Japan Relations UMich 7WK Clark/Eyzaguirre/Miller/Peterson Lab1/144 Vish, Mallika, Ike, Keenan

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AT: Japan Costs too highJapan will use artificial intellicence to cut costsEngadget, 11 (3/23/11, Engadget blog, “Japan’s space agency considers using rockets with artificial intelligence”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=news&rft.atitle=Japan+Voices+Concern+about+China%27s+Anti-Satellite+Missile+Test&rft.jtitle=Jiji&rft.date=2007-01-19&rft.spage=1&rft.externalDBID=JIJI&rft.externalDocID=1197130401) MH--JC

The keyword here is obviously "considers," but it looks like Japan's space agency, JAXA, is indeed seriously thinking about using artificial intelligence to improve their rocket launches. As JAXA scientist Yasuhiro Morita explains, as opposed to simply being "automatic" as rockets are today, an "artificially intelligent" rocket would be able to keep watch on its condition, determine the cause of any malfunction, and potentially even fix it itself. According to JAXA, that would not only make rocket launches more efficient, but more cost-effective as well given the reduced manpower needs. That's not the only new measure being explored to cut costs, though -- as Space.com reports, JAXA's new Epsilon launch vehicle is also being built using fewer, but more advanced components, which promises to let it be moved to the launch pad nearly fully assembled. It's currently set to launch sometime in 2013, although it's not yet clear how much it will actually be relying on AI if such a system is put in place.

Japan is reducing launch costs by 75%JAXA, 11 (2011, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, “Lowering the hurdles to space”, http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/epsilon/index_e.html)MH--JCAs part of our research on the next-generation solid propellant rocket, we plan to reduce the cost by a third of that for the former M-V Launch Vehicle . However, we are not only thinking about cost reductions. Our ultimate goal is to lower hurdles to space by developing a space transportation system suitable for a new age and by making rocket launches much simpler. Additionally, we will be able to meet the wide range of demands for rocket launches by operating the H-IIA and H-IIB Launch Vehicles as well.For the next-generation solid fuel rocket, we plan to reform the launch system and improve the operation performance to the highest global standard by utilizing innovative ideas far beyond a simple combination of existing technologies. For example, we will reduce the time needed for the operation of ground facilities and launches to about one fourth of the time required for the M-V Launch Vehicle. To do this, we will make the vehicle perform checks onboard and autonomously and reduce the time required for operations on the ground. Ultimately, through internet, we will be able to check a0nd control rockets anywhere in the world simply by using a laptop computer. We are planning to realize the world, where the launch control system is not necessarily at the launch site anymore. Such an innovative concept for a new solid propellant rocket will become a good model for future launch systems involving a liquid fuel rocket. Currently, onboard equipment is custom made to suit each rocket. Assuming that the rocket was a personal computer, onboard equipment for the rocket would correspond to the computer peripherals and are unique to that specific rocket. For our new rocket, we are aiming as much as possible to develop onboard equipment that can be shared with a family of rockets. For example, we are thinking of connecting onboard equipment through a high-speed network. Hence, if we use common interfaces on them, we can freely add or change equipment, or even put them on a different rocket just like computer peripherals. In other words, launching the rocket is just like using a computer. The launch of the rocket will become much easier, just like daily events. This dream era, where we can become much closer to space, is only a few steps away.

Japan already has a launch vehicle that cuts launch costs in halfJAXA, 3 (1/29/3, Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency, “Leading edge, efficient and economical technology Japanese main large –scale launch vehicle, H-IIA”, http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/h2a/index_e.html)MH--JCH-IIA, Japan’s primary large-scale launch vehicle, is designed to meet diverse launch demands, at lower cost and with a high degree of reliability, by making the best use of the H-II launch- vehicle technology. The simplified design and improved efficiency of the manufacturing and launch processes of H-IIA have achieved one of the highest performance to cost ratio of launch system in the world, reducing the cost of launches by a half or more.H-IIA launch service operations have been transferred to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD. ahead of the launch of H-IIA Flight 13. JAXA is in charge of launch safety management (including ground safety confirmation, flight safety assurance, and overall countdown control and supervision.)

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Generic Japan Can Do ItJapan launch system improvements will makes any space mission easierJAXA, 11 (2011, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, “Lowering the hurdles to space”, http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/epsilon/index_e.html)MH--JCAs part of our research on the next-generation solid propellant rocket, we plan to reduce the cost by a third of that for the former M-V Launch Vehicle . However, we are not only thinking about cost reductions. Our ultimate goal is to lower hurdles to space by developing a space transportation system suitable for a new age and by making rocket launches much simpler. Additionally, we will be able to meet the wide range of demands for rocket launches by operating the H-IIA and H-IIB Launch Vehicles as well.For the next-generation solid fuel rocket, we plan to reform the launch system and improve the operation performance to the highest global standard by utilizing innovative ideas far beyond a simple combination of existing technologies. For example, we will reduce the time needed for the operation of ground facilities and launches to about one fourth of the time required for the M-V Launch Vehicle. To do this, we will make the vehicle perform checks onboard and autonomously and reduce the time required for operations on the ground. Ultimately, through internet, we will be able to check a0nd control rockets anywhere in the world simply by using a laptop computer. We are planning to realize the world, where the launch control system is not necessarily at the launch site anymore. Such an innovative concept for a new solid propellant rocket will become a good model for future launch systems involving a liquid fuel rocket. Currently, onboard equipment is custom made to suit each rocket. Assuming that the rocket was a personal computer, onboard equipment for the rocket would correspond to the computer peripherals and are unique to that specific rocket. For our new rocket, we are aiming as much as possible to develop onboard equipment that can be shared with a family of rockets. For example, we are thinking of connecting onboard equipment through a high-speed network. Hence, if we use common interfaces on them, we can freely add or change equipment, or even put them on a different rocket just like computer peripherals. In other words, launching the rocket is just like using a computer. The launch of the rocket will become much easier, just like daily events. This dream era, where we can become much closer to space, is only a few steps away.

Japan already has a launch vehicle that cuts launch costs in halfJAXA, 3 (1/29/3, Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency, “Leading edge, efficient and economical technology Japanese main large –scale launch vehicle, H-IIA”, http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/h2a/index_e.html)MH--JCH-IIA, Japan’s primary large-scale launch vehicle, is designed to meet diverse launch demands, at lower cost and with a high degree of reliability, by making the best use of the H-II launch- vehicle technology. The simplified design and improved efficiency of the manufacturing and launch processes of H-IIA have achieved one of the highest performance to cost ratio of launch system in the world, reducing the cost of launches by a half or more.H-IIA launch service operations have been transferred to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD. ahead of the launch of H-IIA Flight 13. JAXA is in charge of launch safety management (including ground safety confirmation, flight safety assurance, and overall countdown control and supervision.)

Japan is increasing space operabilityFlight International, 9 (11/9/09, Flight International UK, “Japan aims for 2014 suborbital test”, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?index=1&did=1905533501&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1308851421&clientId=17822) MH--JCThe Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) wants to air launch a suborbital demonstrator by 2014 to test technologies for its planned two-stage to orbit advanced space transport system. The technologies are for reusability, health monitoring and aircraft-like operability. Released at 36,000ft (11,000m) at a speed of about 456kt (845km/h). the vehicle would fire its rocket engines to reach 100km (62 miles) and glide back for a runway landing. JAXA is interested in using Virgin Galactic' s WhteKnight Two as a carrier aircraft.

Japan is a leader of the newly developed Asian space industryFriedman, 8, Louis Friedman- Executive Director of The Planetary Society (9/8/08, “A New Paradigm for a New Vision of Space”, http://www.planetary.org/programs/projects/advocacy_and_education/space_advocacy/new_paradigm.pdf)MH--JCAnd now, in Asia: New players have emerged: China, India, and Japan, seeking the national prestige that comes with a successful space program, are replaying the 1960sspace race by concentrating on development of launch vehicles, lunar missions and placing humans in space. Japan has also begun exploration of the solar system and is a major contributor to space science.

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U.S. space leadership is declining while other nations, are taking giant leaps in space exploration, especially Japan. Kaufman, 8- chief staff writer for the Washington post (July 2008, Marc, “U.S. Finds It's Getting Crowded Out There” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/07/08/AR2008070803185.html). EESix separate nations and the European Space Agency are now capable of sending sophisticated satellites and spacecraft into orbit -- and more are on the way. New rockets, satellites and spacecraft are being planned to carry Chinese, Russian, European and Indian astronauts to the moon, to turn Israel into a center for launching minuscule "nanosatellites," and to allow Japan and the Europeans to explore the solar system and beyond with unmanned probes as sophisticated as NASA's. While the United States has been making incremental progress in space, its global rivals have been taking the giant steps that once defined NASA: · Following China's lead, India has announced ambitious plans for a manned space program, and in November the European Union will probably approve a proposal to collaborate on a manned space effort with Russia. Russia will soon launch rockets from a base in South America under an agreement with the European company Arianespace, whose main launch facility is in Kourou, French Guiana. · Japan and China both have satellites circling the moon, and India and Russia are also working on lunar orbiters. NASA will launch a main launch facility is in Kourou, French Guiana. · Japan and China both have satellites circling the moon, and India and Russia are also working on lunar orbiters. NASA will launch a lunar reconnaissance mission this year, but many analysts believe the Chinese will be the first to return astronauts to the moon.

US space dominance is declining and countries like Japan are rising with their technical abilities, and their defense purposes for space. Kaufman, 8- staff writer for the Washington post (July 9, 2008, Marc, “U.S. Finds It's Getting Crowded Out There; Dominance in Space Slips as Other Nations Step Up Efforts”,http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?csi=8075&shr=t&sr=BYLINE(Kaufman+w%2F3+Marc)+AND+HLEAD(U.S.+finds+it's+getting+crowded+out+there%3A+dominance+in+space+slips+as+other+nations+step+up+efforts.)+AND+DATE+IS+20080). EESix separate nations and the European Space Agency are now capable of sending sophisticated satellites and spacecraft into orbit -- and more are on the way. New rockets, satellites and spacecraft are being planned to carry Chinese, Russian, European and Indian astronauts to the moon, to turn Israel into a center for launching minuscule "nanosatellites," and to allow Japan and the Europeans to explore the solar system and beyond with unmanned probes as sophisticated as NASA's. While the United States has been making incremental progress in space, its global rivals have been taking the giant steps that once defined NASA: · Following China's lead, India has announced ambitious plans for a manned space program, and in November the European Union will probably approve a proposal to collaborate on a manned space effort with Russia. Russia will soon launch rockets from a base in South America under an agreement with the European company Arianespace, whose main launch facility is in Kourou, French Guiana. · Japan and China both have satellites circling the moon, and India and Russia are also working on lunar orbiters. NASA will launch a lunar reconnaissance mission this year, but many analysts believe the Chinese will be the first to return astronauts to the moon. · The United States is largely out of the business of launching satellites for other nations, something the Russians, Indians, Chinese and Arianespace do regularly. Their clients include Nigeria, Singapore, Brazil, Israel and others. The 17-nation European Space Agency (ESA) and China are also cooperating on commercial ventures, including a rival to the U.S. space-based Global Positioning System. · South Korea, Taiwan and Brazil have plans to quickly develop their space programs and possibly become low-cost satellite launchers. South Korea and Brazil are both developing homegrown rocket and satellite-making capacities. This explosion in international space capabilities is recent, largely taking place since the turn of the century. While the origins of Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Israeli and European space efforts go back several decades, their capability to pull off highly technical feats -- sending humans into orbit, circling Mars and the moon with unmanned spacecraft, landing on an asteroid and visiting a comet -- are all new developments. A Different Space Race In contrast to the Cold War space race between the United States and the former Soviet Union, the global competition today is being driven by national pride, newly earned wealth, a growing cadre of highly educated men and women, and the confidence that achievements in space will bring substantial soft power as well as military benefits. The planet-wide eagerness to join the space-faring club is palpable. China has sent men into space twice in the past five years and plans another manned mission in October. More than any other country besides the United States, experts say, China has decided that space exploration, and its commercial and military purposes, are as important as the seas once were to the British empire and air power was to the United States. The Chinese space program began in the 1970s, but it was not until 2003 that astronaut Yang Liwei was blasted into space in a Shenzhou 5 spacecraft, making China one of only three nations to send men into space. "The Chinese have a carefully thought-out human spaceflight program that will take them up to parity with the United States and Russia," Griffin said. "They're investing to make China a strategic world power second to none -- not so much to become a grand military power, but because deals and advantage flow to world leaders." Meanwhile, other nations are pushing to increase their space budgets. Ministers from the European Space Agency nations will vote in November on a costly plan to begin a human space program. David Southwood, ESA's director for science, said human space travel has broad support across the continent, and European astronauts who have flown to the space station on U.S. and Russian spacecraft are "extremely popular people" in their home nations. "It seems highly unlikely that Europe as a whole will opt out of putting humans into space," he said. NASA and the U.S. space effort, meanwhile, have been in something of a slump. The space shuttle is still the most sophisticated space vehicle ever built, and

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orbiting observatories such as the Hubble space telescope and its in-development successor, the James Webb space telescope, remain unmatched. But the combination of the 2003 Columbia disaster, the upcoming five-year "gap" when NASA will have no American spacecraft that can reach the space station, and the widely held belief that NASA lacks the funding to accomplish its goals, have together made the U.S. effort appear less than robust. The tone of a recent workshop of space experts brought together by the respected National Research Council was described in a subsequent report as "surprisingly sober, with frequent expressions of discouragement, disappointment, and apprehension about the future of the U.S. civil space program." Uncertainty over the fate of President Bush's ambitious "vision" of a manned moon-Mars mission, announced with great fanfare in 2004, is emblematic. The program was approved by Congress, but the administration's refusal to significantly increase spending to build a new generation of spacecraft has slowed development while leading to angry complaints that NASA is cannibalizing promising unmanned science missions to pay for the moon-Mars effort. NASA's Griffin has told worried members of Congress that additional funds could move up the delivery date of the new-generation spacecraft from 2015 to 2013. The White House has rejected Senate efforts to provide the money. Although NASA's annual funding of $17 billion is large by civilian space agency standards, it constitutes less than 0.6 percent of the federal budget and is believed to be less than half of the amount spent on national security space programs. According to the Futron report, a considerably higher percentage of U.S. space funding goes into military hardware and systems than in any other nation. At the same time, the enthusiasm for space ventures voiced by Europeans and Asians contrasts with America's lukewarm public response to the moon-Mars mission. In its assessment, Futron listed the most significant U.S. space weakness as "limited public interest in space activity." The cost of manned space exploration, which requires expensive measures to sustain and protect astronauts in the cold emptiness of space, is a particular target. "The manned space program served a purpose during the Apollo times, but it just doesn't anymore," says Robert Parks, a University of Maryland physics professor who writes about NASA and space. The reason: "Human beings haven't changed much in 160,000 years," he said, "but robots get better by the day." Satellite Launches Fall The study by Futron, which consults for public clients such as NASA and the Defense Department, as well as the private space industry, also reported that the United States is losing its dominance in orbital launches and satellites built. In 2007, 53 American-built satellites were launched -- about 50 percent of the total. In 1998, 121 new U.S. satellites went into orbit. In two areas, the space prowess of the United States still dominates. Its private space industry earned 75 percent of the worldwide corporate space revenue, and the U.S. military has as many satellites as all other nations combined. But that, too, is changing. Russia has increased its military space spending considerably since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In May, Japan's parliament authorized the use of outer space for defense purposes, signaling increased spending on rockets and spy satellites. And China's military is building a wide range of capabilities in space, a commander of U.S. space forces said last month. Last year, China tested its ground-based anti-satellite technology by destroying an orbiting weather satellite -- a feat that left behind a cloud of dangerous space debris and considerable ill will.

Japan will have a low cost launcher up and running in within the next 2 yearsPerrett, 9 – Bradley Perrett, Editor of Aviation Week (11/23/09, Aviation Week, “Solid Effort”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Solid+effort.%28Space%29%28Japan+Aerospace+Exploration+Agency+to+develop+Advanced+Solid+Rocket%29&rft.jtitle=Aviation+Week+%26+Space+Technology&rft.au=Perrett%2C+Bradley&rft.date=2009-11-23&rft.pub=The+McGraw-Hill+Companies%2C+Inc&rft.issn=0005-2175&rft.volume=171&rft.issue=19&rft.spage=54&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=218991485)MHThe Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) hopes next year to begin full-scale development of the Advanced Solid Rocket, its proposed launcher for medium-size scientific payloads. A first flight of the three-stage ASR, to be built by IHI Aerospace, should follow in 2012 or 2013, sustaining the solid-propellant expertise that Japan has built up since launching pencil-size rockets in the mid-1950s. The agency is also studying a further initiative that would cut costs partly by using a fuel that could be melted and formed into a solid engine at less than the boiling temperature of water. That follow-on rocket could be available for commercial use, says ASR project leader Yasuhiro Morita. Studies of the ASR began in 2007, and the agency has completed its concept design, done the preliminary design review and is about halfway into more detailed development work. The point of the project is to cut costs. The ASR would lift 1.2-metric-ton satellites to low Earth orbit, a third less than its predecessor M-V, at around a third of the cost per launch. At $80 million a shot, the M-V was enormously expensive, partly because it was launched only seven times in nine years, the last in 2006. The agency says Japan’s space scientific effort suffered from that high cost. For the ASR, «the purpose is to significantly reduce the time and labor needed for . . . assembly and checkout of the rocket and to make the associated ground support system and facilities as compact as possible,» says Morita. The target cost is $30 million per launch. The design would cut costs in several ways, beginning with the use of the SRB-A strap-on solid-rocket booster from the H-IIA and H-IIB heavy rockets as the ASR’s first stage, which would offer the economies of a faster production run. The casings for the upper stages would be made more cheaply by curing their composite material at normal pressure rather than high pressure. The second stage would be based on the third stage of the M-V. The ASR third stage would be adapted from the fourth stage of the M-V. Thrust will be increased a little for both of those upper stages. The ASR would be autonomous enough to do without all but two or three of the 50 people that were needed to launch M-Vs. The agency also expects that operation of the ground facilities for each launch would take only a quarter of the time needed for the earlier rocket. Avionics from the H-IIA would also be used. The launch mass is planned to be 90 metric tons (compared with 140 tons for the M-V) and height 24 meters (78.7 ft.), compared with 30.8 meters. Payload would be 1.33% of launch weight, slightly better than the M-V’s 1.32%. Despite those strides toward lower costs, the agency believes it could do better with a follow-on development of the ASR. The follow-on would adopt onboard safety monitoring, to eliminate the tracking infrastructure on the ground. If the rocket

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malfunctioned dangerously, it would destroy itself. Under another program, the agency is working on a way of cutting the cost of solid-rocket motors by developing a fuel that can be melted at 70-80C. Since conventional solid fuels need to be mixed and then immediately cured, the plant must be large enough to handle all the fuel for an engine in one batch. The agency sees thermoplastic fuel avoiding that problem, because it can be made continuously in lumps resembling large blocks of chocolate that would be stored until needed, at which point they would be melted and poured into a mold to form the engine. The fuel production process would cease to be an occasional big effort needing big equipment; instead, it would be a continuous trickle using smaller equipment that would be kept humming. The idea of reheating solid propellant may seem alarming, but Morita says the melting point is so low as to present no risk of explosion. The fuel is ammonium perchlorate and aluminum powder held in a thermoplastic binder made up of a butadiene elastomer, plasticizer and bonding agent. It has been successfully tested with an experimental engine 85 mm. (3.3 in.) long. The agency thinks it must aim at a launch cost of $20 million for the follow-on ASR, a figure that Morita believes opens up the possibility of IHI Aerospace operating the rocket for commercial customers, though maybe with government support. Space Exploration Technologies of the U.S. charges $10.5 million to launch a 1-ton payload to low Earth orbit with its kerosene-fueled Falcon 1e rocket. The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency is a civilian scientific outfit, and the ASR would be a civilian launcher, but there may be an ancillary reason for Tokyo to fund the program: to sustain the country’s technological base in building large solid-propellant rockets so that it can rapidly develop ballistic missiles with that know-how if it suddenly needed to. Bernard Loo of Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies says he would be amazed if such thoughts had not crossed the mind of Japanese officialdom. Morita, however, says solid rockets are a practical choice. They are storable and simple and therefore reliable and cheap, he notes, while admitting the traditional caution about assembling large amounts of solid propellant for big launchers.

Japan has launched a new sophisticated imaging satellite into space

Advanced Imaging, 6 (3/06, Advanced Imaging March Issue, “Goodrich Technology Enables Japan’s Advanced Earth Remote Sensing Satellite”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=GOODRICH+TECHNOLOGY+ENABLES+JAPAN%27S+ADVANCED+EARTH+REMOTE+SENSING+SATELLITE&rft.jtitle=Advanced+Imaging&rft.au=Anonymous&rft.date=2006-03-01&rft.issn=1042-0711&rft.volume=21&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=49&rft.externalDBID=BAIG&rft.externalDocID=1017833551) MHDeveloped by the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency, ALOS is one of the largest Japanese satellites ever sent into space. The main imaging instrument on ALOS is the Panchromatic Remote-sensing Instrument of Stereo Mapping, or PRISM, payload which will capture images on the Earth as small as 2.5-meters to support precision mapping. PRISM has three, Goodrich-produced optical sensors pointing forward, downward and backward along the craft's ground track as it orbits Earth. This arrangement provides high quality, three-dimensional imagery and can collect image areas on the Earth up to 70 kilometers wide. Goodrich's Electro-Optical Systems team developed the advanced high precision optical systems in the three PRISM payload telescopes. Each telescope has a unique optical configuration allowing it to capture large areas on the ground. The Goodrich-produced mirrors for each of these lightweight systems are 0.6-meters in maximum dimension and are polished to a surface precision of better than 10 billionths of a meter. The company also provided the attitude control hardware that supports precision pointing of the ALOS spacecraft to specific regions of the Earth. These items incorporate Goodrich proprietary fine balancing processes which dramatically reduce the disturbances imparted to the satellite. The ALOS system will aid scientists in their search for natural resources, help cartographers around the world create more precise maps and provide support for disaster response.

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Moon Mining AffJapanese scientists have created exclusive lunar explorers, they have no desire for cooperation – U.S. is way behind.Iannotta, 8, (6/08, Featured Space News Writer for Aerospace America, Aerospace America, “Japan's Kaguya probes Moon's mysteries”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Japan%27s+Kaguya+probes+Moon%27s+mysteries&rft.jtitle=AEROSPACE+AMERICA&rft.au=Iannotta%2C+B&rft.date=2008-06-30&rft.pub=AMER+INST+AERONAUT+ASTRONAUT&rft.issn=0740-722X&rft.volume=46&rft.issue=6&rft.spage=42&rft.epage=45&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=1518912931)--JCJapan's Kaguya lunar probe is the most sophisticated--critics like to say the most complicated--unmanned mission to the Moon in history. With the spacecraft and its two subsatellites now safely orbiting the Moon, lunar scientists in the U.S. and around the world are facing an issue they admit could be worse: How to convince the Japanese to share their treasure trove of data sooner rather than later, and commit themselves to storing it in an easily accessible way. Other experts, such as former NASA lunar scientist Alan Binder, wonder if a trend toward giant Moon spacecraft--which he insists are riskier technically--is a positive development. In an age of joint space exploration programs, from the International Space Station to the Cassini Saturn probe, Japan's space managers have made a point of keeping Kaguya almost purely a Japanese mission. Formerly known as the Selenological and Engineering Explorer, or SELENE, the 3.5-ton spacecraft was built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries for the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). Kaguya is named for the girl in an ancient Japanese tale who came from and returned to the Moon. The spacecraft blasted off last September aboard a Japanese H-IIA rocket. In October 2007, the main Kaguya orbiter released a 50-kg relay satellite that is currently doing its job of keeping the main orbiter in touch with Earth when it is over the far side of the Moon. A companion 50-kg satellite called VStar, released a few days later, is assisting in mapping variations in the Moon's gravity field, especially over the less-studied far side. Kaguya carries 14 main science instruments, all managed by Japanese scientists. "It's a pretty amazing mission. It's going to contribute a data set that [U.S. scientists] don't have and don't plan to collect," says Brent Archinal, a precision lunar mapper at the U.S. Geological Survey Field Center in Flagstaff, Ariz. Flagstaff is home to the U.S. Planetary Data System, which stores planetary images and data. "It's no secret that the Japanese are trying to be very independent in running this mission. Everyone agrees that's fine, but in the long run they have told us they do plan to make the data available, and that's what's important," Archinal adds. Japan did invite U.S. and other scientists to witness the Kaguya launch. Shinichi Sobue, a JAXA spokesman for Kaguya, says by e-mail that JAXA saw no need to look beyond Japan for investigators and science instruments. "JAXA realized there were enough mission instrument proposals," says Sobue. This was the "first lunar explorer mission for Japan," he adds, "and JAXA decided only to select Japanese scientists as Kaguya [principal investigators]." The varied roles of Kaguya's instruments range from public outreach--its HDTV camera has wowed viewers with videos of Earth setting over shaded craters--to the critical search for water in the form of ice that explorers would need on extended stays. The spacecraft carries 14 main instruments: The Kaguya mission marks a potential dam burst in what is expected to be an international torrent of new lunar data for years to come. The flood began with a trickle in 2003, when ESA launched its SMART 1 lunar probe. SMART 1 ended its mission in 2006 by intentionally crashing into the lunar surface. Kaguya blasted off last September, and China followed the next month with its Chang'e 1 probe. India planned to launch its Chandrayaan-1 probe early this year, but has announced it will delay the flight until July. And NASA plans to launch its Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter by year's end. If most or all of these missions succeed, the world's collective digital knowledge of the Moon will go from dozens of terabytes--a terabyte consists of a trillion bytes--to several petabytes--a petabyte equals a quadrillion bytes. Archinal and other scientists are concerned that managers at space agencies around the world have not given enough thought to how all that data will be processed to high accuracy and stored in ways that will make it accessible to scientists beyond the home countries of each mission. Scientists from NASA and other agencies are working on plans for doing that. But those efforts lag behind hardware development and "aren't as advanced as plans to have the actual missions," Archinal says.

Japan has the capability and technology to mine the moon for helium 3 which would boost the space program. Joseph, 95- chairman of the board of New Mexico–based Aerospace Consulting Corporation ( Joseph E., 1/26/95, “Who Will Mine the Moon?”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=news&rft.atitle=WHO+WILL+MINE+THE+MOON%3F&rft.jtitle=The+Plain+dealer+%28Cleveland%2C+Ohio+%3A+1961%29&rft.au=LAWRENCE+E.+JOSEPH&rft.date=1995-01-25&rft.spage=13.B&rft.externalDBID=CLEV&rft.externalDocID=31641500) -- JCLast year, Japan announced plans to begin an exploratory project to mine helium 3 on the moon. Government and private laboratories will begin tests this year with the goal of sending up robots and eventually manned missions. Japan has the money and information technology, and the driving need of a nation with few natural resources to secure its energy supply. Gerald Kulcinski, director of the Fusion Technology Institute at the University of Wisconsin, estimates that Japan's helium 3 fusion program

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outspends U.S. helium 3 research by 100 to 1. Japan's space program lacks the hardware and expertise for lunar missions. But Japanese investors have backed joint ventures with NPO Energia, the Russian space contractor that makes massive booster rockets. And collaboration between Japanese and Russian scientists on the proposed lunar mission is under study, according to Japan's National Space Development Agency. Russia, with its formidable nuclear-weapons stockpile, would be an attractive and logical partner. It offers decades of fusion expertise and about half the world's stock of helium 3 - and a space program that would love more than anything to beat us in round two of the race to the moon. Helium 3 may be the next chapter in the saga of great American discoveries that other nations capitalize on. The gas was first identified by the American scientists Robert Cornog and Luis Alvarez in 1939, but no one gave much thought to technological or commercial applications because it was so rare. And though the gas was found embedded in most lunar soil samples, that fact didn't really register until 1986, when University of Wisconsin researchers re-examined the Apollo missions' findings. Since then, Madison has become the center for U.S. helium 3 research. Harrison Schmitt, the former Apollo 17 astronaut who also served a term as U.S. senator from New Mexico, has taken up the cause. He believes that compact helium 3 fusion reactors will one day extend the range of space vehicles much the way that fission reactors have enabled nuclear submarines to spend months at a time under water.

An International Lunar base would benefit all countries involved

Friedman, 8, Louis Friedman- Executive Director of The Planetary Society (9/8/08, “A New Paradigm for a New Vision of Space”, http://www.planetary.org/programs/projects/advocacy_and_education/space_advocacy/new_paradigm.pdf)MHRedirect the lunar program (NASA) from establishing a nationalistic and wasteful lunar base to an international endeavor that would advance all spacefaring interests. The Moon is a steppingstone into the solar system, and today it is considered a primary objective of many spacefaring nations. It is magnificent to imagine all of them working with NASA to return to the Moon, this time truly “for all mankind.” The U.S. could support an international lunar base in many ways consistent with national objectives and end up spending much less money than by doing it all themselves. U.S. roles, as the Vision for Space Exploration so clearly states, could then be directed for the bigger and longer-range move outward of humans to Mars

Japan is working on a walking lunar robot – set for 2020

The Telegraph, 9 (4/4/09, The Telegraph Asian Politics, “Japan aims for a walking robot on the moon by 2020”, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/5101633/Japan-aims-for-walking-robot-on-the-moon-by-2020.html) MH--JCJapan hopes to have a two-legged robot walk on the moon by around 2020, with a joint mission involving astronauts and robots to follow, according to a plan laid out by a government group. Specifics of the plan, including what new technologies will be required and the size of the project's budget, are to be decided within the next two years, according to Japan's Strategic Headquarters for Space Development, a Cabinet-level working group.Development of a lunar robot is part of a broad framework outlined by the group, which is charged with plotting a new course for Japan's space strategy. As a next step, joint exploration of the moon involving robots and astronauts will be considered.The framework is to be finalised late next month, after the public has a chance to comment on the proposals.The group also recommended promoting research into military satellites, such as an early warning system for detecting ballistic missile launches and systems to detect and analyse radio waves sent in space.Other recommendations by the group include using space research as a tool to foster diplomacy with other countries and developing an advanced satellite to predict and monitor natural disasters.The Strategic Headquarters was established last year by a law passed to advance Japan's space technology and exploration. It allows the country, which has a largely peaceful constitution, to use space for military defence.Friday's proposal was released as North Korea was completing preparations to launch a multistage rocket over Japan. The communist country says it will send a communications satellite into orbit, but Tokyo suspects the North, which has acknowledged it has nuclear weapons, is actually testing long-range missile technology.Japan launched its first satellite in 1970 and has long been among the world leaders in space technology. But in recent years, it has been overshadowed by China, which is aggressively pushing its own space program.In January, Japan used one of its rockets to launch the first satellite to monitor greenhouse gases worldwide, a tool to help monitor global warming.

Japan has the power can capability mine the moon with humanoid robots by 2015. Mick, 10-sr. writer for Daily Tech ( June 2010, Jason, “Japanese Robots Take Over the Moon by 2020”, http://www.dailytech.com/Japanese+Robots+to+Take+Over+the+Moon+by+2020/article18572.htm). EE--JCNow another Asian superpower is thirsting for the resources buried on Earth's largest natural satellite. According to a report in Japanese publication NODE, JAXA, Japan's space program, is looking to pour $2.2B USD into plans to put an army of robots (peaceful robots, of course) on the Moon. Japan, always on the

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cutting edge of technology, has come up with all sorts of creative and outlandish uses for robots. But its lunarbots may just steal show. JAXA plans on landing humanoid robots on the moon by 2015. After receiving the official backing of the Japanese Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, the mission timeline has been expanded to include plans for a full fledged robot space-base by 2020. The robot invasion will start when 660-pound robots with treads land in 2015. These WALL-E-esque robots will come equipped with solar panels, seismographs,high-def cameras, and loads of sensors. These robots will also come with human-like arms to collect lunar rocks, which they will deposit in a rocket that will launch on a return flight to Earth.

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SPS Aff

Participation in a global SPS project would help economies worldwide (AT Japan doesn’t have enough Money for SSP)Matsuoka, 99 – Hideo Matsuoka, Professor at Teikyo Heisei University (10/7/99, Paper presented to IAF Congress, “An Equatorial SPS Pilot Plant”, http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/an_equatorial_sps_pilot_plant.shtml) MH -- JCIn addition, the present economic difficulties currently faced in many countries, exemplified by record levels of unemployment simultaneously in Japan, Russia, Germany, France, and many developing countries in South East Asia and South America are evidence above all, of the need to develop new industries. Solar power satellites would generate sales revenues from a new space-based service, and would thereby create a wide range of new business opportunities in space. In addition, Germany and several other countries in Europe have renounced the use of nuclear electricity generation, but they have yet to take any major initiative towards developing a major new power source to replace it. Participation in SPS 2000 could be a positive and popular move in this direction.

SPS pilot plant would boost the Japanese economy – commercially profitableMatsuoka, 99 – Hideo Matsuoka, Professor at Teikyo Heisei University (10/7/99, Paper presented to IAF Congress, “An Equatorial SPS Pilot Plant”, http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/an_equatorial_sps_pilot_plant.shtml) MH--JCThe Japanese space industry faces a similar problem to NASA: after H2A and JEM are developed, there is no consensus on what government space spending should aim at. Space science of course has its own justification, but that represents only about 10% of government space spending. At a time when the Japanese government's financial deficit is reaching crisis-level, it is surely undesirable to fund space technology development projects that offer no possibility of becoming commercially profitable. This poses important questions for Japan's space leadership, but as a potentially important energy project, the building and operation of an SPS pilot plant would certainly have economic value.

<Add Japanese Economy key to world economy—Global economic downturn = NW> Perm can’t solve, because it would decrease profitability and investment in Japanese SSP.

Japan will have a fully capable solar based space power system by 2030, and will lead the way for space development. Cyranoaki, 9- japan specialist writer for nature news (November 2009, David, “Japan Sets Sights on Solar Power From Space”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Japan+sets+sights+on+solar+power+from+space&rft.jtitle=Nature&rft.au=Cyranoski%2C+David&rft.date=2009-11-26&rft.pub=Nature+Publishing+Group&rft.issn=0028-0836&rft.volume=462&rft.issue=7272&rft.spage=398&rft.epage=399&rft_id=info:doi/10.1038%2F462398b&rft.externalDBID=GNAA&rft.externalDocID=462398b)EE--JCJapanese scientists are once again eyeing an off-world approach to alternative energy — collecting solar energy from satellites in orbit and beaming it down to Earth. A space-based solar-power satellite — which could gather energy without having to worry about clouds or night-time — has been a dream for decades in both the United States and Japan. But the costs of developing it has meant that support has waxed and waned over the years. Now, however, Japan has a new sense of mission. In June, it released a national space plan calling for a programme to "lead the world in space-based solar power". And earlier this month, scientists, engineers and policy-makers met at Kyoto University to lay out development plans. The government's commitment "is definitely a milestone and has given tremendous excitement to solar-power satellite researchers", says Hiroshi Matsumoto, a radio scientist and president of Kyoto University. Researchers are hoping to launch a full-scale system by 2030, but costs need to come down dramatically for it to be economically viable. Few doubt that the project is technically possible. The well-understood process starts with collecting solar energy with photovoltaic cells, transferring that energy to antennas that transmit microwaves, then receiving those microwaves with a 'rectifying antenna' that converts them to electricity. As early as 1975, scientists at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, transferred energy by means of microwaves over a distance of 1.54 kilometres. And in May last year, scientists beamed power over a distance of 148 kilometres, between two Hawaiian islands. Japan has been investigating solar-power satellites since the 1980s. In 1983 and again in 1993, Matsumoto, working with Kobe University's Nobuyuki Kaya, launched rockets into the ionosphere to investigate what happens to microwaves as they travel through space (H. Matsumoto Radio Sci. Bull. 273, 11–35; 1995). In March this year, a group from Kyoto University

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became the first to use microwaves to send power from the air to the ground when they charged a mobile phone with microwaves transmitted from a blimp-like airship hovering some 30 metres above the ground. Current scale-up plans call for a series of tests, each with an increasingly larger capacity for power transmission. First, Japan aims to demonstrate ground-based transmission in the kilowatt range, then space-based kilowatt transmission using Japan's Kibo module on the International Space Station or small satellites. By 2020, researchers hope to have a prototype satellite that can transmit in the range of hundreds of kilowatts, and by 2030 a satellite that can transmit a gigawatt. As currently envisioned, the system to launch in 2030 would be a 2-kilometre-wide array of solar cells with an array of 1 billion transmitting antennas — each measuring 5–10 centimetres across — on the side facing Earth. The goal is to make satellites for under ¥1 trillion (US$11 billion) each; it currently costs 100 times that. "It's exciting, but there are many problems to overcome," says Naoki Shinohara of Kyoto University. For one thing, transmission efficiency must rise to 75%, he says; the airship experiment achieved just 40% efficiency, although the technology it uses differs from what a satellite would use. Rocket launches will also need to be cut to a hundredth of their current cost; options such as reusable rockets are being considered, according to Susumu Sasaki of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). At this month's meeting, Tokyo University's Kimiya Komurasaki discussed how a remote microwave source could power rockets. That would reduce the amount of propellant they need to carry and, in theory, mean that rockets used to build a solar-power satellite could carry more antennas and solar cells. Matsumoto estimates that it will take ¥2 billion to ¥3 billion to demonstrate solar-power satellite technology on the ground, and ¥10 billion to ¥50 billion to demonstrate it in orbit. The nation's space plan calls for an "all-Japan" effort to prepare for space-based demonstrations within three years. And as research budgets have been tight in many areas (see Nature 462, 258–259; 2009), the industry and science ministries have more than doubled their budget requests for solar-power satellite-related programmes, to nearly ¥1.4 billion. JAXA has pressed for a doubling of its budget for space-based solar power, from ¥250 million to ¥500 million. "I'm 100% confident this [technology] will happen," says Shinohara. Unlike wind or Earth-based solar, solar-power satellites in space can gather energy 24 hours a day to provide a reliable source of alternative energy. "We need another stable power source," he says. Japan looks likely to lead the way, as interest in the United States has waned, says John Mankins, who led the space solar-power programme at NASA. Most efforts in the United States are now in private companies or non-profit organizations. In April, Solaren, a company based in Manhattan Beach, California, signed a contract with San Francisco-based Pacific Gas and Electric to produce 200 megawatts of energy from a solar-power satellite starting in 2016. But Mankins, who co-founded and works at Managed Energy Technologies in Ashburn, Virginia, calls that goal "extremely challenging". Japan's effort, he says, may lead the way: "The Japanese plan is quite well formulated."

