the matrix. Furthermore,only corner squares represent valid states corresponding to govern-ment strategy, e-government strategy, e-government infrastructureand government infrastructure. Horizontal and vertical paths inaccordance with each situation below are the desired trajectories,while diagonal paths represent less desirable trajectories that creategaps and misalignments.

e-Government Sector

ment Servicese-Government

Strategy

Transformation ofe-Government

nment Services

Infrastructure ofe-Government and

Processes.

ic Alignment ,g & Automationrocesses

aturity model.t al.(2005, p. 287).

3b. Gap 3a. StrategicPlan

1. “Rhetoric”

2b. e-GovVision

2c. Focuson Systems

2a. StrategicVision

3a. StrategicPlan

3c. Automation 3b. Gap

4. Integration

5. Transformation

Alignment

Poor Alignment

Desirable Trajectory

Less Desirable Trajectory

Fig. 2. Sequences of trajectories in the e-government maturity model.Adapted from Davison et al.(2005, p. 288).

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In general terms, the model seeks to reflect the complexity anddisparities that may occur between structure and strategy, consideringthat the organization responsible for conducting e-government can beorganized and conducted with a degree of autonomy in relation togovernmentas awhole. The stages ofmaturity are linked togetherunderdifferent possible sequences, leading to specific configurations ofalignment between strategy and structure. Stage 1 represents themanifestation of the outline of the intent of an e-government policywithout a strategy or plan being configured in this sense. It is defined asthe “rhetoric stage,”witnessed by themere presence of awebsite on theinternet.

Stage 2 is structured around the alternatives of initial engagement ine-government either by formulating a strategic vision of government(2a), building a strategic vision of electronic government (2b), or by theimmediate development of electronic government systems or projects(2c). While the first two alternatives reflect a more conventional pathstructured around a formal-rational sequence, the latter reflects thechoice for implementation without a previously outlined strategy.

Stage 3 permits very different configurations determined by thepreceding trajectory, on a case-by-case basis. The trajectories thatwere initiated by the construction of the strategic vision ofgovernment (2a) can advance sequentially towards the achievementof a strategic plan of government, with its simultaneous deploymentin the area of electronic government (3a), or follow a less desirable –

albeit more plausible – path of immediate implementation ofe-government services (3b). In this case, the achievement of progresswill be negatively affected by the emergence of a gap between thestrategy of government and the attempt to develop e-governmentsystems and applications that are not adequately compatible withthis strategy.

The trajectories initiatedwith the design of a specific strategic visionof electronic government (2b)may, in turn, bemovingeither toward theinclusionof this vision in a strategic viewof government as awhole (3a),yet to be defined, or toward the implementation of e-governmentservices (3c). Both directionsmay be considered desirable, because theyallow for adjustments — in the first case between strategies, and in thesecond between strategy and structure.

The trajectories that dispense with a strategic vision, wherebyelectronic government is launched via initiatives of introduction of ICTsystems and innovations (2c), can progress to the construction of ane-government strategy (3c), albeit led by the technological area. Thisis a desirable trajectory, as opposed to the unfavorable alternative ofmisalignment with the planning of government as a whole (3b).Hence, the gaps generated in this stage may originate either from astrategic vision that does not incorporate the treatment of e-government, and therefore a specific vision and planning for ICT,consistent with its requirements and potential (trajectory 2a–3b), orfrom the deployment of systems and services without the support ofan e-government strategy (trajectory 2c–3b).

Stage 4 represents a confluence in which full alignment betweengovernment and e-government strategies and the structures andsystems of electronic government is achieved (4). It enables theintegration between services and a strong collaboration betweenagencies, although without resulting in changes in structures andprocesses in the back office. Stage 5 marks the end of the transition toe-government, with the transformation of structures and integratingorganizational redesign, fully exploiting the potential of ICT (5).

As will be shown in this research, misalignments in the trajectorydo not prevent any governmental body from progressing towards thenext stage. However, this progress is made at a far slower pace andwithout reaping the full benefits of the stage. Although e-governmentcan be implemented despite existing gaps, the resultingmisalignmenthampers the integration of this initiative with other importantelements of public management, such as strategic planning orgovernment infrastructure. Gaps can be filled or tolerated accordingto the needs of the organizations, the gap complexity, and its impactson strategy or operations.

3. Background

3.1. Organizational structure of the Brazilian Judiciary System

The Brazilian Judiciary System consists of a complex combinationof nature of lawsuit, physical location and level of jurisdiction. The

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jurisdiction for deciding a certain issue is based on a combination ofthe right in dispute (nature of lawsuit), location of the dispute(physical location) and level of jurisdiction of the judge (level ofjurisdiction). Although the explanation may be simple, the plethora ofpossible combinations offers a complexity of options that goes beyondthe number of autonomous administrative units of the BrazilianJudiciary System. The responsibility for judging a certain dispute caneven migrate from one branch to another as the dispute evolves tohigher levels of appeal.

As Brazil is a federative republic, the basis of the Brazilian JudiciarySystem lies at state level. The macro-organizational structure of theBrazilian Judiciary System is established in Title IV, Chapter III, Section I,Article 92 of the Brazilian Constitution: “Article 92. The organs of theJudiciary Power are as follows: I — the Federal Supreme Court; II — theNational Council of Justice; III — the Superior Court of Justice; IV — theCourts of Appeals and Labor Assizes; V — the Courts of Appeals andElectoral Assizes; VI— theCourts ofAppeals andMilitaryAssizes;VII— theCourtsofAppeals andState, FederalDistrict andTerritorialAssizes” (Fig. 3)(Brasil, 2010). Due to this division, Brazil has more than 100 autonomousadministrative judiciary units (Andrade, 2008).

Besides thefiveSupremeCourts, the Federal Judiciary SystemhasfiveRegional Federal Courts of Appeals responsible for all 27 states of theBrazilian Federative Republic. These Regional Federal Courts of Appealsare divided into 27 Federal Judiciary Sections with administrativeautonomy; one for each state. The Labor Justice System has 24 RegionalLabor Courts of Appeals with administrative autonomy, with more thanone in one state (São Paulo) and four that are responsible for two states.The Electoral Justice System has 27 Regional Electoral Courts of Appeals— a one for each state, each one with administrative autonomy. Thepresident of theElectoral Court of Appeals is elected among the appellatejudges of the corresponding State Court of Appeals. However, this doesnot affect the administrative autonomy, as budget and personnel areseparate for each Court of Appeals.

