CMD 18-H4.99

File / dossier: 6.01.07 Date: 2018-04-16

Edocs: 5510608

Oral Presentation Submission from Greenpeace In the Matter of Bruce Power Inc. – Bruce A and B Nuclear Generating Station

Exposé oral Mémoire de Greenpeace À l’égard de Bruce Power Inc. - Centrale nucléaire de Bruce A et Bruce B

Request for a ten-year renewal of its Nuclear Power Reactor Operating Licence for the Bruce A and B Nuclear Generating Station

Demande de renouvellement, pour une période de dix ans, de son permis d’exploitation d’un réacteur nucléaire de puissance à la centrale nucléaire de Bruce A et Bruce B

Commission Public Hearing – Part 2 May 28-31, 2018

Audience publique de la Commission – Partie 2 28-31 mai 2018

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CommentsonBrucePower’sapplicationtorenew

itslicencefortheBrucenuclearstationPreparedbyShawn-PatrickStensil

SeniorEnergyAnalystGreenpeaceCanada

April16,2018

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1.RejectrequesttoreducepublicandCommissionscrutinyInGreenpeace’sview,BrucePower’srequestforaten-yearlicenceis,ifapproved,bothinappropriatetoaddresstheexternalandinternalchallengesfacedbyBrucePoweroverthenextdecade,andinconsistentwithdemocraticvalues,suchastransparencyandpublicparticipation.

ThefollowingsummarizessomekeyreasonstheCommissionshouldrejectBrucePower’sapplicationforaten-yearlicence:

• Prioritizingdemocraticvaluesbeforebusinessinterests–Thepracticeofregularlicence

renewalhearings,encouragesinformationdisclosure,publicparticipationandprovidesamechanismtokeepBrucePowerandCNSCstaffaccountabletothepublic.Aten-licenceisineffectade-prioritizationofdemocraticvaluesintheCommission’sregulatorprocess.Notably,thisapplicationcomesonlytwoyearsafterBrucePowerreceivedanunprecedentedfive-yearfortheBruceAandBnuclearstations.TheCNSCisshowingapatternofbehaviourthatdeprioritizespublictransparency.

• PlanningforOfframps-AlthoughthegovernmentofOntariohassignedacontractwithBrucePowertoenablethelife-extensionofsixadditionalreactorsattheBrucenuclearstation,thecontractalsocontainsan“offramp”mechanism.ThispermitsOntariotoabandonfuturereactorlife-extensionsifcostsincreases,electricitydemanddeclines,orotherenergyoptionsbecomemoreeconomical.Aten-yearlicencewouldhampertheCommission’sabilitytoappropriatelyrespondtosuchdecisions.

• ForeseeablePoliticalPressuremayunderminesafety–Thereisahighlikelihoodthatoverthenextdecadereactorlife-extensionprojectsattheDarlingtonorBrucenuclearstationswillbedelayed.Thismayincreasepoliticalpressuretooperateagingreactorsbeyondtheirdesignlives.TheCNSCshouldanticipatesuchexternalpressuresandputinplacemeasurestoshieldsafetyoversightfromunduepoliticalinterference.InGreenpeace’sview,onesuchmeasureisregularpubliclicencerenewals.

• RiskandComplexity-Theundertakingsproposedunderthecurrentapplicationaresignificantlymorecomplexthanthosepermittedunderthecurrentlicence.BrucePower’sapplicationincludesthereconstructionofthreereactorsoveraten-yearperiodwhileinparalleloperatingreactorswellbeyondtheiroperationallives.InGreenpeace’sview,thiscomplexityrequiresmore,notless,oversightbytheCommissionandthepublic.

• NoEnvironmentalReviewoftheBruceBLife-extension–TheCNSChassupportedexemptingthelife-extensionoftheBruceBreactorsfromanenvironmentalassessmentwithpublicparticipation.Suchareductioninpublicoversightandinformationdisclosureshouldnotbeexacerbatedbyalongerlicence.

Request:TheCommissionshouldapproveafive-yearlicencetoencouragegreatertransparencyandaccountability.ThislicenceshouldrequireCNSCstaffandBrucePowertoreportannuallyonsignificantissuessuchastheagingofthestationandthestatusofgovernmentdecisionsonfuturelife-extensions.

