JUSTICE: RE-MEMBERING THE OTHER IN ORGANIZATIONS

Carl Rhodes

Chapter for: Mir, R., Willmott, H. and Greenwood, M. (2015) The Routledge Companion to

Philosophy in Organization Studies, London: Routledge.

Introduction

Justice is one of the oldest concepts in Western philosophy. In Aristotle’s (2000) virtue

ethics it holds a special place as a “complete virtue” and “the most excellent of the virtues”

(p. 78). What sets justice apart, for Aristotle, is that it is a virtue that has as its condition the

other person, rather than just concerning the constitution and demeanour of the self. While

other virtues are matters of individual character and capacity for thinking, justice arises when

a person uses virtue for the advantage of someone else. Aristotle explains this relation in

terms of injustice, understood by him as being related to a form of greed where a person

desires and pursues more than what is a fair share of what is due to them. Aristotle also

distinguishes the idea of justice as lawfulness from that of justice as fairness. With the latter

he regards injustice as the unfair pursuit of personal profit at the expense of another person.

This justice thus concerns fairness and equality within a community, with no one getting

more or less of the common wealth than their rightful share.

The ancient philosophical idea of justice as fairness has, in recent times, been adopted

wholeheartedly in the study of what is referred to as ‘organizational justice’. Positioning

justice as a phenomenon subject to social scientific investigation, organizational justice is

defined as a person’s individual and subjective perception that that a work based event is fair

(Cropanzano and Stein, 2009). As a well-established field of inquiry, organizational justice

research has almost exclusively focussed on understanding justice through what are presented

as its three ‘dimensions’: (1) distributive justice and the question of whether the various

resources and rewards available through work are distributed fairly amongst employees, (2)

procedural justice and the question of whether the same rules and procedures are applied

equally to all people in an organization, and (3) interactional justice and whether people are

treated fairly in terms of their interactions with other people in organizations and the nature

of the communication involved in those interactions. (Colquitt, Greenberg and Zapata-

Phelan, 2013).

Those who research organizational justice in this way have a somewhat ambivalent

relationship with philosophy. On the one hand their research is reliant at its very centre with

one of Western philosophy’s most potent and longlasting concepts (Cohen and Greenberg,

1982). On the other hand proponents of organizational justice have disparaged this

philosophical inheritance, arguing somewhat dismissively that while philosophers are

interested in a normative theorization of justice, social scientists focus more on describing

people’s perceptions of justice in the workplace (Cropanzana, Bowen and Gilliland, 2007).

When works of philosophy are cited in the organizational justice literature it is most

commonly in passing, with reference being largely limited to either ancient Greek

philosophers (e.g. Plato and Aristotle) or modern American ones (e.g. Nozick and Rawls).

This chapter mounts a critique of the dominant social scientific approach to organizational

justice arguing that it is flawed because while being wholeheartedly indebted to and infused

with philosophy for its central concept it has eschewed adequate or explicit attention to or

deliberation over that philosophy. Further this primary flaw is related to an even more

damning secondary flaw: that distinguishing itself from philosophy has enabled

organizational justice research to makes claims to descriptive objectivity, with this being a

thin veil for a neoliberal political instrumentalism which renders justice secondary to the

market.

The chapter argues that the dominant conception of organizational justice is based on the

assumptions that justice should be at the service of organizational and business strategy. This

assumption serves to deploy justice not so much in the liberal philosophical tradition that sees

it as a central pillar of a fair society to which organizations should be held to account, but

limits justice to being merely resource at an organization’s disposal in the pursuit of its own

self-interest. Organizational justice thus both appropriates and abrogates the philisophical

idea of justice, squandering the value of its meaning by reducing it to yet another tool through

which to enhance organizational power and prerogative.

While there are many possible philosophical approaches that might be used to reconsider

organizational justice and the limits of its managerialism, the chapter considers in particular

the philosophy of justice found in the work of Emmanuel Levinas and how it has begun to be

taken up in organizational studies and business ethics. The chapter concludes by considering

possible futures for research and theory in organizational justice.

Organizational Justice and Philosophy

The idea of ‘organizational justice’ as studied in the social sciences is very much a late 20th

century phenomena. In tracing the history of organizational justice social scientists

commonly begin the narrative with studies of distributive justice beginning in the 1960s.