The most complicated part of the organizational structure of theBrazilian Judiciary System is the Military Court System. The FederalMilitary Court System is qualified to judgemilitary personnel from thearmed corps (army, navy and air force). The State Military CourtSystem is qualified to judge military personnel from the state militarypolice and the state military fire department. There is a State MilitaryCourt of Appeals in just three states (Minas Gerais, São Paulo and RioGrande do Sul). Appellate cases are judged by local State Courts ofAppeals where there is no such instance.

SupremCou

SupremeElectoral Court

(1)

Supreme LaborCourt (1)

RegionFederal Cof Appea

RegionalElectoral Courtsof Appeal (27)

Regional LaborCourts of

Appeal (24)

FederJudicia

Sections

In case there is noRegional MilitaryCourt of Appeal

Fig. 3. Organizational structure of the Brazilian Judiciary System. (*)

As the existing territories became states, the structure of the state-level Brazilian Judiciary System became consolidated. There are 27State Courts of Appeals, one for each state and one for the FederalDistrict. Although one may argue whether or not Brazil is truly afederative republic, as the bulk of tax revenues is concentrated in theFederal Government and legislation is created mostly in the FederalChamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic (laws that takeprecedence over local state laws), it is clear that the Judiciary Systemis state-based, as the core competence (unless otherwise establishedin the law) is provided by the State Courts (Brasil, 2010).

Recently, rapid growth of the Federal Judiciary System has beenobserved. This is a twofold phenomenon: the number of lawsuitsagainst the Federal Government is increasing and new laws aretransferring competence over matters that were previously assignedto the State Courts to the Federal Courts. However, as this is a recentphenomenon, it does not alter the fact that most of the service ofjustice to citizens in Brazil is provided by the State Courts (ConselhoNacional de Justiça, 2009).

Analysis of the organizational structure of the Brazilian Judiciaryreveals a marked lack of central coordination. The various autono-mous units are redundant in all their administrative activities(including ICT planning and implementation). This is also true ofindividual goals, and specialization by competencies (includinggeographical area). The expected result of this sort of organizationalstructure is decentralized planning and decision-making, as well asduplication of efforts. This has changed a little with the deployment ofthe National Council of Justice (NCJ) by Constitutional AmendmentNo. 45, in 2004.

With 26 states and a federal district, each with its own structurefor almost all of the 5 different levels of jurisdiction, coordination is nosimple task. In this fragmented environment, information systemswere developed in an uncoordinated manner, according to the localinternal needs of the organizations (Andrade et al., 2008). Rarely werethe different interested stakeholders in the Judiciary administrationheard (Andrade, 2009). This resulted in several concurrent and non-interchangeable systems for lawsuit automation, with low knowledgesharing and high costs (Andrade & Joia, 2009).

3.2. Use of internet and e-government services in Brazil

Internet technology has enabled government agencies to adapt anew paradigm. However, this step is not achieved simply by offering

e Federalrt (1)

Supreme Courtof Justice (1)

SupremeMilitary Courtof Appeal (1)

State Courts ofAppeal (27)

alourtsl (5)

Circumscriptions of

Military Justice(12)

State MilitaryCourts ofAppeal (3)

alry

(27)

National Council ofJustice (1)

Between brackets, the number of judiciary units in each branch.

S36 A. Andrade, L.A. Joia / Government Information Quarterly 29 (2012) S32–S42

new services to citizens via the web, in what are now called G2C(Government-to-Citizen) initiatives. In Brazil, most e-governmentprojects have addressed the provision of new digital services (G2C)for the citizen as well as the purchasing of goods and services fromenterprises, mainly through web-based reverse auctions (Joia &Zamot, 2002), in what is now called Government-to-Business (G2B).Unfortunately, in Brazil, very few projects strive to link publicagencies so as to manage their knowledge and allow them to putnew workflows into effect (Joia, 2007).

In the Brazilian case, the lack of skills to access the internet (53%) isthe major barrier to be overcome (Barbosa, 2010). Besides, for a largepart of the population (36%), there are no clear benefits derived fromaccessing the internet (Barbosa, 2010). Despite these problems, digitalinclusion is growing at a brisk pace (Wagner, 2009). From2008 to 2009,the percentage of the Brazilian population who accessed the internet atleast once rose from43% (Barbosa, 2009) to 45% (Barbosa, 2010) and thesame variation was observed between 2007 and 2008 (Balboni, 2008).The frequency of internet access has also increased: 58% access it dailyand 30% at least once aweek (Barbosa, 2010). From the aforementionedstatistics, it is possible to infer that users have migrated from lessintensive (once a week) to more intensive access (daily).

The use of e-government services experienced the samegrowth as thepercentage of individuals who accessed the internet, namely from 25% in2007 (Balboni, 2008) and 2008 (Barbosa, 2009) to 27% in 2009 (Barbosa,2010). Only 13% of the individuals who accessed e-government servicesused the internet to monitor the progress of lawsuits in the courts(Barbosa, 2010), a decrease from the previous year when usage was 16%(Barbosa, 2009).

These data show that the use of e-government services related tothe Brazilian Judiciary System is not benefiting directly from thegrowth of the internet and e-government service usage by theBrazilian population. The decrease in relative use of internet servicesof the Brazilian Judiciary System among the Brazilian population canbe explained by the fact that highly educated people and the upperclasses are among the first to adopt the technology and only 46.4% ofthe Brazilian population has ever filed a lawsuit (FGV, 2010).According to this research there is a clear relation between usingJudiciary services and education, income and residence. As the lowerincome population starts to use the internet, they are less interestedin the Judiciary System's e-government services, as they are notparties in lawsuits.

The number of individuals who did not use e-government services,but who accessed the internet and declared willingness to consult theprogress of lawsuits in the courts, decreased from 30% in 2008 (Barbosa,2009) to27% in 2009. This reinforces the above analysis, proving that theuse of the internet to follow up lawsuit status is reaching saturationpoint at approximately 3 to 4% of the total population (3.22 in 2008 and3.28 in 2009). Furthermore, the potential number of citizenswhomightmonitor the progress of lawsuits over the internet increased from 9% ofthe population in 2008 to almost 15% in 2009.