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2.Planningforlife-extensionofframpsInGreenpeace’sview,aten-yearlicenceisinappropriatebecauseitunderminestheCommission’sabilitytorespondappropriatelytosignificantchangesinBrucePower’sbusinessplanning.AlthoughthegovernmentreleasedinDecember2015acontractwithBrucePowertorebuildandextendtheoperationallivesoftworeactorsattheBruceAnuclearstationandfourreactorsattheBruceBnuclearstation,1thecontractalsoincluded“offramps”to“allowthegovernmenttoassessBrucePower'scostestimatesforeachreactorpriortoitsrefurbishmentandstoptherefurbishmentiftheestimatedcostexceedsapredefinedamount.”2Notably,therewasnoindependentassessmentofthedesirabilityofBrucecontractbytheOntarioEnergyBoard(OEB).DocumentsacquiredbyGreenpeacethroughprovincialFreedomofInformation(FOI)legislationshowthecost-effectivenessoftheBrucereactorsismarginalatbest.Aheavilyredacted2015IESOpresentationentitled“BruceNuclearRefurbishment:EffectivenessofOfframps”3statesthat“…thereareresourceportfoliosthatcanreplaceBrucerefurbishmentwithintherangeofBrucecostsidentifiedsofar,butnotatcomparablelevelsofemissionsperformance.”4Anticipatingfuturecostover-runs,theIESOalsoconcludesthattheBrucelife-extensionmaybecomedisadvantageousforOntarians.Thepresentationnotesthatthe“…futureevolutionofthepriceand/orrefurbishmentschedulecouldimpactthecosteffectivenessofBrucerefurbishmentandBrucerefurbishmentoptionsshouldthereforecontinuetobeassessedonanongoingbasis.”5ItshouldbenotedthattheIESOrefusedtoreleasedetailsontheresourceportfoliositconsideredinitsanalysis.TheIESO,however,hasahistoryofunderestimatingthecostdeclinesinrenewablecosts.WhileoutoftheCNSC’smandate,GreenpeaceencouragestheCNSCtomaintainasituationalawarenessoftheexternalpressuresthatmayimpactBrucePower’sbusinessplanningandcreatechallengesfortheCommissionsoversightofsafety.SuchsituationalawarenessisnecessaryinlightoftheIESO’sfindingthattheBrucelife-extensionisofmarginaleconomicbenefit.BrucePower’sagreementwiththeOntariogovernmentcontainstwotypesofofframp.First,“financial”or“threshold”offramps;andsecond,“economic”offramps.TheIESOdescriesthefinancialofframpasoptional“…ifcostestimatesprovidedbyBrucePower18monthpriortorefurbishmentstartofthenextunitexceedtheagreeduponthreshold,adecisioncanbemade

1ContractbetweenBrucePowerandtheIESOAMENDEDANDRESTATEDBRUCEPOWERREFURBISHMENTIMPLEMENTATIONAGREEMENT,December3,2015,http://14083-presscdn-0-0.pagely.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Amended-and-Restated-Bruce-Power-Refurbishment-Implementation-Agreement.pdf2MinistryofEnergy,“OntarioCommitstoFutureinNuclearEnergy,”pressrelease,December3,20153IESO,BruceNuclearRefurbishment:EffectivenessofOff-Ramps,October9,2015,FOIRequest#2015-070.4Ibid,pg.4.5Ibid,pg.5.

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bytheIESOtonotrefurbishoneorallsubsequentunits.”6Thegovernmenthasrefusedtoreleasethe“agreeduponthreshold”thatwouldbeusedtorejectaBruceoffer.ConsideringthatBruceBunit6issettoberebuiltin2020,itisreasonabletoassumethatBrucePowerwillbesubmittingitsfirstoffertoOntariogovernmentthissummer.ThismeansthegovernmentelectedonJune8thwillmakeadecisiononwhethertoacceptorrejectBrucePower’soffer.TheIESOstatesthataneconomicofframpcanbetaken“….inlightofchangestotheplanningcontext(e.g.lowerdemandoravailabilityoflowercostresourceoptions).Opportunitiestoexercisethiskindofofframpexistsafterpairsofunitshaveproceededwithrefurbishment(i.e.afterfirsttwounitshaveproceededorafterfourunitshaveproceeded).”7ThegraphicbelowindicateswhenofframpscanbetakenundertheBrucecontract.Notably,alloftheseofframpdecisionswouldfallundertheten-yearlicenceproposedbyCNSCstaff.OnlythedecisionregardingUnit8wouldfallunderthenextlicence.8

ConsideringthateverynuclearprojectinOntario’shistoryhasgonesignificantlyoverbudgetandtherapidlydecliningcostofrenewablesandstoragetechnologies,GreenpeacebelievesitisimprudenttoassumethatOntariowillnotexerciseitscontractrighttoforgofuturelife-extensionsattheBrucenuclearsite.AccordingtodocumentsobtainedbyGreenpeacethroughFreedomofInformation(FOI)legislation,theIESOestimatesthereisaneightypercentlikelihoodthatareactorlife-extensionatDarlingtonorBrucewillundergodelaysorcostover-runsinthe2024.9InGreenpeace’sview,thissupportsashorterfive-yearlicencefortheBrucenuclearstation.

6Ibid,pg.5.7Ibid,pg.5.8Thelife-extensionofUnit8wouldbegininmid-2030.Thus,theofframpdecisionwouldbemadein2029.9IESOFOI2016-030,APPENDIX:ResourceAvailabilityRisks,pg.6.