Adams (1963) ‘equity theory’ is a particular touch stone as it relates to the relationship

between work effort and the fairness of the rewards one receives from work. In

organizational contexts distributive justice has been understood more generally as “the

perceived fairness of the amounts of compensation employees receive” (Folger and

Konovsky, 1989).

With distributive justice, the work of organizational researchers was clearly located in an

Aristotelian tradition, with the issue of fair distribution being central to Aristotle’s (2000)

ethics and politics. While Aristotle himself may not be considered in any explicit detail, it is

taken that if distributive justice is an appropriate concept through which to consider political

communities, then it can be applied also to organizations (French, 1964). While

acknowledging the value of distributive justice, in the 1980s social scientists became

interested in the ways that justice was also relevant to the fairness with which procedures

were applied to different people. Philosophically this approach began to take a more

Rawsian flavour, with the focus shifting to include the process of justice as well as its

outcome (Rawls, 1971). This was directly informed by Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) studies

of procedures used in legal dispute resolution, and their findings that the perceived fairness of

the process through which disputes were resolved related to whether people felt the resolution

itself was fair. In organizational contexts it has been surmised that higher levels of procedural

justice will be perceived when decision making processes are consistent, free from bias,

based on accurate information, are aligned with stated organizational values, and account for

the concerns of stakeholders (Leventhal, Karuza and Fry, 1980).

Interactional justice, as the third dimension of organizational justice, began to be researched

in late 1980s, arising out of specifically social scientific rather than philosophical

antecedents. Understood as “the fairness of the interpersonal treatment that one receives at

the hand of an authority figure” (Byrne and Cropanzano, 2001: 17) interactional justice

refers to the character of workplace relationships within the context of formal organizational

hierarchies. An early study of employee recruitment conducted by Bies and Moag (1986)

was especially influential in showing that people’s perception of fairness was influenced by

the truthfulness of communication, respect shown to them, the communicated justification of

decisions, and lack of prejudice.

Studies of organizational justice have brought the concept of justice centrally to bear on

management theory and practice in way that was hitherto absent – especially as it relates to

the philosophical idea of ‘justice a fairness’ (Rawls, 1971). What is curious in these

developments, however, is the way that the proponents of organizational justice deliberately

and explicitly distance themselves from philosophy, both in general and in relation to the

specific philosophers (notably Aristotle and Rawls) that their work relies on conceptually.

The justification for this is the claim that philosophical approaches to justice are normative in

nature, while within the social sciences the approach is descriptive. Colquitt, Greenberg and

Zapata-Phelan (2013), for example, express the sweeping view that across the many and

various philosophical explorations of justice from ancient to modern times, all, bar none,

“share a common prescriptive orientation, conceiving of justice as a normative ideal”.

Conversely the social sciences have a “descriptive orientation” whose “conceptualizations

focus on justice not as it should be, but as it is perceived by individuals” (p. 4). Cropanzano,

Bowen and Gilliland (2007) concur with this unsubstantiated generalization stating that:

“Unlike the work of philosophers and attorneys, managerial scientists are less concerned with

what is just and more concerned with what people believe to be just” (p. 35, italics in

original)

This crude bifurcation echoes throughout the literature on organizational justice. It is

suggested that it “is clear where philosopher and social scientists diverge. Ethical

philosophers are interested in providing prescriptive or normative definitions of justice”

while for social scientists justice is a “perceptual cognition” (Folger and Cropanzano, 1998),

we are informed. Similarly it is asserted that” “the philosophical approach to studying

business ethics is inherently prescriptive […] whereas the approach of social scientists is

primarily descriptive” (Greenberg and Bies, 1992: 433). Philosophy’s explicit presence in the

organizational justice literature is thus present through its othering.

It does not end here. With surprising social scientific hubris, when philosophical ethics is

discussed it has even be castigated as being inferior. Greenberg and Bies, (1992) for

example, evaluated ethical theories including utilitarian and deontological ethics in relation to

empirical findings in social scientific studies of organizational justice. Their unequivocal

position was that “the underlying philosophical premises [of these theories] were concluded

to be overly simplistic in in view of complexities about human nature revealed in empirical

research” (Greenberg and Bies, 1992: 433). Social scientists, we are thus informed are not

only superior to philosophers in their appreciation of justice, they also have the formidable

ability to suspend their own judgements so as to truly understand justice in in phenomenal

nudity and complexity!