On the other hand, 56% of internet users who did not usee-government services preferred to make personal contact, 15% haddata security concerns, 13% said that the services were hard to find,9% declared that the services needed were not available online, and8% thought that it was too complicated (Barbosa, 2010). Given theexistence of multiple answers, less than 30% can be reached byproviding more easier-to-find and easier-to-use services, and morethan 70% of internet users who do not use e-government serviceshave behavioral and trust barriers.

4. Methodology

The research problem was to establish how the organizationalstructure influenced the definition and implementation of informa-tion and communication technology (ICT) strategies in the BrazilianJudiciary System. Given the research problem, the single case study

methodology as described by Yin (2004) was chosen for conductingqualitative research, in order to explore and describe a phenomenonin its own context.

The implementation of ICT strategies in the Brazilian JudiciarySystem is the single case study and the Brazilian Judiciary System isthe unit of analysis according to Stake's (1988) definition. Whenreferring to multiple information systems within the BrazilianJudiciary System, these information systems are not individuallyconsidered, but are seen as part of a complex organization. In the sameway, the different administrative units are seen as part of the wholeorganization rather than being considered individually, althoughsome observations on specific units are presented. This is a limitationof the case study, as specificities in the judiciary units, as well as otherfactors, may have influenced local automation processes.

Case studies are particularly suitable for answering “how” and“why” questions, and are ideal for generating and building theory inan area where little data or theory exists (Yin, 2004). It also enablesresearchers to use “controlled opportunism” to respond flexibly tonew discoveries made while collecting new data (Eisenhardt, 1989).

An explanatory approach was adopted in this case study. Explana-tory case studies are useful for assessing how and why a form ofintervention is working. Thus, as an explanatory case study, this worktries to answer how the organizational structure of the BrazilianJudiciary System has influenced its ICT strategy. The methodologyverifies whether problems and modifications are needed, and attemptsto explain the causal effects revealed (Morra & Friedlander, 1999). Inthis case study, the causal effects of theNational Council of Justice on theBrazilian Judiciary System ICT strategy are investigated. An analysis ofthe case was conducted comparing the outcomes accrued from theaforementioned case study with the e-gov maturity model presentedabove. This was done by taking into account the peculiarities of theenvironment associated with the system's implementation, accordingto the principle of contextualization for interpreting field data, assuggested by Klein and Myers (1999).

Yin's tactics (construct validity, internal validity, external validityand reliability) were carefully considered in this research. Inparticular, construct validity was dealt with in the study throughthe use of multiple sources of evidence, the elaboration of a sequenceof evidence and having the members of the group review the draftcase study reports. Official documents of the Brazilian Governmentand several administrative units of the Brazilian Judiciary System,from a period that covers 1990 to 2010, were reviewed. All thesedocuments are publicly available and no secret or restricted documentwas considered even when available to the researchers. Interviewswere conducted with government officials from 2008 to 2010 andtheir anonymity was assured by the researchers. No individualopinion is portrayed in this research. The sample of governmentofficials interviewed includes presidents of state courts, appeal courtjudges, judges and civil servants. Among civil servants, both ICTprofessionals – ICT managers and programmers – and software userswere interviewed. Besides qualitative data, several quantitativesources were also used in this research. The most important sourceis the Survey on the Usage of Information and CommunicationTechnologies in Brazil: ICT Households and ICT Enterprises (Balboni,2008; Barbosa, 2009, 2010). In addition to this, one of the authors tookpart in the reform, automation, strategic planning andmanagement ofthe Judiciary, playing different roles at different moments in time,which made him a participant observer of the process described.

Internal validity was also taken into account mainly by asking expertsto review key findings. The two timelines (Figs. 4 and 5) presented belowin the paperwere validated by using a panel of experts that belongs to theBrazilian Institute of Informatics Policy and Law— a reputable institutionthat brings together several experts on electronic lawsuits.

External validity was verified by using replication logic and trying toinfer behavior patterns in similar environments, so as not to introducebiases.

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Pre-automation

Automation

Virtualization

Fig. 4. Automation phases of the Brazilian Judiciary System.

Table 1Lawsuit automation systems in state courts.

Type Internally developed Developed by third party Off-the-shelf solution

Quantity 14 6 7

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Finally, the reliability of the results was ratified using a case studyprotocol and developing a case study database, in order to make itpossible for other researchers to reach the same outcomes andconclusions as those presented at the end of this paper. The case studydatabase includes copies of reviewed documents and detailed dataabout the systems consolidated in Table 1 presented below.

5. Automation phases of the Brazilian Judiciary System

Procedural Law is at federal level in Brazil, but states have autonomyto control the operation of local State Courts of Appeals. Besides this,each of the State Courts has its own internal organization and internalprocedures. As Procedural Law is the same throughout the country, theway each State Court works depends on its internal organization andinternal procedures, regulated in a decentralized way.

The internal organization concept of an autonomous judiciary unit(such as a State Court of Appeals) includes both its administrativeunits and its courts. The administrative units are responsible forproviding internal (back-office) services to the courts, allowing themto deliver justice to the citizens. Most courts are specialized accordingto matter, territory and instance, reproducing, at the micro level, thesort of partition found at the macro level. Each court has relative andlimited autonomy, mostly related to internal organization, division oflabor and the judge's decision powers. Although judge's decisions aremarked by independence, the courts that belong to a State Court ofAppeals are dependent on the services provided by its administrativeunits. In some cases, procedures of an administrative unit can evenrestrict the actions of the judges by denying access to a judge's rulingunder certain conditions or denying certain (material or personnel)resources required by the judge in order to act. Because of this, it iscommon knowledge that the quality of judiciary services is highlydependent on the administrative structure of the court and the qualityof the services it provides.

The administrative structures of the state courts are very muchalike and include a combination of political and technical power. Themost important role in a state court is played by its president, who iselected from among the three oldest appeal court judges. The othertwo become vice-president and comptroller of the state court,respectively. In many states this election is a mere formality and theoldest appeal court judge is always elected. Presidents serve a two-year term with no possibility of re-election and many of them simplyretire after their mandate. These presidents are life-commissionedjudges with no prior experience in managing large organizations (astate court ranges in size between 1000 and 50,000 public servants),because as judges they are not allowed to hold positions in the privatesector and do not hold administrative jobs inside the institution

Fig. 5. Coordinated automation initiatives for the Brazilian Judiciary System.

before being elected to office. The presidents may appoint officers forthe managerial positions in the court and, in most cases, can freelychoose between appointing a public servant from the same court, apublic servant from another government branch or someone whodoes not hold public office.