NASDA has committed to developing solar space power for japan, the low launch cost projects are able to fund. Normile, 1- freelance writer on science policy in Tokyo (11/9/01, Denis, “Japan looks for brighter answers to energy needs”. Vol. 294, Iss. 5545, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?did=91871968&sid=3&Fmt=3&clientId=17822&RQT=309&VName=PQD). EE--JCJapan's National Space Development Agency (NASDA) earlier this year commissioned two industrial groups to develop competing proposals for a space solar power test satellite that could be launched within this decade. "The agency and the aerospace industry are extremely interested in this project," says Masahiro Mori, NASDA's space solar program manager. Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) is separately finding a study of a commercial space solar power plant that is expected to trigger additional funding. "We consider this a possible future energy option," says Junya Nishimoto of METIs space industries office. And this year Matsumoto received $3.5 million from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology to build a facility to test microwave antennas and receivers. Matsumoto estimates that in the last decade Japan has spent $10 million to $20 million, not including salaries, on both wireless power transmission and space solar power. Interest in space solar power is picking up in other countries as well. The French space agency, CNES, is watching the installation of the first operational wireless power transmission system on remote Reunion Island in the Indian Ocean for clues about its use as a power source for robots on Mars or the moon. In September, a committee of the U.S. National Research Council (NRC) said that a fledgling NASA program on space solar power deserves at least enough funding to do some serious research. "I am confident that with this positive peer review we will be able to move ahead with this research," says John Mankins, director of the NASA program, which has spent $22 million in the past 2 years. Some doubt that space solar power will ever prove economically competitive for terrestrial use. "The tasks are formidable, and [at present] it's not clear that you can identify a path that you know will solve the technology problems," says Richard Schwartz, an electrical engineer and dean of engineering at Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana, who chaired the NRC panel. Schwartz, who remains neutral on the question of putting a solar power plant in space, nevertheless believes that an increased investment could bolster work on photovoltaics, robotics, and wireless power transmission. The concept of generating power from space goes back to Nikola Tesla, who in 1899 tried unsuccessfully to illuminate isolated homes by beaming energy from a tower set up in Colorado Springs, Colorado. In the 1960s, William Brown, an engineer at Raytheon Co., powered a small helicopter hovering above a transmitting array, and Peter Glaser, a mechanical engineer in Boston, proposed the idea of space-based solar arrays beaming energy to Earth (Science, 22 November 1968, p. 857). Since then, scientists have tried to show that the physical constraints are not insurmountable. In 1983 and again in 1993, Japan's Institute of Space and Astronautical Science transmitted microwave beams from one rocket to another, confirming that atmospheric scattering is negligible. It has also been shown that microwaves below 10 gigahertz suffer minimal damping from atmospheric water vapor. Although the NRC committee

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agrees with Matsumoto that the basic concept has been proven, it noted that "providing space solar power for commercially competitive terrestrial electric power will require breakthrough advances in a number of technologies." There's also the problem of getting the necessary equipment into space. Both NASA and NASDA have programs to develop lowcost launch technologies based on either reusable rockets or inexpensive expendable rockets. Both will probably be needed to build a workable power grid: The NRC committee estimates that it would take 1000 space shuttle payloads to deliver the necessary material, an order of magnitude more than the number of missions needed to construct the international space station. Without breakthroughs in launching technology, space solar power "would be impractical and uneconomical for the generation of terrestrial base load power due to the high cost and mass of the components and construction," the NRC report concludes. But enthusiasts see that long list of challenges as a rallying cry, not a signal to retreat. "It may take 2000 years, but humans are destined to civilize space," says Matsumoto, who also chairs NASDA's space solar power advisory committee and is an adviser to the METI program. "And this will be one of the enabling technologies."

Luna Ring will bring solar power from the moon and is just the project needed to bring Japan back on top after the earthquake. Tucker and Criswell, 11- **senior editor of “The Futurist Magazine” and **director of the institute for space system operations at the University of Houston (may/june 2011, Patrick and David, “Solar Power from the Moon”,  Vol. 45, Iss. 3, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?did=2345982861&Fmt=7&clientId=17822&RQT=309&VName=PQD) EE--JCMeet the LUNA RING, the brainchild of Tetsuji Yoshida and his colleagues at CSP, the research arm of Shimizu, one of the largest construction firms in Japan. The LUNA RING is an idea that could only come from the land of the rising sun, a country boasting many of the world's best-known technology companies, like Sony, Hitachi, and Panasonic, but also saddled with a shortage of natural resources. The LUNA RING speaks to a future global need that's keenly felt in the present in Japan, a nation now also coping with the impacts of the devastating March 2011 earthquake on its nuclear power capacity. It's also an example of planning in the long term. "My very optimistic forecast is 25 years," Yoshida told me when I visited the company headquarters in Tokyo last November. He explained that this is the time required before they could even begin the lunar-surface activity, assuming that Japan, the United States, or some other investor was actually willing to fund the project. "The scale is so huge; I don't know how long it would take to construct. We may have to adjust the plan and the scale," he says. If the most exciting part of Yoshida's job is coming up with bold engineering concepts, the most difficult part, except for the math, is keeping people's expectations realistic. Shimizu's company president, Yoichi Miyamoto, was hoping to pitch the project to potential investors with a start date on the Moon of around 2035. Yoshida sees this as ambitious, to say the least. The technical, practical, and monetary obstacles to building a solar laser power station on the Moon are unprecedented. But the LUNA RING is buildable. Photovoltaic panels, remotely guided robots, and microwave transmission and lasers are already proven technologies. The LUNA RING is simply raising the proverbial bar on the current state of innovation- raising the bar to the Moon. "It's very challenging, a good project for a company like Shimizu. So complithis is a type of campaign for us," says Yoshida.

Japan is making SSP by 2016. The Daily Yomiuri, 11- National Japanese Newspaper (1/23/11, “Space Based Solar Power Set for first test”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?genre=news&SS_sid=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&SS_issnh=0890-8710&issn=08908710&SS_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lib.umich.edu%2Farticles%2Fsearch%3Fkw%3D%2522Japan%2522%2B%2522solar%2Bpower%2522%2B%2522space%2522%26local%3D0%26fulltext%3D1%26scholarly%3D0%26newspapers%3D0&date=2011-01-22&externaldbid=n%2Fa&externaldocid=247466924&atitle=Space-based+solar+power+set+for+1st+test&title=Yomiuri+Shimbun+%28Toyko%2C+Japan%29&localeid=1033&paramdict=en-US&jtitle=Yomiuri+Shimbun+%28Toyko%2C+Japan%29&SS_LibHash=DL2AF5JF3E&sid=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&SS_source=56&l=DL2AF5JF3E&SS_ReferentFormat=JournalFormat&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&au=&PP=true&SS_RequestType=1&SS_jc=THEYOMSHIN&SS_multi=true) EE--JCA team of scientists from several organizations will begin tests this spring on a space-based power generation technology using satellites, it was learned Saturday. The technology would start by generating electricity from sunlight in space, convert the power into microwaves and then send it to Earth, the team said. The planned test will attempt to convert a strong electric current into microwaves and transmit them 10 meters away in a simulated outer space environment at Kyoto University. The group comprises scientists from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., IHI Corp. and Kyoto University. A successful test would likely accelerate

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the goal of putting a space-based power generation system into practical use by 2025. Space-based solar power generation, which is 10 times more efficient than earthbound generation, would be a major step forward in terms of fulfilling energy needs, as the strength of sunlight in space is about twice that on Earth, and there are four or five times the hours of sunlight due to the absence of clouds. Mitsubishi Electric has proposed what it calls the Solarbird project, in which 40 relatively small 200-meter solar power generating satellites would be launched. This could produce 1 million kilowatts of electricity, equivalent to a nuclear power plant. The Solarbird system would collect sunlight using reflecting mirrors fitted onto satellites in geostationary orbit 36,000 kilometers above the equator. After the electricity is generated, it would be converted into microwaves and transmitted to Earth. The microwaves--to be sent as harmless radio waves--would be received at ground stations 3 kilometers in diameter and placed on the sea or in sunny desert areas, and then converted back into electricity. The key to making the system practical hinges on the efficient conversion of electricity into microwaves. The experiment will be conducted in a room that does not reflect electromagnetic waves to mimic the conditions of space. If the team succeeds in converting a strong electrical current into microwaves and transmitting them about 10 meters, it will then start work on reducing the weight of the power generation equipment and improving the transmission technology. The team hopes to launch a trial satellite sometime after 2016. It is estimated that implementing a workable space-based solar power generation system will cost about 2 trillion yen.

Japan will build SSP- Readiness & InitiativeLeatherwood, 5/22/11-Sr. staff writer at Space Future Journal (G B, “ Space Based Solar Power by 2016?, Solaren Plans to Make it Happen”, http://www.spacefuture.com/journal/journal.cgi?art=2011.05.22.solaren_plans_SSP_by_2016)--JCIt is only fair to mention that as of this writing, Solaren appears to be in the forefront of efforts to make space based solar power a reality, but there are other experimental projects being conducted; at least one other government, Japan, has indicated a readiness to allocate significant funding to research and development. With the current enthusiasm being generated by private commercial rocket development it appears that the goal of less expensive, reliable, reusable vehicles is getting closer. And as we know, a world of opportunity will open up when we have Cheap Access to Space …including clean, unlimited energy at a price competitive with current outdated and polluting production sources.

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Space Elevator Aff

Japan is leading the pack in space elevator technology The Times, 8 (9/22/08, The Sunday Times, “Japan hopes to turn sci-fi into reality with elevator to the stars”, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/science/article4799369.ece)MH--JCFrom cyborg housemaids and waterpowered cars to dog translators and rocket boots, Japanese boffins have racked up plenty of near-misses in the quest to turn science fiction into reality. Now the finest scientific minds of Japan are devoting themselves to cracking the greatest sci-fi vision of all: the space elevator. Man has so far conquered space by painfully and inefficiently blasting himself out of the atmosphere but the 21st century should bring a more leisurely ride to the final frontier. For chemists, physicists, material scientists, astronauts and dreamers across the globe, the space elevator represents the most tantalising of concepts: cables stronger and lighter than any fibre yet woven, tethered to the ground and disappearing beyond the atmosphere to a satellite docking station in geosynchronous orbit above Earth. Up and down the 22,000 mile-long (36,000km) cables — or flat ribbons — will run the elevator carriages, themselves requiring huge breakthroughs in engineering to which the biggest Japanese companies and universities have turned their collective attention. In the carriages, the scientists behind the idea told The Times, could be any number of cargoes. A space elevator could carry people, huge solar-powered generators or even casks of radioactive waste. The point is that breaking free of Earth's gravity will no longer require so much energy — perhaps 100 times less than launching the space shuttle. “Just like travelling abroad, anyone will be able to ride the elevator into space,” Shuichi Ono, chairman of the Japan Space Elevator Association, said. The vision has inspired scientists around the world and government organisations including NASA. Several competing space elevator projects are gathering pace as various groups vie to build practical carriages, tethers and the hundreds of other parts required to carry out the plan. There are prizes offered by space elevator-related scientific organisations for breakthroughs and competitions for the best and fastest design of carriage. First envisioned by the celebrated master of science fiction, Arthur C. Clarke, in his 1979 work The Fountains of Paradise, the concept has all the best qualities of great science fiction: it is bold, it is a leap of imagination and it would change life as we know it. Unlike the warp drives in Star Trek, or H.G. Wells's The Time Machine, the idea of the space elevator does not mess with the laws of science; it just presents a series of very, very complex engineering problems. Japan is increasingly confident that its sprawling academic and industrial base can solve those issues, and has even put the astonishingly low price tag of a trillion yen (£5 billion) on building the elevator. Japan is renowned as a global leader in the precision engineering and high-quality material production without which the idea could never be possible. The biggest obstacle lies in the cables. To extend the elevator to a stationary satellite from the Earth's surface would require twice that length of cable to reach a counterweight, ensuring that the cable maintains its tension. The cable must be exceptionally light, staggeringly strong and able to withstand all projectiles thrown at it inside and outside the atmosphere. The answer, according to the groups working on designs, will lie in carbon nanotubes - microscopic particles that can be formed into fibres and whose mass production is now a focus of Japan's big textile companies. According to Yoshio Aoki, a professor of precision machinery engineering at Nihon University and a director of the Japan Space Elevator Association, the cable would need to be about four times stronger than what is currently the strongest carbon nanotube fibre, or about 180 times stronger than steel. Pioneering work on carbon nanotubes in Cambridge has produced a strength improvement of about 100 times over the last five years. Equally, there is the issue of powering the carriages as they climb into space. “We are thinking of using the technology employed in our bullet trains,” Professor Aoki said. “Carbon nanotubes are good conductors of electricity, so we are thinking of having a second cable to provide power all along the route.” Japan is hosting an international conference in November to draw up a timetable for the machine.

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Asteroid Affs

Japan is probing asteroids nowJiji Press English News Service, 10. (6/14/10, “Japan Asteroid Probe Returns to Earth”, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?index=0&did=2057822871&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1308682771&clientId=17822)Tokyo, June 14 (Jiji Press)--Ending its seven-year voyage, a Japanese asteroid probe has returned to Earth, with scientists closely watching whether the probe's sample return capsule contains sands of the asteroid, "Itokawa." If the capsule actually has Itokawa's sands inside, it will be the first spacecraft that brings back a geological sample from an asteroid, officials at the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency said. According to JAXA, the unmanned probe, called "Hayabusa," meaning falcon, successfully separated the heat-resistant capsule before its atmospheric entry. Hayabusa burned up around 10:30 p.m. Sunday Japan time, while the capsule parachuted down to a southern Australian desert. Work to recover the capsule started on Monday morning. It will take several hours, the officials said, expressing hope that the sands, if found inside the canister, will help elucidate how the solar system has evolved since its birth some 4.6 billion years ago. JAXA launched Hayabusa from its observatory in Uchinoura, Kagoshima Pref., southern Japan, in May 2003, and Hayabusa reached a point near Itokawa, located between Earth and Mars, in September 2005. The asteroid was named after late Hideo Itokawa, a pioneer of Japan's rocketry and known as the father of the country's space program.Hayabusa made two landings on and departures from Itokawa in November the same year. Though its rock and stone sampling system failed to work, chances are high that sands stirred up by the spacecraft entered the capsule because its cap was open, the officials said.After recovering the capsule, JAXA will analyze the sample, if any. The analysis will take time, they said. Even if the capsule contains no sand, Hayabusa should be credited for revealing that Itokawa is made from debris of celestial bodies that collided with each other, experts said.The Japanese space agency is now planning another asteroid probe.

Japan is ahead in asteroid mining with recent Hayabusa missionNewland &Douglas, 10 - *Ph.D., Mission Analysis manager for Mission Development Group, AND **Degree in Space Science, commander of spacecraft for Advanced Composition Explorer. (11/10, Aerospace America, “Space Operations and Support”, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&csi=7908&sr=HLEAD(Space+operations+and+support)+and+date+is+December,%202010)This year has been marked by a number of significant scientific advances in the field of spacecraft operations, including a number of asteroid mission successes. Deep Impact's flyby of Earth in June as part of its extended investigation activity en route to comet Hartley-2 was followed closely by Rosetta's flyby of asteroid Lutetia in July. The most remarkable of the asteroid missions was undoubtedly the Japanese Hayabusa mission. Japan had already enjoyed a significant scientific operations success in May with the launch of its Akatsuki satellite to Venus. But Hayabusa became the first mission to take a sample from the surface of an asteroid (Itokawa) and return it to Earth. The mission's success was all the more remarkable considering the issues the operations team had to overcome. The spacecraft's rover, Minerva, could not be dispatched and Hayabusa itself, which was not intended to land on the asteroid, landed for 30 minutes. The particle collection mechanism failed, but asteroid dust was collected as a result of the landing. A failure in one of the engines resulted in a loss of communications with the spacecraft for seven weeks, and JAXA needed a further 16 months to regain control. Finally the craft had to use ion thrusters to return to Earth after the chemical thruster failure. Space debris and situational awareness remained very active topics. The widely publicized control communications failure of the Galaxy 15 satellite while maintaining transponder broadcasting in April, resulted in significant interference to neighboring spacecraft as it drifted uncontrolled in front of active geostationary orbital slots over the subsequent months. This not only caused significant disruption to the geostationary communications sector, but highlighted a less cited but equally important domain of spacecraft control failure mitigation and end-of-life strategies, compared to past years' dramatic debris events. End-of-life passivation guidelines highlight the need for disabling intentional transmitters, and although Galaxy 15 was not being placed into an end-of-life configuration, it demonstrated very clearly the need for such guidelines during both these and mission contingency activities. Progress in space situational awareness included the first operations of the Space Data Center, set up in 2009 as a nonprofit organization looking at conjunctions of satellites owned by its participating operators, and the expected first launch of the USAF's space surveillance satellite. Commercial spaceflight has made steady progress this year, most notably by SpaceX with the successful maiden flight of its Falcon 9 heavy-lift rocket on June 4 from Launch Complex 40 at Cape Canaveral. The company achieved another major milestone on August 12 with a successful drop test of its Dragon capsule about 9 mi. off the coast of Morro Bay in California. The test validated its parachute deployment system. And though the initial flights will descend for a touchdown on the water, their goal is a land recovery. The combined Falcon 9 and Dragon were designed not only to replace the space shuttle as a cargo carrier but also to transport crew to low Earth orbit. The latter is the so-called "D" option of the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services contract, which NASA has not yet exercised. Elsewhere in private spaceflight, Virgin Galactic's VSS Enterprise made its inaugural manned flight on March 22 in a "captive carry" flight test in which the vehicle stayed attached to the VMS Eve mothership. The flight lasted 2 hr 54 min and achieved a peak altitude of 45,000 ft.

Japan has the funds and technology to track asteroids and bring them back for earth study, and NASA supports these missions.

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Normile, 97- freelance writer on science policy in Tokyo (5/23/97, Dennis, “Japanese Mission to Explore Asteroid”, Vol. 276, Iss. 5316, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?did=11991870&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=17822&RQT=309&VName=PQD)TOKYO-Japan's Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS) has earned a reputation for collecting big scientific and engineering payoffs from modest budgets. It hopes to continue that tradition with a $200 million mission that will attempt to collect samples from a small asteroid and bring them back to Earth for study. The mission, scheduled for launch in January 2002, got a boost last week when NASA announced that it would contribute a 1-kilogram instrumented robotic rover. "It will be a world first," says Akira Fujiwara, an ISAS planetary scientist in charge of the scientific aspects of the asteroid mission, called MUSES-C. Fujiwara expects the samples to provide insights into the materials and conditions that formed the rocky inner planets in the very early days of the solar system. "These are the fossils of the solar system," he says. The 350-kilogram, $104 million spacecraft will take 20 months to reach Nereus, a near-Earth asteroid, 1 kilometer in diameter, that was first spotted in 1982. MUSES-C will stay near the asteroid for 2 months, making three landings to let NASA's rover out and to collect samples. "The rover will be the smallest ever flown in space," says Jurgen Rahe, head of NASA's solar system exploration program. A reentry capsule carrying the samples will parachute to Earth in January 2006. Along with the challenge of landing on such a small target, engineers also face the problem of gathering samples when there is insufficient gravity to drill or pick at the surface. MUSES-C will fire a small metal projectile into the asteroid's surface, breaking away fragments with enough force that some of them are expected to bounce up through a funnellike device and into a receptacle on the spacecraft. That technique may yield only 1 to 5 grams of material. But Fujiwara says that the amount should be enough to help resolve such questions as the mismatch between the relative abundance of materials in asteroids based on studies of meteorites-tiny pieces of asteroids that have landed on Earth-and spectrographic studies of asteroids. "It's not entirely clear just how well meteorites are representative of the material in the solar system," he says. Studying materials from a known source that has been spectrographically observed, he adds, could also help refine spectrographic studies. Collecting the samples is just one of many engineering challenges. The mission's primary objective is to develop technologies "for planetary exploration in the 21st century and beyond," says Junichiro Kawaguchi, a design engineer for the spacecraft, and there will be several such elements on board. The craft will be powered by an ion thruster, in which xenon ionized by microwaves is accelerated by high-voltage electrodes to generate the thrust. This technology, which replaces the much heavier solid or liquid fuel used in present propulsion systems, has been used before in stabilizer thrusters but not in the primary spacecraft engine. NASA is planning an ion-thruster demonstration flight in 1998 as part of its New Millennium program. MUSES-C also will rely on a host of new sensors and controls to guide its asteroid landings, and its reentry capsule will require a new type of heat shield to protect it from the much hotter temperatures generated by a higher reentry speed, a result of its trajectory from interplanetary orbit.Mars Aff

Japan is ahead in Mars exploration with recent NOZOMI missionAWST, 00 (12/11/00, Aviation Week & Space Technology, “Nozomi on target for Mars”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Nozomi+On+Target+for+Mars&rft.jtitle=AVIATION+WEEK+%26+SPACE+TECHNOLOGY&rft.date=2000-12-11&rft.pub=MCGRAW+HILL+INC&rft.issn=0005-2175&rft.volume=153&rft.issue=24&rft.spage=84&rft.epage=84&rft.externalDBID=AWS&rft.externalDocID=000165796400034)MHJapan's Nozomi spacecraft is on schedule to enter an orbit in Mars' upper atmosphere in January 2004 after completing the second of three trips it will take around the Sun since its July 1998 launch. The 1,177-lb. spacecraft has been taking measurements of the interplanetary medium as it continues on a four-year trip to Mars. These include counts of dust and energetic particles and readings of low energy plasma, the magnetic field and the densities of hydrogen and helium. Program Manager Koichiro Tsuruda of the Institute of Space and Astronautical Sciences reports the spacecraft and its instruments are healthy.However, a test of the spacecraft's systems will come during a three-week-long Sun conjunction that begins Dec. 28 and continues until Jan. 20. During this period the spacecraft's radio link with Earth is blocked by the solar atmosphere. It lacks sufficient memory to take data. Its instruments will be shut down, except for a dust counter. Nozomi will orbit the Sun three times in four years but will be in conjunction on this pass only. It experiences a three-week conjunction with Mars 200 days after it begins its orbit. The Martian conjunction will reoccur every two years.The mission's main operational concern is deployment of its instrument booms and antennas, Tsuruda said. Ground tests indicate success despite the fact that booms and antennas have been stowed far longer than expected in the original mission lifespan.They have remained folded because Nozomi suffered a stuck thruster valve after launch. The valve depleted its onboard fuel and prevented it from achieving the original insertion in October 1999 (AW&ST Jan. 25, 1999, p. 47).The mission was saved by a gravity assist from three swingbys of the Sun and two of Earth.Nozomi is to arrive at Mars at about the same time as the European Space Agency's Mars Express. The Japanese and European science teams have agreed to coordinate their observations.Nozomi's main scientific objective is to study the Martian upper atmosphere and its interactions with the solar wind. Mars Express is more closely associated with the lower atmosphere, so their findings should be complementary

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Solar Sail Aff

Solar sails already a developed technology in japan, JAXA plans to send solar sails to Jupiter by 2020. Westlake, 10 - Contributing Editor at Yachtstyle magazine and Asia columnist for Aerospace America. Formerly Senior Editor at Far Eastern Economic Review. (June-August 2010, Michael, “Japan's solar sail heads starward”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Japan%27s+solar+sail+heads+starward&rft.jtitle=Aerospace+America&rft.au=Westlake%2C+Michael&rft.date=2010-07-01&rft.pub=American+Institute+of+Aeronautics+and+Astronautics+Inc&rft.issn=0740-722X&rft.volume=48&rft.issue=7&rft.spage=24&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=238191759)EEThis 667-lb, 59-in.-tall, 15-in.-thick cylindrical minisat is to show its paces by heading past Venus and the Sun rather than trying to demonstrate top performance in Earth orbit. No previous satellite has used light pressure as its primary means of propulsion--this is what's new, and it is why this experiment is so important to the future of space exploration. There is nothing new about the idea of a space sail in itself--Japan deployed one on a suborbital flight to prove the unfurling technology in 2004; the U.S. has tried them in Earth orbit; India and Russia have tried the same. None of the orbital trials succeeded. The idea has been around in science fiction since 1865, when Jules Verne briefly mentioned the notion of using light pressure to drive a spacecraft. Scientists, engineers, and writers have pursued the idea over a good many years, including, in 1964, scientist and writer Arthur C. Clarke. (The invention of the solar sail is often incorrectly attributed to Clarke, who did conceive the idea of the geostationary communications satellite.) Interplanetary trial run Weight and how to get sails to unfurl without tangling or tearing in space have always been problems. But materials science has come a long way since the previous U.S. experiments (of which another is scheduled for later this year by the Planetary Society, a nongovernmental group). So Japan has bitten the bullet and decided to try for an interplanetary trial run, adding the space sail experiment to four other minisats piggybacking aboard its own HII-A F11 rocket, which was already due to launch the Akatsuki (Dawn), a more conventional Venus Climate Orbiter observations satellite. Weather delays held the launch back by a few days, but then the rocket left from the Tanegashima Space Center in southern Japan with no problems, and rapidly deployed all six of its payload components. The space sail minisat is named Ikaros, which stands for interplanetary kitecraft accelerated by radiation from the Sun. (Never mind that the acronym has unfortunate connotations because of the ancient Greek legend of Icarus: He and his father flew with wings made of feathers held together with wax, but Icarus went too close to the Sun and crashed because the wax melted.) Going for an interplanetary run with a space sail is new. and that is why this technology demonstrator is important to the future of space exploration. The sail expanded fully on June 9. Pressure exerted by photons--minute "packages" of light energy emitted by the Sun--are now pushing the sail along in much the same way that wind drives maritime sailing craft. The rate of acceleration created by such tiny bundles of energy is very small, but it is constant, and although it takes a while, the sail should accelerate to a reasonable speed, an estimated 100 m/sec, according to Ikaros' creator, JAXA (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency)--and should be able to reach Venus within about six months. Slowness and patience Such a slow speed is hardly useful for manned spaceflight, at least over relatively short distances like those within the solar system, considering the weight of people and stores to be accelerated. But for long-range unmanned probes, it is fine: In theory, at least, a light sail should be able to accelerate up to 10% of the speed of light. If there is a problem with this, it is how to slow down at the end of the trip. In practice, a great deal of patience will be needed; at the Earth's distance from the Sun, the acceleration of the space sail should be one-sixtieth the force of gravity. Beyond that distance, the inverse square law applies, so the number of photons producing acceleration reduces as the sail gets farther away. Various solutions have been suggested, such as aiming giant laser beams into space to give space sails power, or using a "slingshot" trajectory past the Sun. In this application of science and engineering, size matters. Ikaros's sail is a technology demonstrator, and is a modest square measuring 46 ft on each side, made up of four triangular petals that unfurled from a drum. To avoid having to provide bracing struts to pull the sail out, JAXA opted for small weights on lines, and centrifugal force from spinning the minisat to throw the weights outward and pull the sail petals off their storage drum. A later version of Ikaros, many times larger, is intended to head for Jupiter in about 2020. Deployment of the sail occurred over several days. With Ikaros spinning at 25 rpm, the membrane was pulled from its container by guide weights. The four sail petals were released, extending outward as the weights exerted centrifugal force. In the final phase, holders restraining the sail petals' bundled material were ordered released and the petals unfurled. JAXA performed the delicate maneuvers slowly to avoid tearing the fragile membrane. As planned, the sail's expansion slowed the craft's spin rate, just as an ice skater slows a pirouette by extending arms outward. Ikaros should continue to spin at about 1-2 rpm. JAXA confirmed the full expansion of the sail and electric generation with the thin film solar cells at about 7.7 million km from Earth. Material breakthrough The sail itself is a masterpiece of design and technology, comprising several different elements. The basic sail is an aluminized polyimide film only 7.5 m thick. Ikaros project leader Osamu Mori describes the material: "This film has to be made from a material that's not just lightweight but can withstand extreme radiation and heat in space. The material that meets these conditions is polyimide resin, which is used as a foam insulation for satellites. Once such a high-quality material became available, the development of a solar sail came much closer to reality. "Today, Japan has the largest market share in the world for polyimide resin. We are currently leading the race to develop applications for this technology, and it would mean a great deal to us to be the first in the world to build a working solar sail. Polyimide resin allows us to create a much lighter sail. As well as being extremely strong, it doesn't need glue, because it can be joined using heat sealing. "Polyimide resin is originally yellow, but one side of Ikaros's sail is silver. This is because aluminum is vapor-deposited on one side of the film, in order to reflect sunlight more efficiently. In addition, the film is reinforced in such a way

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as to prevent it from splitting all the way if it is ripped. If the solar sail is torn, its performance will decline slightly, but it can still continue its space travels." The sail is also providing electrical power. About halfway up each sail petal are thin-film solar array strips; collectively all four sets of strips occupy about 5% of the sail's area and produce about 500 W of power. Assuming it works as planned, this will take care of Ikaros's "housekeeping" reports and computing needs. Sail shape is fixed; changing course is a matter of using the steering device in each petal--two reaction control device strips near each edge contain liquid crystal cells whose reflectivity can be changed. Says Mori, "It works just like frosted glass. Normally, the entire area of the sail will reflect sunlight, but by 'frosting' part of the film, we can reduce the reflectivity of that area." This, in turn, cuts the force exerted by the photons on that part of the sail, and so can change the direction of flight. It has not been an easy trip to the launch pad. The sail's deployment was a particular headache, said Mori before takeoff. "The sail film doesn't have a supporting frame," he said, and for storage at launch it was folded and wrapped around the main body of the spacecraft. Because the spacecraft continues to spin following the deployment of the sail, it will maintain centrifugal force and thus keep the sail open. "This eliminates the need for a supporting frame for the sail film, so the spacecraft can be very light." Goals and outlook Looking ahead to future missions, Mori continued: "Using the centrifugal-force method, a bigger sail is easier to unfurl. Ikaros's sail is small for a solar sail, but I think sails with a diameter of 50-100 m will be developed in the near future." The Ikaros Venus/solar mission has four main objectives: * Demonstrating deployment of a large membrane sail in space by mechanical means--this is described as an "enabling technology." * Generating power through the solar cells on the sail. * Demonstrating photon propulsion or "light power" and measuring and analyzing the results. * Demonstrating guidance and attitude control by the sail's reaction control devices to show that a particular flight path can be achieved and maintained. The first two are regarded as minimum objectives and have now been achieved, according to JAXA. Assuming all goes well, showing the solar power system to be capable has implications for the Jupiter mission in the next decade. Says Mori, "The plan is to equip the probe with an ion engine, as well as a solar sail approximately 50 m in diameter. The larger the sail, the larger the solar cell area, so the probe will be very efficient, with no need to carry fuel. "But it is very difficult to use only solar power for acceleration and at the same time control the probe's attitude, so we are planning to use a fuel-efficient ion engine along with the solar sail. However, the weakness of an ion engine is that it consumes a lot of electricity, so how do we give it a power source without carrying fuel? Jupiter is five times farther from the Sun than Earth is. At that distance, solar cells will be only 4% as efficient in generating power. "For that reason, other countries' missions that ventured past Jupiter have all used isotope batteries. But we are determined to go to Jupiter using solar cells, so we invented a way to generate electricity using the thin-film solar cell on the sail. We would like to use Ikaros to evaluate it, and share the technology with the next near-Jupiter exploration mission." Japan has a history of setting up very reasonably priced scientific efforts. JAXA previously announced plans to set up an unmanned lunar base by 2020 with a wheeled robotic lunar rover to explore the surface and report its findings back to Earth. Achieving that is expected to cost around $2 billion. Against that, the cost of the Ikaros experiment was a bargain at $16 million (yes, $16 million)--a small price for a potentially huge scientific and engineering reward.

Japan on track with solar sail mission to Venus, Japan plans to reach Jupiter by 2020. Talcott, 10- senior editor for astronomy magazine. (September 2010, Richard, “Japan on track for Venus”, Vol. 38, Iss. 9, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?did=2109787521&sid=5&Fmt=3&clientId=17822&RQT=309&VName=PQD). EEShortly after dawn May 21, the twin solid rocket boosters of an H-IIA launch vehicle roared to life at Japan's Tanegashima Space Center. Not content with conducting a single mission, Japan packed two major spacecraft in the payload bay: Akatsuki will explore Venus' thick atmosphere, and IKAROS will test solar-sail technology. Akatsuki, Japanese for "dawn," also goes by the name Venus Climate Orbiter. It will arrive at Venus in December, when it will enter a highly elliptical orbit around Earth's "twin.'The mission should last at least 4 years. Although Venus nearly matches Earth in size and composition, the similarity of the two worlds stops there. Venus' atmosphere is about 100 times denser than Earth's and consists mostly of carbon dioxide, with highaltitude clouds of sulfuric acid. Akatsuki's goal is to help scientists understand how the two planets evolved so differently. To accomplish this task, Akatsuki carries five cameras. The Lightning and Airglow Camera will search for lightning in the visible part of the spectrum; the Longwave Infrared Camera will view high-altitude clouds at a wavelength of 10 micrometers; the Ultraviolet Imager will examine atmospheric gases at wavelengths between 293 and 365 nanometers; the 1 -micron camera will observe at wavelengths between 0.9 and 1.01 micrometers and reveal heat from the surface; and the 2-micron camera will operate between 1.65 and 2.32 micrometers, which will record heat from the atmosphere's lower levels. IKAROS is a tongue-twisting acronym that stands for Interplanetary Kite-craft Accelerated by Radiation Of the Sun. This giant solar sail is a square measuring 66 feet (20 meters) diagonally but only 0.0075 millimeter thick. The sail generates propulsion from the radiation pressure supplied by solar photons. IKAROS gets additional energy from thin solar cells. The Japanese Space Agency (JAXA) says the mission should complete its technology goals in 6 months. The IKAROS spacecraft will test technology Japan plans to use for future missions. By 2020, JAXA hopes to launch a mission to Jupiter and the Trojan asteroids. This spacecraft would reach its targets by using a solar sail 164 feet (50m) across combined with ion propulsion.

JAXA has power and capabilities to launch solar sails, 2004 launch proves.