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Request:TheCommissionshouldonlyapproveafive-yearlicencetoensuretheCommissionhasthecapacitytoappropriatelyrespondtochangesinprovincialenergyplans.Request:TheLicenseControlHandbookshouldbemodifiedtoprovideguidancetostaffonhowtoapproachprovincialofframpdecisions,includingregularstatusreportsfromBrucePower.3.Self-regulation–lackofsafetylimitsBeforeallowingBrucePowertorebuildandextendthelivesofsixreactors,theCommissionshouldensureclearrisklimitsareinplacetodrivecontinuoussafetyimprovementsattheBrucenuclearstation.Duringthe2015re-licensinghearingsGreenpeaceaskedtheCommissiontoaddresstheloopholesintheCNSC’sregulatoryapproachthathaveallowedreactoroperatorsinCanadatoeffectivelyself-regulate.Greenpeacecontinuestobeconcernedthatthisformofself-regulationallowsindustrytoavoidsafetyupgradestocutcosts.GreenpeaceurgesthenewCommissionensureBrucePowersetsrigorousandsociallyacceptablerisklimitsfortheBruceAandBnuclearstationsbeforeitisallowedtoproceedwithrebuildingunitsixatBruceBin2020.CommissionsupervisionisneededbecauseBrucePowerhasafinancialinterestinavoidingrequirementsthatmayforceupgradestothestation.Aswitnessedduringthe2013Pickeringlicencerenewal,CNSCstaffhavealsofailedtorequireOPGtorespectitsownrisklimitswhenleftunobserved.3.1Ahistoryofavoidance:risklimits&externaleventsCNSCstaffhavebeenawareofthelackofclearrisklimitsforexistingreactorsforoveradecade,buthavedonenothing.GreenpeaceencouragesthenewCommissiontoaddressthisgapinCNSCregulatoryoversight.In2008,theCNSCconsultedandestablishedrisklimitsfornewreactors.Section4.2.2ofRD-337,DesignofNewNuclearPowerPlants,statesthefollowinglimitforlargeradioactivereleases:

Thesumoffrequenciesofalleventsequencesthatcanleadtoareleasetotheenvironmentofmorethan1014becquerelofcesium-137islessthan10-6perreactoryear.Agreaterreleasemayrequirelongtermrelocationofthelocalpopulation.10

Notably,thislimitisonelevelofmagnitudelowerthanthelimitssetbyindustry(OntarioPowerGenerationandNewBrunswickPower)forexistingreactors.What’smore,thewording“alleventsequences”requiresreactoroperatorstoconsideraccidentsequencestriggeredbymorethancomponentandstructurefailure(internalevents).Specifically,thismeansexternalevents,suchasearthquakes,tornados,floodsandterrorism.Itwasonlyin2005thattheCNSCfirstrequiredlicenceestoconsiderexternaleventsintheirriskassessments.

10RD-337,RD-337:DesignofNewNuclearPowerPlants

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In2009,theCNSCattemptedtoestablishclearandconsistentregulatoryguidanceforexistingreactors.ItpublishedRegulatoryDocument152(RD-152),GuidanceontheUseofDeterministicandProbabilisticCriteriainDecision-makingforClassINuclearFacilities,forconsultation.RD-152adoptedtherisktargetsandlimitsthatwerehistoricallyusedbyOntarioHydroandOPG.11However,RD-152imitatedRD-337byrequiringexternaleventsbeincludedwhenconsideringwhetheranoperatoriscomplyingwithrisklimits.RD-152states:

“Thesafetygoalsincludethecontributionoffacility-originatedevents(suchasequipmentfailure,operatorerrors,internalfire,andinternalfloods)andexternalevents(suchasearthquakes,weather-originatedevents,andfire),butexcludemalevolentact.”

InGreenpeace’sview,thiswasapositivesteptowardaddressingasignificantgapinthesafetyassessmentofexistingreactors.RD-152was,however,neverputintoforcebytheCNSC.12Thismeansthatrisklimitsarestilldeterminedbylicensees.GreenpeacehasreviewedallofthepubliclyavailableprobabilisticriskassessmentsbyCanadiannuclearoperators.Notably,comparedtohistoricriskassessments,themajorityoftheriskstudiespublishedbetween2008and2015showedasignificantincreaseintheestimatedlikelihoodofaccidentsleadingtooffsitereleasestriggeredbyinternalevents.Theinclusionofexternaleventsintosuchcalculationswouldincreasetheestimatedlikelihoodstillfurther.GreenpeaceislefttospeculatethattheCNSC’sabandonmentofRD-152wasinfluencedbyindustryopposition.Arguablysuchrequirementscouldimposeadditionalsafetyupgradesonlicencees.Inthe2009–2010perioditwasbecomingevidentthatthecosteffectivenessofreactorlife-extensionwasmarginalatbest.In2010,OPGannounceditwouldnotproceedwiththelife-extensionofthePickeringBreactorsduetotheprohibitivecost.OPGhadalreadydecidedin2005againstextendingtheoperationallivesoftwounitsofthePickeringAnuclearstation.Hydro-Quebecalsoannouncedin2012itwouldnotproceedwiththereconstructionoftheGentilly-2nuclearstation.BrucePower’srestartoftwoBruceAunitsalsowenttwobilliondollarsoverbudget.TheCanadiannuclearindustry’scostchallengesareinconflictwithpublicsafety.BrucePowerhasanobviousfinancialinterestinminimizingsafetyupgrades.Inspiteofthisclearconflict,theCNSChasn’tensuredclearrulestogovernreactorupgradedecisions.GreenpeaceencouragesthenewCommissionensureclearrisklimitssothatpublicsafetydecisionsarenotundulyinfluencedbythefinancialinterestsofBrucePower.3.2Risklimits:lackofCNSCstaffconsistencyAsidefromtheCommissionneedingtoensureBrucePowerestablishessociallyacceptablerisklimits,theCommissionalsohasanimportantroleinverifyingstaffconsistentlyapplythese

11CanadianNuclearSafetyCommission,RD-152:GuidanceontheUseofDeterministicandProbabilisticCriteriainDecision-makingforClassINuclearFacilities,May2009,AppendixB,p.2.12ToGreenpeace’sknowledge,nojustificationhasbeengivenfornotissuingRD-152asofficialregulatoryguidance.