Among the administrative units, ICT units are said to be the onesthat have a major influence on judiciary services. This influence isdirectly related to the degree of automation adopted by the court.

According to Tapscott's(1997) model, it is possible to divide thehistory of the automation of the Brazilian Judiciary System into threedistinct phases: pre-automation; automation; and virtualization (or fulllawsuit automation). Consequently, a timeline was created to portraythese different phases (Fig. 4). It is important to note that, although thevirtualization phase has already started, some pre-automation initia-tives are still in progress. This is not a result of the autonomy of thejudicial units, but of the judges' autonomy tomanage their courts as theythink fit, including the possibility of creating their own informationsystems, sometimes working in parallel with the ‘official’ systems. Themost frequent example is the development of spreadsheets and simpledatabases, frequently referred to as ‘systems.’

5.1. Pre-automation

The first phase of automation of the Brazilian Judiciary Systemlacked coordination, even within a single autonomous administrativejudiciary unit. It is marked by individual initiatives (both from judgesand civil servants), with the use of private computers and simplesoftware or adaptation of the use of available software developed bythemselves or third parties. Word processors to type court hearingsand decisions and spreadsheets to register and control the accompa-niment of lawsuits are typical tools of this phase. Moreover, the goalsare individual, as these tools are developed and used only to reduce orrationalize the user's work.

5.2. Automation

The second phase of the automation of the Brazilian Judiciary Systemrequired a certain degree of coordination within each autonomousadministrative judiciary unit. This was necessary in order to enable thedefinition and implementation of software to control the basic routines ofthe court: distribution of initial briefs, fulfillment of court orders,accompaniment of lawsuits, publication routines, scheduling of hearings,among others, that undoubtedly benefit from computerization. The goalattains institutional status when it becomes possible to follow andmonitor every lawsuit in a given autonomous administrative judiciaryunit.

The second phase was not marked by rationalization. Until recently,São Paulo State Courts hadmultiple systems for lawsuit automation, withno communicationwhatsoever among them (Andrade et al., 2008). MatoGrossodoSul StateCourthadseveral versionsof thesamesystem,withoutfull communication among the different versions (Andrade et al., 2008).As Brazilian State Courts still struggle to attain the full potential ofautomation, the current situation reflects a lack of coordination of thestrategic ICT initiatives even within a single autonomous judiciary unit(Andrade et al., 2008). Of the 26 states and the Federal District, 14 havedeveloped their own system for lawsuit automation: Amapá (Tucujuris);Bahia (Saipro) (Bahia); Ceará (SPROC); Distrito Federal (SISTJ);EspíritoSanto (Ejud); Goiás (SPG); Maranhão (Themis); Minas Gerais (Siscon);Mato Grosso (Pólo); Paraná (name not found); Piauí (Themis); Rio de

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Janeiro (Comarca); Rondônia (SAP); and Sergipe (SCP) (Andrade et al.,2008). Two states adopted Siscon, developed byMinas Gerais State Court:Roraima and Paraíba (Andrade et al., 2008). Seven states adopted an off-the-shelf system available for lawsuit automation – SAJ – developed bySoftplan: Acre; Alagoas; Amazonas; Mato Grosso do Sul; Rio Grande doNorte; Santa Catarina; and São Paulo (Andrade et al., 2008). Two statesadopted systems developed by third parties (Rio Grande do Norte andPará), both with the same name (SAJ), but not developed either bySoftplan or by the same developer in either case. Pernambuco (Judwin)and Tocantins (SPROC) also adopted systems developed by third parties(Andrade et al., 2008).

Analysis of the second phase of the automation of the BrazilianJudiciary System based on the system adopted for lawsuit automationshows the clear effects of administrative decentralization. Most of theState Courts developed their own system for lawsuit automation (CunhaJúnior, 2003), though a single system could be used by all State Courtswith minor adaptations (Table 1). The commercial success of SAJ, sold toseven different states, with different sizes and needs, shows that much ofthis development effort was duplicated, ormultiplied by 14 (see Table 1),with no clear advantages. Some smaller states, such as Roraima andParaiba, with no large budget, bulky administrative structure orspecialized personnel to invest in ICT development, adopted a systemdeveloped by another state, namely Minas Gerais, thereby avoiding thecost of purchasing a commercial system. This solution, as opposed todeveloping software internally, shows that a certain degree of coordina-tion among the State Courts would be of benefit in reducing spending onICT.

5.3. Virtualization

The third phase of automation of the Brazilian Judiciary System,namely the electronic lawsuit, is in progress even though the secondphase is still incomplete in several autonomous administrativejudiciary units of the Brazilian Judiciary System, especially in State,Military and Labor Courts. This situation, in which autonomous unitsare at different maturity levels, can hamper the advancement of thethird phase that needs to transcend the existing status quo of internalcontrols and a systemic lack of coordination.

The first instances of electronic lawsuits were implemented byisolated courts in the various autonomous units, often based onpreviously available lawsuit information systems. This tally with thephenomenon already analyzed: multiple systems, developed inter-nally or on demand by each court, for which a learning process isnecessary to enable their effective use (Andrade et al., 2008). In manycases, the existence of more than one system in place in each courtexacerbates this problem (Andrade et al., 2008).

The Digital Judicial Lawsuit (Projudi) system of the NCJ waspresented as a solution to this problem and has been used in 26 of the27 states. However, the states used different available versions andhad a high degree of freedom to customize them, which repeated thesame model, with high, albeit less significant, learning curve costs.Later on, in 2010, after more than 50 million dollars had been wasted,the NCJ abandoned the Projudi initiative, recognizing that severeproblems arose from the degree of freedom given to each court todevelop its own version of the system. A new initiative, Creta, wasannounced, but with centralized development and without access tothe software code. Both initiatives will be further detailed in the casestudy presentation and analysis.