The Politics of Organizational Justice

While social scientific research into organizational justice has done much to erect a

standardized body of knowledge on the basis of its own definition of justice, that

standardization has also seen a range of questionable assumptions and false dichotomies

become institutionalized and as such un-scrutinized. Following on from the comments above

a significant one of these is the assumption that a social scientific and philosophical

approaches to justice are and should be seen as separate and different, despite the central

conceptual scaffolding of organizational justice being borrowed from a long philosophical

tradition.

The notion that the social scientific approach to justice is non-prescriptive is highly dubious.

It is true that the focus is on ‘perceived’ justice on the part of employees, but one does not

need to dig deep beneath the surface to see that there is a moral judgement in place that

deems that it is ‘good’ if these perceptions are positive. Further, the managerialist focus of

organizational justice theory comes to the fore in claiming the managerial benefits that that

high levels of perceived justice in an organization will reduce troublemaking, facilitate the

implementation of managerially driven change, enhance managerial authority, reduce

worker’s perceptions of being exploited, and render people more aligned with organizational

culture and identity (Colquitt, Greenberg, and Zapata-Phelan, 2005: 5-6). Justice is also

said to positively influence “motivation, wellbeing, performance, attitudes, behaviours and

other outcomes relevant for organizations and organizational members” (Fortin, 2008: 93).

What this infers is that justice is not an end or virtue in itself, but is rather focussed ultimately

on “the unique effects of justice dimensions on key outcomes” (Colquitt, Conlon, Wessen,

Porter and Ng, 2001: 86) most especially productivity (de Cremer and van Knippenberg,

2003: 858). In all its crudeness the credo is: “being fair costs little and pays off handsomely”

(Brockner, 2006: 122). Put simply, organizational justice has developed as a means to an end

– that of enhanced organizational performance (see also Fortin and Fellenz, 2008). Moreover

this is normative; it is something that organizations should do. To suggest that this is not

prescriptive is naïve at best, conspiratorial at worst.

If we admit that a solid call to descriptivism as a justifying trope of the dominant social

science approach to organizational justice is false, then what we are left with is a particular

theoretical (albeit avowedly non-philosophical) approach to justice which equates justice with

individual perception of the justice done unto that individual by a superordinate

organizational authority. While Aristotle had it that justice was the most excellent of the

virtues, it would seem that the virtues deemed most excellent in organizational justice

research are managerial power and corporate success.

While earlier it was commented that the general Aristotelian notion of justice as fairness was

used in the social sciences, Aristotle is seldom addressed in any detail in the current

organizational justice literature. Perhaps not surprisingly what Aristotle understands as

fairness differs from the understanding proferred in relation to organizational justice. It is

highly relevant to this discussion that when Aristotle discusses justice, he does so with direct

reference to matters of organized work and market based exchange. Community exists, for

Aristotle, when people with different skills and abilities fairly exchange the products of their

labour with each other. Using money as the medium it is this possible, in Aristotle’s

example, for shoemakers, famers and builders to engage in fair exchange so that each has

shoes, food and shelter. Moreover a just person is the one who, in engaging with others,

deliberately and voluntarily ensures both that s/he does not acquire too much, and that other

do not acquire too little. Justice is that which enables communities to exist through fair

forms of exchange and commerce. What happens with the social science literature is that this

originary ethico-political import of the very concept of justice is neutered – first by

disavowing philosophy, second by rendering justice servile to managerial prerogative, and

third by individualizing what is an inherently social concept.

There is obviously not the space here to provide a review of justice theory from antiquity to

the present, however even the most superficial understanding of justice would realise that we

are dealing with a political concept, and a part of political philosophy. Clearly to de-

politicize it, as achieved by organizational justice theory, is to rob it of its very meaning,

rendering it instead just another managerial tool to be used in the pursuit of business and

organizational imperatives. As such organizational justice research’s explicit non-normative

stance serves only to hide the norms that it privileges; norms rooted in a neoliberal

moralization of capitalism and individualism. In sum, the abandonment of philosophy by

social science approaches to organizational justice has meant that the very meaning of justice

has too been abandoned.