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requirements.Thiswashighlightedbystaff’sfailuretoapplysuchrulesduringthe2013Pickeringlicencerenewal.In2013,GreenpeacealertedtheCommissionthatthelatestriskassessmentforthePickeringBnuclearstationshowedasignificantincreaseintheestimatedlikelihoodofalargeradioactiverelease.TheLargeReleaseFrequency(LRF)wasatsuchalevelthat,accordingtoOPG’sriskpolicy,OPGshouldhaveundertakenmeasurestoreducetheriskposedbythestation,includingsafetyupgrades.13CNSCstaff,however,effectivelyignoredthisrequirementinitssubmissionstotheCommission.BecauseofGreenpeace’sintervention,theCommissiondirectedOPGtosubmitan“actionplantoaddressanyidentifiedissuesshouldOPGexceeditstargetedsafetygoals.”14TheCommissionalsoaffirmedinits2013rulingthatthatifariskassessmentfindsthestationisoperating“…aboveacceptablelimitsthensafetyimprovementswouldbemandatory”andthatifthefinds“arebetweenthelimitsandthetargets,thensafetyimprovementsshouldbeputinplaceifpracticable.”ThisisinlinewithOPG’sriskpolicy.BrucePowershouldalsoberequiredtocarryoutsimilartransparentriskreductionplansifitsmostrecentprobabilisticriskassessmentfindsanyaccidentfrequencyexceedssafetygoals.Notably,BrucePower’ssubmissionindicatesBruceAcurrentlyhasaLargeReleaseFrequencyforaccidentstriggeredbyinternalfireof7.3E-6.15InGreenpeace’sview,BrucePowershouldbereportingannuallyonariskreductionplansimilartoOPG.Conclusion:ThepublicaswellastheCommissionhaveanimportantroletoplayinensuringCNSCstaffareappropriatelycarryingouttheirresponsibilities.ReducingopportunitiesforthepublicandCommissiontoscrutinizethebehaviourofCommissionstaffmaycompromisesafety.Request:BrucePowershouldbedirectedtoundertakeandreportannuallyonariskreductionplantoreducethelikelihoodofinternalfiresleadingtolargeradioactivereleasesbeforeitisallowedtoproceedwiththereconstructionofBruceBunit6in2020.3.3SetdeadlineforBrucePowerriskpolicyThe2013PickeringrelicensinghighlightswhytheCommissionshouldpayspecialattentiontolicenceeriskpolicyduringrelicensing.GreenpeacerequeststhenewCommissionrequireBrucePowertoproduceitsownriskpolicybeforeitispermittedtoproceedwithrebuildingBruceBunit6in2020.In2014,theCNSCpublishedREGDOC-2.4.2,SafetyAnalysis:ProbabilisticSafetyAssessment(PSA)forNuclearPowerPlantstoreplaceS-294.ItstatesthatlicenceeprobabilisticriskpoliciesshouldbereferencedintheLCHtobecomepartofastation’slicensingbasis.Thelicensingbasissetsthelegal“boundaryconditions”forreactoroperation.

13RecordingofProceedinginthematterofOntarioPowerGeneration’sapplicationtoRenewthePowerReactorOperatingLicenceforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation,August9,2013,pgs.5-6.See:http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/the-commission/pdf/2013-05-29-Decision-OPG-Pickering-e-Edocs4177096.pdf14Ibid.15BrucePower,PerformanceReviewofBruceAandB,June2017,Pg.867