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Jiji Press English news service, 08- newspaper devoted to japans developments in various fields. (11/8/2008, “JAXA Eyes Interplanetary Flight by Experimental Solar Sail”, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?did=1591166431&sid=6&Fmt=3&clientId=17822&RQT=309&VName=PQD). EEAXA unveiled a plan to equip an H2-A rocket with a solar sail as a weight to curb launch vibrations in the near future, at an international conference held recently in Britain. Osamu Mori, leader of the experimental solar sail project, says that if successful, the interplanetary flight of the experimental solar sail, named Ikaros, would be the world's first such achievement. A solar sail, which uses radiation pressure from sunlight for propulsion, requires no fuel and features low costs. But spreading the craft's large sail in space is technically difficult. In a test conducted in August 2004, a JAXA team successfully unfolded in space a frameless sail that is made of a thin resin film and is 10 meters in diameter for the first time in the world. Following the success, JAXA drew up a plan to build spacecraft that can travel to Jupiter and farther asteroids with the combined power of a sail partially equipped with solar cells and an ion engine that was used in JAXA's asteroid probe Hayabusa. Under its interplanetary flight plan, JAXA hopes to prove that a solar sail can travel only with its sail, aiming for closer planets such as Venus, JAXA officials said. Ikaros will have a 14-meter-by-14-meter square sail made of an aluminum-evaporated polyimide thin film. About 10 pct of the 200-square-meter sail will be covered with solar cells. After being launched into space, the spacecraft will spin at a high speed to unfold its sail. Then it will continue to spin slowly to maintain the shape of the sail. The solar sail can control its travel speed by changing the angle of its sail toward the sun, according to the officials.END

Solar sails already a developed technology in japan, JAXA plans to send solar sails to Jupiter by 2020. Westlake, 10 - Contributing Editor at Yachtstyle magazine and Asia columnist for Aerospace America. Formerly Senior Editor at Far Eastern Economic Review. (June-August 2010, Michael, “Japan's solar sail heads starward”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Japan%27s+solar+sail+heads+starward&rft.jtitle=Aerospace+America&rft.au=Westlake%2C+Michael&rft.date=2010-07-01&rft.pub=American+Institute+of+Aeronautics+and+Astronautics+Inc&rft.issn=0740-722X&rft.volume=48&rft.issue=7&rft.spage=24&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=238191759)EEThis 667-lb, 59-in.-tall, 15-in.-thick cylindrical minisat is to show its paces by heading past Venus and the Sun rather than trying to demonstrate top performance in Earth orbit. No previous satellite has used light pressure as its primary means of propulsion--this is what's new, and it is why this experiment is so important to the future of space exploration. There is nothing new about the idea of a space sail in itself--Japan deployed one on a suborbital flight to prove the unfurling technology in 2004; the U.S. has tried them in Earth orbit; India and Russia have tried the same. None of the orbital trials succeeded. The idea has been around in science fiction since 1865, when Jules Verne briefly mentioned the notion of using light pressure to drive a spacecraft. Scientists, engineers, and writers have pursued the idea over a good many years, including, in 1964, scientist and writer Arthur C. Clarke. (The invention of the solar sail is often incorrectly attributed to Clarke, who did conceive the idea of the geostationary communications satellite.) Interplanetary trial run Weight and how to get sails to unfurl without tangling or tearing in space have always been problems. But materials science has come a long way since the previous U.S. experiments (of which another is scheduled for later this year by the Planetary Society, a nongovernmental group). So Japan has bitten the bullet and decided to try for an interplanetary trial run, adding the space sail experiment to four other minisats piggybacking aboard its own HII-A F11 rocket, which was already due to launch the Akatsuki (Dawn), a more conventional Venus Climate Orbiter observations satellite. Weather delays held the launch back by a few days, but then the rocket left from the Tanegashima Space Center in southern Japan with no problems, and rapidly deployed all six of its payload components. The space sail minisat is named Ikaros, which stands for interplanetary kitecraft accelerated by radiation from the Sun. (Never mind that the acronym has unfortunate connotations because of the ancient Greek legend of Icarus: He and his father flew with wings made of feathers held together with wax, but Icarus went too close to the Sun and crashed because the wax melted.) Going for an interplanetary run with a space sail is new. and that is why this technology demonstrator is important to the future of space exploration. The sail expanded fully on June 9. Pressure exerted by photons--minute "packages" of light energy emitted by the Sun--are now pushing the sail along in much the same way that wind drives maritime sailing craft. The rate of acceleration created by such tiny bundles of energy is very small, but it is constant, and although it takes a while, the sail should accelerate to a reasonable speed, an estimated 100 m/sec, according to Ikaros' creator, JAXA (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency)--and should be able to reach Venus within about six months. Slowness and patience Such a slow speed is hardly useful for manned spaceflight, at least over relatively short distances like those within the solar system, considering the weight of people and stores to be accelerated. But for long-range unmanned probes, it is fine: In theory, at least, a light sail should be able to accelerate up to 10% of the speed of light. If there is a problem with this, it is how to slow down at the end of the trip. In practice, a great deal of patience will be needed; at the Earth's distance from the Sun, the acceleration of the space sail should be one-sixtieth the force of gravity. Beyond that distance, the inverse square law applies, so the number of photons producing acceleration reduces as the sail gets farther away. Various solutions have been suggested, such as aiming giant laser beams into space to give space sails power, or using a "slingshot" trajectory past the Sun. In this application of science and engineering, size

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matters. Ikaros's sail is a technology demonstrator, and is a modest square measuring 46 ft on each side, made up of four triangular petals that unfurled from a drum. To avoid having to provide bracing struts to pull the sail out, JAXA opted for small weights on lines, and centrifugal force from spinning the minisat to throw the weights outward and pull the sail petals off their storage drum. A later version of Ikaros, many times larger, is intended to head for Jupiter in about 2020. Deployment of the sail occurred over several days. With Ikaros spinning at 25 rpm, the membrane was pulled from its container by guide weights. The four sail petals were released, extending outward as the weights exerted centrifugal force. In the final phase, holders restraining the sail petals' bundled material were ordered released and the petals unfurled. JAXA performed the delicate maneuvers slowly to avoid tearing the fragile membrane. As planned, the sail's expansion slowed the craft's spin rate, just as an ice skater slows a pirouette by extending arms outward. Ikaros should continue to spin at about 1-2 rpm. JAXA confirmed the full expansion of the sail and electric generation with the thin film solar cells at about 7.7 million km from Earth. Material breakthrough The sail itself is a masterpiece of design and technology, comprising several different elements. The basic sail is an aluminized polyimide film only 7.5 m thick. Ikaros project leader Osamu Mori describes the material: "This film has to be made from a material that's not just lightweight but can withstand extreme radiation and heat in space. The material that meets these conditions is polyimide resin, which is used as a foam insulation for satellites. Once such a high-quality material became available, the development of a solar sail came much closer to reality. "Today, Japan has the largest market share in the world for polyimide resin. We are currently leading the race to develop applications for this technology, and it would mean a great deal to us to be the first in the world to build a working solar sail. Polyimide resin allows us to create a much lighter sail. As well as being extremely strong, it doesn't need glue, because it can be joined using heat sealing. "Polyimide resin is originally yellow, but one side of Ikaros's sail is silver. This is because aluminum is vapor-deposited on one side of the film, in order to reflect sunlight more efficiently. In addition, the film is reinforced in such a way as to prevent it from splitting all the way if it is ripped. If the solar sail is torn, its performance will decline slightly, but it can still continue its space travels." The sail is also providing electrical power. About halfway up each sail petal are thin-film solar array strips; collectively all four sets of strips occupy about 5% of the sail's area and produce about 500 W of power. Assuming it works as planned, this will take care of Ikaros's "housekeeping" reports and computing needs. Sail shape is fixed; changing course is a matter of using the steering device in each petal--two reaction control device strips near each edge contain liquid crystal cells whose reflectivity can be changed. Says Mori, "It works just like frosted glass. Normally, the entire area of the sail will reflect sunlight, but by 'frosting' part of the film, we can reduce the reflectivity of that area." This, in turn, cuts the force exerted by the photons on that part of the sail, and so can change the direction of flight. It has not been an easy trip to the launch pad. The sail's deployment was a particular headache, said Mori before takeoff. "The sail film doesn't have a supporting frame," he said, and for storage at launch it was folded and wrapped around the main body of the spacecraft. Because the spacecraft continues to spin following the deployment of the sail, it will maintain centrifugal force and thus keep the sail open. "This eliminates the need for a supporting frame for the sail film, so the spacecraft can be very light." Goals and outlook Looking ahead to future missions, Mori continued: "Using the centrifugal-force method, a bigger sail is easier to unfurl. Ikaros's sail is small for a solar sail, but I think sails with a diameter of 50-100 m will be developed in the near future." The Ikaros Venus/solar mission has four main objectives: * Demonstrating deployment of a large membrane sail in space by mechanical means--this is described as an "enabling technology." * Generating power through the solar cells on the sail. * Demonstrating photon propulsion or "light power" and measuring and analyzing the results. * Demonstrating guidance and attitude control by the sail's reaction control devices to show that a particular flight path can be achieved and maintained. The first two are regarded as minimum objectives and have now been achieved, according to JAXA. Assuming all goes well, showing the solar power system to be capable has implications for the Jupiter mission in the next decade. Says Mori, "The plan is to equip the probe with an ion engine, as well as a solar sail approximately 50 m in diameter. The larger the sail, the larger the solar cell area, so the probe will be very efficient, with no need to carry fuel. "But it is very difficult to use only solar power for acceleration and at the same time control the probe's attitude, so we are planning to use a fuel-efficient ion engine along with the solar sail. However, the weakness of an ion engine is that it consumes a lot of electricity, so how do we give it a power source without carrying fuel? Jupiter is five times farther from the Sun than Earth is. At that distance, solar cells will be only 4% as efficient in generating power. "For that reason, other countries' missions that ventured past Jupiter have all used isotope batteries. But we are determined to go to Jupiter using solar cells, so we invented a way to generate electricity using the thin-film solar cell on the sail. We would like to use Ikaros to evaluate it, and share the technology with the next near-Jupiter exploration mission." Japan has a history of setting up very reasonably priced scientific efforts. JAXA previously announced plans to set up an unmanned lunar base by 2020 with a wheeled robotic lunar rover to explore the surface and report its findings back to Earth. Achieving that is expected to cost around $2 billion. Against that, the cost of the Ikaros experiment was a bargain at $16 million (yes, $16 million)--a small price for a potentially huge scientific and engineering reward.

Japan on track with solar sail mission to Venus, Japan plans to reach Jupiter by 2020. Talcott, 10- senior editor for astronomy magazine. (September 2010, Richard, “Japan on track for Venus”, Vol. 38, Iss. 9, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?did=2109787521&sid=5&Fmt=3&clientId=17822&RQT=309&VName=PQD). EEShortly after dawn May 21, the twin solid rocket boosters of an H-IIA launch vehicle roared to life at Japan's Tanegashima Space Center. Not content with conducting a single mission, Japan packed two major spacecraft in the payload bay: Akatsuki will explore Venus' thick atmosphere, and IKAROS will test solar-sail technology. Akatsuki, Japanese for "dawn," also goes by the name Venus Climate Orbiter. It will arrive at Venus in December, when it will enter a highly elliptical orbit around Earth's "twin.'The mission should

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last at least 4 years. Although Venus nearly matches Earth in size and composition, the similarity of the two worlds stops there. Venus' atmosphere is about 100 times denser than Earth's and consists mostly of carbon dioxide, with highaltitude clouds of sulfuric acid. Akatsuki's goal is to help scientists understand how the two planets evolved so differently. To accomplish this task, Akatsuki carries five cameras. The Lightning and Airglow Camera will search for lightning in the visible part of the spectrum; the Longwave Infrared Camera will view high-altitude clouds at a wavelength of 10 micrometers; the Ultraviolet Imager will examine atmospheric gases at wavelengths between 293 and 365 nanometers; the 1 -micron camera will observe at wavelengths between 0.9 and 1.01 micrometers and reveal heat from the surface; and the 2-micron camera will operate between 1.65 and 2.32 micrometers, which will record heat from the atmosphere's lower levels. IKAROS is a tongue-twisting acronym that stands for Interplanetary Kite-craft Accelerated by Radiation Of the Sun. This giant solar sail is a square measuring 66 feet (20 meters) diagonally but only 0.0075 millimeter thick. The sail generates propulsion from the radiation pressure supplied by solar photons. IKAROS gets additional energy from thin solar cells. The Japanese Space Agency (JAXA) says the mission should complete its technology goals in 6 months. The IKAROS spacecraft will test technology Japan plans to use for future missions. By 2020, JAXA hopes to launch a mission to Jupiter and the Trojan asteroids. This spacecraft would reach its targets by using a solar sail 164 feet (50m) across combined with ion propulsion.

JAXA has power and capabilities to launch solar sails, 2004 launch proves. Jiji Press English news service, 08- newspaper devoted to japans developments in various fields. (11/8/2008, “JAXA Eyes Interplanetary Flight by Experimental Solar Sail”, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?did=1591166431&sid=6&Fmt=3&clientId=17822&RQT=309&VName=PQD). EEAXA unveiled a plan to equip an H2-A rocket with a solar sail as a weight to curb launch vibrations in the near future, at an international conference held recently in Britain. Osamu Mori, leader of the experimental solar sail project, says that if successful, the interplanetary flight of the experimental solar sail, named Ikaros, would be the world's first such achievement. A solar sail, which uses radiation pressure from sunlight for propulsion, requires no fuel and features low costs. But spreading the craft's large sail in space is technically difficult. In a test conducted in August 2004, a JAXA team successfully unfolded in space a frameless sail that is made of a thin resin film and is 10 meters in diameter for the first time in the world. Following the success, JAXA drew up a plan to build spacecraft that can travel to Jupiter and farther asteroids with the combined power of a sail partially equipped with solar cells and an ion engine that was used in JAXA's asteroid probe Hayabusa. Under its interplanetary flight plan, JAXA hopes to prove that a solar sail can travel only with its sail, aiming for closer planets such as Venus, JAXA officials said. Ikaros will have a 14-meter-by-14-meter square sail made of an aluminum-evaporated polyimide thin film. About 10 pct of the 200-square-meter sail will be covered with solar cells. After being launched into space, the spacecraft will spin at a high speed to unfold its sail. Then it will continue to spin slowly to maintain the shape of the sail. The solar sail can control its travel speed by changing the angle of its sail toward the sun, according to the officials.END

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Space Debris Aff

Japan is ahead in efforts to remove space debris with new softwareSatellite Today, 3. (4/8/03, Philips Business Information, “Japanese Satellite Takes Images of Space Debris”, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=06-19-2016&FMT=7&DID=322463511&RQT=309)As a first step in collecting space debris, the National Space Development Agency of Japan's (NASDA) satellite, mu-Lab Sat, last month captured images of a small target jettisoned from the satellite. mu-Lab Sat, whose mass is only 50 kilograms, is a microsatellite launched piggyback with Midori-II by the H-IIA F4 rocket on Dec. 14. Sophisticated software technology is required to identify a small target and capture pictures in strong sunlight with the gleaming earth in the background. Japan's National Aerospace Laboratory (NAL) has been studying possible ways of collecting and removing space debris, and the successful image acquisition verified the ability to identify and capture an on-orbit target by image recognition, as the first step.

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AT: Kills relations with US

The U.S. can’t enter another space race – budget and lack of public interest won’t allow

Friedman, 8, Louis Friedman- Executive Director of The Planetary Society (9/8/08, “A New Paradigm for a New Vision of Space”, http://www.planetary.org/programs/projects/advocacy_and_education/space_advocacy/new_paradigm.pdf)MHThe required budget for the current U.S. Vision for Space Exploration implementation plan exceeds available resources, as shown by a recent GAO report (Oct 2007, GAO-08-51). Further cuts to space science and exploration may be required to compensate for this. 2. The current thrust of the U.S. Vision for Space Exploration to return humans to the Moon lacks political resonance. The public is basically uninterested: “Been there, done that” rules. As a result, after getting inadequate funding from the Administration that proposed it, the Vision for Space Exploration is unlikely to get more support from a new Administration. Problem 1 can only be solved if problem 2 is addressed first. To arouse public and political interest in space a new space race could be invented, replacing the Soviet Union with China, but that makes sense, if at all, only in the narrow fields of the military use of space and the defense of space assets. A space race to the Moon, even if it were politically viable, is doomed. Why should the U.S. enter a race they already won? The U.S. and Soviet Union sent nearly a hundred spacecraft to the Moon at a cost (in today’s money) in excess of $200 billion to prove the Moon has no strategic, economic, or military value. What could this strategy be? The novelty of space has worn off while the costs have not decreased, the proposed missions are repetitive rather than 3 inspirational, space-related services are considered routine, and only marginal improvements are needed to satisfy projected demands. The space shuttle, which was supposed to provide affordable and frequent access to space, is headed for retirement. Space is no longer the inspiration upon which young people are basing their education or forecasting their careers. What might reverse these trends and return space to its former place as aninspiring avenue to a posit ive future?

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*Japan Space Leadership NB<Incomplete>*

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Japan Space Leadership

Japan is Asian space leader – SELENE mission put it aheadTalmadge, 7 – Eric Talmadge, Associated Press journalist (10/5/07, Associated Press, “Japan is Asia space leader”, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=11C185A6B7855D18&d_place=BRZB&f_issue=2007-10-05&f_publisher=)MH TOKYO - Japan put its first satellite into orbit around the moon today, placing the country a step ahead of China and India in an increasingly heated space race in Asia. The probe was set into lunar orbit after completing a complicated navigational maneuver late Thursday, space agency officials said. The probe will gradually move into orbit closer to the surface to the moon before conducting a yearlong observational mission. "We believe this is a big step," said project manager Yoshisada Takizawa. "Everything is going well and we are confident." Though four years off schedule, the mission comes at a crucial time for Japan. China is expected to launch its own moon probe by the end of the year, and India is to follow with an unmanned lunar mission in 2008. Japanese officials claim the $279 million Selenological and Engineering Explorer - or SELENE - is the largest lunar mission since the U.S. Apollo program in terms of overall scope and ambition, outpacing the former Soviet Union's Luna program and NASA's Clementine and Lunar Prospector projects. The mission involves placing the main satellite - called "Kaguya," after a legendary moon princess - in a circular orbit at an altitude of about 60 miles and deploying two smaller satellites in elliptical orbits, according to the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, or JAXA. Researchers will use data gathered by the probes to study the moon's origin and evolution. Takizawa said it will begin its observation phase in mid- to late-December. "The timing was very delicate," he said at a news conference in JAXA's Tokyo headquarters via a video link from the mission command center south of the capital. "It was important to the completion of the mission, and it was successful." Japan launched its first satellite in 1970 but is now struggling to keep up with rival China. Japan launched a moon probe in 1990, but that was a flyby mission. It canceled a 2004 moon shot, LUNAR-A after repeated mechanical and fiscal problems. SELENE was launched on Sept. 14 aboard one of the space program's mainstay H-2A rockets from Tanegashima, the remote island where the agency's space center is located. To garner public interest, the probe carries sheets engraved with messages from 412,627 people around the world in its "Wish upon the Moon" campaign. China's minister of defense and technology told China Central Television in July that everything was ready for a launch "by the end of the year" of the Chang'e 1 orbiter, which will use stereo cameras and X-ray spectrometers to map three-dimensional images of the lunar surface and study its dust. China sent shock waves through the region in 2003 when it became the first Asian country to put its own astronauts into space. More ominously, China also blasted an old satellite into oblivion with a land-based anti-satellite missile, the first such test ever conducted by any nation. That test was widely criticized for its military implications. A similar rocket could be used to shoot military satellites out of space, and create a dangerous cloud of space debris. India plans a manned space mission by 2015, using indigenous systems and technology. That will be preceded by an unmanned moon mission, Chandrayaan-1, in April 2008.

Japan is an emerging space leader – two milestones proveFackler, 98 - Martin Fackler, terminal ballistics army specialist (7/12/98, Buffalo News, “2 missions signal arrival of Japan as a Space Exploration Leader”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=news&rft.atitle=2+MISSIONS+SIGNAL+ARRIVAL+OF+JAPAN+AS+A+SPACE+EXPLORATION+LEADER&rft.jtitle=Buffalo+News&rft.au=MARTIN+FACKLER&rft.date=1998-07-12&rft.issn=0745-2691&rft.spage=A.9&rft.externalDBID=XBFN&rft.externalDocID=31925243) MH There's a new star rising in space exploration: Japan. Over the past 40 years, Japan has built up one of the world's leading space programs, and it has done it with low budgets, no manned flights of its own and very little fanfare. Little fanfare, that is, until two milestone missions last week. Last weekend, Japan launched a probe on its way to Mars. If successful, the probe will make Japan only the third country -- after the United States and Russia -- to reach another planet. And Tuesday, two Japanese satellites docked by remote control in outer space -- the first such operation by two unmanned spacecraft. The U.S. and Russian space programs have often docked cargo ships with manned space stations by remote control in a similar procedure."To do so with two unpiloted craft is an impressive feat," said NASA spokesman Brian Welch. The rendezvous had a deliberately Japanese twist: It was timed to coincide with Japan's "Tanabata," or star festival, which celebrates a mythical meeting between the princess Orihime and her lover, Hikoboshi. According to legend, the two -- associated with the stars Altair and Vega -- are only allowed to meet once a year, on the night of July 7. For Japan's space planners, the link-up had a different symbolism. "Space exploration started as competition between America and the Soviet Union," said Mitsunori Miyasato, a spokesman for Japan's National Space Development Agency. "But that era is over." Japan's space bureaucracy has worked hard to wean itself from reliance on foreign technology, and engineers now take pride

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in Japan's development of its own rockets and satellites. "Without the technology to do it yourself, you're always going to rely on others," Miyasato said. Japan's space program began humbly as a handful of university professors launching rockets the size of pencils in 1955. By 1970, the newly created NASDA had put Japan's first satellite in space -- the fourth nation to do so after the United States, the Soviet Union and France. Progress often has been slow. The space agency's effort to build a liquid fuel rocket to compete for commercial satellite launches suffered numerous failures, including an explosion in 1991 that killed an engineer. The first H-2 rocket finally lifted off in 1994, two years late and so far over budget that it will probably never be able to compete with low-cost launch services offered by neighboring China .Japan's efforts in space also have suffered from bureaucratic haggling. Its space program is split between two agencies, each building its own rockets. And Japanese scientists have had to make do with shoestring budgets; spending on civilian space projects this year totaled only about one-tenth of NASA's $ 13.6 billion budget. Still, the efforts are paying off. Japan now leads the world in several space-related fields, including research on planetary magnetic fields. With the completion last year of the M-5, a three- or four-stage solid fuel rocket, Japan finally has a homemade launch vehicle strong enough to put probes into deep space. The rocket has paved the way for a flurry of new missions, including one next year to the Moon and a robot lander in 2001 that will visit an asteroid and bring back rock samples. Japan's next interplanetary mission will probably be a probe to Mercury early in the next millennium. By far the biggest chunk of Japan's space budget is going to the International Space Station. Japan is the only Asian country joining in the ISS, a multinational effort to establish humankind's first permanent presence in space by 2003, and it is looking for a chance to showcase its technological expertise. Japan's space agency is spending $ 2.2 billion to build a 36-by-14-foot laboratory where astronauts will conduct scientific research while in space. The space station's living quarters, power plant and superstructure will be built by the United States and Russia, but Japan's contribution rivals Europe. After that, Japan is aiming for human space flight. Two Japanese astronauts already have flown on U.S. space shuttles, but NASDA is to test a scaled-down model of its own space shuttle in 2000. Japan hopes to launch the real thing a decade later.

Japan has taken on challenging missions recently which shows their leadership in space Elachi, 11 – Dr. Charles Elachi, Directior of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Vice President of the California Institute of Technology (2011, Interview with JAXA, “Japan’s Role in Space Exploration”, http://www.jaxa.jp/article/interview/vol37/index_e.html) MHOne of JAXA's recent missions was the rendezvous and landing on an asteroid by Hayabusa. That was a major challenge. I mean, even here in the U.S. such a mission would be a major challenge. I think the involvement of ISAS both in studying asteroids and in conducting the KAGUYA (SELENE) mission to the moon, which is now in orbit, really shows the leadership that Japan is taking in planetary exploration. JAXA has had a number of programs that involved international activity, not only in planetary exploration but also in Earth science. So we at JPL have participated many times in Earth observation missions for which Japan had developed the spacecraft. And we've also had a number of scientists from Japan involved in our missions here. These international exchanges, where either scientists or instruments from the U.S. fly on Japanese spacecraft or vice versa, build a strong scientific and human relationship between countries. That's very important in science and space exploration, and you have been very proactive in doing that.

Prime Minister Hatoyama is advancing the Japanese space program – new laws, new funding, new goalsBrown, 9 - Peter J. Brown, Satellite technology specialist (9/9/09, Asia Times, “Japan’s next chapter in space begins”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/KI09Dh01.html) MHJapan's soon-to-be prime minister Yukio Hatoyama, leader of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), has a lot of space-related issues to deal with over the coming months, though North Korea and domestic affairs - including the economy and government bureaucracy - will likely dominate his first few months in office. Over the coming months, details surrounding a restructuring of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency's (JAXA) will be announced, and government support for private sector space companies in Japan will likely grow, albeit modestly. Due to his involvement in a recent review of Japan's future space options from a scientific and technological standpoint, Hatoyama has a good grasp of space-related issues as well as the state of Japanese space technology in general. Japan sees China's activities in space as a significant, but not urgent, matter. "We view China as a growing military power in the region. But there is no immediate military threat from China," said Dr Kazuto Suzuki, an associate professor of International Political Economy at Hokkaido University's School of Public Policy. Japan's new Basic Law for Space Activities or simply Basic Space Law (BSL) passed the Diet (parliament) in 2008, and in mid-2009, a new Basic Space Plan was completed. As a result, Japan's government is now able to fund military space activities, ending a ban on such activities that lasted 40 years. Japan's small fleet of Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) was allowed during this time because they were not funded or operated by Japan's Ministry of Defense (MoD), according to Suzuki. All IGS operations are overseen by the civilian Cabinet Secretariat, which includes Japan's central intelligence office. In the past few days, North Korea cut short Hatoyama's and the DPJ's victory celebrations with its sobering declaration about the status of its uranium enrichment program. However, the overall space strategy of the Japanese military is really not affected, according to Suzuki. "The situation will not translate immediately into any sort of rapid military use of

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space by Japan," said Suzuki. "Space is not seen as a viable military zone by the DPJ and by most Japanese people [who] prefer that space should remain as a civilian domain where international cooperation is promoted and strengthened." Among other things, the MoD has been slowly developing new sensors for an early warning satellite with a completion date for this project within five years. "Even if we obtain these sensors earlier than expected, we have no satellite to put these sensors on," said Suzuki. "Development of these sensors for military use will proceed, but this North Korean issue will not have a strong impact on the outcome." Because the DPJ lacks a majority in the Upper House of the Diet, a coalition must be formed with the Social Democrats, who strongly oppose any military uses of space. This relationship also slows military space initiatives at a time when the MoD is mapping out its military space objectives, and finishing work on new defense guidelines covering the next five years. "These guidelines have not been published yet," said Suzuki. "While the DPJ may not be enthusiastic about military space due to the coalition, no matter who will be in power, there will be a change from the past." When Hatoyama meets with President Barack Obama later this month, ballistic missile defense planning and coordination will be on the agenda. A status check of the International Space Station (ISS) is also likely. Other space-related issues may have to wait, especially as the Barack Obama administration is apparently in no hurry to revise export controls which the United States satellite industry favors in order to increase satellite-related exports. Chinese launch vehicles will remain off limits - there appear to be no plans for Chinese rockets to launch satellites for Japan anyway - whether US components on the US Munitions List and currently subject to US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) are present or not. "During the meeting, ITAR issues may be discussed, but only in a context of the broader topic of nuclear disarmament," said Suzuki. "The launching of Japanese satellites by Chinese launchers will never be on the agenda, because Japan has its own launch vehicles, and has no intention of launching its satellites on Chinese launchers."

Japan is working together with other Asian countries to strengthen their space programBrown, 9 - Peter J. Brown, Satellite technology specialist (9/9/09, Asia Times, “Japan’s next chapter in space begins”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/KI09Dh01.html) MHHatoyama has made recent statements about the need for Japan to concentrate on establishing closer regional ties, Chu Ishida, director of JAXA's space cooperation office for Asia Pacific Region, Space Applications Mission Directorate, said a few months ago that, "Japan's Basic Space Plan defines the promotion of space diplomacy as a national policy. Under this policy, JAXA will develop and utilize space systems and satellites, and develop deeper cooperation among Asian countries." Although Japan is not one of the nine state signatories to the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) convention which China created a few years ago, Japan does send representatives to APSCO sessions. And China belongs to the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) which was established more than 15 years ago with Japan as its principal sponsor. These regional space organizations co-exist, and should not be seen as competing with each other, according to Suzuki. "APSCO and APRSAF are completely different organizations in terms of membership, objectives, and the means of cooperation. APRSAF is a space agency forum which supports various projects," said Suzuki. "APSCO, on the other hand, is an organization for transferring technology. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs took advantage of China's prowess in space technology to help establish its diplomatic leadership in the Asian region. APSCO membership is limited to states or countries such as Iran and Pakistan in particular which find it difficult to access advanced space technology due to sanctions." Countries in Asia that operate their own earth observation (EO) satellites include Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, India and Thailand. According to Suzuki, because the number of analysts in Asia who can process EO satellite data is so limited, both APSCO and APRSAF primarily focus on providing Chinese and Japanese EO data to their member states. "There is an obvious rivalry here. However, for the respective member states, this dual leadership is beneficial because more EO data flows more quickly whenever major disasters happen in the region in particular," said Suzuki. "As long as China and Japan control which EO data should be distributed, there will not be any problems in terms of deliberate military uses." Japan has also been providing EO data directly to China for over three decades. Suzuki emphasizes that this cooperation involves data, and may expand slowly to include space science. However, no joint development of space technology is anticipated.

Japan leading in space leadership, especially due to their new heavy launch capabilities. Covault, 86- senior space technology editor ( July 14, 1986, Craig, “Japan Challenging Western Leadership in Space”, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&csi=142709&sr=HLEAD(Japan+aborts+Mars+mission)+and+date+is+December,%202003). EEJapan has begun to challenge areas of U.S./European space leadership by developing three new expandable boosters and defining advanced satellites, space platforms and a Japanese space shuttle that could be operational in the late 1990s. The country also is planning a dedicated mission on he U.S.

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shuttle, playing a substantial role in development of the U.S./international space station and testing hardware for a possible unmanned mission to the far side of the Moon. The new H-1 booster, already on the launch pad at Japan's Tanegashima Space Center, and the larger H-2 booster entering development will bolster the free world's space launch resources. The Japanese rockets already are being reviewed by companies such as McDonnell Douglas and Telesat Canada to help counter the U.S./European commercial launch crisis. The H-1 and H-2, which are being developed by Japan's National Space Development Agency (NASDA), will provide Japan with important new medium- and heavy-lift capabilities for launching 10 advanced satellites already in development and several others under study. The H-1, set for first launch Aug. 1, can place over 1,200 lb. in geosynchronous orbit. The H-2, planned to be operational in 1992, can launch 4,400-lb. geosynchronous orbit payloads -- more than a U.S. Air Force Titan 34D. A third new Japanese booster, the solid propellant M-3S-2, has just completed development by Nissan and the Institue of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), a sister space agency to NASDA. The M-3S-2 is smaller than the H-1 and H-2 but has a liftoff thrust comparable to early U.S. Delta rockets, and can place 1,500-lb. satellites in orbit -- three times the capability of the U.S. Scout booster. The third M-3S-2 is being readied for launch in January or February, carrying the Japanese Astro-C X-ray spacecraft. A two-week AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY tour of government and industry space facilities throughout Japan showed that 15 years of consistent Japanese populsion research has produced three advanced boosters, with the H-1 and M-3S-2 in production and H-2 i advanced design. This is in contrast with the U.S., where new booster developments are just being initiated to upgrade or replace the aging and limited stable of U.S. expendable vehicles. International satellite sponsors, unable to launch their spacecraft because of the shuttle, Titan, Delta and Ariane failures, are becoming increasingly interested in the H-1 and H-2. McDonnell Douglas Astronautics President John F. Yardley has asked Japan's NASDA and Mitsubishi to consider immediate commercialization of the H-1 rocket in cooperation with McDonnell Douglas, making that launch vehicle available for commercial satellite launches either from Tanegashima or Cape Canaveral. It will be difficult for the Japanese to fulfill that request because of their own scheduling constraints and a need for the Japanese government to help subsidize any commercialization of the vehicle. The key to the H-1 is its large new Mitsubishi LE-5 oxygen/hydrogen-powered second stage and new Nissan solid propellant third stage, which provide a significant payload increase over Japan's smaller N-2 booster. Both the H-1 and N-2 use the same first stage, identical to the McDonnell Douglas Delta 2914 and built by Mitsubishi under license. The license arrangement and Japan's own domestic launch schedule has, until now, prevented this Pacific nation from offering commercial launch services. What the Japanese need for commercialization is government support and a production rate increase above the rockets needed for their own space launches, now running at aout two per year. In addition to full H-1 commercialization, McDonnell Douglas also has discussed with the Japanese the export of their LE-5 second-stage technology to the U.S. for mating with the U.S. Delta 3920 to form a joint vehicle with increased payload (AW&ST July 7, p. 20). The much larger H-2 booster is being developed entirely with Japanese technology to place 4,400-lb. payloads in geosynchronous orbit -- a capability that will spur new Japanese high- and low-altitude spacecraft advances such as space station resupply by unmanned booster. The H-2 heavy-lift expendable vehicle, powered by two large solid rocket boosters strapped to a two-stage oxygen/hydrogen core vehicle, also is drawing commercial launch service interest. NASDA has no formal commercialization plan and discourages its officials from public discussion of the issue, but it has talked with companies, such as Telesat Canada, regarding future commercial H-2 launches. NASDA's brochure on the H-2 notes that satellites flying on the H-2 will have a ride "as mild [as] or less severe than Ariane." Mitsubishi, the prime H-1 and H-2 system integration contractor, also has no formal commercialization plan but has been considering the commercial market."We would like to get customers directly for the H-2 like Arianespace [does for Ariane]," Toshio Masutani, Mitsubishi general manager for space systems, said. Since 1970 Japan has launched 31 spacecraft on its own boosters and paid the U.S. to launch three others. Of these, 16 space science missions have been launched by ISAS from its site near Kagoshima on the sourthern tip of Kyushu Island, about 40 mi. south of Kyushu. NASDA's role is development of large boosters and advanced technology, communications, and Earth resources spacecraft. Seven of its spacecraft have been launched into geosynchronous orbit by Japanese boosters, and it has seven more geosynchronous and three low-orbit missions planned for launch through 1991. These spacecraft are: * Experimental Geodetic Payload -- The 1,500-lb. EGP spacecraft is the first H-1 payload set for launch Aug. 1 into a 900- mi. orbit. The Kawasaki satellite will be used as a laser target for geodetic research. * Engineering Test Satellite-5 -- The Mitsubishi Electric ETS-5 spacecraft set for launch in mid-1987 on an H-1 will demonstrate advanced Japanese geosynchronous spacecraft technology and mobile satellite communications involving aircraft and ships. * Marine Observation Satellite -- The 1,628-lb. ocean survey spacecraft is set for launch into a 545-mi. orbit in January on board the last N-2 booster. MOS-1, built by Nipon Electric, will be Japan's first Earth observation satellite. It carries multispectral, microwave, thermal infrared and visible radiometers, including charge-coupled detectors comparable to those on the French Spot satellite. * CS-3A communications satellite -- This third-generation Japanese domestic communications satellite is set for launch on an H-1 in early 1988. The Mitsubishi Electric spacecraft will carry 6,000 voice channels, 10 K-band and one C-band transponder. A

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second spacecraft, CS-3B, is set for launch in mid-1988. * Geosynchronous Meteorological Satellite -- The Nippon Electric GMS-4 weather spacecraft is set for launch on an H-1 in mid-1989. The Japanese have just decided to begin a $ 185-million GMS-5 development that will result in a new three-axis-stabilized weather satellite for launch in 1992 on an H-2. * BS-3A broadcast satellite -- This third-generation Japanese domestic direct broadcase satellite is set for launch in mid-1990 on board an H-1. The BS-3A spacecraft, built by Nipon Electric, will carry three color television channels. Its sister spacecraft, BS-3B, will be launched in mid-1991. * Earth Resources Satellite -- The 3,000-lb. ERS-1 spacecraft will carry Japan's first synthetic aperture imaging radar and visible and infrared imaging sensors. The Mitsubishi Electric/Nippon Electric-built satellite will provide a significant Earth observing capability increase over the MOS-1 vehicle. * Engineering Test Satellite-6 -- The ETS-6 spacecraft will be the first H-2 booster payload and is set for launch in January, 1992. It will demonstrate many advanced Japanese systems. The advent of the H-2 heavy boost capability is spurring definition of more advanced Japanese missions for the 1990s. ISAS, which earlier launched two Japanese spacecraft to intercept Halley's Comet, is studying a possible unmanned mission to the far side of the Moon which could be launched about 1994 and use an H-2 rocket in a cooperative project with NASDA. The spacecraft would go into polar orbit around the Moon, then fire two or three penetrators into the lunar far side to transmit seismic data back to the mother spacecraft for relay to Earth. Another ISAS group is studying launching a spacecraft to Venus to examine the planet's magnetosphere. By using two separate noncompetitive space agencies, Japan has been able to maintain a constant level of space science activity, launching about one ISAS science satellite per year since 1970. Other agencies, such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), also are significant Japanese space program elements because they propose, develop and fund specific sensor payloads -- as MITI has done for the ERS-1 spacecraft. This has created competitive pressures among agencies on development of proposed large new Japanese space platforms that could be launched by both the U.S. space shuttle and a Japanese H-2 booster. Thirteen Japanese companies have formed the Institute for an Unmanned Space Experiments Platform to study the idea in connection with MITI and ISAS. Another low-altitude platform study is under way in NASDA, although the NASDA effort appears to be as much a raction to the ISAS/MITI activity as a well-defined platform effort. The industrial group envisions a platform that could be launched by the U.S. shuttle about 1992. In addition to assessing the platform, NASDA is continuing to refine its space station participation with the U.S., which includes a Japanese Experiments Module and an externally mounted experiment exposure facility. The latest design for the external facility is a large boxlike truss that could be launched by the H-2 as a free-flying platform before the station is operational about 1994. Another space platform study aimed at forming a geosynchronous orbit communications antenna facility is under way at Mitsubishi Electric under the direction of Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. The platform work and associated research have significant implications for future Japanese world markets in telecommunications and information distribution systems, U.S. space officials said. The Japanese are conducting technology tests and studies concerning development of a Japanese tracking ad data relay satellite system by the mid-1990s and a manned Japanese space shuttle by the late 1990s. Mitsubishi Electric is conducting S-band multibeam technology work in support of what Japan calls an Experimental Data Relay and Tracking Satellite that would be analogous to the U.S. TDRSS system. Technology work on a Japanese space shuttle that could be launched by the H-2 booster is being led by ISAS and Japan's National Aeronautical Laboratories, which have conducted numerous wind tunnel tests of various shuttle concepts. The program is being formally reviewed by Japan's Space Activities Commission, which must rule on whether the program is to be started. National Aerospace Laboratory engineers envision a test launch of an unmanned subscale shuttle on an H-1 or other rocket by about 1995. Launch of a manned vehicle on an H-2 -- possibly with additional strap-on boosters -- could occur by 1995-2000. A recent issue of Nihon Keizani, the Japan Financial Times, carried a full-page advertisement by Mitsubishi showing a Japanese astronaut with the vision of a Japanese shuttle on reentry reflected in the faceplate of his helmet -- and a diagram about the shuttle reentry thermal protection tiles under development by Mitsubishi.