An ‘Other’ Justice

If the meaning of justice has been lost, where might it be found again? Clearly what is

required is a return to political philosophy through inter-disciplinary inquiry that re-

politicizes the notion of justice in organizations. The whole canon of Western philosophy

offers opportunities for this to be done, and indeed within the disciplines of organization

studies and business ethics many philosophers associated with justice have been drawn upon.

Notable examples include Aristotelian approaches to business ethics (Solomon, 2004), the

deployment of social contract theory originating with Locke, Rousseau and Hobbes for

managing the dilemmas of global business (Donaldson and Dunfee, 2002), and the use of

Rawls’ political theory to inform an ethical basis for stakeholder theory (Phillips, 2003). To

review all of these, and other, possible directions is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead

one particularly productive example will be discussed in order to demonstrate how

philosophical work has recently been used as a means to consider justice in organizations.

This example relates to the way that the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas has been drawn on

to inform recent research and theory on the relationship between ethics and justice in

organizations.

Levinas’ philosophy is an important one to consider in that, since the 1990s, his work is said

to have ushered in an ‘ethical turn’ in literary theory, cultural studies, philosophy and social

theory, through his radical rethinking of the relationship of the self to ethics, and the

implications of this for justice and politics (Hofmeyr, 2009). This turns has affected studies of

ethics in organizations too with Levinas’ unique understanding of ethics and justice having

been drawn on to develop some of the most innovative and compelling new ways to approach

ethical issues in organizations. This includes theoretical investigations into the meaning of

justice in organizations (e.g. Aasland, 2007; Bevan and Corvellec, 2007; Byers and Rhodes,

2007) as well as applications of that to studying leadership (Knights and O’Leary, 2006;

Rhodes, 2012), diversity management (Muhr, 2008), decision making (Lewis and

Farnsworth, 2007), corporate codes of ethics (Painter-Morland, 2010), corporate

responsibility (Soares, 2008), corporate reporting (Campbell, McPhail and Slack, 2009) and

software piracy (Introna, 2007). What Levinas offers these studies is an approach to justice

that, rather than relying on narrow notions of individual perceptions, understands justice as a

political response to an ethical dilemma.

Levinas (1989) bases his understanding of justice on a prior ethics such that the ethical

primacy of care and devotion to other people is the wellspring of justice. For Levinas (1969)

ethics arises in the context of face-to-face relationships; relationships where the other person

is considered simultaneously close and distant. That is, while the other might be close in

physical proximity but at the same time infinitely distant in their uniqueness, particularity and

knowability. The other is prior to ourselves to the extent that we are hostage to the other for

our own existence, as we take responsibility for them. Ethics, for Levinas happens when one

is called into question by the other and becomes responsible for the other. Levinasian ethics is

thus non-selfish and relational; it I about one’s care and devotion to the other person before

and above one’s self.

It is in the practical problems in enacting such ethics that, for Levinas (1989), justice is called

forth. Indeed, if we have a notion of ethics based on the sanctity of and responsibility

towards the other person, what happens when one is called to responsibility for more than one

person? This is what Levinas calls the entry of the ‘third party’ that divides one’s ethical

attention between multiple others. It is in this sense that we might regard justice as the

impossible but necessary task of dividing one’s care, duty and resources between people,

each of whom is unique and incomparable as well as deserving. Levinas (1985) answers the

question ‘how is it there is justice?’ is follows:

I answer that it is the fact of the multiplicity of men [sic] and the presence of someone

else next to the Other, which condition the laws and establish justice. If I am alone

with the Other, I owe him everything; but there is someone else. Do I know what my

neighbor is in relation to someone else? Do I know if someone else has an

understanding with him or his victim? Who is my neighbor? It is consequently

necessary to weigh, to think, to judge, in comparing the incomparable. The

interpersonal relation I establish with the Other, I must also establish with other men;

it is thus a necessity to moderate this privilege of the Other; from whence comes

justice. Justice, exercised through institutions, which are inevitable, must always be

held in check by the initial interpersonal relation. (pp. 89-90)

Justice is thus about how ethics manifests in the real world of inter-personal social relations.