6. Automation initiatives for the Brazilian Judiciary System

Undoubtedly, the most important initiative in the field of e-gov bythe Brazilian Judiciary System is the so-called electronic lawsuit.Although it is known by this name, it is not a new type of lawsuit, but adifferentiated physical medium with the same rules as traditionallawsuits. Instead of the court dockets being on paper, the lawsuit is

processed using electronic means. In other words, the standardprinciples and rules of judicial lawsuits are maintained, thoughdocuments that were stored on paper (often electronically generated)are stored and managed in digital media.

There were two alternative models of computerization of thejudicial process in Brazil (Cunha Júnior, 2003). The first, representedby Bill 5828 in 2001, submitted by the Association of Federal Judges, isconsidered idealistic. It is based on the assumption that the computershould only be used when access to information technology isuniversal, i.e. all citizens have internet access and an e-mail account.Starting from this premise, simultaneous computerization of all acts isproposed as a way of speeding up court procedures, as it is assumedthat digital exclusion will have been eliminated. The other stream isconsidered pragmatic, being represented by Deputy Senator OsmarDias and backed by the Brazilian Bar Association. It is based on thepremise that the security of judicial acts is the primary concern whenit comes to the issue of computerization.

The enactment of Federal Law 11.419/06 represented a victory for thefirst group above (Reinaldo Filho, 2007), though the effective implemen-tationof the electronic lawsuit has beenpragmatic. The control of routinessuch as the distribution of initial briefs, fulfillment of court orders, followupof lawsuits, publication routines, scheduling of hearings, amongothers,has undoubtedly benefitted from computerization (Marcacini & Costa,2008). Article 8 of Federal Law 11.419/06 defined the model of lawsuitautomation, allowing each and every autonomous administrativejudiciary unit to develop its own system for the electronic lawsuit, withcourt dockets totally or partly in electronic format. This represents themaintenance of the previously existing autonomy and consequent lack ofcoordination. Furthermore, there is no legal obligation to adopt theelectronic lawsuit, not even some aspect thereof, despite the fact that inthe Multi-year 2010–2014 Strategic Plan for the Brazilian JudiciarySystem, theNCJ has established 2014 as being the deadline for all lawsuitsin Brazil to be presented in electronic format. Article 14 states a‘preference’ for both open source and standardization. The concept of‘preference’was intentionally adopted by the legislature, since its absencewould alter themeaning or at least the scope of standardization. Thus, thelegal text confirms the freedom of each unit of the Brazilian JudiciarySystem to choose the development model that is best suited to its ownuse, even without using open source software as suggested. Likewise,“giving priority to its standardization” does not require the adoption of aspecific system, such as the ones developed by the NCJ.

Given the degree of freedom conferred by the Constitution on eachautonomous administrative judicial unit, as seen in the organizationalstructure and confirmed by Federal Law 11.419/06 that defines themodel of automation of the Brazilian Judiciary System, this processcould end up with more than 100 different systems spread among thedifferent units. However, this is not what is effectively happening. Theautomation initiatives of the Brazilian Judiciary System are increas-ingly structured and coordinated, mostly due to efforts of the NCJ.

As with the automation phases in Fig. 4, a timeline was establishedto display the different coordinated initiatives (Fig. 5). This timeline isbased on official dates for each initiative. It is important to note thatthe first timeline (Fig. 4) spans from the late 1970s through today,while this timeline started in 2000 (Fig. 5).

6.1. Electronic Government Program

The Electronic Government Program of the Brazilian FederalGovernment was the result of the Working Group on InformationTechnology (GTTI) formed in 2000 to study the formulation of federalpolicy for electronic government (Diniz, Barbosa, Junqueira, & Prado,2009). The program implementation focused on three lines of action,namely universal service, government available to all and advancedinfrastructure.

During President Lula'smandate, the former structure of the ExecutiveCommittee on Electronic Government at the Department of Logistics and

4 https://serpensp2.cnj.gov.br/banco_de_solucoes/listar_solucoes.php.5 http://www.cnj.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&task= view&id =4293&

Itemid=42.6 http://www.cnj.jus.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=57:

resolucoes&id=7024:resolucao-no-70-de-18-de-marco-de-2009.

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InformationTechnologywasdisbanded(Dinizet al., 2009). ThecreationoftheDepartmentof ElectronicGovernment in2005 sawa resurgenceof themovement. However, this activity remained restricted to the ministriesand the Federal Government. In other words, the Electronic GovernmentProgramwas not identified as an element of planning or implementationof strategies for theuse of ICT in the Brazilian Judiciary System. Indeed, theElectronic Government Program has limited itself predominantly to theExecutive branch.

The marked effect of the actions of the Federal Government can befelt in public policies for social inclusion, the results of which areexpressed in the continuous improvement of the content of digitalinclusion (Balboni, 2009). The increases in the number of computers,cell phones and the spread of internet use are elements that allow theJudiciary to make intensive use of ICT in the application of e-gov, butthis application was not a planned outcome of the Program (Andrade,2009).

6.2. Secretarial Department for Judiciary Reform

The Secretarial Department for Judiciary Reform was establishedwithin the sphere of the Federal Government by Decree 1117 ofAugust 7, 2003 of the Ministry of Justice (Kozikoski Júnior, 2008). Itsduties are enshrined in Article 23 of Decree 6061 of March 15, 2007and include: I — to control and coordinate actions with a view toadopting measures to improve judiciary services provided to citizens;II — to examine, formulate, promote, supervise and coordinate theprocess of modernizing the administration of justice in Brazil, bymeans of coordination with other federal agencies, the Judiciary, theLegislature, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the State Governments,international agencies and civil society organizations; III— to proposemeasures and examine proposals to restructure the judiciary sector inBrazil.