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U.S.- Japan Cooperation BadJapan has never been completely on board with U.S. space operations – ISS proves

Friedman, 8, Louis Friedman- Executive Director of The Planetary Society (9/8/08, “A New Paradigm for a New Vision of Space”, http://www.planetary.org/programs/projects/advocacy_and_education/space_advocacy/new_paradigm.pdf)MHThe second item – the space station -- consists of a 100 billion dollar program entirely conceived and managed by NASA, to which foreign contributors from Europe, Canada and Japan have been coerced to participate often with extreme diplomatic pressure. NASA has made all the decisions, and now intends to quit in 2015 soon after international operations begin.

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****Aff Answers to CP****

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Aff- Japan can’t do it

Japan is scaling back on their space operations in light of recent string of mission failsVieru, 10 – Tudor Vieru, science editor on space issues (12/18/10, News Today, “JAXA may Need to Downscale Its Space Ambitions”, http://news.softpedia.com/news/JAXA-May-Need-to-Downscale-Its-Space-Ambitions-173513.shtml) MHSpace analysts in Japan believe that the nation's space agency may need to rethink its long-term space strategy and ambitions, following last week's failure to put a spacecraft in Venusian orbit. This is the second of two probes to miss its target, after the spacecraft Nozomi swung past Mars in 2003, failing to get captured in a stable orbit. That mission is currently on a heliocentric orbit. Last week, the Akatsuki space probe, the world's first weather satellite around another planet, failed to decelerate sufficiently to be captured in an orbit around Venus, and overshot the planet. According to early calculations, it will take until late 2016 – early 2017 for another orbital insertion attempt to become possible. These poor results deserve proper scrutiny, experts now say. Even Akatsuki mission scientists believe that the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) should take a close, hard look at its plans, and trim them according to its actual capabilities. “Our score is zero wins, two losses. We have to be more conservative to plan our next planetary mission, so it will never fail in any aspect,” JAXA official Takehiko Satoh told Space on December 16. The interview was taken at the 2010 annual fall meeting of the American Geophysical Union (AGU), which was held in San Francisco, California, between December 13-17. On December 6, Akatsuki reached a point some 342 miles (550 kilometers) away from its target. Once there, it was supposed to fire its thrusters, get obscured by the planet for a few minutes, then resume communications and enter orbit. But the 22-minute communications blackout turned into a 90-minute one, and once contact was established the JAXA mission control team could see that the spacecraft was speeding away from its intended target. According to Satoh, JAXA experts still have no idea why the thrusters misfired. “The pressure decrease was the direct cause. But we don't know why the pressure shut down,” he said. The expert added that the Akatsuki team is relatively optimistic about the second orbital insertion attempt. “Everybody thought Hayabusa was unrecoverable. We now share that never-give-up-spirit with the Hayabusa team,” he explained. The Hayabusa sample-return flight spent years traveling to the asteroid Ikotawa, and then returning home. Nearly everything that could have failed on it did, yet the sample chamber was safely returned to Earth this June. “With Mars exploration, so many scientists want a big lander or a big rover. If we had previous successes with planetary orbital insertions, we might say, OK, we'll try something big,” Satoh said. “But now, maybe we can do an orbiter and a very small lander or a small rover,” he added, saying that JAXA could learn a lot from NASA and the European Space Agency.

Japan aborted mars mission, aircraft and technology failed. The Associated Press, 3 (12/10/03, “Japan aborts Mars Mission”, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&csi=142709&sr=HLEAD(Japan+aborts+Mars+mission)+and+date+is+December,%202003). EETOKYO - Japan abandoned its troubled mission to Mars on Tuesday after space officials failed in their final effort to put the Nozomi probe back on course to orbit the Red Planet. The probe, Japan's first interplanetary explorer, had been traveling for five years toward Mars and would have reached the planet next week. But officials at JAXA, Japan's space agency, said Nozomi was off target and scientists gave up trying to salvage the mission after an attempt to fire the probe's engines failed because it was short on fuel. "Our mission to explore Mars is over," JAXA spokesman Junichi Moriuma said. "After today's attempt, almost all of the probe's fuel is gone." Malfunctions during Nozomi's journey altered its trajectory, putting the dragonfly-shaped, 1,190-pound probe into a course that was too low and raising concerns it might crash into - and possibly contaminate - the planet's surface. The probe was limping and its electrical and communications equipment damaged by solar flares.

JAXA is failing they can’t launch a medium lift rocket, and could barely even consolidate their space industry. Aviation week and space technology, 4 (March 8,2004, “JAXA, the Japanese”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=JAXA%2C+the+Japanese&rft.jtitle=Aviation+Week+%26+Space+Technology&rft.date=2004-03-08&rft.issn=0005-2175&rft.volume=160&rft.issue=10&rft.spage=21&rft.externalDBID=AWS&rft.externalDocID=680916671). EEJAXA, the Japanese space agency, has completed a 2-min. burn test of a full-scale improved solid rocket booster motor for the H-IIA that has given it confidence the launch program can resume. But there are a lot of "ifs" in the proposition that the nation's medium-lift rocket can return to service. They won't be answered until the Space Activities Commission (SAC), an advisory panel that is independent of the eight ministries and agencies involved in Japanese space and aeronautical activities, issues a series of reports. They could begin coming as early as

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this week. JAXA had barely consolidated Japan's three main space agencies late last year when it was hit by a series of failures. The sixth H-IIA launch failed when an SRB nozzle was breached during the first stage liftoff. Overcoming the nozzle problem is the highest priority, said Yasunori Matogawa, a senior member of Japan's space leadership who is now director of JAXA's office of public outreach and space education. A data analysis indicates the burnthrough can be overcome by repositioning the grain of the carbon-carbon fiber at the nozzle's throat, Matogawa said. Doing that resulted in the successful burn test on Feb. 18. In all, there have been four static test firings of the SRB motor, including three with scale models, since the sixth mission loss. This fiber fix is likely to be used for the seventh launch hardware. For the eighth mission, instead of the current bell-shaped nozzle, JAXA is likely to shift to straight sides because A Japanese research probe failed to touch down on an asteroid Sunday after developing trouble just yards away from the surface, Japan's space agency said.

JAXA failed to land craft on asteroid, and lost all communication with the probe, the location is still unknown. Chicago Sun Times, 5 (November 21, 2005, “Japanese probe fails to land on asteroid”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=news&rft.atitle=Japanese+probe+fails+to+land+on+asteroid&rft.jtitle=Chicago+sun-times+%28Chicago%2C+Ill.+%3A+1985%29&rft.date=2005-11-21&rft.spage=45&rft.externalDBID=UABF&rft.externalDocID=935278681). EEThe Hayabusa probe, which botched a rehearsal landing earlier this month, was on a mission to briefly touch down on the asteroid, collect material, then bring it back to Earth. When Hayabusa was 130 feet above the asteroid Itokawa, it dropped a small object as a touchdown target, then descended to 56 feet, officials from Japan's space agency, JAXA, said. At that point, ground control lost contact with the probe for about three hours, the officials said. CRAFT'S LOCATION UNKNOWN ''Hayabusa reached extremely close, but could not make the landing,'' said JAXA spokesman Toshihisa Horiguchi, adding that the reason for the failure was unknown. The probe switched to auto-control, storing data about itself and later transmitting it to ground control to be analyzed. The exact location of the probe was unknown, Horiguchi said, but it was believed to be within 60 miles of the asteroid. Officials plan to make a second landing attempt on Friday. they will reduce pressure by about 20%. The exhaust gases will still be about 3,000C and thrust will not be altered, Matogawa said.

Japan failed to send space probe to Venus, and is being overshadowed by other countries in space development and success. The Statesman, 10 (Dec 8, 2010, “Japan space probe fails to orbit Venus”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=news&rft.atitle=Japan+space+probe+fails+to+orbit+Venus&rft.jtitle=Statesman+%28New+Delhi%2C+India%29&rft.date=2010-12-08&rft.pub=Financial+Times+Ltd&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=243869242). EEA Japanese space probe sent to the thick clouds of Venus shut itself down, and its future looks as hazy as the planet it was built to study. The probe, called Akatsuki, which means 'dawn', reached Venus yesterday to orbit Earth's neighbour on a two-year mission. But communication problems left scientists in the dark about whether it was successfully in orbit. An American scientist on the probe's research team said the probe shut itself partially down and is in safe mode. That means it is sending back signals indicating it is alive, but not transmitting any data. At first, controllers back on Earth lost contact with the probe and got modulating signals indicating that spaceship may be wobbling a bit, said Dr Sanjay Limaye, a University of Wisconsin-Madison professor who is one of five American scientists on the Akatsuki research team. But after a few hours, engineers at Nasa and the Japanese space agency, JAXA, were able to lock on the probe's signal and found it shut itself down to protect itself, Dr Limaye said. That means at least things are looking better if not perfectly the best, he said. It would be the first time Japan has ever placed a spacecraft into orbit around another planet and comes after the country recently brought a probe back from a trip to an asteroid. Russia, the USA and the Europeans have successfully explored other planets. The Russian space programme has been sending missions to Venus since 1961 with more than 30 attempts. Its early missions were marred with many failures. Dr Limaye said it was unclear if the probe was successfully inserted into orbit around Venus, but Dr Gerald Schubert, a University of California, Los Angeles, scientist who is on the probe team, said he thinks it is in some kind of orbit around the hazy planet. There appears to be a problem, but exactly what the problem is I'm not sure, Dr Schubert said. Japan has long been one of the world's leading space-faring nations. It was the first

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Asian country to put a satellite in orbit around the Earth in 1970 and has developed a highly reliable booster rocket in its H-2 series. In recent years, Japan has been overshadowed by the big strides of China, which has put astronauts in space twice since 2003 and was the third country to send a human into orbit after Russia and the USA.

Japanese rocket fails to reach orbit, this will hurt Japan’s space ambitions. The Associated Press, 3 (Nov 30, 2003, “Japanese Spy Mission Fails to Reach Orbit”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=news&rft.atitle=Japanese+spy+mission+fails+to+reach+orbit&rft.jtitle=Calgary+Herald&rft.au=Audrey+McAvoy&rft.date=2003-11-30&rft.issn=0828-1815&rft.spage=A.10&rft.externalDBID=CALH&rft.externalDocID=480186001). EEA Japanese rocket carrying two spy satellites for monitoring North Korea failed to reach orbit Saturday and had to be destroyed, space officials said, a blow to Japan's space program. The launch of the H2-A rocket had been delayed three times since Sept. 10 because of technical glitches. National broadcaster NHK reported one of the rocket's engines had malfunctioned, prompting the space agency to order the rocket blown up 10 minutes after liftoff. "There was no chance of the mission being recovered, so ground control issued an order to destroy the rocket," said Shoko Yamamoto, a spokeswoman for Japan's space agency, JAXA. The failure occurred when one of the two rocket boosters didn't separate, making it impossible for the rocket to obtain sufficient altitude and speed to reach orbit, JAXA said in a statement. The agency set up a team of engineers and executives to investigate what caused the failure. Saturday's launch was kept under tight security, with the usual live film coverage of the liftoff banned because of the sensitivity of the payload. Tokyo sent its first two spy satellites into space in March as part of a $2.6-billion Cdn surveillance project to keep watch on North Korea's missile and nuclear programs. The move prompted protests from Pyongyang, which warned Tokyo against triggering a regional arms race. Japanese officials say the program was prompted by North Korea's surprise test launch of a long-range missile over Japan's main island in 1998. The satellites, the officials say, are not meant as a provocation and would also be used for other missions such as monitoring natural disasters and weather patterns. Saturday's failure will likely complicate Japan's space ambitions. "It's very unfortunate, as our country needs to boost intelligence capability to increase readiness for natural disasters and secure national security," Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said. "We will quickly, strictly and thoroughly study the cause and consider what further actions to take." Japan had planned to put eight spy satellites in orbit through 2006.

JAXA missions fail – Akatsuki, Nozomi, and Hayabusa missions prove

Jiji Press, 10 (12/8/10, Jiji Press English News Service, “Japanese Venus Probe Fails to Enter Orbit”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=news&rft.atitle=Japanese+Venus+Probe+Fails+to+Enter+Orbit&rft.jtitle=Jiji&rft.date=2010-12-08&rft.pub=Financial+Times+Ltd&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=243869163)MHThe probe, Akatsuki, Tuesday passed over Venus after failing to reverse its engine for an enough time to be drawn into the planet's orbit as planned, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, or JAXA, said. JAXA is considering trying again to put Akatsuki into Venus' orbit six years later. The agency said it has such a chance when the probe comes close to Venus between December 2016 and January 2017. Explaining a reason for the failure of the latest mission, Masato Nakamura, professor at JAXA, said at a press conference here that Akatsuki entered a self-hold mode when it began reversing its engine. It remains to be seen why the probe entered the emergency mode, he said. Nakamura said JAXA has a high chance of successfully sending Akatsuki to Venus' orbit six years later. The probe has so far consumed only about 20 pct of all fuel, he said. JAXA launched Akatsuki on May 21 from the Tanegashima Space Center, southern Japan. The spacecraft had not experienced any major troubles until the engine reversal. Akatsuki started reversing its engine at 8:49 a.m. Tuesday (11:49 p.m. Monday GMT) when it reached a point some 550 kilometers away from Venus. JAXA had estimated that if the probe had been able to reverse its engine for nine minutes and 20 seconds to 12 minutes, it would have entered Venus' orbit. In Akatsuki's two-year mission, the probe was expected to help elucidate mechanisms for Earth's climate and weather change as Venus and Earth are believed to resemble each other in nature. Akatsuki's failure came after JAXA failed to put the Nozomi probe into Mars'

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orbit in December 2003. The agency's Hayabusa probe brought asteroid dust back to Earth for the first time this year. Its Kaguya lunar orbit explorer mission between 2007 and 2009 was also successful.

Japan’s Hayabusa mission failed to bring back asteroid samples

AP, 5 (11/24/05, Associated Press, “Asteroid probe lands but fails to collect samples”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=news&rft.atitle=Asteroid+probe+lands+but+fails+to+collect+samples&rft.jtitle=Times+-+Colonist&rft.date=2005-11-24&rft.issn=0839-427X&rft.spage=A.12&rft.externalDBID=VCTC&rft.externalDocID=931753051)MHTOKYO - Japan's space agency said Wednesday its spacecraft had successfully touched down on an asteroid some 290 million kilometres from Earth despite an earlier announcement that it had failed. On Sunday, officials of the space agency, known as JAXA, had said the Hayabusa probe, on a mission to land on the asteroid named Itokawa, collect material, then bring it back to Earth, failed to touch down after manoeuvring within metres of the surface. However, the agency said Wednesday that data confirmed that Hayabusa had landed on the surface Sunday for a half-hour, although it failed to collect material.

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U.S. Japan Cooperation Good

The U.S.- Japanese exchange of scientists and instruments strengthens relationship – good for space explorationElachi, 11 – Dr. Charles Elachi, Directior of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Vice President of the California Institute of Technology (2011, Interview with JAXA, “Japan’s Role in Space Exploration”, http://www.jaxa.jp/article/interview/vol37/index_e.html) MHOne of JAXA's recent missions was the rendezvous and landing on an asteroid by Hayabusa. That was a major challenge. I mean, even here in the U.S. such a mission would be a major challenge. I think the involvement of ISAS both in studying asteroids and in conducting the KAGUYA (SELENE) mission to the moon, which is now in orbit, really shows the leadership that Japan is taking in planetary exploration. JAXA has had a number of programs that involved international activity, not only in planetary exploration but also in Earth science. So we at JPL have participated many times in Earth observation missions for which Japan had developed the spacecraft. And we've also had a number of scientists from Japan involved in our missions here. These international exchanges, where either scientists or instruments from the U.S. fly on Japanese spacecraft or vice versa, build a strong scientific and human relationship between countries. That's very important in science and space exploration, and you have been very proactive in doing that.

Great potential for U.S.-Japanese collaboration on space projectsElachi, 11 – Dr. Charles Elachi, Directior of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Vice President of the California Institute of Technology (2011, Interview with JAXA, “Japan’s Role in Space Exploration”, http://www.jaxa.jp/article/interview/vol37/index_e.html) MHLooking at the future, I would say one of the areas where Japan has built capabilities is rendezvousing and bringing samples from small bodies, such as asteroids. So that could be an exciting potential collaboration in the future - doing more extensive studies of asteroids and comets, rendezvousing with them and bringing samples from a variety of asteroids and comets, so we can see the diversity across the solar system. And clearly, the other area of cooperation would be in the Earth sciences, where we are all sharing the concern over global change. It's going to require all the leading nations in space to develop a network to observe the changes that are happening on our planet, so the public policy people can decide how to address all these issues.

International cooperation is vital to being a space leaderElachi, 11 – Dr. Charles Elachi, Directior of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Vice President of the California Institute of Technology (2011, Interview with JAXA, “Japan’s Role in Space Exploration”, http://www.jaxa.jp/article/interview/vol37/index_e.html) MHI recommended two things. One is to expand international collaboration. I think international cooperation is very important, and almost every mission we have at JPL has an international element. We have a number of Japanese scientists involved in our missions, and we have been involved in Japanese missions. We all agree that space exploration is for all humankind, because when you look from space at the Earth you don't see any boundaries. There is some international collaboration now at JAXA, but I think it ought to be expanded. For instance you could have scientists from other countries work at JAXA for a year or two - what we call a research fellows program. The other advice is to increase your tolerance for taking risks. In space exploration, particularly planetary exploration, there is always a high risk, because many of these missions we're doing the first time. So there needs to be a good tolerance for risk. In any type of exploration, in Antarctica, or when people explored the oceans 300 years ago, there was always high risk. And there were always setbacks and failures, but people never gave up. People in general, but particularly big organizations tend to shy away from risk. And if you are always afraid of problems and failure, you will not be a leader. So one of my recommendations is that we should try to avoid problems but expect that setbacks will happen. The important thing is to learn from our failures and keep pushing the frontier. We at JPL encountered that many times through our history. We had successes and we had failures. But we always learn from our failures, so we can push the frontier to the next step.

A global project involving the U.S. and Japan would give countries a unifying purpose in space to follow the ISS

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Matsuoka, 99 – Hideo Matsuoka, Professor at Teikyo Heisei University (10/7/99, Paper presented to IAF Congress, “An Equatorial SPS Pilot Plant”, http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/an_equatorial_sps_pilot_plant.shtml) MH Recent cost-estimates suggest that the SPS 2000 satellite would cost some hundreds of $millions, and that using today's launch vehicles its launch will cost some $1-2 billion. Thus the total project cost would be about 10% of one year's expenditure by the US, European and Japanese space agencies - or 2% per year if spread over 5 years. Clearly this would not be a significant burden, either for taxpayers, nor for government space budgets. Indeed, by giving the space agencies a project that has public support it could benefit them greatly. However, in view of the problem referred to above that SPS has weak political support because it falls between the responsibilities of different government departments (2), it lies in the hands of the space community to design and propose such a collaborative project to follow ISS. The overall breakdown of work between different participating countries would depend on their political and economic objectives. Based on the discussion above, the different countries' roles might work out somewhat like those shown in Table 2, with the space infrastructure being the responsibility primarily of the advanced countries, and the terrestrial infrastructure being primarily the responsibility of developing countries, with Japan also involved in coordinating the rectennas.

Japan and the U.S. have cooperated for the past decade – Cooperation is possibleBeckner, 3 – Christian Beckner, Managing Consultant and Senior Homeland Security Analyst (7/03, “U.S.-Japan Space Policy: A Framework for 21st Century Cooperation”, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/taskforcereport.pdf)MH In the 1990s, the United States and Japan cooperated on a number of scientific projects in space. In 1994, the two countries partnered on the Advanced Earth Observing Satellite Program (ADEOS), a scientific remote-sensing system designed to acquire data on global environmental change. The International Space Station (now involving the Russians as a partner, not a competitor) came into existence with both U.S. and Japanese participation, and the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Japan and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States of America(NASA) Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station codified their cooperation. The two countries also concluded several minor space policy agreements during the decade. The 1995 Agreement between the United States and Japan Concerning Cross-Waiver of Liability for Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Space for Peaceful Purposes dealt with a legal issue related to space policy but had no real impact on the substance of the relationship. In 1998, the two countries signed the U.S.–Japan Joint Statement on GPS Cooperation, confirming their intent to partner and ensure full compatibility for future satellite navigation systems.

U.S.-Japan cooperation with launch vehicles would save both countries money Beckner, 3 – Christian Beckner, Managing Consultant and Senior Homeland Security Analyst (7/03, “U.S.-Japan Space Policy: A Framework for 21st Century Cooperation”, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/taskforcereport.pdf)MH The security imperative in the United States and the desire for autonomy in Japan are both still strong. Neither country is likely to exit the market in the face of low-cost competition. This leaves the two countries with three non-mutually-exclusive options: subsidize, innovate, and/or reduce costs. The first option is the least painful in the short-term, but ultimately the most costly. The latter two options require substantial up-front investment, but have the potential to deliver long-term returns. One way to minimize these investments is international partnership, and the United States and Japan should expand their cooperation in the area of launch vehicles to achieve these goals. These separate areas of focus could be the basis for a deal between United States and Japan. The United States could provide relevant information on its EELV capabilities to Japan in exchange for insight into the latter’s work on RLVs. A deal such as this has a number of obstacles—export control issues, fair accounting for each country’s contribution, and third-party entanglements (such as Japan’s current relationship with Europe on RLVs), but these problems are solvable, given the desire to avoid costly subsidies as much as possible and focus instead on investment in cost-saving and innovation.

U.S.-Japanese cooperation is high now- work on GPS proves Beckner, 3 – Christian Beckner, Managing Consultant and Senior Homeland Security Analyst (7/03, “U.S.-Japan Space Policy: A Framework for 21st Century Cooperation”, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/taskforcereport.pdf)MH

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To date, cooperation between the United States and Japan has been strong on navigation systems. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the two countries signed the U.S.–Japan Joint Statement on GPS Compatibility in 1998. In October 2002, the United States and Japan reconfirmed the principles of this statement and agreed to establish a technical working group that will coordinate the details of GPS and QZSS compatibility.xxxviii Both countries have strong incentives to cooperate: the United States is not interested in seeing a repeat of the Galileo episode, and Japan does not want to promote a new or modified standard that would harm its installed base of users or the companies involved in the manufacture of GPS equipment in Japan. The Japanese government has not yet come forward with a position on a second stage regional system. In addition, by the time that this issue arises, Galileo will likely be operational—and if the experience of the current decade has not been positive, Japan could decide to move over and align with the European system. Overall, the record of cooperation between the United States and Japan in this area is currently strong, but steps still need to be taken to ensure a successful partnership and maximize the economic and security-related interests of both countries.

U.S.-Japanese cooperation on research will strengthen relations and yield quality dataBeckner, 3 – Christian Beckner, Managing Consultant and Senior Homeland Security Analyst (7/03, “U.S.-Japan Space Policy: A Framework for 21st Century Cooperation”, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/taskforcereport.pdf)MH On balance, the imperatives for cooperation outweigh the current obstacles in both the United States and Japan. But awareness and good intentions are meaningless unless both countries take active steps to negotiate a framework that clarifies the two countries’ common interests, and provides institutions and private companies with the capabilities and incentives to act upon these interests and reap the benefits of cooperation. The next chapter examines the steps that both countries need to take, acting both in common and alone, to create a new space policy relationship. The agreement should encourage joint research and development projects, and more importantly, establish new incentives for the various space agencies to cooperate. The agreement should establish defined procedures for the use and licensing of jointly-developed technologies that appropriately remunerate both nations’ entities for their investments. The two countries should strengthen programs and mechanisms for the exchange of scientists between their key space agencies, to build the personal relationships and trust that lead to successful joint research. The two countries should not set specific research goals or targets, but delegate that to the respective agencies and related commercial entities.

Japan and the U.S. are currently working on an International space X-Ray project togetherFriedman, 11 – Louis Friedman, Executive Director of The Planetary Society (2/21/11, The Space Review, “The case for international cooperation in space exploration”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1782/1) MH The European Space Agency has to make decisions long in advance of their technical necessity. They will probably decide this year or next on their next big step in space exploration and choose a mission that will probably not launch until well into the 2020s. They are considering their first outer planets mission: an orbiter of Jupiter and its giant moon Ganymede, to fly as a companion to NASA’s putative Europa orbiter. An International X-Ray Observatory is also being considered in cooperation with both NASA and JAXA, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. It would be a large telescope companion to the James Webb Space Telescope at the Sun-Earth Lagrangian point, L2. The third candidate in the science competition is a gravity wave detector called LISA, Laser Interferometer Space Antenna. It would be a cooperative mission with NASA, utilizing three satellites.

Japan and the U.S. cooperation is key to a strong projection or power. Logsdon, 92- Director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs( Jan 17, 1992, John M., “U.S. Japanese Space Relations at a Crossroads”, Vol. 255, Iss, 5042, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?did=1786437&Fmt=7&clientId=17822&RQT=309&VName=PQD). EEThe United States and Japan have cooperated in space at both the governmental and industrial level for the past two decades. But the objectives of such cooperation have been different for the two countries. The U.S. government has seen space cooperation as a means of demonstrating in a highly visible way its claims to global political and technological leadership; Japan has used cooperation (and not only in space) as a way of learning from a more advanced partner as an interim step to independent, often competitive, Japanese capabilities. Japanese industry worked with U.S. firms in the early stages of developing its space capabilities; after acquiring as much U.S. technology as possible through licensing and other forms of technology transfer, a Japanese firm typically

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reduces the interactions with its U.S. collaborator and tries to improve on the imported technology. To date, the benefits to U.S. firms have come from the revenues generated by technology transfer, not from access to Japanese or world markets through alliances with Japanese collaborators. Both the United States and Japan recognize that the "leader-follower" relationship that has characterized their space relationship so far requires revision, particularly because Japan is developing world-class capabilities in critical areas of space technology and could emerge both as a significant competitor to the United States for economic payoffs from space and as a major partner in collaborative space undertakings. From the U.S. perspective, a strategy is needed for Japanese-U.S. space relations that balances national security, political, economic, and scientific interests. Key to such a strategy is the balance sought between cooperation and competition. It is in the U.S. interest to stress cooperative interactions (1). As one high-level group recently commented, an "increasingly cooperative U.S.-Japan relationship" would have "a strongly constructive" effect, strengthening the general trend that existed from the late 1940s through the 1970s toward a more open, multilateral trading regime, alignment of security policies, and cooperation in minimizing the instabilities produced by massive capital flows and the loosening of fixed exchange rates... Partnership and competition need not be mutually exclusive (2, p.1). To develop such a productive strategy, one needs a clear understanding of the current state and likely future character of the Japanese space program. Unfortunately, there is substantial confusion on these two topics. For example, last year an aerospace trade publication reported on Japan's "commitment to an aggressive development program that will position it as a major space power in the 21st century" (3, p. 37). In contrast, the Tokyo correspondent of the New York Times observed that Japan is entering its third decade in space more confused than ever about where to proceed next, and deeply uncertain whether it wants to commit the money or scarce talent needed to turn the world's second largest economy into a spacefaring nation" (4, p. C1). The reality is that Japan is still in the process of reaching a national consensus on its long-term purposes in space and on the appropriate level of public and private investment justified by the potential benefits of space activities. The United States can exert some influence on that consensus, but more importantly, the United States needs to understand its emerging outlines so that it is well prepared for future interactions. This article is intended as a contribution to such an understanding.

U.S. Japan cooperation is key to Japan development of science and technology. Logsdon, 92- Director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs( Jan 17, 1992, John M., “U.S. Japanese Space Relations at a Crossroads”, Vol. 255, Iss, 5042, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?did=1786437&Fmt=7&clientId=17822&RQT=309&VName=PQD). EECooperation in space science between the United States and Japan is likely to increase, whatever future course in space Japan chooses. Such cooperation has its own dynamics, driven primarily by the desire of scientists for more and better data, and usually occurs independently of more visible and politically charged forms of cooperation and competition. Unique among the spacefaring countries of the world, Japan has organized much of its space science program separately from other areas of space activity; this is an approach that the U.S. space science community has sometimes advocated, particularly when it perceives its programs threatened by the budget demands of human space flight. But if Japan's overall spending on space is modest in comparison to that of the United States, its spending on basic space science (13) is very modest, and that may be a necessary condition of independence. The 1991 ISAS budget is approximately one-twentieth that of NASA's Office of Space Science and Applications. Within this budget, ISAS not only develops scientific spacecraft, it also operates its own launch vehicles, launch site, and mission control center. Similar expenses are not charged against the NASA space science budget. The academic, research-oriented operating style of ISAS dates to its origins in the 1950s as scientists and engineers at the University of Tokyo planned Japanese participation in the International Geophysical Year. When Japan in the late 1960s reorganized its institutional structure for space to pursue space development more aggressively, ISAS fought hard and successfully to retain its independence. The Institute stayed affiliated with the University of Tokyo until 1981, when it became a national research institute. There are pressures for change, however. The Space Activities Commission is pushing for more ISAS-NASDA cooperation, and ISAS is working with MITI on several projects, including a German-Japanese effort to develop an automated reentry capsule for returning experiments from orbit and an ISAS-NASDA-MITI retrievable (by the U.S. shuttle) platform, the Space Flyer Unit, for microgravity research in orbit. As ISAS budgets, capabilities, and involvement with other agencies grow, it is likely to become more integrated into the mainstream of Japan's space development activities rather than remain a self-sufficient enclave of pure research. Although ISAS has launched 20 missions in 21 years, concentrating on x-ray astronomy, upper atmosphere studies, and solar physics, these missions have been low in cost and simple in concept and design. There is a sense within Japan that such simple missions may be reaching the point of

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diminishing scientific returns. Spurred on by Japanese scientists interested in solar system exploration, ISAS has recently been successful in pressuring the government to allow it to develop a larger launch vehicle capable of carrying out lunar and planetary missions. This vehicle, called the M-5, is scheduled for a first launch in 1995 and will allow ISAS to launch spacecraft up to three times heavier than before. One 1996 flight will launch the recently approved Lunar-A mission, which will send several penetrators into the lunar surface at different locations for geological measurements; other solar system missions are also being planned, including one in 1996 to investigate the Martian atmosphere. ISAS scientists in areas other than solar system exploration are also designing larger missions to take advantage of the M-5 capabilities, and there is talk of even more ambitious post-2000 science missions that would require the use of the H-II launch vehicle under development by NASDA. These missions will be possible only if ISAS obtains a significantly larger budget, which is not likely, or combines less frequent launches of its own missions with more participation in international cooperative undertakings than has been the case in the past. To be sure, there has been some limited international involvement on the part of ISAS, and the United States has been the primary cooperative partner, mainly through exchanges of data, scientists, and occasionally instruments on spacecraft; the Japanese Solar-A mission launched in August 1991 carried a U.S.-supplied soft x-ray telescope as one of its two major instruments. ISAS has also been part of the multilateral planning for and conduct of missions such as the 1986 encounter with Comet Halley and the upcoming International Solar Terrestrial Physics (ISTP) program. An important change in past ISAS behavior is the Geotail mission, planned for a 1992 launch as part of the ISTP. Both U.S. and Japanese instruments will be mounted on a spacecraft developed and controlled by ISAS but launched by the United States. This kind of mutual dependence is unusual for ISAS, and it may set a precedent for more intimate cooperation in space science between Japan and the United States (or Europe or Russia) in the future.U.S. should encourage the Japan to cooperate with them at all costs, or else it could lead to a Japan rise and U.S. decline in space dominance. Logsdon, 92- Director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs( Jan 17, 1992, John M., “U.S. Japanese Space Relations at a Crossroads”, Vol. 255, Iss, 5042, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?did=1786437&Fmt=7&clientId=17822&RQT=309&VName=PQD). EEJapan is best seen as an emerging space power, still unsure of how it wants to put to work the technological capability it is developing. In the interim, it is positioning itself to take advantage of any economic, political, or security opportunities to use the capability that might emerge. In its discussion of international cooperation, Japan's most recent statement of space policy noted that "Japan will establish and accumulate space technology equal to that at an international level. Japan will provide the results for global space development and will positively promote international cooperative activities consistent with Japan's status as an international society" (10, p. 18). The United States should be doing all it can to encourage Japan to move in this direction, rather than to use its developing capabilities in a competitive manner. Historically, Europe and the former Soviet Union have been the transatlantic partners for most major U.S. cooperative space initiatives; given the growing importance of transpacific relations, the United States should seek additional opportunities to make Japan primary partner in new space undertakings. Engaging Japan in regional and global cooperative space undertakings may be one way to build the kind of stable relations in the Asia-Pacific area that are essential to 21st century world order. There are many questions that must be answered for the United States to develop a coherent approach to space relations with Japan. Perhaps the most fundamental is how best to balance U.S. security, political, and technological interest in dealing with another society that is pursuing a space program for reasons that to date have been very different from those shaping the U.S. effort in space. Is Japan likely to increase the emphasis on international uses for the public good of its space capability, as its recent policy pronouncements suggest, or will its space priorities continue to be driven primarily by anticipation of technological and commercial payoffs? Without an answer to that question, it is difficult to recommend a particular approach to U.S.-Japanese space relations. For the time being, the United States should remain flexible in its strategy toward Japan while trying to exert its influence toward collaboration rather than competition. There are a number of scientific, Earth observation, and public service communication missions under discussion between the U.S. and Japanese technical communities and governments as candidates for fUture cooperative projects. Japan appears particularly interested in contributing its space capabilities to the worldwide global change effort. Moreover, the United States has announced its intention to open an exploratory dialogue with potential partners regarding international collaboration in the human exploration of the solar system; Japan's interest in lunar exploration and exploitation makes it a logical candidate for a major cooperative role if a U.S. exploration program gets under way. Japan's private sector is also proposing ambitious international space projects. An example is the World Environmental and Disaster

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Observation System (WEDOS), which Japanese industrial leaders are promoting in various forums around the world. WEDOS would be composed of numerous Earth observation satellites linked by series of data relay satellites (24). Presumably, most of these satellites would be manufactured by Japan, thereby giving it the opening into the world market it has been seeking, and combining cooperative and commercial impulses in a single undertaking. As both the United States and Japan engage, each in its own national style, in a debate over future goals in space, there are opportunities to create broader cooperative space relations between the world's two richest societies. Although space collaboration is by itself certainly not a solution to tense relations between the two nations, it can, if well conceived and implemented, serve as one means of stressing positive interactions. Thus, it would be wise for the United States to take seriously this passage from the 1989 statement of Japanese space policy: "The time is ... ripe for global space development and for cultivating close international relationships"

Obama and Japanese officials are both interested in international space cooperation

Brown, 10- Peter J. Brown, Satellite technology specialist (7/16/10, Asia Times, “Asia takes stock of new US space policy”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LG16Df02.html)A new National Space Policy issued by United States President Barack Obama's administration in late June emphasized the important role of international cooperation in space and demonstrated the apparent willingness of the US to begin work on a space weapons treaty. As the three major space powers in Asia - China, India and Japan - assess the new policy, they must pay close attention not only to the details, but also to the harsh political winds that are buffeting Obama these days. Some see China as the big winner in this instance, while others see India and Japan coming out on top. "[The new US space policy] which lays out broad themes and goals, does not lend itself to such determination for a specific country," said Subrata Ghoshroy, a research associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Program in Science, Technology, and Society. However, he added, "countries like India and Japan are expected to benefit more".From the start, however, Obama's overhaul of both the US space sector as a whole and the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in particular has encountered stiff opposition in the US Congress. That opposition is likely to intensify as November's mid-term elections approach. In the US Senate, attempts are being made to toss aside Obama's domestic space sector agenda"To date there have been no concrete proposals for cooperative projects from either side, despite the express wishes of both presidents. US Secretary of State Clinton and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang [Jiechi] seem to have dropped the ball," said Kulacki. "The Chinese aerospace community has their own long-standing plan for a national space station and they are well on their way to completing it. They do not need access to US technology to do it." Japan's situation is entirely different. Japan faces a difficult task of adjusting and then readjusting to the shifting priorities in space spelled out by the Obama administration. Part of the problem confronting Japan stems from Japan's close alignment with the US after embracing the vision of space cooperation and lunar exploration that started to emerge a few years ago as part of former president George W Bush's plans for space. "There has been a significant discussion on how to justify the exploration of the Moon. But due to the cancellation of the Constellation program - only partial cancellation may occur if a new bill in the US Congress is passed - this has been in vain," said Suzuki. "For some people, the extension of ISS to 2020 might be good, but not for other people considering that it would increase the spending on ISS further, which might possibly threaten the other space programs." In other words, Japan is uncertain about the status and integrity of certain US space programs, just like everyone else. That said, Japan enjoys its leadership role in space, and its work in areas such as innovative space engineering, robotic spacecraft, and propulsion systems is well insulated from any tectonic shifts taking place in the US space program. While the new US national space policy seems to lend support to a ban on space weapons or at least points to a reduced interest in the weaponization of space, serious questions remain about how this might actually come about. Previous Russian and Chinese proposals which have attracted much praise have sidestepped verification which is an absolute necessity called for by the Obama administration."The US just is not supportive of multinational treaties in general," said Johnson-Freese. "What was done here was showing a more amenable attitude as opposed to outright rejection. More than anything the new policy says it will not be strictly relying on or looking to hardware to protect hardware." A speech in mid-July by Frank Rose, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva reinforced this idea that the US government is opening a new chapter. This receptivity contrasts with the Bush administration's tough stance which was not really an invitation, and asserted that a new treaty was simply not necessary because a pair of existing treaties were sufficient. "Although heavily caveated, the new policy may mean that the US will participate in discussions," said Ghoshroy.