As such while it is an ethical desire for and service to the other that inaugurates the need for

justice, justice demands rules and rationality so as to decide and justify how things might be

divided between all of the others. With such a philosophical view, the idea that

organizational justice can be reduced to a matter of individual perceptions is an abrogation of

the very term justice. So, when organizational justice researchers claim that organizations

should enact “some noticeable act of fairness” (Janson et al, 2008: 267) so as to improve

“performance, and organizational commitment” (de Cremer, van Djike and Bos, 2007: 1798)

they are simultaneously relinquishing organizations from any responsibility for justice other

than that which is at the service of their own self-interest. Moreover, it is precisely this

obsession with (in this case organizational) self-interest that is diametrically opposed to ethics

in the Levinasian sense. As such, even with such a brief exposition as is permitted here, a

turn to philosophy is a means through which to radically rethink the entrenched and

impoverished notion of organization justice that has developed in the ‘normal science’

(Kuhn, 1970) of social science.

What Levinas teaches us is that while it might be possible for managers to motivate

perceptions of fairness amongst employees such that corporate interests are realised, can be

achieved and can be righteously aligned with corporate interests, this is not justice. Instead

the remarkably more urgent and difficult task of justice concerns the very nature of the

exercise of organizational power if that power is to be exercised in a manner that places

ethics prior to it. Justice is a practice of fair distribution, but also a practice of engaging

with the dilemma over what is fair in terms of who does and does not benefit from justice.

As I have suggested elsewhere in practice this calls for “an ongoing questioning of the self in

relation to the others to whom one is responsible” such that organizational justice not about

trying to ensure people perceive there experience in organizations as fair in order to improve

effectiveness “it is about navigating the ethical quandaries and dilemmas that leading other

people, and being responsible for them, inevitably raise” in the political realities

organizational life. (Rhodes, 2013: 1322)

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the dominant social science approach to organizational justice,

offering a critique of it based on its theoretically limited and managerially oriented character.

It has been suggested that organization justice is ambivalent to philosophy in that in depends

on philosophical ideas and concepts, yet has explicitly distanced itself from philosophy.

Partly as a result of this ambivalence the literature on organizational justice encases a

philosophically and ethically impoverished notion of justice. It was further proposed that

organizational justice can benefit from a much more direct and explicit consideration of the

long and deep history of how justice has been conceived of in philosophy. This was

illustrated by a consideration of Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy and how it has been drawn

on in organization studies and business ethics. It was argued that Levinas’ philosophy leads

to a radically different understanding of organizational justice – one that reaches to the heart

of the tense and difficult political realities of organizational life and its implications for fair

distribution within organizational and within society itself.

In parting ways with this chapter I will now finally speculate as to the possible future of

studies in organizational justice. If we are to be honest, on account of their entrenched and

institutionalized nature, it is most likely that for at least the medium term, social scientific

approaches to organizational justice will remain dominant while undergoing the incremental

improvements that one expects of ‘normal science’. Moreover, the ethical and political

shortcomings of this approach are likely to remain unchanged. Such is the fate of vested

interests and established power structures!

Despite this pessimistic outlook, what is more important is that a turn to philosophy offers a

radically different possible future, and as demonstrated in this chapter Levinas in particular

provides a radical antidote to the anodyne manageralism of conventional social science.

More generally we might envisage a future by looking to the ancient past. As commented

earlier for Aristotle justice is primarily about the fairness of economic distribution in a

society and the political means through which that might be achieved. In an era where

income inequality is radically widening, where a managerial class are the disciplined and

trained henchmen of capital, where discrimination and oppression at work are rife, and where

social scientists sing along side in a chorus of justice, is it not now time to put the philosophy

and politics back into a true justice for organizational life?

Key Texts for Further Reading

Works by Levinas discussing Justice

- Levinas, E. (1998) Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, Pittsburgh: Duquesne

University Press.

- Levinas, E. (1998). Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-other. New York: Columbia

University Press.

- Levinas, E., (1985). Ethics and Infinity. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press..

Studies of work business, work and organizations drawing on Levinas’ conception of justice:

- Aasland, D.G. (2007) The exteriority of ethics in management and its transition into

justice: A Levinasian approach to ethics in business. Business Ethics; A European

Review, 16(3): 220-226.

- Bevan, D. and Corvellec, H. (2007) ‘The impossibility of corporate ethics: For a

Levinasian approach to managerial ethics’, Business Ethics: A European Review, 16

(3): 208–219.

- Byers, D. and Rhodes, C. (2007) Ethics, alterity and organizational Justice, Business

Ethics: A European Review, 16(3): 239-250.