The Secretarial Department for Judiciary Reform played an activerole within the scope of items I, II and III, as part of the formulation orcoordination of strategies for ICT use within the Judiciary Branch.Indeed, consulting the Secretarial Department website, four prioritylines of action were identified: (i) Democratization of access tojustice; (ii) Research/Diagnosis; (iii) Modernization of management;and (iv) Changes in legislation.2

The Ministry of Justice, to which the Department is subordinated,is an element of mobilization of important initiatives such as the ‘StateRepublican Pact,’ the second version of which has been signed by theheads of the three executive branches in early April 2009. There wasalso the ‘Judiciary Pact,’ also signed by the heads of the three branches,and the ‘Innovare Award: the Judiciary of the Twenty-First Century.’However, these initiatives are restricted to current best practices,either by reward or disclosure on the website of the SecretarialDepartment.3

6.3. National Council of Justice (NCJ)

The NCJ, the powers of which are enshrined in Article 103-B of theBrazilian Constitution, was set up to establish the strategic planning,as well as the goals, and programs for institutional evaluation of theJudiciary. Besides this attribution, the NCJ oversees the administrativeand financial management of the Brazilian courts, and the fulfillmentof office duties by judges. The NCJ can review administrative decisionstaken by the court, set up operational rules, and recommend coursesof action. Mostly, the NCJ has reviewed administrative decisions andsuggested administrative measures since the constitutionality of thepower to set rules is in dispute, as it contravenes the constitutionallyguaranteed administrative autonomy of the courts. The NCJ has no

2 http://www.mj.gov.br/data/Pages/MJBB93AF25PTBRNN.htm.3 http://www.mj.gov.br/data/Pages/MJB162128BITEMID8C738 252430423E981A11571

C6C2186PTBRNN.htm.

power to review judicial decisions, but has an active role in penalizingjudges for misconduct.

Strategic planning is not unusual in units of the Brazilian JudiciarySystem. Some Courts have systematically programmed their strategicplanning since the 1990s, after the adoption of the model of publicmanagement (which replaced the bureaucratic model of public admin-istration), in accordance with the directives of the Master Plan for StateReform, prepared by the Ministry of Federal Administration and StateReform in 1995 (Baracho, 2002). However, many of these initiativeswerediscontinued, either due to disruption or as a result of two-yearly changein administration given the short termmandate of the court's presidents.

The NCJ created a database of best practices on the same lines as theSecretarial Department for Judiciary Reform.4 However, unlike theprevious initiative, it has also adopted effectivemeasures for coordinationand formulation of ICT strategies, such as the development of the Projudijudicial lawsuit automation system.

The NCJ has also assistedwith the formulation and coordination of ICTstrategies, through the Committee for Management of InformationSystemsof the Judiciarycoordinatedby theNCJ,whichhas representatives(both judges and civil servants) from several courts from all the judicialbranches anda single representative fromtheBrazilianBarAssociation.Asa practical result of the Committee integration and uniform approach, wecan cite the adoption of unified class tables and handling procedures.There is also the unification of the identification numbers of cases, the aimof which is “to facilitate communication among the courts in Brazil toenable a sole identification of the lawsuit, regardless of its origin”.5

Themajor innovationof theNCJwas conducting the strategic planningwithin the Judiciary, with all the difficulties involved in integrating morethan 100 units of the Brazilian Judiciary System, which was somethingthat had never been attempted before. In 2009, the NCJ staged the 2ndNational Meeting of the Judiciary, the main result being the implemen-tation of coordinated strategic planning for the entire Brazilian JudiciarySystem. Thiswas consolidated inResolution 70 ofMarch 18, 2009, that set10 national goals for 2009, including six specifically dealing with ICTstrategy. These included: computerizing all the judicial units andinterconnecting them to the respective court and theweb; computerizingandautomating thedistributionof all lawsuits andappeals; implementingmanagement systems for criminal enforcement and monitoring mecha-nisms for temporary incarceration; making available the proceduralinformation in the portals of the web, with up-to-the-minute lawsuitaccompaniment and content of decisions, duly respecting the judiciarysecrecy; registering all magistrates in the electronic systems for access toinformationonpeopleandpropertyand reporting court orders (Bacenjud,Infojud, Renajud); and implementing theelectronic lawsuit inpart of theirunits.6

On September 29, 2009, Resolution 90 of the NCJ establishedparameters for ICT in the Judiciary Power.7 It defined the number ofcivil servants in ICT according to the size of the Court, the rules fordeveloping or contracting information systems, the minimum ICTinfrastructure required, and the need for strategic planning in ICT. InResolution 91, also of September 29, 2009, the NCJ established theModel of Requirements for Information Systems for Management ofLawsuits and Documents of the Judiciary Power (MoReq-Jus).8 TheMoReq-Jus established technical and functional specifications to guidethe acquisition, detailing and development of systems for lawsuit anddocument management within the Brazilian Judiciary.9 It establishedcommon practices for all electronic lawsuit systems despite the broad

7 http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/stories/docs_cnj/resolucao/rescnj_90.pdf.8 http://www.cnj.jus.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8975:

resolucao-no-91-de-29-de-setembro-de-2009&catid=57:resolucoes&Itemid=512.9 http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/stories/docs_cnj/resolucao/manual moreq.pdf.

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degree of freedom provided by Federal Law 11.419/06. One of themain goals of the MoReq-Jus is to assure the interoperability of thesystems developed from then onwards, which was previously one ofthe major problems for the integration of informatics and e-govinitiatives given the large number of existing, competing and non-interoperable systems for managing judicial lawsuits.

In 2010, a new round of strategic planning was conducted at the3rd National Meeting of the Judiciary, and resulted in 10 new goals forthe year.10 Two of these goals were specifically related to ICTstrategies: increasing the speed of the links between the Court and100% of the units installed in the judicial capital and at least 20% of theunits of the interior to at least 2 Mbps; and performing at least 90% ofthe official communications between the bodies of the Judiciaryelectronically.

This focus on ICT shows that the NCJ includes the use of these toolsas a crucial factor for solving the problems of the Brazilian JudiciarySystem. If the adoption of new public management indicatedcomputerization and e-government as paths to follow, the currentneed to expand electronic government services increases the need fora restructuring of the state to provide these services in terms ofroutines and processes that need to be revised, deleted or modifiedusing ICT tools (Fountain, 2001; Ruediger, 2003).

7. Analysis of the case study

As said before, the creation of the NCJ, in 2004, represented aturning point in the history of the automation of the BrazilianJudiciary System. Until then, the three phases of the automationprocess (pre-automation, automation, and virtualization) were con-ducted in a decentralized manner.

The first e-gov initiatives arose in a decentralized manner in thepre-automation phase. The Brazilian government began to permitprivate access to the internet in 1994, and the first Brazilian portalsappeared in 1995. Around the same time, judges and their teamsstarted to develop institutional home pages for their courts, withsimple information, such as the address and opening hours. Thesewere isolated initiatives, usually without the cooperation of the ICTarea. According to the maturity model adopted, this configuration canbe classified as “rhetoric,” corresponding to the first stage of Davisonet al. (2005) model.