The U.S. and Japan have worked together successfully in the past with the Geotail program

Neilan, 89 – Edward Neilan, Washington Times editor who specializes in political relations (9/25/89, The Washington Times, “U.S. Japan join in Geotail space project”, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/

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fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=news&rft.atitle=U.S.%2C+Japan+Join+in+Geotail+Space+Project&rft.jtitle=Washington+Times&rft.au=Neilan%2C+Edward&rft.date=1989-09-25&rft.issn=0732-8494&rft.spage=A8&rft.externalDBID=TIME&rft.externalDocID=8299799)MHVice President Dan Quayle (US) and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu (Japan), shelving the U.S.-Japanese trade controversy at least temporarily, activated a space cooperation project yesterday that Mr. Quayle said symbolizes the vitality of the "global partnership" built by the two nations.Under the project, dubbed "Geotail," Japan will provide the satellite and scientific instruments and the United States will provide instruments and a vehicle for a 1992 launch."The cooperative spirit reflected in the Geotail program clearly demonstrates the vitality and promise of the Japan-U.S. relationship in civil space activity," the vice president said. Mr. Quayle has been designated by President Bush to lead the National Space Council in developing concrete recommendations for the next round of space exploration and in considering the feasibility of international cooperation in the long-term U.S. goal of returning to the moon and sending a manned mission to Mars. Each side is to put up more than $2 billion to finance the Geotail project, but proposed cuts by Congress have raised some Japanese eyebrows about Washington's financial commitment. There have been other musings in the Japanese press that space cooperation - including the Geotail project - might become mired in arguments such as those that beset the FSX next-generation jet fighter project.There are many Japanese in favor of going it alone in space, just as many advocated an all-Japanese fighter instead of the finally agreed-upon joint-production version. As in the case of the FSX, there have been concerns raised on both sides of the Pacific about transfer of high-level space technology that might be used later to commercial benefit by one of the partners. Mr. Quayle and Mr. Kaifu toured the Tsukuba Science City facilities together, viewing the latest in Japanese space research facilities. During his visit here Mr. Quayle has been upbeat about the relationship and the desirability of viewing the U.S.-Japan tie more broadly than focusing just on the trade issue, a senior official traveling with the vice president told reporters at the U.S. Embassy last night. He said the United States hopes "it will be an aggressive and assertive relationship." Mr. Quayle arrived in Japan from South Korea on Thursday and has been a participant in a meeting of the International Democratic Union. Before meeting with Mr. Kaifu on the space accord, Mr. Quayle discussed perennial and specific trade issues with Japan's minister of international trade and industry, Hikaru Matsunaga. Mr. Quayle has stressed the importance of bilateral security arrangements during his visit to South Korea and Japan. On departing tomorrow, after an address to the Japan National Press Club at which he will repeat the "global partnership" theme, he will stop in Okinawa to visit a third U.S. military base in Japan, Kadena Air Force Base, before traveling on to the Philippines. Just as there were some demonstrations against his presence in South Korea, Mr. Quayle is also likely to face vocal protesters in Manila. The issue of U.S. bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay has raised political emotions in recent weeks.

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Aff- A2: Mars NOZOMIJapan’s NOZOMI mission is irrelevant – It failedJAXA, 8 (2008, Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency, “NOZOMI Project”, http://www.isas.jaxa.jp/e/enterp/missions/nozomi/index.shtml)MHNOZOMI (PLANET-B) was Japan's first Mars explorer and its main mission was to research Martian upper atmosphere by focusing on the interaction with solar wind. On July 4, 1998, the explorer was launched by M-V-3 rocket from Kagoshima Space Center in Uchinoura. On the way to Mars, however, troubles occurred with NOZOMI and substantial orbit changes were made. Thus, it approached closely Mars in December 2003, four years behind the original plan. Due to frequent problems, however, the systems required to enter orbit around Mars did not work. Despite of every possible effort to restore the functions, we had to abandon insertion of the explorer into orbit around Mars on December 9, 2003. NOZOMI became an artificial planet that flies forever in orbit around the Sun near that of Mars.

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Permutation- Do BothInternational cooperation in space would create public support and help scientists with critical issues

Friedman, 8, Louis Friedman- Executive Director of The Planetary Society (9/8/08, “A New Paradigm for a New Vision of Space”, http://www.planetary.org/programs/projects/advocacy_and_education/space_advocacy/new_paradigm.pdf)MHAn approach of broad international cooperation in a human space flight venture could inspire worldwide excitement and provide political decisions makers with a compelling rationale for the needed investment in a space program – especially if that space program is also dealing with the critical issues of humankind survival on a habitable world. The difficulty in extricating US space policy from its current doldrums rests on its very superiority above all other players. With little competition from other space programs, the U.S. has little incentive for a dramatic change of course. But as we learned from the Cold War space race, as well as from the creation of the International Space Station, the only path to the realization of a major program is to allow it to serve geopolitical objectives.

Perm solves Japanese Leadership – Cooperation KeySuzuki, 6- School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan (5/5/06, Minoru, “Alternative international cooperation in space development for Japan—Need for more cost-effective space application projects”, vol. 56, iss. 1-5, http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0094576506001238#secx9)The need to maintain independence or autonomy in space development has been recognized as the basic condition for Japanese space development. This principle is important for certain areas of key and advanced technology and those related to national security. Nevertheless, Japanese space development up to the end of the last century had pursued purely peaceful purposes. Furthermore, Japan's space projects were heavily dependent on imported technology, as shown by the low localization ratio in space projects. It is important for Japan to promote international cooperation, through which Japan can learn diversified space development projects and exchange ideas. In this regard, to develop cooperative projects with European countries may be beneficial to Japan in view of the factor endowments of European countries and the various on-going space projects by ESA member countries. The US has acknowledged technological expertise in space, however, due to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), mutual cooperation projects with the US in space could be difficult to develop.

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***External Net Benefit***

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External 1NC (Japan DA)1. The United States recently committed to cooperate with Japan on space defense measures against ChinaCole 6/23 (J. Michael, Staff Reporter for the Taipei Times, “US, Japan call for strong Asia-Pacific defense”, June 23rd, 2011, http://www.taipeitimes.net/News/front/archives/2011/06/23/2003506460 // Vish)

In a joint statement, the committee said it recognized the need to address a number of challenges in an “increasingly uncertain security environment,” which included expanding military capabilities and activities in the region, as well as the emergence of non-traditional security concerns. The US government reaffirmed its commitment to the defense of Japan and to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, including through regional alliances and the full range of US military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional. Japan reaffirmed its commitment to provide stable use of facilities and areas by US forces and to support their smooth operation. The statement said it welcomed continued developments and cooperation with Japan on theater ballistic missile defense — which for years has met strong opposition from Beijing — and called for the study of future issues in preparation for transition to production and deployment of the SM-3 Block IIA missile defense system. The US also reaffirmed its commitment, first made in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, to strengthen regional deterrence and to maintain and enhance its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. More specifically, in comments that ostensibly targeted China, it stated its intent to tailor its regional defense posture to address proliferation of nuclear technologies and theater ballistic missiles, anti-access/area denial capabilities and other evolving threats, such as to outer space and cyberspace. On China, the statement said the US and Japan encouraged Beijing’s responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, cooperation on global issues and its adherence to international norms of behavior. It also reiterated the need for China to improve openness and transparency with respect to its military modernization and activities, and to strengthen confidence-building measures.

2. Japan would resent any action the US takes alone – devastating the allianceJapan Times 4 (1/14/04, The Japan Times, "Mr. Bush Sets His Sights on Mars," http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20040114a1.html, MM)

For as long as humankind has been capable of wonder, men and women have looked to the stars and dreamed. For centuries, they had to be content with just that. Only a mere half century ago, we first escaped the Earth's atmosphere; a decade later an American astronaut lowered himself to the lunar surface. That landing and the few more that followed are the high point of humankind's attempt to leave this planet as the costs of space travel - both human and financial - have mounted. Dreams of exploring worlds beyond our own have been rekindled with reports that U.S. President George W. Bush will announce a new space initiative this week. According to the leaks, the president will propose establishing a permanent science base on the moon for astronauts, from which, more than a decade from now, they will be used for manned trips to Mars or asteroids. In the meantime, the United States will gradually terminate its involvement in the International Space Station, or ISS, and retire the trouble-plagued space shuttle, replacing it with a new spacecraft, the crew exploration vehicle. There are a number of reasons for Mr. Bush's new initiative. In practical terms, the troubles with the space shuttle have forced the U.S. to rely on the Russians to make progress in space and the Russians have not performed as promised. Establishing a base on the moon would facilitate space exploration since the gravity there is one-sixth that of the Earth, making it easier to launch vehicles. It would also provide a better environment for testing equipment and procedures. But it is more likely that the U.S. administration is looking for more immediate political payoffs. Mr. Bush hopes to tap that human capacity for wonder and the desire to explore space. Space exploration is a "big idea." It has rallied and united nations in the past. For President John F. Kennedy, space was the arena for competition with the Soviet Union. The Soviets put the first man in space; the Americans got the first man on the moon. China's recent successes with its manned space program mark its entry into an elite club. "Vision" is critically important for Mr. Bush. His administration is mired in the war against terror and the occupation of Iraq, and is gearing up for an election campaign. He needs a positive symbol around which he can rally his country. (Ironically, in 1989 his father, who conceded he lacked "the vision thing," proposed a manned landing on Mars by 2020, but gave that up when the immense financial costs became apparent.) Americans may not be so easily rallied. Opinion polls show Americans are split on the question of space exploration. They think it is a good idea, but when asked about alternative uses of those funds, a majority believes the money should be used on domestic programs closer to home. Mr. Bush might not be deterred: Even in 1967, Americans were equally divided about the merits of space exploration. The cost of the program might prove to be as big an obstacle for this president as it was for his father. Over a decade ago, estimates of a manned Mars program reached Dollars

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400 billion to Dollars 500 billion, without the moon base. Senior administration officials insist that Mr. Bush's initiative will be affordable, will not increase the already sizable government deficit and will not squeeze out other domestic programs. Things should become clearer next month when the president presents his budget, but it is hard to see how all those promises can be kept. Costs can be minimized if the U.S. internationalizes that effort. Although the ISS is behind schedule and has failed to capture the public imagination, it is a joint project that has allowed many nations to work together. Japan is a key participant, along with Russia and the European Union. The shared sense of mission in space is becoming more important, not less - and especially as the U.S. fends off accusations of unilateralism in its foreign policy. It is to be hoped that the same attitudes do not prevail as Washington turns its eyes once again to the stars. Sadly, it has been reported that the key nations in the ISS program were not informed in advance of Mr. Bush's initiative. The millions of people around the world who gaze at the images beamed from Mars' surface by the Rover spacecraft should put to rest any doubts about humanity's continuing fascination with space. Mr. Bush is right to dream of an age when humankind lives on planets other than our own. But it is a shared dream, and a goal to which we must all aspire and work together to achieve.

3. With an equal and effective alliance, Japan and the US would be able to respond quickly and effectively to deter threats like North Korea and China and foster peace and stability in East AsiaRapp 4 (William E., Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army and former Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies, Tokyo, “Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance”, January 2004, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub367.pdf // Vish)

Finally, as the partnership deepens, Tokyo’s influence in Asia could further the common interests of the alliance. Japan is in a better position to mitigate the fears of its neighbors―through its leadership in multilateral institutions, continued transparency about its increased military role, and thoughtful recognition of historical emotions. By not intentionally inflaming passions in Korea and China, through acts of nationalist pride aimed at domestic audiences, and by leading East Asia in a number of multilateral forums, Japan could gain influence where the United States might not be so welcomed . Former UN diplomat Yasushi Akashi recently stated that Japan can be an important bridge for the United States into Asia. “There is a gap spreading between the United States and other countries. Japan, as a U.S. ally, can fill that gap. If Japan takes action in areas out of reach for the United States, Washington will count highly on Japan.”204 Having built a reputation for nuance, flexibility, and pragmatism through its ODA program and postwar interaction with Asian countries, Japan may be in a position to soften the more ideological tone of American foreign policy toward the region for the benefit of the two partners.205 For example, Japan could help extend the joint shaping capabilities of the alliance into ASEAN. A potential example is future negotiations over nonproliferation with Iran, with which Japan still maintains diplomatic relations and Washington does not.206 In that manner, Japan and the United States could act as a coordinated team and be successful in molding the future security environment of Asia. Using the Alliance to Shape the Future of East Asia. This monograph began by making the assertion that the alliance can and must become more than simply a narrow defense pact if both the United States and Japan want to be successful in shaping the security future of East Asia in ways that support peace, prosperity, and the growth of democratic and human values. In the next several decades, East Asia in particular will need the stability and positive character of Japan and the United States working in close concert. There is a distinct need for positive complementarities in the relationship. This power sharing could result in an alliance wellsuited to handle, in a positive manner, the most important challenge of the first half of the 21st century―the character of the rise of China to superpower status. Tight coordination of policy and increased military capability will vastly increase the

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deterrence credibility of the alliance. As Diet Representative Eisei Ito noted, “The best way to deal with China is for Japan and the U.S. to be partners in the truest sense and consult closely and frankly over policy toward that country.”207 Working together with one voice may be the best means of engaging China in the coming decades, preventing the opening of an exploitable rift, precluding the forceful reunification of Taiwan and the mainland, and creating a path that both facilitates Chinese national interests and the peace and prosperity of the entire region.208 North Korea and its quest for nuclear weapons represent a salient opportunity for the alliance to act in concert for the stability of Northeast Asia. No resolution of the current crisis on the Peninsula will be possible without both Japan and the United States working together within an agreed strategic framework. In addition, the powerful American and Japanese navies can help to guarantee the maintenance of the vital sea lines of communication (SLOC) running through Southeast and East Asia.209 About 52 percent of all commercial sea cargo (59 percent of supertankers) transit this region amid thorny and unresolved issues of territorial boundaries, intrastate governance problems, and piracy.210 For Japan, the routes are even more important―over 85 percent of the oil Japan imports sails through these sea lanes.211 Piracy in South and Southeast Asian shipping lanes remains a major hazard, especially in Indonesian waters and the Straits of Malacca.212 At present, Japan is committed to protect only SLOCs out to 1,000 miles from Osaka and Tokyo.213 This arc of committed sea lane protection does not even extend all the way through the vital Bashi Channel to the southern end of Taiwan and the northern entrance to the South China Sea. Increasing this Japanese maritime reach through port calls, freedom of navigation cruises into the Indian Ocean, and combined exercises should be encouraged.214 Aiding in the provision of unfettered SLOCs, which benefit most of Southeast and East Asia, also may reassure Asia about the future role of the Japanese military, thus increasing Japan’s ability to comprehensively engage ASEAN. Working in concert, the two alliance partners could expand their tight cooperation into associated security realms within the region. WMD and ballistic missile nonproliferation, cyber-terrorism, and counternarcotics are just three examples of potentially fruitful venues for increased cooperation. Ideally, the alliance would continue to deepen into a multidimensional force for peace and prosperity in East Asia. The Proliferation Security Initiative hopefully is a harbinger of further expansion beyond the original scope of the alliance . Finally, the alliance can provide the continuity of peace and trust necessary for the growth of liberalism throughout the region. Success for the United States and Japan will increasingly be measured in terms of an increased community of vibrant, pacific, free-market democracies in Asia. Making the two publics aware of the idealistic benefits of the alliance will make more headway toward acceptance of a deepening partnership than simply focusing on the alliance’s role in power politics in the region. Creating the conditions for that liberal development and tamping down the anticipated frictions that will arise along the way can best be accomplished in tandem. In the long run, this liberalism backed by the concerted power of the United States and Japan will bring lasting stability to the region .

4. East Asia is the most likely scenario for nuclear war – unique nuclear capabilities and territorial, ideological and regional disputeDibb 01 (Paul, emeritus professor of strategic and defense studies @ The Australian National University. “Strategic Trends - military and political in Asia” Naval College Review, Winter 2001. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_54/ai_75762211/)

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The areas of maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia, followed by the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union. The strategic situation in Asia is more uncertain and potentially threatening than anywhere in Europe. Unlike in Europe, it is possible to envisage war in Asia involving the major powers: remnants of Cold War ideological confrontation still exist across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula; India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and these two countries are more confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s; in Southeast Asia, Indonesia--which is the world's fourth-largest country--faces a highly uncertain future that could lead to its breakup. The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense (about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world except the United States and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military spenders. Asia also has more nuclear powers than any other region of the world. Asia's security is at a crossroads: the region could go in the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into confrontation and military conflict. There are positive tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy, which would encourage an optimistic view. But there are a number of negative tendencies that must be of serious concern. There are deep-seated historical, territorial, ideological, and religious differences in Asia. Also, the region has no history of successful multilateral security cooperation or arms control. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be ineffective when confronted with major crises.

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External UniquenessTokyo and Washington committed to deter the existential threat of China from attacking through means of space defenses, among other defense capabilitiesFurukawa and Ogawa 6/23 (Hajime, Staff Writer for The Daily Yomiuri, and Satoshi, correspondent based in Washington, “'China's a threat' comes out clear as a bell”, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110622005028.htm // Vish)

WASHINGTON--Although it was not mentioned directly as such, the main threat playing on the minds of Japan and the United States in this week's bilateral security talks was crystal-clear: China. "Although China wasn't specifically named, Japan and the U.S. have all but said, 'China is a threat,'" a Japanese government source said of the "main objective" of a joint statement issued after ministerial-level defense and security talks in Washington. The preamble of the statement said both countries agreed on the need to "address challenges posed by the increasingly uncertain security environment" in East Asia in "common strategic objectives." For the first time, the statement also mentioned "nontraditional security concerns," and other evolving threats, such as "to outer space, to the high seas, and to cyberspace." It is not difficult to figure out what nation this was referring to. "Everybody knows that the nation causing the most concern to others in these fields is China," the government source said. With China acting increasingly hegemonistic in its nearby waters, the statement reaffirmed the importance of maintaining the "security of the maritime domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation." Japan and the United States also agreed to maintain cooperation for the protection of and access to space and cyberspace as new elements in the objectives. The common strategic objectives were first formulated in the February 2005 "two-plus-two" talks as basic guidelines that the Japan-U.S. alliance and the U.S. forces' realignment aim to achieve. They were revised in 2007. The statement said both governments will "encourage China's responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity" and "its cooperation on global issues." They also will urge China to "improve openness and transparency with respect to [its] military modernization." The statement issued after the previous round of the two-plus-two talks, held in 2007, urged China "to conduct itself as a responsible international stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain consistency between its stated policies and actions." Tuesday's statement also said Tokyo and Washington will "discourage the pursuit and acquisition of military capabilities that could destabilize the regional security environment." That was a nudge at ballistic missile programs being developed by North Korea and Russia, as well as China's military buildup that is aimed at strengthening its "anti-access strategy." C hina's decision to restrict exports to Japan of rare earths--minerals crucial to the manufacture of many high-tech products--as bilateral ties chilled after a Chinese trawler rammed two Japan Coast Guard vessels near the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture in September also prompted an entry in the joint text. The statement said Japan and the United States will seek to promote talks "on the diversification of supplies of critical resources...including energy and rare earths." The expressions of increased concern in the statement seem to be aimed at erasing fears in the region that there could be a shift in the military balance between the United States and China in the western Pacific, according to observers. Years of sizzling growth have seen China leapfrog Japan to become the second-largest economy in the world. Beijing's defense budget has also risen sharply in recent years, and it has stepped up moves to establish dominance over maritime interests and in territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

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Cooperation with Japan is U.S.'s number one priority – SM3 provesHicks 7 (Alan B, rear admiral of the U.S. navy, 11/28/07, Washington Round Table on Science& Public Policy, "Aegis Ballistic Defense System-Status and Upgrades," marshall.org, http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/573.pdf, MM)

I would have liked to see some funding that would have allowed us to get to a system concept review for a multiple variant for the SM-3. As much as anybody, I would like to have something beyond the unitary warhead that is planned with the government of Japan to deliver with the SM-3. That is priority one, absolutely priority one. We have to deliver that missile on our agreement, not just to the government of Japan, but to our own combatant commanders who want that missile. But beyond that, to get an extra kill vehicle or two on top of the SM-3 and provide options against more advanced threats in the future is something I would like to be able to have as an option. I am also acutely aware there are finite fiscal resources to do this and there are also finite engineering resources to do this. Whether we like it or not, the technical base out there is finite. If we want to ramp up and go to my industry partners, it takes time and money to go do this. I would have liked to see some MKV funding to get to a system concept review for the SM-3 Block IIA. We will see how that plays out over the year. We are going to press forward with the current program of record. Within the agency we are going to look for opportunities about how we go forward with Congress to talk to them about what we want to do with the SM-3 in a multiple concept. But clearly right now the number one priority is to meet our commitment to Japan. It always has been and will remain so.

US commitment to Japan key now - cooperation key to peace in the Asia-Pacific regionRTT NEWS 6/22 (6/22/11, RTT News, "US, Japan to Strengthen Security, Defense Cooperation," http://www.rttnews.com/Content/TopStories.aspx?Id=1651487&SM=1&pageNum=2, MM)

In order to address the evolving regional and global security environment, the United States and Japan have agreed to ensure the security of Japan and strengthen peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region as well as to enhance the capability to address a variety of contingencies affecting the two allies. At the end of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting in Washington between U.S. State Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates and their Japanese counterparts Takeaki Matsumoto and Toshimi Kitazawa, a comprehensive joint statement articulating common strategic objectives and efforts to enhance the U.S.-Japan alliance was released. Based on the assessment of the changing security environment, they reviewed and updated the Alliance's Common Strategic Objectives and took the following decisions: Deter provocations by North Korea and achieve its denuclearization; Strengthen trilateral security and defense cooperation with both Australia and South Korea. Encourage China's responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, its cooperation on global issues, and its adherence to international norms of behavior, while building trust among the United States, Japan and China. Improve openness and transparency with respect to China's military modernization and activities and, strengthen confidence building measures. While welcoming the progress to date in improving cross-Strait relations, encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues through dialogue. Realize full normalization of Japan-Russia relations through resolution of the Northern Territories issue. Discourage the pursuit and acquisition of military capabilities that

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could destabilize the regional security environment. Strengthen security cooperation among the United States, Japan, and ASEAN and support ASEAN's efforts to promote democratic values and a unified market economy. Welcome India as a strong and enduring Asia-Pacific partner and encourage India's growing engagement with the region. Promote trilateral dialogue among the United States, Japan, and India. Promote effective cooperation through regional networks and rule-making mechanisms, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit. Promote non-proliferation and reduction of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and hold states accountable for violating their non-proliferation obligations. Maintain safety and security of the maritime domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation, including preventing and eradicating piracy, ensuring free and open trade and commerce, and promoting related customary international law and agreements. RTTNews) - Consult on efforts to enhance the ability of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to carry out its mandate and effectively meet the challenges of the new century through reform, looking forward to an expanded Council that includes Japan as a permanent member. Ensure Iran's full compliance with its international obligations and return to the P5+1 nuclear talks. As part of the dual-track approach, the United States and Japan will continue robust implementation of UNSC Resolutions. Support Pakistan's efforts to strengthen civilian governance and to implement economic reforms. Addressing the media after the SCC meeting, informally known as the 2+2 Ministerial, Gates said the U.S. remains committed to maintaining a robust forward presence in East Asia. He added that it is critical that "we move forward with the relocation of US military base in Futenma and construction of facilities in Guam for the U.S. Marines to reduce the impact of our presence on local residents in Okinawa while allowing us to maintain capabilities critical to the alliance in Japan." Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said it had been decided on the v-shape configuration for the runways in connection with the Futenma relocation issue, and to remove the deadline of 2014 for its completion, in order to avoid the continued use of Futenma Air Station. Both sides agreed to earliest possible relocation. Okinawans, who have long hosted the bulk of U.S. forces in Japan, strongly opposes the move to relocate the US base to Camp Schwab on the east coast of Nago City in northern Okinawa.

The US and Japan currently cooperate on BMDs, and satellite technologySDA 6/22 (The Security Defense Agenda, “JAPAN AND US TO BOLSTER COOPERATION ON MISSILE DEFENCE AND CYBER SPACE” http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Contentnavigation/Library/Libraryoverview/tabid/1299/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/2736/Japan-and-US-to-bolster-cooperation-on-missile-defence-and-cyber-space.aspx 6/26/11 I.R.)

The United States and Japan will continue to work together on missile defense, cyber and space initiatives, as well as expand information-sharing and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities. According to a joint statement by the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee on 21 June, "The ministers decided to expand joint training and exercises, study further joint and shared use of facilities and promote cooperation, such as expanding information sharing and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, in order to deter and respond proactively, rapidly and seamlessly to various situations in the region". As for missile defence, the ministers designated the Joint Arms and Military Technology Commission as the consultation mechanism for the transition to the production and deployment phase of the SM-3 Block 2A. In addition, the ministers agreed to promote dialogue on supply of critical resources and materials, including energy and rare

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earths. The US reaffirmed its intentions to defend Japan and peace and security in the region through conventional and nuclear force, and to address challenges of nuclear technologies proliferation and evolving threats such as in high seas. The two countries acknowledged the potential for future cooperation in space situational awareness, a satellite navigation system, space-based maritime domain awareness and the use of dual-use sensors. The ministers also agreed to "promote the resilience of critical infrastructure, including the security of information and space systems."

US-Japan commitment nowAashi Shimbun 6/23 (Aashi.com, "With Few Specifics on Relocating Futemna, Japan, U.S. focus on China," 6/23/11, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106220162.html, MM)

WASHINGTON--After failing to agree on a timetable for relocating the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Japan and the United States focused on common strategic objectives mainly to deal with China's emergence . The bilateral Security Consultative Committee meeting June 21 was attended by Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The ministers agreed that Futenma should be relocated off the coast of Henoko in Nago, Okinawa Prefecture. But they also admitted the two nations would not be able to meet a 2014 deadline to complete the relocation. A joint statement issued after the meeting only said the ministers "confirmed their commitment to complete (the Futenma relocation and transfer of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam) at the earliest possible date after 2014 in order to avoid the indefinite use" of Futenma. The two sides agreed to the relocation proposal--even though there are no assurances it will actually be implemented--because they did not want to give the impression of a deep division that China could exploit. To demonstrate that the bilateral alliance was actually deepening, the two nations agreed to comprehensively revise the common strategic objectives that had been agreed to during meetings in 2005 and 2007. Although the revised common strategic objectives do not actually name China, a Japanese government source said "the document was made about 20 to 30 percent more severe" toward China. During the discussions, the ministers pointed to various issues that have arisen in recent months due to the rapid emergence of China. "It has led to frictions in relation to freedom of navigation in the East China Sea and South China Sea," Matsumoto said, referring to China's aggressive maritime moves. "While Japan and the United States should cooperate with nations in the region, there is also a need to ask China to deal with the issue in a responsible and constructive manner." Clinton went further, saying that Beijing's advances into the South China Sea had increased tensions within the region. She said the United States is seeking to secure maritime national security by abiding with international law in order to guarantee freedom of navigation. A new item included in the common strategic objectives list was to "maintain safety and security of the maritime domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation." In the summer of 2010, Clinton said in a speech regarding Chinese advances into the South China Sea that freedom of navigation was in the national interests of the United States. Since then, the issue of freedom of navigation has become a major theme of discussions between Japan and the United States. The document was careful to avoid mentioning China directly, but a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said, "Anyone reading the document will understand it is about China." Another common strategic objective called on China to adhere to "international norms of behavior." Regarding China's relations with Taiwan, the document said the two nations "encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues through dialogue." That was similar to the call in the 2005 document to "encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue," which was greeted by criticism from Beijing. The latest document also prefaced the above objective with the wording that Japan and the United States were "welcoming the progress to date in improving cross-Strait relations." Regarding North Korea, the document said a common strategic objective was to "deter provocations by North Korea" and to "achieve the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, including its uranium enrichment program." This was the first time direct reference was made to Pyongyang's uranium enrichment plan. In addition to the

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relationship between Japan, the United States and Australia that was included in past common strategic objectives, the strengthening of national security and defense cooperation between Japan, the United States and South Korea was included in the latest list. The list also confirmed the need to promote dialogue between Japan, the United States and India.

US-Japan committed to space security nowGSN 6/22 (Global Security Newswire, "Japan, U.S. Pledge to Head Off North Korean Hostilities," 6/22/11, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110622_5660.php, MM)

Japan and the United States on Tuesday reaffirmed their shared strategic objectives, which include deterring future hostile behaviors from North Korea and convincing the Stalinist state to shutter its nuclear weapons effort, the Yonhap News Agency reported (see GSN, June 21). The two countries' defense heads and chief diplomats held direct talks in the U.S. capital on Tuesday. There, the officials declared they would deepen a three-state partnership that also includes South Korea. "We remain committed to deterring further provocative behaviors by North Korea, supporting a North-South dialogue and promoting the complete and peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula ," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said to journalists following the so-called 2+2 talks. Defense Secretary Robert Gates described Tuesday's discussion as "excellent." "We focused on the most critical challenges facing the Asia-Pacific region," including North Korean denuclearization, he said. The allies said in a bilateral statement that their common strategic goals are to "deter provocations by North Korea; achieve the complete, and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, including its uranium enrichment program, through irreversible steps and, through the six-party process; resolve issues related to proliferation, ballistic missiles, illicit activities, and humanitarian concerns, including the matter of (past) abductions by North Korea" of Japanese citizens (Lee Chi-dong, Yonhap News Agency, June 21). Japan and the United States "recognized the need to continue to address challenges posed by the increasingly uncertain security environment, which includes: the expanding military capabilities and activities in the region; North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and its provocative behavior; the emergence of nontraditional security concerns; and other evolving threats, such as to outer space, to the high seas, and to cyberspace," reads the statement. "The government of the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the defense of Japan and the peace and security of the region, including through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, " it adds (U.S. State Department release, June 21).

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External LinksJapan is sick of having no say, and is growing more assertive, killing relations – satellites prove only cooperation as equals over important policy issues solve relationsRapp 4 (William E., Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army and former Fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies, Tokyo, “Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance”, January 2004, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub367.pdf // Vish)

However, unless the alliance changes to make the strategic decisionmaking more symmetric, the Japanese role more active, policy announcements more coordinated, the legal jurisdiction components of the SOFA less publicly offensive, and the basing of U.S. troops and capabilities in Japan less burdensome, the long-term health and centrality of the alliance could be in jeopardy. As Japan slowly achieves a renewed sense of international responsibility and capability, it will increasingly see the current asymmetry of the alliance as a hindrance to its own foreign policy objectives and its stature as a major sovereign power. Yoshinori Suematsu, a Minshuto member of the Diet, stated that the “United States is always trying to control Japan, and this is a frustration for the Japanese.”134 The perception of American unilateralism (heightened by the war on terrorism and rogue states which has followed September 11) serves to aggravate the lack of comfort many Japanese have in being the junior partner of the United States.135 The Asahi Shimbun, citing opinion polls showing 78 percent opposition to a war in Iraq in February 2003, declared that “voters are clearly opposed to [government actions] that merely follow the U.S. line.”136 “The U.S. is too focused on its own interests,” states Katsuei Hirasawa (LDP Diet member). “It acts unilaterally and then is always asking other countries to follow its lead.”137 Pointedly recognizing these concerns, a March 2003 Tokyo TV-Asahi poll found that 70 percent of the respondents thought that the Bush administration’s strategy of preemption of threats either was “arrogant” or “would destabilize the world.”138 Former Ambassador to the United States Yoshio Okawara notes that, in the eyes of the Japanese public, the continuing viability of the alliance requires a greater Japanese voice in important policy decisions made by the United States in the region.139 In an interesting argument in favor of increased autonomous security capability, the secretary general of the DPJ, Katsuya Okada, argued that if Japan had a stronger self-defense capability, it would not have to support the United States in future wars which the Japanese people oppose.140 Okada argues that Japan was forced to support the United States in the Iraqi War in 2003 because it had no credible autonomous capability against the possibility of a North Korean missile attack. His statements echo the results of public opinion polls that show the United States ranking second in the list of countries most likely to embroil Japan in a war.141 A public opinion poll taken by Kyodo News in late March 2003, as the United States and Britain moved in on Saddam’s regime in Iraq, found most Japanese looking toward the UN, rather than the United States, for Japan’s future. Of the respondents, 61.7 percent thought that Japan should place priority on the UN, while only 30.4 percent declared that the alliance with the United States should come first.142 Thus, Tokyo’s passivity of the past, in regard to policy issues on which the United States has taken a firm stance, may not continue to be seen as always advancing Japanese vital interests. Minshuto Secretary General Katsuya Okada recently lamented that “Japan is more like a vassal than an ally of the United States.”143 Prime Minister Koizumi’s decision to directly engage North Korea in September 2002, without prior consultation with the United States, is indicative of Japan making its own evaluations of foreign policy and national interest.144 The outspoken Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, criticized the Japanese people recently for relying on the United States to defend Japan. “A country that fails to decide its own fate will eventually collapse.”145 This resurgence of desire to start taking a

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more active stance in pursuing Japan’s own interests was echoed by Katsuei Hirasawa who said that the long-term health of the alliance “depends on whether or not the U.S. supports Japan on policies important to Japan or whether it continues to focus unilaterally on American interests.”146 Among the younger Japanese politicians especially, there is a growing sense of need for Japan to strategically pursue its own interests. The indigenous surveillance satellite program offers a salient example of this increasing desire to pursue self-interest and achieve limited security autonomy. For years, the Japanese have relied on satellite imagery obtained from the United States or purchased in Europe from commercial vendors. At times, the Japanese have chafed at the delays and lack of availability of desired imagery. General Tetsuya Nishimoto, former head of the Joint Staff Council, lamented that “around 1993 and 1994, Japan could not obtain spy satellite information or any direct information from the U.S. concerning nuclear facilities in North Korea.” The Yomiuri Shimbun reported that, in fall 2001, the United States bought up all of the commercially available imagery of the Middle East necessary to keep troop and ship movements toward Afghanistan a secret from other nations. Japan was unable to obtain images of areas in which it had interest at that time.147 Following what some Japanese perceived as an intelligence failure, on the part of the United States, to give timely warnings of the August 1998 Taepodong I missile firing (but many now recognize as a Japanese bureaucratic failing combined with commercial pressure from Japanese electronics firms), Japan quickly decided to develop its own satellite capability.148 From the Japanese point of view, the perceived lack of trust by the United States toward Japan continued. Over the next year, the United States attempted to convince Japan to buy American satellites with better capabilities than the first four indigenous satellites Japan that decided to develop and launch, but would not relinquish full control of the satellite’s ability to take pictures of certain areas. Japan chose to build satellites with inferior image resolution capability in order to maintain unhindered control of the collection of needed data (and in order to service domestic industrial needs) and launched one set of optical and radar imaging satellites in 2003.149 On the grand scale, the confluence of vital interests between the two nations will keep the alliance alive, but the pressure for power sharing and for the accommodation of both countries’ interests will be intense. Shinzo Abe, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for the Koizumi Government and Secretary General of the LDP, noted, “The U.S.-Japan alliance is necessary for our security. But, the defense relationship between our countries should be complementary and not dependent.”150 In the long run (that is 15-30 years from now) only a more mature partnership between regional equals will be able to reap the benefits of the growing assertiveness and independence of Japanese foreign policy.

Unilateralist actions can't solveWirebel 6 (Loring, Communications Editor for EE Times, 10/30/06, EE Times, "Space Policy Still Off-Course," http://www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4066386/Space-policy-still-off-course, MM)

The global press corps in mid-October belatedly discovered the National Space Policy document released by the U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy --10 days after EE Times first carried details of the policy on our Web site and a week after military leaders meeting in Omaha discussed the policy in open session. Dollops of righteous indignation were served all around, topped off by an Oct. 21 editorial in The New York Times chiding the policy's unilateralist principles. The Times was right to point out that the nation often does not abide by the rules it demands others follow, but the Bush administration is right to insist the 2006 policy does not represent that big a change from the Clinton administration. The problem is not that President Bush uses unilateralist terms of reference that have not been encountered before but that unilateralist doctrine has driven certain global policies for decades, while pundits and citizens do their best to ignore the contradictions that arise when other nations confront those policies. When the last National Space Policy was released in 1996, it was accompanied by a shiny piece of propaganda from the U.S. Space Command, Vision

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for 2020, which critics later nicknamed the "document of domination." It made clear that the Pentagon's space agencies saw its role as assuring U.S. dominance of all orbital space surrounding the planet. Using military space networks for intelligence and communication as a "force multiplier" implied preserving the economic divide. And indeed, three years before the document was released, the Clinton administration touted a program called TenCap, the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities, in which technical intelligence agencies like the National Reconnaissance Office and National Security Agency announced openly that they no longer saw arms-control treaty verification as a mission. Their purpose was to "serve the warfighter." While Clinton was president, the Washington-based think tanks and nongovernmental organizations that monitor the Pentagon, such as the Center for Defense Information (CDI), made specific critiques of programs like ballistic missile defense, but avoided like the plague any direct analysis of unilateralist doctrine. Some of the reluctance to take on Clinton might have been attributable to the funding on which NGOs rely; some of it may have been due to a fear (perhaps well-founded) that most Americans might favor unilateralism. These groups spoke out against potential weapons in space, but they ignored the misuse of the military networks already out there. In the aftermath of a war gone bad and an arrogant White House approach to issues like enemy combatants in Guantanamo, Bush administration critics feel comfortable addressing unilateralism directly. CDI, in its critique of the October 2006 Space Policy, made the issue of inherent unilateralism its primary talking point. Welcome to the club. Just as many military officers believe that the Iraq war was mishandled from the get-go, many in the military do not buy all the implications of a single nation holding both the playbook and the dictionary. For example, Gil Klinger, an executive who has worked in the NRO and National Space Architect's office, talks of "universal rules of the road" to which all space-faring nations must adhere. But these bureaucrats must compete with the continued support in both political parties for Rumsfeld-style "transformationalism." Despite problems with civilian space missions and significant delays in big-budget military space programs, this nation remains far ahead of any other in its use of space. Indeed, that's what made Donald Rumsfeld's 2001 warning of a "space Pearl Harbor" so silly--we are the only ones likely to inflict a Pearl Harbor on others. But a wise superpower uses dominance to convince, not to dictate, and that is where the National Space Policy fails. Even without crossing the the Rubicon of space weaponization, most of the nation's military networks in space have been repurposed for unilateralism and tactical warfare. A turn to a more equitable use of orbital space does not imply that any satellite needs to be turned off, or that no satellite system can support a soldier in the field. But it does imply that the U.S. should rethink its unilateralist doctrine of imposing fair-use policies on other nations. What the press failed to realize in its October tirade over space doctrine is that such unilateralism is much more deeply embedded in both political parties than Bush critics realize. For once, the president was right in insisting that his message was not that different from Clinton's. The message, however, is still wrong.