- Knights, D., andO’Leary, M. (2006). Leadership, ethics and responsibility to the

other. Journal of Business Ethics, 67(2), 125-137.

- Rhodes, C. (2012). Ethics, alterity and the rationality of leadership justice. Human

Relations, 65(10), 1311-1331.

- Muhr, S.L. (2008) Reflections on responsibility and justice: Coaching human rights in

South Africa, Management Decision, 46(8): 1175-1186.

Cited References

Aasland, D. G. (2009). Ethics and Economy: After Levinas. London: MayFlyBooks.

Aasland, D.G. (2007) The exteriority of ethics in management and its transition into justice:

A Levinasian approach to ethics in business. Business Ethics; A European Review, 16(3):

220-226.

Adams, J.S. (1963) Toward an understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal and Social

Psychology, 67: 422-436

Aristotle (2014) Nicomachean Ethics, Indeannapolis: Hackett

Bevan, D. and Corvellec, H. (2007) The impossibility of corporate ethics: For a Levinasian

approach to managerial ethics, Business Ethics: A European Review, 16 (3): 208–219.

Bies, R.J. and Moag, J. (1986) Interactional Justice: Communication Criteria for Fairness, in

R. Lewicki, B. Sheppard and M Bazerman (Eds.) Research on Negotiation in Organizations

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Brockner, J. (2006). Why it’s so hard to be fair. Harvard Business Review, 84(3), 122-129.

Byers, D. and Rhodes, C. (2007) Ethics, alterity and organizational Justice, Business Ethics:

A European Review, 16(3): 239-250.

Byrne, Z.C. and Cropanzano, R. (2001) The History of Organizational Justice: The Founders

Speak, in R. Cropanzano (Ed.) Justice in the Workplace: From Theory to Practice, pp. 3- 26,

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Campbell, D., McPhail, K., & Slack, R. (2009). Face work in annual reports: A study of the

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and prospects, Business Ethics Quarterly, 19(2): 193-233.

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justice, The Academy of Management Perspectives, 21(4): 34-48.

de Cremer, D. and van Knippenberg, D. (2003) How Do Leaders Promote Cooperation? The

Effects of Charisma and Procedural Fairness, Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(5): 858-866.

de Cremer, D., van Dijke, M. and Bos, A.E.R (2007) when leaders are seen as

transformational: The effects of organizational justice, Journal of Applied Social Psychology,

37(8): 1797-1816.

Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T. W. (2002). Ties that bind in business ethics: Social contracts

and why they matter. Journal of Banking & Finance, 26(9), 1853-1865.

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Management, Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Folger, R., & Konovsky, M. A. (1989). Effects of procedural and distributive justice on

reactions to pay raise decisions. Academy of Management journal, 32(1), 115-130.

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ethical base in organizational justice research and practice. Journal of Business Ethics, 78(3),

415-433.

Fortin, M. (2008) Perspective on organizational justice: Concept clarification, social context

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French, W. (1964) The Personnel Management Process, Boston; Houghton Mifflin.

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organizational justice in philosophical inquiries into business ethics. Journal of Business

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Hofmeyr, B. (2009) Radical Passivity: Rethinking Ethical Agency in Levinas, Springer.

Introna, L. (2007) Singular Justice and Software Privacy, Business Ethics: A European

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heuristics: A four-nation study, European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology,

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Knights, D., andO’Leary, M. (2006). Leadership, ethics and responsibility to the other.

Journal of Business Ethics, 67(2), 125-137.

Kuhn, T. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of

Chicago Press.

Leventhal, G. S., & Karuza, J. 8: Fry, WR (1980). Beyond fairness: A theory of allocation

preferences. Justice and social interaction, 167-218.

Levinas, E. (1969). Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Pittsburgh: Duquesne

University Press.

Levinas, E. (1998) Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, Pittsburgh: Duquesne

University Press.

Levinas, E., (1985). Ethics and Infinity. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press..

Lewis, M., & Farnsworth, J. (2007). Financialisation and the ethical moment: Levinas and the

encounter with business practice. Society and Business Review, 2(2), 179-192.

Muhr, S. L. (2008). Reflections on responsibility and justice: Coaching human rights in South

Africa. Management Decision, 46(8), 1175-1186.

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Africa, Management Decision, 46(8): 1175-1186.

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