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In2015,GreenpeaceaskedBrucePowertoprovidealistofdocumentsreferencedinitsLCHrelatedtoprobabilisticriskpolicy.BrucePowerprovidedsomeinformationfromitsinternal“proprietary”probabilisticriskpolicy,butdidnotconfirmifanysuchdocumentsarelistedintheLCH.AreviewoftheproposedLCHshowsnoreferencestoanysuchpolicy.IntheCommission’s2015ruling,itissuednon-mandatorylanguageencouragingBrucePowertoestablishariskpolicy,specifically“TheCommissionstatedthatsuchapolicyshouldbeformalizedandstronglyrecommendsthatBrucePowerdevelopssuchapolicy,aswellasformallydocumentsthatenhancementstoBruceAandBwillbeconsideredbyBrucePowerifthePSAresultisbetweenthesafetygoallimitandthetarget.”16GreenpeacewasdisappointedthatthepreviousCommissionchosenon-mandatorylanguageinits2015ruling,andencouragesthenewCommissiontobemoreassertivewithBrucePowerandCNSCstaff.Notably,BrucePowerrepeatedlyreferencesasafetypolicyinitssubmissions.17However,CNSCstaffadmitthatnosuchpolicyhasbeencompleted.CNSCstaffstatethat“BrucePower’sgovernancedocumentforPSAdevelopmentandapplicationiscurrentlyunderrevisionaspartofREGDOC-2.4.2transitionplan.”18Notimelinesareprovidedforthecompletionofthedocumentorwhetheritwillbepubliclyavailable.InGreenpeace’sview,itisinappropriateforCNSCstafftorecommendaten-yearlicence,andsupportplansforthelife-extensionofthreereactorsoverthenextdecade,withoutatransparentplanforfillingthissignificantgapinBrucePower’ssafetypolicies.GreenpeaceasksthenewCommissiontosetaccountabletimelinesfortheproductionofthispolicy.Moreover,thispolicyshouldbevettedbytheCommissionbeforeBrucePowercanproceedwithitsnextlife-extension.Request:BrucePowershouldberequiredtoproduceadraftrisklimitpolicyforreviewbytheCommissionatapublicmeetingbeforeitproceedswiththeoutageforBruceBunit6in2020.4.Aging:SettinglimitsandproperoversightofdesignLimitsGreenpeaceisconcernedthatforeseeabledelaysintheprovince’sreactorlife-extensionplanswillcreateundesirablepoliticalpressureonBrucePowerandCommissionstaff.Specifically,thereislikelytobepressureforBrucePowertooperatetheBrucereactorsbeyondwhatisproposedinthecurrentapplication.Tomitigatethisrisk,GreenpeacerecommendstheCommissionretainitsauthoritytoapproveserviceextensionsattheBrucestation.GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontoconsiderlessonsfromthe2007“radioisotopecrisis.”TheshortageofisotopeswascausedbythefailureofAtomicEnergyofCanadaLimited’s

16CanadianNuclearSafetyCommission,RecordofDecision,includingReasonsforDecisioninthematterofBrucePowerInc.,July9,2015,pg.19.17SeeTable6onPageA15ofBrucePower,ApplicationforRenewalofPROL18.00/2020supplementalmaterial,February2018.18CommissionMemberDocument18-H4,March2018,pg.152.

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(AECL)failuretocompleteareplacementreactorfortheNationalResearchUniversal(NRU)reactoratChalkRiverLaboratories.Theagingandout-datedNRUshouldhavebeenshutdowntoprotectpublicsafety,butwasinsteadforcedtocontinueoperatingtoavoidradioisotopeshortages.AstheCommissionisaware,ParliamenteventuallyintervenedintheCNSC’sproceedingsandformerCNSC’spresident,LindaKeen,wasfiredbytheHarpergovernment.19SimilartothefailureofAECLtocompleteareactor,delaysinthereactorlife-extensionscouldcreateelectricityshortagesorunwantedrelianceonfossilgeneration.AccordingtodocumentsobtainedthroughprovincialFreedomofInformationlegislation,theIndependentElectricitySystemOperator(IESO)estimates“…thattheoverallprobabilityofoneormoreunitsbeingdelayedishighestinthemid2020s”.AccordingtotheIESO,thereisan80%likelihoodthatoneormorereactorsoutagesundergoesdelayin2024.20AccordingtotheseFOIdocuments,theIESOisalreadyassumingthatreactorscouldbeoperatedbeyondwhatiscurrentlybeingproposedbyBrucePowerinthisapplicationtorespondtorefurbishmentdelays.InternalIESOdocumentsstate:“OpportunitiescouldexisttodefertherefurbishmentstartsofunitsinordertomitigatetheimpactofpotentialdelaysonpreviousunitsortoprovidecoverageforothersystemrisksRequest:Inlightofthesignificanttechnicaluncertaintiesandthepotentialforexternalpoliticalpressure,theCommissionshouldmaintainitsauthoritytoreviewandapprovereactorservice-extensions.

4.Site-wideriskassessmentSincetheFukushimadisasterbegan,GreenpeacehasdrawntheCommission’sattentiontoaregulatoryloopholethatallowsOntario’smulti-unitnuclearstationstoimposesignificantlyhigherlevelsofriskonsurroundingcommunitiesthanisallowedatthesingleunitPointLepreaunuclearstationinNewBrunswick.ThisloopholewasoverlookedbytheCommission’sofficialreviewofFukushimadisaster.Inits2013rulingonOPG’srequesttorenewtheoperatingforthePickeringnuclearstation,theCommissionacknowledgedthelegitimacyofGreenpeace’sconcernandinstructedOPGtodevelop“…awhole-sitePSAoramethodologyforawhole-sitePSA[ProbabilisticSafetyAssessment],specifictothePickeringNGSsite.”21AsnotedinCNSCstaff’ssubmissiontotheseproceedings,theCommissionalsorecommendedBrucePowerdevelopawhole-sitePSAmethodologywithindustrypartners.Thiswhole-sitePSAmethodologywillbesubmittedtotheCommissionbytheendof2018.22Notably,sincetheCommissionacknowledgedGreenpeace’sconcernanddirectedstaffandlicenceestoaddressthesite-wideriskposedbyOntario’snuclearstations,CNSCstaffhave

19Keenhasassertedthattheradioisotopewasinfactjustapretextforherfiring.Instead,KeenhasarguedthatSNC-LavalinlobbiedtohaveherfiredaftersherequiredmoderninternationalnuclearsafetystandardstobeusedinthelicensingofnewCANDUreactors.20IESOFOI2016-030,APPENDIX:ResourceAvailabilityRisks,pg.6.21RecordofDecision,includingreasonsfordecision,inthematterofOntarioPowerGeneration’sapplicationtorenewthepowerreactoroperatinglicenceforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation,August9,2013,pg21.22CMD18-H4,March2018,pg.152.