Lack of cooperation is deleterious to US-Japan relationsCrow 92 (Stanley Jr, Captain, USAF, Masters in international studies, AEROSPACECOLLABORATION Theories and Case Studies From the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korean Experience: Implications for Theater Missile Defense, p.dtic 6/26/11 K. Harris)

The H-2 rocket and its LE-7 main engine are not collaborative projects. It is precisely this lack of foreign (i.e., U.S.) technology assistance that makes this project distinct from all previous Japanese space efforts and warrants its inclusion in this study as an example of a case in which collaboration failed to occur. The background for the project begins in 1966, when the U.S. ambassador to Japan, U. Alexis Johnson, initiated efforts to promote technical cooperation between the two countries. As described by Joan Johnson-Freese in her book on the Japanese space program, he devised a plan to transfer space-related technologies to Japan as part of a larger political agenda of strengthening the overall bilateral relationship.l'f NASA and DoD objected but were eventually overruled when Johnson became undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in 1969. That year the first U.S.-Japan cooperative space agreement was signed. Continuing until 1984, this agreement allowed Japan to purchase licenses to U.S. space technologies not available to any other countries, though the U.S. continued to withhold access to key areas such as inertial guidance, spacecraft stabilization, and cryogenic propulsion. By

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including restrictions in the licenses for these technologies, the U.S. could exercise control over payloads (especially those of third countries) launched on Japanese vehicles in keeping with U.S. foreign policy objectives. 113 Since 1975 Japan produced a total of 24 rockets that combined U.S. and domestic technologies in three configurations: the N-l, N-2, and H_1. 114 Each of these uses a liquid-fuel first-stage engine licensed from Rocketdyne. The N-2 also used U.S. technology for the second stage, licensed from Aerojet; the N-l and H-l each use indigenous technologies for their second stage engines, designated the LE-3 and LE-5, respectively. The H-l is essentially a continuation of the hybrid indigenous/licensed approach and was in fact originally designated the N-3 until it was changed due to a desire to dissociate the program from the "heavy connotations of technology transfer that accompany the N-series names.,,1l5 In 1984 the U.S. side terminated the space agreement with Japan due to growing concerns that the technology transfers were allowing Japan to develop capabilities that would soon threaten U.S. interest in this vital sector of the economy.i'" The combination of the decrease in U.S. willingness to share technology and the blow to NASA's reputation caused by the Challenger accident prompted the Japanese to look for independent access to space. Thus was born the drive for a completely domestic launch vehicle that produced the H-2 rocket and its LE-7 main engine. The goal of the H-2 program was to produce a rocket with "the ability to compete financially with the other rockets in the world" and sufficient "flexibility" to accept payloads "without restrictions from foreign countries [i.e., the U.S.].,,117 To accomplish this goal the Japanese had to develop the technologies formerly withheld by the U.S. The first of these -- spacecraft guidance -- was tackled by a team of five companies including NEC and Mitsubishi Space Software that produced the first domestic inertial guidance system.l " There was apparently relatively little difficulty in this process as there were no reported failures during development. Flight results bore out the system's accuracy, as shown by the relatively small errors in the trajectory of the experimental geosynchronous transfer payload of 50km at the apogee altitude of 36,261km and 800m at the perigee altitude of 449km (0.13% and 0.18%, respectivelyj.!" Development of the cryogenic propulsion system was another matter. The H-2's LE-7 engine uses a complex high-pressure, staged combustion approach, not used in any launch system in the world apart from the technology-intensive U.S. space shuttle's main engines. 120 From the beginning this presented a significant hurdle for engineers at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries, the prime engine contractors, despite their earlier experiences with the domestically-developed and produced LE-5 and LE-5A: The program was confronted by a succession of problems during the entire development phase including oscillation of the turbine axis, damage to the turbine blades, meltdown of the combustion chamber, and engine explosion due to structural failure.121 These setbacks delayed the first launch of the H-2 by over two years. But when the launch finally occurred, one Japanese commentator labeled it "a 260-ton declaration of independence from U.S. aerospace technology.,,122

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***Alliance Impacts

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BMDUS- Japan Alliance key to missile defense – no production without Japanese industriesChanlett-Avery 11 (Emma Chanlett-Avery is an Analyst in Asian Affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade division of Congressional Research Service, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance” 1/18/11 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf 6/25/11 I.R.)

Many analysts see U.S.-Japan efforts on missile defense as perhaps the most robust form of bilateral cooperation in recent years. In December 2003, Koizumi announced that Japan would jointly develop and deploy missile defense capabilities with the United States. Japan decided to acquire upper and lower ballistic missile defense systems, including the sea-based AEGIS combat system and an SM-3 interceptor missile, equipment similar to and interoperable with U.S. missile plans. The decision has led to defense industry cooperation between Japanese and American firms . Co-development milestones established under the DPRI process have been accomplished on schedule with successful tests of the technology. For example, in December 2007, a Japanese destroyer successfully intercepted a missile in a test exercise near Hawaii . With these results, the alliance now faces the question of production, which was scheduled to begin in FY2010. Differences have emerged over the export of co-developed technology to third countries in the future, with Japan demanding that the United States receive Japanese consent prior to any sale . Although Japanese officials earlier provided an exception to Japan’s ban on exporting arms specifically for the bilateral development scheme, third-country sales could face a process of obtaining permission from the Japanese cabinet. Although the conflict probably will not ultimately jeopardize the plan to jointly develop next-generation missile defense, it is emblematic of how Japanese constraints limit the extent of bilateral cooperation and frustrate U.S. defense planners, even for technically successful project.

Ballistic missiles endanger the world’s safety - further research key to prevent global nuclear warDOD No Date (US Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, "The Threat," http://www.mda.mil/system/threat.html, MM)

Throughout the years of the Cold War, the U.S. relied significantly on nuclear weapons to deter hostile threats. This concept was centered upon the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) -- protecting ourselves with weapons that could destroy any enemies who were aiming to harm or destroy us. However, the world soon rejected the MAD policy of retaliation as concern over nuclear arsenals increased. While the end of the Cold War signaled a reduction in the likelihood of global nuclear conflict, one of the greatest threats facing the world today remains the increasing proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Countries invest in ballistic missiles because they are a means to project power both in a regional and strategic context and a capability to launch an attack from a distance. Presently, sophisticated ballistic missile technology is available on a wider scale than ever to countries hostile to the U.S. and our allies. As those countries continue to develop and exchange this technology, there is also an increasing threat of those technologies falling into the hands of hostile non-state groups. The Intelligence Community states that current trends indicate that proliferation of ballistic missile systems, using advanced liquid- or solid-propellant propulsion technologies, are becoming more mobile, survivable, reliable, accurate and capable of striking targets over longer distances. The proliferation of ballistic missiles is increasing the number of

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anti-access weapons available to potential regional adversaries. These weapons could be used to reduce military options for Combatant Commanders and decrease the survivability of regional military assets. Iran has grown its short- and medium-range missile inventories, while improving the lethality, deployability, and effectiveness of existing systems with new propellants, more accurate guidance systems and payloads. Iran’s launch of a solid-fuel, 2,000 km medium-range ballistic missile last month demonstrates a capability to strike targets in Israel as well as southern Europe. And with the successful launch of the Safir Space Launch Vehicle on February 2, 2009, Iran demonstrated technologies that are directly applicable to the development of ICBMs. North Korea deploys a No Dong ballistic missile capable of reaching Japan and South Korea and U.S. bases throughout the region, and continues to develop a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) capable of reaching Guam and the Aleutian Islands. Despite the failure to place an object in orbit on April 5, 2009, North Korea successfully demonstrated the same staging and separation technologies required to launch a two-stage Taepo-Dong 2 ICBM capable of reaching the United States. An additional concern are North Korea’s and Iran’s repeated demonstrations of salvo launches, indicating large ballistic missile attack raid sizes must be considered in developing the BMDS capability. Syria continues to field updated Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) systems and acquire Scud-related equipment and materials from North Korea and Iran. There has been an increase of over 1,200 additional ballistic missiles over the past 5 years. The total of ballistic missiles outside the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia, and China has risen over 5,900 . Hundreds of launchers and missiles are currently within the range of our deployed forces today. The increasing technology transfer and missile proliferation could render traditional deterrence and diplomacy ineffective against a future missile attack on the U.S., our deployed forces, or our allies. Through its capabilities for defending critical nodes, military assets, and seats of government, missile defense enhances existing non-proliferation activities. Missile defenses can provide a permanent presence in a region and discourage adversaries from believing they can use ballistic missiles to coerce or intimidate the U.S. or its allies.

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Ext. BMDCooperation with Japan is a prerequisite to allowing privatization and research of the BMD programDepartment of State 6/21 (“Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee”, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166597.htm // Vish)

The Ministers welcomed the progress both countries have made in cooperation on ballistic missile defense. Regarding the SM-3 Block IIA cooperative development program, the Ministers decided to study future issues in preparation for transition to a production and deployment phase. In this regard, transfer of the SM- 3 Block IIA to third parties to be requested by the Government of the United States may be allowed, in accordance with the Exchange of Notes of June 23, 2006, concerning transfer of arms and military technologies to the United States of America, in cases where the transfer supports the national security of Japan and/or contributes to international peace and stability, and when the third party has sufficient policies to prevent the further transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA. The Ministers designated the Joint Arms and Military Technology Commission (JAMTC) as the consultation mechanism for such future third party transfers.

Joint BMD cooperation doesn't only protect US and Japan, but other countries as wellCronin 2 (Richard P., specialist in Asian affairs, Foreign affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 3/19/02, CRS Report for Congress, "Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects," page 2, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9186.pdf, MM)

Focus and Scope of This Report This report documents and analyzes Japanese perspectives on ballistic missile defense and on participation in the U.S. missile defense R&D program, with particular attention to current trends in Japanese security thinking, major actors in the policymaking process, and political and constitutional constraints. It notes areas of convergence as well as issues on which American and Japanese perspectives tend to diverge. Finally, the report briefly addresses a number of policy considerations for Congress and the Bush Administration in light of ongoing uncertainties about Japan’s participation. For broader background on U.S.-Japan relations and security cooperation, see Issue Brief IB97004, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress (regularly updated). Congressional Support for An “Asian” Missile Defense Capability Since the mid-1990s, Congress has supported the development of a missile defense capability to protect forward-deployed U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific area, regional allies, and Taiwan from short- and medium-range missiles, a goal that requires some level of Japanese support–if only hosting U.S. missile defense forces. The 1991 Persian Gulf War highlighted the threat of short-range Scud ballistic missiles and the inadequacy of the Army’s Patriot missile defense system to protect U.S. ground forces and facilities. Similar concerns have been expressed regarding CRS-2 1 For further background on this legislation and the subsequent Department of Defense report, see CRS Report RL30379, Missile Defense Options for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan: A Review of the Defense Department Report to Congress, by Robert D. Shuey, Shirley A. Kan, and Mark Christofferson. 2 Ibid., p. 2-5; U.S. Department of Defense. Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific Region, May 1999, 15 pp. (Unclassified Version.) the U.S. Navy’s current lack of a defense against both short- and intermediate-, or “theater”-range, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. Testimony bynumerous defense and intelligence officials highlighted the growing threat posed by the development of intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by anti-U.S. regimes ranging such as North Korea and Iraq . Congress continued to show support for developing and deploying a “theater” level missile defense capability in 2001, but also for more ambitious development objectives that might allow TMD systems–especially the Navy’s sea-based TMD capability to serve as a basis for an early national missile CRS-3 3 In February 2001, the House passed a resolution honoring the “ultimate sacrifice” of 28 American service personnel killed in a February 25, 1991, Iraqi Scud missile attack on a U.S. military warehouse in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The resolution noted that in the intervening years neither the United States nor its allies had “fielded advanced

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theater missile defenses,” and resolved “to support appropriate and effective theater missile defense programs to help prevent attacks on forward deployed United States forces from occurring again.” A nearly identical resolution, S. 19 (Santorum) was introduced in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Armed Services on Feb. 28, 2001, but did not receive further action. 4 H.R. 1282, the Realistic Tests for Realistic Threats National Security Act of 2001. defense capability.3 For instance, on March 28, 2001, Rep. Vitter introduced two related bills expressing strong support for an Asian missile defense capability but also for upgrading the planned speed of the Navy Theater-Wide (NTW) interceptor missile to give it the ability to intercept North Korea’s Taepo Dong I missile and Iran’s Shahab 5 missile, and requiring the Department of Defense to conduct at least one test against an incoming missile with the flight characteristics, including velocity, of the Taepo Dong I.4 Rep. Vitter also introduced a companion bill, the Defense Against Regional Threats Act of 2001, Sec. 2 of which would make it U.S. policy “to provide for deployment as soon as is technically possible of effective missile defense systems capable of defending Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and all member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization against ballistic missile attack.” Sec. 3 of the bill would make it U.S. policy “to seek continued negotiated burdensharing agreements with the nations specified in section 2 to share the costs of development and deployment of ballistic missile defense systems.” Both H.R. 1282/1283 appeared to reflected impatience on the part of a number of Members of Congress at the determination of the Clinton Administration to avoid testing or deploying missile defense systems that would violate the ABM treaty. Although neither bill went beyond referral to the Armed Services Committee, the proposed legislation implicitly supported the decision of the Bush Administration to radically revamp the U.S. BMD program, with the goal of applying various ABM technologies across a range of missions, including the early deployment of a capability to defend U.S. territory against limited attacks by intercontinental-range ballistic missiles that might be launched by “rogue” states.

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Chinese AggressionUS–Japan Alliance solves Chinese aggressionChanlett-Avery 11 (Emma Chanlett-Avery is an Analyst in Asian Affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade division of Congressional Research Service, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance” 1/18/11 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf 6/25/11 I.R.)

Sino-Japanese relations warmed in the past few years, in considerable part due to the deepening economic ties, but have suffered setbacks as historical mistrust and contemporary rivalries surfaced. An incident in September 2010 in a disputed area of the East China Sea re-ignited longstanding sovereignty tensions. The Japanese Coast Guard arrested the crew of a Chinese fishing vessel after the trawler apparently collided with two Coast Guard ships in the areas surrounding the Senkaku Islands (called the “Diaoyu” Islands by the Chinese). The islands, located between Taiwan and Okinawa and reportedly rich in energy deposits, are administered by Japan but claimed by Tokyo, Beijing, and Taipei . After Japan released the crew but kept the captain of the Chinese ship in custody, Chinese officials reacted vociferously with threats of unspecified “countermeasures,” the suspension of high-level exchanges and visits, the arrest of four Japanese nationals suspected of spying in an apparently retaliatory move, and, according to some, a temporary halt in the export of rare earth minerals that are essential to Japanese automakers’ operations . The captain’s release later in the month calmed the hostile rhetoric, but the episode points to some troubling trends. The historical sensitivity over territorial issues and the potential abundance of natural resources in the disputed waters are a combustible combination. China’s maritime activities have become more assertive in recent years, including Chinese naval helicopters buzzing Japanese destroyers in the East China Sea in April 2010. China’s intense and immediate escalation of rhetoric in what could have been a more routine matter also disturbed many regional observers. The incident appeared to play a key role in changing the DPJ’s approach to the U.S. alliance and may have crystallized a shift in Japan to seeing China as a military threat. Although Japanese security officials had been deeply concerned about Beijing’s intentions and growing capabilities for years, the Senkakus dispute may have convinced governing politicians and the broader public of the need to adjust Japan’s defense posture to counter China. As the Senkakus dispute played out, the United States reasserted its position that it would not weigh in on territorial disagreements but that the islands are subject to Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which stipulates that the United States is bound to protect “the territories under the Administration of Japan.” This was the clearest statement yet that the United States would honor its treaty obligations to defend the Senkakus, raising the remote but sobering possibility of a U.S.China confrontation over the islands. In general, the U.S.-Japan alliance complicates U.S.-China relations; Beijing regularly complains about any indication that Japan is strengthening its defense capabilities, even though some Chinese sources acknowledge the stabilizing role that the U.S. presence provides in the region.

Chinese aggression ensures c0nflict will escalate and they will strike with nuclear weaponsDodge 5 (Paul, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies – Missouri State University, “China’s Naval Strategy and Nuclear Weapons: The Risks of Intentional and Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation”, Comparative Strategy, 24(5), December, p. 415-416)

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In the summer of 2005, Chinese Major-General Zhu Chenghu threatened the United States with nuclear attack, stating that, “If the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition on to the target zone on China’s territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons.”1 It should be noted that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) considers Taiwan to be PRC territory, as well as the territorial waters surrounding the island, its exclusive economic zone, those of the Senkaku (Diaoyutai Islands), and virtually the entire South China Sea and its islands. To be successful in any military effort to acquire Taiwan or any of its many other territorial ambitions, the PRC realizes that it must be able to deter U.S. military intervention. The idea is to convince the United States and the world that China is both capable and, more importantly, willing to inflict grievous casualties on U.S. forces, even at the cost of heavy economic, diplomatic, and military losses to the PRC. Efforts toward this end have been manifested over recent years in the form of greatly increased military spending, the acquisition of weapons designed specifically to attack U.S. naval forces, the development of new strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and the formation of a naval warfighting strategy that emphasizes asymmetric attacks on high-value U.S. assets and personnel. The July statement from General Zhu is of course among the most visible of these efforts. One wonders why General Zhu was not fired or even sternly reprimanded by his military and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) superiors for such a statement at an official press conference. In truth, it is but the latest in a string of bellicose remarks by high-ranking Chinese military officials designed to convince the U.S. policymaking, intelligence, and military communities that China is ready to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons should it become necessary. Classic deterrence, after all, dictates that an enemy can only be deterred through the combination of capability and credibility. However, when considered in the context of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Navy (PLAN) strategy to take on the United States in a naval and aerial conflict, China’s strategy to deter can be seen as a recipe for inadvertent nuclear escalation. Put simply, this piece argues that China’s warfighting doctrine is misguided, unrealistic, and dangerous. It is misguided because it places a great deal of focus on attacking U.S. aircraft carriers, which in reality are likely to be far more difficult to find, track, and attack than the Chinese realize. It is unrealistic because the vast majority of Chinese naval and air forces, which comprise the backbone of its conventional force options, are likely to be annihilated by American standoff weapons, advanced aircraft, and vastly superior attack submarines. Most important of all, the way in which China has mated its nuclear strategy to its conventional warfighting strategy is extremely dangerous because it makes nuclear war with the United States far more likely. There are several reasons why this is the case. First, China’s acquisition of advanced foreign weaponry, its expectation that the United States will back down at the first hint of casualties, and its belief that nuclear weapons can act as a force multiplier all threaten to lower the nuclear threshold and cause a deterrence failure vis-a-vis U.S. forces in the region. Lulled into a false sense of security, China may act on its irredentist policies when it should be deterred by superior U.S. forces and slim chances for victory. Second, Chinese capabilities are actually very modest, meaning they are only suitable for combat against other regional states. When faced with a first-rate power, China’s forces will suffer heavy attrition. Finally, the loss of these forces, including high-value naval combatants, aircraft, and early warning assets, will cause China’s conventional strategy to collapse, leaving only nuclear options. At this point, the PRC will be left with only two real choices and find itself at a strategic “fork in the

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road.” On one hand, it can de-escalate, sue for peace, or otherwise accept defeat. On the other, it can fall back on the nuclear aspect of its doctrine. Enormous domestic, economic, and political pressures will make the choice of the former a very difficult one for the PRC leadership. The latter choice entails either early nuclear usage to avoid anticipated casualties, or later use in a desperate effort to cause massive U.S. casualties, aid PLAN conventional forces, or tip the tactical balance in China’s favor. This analysis first examines the conventional aspects of China’s naval strategy and its preoccupation with anti-carrier tactics. Nuclear weapons are closely integrated with conventional forces in this strategy, and both play a crucial role in threatening high-value U.S. assets. The discussion then turns to the real-world difficulties China would face while attempting to track and attack an aircraft carrier battlegroup. Similarly, the vital role of U.S. attack submarines in defeating China’s anti-access strategies will be detailed. While these sections explore why China’s anti-carrier and sea denial strategies are unlikely to succeed, they also highlight just a few of the many reasons why China’s forces would stand little real chance against U.S. forces in the foreseeable future. Finally, these factors will be analyzed in the context of theories of inadvertent escalation. Originally formulated in reference to late ColdWar conflict scenarios, these ideas are greatly germane to any future Sino-U.S. conflict. It is only through the exploration of the impacts of U.S. offensive and defensive actions, as well as the concomitant attrition of conventional forces, that the full escalatory dangers of Chinese warfighting strategy may be revealed.

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Ext. Chinese AggressionThe Alliance deters Chinese AggressionMcDevitt 01 (Michael, 2001, Director @ C.S.I.S., CNA Corperation, Oct. 20, “Implications of the Rise of China for the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/dc/track2/1st/mcdev.pdf, Manchester)

The Bush administration is clearly concerned about the rise of China. While they do not name China by name, the DOD report holds that Asia is "...gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale militate competition.'' The report goes on to conclude that maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be a complex task, and, clearly implying China, holds that a "military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge.'' Aside from Japan, no other East Asian country but China fits this profile-and Japan, of course, is an ally not a competitor. To address this issue and to preclude China, or anyone else for that matter, from dominating Northeast Asia or the East Asian littoral, the QDR says U.S defense strategy will focus on promoting security cooperation with friends and allies in order to create a “favorable balance of military power" to improve deterrence and prevent aggression and coercion. In fact, a principle objective for ''security cooperation" (the term of art that evidently replaces "engagement" as a way to characterize military-to-military contacts between the United States and the countries of East Asia) will be to ensure access, interoperability with allies and friends, and intelligence cooperation. This is because there are so few U.S. bases in Asia and the distances are so vast. As a result, the report indicates, the United States will place a premium on securing additional access and infrastructure agreements in the region. In practical tents, this guidance translates into sustaining the current continental-maritime military balance in East Asia. In other words insuring that a continentally dominant China does not develop, unchecked, the ability to project its power off the continent into what the ODR terms Northeast Asia and littoral Asia. Given the fact that China needs to cross open ocean to bring its formidable army to bear against Japan, or other allies and friends, including especially Taiwan- U.S. forces must be able to trump any attempts to do so.

The United States and Japan must ramp up their alliance cooperation to check China aggressionShiozaki 5/6 (Yasuhisa, Member of the Japanese House of Representatives, “The US-Japan Alliance after 3/11”, The Stimson Center, May 6th, 2011, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Shiozaki_Speech.pdf // Vish)

While the Kan Administration has been preoccupied with managing the disaster response, security challenges around the world are evolving and increasing. But due to the renewed cooperative spirit from “Operation Tomodachi” and other joint exercises, the Japan-US alliance is ready to meet these challenges. Regarding North Korea, their uranium enrichment activities are a clear violation of the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and the UN Security Council Resolutions. And the UN Security Council inability to implement sanctions on North Korea affects their credibility. Japan and the US will work together to ensure the UNSC lives up to its responsibilities. As for China, there is no end in sight for its military expansion and it remains the only P5 nation to carry out the modernization and reinforcement of its nuclear arsenals. According to a recent IMF report, China will surpass the U.S. in terms of purchasing power parity in 2016. How should we deal with this Chinese superpower? With our nation struggling with economic and fiscal difficulties and post-earthquake recovery, and with the U.S. struggling with its national debt, there is no choice but for these two nations to intensify our cooperation to unprecedented levels on the global scale and to promote and maintain an effective defense system.

Commitment to relations now: alliance is key to deter China

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Yomiuri Shimbun 6/23 (6/23/11, Yomiuri Shimbun, "Deepen Japan-U.S. Alliance for Common Strategic Goals," http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T110622004175.htm, MM)

It is significant that comprehensive documents on the Japan-U.S. alliance have been compiled even under the administration led by the Democratic Party of Japan . The foreign and defense ministers of the two countries, who are members of the Security Consultative Committee, met in Washington on Tuesday to discuss security issues and confirm the deepening of the alliance. A joint statement issued after the meeting outlines new common strategic objectives and covers security challenges in Asia and elsewhere. Especially noteworthy in the statement is the strong sense of wariness over China's strengthening of its military might in recent years as well as its penetrating demands to Beijing in this regard. The statement calls for encouraging China's "adherence to international norms of behavior" and "improving openness and transparency with respect to China's military modernization and activities." === China major cause of concern The statement, without naming any particular country, points to the need "to continue to address challenges posed by the increasingly uncertain security environment, which includes the expanding military capabilities and activities in the [Asia-Pacific] region." The statement also takes up "the emergence of nontraditional security concerns, and other evolving threats, such as to outer space , to the high seas, and to cyberspace." This reference was also made with China in mind. China's recent modernization of its military and maritime activities are conspicuous, causing friction with its neighbors in the area bounded by the East China and South China seas. To wean China away from its self-centered behavior, Japan and the United States must first strengthen their alliance further and then seek to hold repeated and tenacious dialogues with Beijing to encourage it to act responsibly. It is also indispensable for Tokyo and Washington to strengthen tripartite alliances with South Korea and with Australia as well as to work together with India and Southeast Asian nations. Common strategic objectives toward Pyongyang call for "deterring provocations by North Korea and achieving the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea." === North Korean threat North Korea's nuclear capabilities and missiles pose realistic threats to Japan. To avert North Korean military action like the attack on a South Korean warship last year, it is essential for Japan, the United States and South Korea to work together and seek close cooperation with China. With respect to Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, the joint statement calls for, among other things, working out more elaborate contingency response plans, expanding Japan-U.S. joint military exercises and establishing logistic support outposts for disaster rescue operations. These measures must be implemented steadily. It was a valuable experience for the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. troops to work together in rescue operations and reconstruction work in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake. The experience should be reflected in formulating future joint operations and training. On the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, the ministers agreed to push back the deadline for relocation of the Futenma Air Station in Okinawa Prefecture to "the earliest possible date" after 2014, the original deadline. In this connection, we can only blame former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's flip-flopping on the relocation issue for causing the deadlock in negotiations with local residents. Retaining the Futenma base in the current location should be avoided. The DPJ-led government must face up to its responsibility and persuade local residents in this respect. Prime Minister Naoto Kan's visit Thursday to Okinawa Prefecture should be the first step toward that goal.

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China-Taiwan WarThe Japan-American security relationship is key to prevent Chinese aggression in the region and attacks on TaiwanOkimoto 98 (Daniel I., graduate of Harvard and Princeton, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Stanford University, “The Japan-America Security Alliance: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century”, January 1998, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10106/Okimoto.PM.pdf // Vish)

To deal with relationships of high uncertainty, where the amplitude of fluctuation is wide, finding and following a steady, middle-of-the-road path may be the optimal strategy for a nation to follow. It may require that elements of engagement and containment be combined. The combination would function as a hedge against unpredictable swings. On the economic front, there would be deep engagement combined with a firm position on China’s adherence to GATT-based rules. The United States and Japan would trade and invest freely with China; but they would be careful about transferring dual-purpose or state-of-the-art technology. On the security front, there would be an effort to cultivate cordial relations with China but also a parallel effort to cultivate ties with India, Vietnam, and Indonesia, nations capable of counteracting the expansion of Chinese influence. JASA would not designate China as the hypothetical enemy; but neither would it be caught off-guard by certain crisis contingencies. Nor would JASA abstain from certain security policies simply because China objects. Those policies that serve American or Japanese security needs would be pursued; they would not be subject to China’s veto. This syncretic policy, combining elements of engagement and containment, is the pragmatic approach that the United States appears to be following. Under today’s circumstances, a suboptimal, satisfying strategy may be the most that can be expected, realistically. China feels ambivalent about JASA. On the one hand, China realizes that JASA may be the “cork in the bottle,” an institution holding back Japanese rearmament. If JASA is removed, the odds of rearmament rise exponentially. When forced to choose between JASA and the likelihood of Japanese remilitarization, China has chosen to put up with JASA. It is the lesser of two evils. But since the end of the Cold War, Chinese attitudes appear to have hardened. The disintegration of the Soviet empire and rockiness of Sino-American relations have had a profound impact. In addition, several benchmark events have occurred in rapid succession—the Clinton-Hashimoto joint communiqué reaffirming the commitment to JASA, the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, and the interim report of the DGR (Defense Guidelines Review) in 1997—causing China to reassess the implications of JASA for Chinese security in Asia’s post–Cold War environment. China seems to believe that JASA is America’s main instrument of containment. By giving U.S. troops a strategic foothold in Asia, JASA enables the United States to exercise hegemonic influence over the region. If JASA were eliminated, American influence would be greatly diminished, allowing China more room to maneuver. China would have an easier time dealing with neighboring states like South Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia, which currently fall into the American orbit. Without JASA, the United States would have a harder time supporting Taiwan. There would be no effective counterweight to China in Asia (unless Japan decided to strike out on its own and pursue superpower status). China would not have to put up with as much U.S. meddling in its domestic affairs or U.S. pressures in multilateral organizations. The Chinese fear that the United States is leading Japan down a slippery slope by expanding the role of JASA. Instead of functioning as the “cork in the bottle,” JASA seems to be accelerating the pace of Japan’s remilitarization. What worries Beijing most is the possibility that Japan might cooperate with the United States in crisis contingencies involving Taiwan. It would be alarming to China if Japan allowed U.S. fighter planes, aircraft carriers, submarines, and other vessels to utilize bases in Japan

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to carry out combat missions in the Taiwan Strait, not to mention providing rear area support and minesweeping. Of course, owing to domestic politics, Japan would be far more reluctant to cooperate with the United States in contingencies involving Taiwan and China than those involving North Korea. Still, the Chinese are concerned. China has asked for clarification as to whether the phrase “areas surrounding Japan” referred to in the DGR includes Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. Concerning this question, U.S. and Japanese government officials have given vague and evasive answers, lending credence in Chinese minds to China’s worst suspicions. If Japan jettisons past military inhibitions, the Chinese would find it easier dealing with a rearmed Japan that is not part of America’s global alliance network. A Japan divorced from the U.S. military network—not integrated within the U.S. NAVISTAR system, for example—would pose far less of a threat. A small “force de frappe” would not give Japan a credible first-strike, offensive nuclear capability; at the most, it would serve as a minimalist deterrent, one of uncertain efficacy. From China’s perspective, the integration of a fully rearmed Japan into America’s global alliance network would be a worst-case scenario. China would be better able to cope with the United States and Japan separately than with the two forces combined.

China-Taiwan war causes extinctionStrait Times 2K (The Strait Times, Singapore, “No one gains in war over Taiwan, June 25th, 2000, Lexis Nexis)

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-

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funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking. "Just when everyone believed that no sensible commander would march south of the Yalu, the Chinese troops suddenly appeared," he recalled. (The Yalu is the river which borders China and North Korea, and the crossing of the river marked China's entry into the war against the Americans). "I feel uneasy if now somebody were to tell me that they bet China would not do this or that," he said in a recent interview given to the Chinese press.

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Ext. China-TaiwanThe US-Japan alliance is able to prevent a China-Taiwan conflictBarkdoll and Kim 6 (Timothy C., Commander in the US Navy, and Jiyul, Colonel, “U.S.-Japan Security Alliance Welcoming a New Japan”, US Army War College, 2005-2006, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA449819 // Vish)

With contentious issues such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, the Korean peninsula poses the greatest threat to regional stability, Japan’s security, and the U.S.-Japan alliance. However, a conflict in the Taiwan Strait follows a close second as a potential threat to stability in East Asia. Taiwan has adopted a democratic government, actively participates in the free market economy, and seeks to maintain its national identity. Beijing, on the other hand, refers to Taiwan as a “renegade province,”47 strongly opposes Taipei’s independence, and seeks to reunite Taiwan with mainland China. U.S. foreign policy support of a ‘one China’ policy attempts to balance competing strategic objectives. On the one hand, the United States recognizes Beijing as the legitimate government of all China and assures the People’s Republic of China (PRC) leadership that the U.S. will not recognize a Taiwanese declaration of independence.48 On the other hand, the United States maintains robust political, military, and economic relations with Taiwan including an expanding foreign military sales program supplying destroyers, diesel submarines, anti-submarine aircraft, and other equipment.49 In February of 2005, Japan and the U.S. declared in a joint agreement that Taiwan is a mutual security concern and, as such, the alliance seeks to achieve the following strategic interests related to Taiwan: · Deter cross-strait conflict between mainland China and Taiwan. · Avoid unnecessary provocation of China. · Preserve Taiwan’s free market economy. 50 The governments of the United States and Japan support the peaceful reunification of Taiwan and China implemented through a democratic and mutually agreed upon process. In the long run, reaching this goal will require patience and crafty diplomacy in order to balance competing national interests and to dissuade unilateral solutions, avoid potential conflict, and continue robust trade and economic ties with both China and Taiwan. Recent history has experienced fluctuating degrees of interaction between China and Taiwan. Since 2001, promising political developments such as Taiwan’s relaxed restrictions on working visas for PRC professionals, travel, direct transport, commerce, and postal exchanges with the mainland have been seen as positive steps towards improved cross-strait relations.51 However, thoughts of improved relations were quickly replaced by fears of increased cross-strait tensions on 14 March 2005 when the PRC passed the Anti-Secession Law that specifically authorizes the state’s use of “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” 52 in the event that all peaceful means of reunification with Taiwan are exhausted. As official political relations between China and Taiwan ebb and flow, unofficial contacts and economic ties between the two countries have experienced a significant and steady increase. The exchange of information, expertise, and ideas between Taiwanese and Chinese scholars, professionals, and entrepreneurs from various fields is viewed by many as a viable alternative for promoting PRC-Taiwan dialogue.53 Increased economic ties are evident in the fact that Taiwanese businesses are increasingly invested in the Chinese economy and that in 2004 China replaced the United States as Taiwan’s primary trading partner.54 The challenge for the U.S.-Japan security alliance is to encourage continued PRC-Taiwan dialogue and strengthening economic and financial interdependence in pursuit of a process which contributes to reduced tensions and a peaceful, long-term resolution of outstanding differences. The cross-strait balance of military power has shifted in favor of the PRC as Beijing has amassed a deterrent force of an estimated 600 missiles in south China.55 However, many analysts believe that China can ill-afford open hostilities to force the reunification of Taiwan due to the prohibitively expensive

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diplomatic, political, and economic costs associated.56 China requires regional and international stability to attract and maintain foreign investment in order to sustain continued economic development.57 As China transforms from an isolated nation to one of increasing interconnectedness and interdependence, maintaining regional and international stability becomes a critical national interest. Therefore, as China’s economy continues to expand, forceful reunification of Taiwan becomes less of a viable option for Beijing. However, as long as “Beijing continues to see the threat and possible use of force as integral to its policy of dissuading Taiwan from pursuing independence,”58 the U.S.-Japan security alliance and the U.S. military presence in Japan and throughout Asia serve to maintain the balance of military power in the region and are a deterrent force against that Chinese military threat.

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EconomyThe relationship between the US and Japan is key to the global economyCooper 11 (William H., Specialist in International Trade and Finance, “U.S.-Japan Economic Relations: Significance, Prospects, and Policy Options”, March 31st, 2011, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32649.pdf // Vish)

Japan and the United States are among the world’s largest economic powers. Together they account for over 30% of world domestic product (2010 estimate). This economic clout makes the United States and Japan powerful forces that affect each other’s economic conditions and the conditions of other countries. Economic conditions in the United States and Japan have a significant impact on the rest of the world. Furthermore, the U.S.-Japan bilateral economic relationship itself can influence economic conditions in other countries. The two countries remain very important economic partners, accounting for significant shares of each other’s foreign trade and investment, even though their relative significance has declined. The global financial crisis and economic downturn added another dimension to the relationship as the two countries have grappled with the severe impact of the crisis on their respective economies and simultaneously have worked with their partners in the G-20 to coordinate a multilateral response. The impact of the March 11, 2011, earthquake and subsequent tsunami and nuclear plant accident in northern Japan have added still another and immediate factor to the bilateral economic relationship. Events are still unfolding, and the ultimate effects are yet to be determined. Nevertheless, the crisis could test the viability of the bilateral economic relationship. The U.S.-Japan economic relationship is important to U.S. national interests and to the U.S. Congress. It has been the subject of oversight hearings and trade legislation, and Congress plays a critical role in shaping U.S. economic policy toward Japan. To assist Congress in fulfilling its responsibilities, this report explores the significance and state of U.S.-Japan economic ties; major issues in the relationship; and the possible options for managing the relationship. An Overview of U.S.-Japan Economic Trends The U.S. and Japanese economies remain closely intertwined through trade and capital flows. U.S. and Japanese political leaders have not always given the U.S.-Japan relationship the priority commensurate with its economic importance; nevertheless, the data and other indicators suggest that the relationship bears attention.