These early initiatives were very successful as they migrated fromsimple home pages to web pages with more information and someservices, such as sending an e-mail to the court with questions to thejudge, models of documents, or unofficial information on the progressof lawsuit. This success instigated the autonomous administrativeunits to take the first steps towards e-gov. This was manifested by theappearance of corporate websites on the web, the use of e-mail as amedium of communication, sectorial systems, and, finally, consulta-tion of the progress of lawsuits via the web. Sporadic and isolatedinitiatives progressed to the implementation of e-gov projects andactions on the initiative of ICT areas.

These projects adopted previously existing corporate systems andinfrastructure. As was the case with other ICT projects, e-gov projectstended to be implemented in a sectorial manner. No strategicplanning for the Judiciary System was available and the tentativeinitiatives of strategic planning by autonomous administrative unitswere swiftly abandoned or produced little or no results.

According to the maturity model adopted, this configuration canbe classified as a focus on systems (stage 2c). The evidence of multiplesystems developed for the same purpose, even within a singleautonomous judiciary unit, reinforces this conclusion. These e-govprojects were limited in their scope and effectiveness due to a lack ofcoordination and integration.

10 http://www.cnj.jus.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10350&Itemid =1125.

From 2000 onwards, several coordinated automation initiativeswere attempted, though most of them were unsuccessful. However,one thing became abundantly clear, namely that e-gov had becomepart of the political agenda, even though admittedly this agenda wasnot immediately translated into strategies and projects in theJudiciary System. Although the Electronic Government Program hadone line of action focused on government available to all, it operatedmainly within the Executive and had no impact on the planning orcoordination of e-gov initiatives in the Judiciary System. TheSecretarial Department for Judiciary Reform was set up to instructand coordinate actions with a view to adopting measures to improvejudicial services provided to citizens, and to coordinate the process ofmodernizing the administration of justice in Brazil. Unfortunately,these highly ambitious goals were never accomplished. The role of theSecretarial Department for Judiciary Reformwas restricted to workingon the Pact for the Judiciary. The various editions of the Pact, whichwas essentially a letter of intent signed by the heads of the Executive,the Legislative, and the Judiciary, were abandoned when the NCJ tookthe lead in coordinating the Judiciary System.

The virtualization phase began long before the creation of the NCJ.Some autonomous federal administrative units developed their ownsystems for electronic lawsuits, mostly as an upgrade from existinglawsuit automation systems. State administrative units adopted thistrend, developing their own systems for electronic lawsuits. Sometimes,they implemented more than one system in an autonomous administra-tive unit, according to the nature of the lawsuit or the level of jurisdiction.Some states acquired systems or adapted versions of existing systemsfromprivate vendors. The lackof strategic IT vision andplanning led to theimplementation of projects without the integrating and transformingpotential of e-gov. According to the maturity model adopted, thisconfiguration can be classified as maladjustment between strategy andelectronic government (stage 3b).

In 2006, with the enactment of Federal Law 11.419/06, the NCJ startedto develop its own electronic lawsuit system, called Projudi, which wasbased on an existing system developed autonomously by two civilservants fromtheStateCourt of Paraíba and implemented in a single courtin the interior of the state. This systemwas then distributed by the NCJ toseveral autonomous administrative units that developed their ownversions of the system in accordance with their existing businessprocedures. This implementation process, despite being promoted bythe NCJ, went out of control as no centralized control version wasimplemented. Given the lack of control, the following situations weredetected: a single court was using different versions at the same time;different courts had implemented changes in the core system and hadgiven the new version the same identification number; and due tocharacteristics of the versions, the interoperability among courts usingProjudi was lost.

In 2010, the NCJ began to appreciate the inherent problems resultingfrom this distribution strategy and initiated a debate on the adoption of anew standard system. It was known as “Creta” and was already in use insome autonomous federal administrative units. The ideawas to insist on asingle nationwide version coordinated and distributed in a centralizedmanner by the NCJ.11 The Creta system was developed for federal courtsand the resistance of the federal courts to adoption of the Projudi systemmaybe consideredoneof the reasons for its rejection. As in the enactmentof Federal Law11.419/06, inwhich theywere on the victorious side of thedispute, the Association of Federal Judges played an important role inrefusing to accept the adoption of Projudi by the federal courts.

It should be stressed that the centralized strategic planning for theJudiciary System conducted by the NCJ that began in 2009 can indeedbe considered a success. Despite the many difficulties in implement-ing strategic planning for the first time and the failings in the first

11 http://www.cnj.jus.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10490:cnj-assina-acordos-para-modernizacao-do-processo-eletronico&catid=1:notas&Itemid=169.

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year's planning process during the fiscal year in which the actionswere to take place, many courts were able to concentrate their effortson the coordinated goals and achieve many of them, according to theNCJ's own assessment. More than 75% of the goals were achieved in2009.12 The same average was achieved by the informatics-relatedgoals if they are considered separately from the others. Both strategicgoals, namely ‘computerizing all the judicial units and interconnectingthem to the respective court and the web’ and ‘computerizing andautomating the distribution of all lawsuits and appeals’ achievedmorethan a 95% rate of success.

Besides the success of the strategic planning from which severalsuccessful coordinated initiatives were derived, many other initiativesmay be considered to have failed. One of themwas the Projudi system.Its early stage of success, propelled by the NCJ decision to rewardadopting courts with free equipment and training, can subsequentlybe considered a huge failure, as the system consistency andadvantages were prejudiced by the multitude of competing versions.Here, the mix of political and technical power structures of thejudiciary units was a decisive element to explain the trajectory. Thepolitical power was represented by the judges' demands, as in orderto accept the systems they asked for extensive customizations, so asnot to have their previously established individual routines affected.Given their important role as users, the judges' requests forcustomization were continuously answered by the courts' IT areas,generating the aforementioned multitude of versions. Besides, inorder to maintain and reinforce their local power within theadministrative structure, IT areas stressed the development of localversions, to prove their technical capabilities to develop “better”systems than the NCJ and other courts' IT areas, as well as to guaranteethat the court retains and increases its dependency on the local ITarea. In otherwords, the NCJ or other parties could neither have accessto the customized version documentation, nor implement anychanges in the local version. States with highly developed IT areasled the development of newer (and non-compatible) versions, likeParaná and Goiás. Wealthier states like Minas Gerais also developedtheir own versions and helped small and poorer states to adopt thecustomized version they developed, creating competition amongProjudi versions. In the poorest states, Projudi was seen by thePresidents as an opportunity to implement informatization withinsevere budget restrictions, as the NCJ usually provided equipment andtraining along with the system.