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repeatedlyassertedthattheyare“worldleaders”23inthefieldofsite-wideriskassessment.GreenpeaceisconcernedthatthisclaimedleadershipwillbelostwithoutadditionaldirectionfromtheCommission.Staff’ssubmissionstotheseproceedingsleavetheimpressionthatafterthedevelopmentofthewhole-sitemethodologiestherewillbenofurtherstepstointegratewhole-siteriskassessmentintotheCNSC’sregulatoryframework.24InGreenpeace’sview,thisisanexampleofstaffcomplacency.BrucePowerhasappliedforaten-yearlicence.Itisreasonabletoassumethattheintegrationofwhole-siteriskassessmentwouldbeintegratedintotheCNSC’sregulatoryframeworkoverthenextdecade.GreenpeaceisdisappointedthatCNSCstaffdidnotusetheseproceedingstosuggestexpectationsfortheintegrationofwhole-siteriskassessmentintoBrucePower’slicensingrequirementsoverthenextdecade.Notably,followingthe2013Pickeringrenewal,theCommissionupdatedREGDOC-2.4.2,ProbabilisticSafetyAssessment(PSA)forNuclearPowerPlantsin2014toacknowledgetheneedforlicenceestoassessmulti-unitaccidentsequences.Itrequireslicenceestoconsidernotonlythereactor,but“…otherradioactivesourcessuchasthespentfuelpool(alsocalledirradiatedfuelbay)”intheirPSAs.Italsorequires“Multi-unitimpacts,ifapplicable,shallbeincluded.”25WithBrucePowerandOPGhavingcompletedsite-wideinitialwhole-sitemethodologies,itshouldbeassumedthattherewillbeadditionalamendmentstoCNSC’sregulatorguidanceoverthenextdecade.ItisGreenpeace’sunderstandingthatCNSCstaffreviewandupdateRegulatoryDocumentsonapproximatelyfive-yearcycle.ThismeansREGDOC-2.4.2willbesetforareviewandupdatein2019.InGreenpeace’sview,theupdateofREGDOC-2.4.2shouldincludeadditionalguidanceregardingthemethodologyforsite-wideriskassessment.Itshouldalsoinitiateapolicydiscussiononwhethersafetygoals,whicharecurrentlysetonaperreactorbasis,shouldbere-configuredonasite-widebasistomoremeaningfullycapturetheriskposedbyOntario’smulti-reactornuclearstations.Establishingsite-widesafetygoalsisareasonableresponsetoFukushimaandacknowledgementofOntario’smulti-unitsites.Witheightreactors,theBrucesiteisoneofthelargestnuclearstationsintheworld.Itthusgoeswithoutsayingthatthisshifttowardssite-wideriskassessmentwillimpactfuturelicensingrequirementsfortheBrucenuclearstation.Forexample,givenPSAsareusedtoinformPeriodicSafetyReviews(PSR),ashifttoasite-wideriskassessmentwillimpactBrucePower’snextscheduledPSRin2018.Consideringthatstaffhaveproposedaten-yearlicencetocoincidewithBrucePower’snextPSR,itisreasonablefortheCommissiontohighlightanysignificantnewexpectationsforthisnext

23AccordingtocolleaguesatGreenpeaceKorea,stafffromtheSouthKoreannuclearsafetyregulatoralsostatetheyareworldleadersindevelopingsite-wideriskassessments.24SeeCMD18-H4,March2018,151-.152.25CNSC,REGDOC2.4.2,ProbabilisticSafetyAssessment(PSA)forNuclearPowerPlants,may2014,Availableat:http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/acts-and-regulations/regulatory-documents/published/html/regdoc2-4-2/index.cfm