Economic collapse causes global warAuslin 9 (Michael, resident scholar at AEI, “Averting Disaster”, The Daily Standard, 2/6, http://www.aei.org/article/100044)

As they deal with a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that when a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region on earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation. The result would be disaster on top of an already dire situation. No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability. This has gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America has directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet policymakers need to

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remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock , such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine such instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources, further saber-rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region, and particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How will overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock back decades in Asia. It would almost certainly drag America in at some point, as well. First of all, we have alliance responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come under armed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America's credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in good measure by the continued U.S. military presence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but nothing approaching a systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and it is unclear if the American military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis. Nor is it clear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood and treasure for lands across the ocean. The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history. There is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have destroyed international systems in the past.

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Ext. East Asian StabilityThe US-Japan security alliance is able to stabilize the region of East AsiaOkimoto 98 (Daniel I., graduate of Harvard and Princeton, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Stanford University, “The Japan-America Security Alliance: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century”, January 1998, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10106/Okimoto.PM.pdf // Vish)

JASA’s effectiveness is evident in what it has accomplished since its inception. In 1951, one of JASA’s prime goals was to foster Japan’s recovery from wartime devastation. From 1945 to 1948, the United States channeled $750 million in direct economic assistance to Japan. By 1952, the year the Occupation ended, the cumulative total is estimated to have reached $2 billion, a whopping sum but substantially less than the package of aid sent to Europe by way of the Marshall Plan.10 The United States also used military procurements and other forms of security assistance to help Japan get back on its feet. And if that was not enough, the United States interceded on Japan’s behalf to persuade Asian states, victims of Japanese aggression, to scale back their war reparation demands. Japan wound up paying a total of $1.15 billion, far less than the amount originally demanded. The bulk of the reparations consisted of grants of capital goods manufactured in Japan and low-interest loans tied to the purchase of Japanese goods (both of which stimulated Japan’s struggling economy). Most importantly, the United States opened its own huge market, giving Japan the opportunity to carve out sizable market shares in key sectors, such as steel, automobiles, and consumer electronics. Owing to JASA, Japan has not had to spend much taxpayer money on national defense. Japan has been spared the need to divert scarce resources for military purposes. This was especially beneficial when capital and resources were tight, as they were during the first decade of JASA’s existence (the 1950s). The “JASA dividend”—the amount saved in Japan’s defense budget as a result of JASA’s security umbrella—could be invested in productive civilian areas such as electrical power generation, social overhead infrastructure, and heavy plant equipment. Patrick and Rosovsky estimate that a heavier defense burden—6 percent of GNP rather than 1 percent—would have slowed Japanese annual growth rates by 2 percent per year between 1952 and 1974. Yearly rates would have fallen from 9 percent to 7 percent. Compounded over a period of two decades, a slowdown of that magnitude would have shrunk the aggregate size of Japan’s economy by 30 percent. Higher defense expenditures would not have halted Japan’s industrial development; but it would have stunted its growth rate.11 Owing in part to its light defense burden, Japan grew from 7 percent the size of America’s economy to 35 percent in 1970, and expanded all the way to 68 percent by 1994. Japan became the world’s second largest economy. Bear in mind that during this time, the U.S. economy was not standing still. Japan had to be moving a lot faster than the United States to close the gap as quickly as it did. Sustained economic development, in turn, had the unanticipated benefit of reducing domestic opposition to JASA. So the two variables—JASA and economic recovery and vigorous growth—worked well together. There was another multiplier-effect benefit generated indirectly and only partially by JASA: Japan’s high-speed growth served as a catalyst for Northeast Asia’s industrial development and Southeast Asia’s economic takeoff. Today, Asia is well on its way to joining the select circle of the industrialized states. It is the only region outside the West to escape the curse of chronic underdevelopment. Not only has Japan led the way, Japan has contributed substantially to Asia’s “economic miracle” by making large-scale investments, extending official development assistance, constructing offshore production facilities, transferring technology, procuring goods and services, engaging extensively in trade, and serving as the “lead goose” in Asia’s “flying geese” pattern of industrial development.12 Economic development has also led directly to postwar Japan’s political stabilization, another prime JASA goal. Until Japan recovered completely from the ravages of war (which did not happen until 1962), Japanese and American policymakers had feared that the country would be a fertile breeding ground for political extremism. Consider

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the ripple effects if Japan had been unstable and had turned communist in the 1940s. This would have dealt a severe, perhaps even fatal, blow to America’s position in Asia. The United States would have lost its bases in Japan and without these bases, it would have had a much harder time fighting in the Korean War. South Korea might have been conquered by the North. The balance of power would have shifted dramatically against American interests. Instead, Japan became a bastion of anti-communist conservatism. The Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) assumed the reins of government and held on to its hegemonic power for three consecutive decades, a record among the world’s industrial democracies. JASA has afforded the LDP the luxury of relegating controversial foreign and security policy issues largely to the back burner. In contrast to the United States, postwar Japan has managed to avoid the deep divisions and paralyzing polarization caused by controversial security policies. Japan has been able to concentrate its energies and attention on the achievement of its economic goals. Thus, JASA has had a hand in stabilizing postwar Japanese politics. Thanks in no small measure to the assurance of security provided by JASA’s defense umbrella, therefore, Japan has become a large and robust industrial economy, a stable democracy, and a benign, non-threatening actor in postwar Asia. This is precisely what Occupation authorities had in mind in setting forth to transform the military regime that had plunged the country and region into the Pacific War. Japan’s postwar volte-face neutralized the danger that there might be a reversion to the military past. Since JASA permitted Japan to delink economic and military power, Japan’s neighbors in Asia, who had suffered grievously from Japanese aggression, could accept Japan’s rapid economic growth without trepidation. Of JASA’s various accomplishments, Japan’s metamorphosis from military to merchant state is certainly the most consequential. Asia is more stable today than it has been at any time since the onset of Western colonialism.13

The US-Japan alliance is critical to Japan’s self-defense in the region and East Asian stabilityMinistry of Foreign Affairs citing Hashimoto and Clinton 96 (Japanese Government, citing Ryutaro, former prime minister of Japan, and Bill, former president of the United States, “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century”, April 17th, 1996, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html // Vish)

THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE AND THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY 4. The Prime Minister and the President underscored the importance of promoting stability in this region and dealing with the security challenges facing both countries. In this regard, the Prime Minister and the President reiterated the significant value of the Alliance between Japan and the United States. They reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. security relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century. (a) The Prime Minister confirmed Japan's fundamental defense policy as articulated in its new "National Defense Program Outline" adopted in November, 1995, which underscored that the Japanese defense capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security environment after the Cold War. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is close defense cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation is based on a combination of appropriate defense capabilities for the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. The leaders again confirmed that U.S. deterrence under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the guarantee for Japan's security. (b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed that continued U.S.

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military presence is also essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The leaders shared the common recognition that the Japan-U.S. security relationship forms an essential pillar which supports the positive regional engagement of the U.S.. The President emphasized the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan as well as to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. He noted that there has been some adjustment of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War. On the basis of a thorough assessment, the United States reaffirmed that meeting its commitments in the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan. (c) The Prime Minister welcomed the U.S. determination to remain a stable and steadfast presence in the region. He reconfirmed that Japan would continue appropriate contributions for the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan, such as through the provision of facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and Host Nation Support. The President expressed U.S. appreciation for Japan's contributions, and welcomed the conclusion of the new Special Measures Agreement which provides financial support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan. BILATERAL COOPERATION UNDER THE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 5. The Prime Minister and the President, with the objective of enhancing the credibility of this vital security relationship, agreed to undertake efforts to advance cooperation in the following areas. (a) Recognizing that close bilateral defense cooperation is a central element of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, both governments agreed that continued close consultation is essential. Both governments will further enhance the exchange of information and views on the international situation, in particular the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, in response to the changes which may arise in the international security environment, both governments will continue to consult closely on defense policies and military postures, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, which will best meet their requirements. (b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation to build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and the United States. The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan. (c) The Prime Minister and the President welcomed the April 15, 1996 signature of the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America, and expressed their hope that this Agreement will further promote the bilateral cooperative relationship. (d) Noting the importance of interoperability in all facets of cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the U.S. forces, the two governments will enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment, including bilateral cooperative research and development of equipment such as the support fighter (F-2). (e) The two governments recognized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery has important implications for their common security. They will work together to prevent proliferation and will continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense. 6. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the smooth stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, which is the core element of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. The two leaders agreed that both governments will make every effort to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces. They also agreed to make further efforts to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In particular, with respect to Okinawa,

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where U.S. facilities and areas are highly concentrated, the Prime Minister and the President reconfirmed their determination to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In this respect, the two leaders took satisfaction in the significant progress which has been made so far through the "Special Action Committee on Okinawa" (SACO), and welcomed the far reaching measures outlined in the SACO Interim Report of April 15, 1996. They expressed their firm commitment to achieve a successful conclusion of the SACO process by November 1996. REGIONAL COOPERATION 7. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two governments will jointly and individually strive to achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, the two leaders recognized that the engagement of the United States in the region, supported by the Japan-U.S. security relationship, constitutes the foundation for such efforts. The two leaders stressed the importance of peaceful resolution of problems in the region. They emphasized that it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China play a positive and constructive role, and, in this context, stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation with China. Russia's ongoing process of reform contributes to regional and global stability, and merits continued encouragement and cooperation. The leaders also stated that full normalization of Japan-Russia relations based on the Tokyo Declaration is important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. They noted also that stability on the Korean Peninsula is vitally important to Japan and the United States and reaffirmed that both countries will continue to make every effort in this regard, in close cooperation with the Republic of Korea. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed that the two governments will continue working jointly and with other countries in the region to further develop multilateral regional security dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, and eventually, security dialogues regarding Northeast Asia.

The US-Japan security alliance is the only thing deterring countries like North Korea and China and preserving stability in East AsiaRoos 10 (John V., The United States Ambassador to Japan, “The Enduring Importance of our Security Alliance”, January 29th, 2010, at Waseda University, http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20100129-71.html // Vish)

As we look back, our two countries can take pride in the fact that the U.S.-Japan Alliance has provided a half-century of peace in East Asia, allowing Japan and the entire region to reach unprecedented levels of security and prosperity. When our two nations entered into this alliance, the coming half-century of peace and prosperity was far from assured. In 1960 we were at the height of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Tensions across the 38th parallel and Taiwan Strait were high, with regular exchanges of fire across boundaries that no party viewed as satisfactory or permanent. Yet for the next 50 years, conflict did not erupt. Our security partnership, a primary component of which is the United States' forces in Japan, helped deter a renewal of full-scale hostilities on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait, while containing Soviet efforts to project power into the Pacific. With this shield, Japan invented the model for rapid economic growth that was soon copied by others in this region. With rising incomes came a flourishing of democracy in South Korea and Taiwan. The United States worked hand-in-hand with Japan and other democratic allies around the world to build a set of international rules and norms that ushered in the most vibrant period of commerce and innovation human history has ever seen. The success of this system ultimately enabled us to bring an end to the Cold War. In my first few years - months, hasn't been a few years,

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sometimes it seems like a few years - but in my first few months as Ambassador, a number of people, including some in government, have questioned the need for the present level and/or mix of the U.S. bases in Japan, even though poll numbers show that the alliance enjoys more popular support than ever before (85% approval rating in the last poll). I just returned from the United States where I heard similar statements being made by many in my own country. Some have pointed to the recent troop adjustments in Europe as a reason to make major adjustments here in Japan. But the end of the Cold War has in no way diminished the importance of our forward deployed forces and our security posture to maintain peace and stability in this area of the world. Even in Europe, in the context of a mutual security architecture, NATO, that has significantly diminished the possibility of cross border conflict, our allies look to us to maintain 80,000 troops and tactical nuclear weapons, to help ensure stability. Of greater concern is the continued level of risk that remains in this region despite the end of the Cold War. With China's dramatic and well-funded military modernization and North Korea's missile and nuclear program, arguably, Japan's security situation is just as complicated as it was when the Berlin Wall fell 21 years ago. North Korea obviously remains the most immediate concern. North Korea is the most militarized state in the world, with over a million soldiers under arms, it remains a conventional threat. Over the past several years, North Korea has focused on developing a wide range of capabilities including ballistic missiles. North Korea, as you know, has also proliferated, using its weapons technology to earn cash from dangerous regimes throughout the world. Even as we prepare to meet these military threats, the possibility of regime collapse, particularly in the context of leadership succession, is a growing concern. A North Korea that falls into internal disarray would pose monumental security challenges to this region. We have all worked hard to use diplomacy to steer North Korea into the community of nations, and we will continue to do so. Our diplomatic efforts, however, rest in part on the credibility of our ability to deter North Korea from using other means to achieve its objectives. China is perhaps the best example of the complexities we face in the world today. There is no doubt that the economies of the United States, Japan, and China are increasingly interdependent. The United States relies on Japanese and Chinese capital. China could not succeed without U.S. and Japanese technology. And Japan and China depend on U.S. markets and we depend on China's markets. The interplay among our three countries has emerged as a driver in the global economy. China's leadership is also very important to solving global problems from climate change to North Korea's nuclear program. President Obama has emphasized that the U.S. seeks a positive cooperative and comprehensive relationship with China, and the world is counting on Beijing to work with the United States, Japan, and the international community to address some of the key issues of our day. Recently, for example, China has worked with us as a partner in stabilizing the international financial system, and in protecting vital sea lanes from piracy. Given Japan's and the United States' overlapping interests as allies, we believe that Japan's active bilateral engagement with China is a positive and complements our own. The relations among and between our three countries are not, as some would suggest, a zero sum game. Yet, even as the United States and Japan work with China as a partner, we have questions about China's accelerating military modernization, especially in areas like cyber warfare, anti-satellite weapons, and the rapid modernization of its nuclear, submarine, and strategic forces. The build-up of military capabilities across from Taiwan over the past decade has the potential to erode the long-standing cross-strait military balance which is so essential to peace and prosperity. Many countries in the region share our concerns about China's recent efforts to limit freedom of navigation in international waters beyond territorial limits. As major maritime trading partners, freedom of navigation is essential to the futures of both the United States and Japan. So while I want to be careful not to overstate these concerns, among these types of uncertainties in this region the deterrent effect of a robust U.S.-Japan Alliance is crucial to ensuring that the dramatic changes in the security environment do not negatively affect this region's future peace and prosperity. The purpose of maintaining a credible deterrent capability is to make the price of using force greater than any potential political or economic gains that could be obtained through the use of force. This is vitally important here in East Asia, which has four of the five largest armed forces in the world. The cost of a military conflict in this region is beyond imagination.

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In addition to the human toll, even a short conflict would set the global economy back years, if not longer. This is why there has been some concerns expressed these past several weeks about the perceived tensions in our alliance by leaders and editorialists from Singapore to Taiwan to Seoul. Our Alliance is the critical stabilizing force in this area of the world.

US-Japan relations are vital to East Asian securityTanaka 11 (Hitoshi, Senior Fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange, “Reinvigorating US-Japan Relations”, East Asia Insights, March 2011, http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAI/6-2.pdf // Vish)

The two countries have come to understand that managing US-Japan relations requires bearing in mind the different roles that each country plays. Japan has expanded its role so that it can take on greater responsibilities in the international community, and the United States has begun showing greater concern for Japan’s sensitivities regarding the United States. On the security side, not only has Japan strengthened its contributions by increasing its defense budget and expanding its host nation support for US troops, but it has also shown progress in adapting its security strategy. For example, over the past two decades, Japan began participating in peacekeeping operations, created the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, passed legislation to better enable it to defend itself and support operations by its allies, and dispatched Japan Self-Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean to help with refueling for US-led forces in Afghanistan and to Iraq to provide humanitarian assistance for reconstruction. On the economic side, Japan’s official development assistance grew rapidly, and the country has been promoting free trade and deregulation. The United States has welcomed these actions, emphasizing consultation with Japan as an alliance partner and attempting to deal with sensitive issues quickly. For the most part, the governments of both countries have managed the alliance relationship effectively, proving the late Ambassador Mansfield’s assertion that “the US-Japan relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none.” There is no doubt that both countries have reaped important benefits from the alliance relationship. For the United States, partnership with Japan is important because the latter shares its democratic values, is one of the world’s largest economies, and serves as the cornerstone of the US forward deployment strategy in East Asia. Japan does not possess its own nuclear or other offensive weapons, and its security options are strictly constrained by its constitution. Therefore, the protection it receives from the United States, including the US nuclear umbrella, is indispensable. But the benefits of the alliance extend beyond just the United States and Japan; it has played a major role in maintaining stability throughout Asia Pacific. Even after the end of the Cold War, there is little room for debate about the necessity of preserving some guarantee that regional security can be maintaine d , given the uncertain future of East Asia that was cited in the 1996 US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security.

The US-Japan security alliance is critical to East Asian stabilityBarkdoll and Kim 6 (Timothy C., Commander in the US Navy, and Jiyul, Colonel, “U.S.-Japan Security Alliance Welcoming a New Japan”, US Army War College, 2005-2006, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA449819 // Vish)

The stability of the Asia-Pacific region is of critical importance to the economic, diplomatic, and political interests of both Japan and the United States. In the post-Cold War era, this stability is challenged by new and emergent threats that are very different

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from those that defined the superpower standoff of the Cold War. The threats are numerous and diverse; however, three sources of tension represent the most likely and gravest threat to regional stability: North Korea, Taiwan, and China. North Korea is determined to guarantee its security through the pursuit of a contentious nuclear weapons program, not to mention its potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and continued support of terrorism. A democratic Taiwan desires to maintain its national identity, while China seeks the reunification of Taiwan through peaceful or, if necessary, forceful means. And finally, many analysts believe that China’s rapid ascent to military prominence fueled by robust economic growth threatens the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan security alliance, originally established to provide for Japan’s security and for unrestricted U.S. access to key military bases and installations in Japan, evolved throughout the Cold War to become the cornerstone of regional stability. For Japan, the alliance is critical not only for the defense of the home islands but also for meeting Tokyo’s own strategic priorities, including achieving the security of its sea lines of communication.1 Washington views the alliance as “the best means to maintain preeminence”2 and securing its national interests in East Asia. Therefore, the U.S.-Japan security alliance remains the best mechanism by which the two leading economies in the world can pursue overlapping national interests that depend upon a stable and secure Asia-Pacific region.

The US-Japan alliance is critical to a stable East AsiaSchoff 7 (James L., Associate Director for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Tufts University, Vol. 31, Ed. 1, Winter 2007, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/31-1pdfs/Schoff.pdf // Vish)

The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of America’s security strategy in the Asia-Pacific area. Japan hosts the largest contingent of U.S. forces in Asia, including the region’s only base for a Marine Expeditionary Force and the only forward-deployed U.S. aircraft carrier, together with many other assets that are regularly deployed for training and operations in Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, various parts of Central Asia, and elsewhere. Japan has often been flexible in accommodating America’s use of its Japan-based military assets for operations within and outside the region. In addition, Japan pays for three-quarters of the total cost of stationing U.S. forces there (and over 50 percent of the total sum that twenty-six host nation allies contribute to the maintenance of U.S. forces overseas).2 Moreover, the strategic importance of the U.S.-Japan security relationship is growing for several reasons. First and foremost, rising Chinese naval power will increasingly complicate America’s plans to protect Taiwan’s political and economic space from possible intimidation and aggression (and thereby require more direct assistance from Japan to help dissuade and deter Beijing). Taiwan’s protection is a critically important, shared strategic interest of the allies, particularly as it pertains to sea-lane protection. Other factors include a relative weakening of U.S.-South Korea military ties; the greater role that Asia plays in world trade, financial, and energy markets; the ongoing nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs of North Korea; Japan’s robust participation in ballistic missile defense (BMD) development; and Japan’s stated objective of playing a more proactive role in a wider variety of international missions (mostly related to humanitarian assistance) that involve military forces.

A strong alliance maintains stability

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Armitage and Nye 7 (Richard L. Armitage, President, Armitage International Joseph S. Nye, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, “ The u.s.-japan alliance Getting asia Right through 2020 ” http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216_asia2020.pdf 6/26/11 I.R.)

In the report issued six years ago, we reflected on the history of U.S.-Japan relations, noting that for over 150 years, “U.S.-Japan relations have shaped the history of Japan and Asia—for better or for worse.” Looking ahead to the challenges of the new century, it concluded with the observation that the ways in which “the two countries respond individually and as alliance partners will define significantly the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific as well as the possibilities of the new century….” That judgment still stands. Indeed, the challenges of the new century—radical Islamic fundamentalism’s attack on Western values, international extremism including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, the rise of crossroads states—will require even greater efforts on the part of the United States and Japan, individually and as alliance partners. Our interest is in stability, to which the United States, Japan, China, and all countries in East Asia can play a supportive role. In particular, stability in East Asia will rest on a triangle of U.S.Japan-China relations, which should be fostered in addition to our strong alliance with Japan. The cooperative efforts that marked Japan’s support for the United States in Afghanistan, its contribution to postwar reconstruction in Iraq, and its early participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative have set a firm foundation for closer future cooperation. We would conclude this report with the observation that to those to whom much has been given, much will be expected.

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HegemonyA more equal US – Japan alliance allows for US HegemonyVan Ness 7 (Peter Van Ness is a visiting fellow in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the ANU, “Australia and Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia: From Hegemony to a Multilateral Security Mechanism?” http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/apsnet/policy-forum/2007/0711a-van-ness.html/ 6/26/11 I.R.)

Now, even the defenders of US hegemony, like Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye in their recent study on the US-Japan alliance (with the presumptuous subtitle "getting Asia right"), acknowledge that American hegemony in the region can no longer be sustained by Bush Doctrine unilateralist designs. American policy must change. They argue that "it is clear that a unipolar US management of Asia is not attainable, and its pursuit could prove counterproductive to adjusting the US role in the region to emerging realities." [28] Their call for strengthening the US alliance with a more proactive Japan and Australia may have set the scene for the subsequent Australia-Japan security agreement. Washington's nuclear agreement with India, and India's enhanced contacts with both Tokyo and Canberra may be further steps in the creation of what some have called an "arc of freedom and prosperity" built on values shared among the US, Japan, Australia, and India. But to the Chinese it might look more like choosing sides. Armitage and Nye also talk about cooperation with China, but the potential for a realist strategic realignment in Asia is implicit in these kinds of proposals. [29] The key word is "trans-pacific" as contrasted with "pan-Asian." The US is afraid of being left out of future designs for an East Asian community.

That solves nuclear warKhalizad 95 (Zalmay Khalilzad, senior defense policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and former undersecretary of defense, Spring 1995. Washington Quarterly, lexis)

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to Multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more receptive to American values – democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world’s major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or multipolar balance of power system.

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Ext. HegeUs-Japan Alliance is key to HegemonyKazuhisa 99, -analyst of international politics (September 1999, Ogawa, “Substantive Debate Needed on Defense Partnership” Japan Quarterly) JBNo country in the littorals of the Pacific and Indian Oceans even begins to approach Japan in meeting conditions for a power-projection platform. One year after Japan notifies the United States of its intention to terminate the alliance, the United States would lose leverage, and with it, most of its capability to project military power over half of the world. Shorn of power-projection capability, the United States would be hard-pressed to remain the world's sole superpower. Despite its colossal economy, diversified nuclear arsenal and qualitative advantage in conventional forces, the United States would be just one among several great powers. America's power differential with respect to China, Russia and other major powers would be much smaller. This has been generally acknowledged by U.S. government policy advisers in semiofficial meetings. Then, by way of reports, I convinced Japanese government leaders of the significance of the Americans' agreement.

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Japanese Space LeadershipJapan wants to use cooperation to develop their own independence in spaceJaramillo 10 (Cesar, managing editor of the Governance Group for the Space Security Index, 8/?/10, 2010 spacesecurity.org, "Space Security 2010," page. 136, http://swfound.org/media/29039/space%20security%20index%202010%20full%20report.pdf, MM)

In addition to the US GPS, Russian GLONASS, and European Galileo satellite navigation systems, other countries are working toward their own domestic systems to decrease foreign dependence for such an essential military service. The second-generation Chinese Beidou (Compass) satellite navigation system is well on its way to becoming a GPS alternative, making several advances in 2009. Following the first satellite launch in 2007, the second was launched in April and placed into a geostationary orbit.206 While China’s first-generation Beidou satellite navigation constellation provides coverage only over China, this system is expected to provide global coverage by 2015.207 The system will comprise at least 30 satellites by 2015, with at least 10 new Compass satellites scheduled to be launched in 2010 and 2011.208 ISRO is developing a constellation of seven satellites for regional navigation.209 The Indian Regional Navigational Satellite System (IRNSS) will provide a “position accuracy of more than 20 meters throughout India and within a region extending approximately 2,000 km around it.”210 As well, in a document released in early 2009 entitled Basic Guidelines for the Development and Use of Outer Space, Japan noted that it will seek to develop an “independent navigation and positioning capability” in the near future .

Japanese independence in space will lead to space leadership that will stabilize East AsiaSuzuki 7 (Dr. Kazuto, Associate Professor of International Political Economy at the Public Policy School, Hokkaido University, in Japan, “Space: Japan’s New Security Agenda”, October 2007, Research Institute for Peace and Security Policy Perspectives, http://www.rips.or.jp/english/publications/policy_perspectives/pdf/RPP05_suzuki.pdf // Vish)

Besides providing technology, Japan can play a useful role as a peace broker in using space. For instance, it could supply the infrastructure for regional confidence building. Although the United States has maintained stability in this region through the general acceptance of its leadership, it may not always play such a “benign” role in Asia, due to the changes just discussed. Thus, it is time for Japan to consider the possibility of providing an infrastructure for the region’s collective security. Because of its network of intraregional relationships and its technological capability, Japan is the best country in the region to supplement the United States’ leadership role. First, Japan should establish an early warning center to provide imagery intelligence data to increase transparency of troop mobilization and to monitor the proliferation of weapons. Satellites are a powerful tool for this. For example, the “Eye in the Sky” project during the cold war allowed both U.S. and Soviet satellites to monitor the progress of their disarmament,16 and the European Union’s Satellite Centre in Torrejon, Spain, is a platform for all EU member states to use for gathering satellite imagery.17 Although providing intelligence data is a sensitive issue, Japan might be able to contribute financially and technologically to establish “regional confidence-building satellites” with a relatively low resolution and a “transparency information center” where operational decisions would be made and satellite images would be stored for all the region’s intelligence agencies. This is not a new idea. The European Union’s experience in sharing information through the EU’s Satellite Centre, and BOC (Besoin Operationnel Commun, or Common Operational Requirements) of France, Germany, and Italy, demonstrates that sharing

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satellite intelligence capability can contribute not only to confidence building but also improve the efficiency of peacekeeping and disaster relief operations.18 Because only a few countries in Asia are capable of operating imagery satellites, it is important for those countries without them to have access to data for peacekeeping and disaster relief operations. Through this regional confidence-building satellite and transparency information center, Japan would assume the role of a “peace broker” in the region. Although it would not intervene militarily in regional conflicts, it could use its technological expertise and its contribution to the region’s security as leverage on disputing countries to encourage their self-restraint in using force when they depend on Japan. Indeed, if it were able to provide useful and effective means for maintaining the region’s security, the Asian Pacific states would have difficulty denying Japan’s request for arbitration. The credibility that Japan has nurtured for the last 60 years as a pacifist nation will bear a fruit when Japan takes action for improving regional security. Some Japanese may argue that it is not politically feasible to contribute unilaterally to the region’s security when it is becoming increasingly unstable. Given Japan’s constitutional constraints and its commitment to the principle of pacifism, however, it also could improve its own security and that of Asia as a whole through its unique space program.

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Ext. JSLJapan-U.S. joint efforts key to deter present and future threats in spaceSpace Daily 7 (1/5/07, Space Daily, "Japan and US working on North Korea Emergency Plan," http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Japan_And_US_Working_On_North_Korea_Emergency_Plan_999.html, MM)

Japan and the United States are drawing up a joint contingency plan to prepare for a possible crisis in the Korean peninsula, Foreign Minister Taro Aso said on Friday. "We must consider how to protect some 20,000 Japanese residents and tens of thousands of tourists" in South Korea, Aso told reporters, without elaborating on the various scenarios being considered. "We need to think about ways to evacuate Japanese nationals using US military vessels and civilian ships," he said, adding that the plan would also consider how to deal with refugees from the Communist North. The Asahi Shimbun newspaper reported earlier that Tokyo fears as many as 100,000 to 150,000 North Korean refugees could flood into Japan in the event of an unspecified contingency in the Korean peninsula. The estimate comes from a committee linked to Japan's national security council, the report said, citing unnamed sources related to the matter. It said the council concluded that such a large number of refugees would overwhelm existing facilities in Japan and some of them might need to be transferred to a third country. North Korea shocked Japan and the rest of the world when it announced on October 9 that it had conducted its first nuclear test, sparking international condemnation and UN sanctions on the already impoverished nation . Six-nation negotiations aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear programs were held in Beijing in December after a 13-month hiatus due to Pyongyang's boycott over US financial sanctions but negotiators failed to make much progress. US television network ABC reported Thursday that North Korea appears to have prepared for a second nuclear weapons test, citing US defense officials. But Aso played down the report, saying: "We see no major development in the situation." Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki, the top government spokesman, said the crisis plan for the Korean peninsula was part of ongoing efforts by Japan and the United States to prepared for possible crises in North East Asia. "Japan and the United States have always worked on a joint military plan or cooperation in the case of possible attacks on Japan or any contingency in the nearby area," he told reporters. Tokyo and Washington are also preparing to draw up a plan to coordinate the response of their armed forces if China invades Taiwan, according to the Kyodo News agency.

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Laundry ListUS-Japan relations solve the economy, climate change, terrorism, and proliferationClinton et al 9 (Hillary R., Secretary of State of the United States, as interviewed by Takashi Sadahiro and Keiichi Homma, Yomiuri Shimbun, 2/17/09, “Yomuiri Shimbun Interview: The Importance of U.S.-Japan Relations”, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/117620.htm // Vish)

QUESTION: So let me start with the U.S.-Japan relations. Prior to your departure, you made clear your purpose is to send a strong signal of the importance of U.S.-Japan relations. And indeed, you’ve sent a really strong signal. And the Prime Minister, I understand, is going to Washington next week. SECRETARY CLINTON: Yes. QUESTION: My first question is why? Why it’s so – why you attach such a high priority to Japan? SECRETARY CLINTON: I really believe that the relationship between the United States and Japan is a cornerstone of our foreign policy. We are the first and second largest economies in the world, and because of that, we have some very significant responsibilities to try to work our way through this current economic crisis. Our security alliance will be 50 years old next year, and the role that the extended deterrence has provided because of that alliance has enabled Japan to be developed in a secure and peaceful way. The increasing role that Japan is playing in development aid, in Africa, in Afghanistan, in the Middle East, the willingness of the Japanese Government and people to assume responsibilities for such international concerns as piracy - just everywhere one turns, you see that Japan is a responsible actor in the world. And the challenges that we face in dealing with global climate change and clean energy and terrorism and nuclear proliferation, all of that is hard to imagine succeeding without a strong U.S.-Japanese partnership. QUESTION: What about current Japan’s political – let me say, crisis. Today, the finance minister has expressed his will to quit. And do you think it’s possible to strengthen alliance and this kind of political -- so shaky under the circumstances? SECRETARY CLINTON: I think so. I believe that the Japanese nation is a resilient and strong one, and the basic constitutional structure is endurable. So for me, it is a matter of internal concern as to governments and who is part of them. I think that we change our government, but the bedrock relationship is the most important attribute of the U.S.-Japanese future. So I leave it to the Japanese people to determine by whom they wish to be governed. But we look forward to deepening and broadening our partnership, no matter what the political future might be.

US-Japan Alliance can solve everything – laundry listChanlett-Avery 11 (Emma Chanlett-Avery is an Analyst in Asian Affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade division of Congressional Research Service, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance” 1/18/11 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf 6/25/11 I.R.)

Over the past decade, U.S.-Japan bilateral initiatives reinforced an expanded commitment to security cooperation by establishing common strategic objectives, outlining major command changes, explicitly identifying the stability of the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula as common priorities in the Pacific region for the first time, and calling on China to make its military modernization more transparent. These agreements and statements emerged first through the working-level Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), launched in 2002, and later at the cabinet level through the Security Consultative Committee (SCC, also known as the “2+2” meeting), composed of the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and

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State and their Japanese counterparts. 6 The 2005 “2+2” proposals envisage greater integration of the U.S. and Japanese militaries and outline a new alliance approach both to enhance the defense of Japan and to move beyond traditional realms of cooperation. Areas specifically mentioned for cooperation include air defense, ballistic missile defense, counter-proliferation, counterterrorism, maritime security operations, search and rescue efforts, intelligence and surveillance, humanitarian relief, reconstruction assistance, peace-keeping, protection of critical infrastructure, response to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks, mutual logistics support, provision of facilities for a non-combatant evacuation, and the use of civilian infrastructure for emergency purposes. Joint efforts in several of these areas have existed for decades, whereas other programs are in their infancy.

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North Korean AggressionThe US-Japan security alliance is necessary to prevent North Korean aggressionBarkdoll and Kim 6 (Timothy C., Commander in the US Navy, and Jiyul, Colonel, “U.S.-Japan Security Alliance Welcoming a New Japan”, US Army War College, 2005-2006, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA449819 // Vish)

In the long-term, it is in the best interest of the United States to encourage the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula under a democratic government participating in a global free market economy. However in the near term, North Korea presents a number of serious threats to regional stability and is therefore a vital concern of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The National Security Strategy indicates that North Korea is the world’s top supplier of ballistic missile technology to terrorist organizations and is developing an arsenal of WMD.43 In support of the war on terror and to maintain Asia-Pacific regional stability, the United States has the following national interests at stake on the Korean peninsula: · Dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapon capability. · Encourage abandonment of long-range missile program with U.S. strike capability. · Prevent proliferation of WMD technology to rogue states and terrorists. · Stop North Korean support for terrorism.44 The successful attainment of these vital national interests will only be achieved through patient diplomatic negotiations. Until the diplomatic, economic, and financial elements of power are effective, the U.S. forces forward deployed to South Korea and Japan must deter aggression and prevent escalation of the crisis. The U.S. military presence also serves as a prerequisite for successful North-South negotiations and bolsters South Korea’s position at the bargaining table.45 As such, the U.S.-Japan alliance plays a vital role in “maintaining peace and deterring aggression on the Korean peninsula.”46

North Korean aggression leads to nuclear warChol 2 (Kim Myong, Executive Director of the Center for Korean-American Peace, “The Agreed Framework Is Brain Dead; Shotgun Wedding Is the Only Option to Defuse Crisis”, October 24, http://www.kimsoft.com/2002/nk-nuke5.htm)

Any military strike initiated against North Korea will promptly explode into a thermonuclear exchange between a tiny nuclear-armed North Korea and the world's superpower, America. The most densely populated Metropolitan U.S.A., Japan and South Korea will certainly evaporate in The Day After scenario-type nightmare. The New York Times warned in its August 27, 2002 comment: "North Korea runs a more advanced biological, chemical and nuclear weapons program, targets American military bases and is developing missiles that could reach the lower 48 states. Yet there's good reason President Bush is not talking about taking out Dear Leader Kim Jong Il. If we tried, the Dear Leader would bombard South Korea and Japan with never gas or even nuclear warheads, and (according to one Pentagon study) kill up to a million people."

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Ext. North Korean AggressionAlliance deters NK, they think it’s a credible deterrentOkamoto 02 (Yukio Okamoto, Spring 2002, Spec Advisor to the Japanese Cabinet & Chairman of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations, Spring, Washington Quarterly, “Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance”, Vol. 25, No. 2; Pg. 59, Lexis, Manchester) Despite its years of famine; its evaporating industrial and energy infrastructure; and its choking, inhumane society, the DPRK government still refuses to retreat to its place on the ash heap of history. Despite the poverty of the people, the North Korean military maintains an arsenal of thousands of rocket launchers and pieces of artillery—some of which are possibly loaded with chemical and biological warheads—awaiting the signal to wipe Seoul off the map. The DPRK’s immense stock of weapons includes large numbers of Nodong missiles capable of striking Japan’s western coastal regions and probably longer-range missiles capable of hitting every major Japanese city. The United States has two combat aircraft wing s in the ROK , in Os an and Kuns an. In addition, some 30,000 U.S. Army troops are stationed near Seoul . Mo s t mi l i t a r y ex p e r t s admit that the Army troops serve a l a r g e l y symbolic function; i f an actual war we r e t o erupt, a massive North Korean artillery bombardment could p in down both the U.S. Eighth Army and the ROK armed forces a t the incipient stage. The firepower the USFJ can bring to bear upon the Korean Peninsula within a matter of hours makes the U.S.-Jap an alliance the Damoclean sword hanging o v e r the DPRK . The DPRK leaders are ma s t e r s o f de c e p t i on and manipulation, but the y know that launching a military strike against the ROK will expose them to a strong and final counterstrike from U.S. forces in Japan.