Besides the relative failure of the “one system fits all” strategy, theimportance of ICT strategies within the organizational strategiesshows that e-gov is no longer restricted to the ICT area. It isincreasingly structured around a strategic ICT vision and planning,aligned with the vision and planning of the government as a whole.This will permit advanced implementation of e-gov projects, assistedby coordination and collaboration among agencies and entities. Theseprojects can have a marked impact on the entire structure of publicadministration, notably via standards for electronic services. Theseinclude integrated electronic systems and services involving systemsand sectors, the information highway, as well as government intranetand electronic communication throughout public administration.

Until now, courts have not reaped the full benefits of re-structuring processes through the adoption of ICT, as proposed byDavenport (1994) and Hammer and Champy (1993). As was pointedout, the courts have freely adapted the Projudi system to their ownexisting working processes. In many cases, this adaptation was donewithout analyzing or remodeling the working processes. Thisapproach was chosen in order to minimize the judges' resistance tothe adoption of the system in their daily routine, which has been doneby minimizing routine changes by simply automating existingroutines.

12 http://www.cnj.jus.br/imprensa/artigos/13355-o-cnj-e-as-metas-do-judiciario-para-2010.

Even adopting the strategy of highly customized versions of theProjudi in order to cope with the existing business processes, somebenefits for the state courts were perceived, among them the reductionin the duration of lawsuits (Alves & Barbosa, 2008). When the NCJsucceeds in its mission, the Brazilian Judiciary System will migrate fromstage 3b (maladjustment between strategy and e-gov) to stage 4(integrated e-gov) of the Davison et al. (2005) e-gov maturitymodel. This will prove that previous misalignments betweenstructure and strategy that created the gaps described in thematurity model are not an impediment to reaching higher levels ofmaturity, although they may delay the process. Only time will tell ifthe change in the organizational structure of the Brazilian JudiciarySystem, with the creation of the NCJ empowered to centralize thestrategic planning, will align structure and strategy in such a way asto allow the development of coordinated and integrated e-govprojects with broad scope and effective implementation, which cantransform the entire Brazilian Judiciary System.

8. Conclusions

The Brazilian Judiciary System as a collection of public courts, eachof them having their own workflows, needs to ensure that theseagencies are linked so as to work concurrently. It can be said that theBrazilian Judiciary System is (or should be) similar to metabusinesses– quasi-firms, or virtual firms, created via digital links between severalcompanies – in such a way that it is almost impossible to define theirprecise boundaries (Keen, 1991, Joia, 2005).

Due to this, examining the organizational structure of the BrazilianJudiciary System by concentrating efforts solely on the technologicalfacet of an e-gov project may cause the undertaking to fail. The localpower dispute on the implementation of Projudi shows that thedifferent stakeholders should be considered in order to improve thechances of success. Despite the fact that the Brazilian Courts aregoverned by the same legal agenda and are meant to comply withsimilar procedures and rules, each court has its own identity, valuesand culture, leading it to develop different workflows, sometimes farremoved from workflows addressing a similar process in anothercourt. Thus, analysis of the organizational structure of the BrazilianJudiciary System is of paramount importance to ensure the success ofan e-gov enterprise. Hence, it is also important to understand thedivision of labor, as well as establish what the main characteristics ofpower and politics within the Brazilian Judiciary System are (Andrade,2008). If this is not fully grasped, a clash between the system and theBrazilian Judiciary System might arise, leading it to be swiftlyabandoned by the users. In line with this, it is important to highlightthe key role of the NCJ as an integrator in that metabusiness, as wellas a focus point with respect to ICT strategy development andimplementation within the Brazilian Judiciary System. This integra-tion corresponds to the fourth level of the maturity model used in thiswork and is a necessary passage point in order to achieve thetransformation of structures and integrating organizational redesign,which represents stage 5 of the maturity model used (Davison et al.,2005).

The process for the transformation of the Brazilian JudiciarySystem through the use of ICT is on track. However, for it to be fullyimplemented it is necessary for the different autonomous adminis-trative units of the Brazilian Judiciary System to agree to adoptcommon standards, such as “Creta” or another similar system. This isthe challenge that the NCJ vowed to tackle when it presented itself asthe coordinating body for the strategic planning of the JudiciarySystem, of which the planning of the ICT strategy is an essential part,and partially failed as Projudi was abandoned.

As the Brazilian Judiciary System moves forward in the process ofautomation of lawsuits (virtualization), it will be possible to analyzewhich initiatives were successful or otherwise and benefit fromlessons learned during the process of change. This study indicates the

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trajectory thus far and possible future developments that should bethe scope of attention for both legislators and law enforcers. This isespecially true for the managers of the autonomous administrativeunits of the Brazilian Judiciary System, as they are the people directlyresponsible for planning and implementing ICT strategies.

Finally, limitations of this research should be mentioned. Firstly, thework applies just one maturity model to analyze the automation of theBrazilian Judiciary System (Davison et al., 2005). Other models could alsobe used, such as those quoted in the bibliographical review section of thispaper. Secondly, more research is necessary to examine how similarendeavors have worked in other countries, in order to enhance theexternal validity of this research, i.e. to verify whether these conclusionscan be replicated in different political, economical, social, legal andtechnological environments. It is important to bear in mind that legalsystems are different throughout the world. The USA and the UK, forinstance, adopt the common law paradigm, which is very different fromthe Roman-German legal system adopted by Brazil, as well as by severalLatin countries worldwide. This fact alone highlights how difficult it is todevelop general prescriptive solutions addressing e-government.

Lastly, this is a very recent knowledge field, which is why a great dealmore research is needed. This paper aimed to make a contribution in thisvery challenging area, in the hope that the results achieved may benefitnot only theBrazilian Judiciary SystemorBrazilian society, but also societyworldwide.

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