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PSR.InGreenpeace’sview,BrucePowerandstaffshouldbedirectedtoanticipateandprepareforBrucePower’snextPSRtobebasedonawhole-wideriskassessmentGiventhatREGDOC-2.4.2requiresupdatedPSAseveryfiveyears,thiscouldallowBrucePowertoproduceitsfirstwhole-siteriskassessmentinapproximatelyfiveyears.Asnoted,Greenpeacebelievesthiswouldbeanappropriatetimeforalicencerenewal.ThiswouldallowthepublicandtheCommissiontoscrutinizeBrucePower’sfirstsite-wideriskassessment.However,inlightofCNSCstaff’songoingreactiveapproachtosite-widerisksincethe2011Fukushimadisasterbegan,GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontolayoutadditionalregulatorymilestonesinitsruling.Request:DirectCNSCstafftoincludeasite-widesafetylimitinthenextiterationofREGDOC-2.4.2,whichisscheduledtobeupdatedin2019.Request:BrucePowershouldbedirectedtoplanandprepareasite-wideriskassessmentfortheBrucesiteinsupportofthePSRitwillproduceby2028.Request:InstructCNSCstaffandBrucePowertopreparethefirstiterationofawhole-siteriskassessmentfortheBrucenuclearsiteforthenextlicencerenewalin2023.5.BruceBshouldundergoanenvironmentalreviewBrucePowerisaskingtobeginrebuildingtheBruceBnuclearstationin2020,but,unlikeotherlife-extensionprojects,withoutanenvironmentalreview.GreenpeaceencouragesthenewCommissiontoaskthefederalgovernmenttosubjectthisprojecttoanenvironmentalassessmentundertheCanadianEnvironmentalAssessmentAct(CEAA).BrucePowerhasbeenexaminingwaystoreducethecostofreactorlife-extensionwhileavoidingadditionalenvironmentalreviewsforalmostadecade.Thelife-extensionofBruceAunits1and2wentapproximatelytwobilliondollarsoverbudgetandwasdelayedbyseveralyears.Asnoted,otheroperatorshavedecidedagainstextendingthelifeofCANDUreactorsduetotheprohibitivecost.TheIESOhasalsofoundthatotherenergyoptionscouldbecompetitivewithreactorlife-extension.In2010,BrucePowerproposedanewapproachtoextendtheoperationallifeofunitsthreeandfourofBruceA.Inthisapproach,theentireCalandriaShieldTankAssembly(CSTA)wouldberemovedfromthereactorvaultandreplacedwithanewCSTAmanufacturedoffsite.AccordingtoBrucePower,thisapproachwouldresultinreducedworkerdose,fewereconventionsafetyincidentsandmakethecostandschedulelife-extensionmorepredictable.26However,theCNSCdeterminedtheprojectwouldberequiredtoundergoanenvironmentassessment.27BrucePowerdidnotproceedwiththisproposal.26J.Stevenson,(CNSC)ProjectManager–BruceAUnits3&4Refurbishment,BruceAUnits3&4RefurbishmentProject:CalandariaShieldTankAssemblyReplacementProject,June21,2010,E-Doc#3524194,pgs.5–6.AcquiredthroughAccesstoInformation.27Ibid.,pg.3.

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InCEAA2012,theHarpergovernmentremovedtherequirementforafederalenvironmentalreviewofreactorlife-extensionprojects.Thismeansthelife-extensionofBruceBwouldbethefirstreactorlife-extensionnottoundergoanenvironmentalassessmentwithpublicparticipation.InGreenpeace’sview,proceedingwithamulti-billiondollarreactorlife-extensionwithoutanenvironmentalreviewiscontrarytomodernvaluessuchasopengovernmentandtransparency.Eliminatinganenvironmentalassessmentforthelife-extensionalongwithaten-yearlicencerenewalisanunacceptablereductionintransparencyandpublicparticipation.Request:TheCNSCshouldrequesttheMinistryoftheEnvironmentandClimateChangetodesignatetheBruceBlife-extensionforanenvironmentalreview.6.Blindspot:offsiteaccidentconsequenceanalysisIftheCommissionapprovesBrucePower’sapplicationforaten-yearlicence,itwilleffectivelyapprovethecontinuedoperationofoneofthelargestnuclearstationsintheworldwithoutanassessmentofamajornuclearaccident.AsperCNSCpolicy,the2005environmentalreviewoftheBruceAlife-extensiononlyassessedtheconsequencesofaccidentswithanestimatedlikelihoodgreaterthan1E-6–onceinamillionyearsofreactoroperation.Thismethodignoredboththepotentialcontributionofexternaleventstoaccidentlikelihoodandwasbasedonestimatesforasinglereactor.Thus,the2005BruceAenvironmentalassessmentdidnotconsidertheoffsiteenvironmentaleffectsofalargeradioactiverelease.Incontrast,themostrecentfindingsoftheBruceAPSAfoundaprobabilityoflargereleaseatBruceAforinternaleventswas1.5E-6,7.3E-6forinternalfire,1.7E-6forseismiceventsand4.8E-6forhighwinds.28IftheBruceAlife-extensionweretoundergoanenvironmentalassessmenttoday,itwouldarguablyneedtoconsidermoresevereaccidents.ThisunderlineswhytheCNSC’spracticeofexcludinglargeradioactivereleasesfromenvironmentalreviewsisnotprecautionaryorreasonable.Itunfortunatelydeprivesthepublicandgovernmentauthoritiesofinformationneededtojudgetheadequacyofemergencyplanning.InGreenpeace’sview,therecontinuestobeaneedtoassessandpublishtheoffsiteimpactsofamajorradioactivereleaseattheBrucenuclearstation.ThemostappropriateplaceforsuchareviewtotakeplaceisinanenvironmentreviewoftheBruceBlife-extension.Ifthisprojectisexemptedfromareview,theCNSCshouldrequiresuchananalysisfortheBrucesite.Anassessmentofsite-wideriskshouldalsotakeplacebeforetheCNSCapprovesthelife-extensionoftheBruceBreactors.FollowingtheFukushimadisasterin2011,theJointReviewPanelreviewingOPG’sproposaltobuildnewreactorsattheDarlingtonsiterecommended:

…thatpriortoconstruction,theCanadianNuclearSafetyCommissionrequireOPGtoevaluatethecumulativeeffectofacommon-causesevereaccidentinvolvingallofthe

28BrucePower,ApplicationforRenewalofProl18.00/2020:SupplementalMaterial.February2018,pg.15.

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nuclearreactorsinthesitestudyareatodetermineiffurtheremergencyplanningmeasuresarerequired.29

ThePickeringandDarlingtonnuclearstationsareapproximately30kmapart.GiventheproximityoftheBruceAandBreactors,thisrecommendationisallthemorerelevantbuthasneverbeenexploredbygovernmentauthorities.Accordingtothe2015BruceAInternalEventsRiskAssessmentacquiredbyGreenpeacethroughAccesstoInformation,theBruceAReleaseCategory0sequenceinvolves“severecoredamageatallfourreactorsmoreorlesssimultaneously.Thesesequencesarepredictedtoresultincontainmentfailureswithin24hoursoftheinitiationoftheaccidentsequences.”30BrucePower’scurrentapplicationadmitsthat“…containmentisassumedtofailinanyfour-unitscenario.”31Moreover,the2003BruceAprobabilisticriskassessmentidentifiedtwoaccidencesequencesthatleadtothereleaseofover50%ofcoreinventoryof1-131andCs-137.ThesewouldbeaccidentsonparwithChernobyl.32Multi-unitaccidentsarebothpossibleandwillleadtosignificantradioactivereleases.Theimpactsofsuchradioactivereleases,however,haveneverbeenassessedpubliclyinCanada.Thisishighlightedbythefactthatitwasonlyin2015thatBrucePowerandOPGbegandevelopingameansofmodellingmulti-unitbeyonddesignbasisaccidentsthatcouldleadtouncontrolledreleases.33Request:ifanenvironmentalreviewisnotcarriedoutontheBruceBlife-extension,theCNSCshoulddirectCNSCstaffundertakeorrequireBrucePowertocommissionastudyoftheimpactsofsignificantradioactivereleasesattheBrucesite.

7.DisclaimerThissubmissionisnotanendorsementoftheCNSC’shearingprocess,credibilityorindependence.Tothecontrary,Greenpeacefeelstherecentlyelectedfederalgovernmentneedstore-establishtheindependenceoftheCNSCthroughalegislativereviewandbyappointinganewCNSCpresident.InGreenpeace’sview,theformerHarpergovernmentunderminedtheindependenceoftheCNSCwhenitfiredtheCNSCpresidentLindaKeenin2008.GreenpeacehasattemptedtoconstructivelyparticipateinCNSClicensinghearings,buthasfoundthatCNSChearingsareoften“staged”byCNSCmanagementtokeepinconvenientinformationofftherecord.

29JointReviewPanel,EnvironmentalAssessmentReport:DarlingtonNewNuclearPowerPlantProject,August2011,pg.vi.30BrucePower,BruceLevel2At-PowerInternalEventsRiskAssessment,December2013,NK21-03611.5PNSAS,pg.319.31BrucePower,PERFORMANCEREVIEWOFBRUCEAANDBRUCEB,June2017,pg.68.32CNSC–ProbabilisticSafetyAssessmentandReliabilityDivision,BruceAProbabilisticRiskAssessment(PAPRA)DetailedReview:MainReport,DocumentFileNumber:26-1-7-4-3,pg.161.33PerformanceReviewofBruceAandB,June2017,pg.184

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Notably,publicparticipationinCNSCproceedingsincreasedfollowingthe2011Fukushimadisaster.ThisincreasedparticipationarguablyleadtoanincreaseinCommissiondecisionscontrarytotherecommendationsofCNSCstaffandlicencees.Examplesinclude,amongothers,strengthenedpotassiumiodide(KI)distributionrequirements,directiontolicenseestodevelopaprocessforsite-wideriskassessmentandtheissuanceofthe2014“severeaccidentstudy”.Inspiteofthisevidencethatincreasedpubicparticipationmayleadtobetterregulatorydecision-making,theCNSChasoptedtoreducepublicparticipationandtransparencybyshiftingtoten-yearlicences.TheCNSC’ssupportforexemptingtheBruceBlife-extensionfromanenvironmentalassessmentreducestransparency,publicparticipationandscrutinystillfurther.InGreenpeace’sview,thisisevidencethattheCommission’smindset–theunspokenassumptionsthatinformactions-stillviewspublicinputandscrutinyasanuisanceinsteadofavaluablealternateperspectiveandcheckontheiractivities.UntilsuchatimethattherehavebeenchangesinCNSCseniormanagementandtotheCNSC’srulesofproceduretoallowforcross-examinationandtestingofevidence,Greenpeacedoesn’tbelieveCNSChearingscanbereliedupontoprovidetrustworthyassessmentsofnuclearrisksinCanada.