NK war escalates globallyChol 10 (Dr. Kim Myong Chol, PhD, Executive Director of the Center for Korean-American Peace, author of a number of books and papers that have been published on Asia Research, Asia Times, etc., “When North Korea’s Threats Become Reality,” Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ Korea/LL15Dg01.html, Manchester)

A resumption of hostilities on the tiny Korean Peninsula would mean immediate war between two nuclear powers, North Korea and the United States. The latter keeps a nuclear-armed garrison of some 20,000 troops with a sprawling network of military bases across South Korea. A second Korean War would not fail to disappoint Western experts who wish to see Kim Jong-eun given an opportunity to prove his unprecedented military genius. He would preside over the evaporation of the world's sole superpower in the first thermonuclear exchange ever fought on the spaceship Earth. Acting for supreme leader Kim Jong-il, the young general is one click away from issuing a long-awaited order to the Korean People's Army's (KPA) shiny and sleek, quick-response global strike force. This would see the torching of the bulwark of the US empire, the skyscrapers of New York City and other centers of metropolitan America. Crack front-line units of the KPA are ready round the clock to bomb Seoul, turning it into a towering inferno before moving in on the ground to complete their mission.

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RearmThe Security Alliance between the United States and Japan is key to prevent Japan remilitarizationOkimoto 98 (Daniel I., graduate of Harvard and Princeton, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Stanford University, “The Japan-America Security Alliance: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century”, January 1998, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10106/Okimoto.PM.pdf // Vish)

This syncretic policy, combining elements of engagement and containment, is the pragmatic approach that the United States appears to be following. Under today’s circumstances, a suboptimal, satisfycing strategy may be the most that can be expected, realistically. China feels ambivalent about JASA. On the one hand, China realizes that JASA may be the “cork in the bottle,” an institution holding back Japanese rearmament. If JASA is removed, the odds of rearmament rise exponentially. When forced to choose between JASA and the likelihood of Japanese remilitarization, China has chosen to put up with JASA. It is the lesser of two evils. But since the end of the Cold War, Chinese attitudes appear to have hardened. The disintegration of the Soviet empire and rockiness of Sino-American relations have had a profound impact. In addition, several benchmark events have occurred in rapid succession—the Clinton-Hashimoto joint communiqué reaffirming the commitment to JASA, the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, and the interim report of the DGR (Defense Guidelines Review) in 1997—causing China to reassess the implications of JASA for Chinese security in Asia’s post–Cold War environment. China seems to believe that JASA is America’s main instrument of containment. By giving U.S. troops a strategic foothold in Asia, JASA enables the United States to exercise hegemonic influence over the region. If JASA were eliminated, American influence would be greatly diminished, allowing China more room to maneuver. China would have an easier time dealing with neighboring states like South Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia, which currently fall into the American orbit. Without JASA, the United States would have a harder time supporting Taiwan. There would be no effective counterweight to China in Asia (unless Japan decided to strike out on its own and pursue superpower status). China would not have to put up with as much U.S. meddling in its domestic affairs or U.S. pressures in multilateral organizations. On the other hand, if JASA disappeared, it would dramatically increase the probability of Japanese military rearmament. Japan would feel exposed and vulnerable. A remilitarized Japan, cut adrift from JASA, would alter the dynamics of security in Asia, to say nothing of the balance of power. China and Japan would confront each other once again as major adversaries, locked in an escalating struggle for power. This Hobbesian scenario is one that no one wants to see happen. To ensure that it does not, China may be forced to refrain from actively undermining JASA. To be sure, China will continue to complain about JASA publicly, seek to have some say about its functions, and try to stop it from further expanding; but in the final analysis, China will have to live with the reality of JASA’s existence.

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Ext. RearmThe Alliance prevents any re-arm from escalating to an actual war scenarioSingh 02 (Bhubhindar Singh, April 1 2002, Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, “ Japan''s post-Cold War security policy: bringing back the normal state”, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-1704012/Japan-s-post-Cold-War.html, Manchester)First, Japan could see a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance as a source of legitimacy for expanding its military capabilities and implementing a more proactive foreign policy to support its normalization process. This is particularly important, as a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance would mitigate the fears and suspicions of neighbouring countries. Japan's neighbours see the presence of the United States as a check against the possible resurgence of a militaristic Japan. Secondly, Japan's normalization would introduce greater reciprocity between Japan and the United States under the security alliance. Japan, together with the United States, would be a more active participant in managing the regional security environment, and assume a bigger role in times of conflict. There would be a greater balance between the two countries in military burden-sharing and crisis decision-making. (72) The emergence of this reciprocity would be a sign of a healthier alliance, where the U.S.--Japan alliance could then evolve towards something akin to America's strategic relationships with major West European allies. (73) Thirdly, Japan's normalization fits into the overall U.S. strategy of maintaining a preponderance of American power in East Asia. With both countries concerned at the rise of China, Japan's enhanced security role would aid the Americans in maintaining the balance of power in East Asia to its advantage. In the hope of Tokyo assuming a larger stake in regional security, the United States has repeatedly asked Japan to participate in collective defence efforts in partnership with it. This is especially true of the current Bush Administration. Secretary of State Colin Powell, during Senate confirmation hearings,

The US understands the implications of a re-arm and will make sure it never occurs Baker Institute for Public Policy 2000 (The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, May, “Japan’s Energy Security and Changing Global Energy Markets”, http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/JES_MainStudy.pdf, Manchester) In addition, there is the reality – often unspoken but always implicitly understood on both sides of the Pacific – that the American security guarantee for Japan has served two purposes. The most obvious one was common defense against the Soviet threat – most famously elucidated, from the American point of view, by George Kennan, when he described Japan as a “stationary aircraft carrier” poised off Soviet Asia. But there was also another, indeed earlier objective: to ensure that Japan never again became a force for instability in the Pacific. By assuming responsibility for Japan’s security, the United States helped ensure that Tokyo would not have the wherewithal to seek East Asian dominance as it had in the 1930’s and 1940’s. The infamous article nine of the Japanese Constitution – that constant source of irritation to US policy-makers seeking to prod Japan into a sharing a greater security burden -- was itself drafted by Japan’s American occupiers. True, the objective of limiting Japan’s ability to make war came into conflict with our desire to field as much force as possible against the Soviet threat. Indeed, as early as 1950, with the outbreak of the Korean War, we were secretly urging the Japanese government to embark on a significant rearmament effort. In the decades that followed, depending on the waxing and waning of the Cold War, the United States would continue to press a usually recalcitrant Japan to assume a greater defense burden (Barnes). But that pressure stopped well short of an invitation for Japan to assume full responsibility for its own defense, much less regional security. Indeed, every perceived revival of “nationalist” sentiment in Japan continued to be greeted with concern by American observers. The benefit of restraining Japan from becoming a threat to Asia may actually have increased in importance with the end of the Cold War and the rise of an ambitious and suspicious China on the Asian mainland. As noted, the prospect of direct US-Japanese conflict remains remote. But any major Japanese effort to rearm could nonetheless prompt a response by its neighbors – notably Beijing – with unpredictable consequences for regional stability.

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RelationsA Strong US- Japan alliance is key to US relations with India and ChinaSteinberg 10 (James is the Deputy Secretary of State “Deputy Secretary of State” 1/15/11 http://www.state.gov/s/d/2010/135270.htm 6/26/11 I.R. )

A strong U.S.-Japan alliance is also fully compatible with Japan’s own efforts to strengthen its bilateral relationships with its neighbors, and we welcome and encourage steps in that direction. Similarly, the U.S.-Japan alliance is enhanced by our deepening bilateral ties in the region, not only with our traditional allies – South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines – but also with India, China and the countries of ASEAN. These relationships are not zero-sum but additive. And they are increasingly buttressed by both of our countries’ engagement in the evolving multilateral arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region, in which our Administration intends to play an increasingly active role. For this reason, Secretary Clinton this week laid out our approach to multilateral cooperation in the region, with the goal of strengthening our common capacity to meet the security and economic challenges of our time, as well as emerging issues such as climate change and public health. Our goal, as the Secretary made clear, is institutions that, in her words, “produce results, rather than simply produce new organizations.”

US – India relations solve terrorism, prolif and maintain regional stability – but relations are weak nowKronstadt et al. 10 (K. Alan Kronstadt, Coordinator Specialist in South Asian Affairs, Paul K. Kerr Analyst in Nonproliferation, Michael F. Martin Specialist in Asian Affairs, Bruce Vaughn Specialist in Asian Affairs, “India-U.S. Relations” October 27, 2010 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf 6/26/11 I.R.)

The United States views defense cooperation with India in the context of “common principles and shared national interests” such as defeating terrorism, preventing weapons proliferation, and maintaining regional stability. Senior officials in the Obama Administration’s Pentagon have assured New Delhi that the United States is “fully committed to strengthening ties through the enhancement of our defense relationship.” 234 Many analysts view increased U.S.-India security ties as providing an alleged “hedge” against or “counterbalance” to growing Chinese influence in Asia, though both Washington and New Delhi repeatedly downplay such probable motives. Still, while a congruence of U.S. and Indian national security objectives is unlikely in the foreseeable future, convergences are identified in areas such as shared values, the emergence of a new balance-of-power arrangement in the region, and on distinct challenges such as WMD proliferation, Islamist extremism, and energy security. There remain indications that the perceptions and expectations of top U.S. and Indian strategic planners are divergent on several key issues, perhaps especially on the role of Pakistan, as well as and on India’s relations with Iran and repressive governments in places such as Burma and Sudan. Some Indian officials express concern that the United States is a “fickle” partner that may not always be relied upon to provide the reciprocity, sensitivity, and high-technology transfers sought by New Delhi, and that may act intrusively. This has contributed to New Delhi’s years-long political resistance to sign several defense cooperation accords, including the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMoA), the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA), and the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA). U.S. law requires that certain sensitive defense technologies can only be transferred to recipient countries that have signed the CISMoA and/or the BECA. 235 All three outstanding accords have been opposed by some influential Indian politicians for their “intrusive” nature.

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Ext. India RelationsCooperation with Japan spills over to IndiaThe Economic Times 6/25 (6/25/11, The Economic Times, "US-India-Japan Dialogue to Begine at Assisstant Secretary Level," http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/us-india-japan-dialogue-to-begin-at-assistant-secretary-level/articleshow/8987053.cms, MM)

WASHINGTON: The proposed trilateral dialogue involving India, Japan and the US would begin at the Assistant Secretary level and it would help align policies of the three countries in the Asia-Pacific region , a senior American official has said. " We will begin that process at my level, at the Assistant Secretary level, and to just explore and see what areas of common pursuit going forward," US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs , Kurt Campbell , told reporters. Campbell was referring to the recent US-Japan joint statement which announced the launch of the trilateral dialogue, adding that it was needed to align policies of the three countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The joint statement issued at the conclusion of the US- Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting here welcomed India as a strong and enduring Asia-Pacific partner. Responding to a question, Campbell said yesterday that the US welcomes the Look East policy of New Delhi. "We welcome India's role as a vibrant, strong player in all aspects of Asian Pacific life - economic, commercial, strategic, and the like," he said. " We've worked closely with them on coordinating our approaches to the ASEAN Regional Forum and to the East Asia Summit. We've seen important dialogues taking place between India and China and also between India and Japan," Campbell said. "There are a number of what we might call mini-lateral steps and initiatives in the Asian Pacific region: Japan, South Korea and China; Japan, South Korea and the United States," he said. There has been, recently, a substantial set of initiatives designed to improve relations between Tokyo and Delhi, "and I think we've agreed that an appropriate next step, given some of our interests and our mutual pursuits, is to seek a trilateral session," Campbell said.

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Sino-Japanese WarThe US – Japan alliance collapse leads to war between China and Japan – The alliance is the lesser of two evilsRolfe 10 (Ewan is a professor at Leeds college in Britain, “The US-Japan Alliance and Sino-Japanese Relations” Nov. 18 2010 http://www.e-ir.info/?p=5419 6/26/11 I.R.)

This tendency among the Chinese population to view Japanese foreign policy through a historical lens underpins the argument that Japan should not be allowed to develop its military capabilities, play a leadership role in Asia, and attain a ‘normal nation’ status (Li, 2008, p118). From this investigation, it appears that the US-Japan alliance has helped Japan to achieve all of these. An expanding purpose to the alliance beyond the defense of Japan, and the belief that Japan should make a greater contribution to global security, has given Japan the green light to develop its military capabilities. In addition, the alliance has allowed Japan to play a leadership role in Asia by involving it in issues such as Taiwan. In summary, the alliance since 1989 has allowed Japan to become more assertive in both its defence and foreign policy, and begin to remove some of its post-Pacific War constraints. In this way, Japan has moved towards – or in fact already achieved – a ‘normal nation’ status. By doing so, the alliance has badly affected Sino-Japanese relations; it has served as a reminder to the Chinese that Japan should not be trusted. The alliance has also had a negative impact by causing China to resent Japan for helping maintain US interests in the region ahead of China’s. Nonetheless, a termination to the US-Japan alliance may not necessarily improve Sino-Japanese relations; it could lead to an aggressive struggle for hegemony between China and Japan, as well as increase military tension, as the two fear the other’s aspirations are less constrained due to the absence of the United States. Seemingly, Sino-Japanese relations cannot win either way. Perhaps now, the US-Japan alliance is simply the lesser of two evils.

Alliance key to Asian StabilityINSS 00 (Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 11 2000, National Defense University. The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SR_01/SR_Japan.htm, Manchester)

Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region’s de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world’s second-largest economy and a wellequipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy. Japan, too, is experiencing an important transition. Driven in large part by the forces of globalization, Japan is in the midst of its greatest social and economic transformation since the end of World War II. Japanese society, economy, national identity, and international role are undergoing change that is potentially as fundamental as that Japan experienced during the Meiji Restoration. The effects of this transformation are yet to be fully understood. Just as Western countries dramatically underestimated the potential of the modern nation that emerged from the Meiji Restoration, many are ignoring a similar transition the effects of which, while not immediately apparent, could be no less profound. For the United States, the key to sustaining and enhancing the alliance in the 21st century lies in reshaping our bilateral relationship in a way that anticipates the consequences of changes now underway in Japan. Since the end of World War II, Japan has played a positive role in Asia. As a mature democracy with an educated and active electorate, Japan has demonstrated that changes in government can occur peacefully. Tokyo has helped to foster regional stability and build confidence through its proactive diplomacy and economic

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involvement throughout the region. Japan’s participation in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in the early 1990s, its various defense exchanges and security dialogues, and its participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and the new “Plus Three” grouping are further testimony to Tokyo’s increasing activism. Most significantly, Japan’s alliance with the United States has served as the foundation for regional order. We have considered six key elements of the U.S.-Japan relationship and put forth a bipartisan action agenda aimed at creating an enduring alliance foundation for the 21st century. Post-Cold War Drift As partners in the broad Western alliance, the United States and Japan worked together to win the Cold War and helped to usher in a new era of democracy and economic opportunity in Asia. In the aftermath of our shared victory, however, the course of U.S.-Japan relations has wandered, losing its focus and coherence— notwithstanding the real threats and potential risks facing both partners. Once freed from the strategic constraints of containing the Soviet Union, both Washington and Tokyo ignored the real, practical, and pressing needs of the bilateral alliance. Wellintentioned efforts to find substitutes for concrete collaboration and clear goal-setting have produced a diffuse dialogue but no clear definition of a common purpose. Efforts to experiment with new concepts of international security have proceeded fitfully, but without discernable results in redefining and reinvigorating bilateral security ties.

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Military Tech

The Alliance is key to military tech development Murayama 05 (Yuzo, February 15 2005, Asst Prof at Osaka U of Foreign Studies, “Studies on U.S.-Japan Military Technology Relations: Reviewing Japanese-Language Sources for Technology Transfers, Military Technology Frictions and The Defense Industry” http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/murayama_wp.htm, Manchester) The third group of books and articles belong to this "conspiracy theory" school. Sumi (1993) argues that the hidden reason behind the pressure for technology transfers from Japan is for the United States to keep the number one position in high technology area by obtaining advanced Japanese technologies. U.S.-Japan security relations, he argues, were used as a lever to push Japan toward this direction. Sadayuki Sato (1987) interprets the reason behind the pressure of technology transfer as the U.S intention to establish predominace in military technologies and to put technologically-rising Japan in a dependent and supplemental position to the United States. Fujii (1992) also argues that the basic technology policy behind the pressure of technology transfers is to integrate Japanese high-tech industries into the U.S. military system and use them as subcontractors (shitauke). Through this arrangement, he argues, the U.S. can restrain Japan and establish its monopoly position in technology areas. Studies in this category argue against technology transfers to the United States. Kibino (1987) made this point using the problems of Japanese companies' participation to SDI program and Inoue (1986) argues using telecommunication industry as an example. They argue that the trend of increasing transfers of Japanese dual-use technologies contradicts Japan's policies based on pacifism and make the Three Principles on Arms Export meaningless. The fourth group puts emphasis on the importance of technology transfers for U.S.-Japan security relations and Japanese technology policy itself and tries to draw out the strategic implications of technology transfers. Ueda (?) argues that technology transfers between the United States and Japan are mutually beneficial, namely, the U.S. can supplement its supremacy of military technologies by absorbing Japanese manufacturing and component technologies and Japan can obtain such military technologies as software and system integration through technology exchanges, and collaboration in this area itself would help to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security relationship. Ueda also discusses the necessity of constructing the technology strategy by assessing the importance of technologies in a broader or more comprehensive concept of national security. Murayama (1993, 1994, 1996a) puts the emphasis on the concept of economic security that emerged in the U.S. in the late 1980s. He argues that internationali-zation of the defense technology base and the increasing importance of dual-use technologies have changed U.S. technology policy and Japan also needs to adjust to this change. He then argues that technology exchanges would help both countries to develop cost-effective defense technology bases and to stabilize U.S-Japan relations in both the security and economic perspectives.

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***Answers To

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AT: Japan Not Advanced EnoughJapanese space technology improving nowGopalaswami 10 (8/16/10, R. Gopalaswami, National Space Society, “An International Preliminary Feasibility Study on Space Based Solar Power Stations,” http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/KALAM-NSS-Initiative.pdf, AMS)

SSP Studies & Programme in Japan. Throughout the late 1980s, the 1990’s, and the early years of the 21st Century, Japan has continued to make quiet, but impressive advances in several of the specific technologies needed for space solar power systems . These have been coupled with various systems studies. It is noteworthy that Japan, has the same population density and hence land availability constraints as India. On 28 June 2009, Japan announced a new suite of national space goals, which included space solar power. Nearer term objectives for Japan in SSP include the development of key technologies, a low Earth orbit demonstration, and the conduct of a new round of systems studies. All of the above have the objective of informing a national decision on the development of an operational solar power satellite within the next 5-10 years.

BSL ensures Japanese success in space even with pacifist restrictionsJaramillo 10 (Cesar, managing editor of the Governance Group for the Space Security Index, 8/?/10, 2010 spacesecurity.org, "Space Security 2010," page. 80, http://swfound.org/media/29039/space%20security%20index%202010%20full%20report.pdf, MM)

On 21 May 2008, Japan adopted the Basic Space Law (BSL), which reverses its longstanding prohibition on national security and military space activities, based on the widely accepted interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty that allows for the military use of outer space for peaceful purposes. The law allows the Ministry of Defense to deploy satellites for nonaggressive purposes, including surveillance and military support functions, but “does not permit the deployment of offensive capabilities” in space. As part of its effort to create a comprehensive national space strategy, Japan issued a five year Basic Space Plan (BSP) in June 2009 to give the BSL more direction and substance. Government officials view the adoption of a comprehensive space strategy as way to catch up to other major space-faring states. Keiji Tachikawa, the President of Japan’s Aerospace Exploratory Agency (JAXA), said in an interview that the BSL and BSP represent "very significant progress, as the United States, Russia, China and India have already made space development a part of their national strategies." The Plan consists of six pillars that address various issues, including environmental research and awareness, stimulating domestic R&D, and national security. A major element of the national security pillar is the Satellite System for National Security. The BSP will “strengthen the information gathering capability and promote research in the field of early warning and signal information gathering, while maintaining our exclusively defense-oriented policy, in accordance with principle of pacifism enshrined in the Constitution of Japan." Some observers contend that since the BSL was adopted, the overall budget for space activities has become weighted more heavily toward “military purposes,” including the appropriation of ballistic missile defense as a space-related project, although this shift can be mainly attributed to the reallocation of a portion of the space budget to the Ministry of Defense. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the new law grants the Ministry of Defense the authority to "manufacture, possess and operate its own satellites to support its military operations, including ballistic missile defense.”A 2009 Ministry of Defense paper details Japan's plan up to 2012 to build up its missile defense capabilities, including additions to its missile

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arsenal and upgrades to its ground-based radar sensors. The BSP adds that the number of information-gathering satellites should be increased to four within five years, a decision that some commentators attribute to North Korea's long-range missile launch in April 2009. Although the BSP is set to last only until FY2013, it includes a satellite procurement projection for FY2014–FY2020, bringing the estimated total of new satellites to 60. This number would include several new optical and radar satellites as part of the satellite system for national security.

Japan technologically advanced enough to participate in plan with USJaramillo 10 (Cesar, managing editor of the Governance Group for the Space Security Index, 8/?/10, 2010 spacesecurity.org, "Space Security 2010," page. 138, http://swfound.org/media/29039/space%20security%20index%202010%20full%20report.pdf, MM)

Launching a payload to coincide with the passage of a satellite in orbit is the fundamental requirement for a conventional anti-satellite capability. To date, nine nations have confirmed autonomous orbital launch capabilities, as discussed in Chapter 4. Tracking capabilities would allow a payload of metal pellets or gravel to be launched into the path of a satellite by rockets or missiles (such as a SCUD missile).27 Kinetic hit-to-kill technology requires more advanced sensors to reach the target. Targeting satellites from the ground using any of these methods would likely be more cost-effective and reliable than space-based options.28 US Air Force (USAF) Counterspace Operations Document 2-2.1 outlines a set of “counter-space operations” designed to “preclude an adversary from exploiting space to their advantage… using a variety of permanent and/or reversible means.”29 Among the tools for offensive counter-space operations, the document lists direct ascent and co-orbital ASATs, directed energy weapons, and electronic warfare weapons. The US Army invested in ground-based kinetic energy ASAT technology in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The small, longstanding Kinetic Energy ASAT program was terminated in 1993 but was later granted funding by Congress in FY1996 through FY2005.30 For FY2005 Congress appropriated $14-million the KE-ASAT program through the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Ballistic Missile Defense Products budget.31 The KE-ASAT program was part of the Army Counter-space Technology test-bed at Redstone Arsenal.32 The US has also deployed a limited number of ground-based exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) interceptors, including the Aegis (Sea-Based Midcourse) and Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Systems, for ballistic missile defense purposes.33 EKVs use infrared sensors to detect ballistic missiles in midcourse and maneuver into the Space Security 2010 158 trajectory of the missile to ensure a hit to kill.34 With limited modification, the EKV could be used against satellites in LEO.35 Japan is the largest international partner with the US on ballistic missile defense, and has its own Aegis system. In 2007 a Japanese destroyer successfully performed a sea-based midcourse intercept against an exoatmospheric ballistic missile target.36

Japan's cutting-edge technology discoveries make its cooperation indispensible to the USPekkamen & Kallender-Umezu 11 (Saadia, Paul, Saadia is, Paul is an expert on Japan, January/February 2011, Foreign Affairs, "In Defense of Japan: from the Market to the Military in Space Policy," http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67195/saadia-pekkanenpaul-kallender-umezu/in-defense-of-japan-from-the-market-to-the-military-in-space-pol)

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In a shift little noticed outside professional military circles, in the last decade Japan has quietly developed a suite of cutting-edge military space technologies -- rockets, satellites, and spacecraft -- that were originally designed for commercial applications. The subject of this book is highly technical: the list of acronyms is 14 pages long, and some passages are hard going for a nonspecialist. But the bottom line is clear enough: Japan's capabilities are widely underestimated, all the more so in space. The strategic logic for Japan's space program is obvious, with a growing naval, space, and nuclear power across the East China Sea and a second nuclear power even closer, on the Korean Peninsula. The emphasis of In Defense of Japan, however, is on the industries that pushed military applications when they could not make money from commercial projects. Today, in addition to ballistic missile defense capabilities developed in cooperation with the United States, Japan is working on reusable launch vehicles (that is, space planes); satellites that detect missiles and help with navigation, communication, and targeting; warhead reentry technologies that can advance the use of missiles in warfare; unmanned aerial vehicles; and technologies for "space situational awareness," which reveal a concern about possible future conflict in space. It is too soon to count Japan out in the arms race in Asia.

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AT: Japan Says NoJapan is on board for cooperation – Solidifies bilateral relationsCrow 92 (Stanley Jr, Captain, USAF, Masters in international studies, AEROSPACECOLLABORATION Theories and Case Studies From the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korean Experience: Implications for Theater Missile Defense, p.dtic 6/26/11 K. Harris)

Another factor impacting Japanese participation in international aerospace projects is the attitude of many Japanese policy-makers towards technology itself. One aspect of Yoshida's initial compromise on which all sides could agree was the advancement of technology, while the application to which this technology would be put was left to each group to determine. To those in the military, technology meant domestic production of weapons systems; to MITI it meant increased competitiveness of exports; to MoFA it was pride and a bargaining chip; to industry it meant increased production know-how across the board. One outcome of this divorce of technology from military might was the virtual enshrinement of technology as an abstract ideal, viewed as a source of power and pride but without regard for the tangible ends to which it would be applied. Now rootless, technology is still sought but often without clear end uses in mind. Instead vague, generalized notions that technology is good, useful, and will eventually bring benefits to its possessors seem to drive much of Japan's efforts to acquire (and retain) technology. Observers of Japanese technology acquisition efforts have described the underlying motivation in various ways. Michael Chinworth points out two motives: pride and national security. The Japanese are proud of their technological accomplishments in developing a "world class" aircraft industry." At the same time concern for national security is a driving factor, but not in the strictly military sense of the pre-Yoshida days: Japanese defense technology strategies are intertwined with a broader process of technology management in government and industry that emphasizes the nurturing of dual-use technologies to ensure Japan's security in the broadest sense during the coming century. It is essential to look beyond narrow definitions of security to appreciate the thrust and implications of Japanese defense technology management." This is "comprehensive security" in its broadest sense. Samuels, too, starts with the conception of security needs driving technology acquisition but then moves into less focused terminology when he describes "technonationalism" as an ideological "belief that technology is a fundamental element in national security, that it must be indigenized, diffused, and nurtured in order to make a nation rich and strong.,,87 Each of these descriptions captures aspects of the way in which the Japanese hold an almost mystical view of technology as a disembodied entity with value in and of itself. It has become, as Samuels writes, a "holy grail.,,88 Two specific examples serve to illustrate the way in which the Japanese have pursued technology as an ends rather than a means. The first was the T-2 trainer aircraft program from the 1960s. Despite the availability of off-the-shelf aircraft from the U.S., MITI proceeded with domestic development of the aircraft. The vehicle ultimately cost twelve times what the U.S. alternative would have and had significantly poorer performance.f" The plane's record earned it the reputation among Japanese military pilots of being "a trainer for industry, not pilots.,,9o A second example is the Advanced Turbo Prop (ATP) engine project initiated in 1986 to develop an advanced, highly efficient, low polluting aircraft engine. The government provided subsidies to a consortium of 34 private firms which conducted the R&D. Although the participants spoke of goals such as competing with Western firms and expanding global market share, this was at best a hope for the distant future. Market surveys in 1985 had shown there was no foreseeable market for the engine among either the U.S. military or the commercial airlines. In reality it was, in the words of one industry participant, "seeds- rather than needs-driven.,,91 Both of these examples could be interpreted as training projects, in which the practical objective was

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increased capability for producers rather than utility to consumers. Such a view would be in keeping with conventional assessments of the orientation of the Japanese political economy and would be correct to a point. But eventually training ceases to be practical if it is not translated into real products with their own merits. And while it is impossible to assess what products Japanese aerospace companies might tum out in the future, the record to date indicates little success in cashing in on this training. Indeed since the beginning of the F-2/FS-X project in 1990, the trend has been away from production of entire airframes in favor of work on subcomponents for u.S. manufacturers such as Boeing and McDonnell Douglas.f What these examples do demonstrate is the ideological approach that characterizes much of the Japanese quest for technology. The significance for attempts at collaboration with the u.S. is that since the technology is not differentiated from its application it becomes extremely difficult for Japanese participants to relinquish any technology whatsoever.

Japanese-US Aegis program defends against threats of North Korean missiles, gives incentive for Japanese agreementCovault 9 (Craig, one of the world's most respected aerospace journalists who has written over 300 articles on the topic, 2/27/09, space.com, "North Korean Space Launch a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing," http://www.space.com/2519-north-korean-space-launch-wolf-sheep-clothing.html, MM)

An armada of air, sea and space intelligence assets are being deployed above and around North Korea in anticipation of the imminent test of a 105 ft. Taeop-Dong 2 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile disguised as a satellite launch vehicle . The timing of the test is unknown, but expected soon. Key North Korean support hardware has been spotted moving into place around the launch site and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il visited the launch facility February 25. Iranian hardware, including possible satellite components, are part of the North Korean test. Many of the same flight test objectives for demonstrating ICBM flight and guidance can be duplicated with a space launch , where the velocity of the upper stage is allowed to reach 17,500 mph. Obama administration officials say any kind of test will immediately result in strong new sanctions against the North . "I am worried about the threatened North Korean test," Rep. Jane Harmon (D-CA) chairman of the homeland security subcommittee on intelligence and risk assessment, said in Washington February 24. "This is very serious so it is important that the administration pay keen attention to the region," she said in an NBC interview. This illustrates the necessity of monitoring how North Korea and Iran act in tandem, as well as individually where such critical weapons developments are involved. As an added caution, elements of the still embryonic U.S. Missile Defense System have been activated and turned over to U.S. Strategic Command for possible use during the North Korean test. These include assets such as the massive Cobra Dane radar in Alaska, a large X-band radar in Japan, a floating X-band off Hawaii and Aegis Surveillance and Tracking destroyers in the waters off North Korea. There are also Aegis "engagement" cruisers and destroyers with Standard missile interceptors at strategic points along the most likely ground tracks. And should the flight move onto a trajectory hostile to the U.S. or Japan, the North Korean vehicle could be shot down by an Aegis ship . U.S. Navy crews are being trained up on potential real life scenarios to be ready for whatever North Korea does. "North Korea has successfully launched [large] missiles in the past but the third stage has never been successful," says Harmon. "Once they are successful with a third stage they would have a missile that could reach the western U.S. This is very serious and so it is critical that this administration

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play keen attention to this test activity. "This combined with an advanced missile industry and a nuclear bomb making capability, forms a North Korean recipe that is truly scary," Harmon said. "And intelligence is the key to figuring it all out." Rarely have so many military space intelligence capabilities been brought to bear on what North Korea is up to. With the Kim regime teetering the test could be the trigger point major leadership shifts in the country. "We are watching closely with all the assets we have," says Marine Maj. Bradley Gordon of the U.S. Pacific Command. "We have all sorts of sensors deployed around the area." These assets, linked with control centers, can maximize the U.S. and Japanese intelligence gained from the flight when it occurs . Air and space based intelligence assets include continuous electronic intelligence patrols by advanced U-2 aircraft flying at 70,000 ft. and EC-135 Rivet Joint type aircraft flying lower with the hope of capturing North Korean voice transmissions, specifically involved with leadership discussions and decision making regarding the launch including the countdown. Special optically equipped C-135 and P-3 aircraft are in the area to image the climbing vehicle when it does lift off. It is possible the North Koreans could launch smaller rockets to temporarily distract American assets. This was done in July, 2006 when the Koreans were able to "penetrate seams" in U.S. intelligence capability. Defense officials say measures have been taken to avoid a repeat of that shortfall. In space, three or four Advanced KH-11 optical and infrared spacecraft pass over the launch site about four times a day and four times at night, while imaging birds from Japan and Europe do the same. Major U.S. Lacrosse radar imaging satellites watch the site at night, as do new European and Japanese radar spacecraft aided by powerful change detection software that can characterize differences in activity over a few hours. Further out, two or three U.S. Air Force Defense Support Program (DSP) infrared scanning missile warning satellite continually watch the area for the flash that would signify a launch. They are now also aided by two Space Based Infrared Highly Elliptical payloads that could provide more advanced data on the climbing North Korean launcher. With all of these assets working to characterize the North Korean launch, the U.S. will have the data necessary to decide whether to shoot it down should the long range Taeop-Dong 2 ballistic missile deviate from a space launch trajectory toward a ballistic path toward Japan or Alaska or Hawaii. Although U.S. and Japanese military commanders have practiced that scenario, U.S. analysts doubt that will be the case . But at the least the test will provide useful experience on American command and control, courtesy of Pyongyang. The U.S. and Japanese response will also "send a message" to the Hermit Kingdom that the U.S. takes nothing for granted in dealing with the teetering government of the ailing Kim Jong-Il. Analysts believe the vehicle will eventually be capable of delivering a small nuclear weapon and is capable now of delivering a biological payload as a terror weapon. The 105 ft. two stage configuration of the Taeop-Dong 2 has a range of 10,000 km. (6,200 mi.) and the three stage version has 15,000 km. range (9,315 mi.) The two stage version could also launch a 300-500 lb. class satellite. On February 25, Kim, still frail from a stroke, visited the Musudan-ni Launch Facility that sits along the rugged central North Korean coast facing the Sea of Japan. It is the same site used for a failed test in July 2006 when the vehicle nose shroud separated to early destroying the vehicle. "New imagery taken on February 17, 2009 provided by DigitalGlobe, shows increased activity at the Musudan-ri launch site," says DigitalGlobe. The new launch center at Tongh'ang dong on the northern west coast is not complete and so the launch site at Musudan-ri is being prepared for one more launch. The imagery was taken during the visit of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to China and South Korea where she outright confirmed that intelligence showed test preparations are underway, saying any flight would be "unhelpful" to the lessoning of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. "Musudan-ri is approximately 28 miles or (45 km.) kilometer) from the nearest railhead at Kilchu. Rocket components and in fact all supplies to the Musudan-ri launch site must arrive over a rough dirt road that is probably not all-weather. Large bulk supplies can be shipped from the port of Kimch'aek to a

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nearby wharf at Tongh-dong," says DigitalGlobe An analysis of the site was performed with the aid of Global Security.Org. Imagery obtained at 60 cm. (2 ft.) resolution by the DigitalGlobe Quickbird satellite shows the facility to be equipped with a modern and enlarged horizontal processing facility, large static engine test stand, and launch pad itself. Although not the type of facility the North would used as an operational war fighting base, there are indications the North Koreans are constructing such facilities for that elsewhere. Other intelligence assists have found what appear to be hardened silos for vertical launch ICBM or IRBMS under construction elsewhere in the country.

Growing China threat means Japan say yes, both countries committed nowFurukawa and Mukai 6/23 (Hajime and Yuko, staff writers, Daily Yomiuri Online [The Daily Yomiuri], "New Japan-US Goals Focus on China's Rise," 6/23/11, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110622005227.htm, MM)

WASHINGTON--Japan and the United States agreed Tuesday on new "common strategic objectives" to respond to China's military buildup and other regional issues, and reaffirmed a commitment to deepening and broadening the alliance. At ministerial-level defense and security talks in Washington, the two countries also agreed to officially drop the 2014 deadline for relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa Prefecture. The so-called two-plus-two talks, held for the first time in four years, was the first meeting under the Democratic Party of Japan-led government. The Japan-U.S. alliance has been on shaky ground since the DPJ took power in autumn 2009, but the two countries were able to finally make specific agreements to strengthen ties. The meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. In a joint statement released after the meeting, the four ministers pointed to "challenges posed by the increasingly uncertain security environment" in the Asia-Pacific region. To achieve global and regional stability, they listed 24 common strategic objectives. The statement called for China's "adherence to international norms of behavior" and urged the country to "improve openness and transparency" of its growing military. Japan's relations with China cooled last year following collisions between a Chinese fishing boat and Japan Coast Guard vessels near the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture. More recently, frictions over territorial issues have increased between China and nations around the South China Sea. According to government sources, the ministers expressed strong concerns about China's increasing naval activity during the meeting. They agreed to strengthen security and defense cooperation with Australia, India and South Korea, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Some observers said Tokyo and Washington have started seeking ways to build "a China containment network" centered around relations with regional allies. According to the Foreign Ministry and other sources, Matsumoto wants Japan and the United States to take the initiative in creating guidelines with Southeast Asian and other countries, and was quoted as saying, "Cooperation under frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum would also be effective . " Futenma deadline dropped As for the Futenma relocation--the main pillar in the realignment of U.S. military forces in Japan--another document also released after the meeting clearly stipulates that the replacement facility would be built with two 1,800-meter runways in a V-shaped alignment by reclaiming the sea off the Henoko district in Nago, Okinawa Prefecture. However, the ministers stopped short of setting a specific deadline for relocating the Futenma facility and transferring thousands of U.S. marines from Okinawa Prefecture to Guam. Japan and the United States initially aimed to complete the relocations by 2014. To avoid the indefinite use of the Futenma facility, the ministers confirmed their commitment to complete the move "at the earliest possible date after 2014," according to the document. Asked about growing calls in the U.S. Congress for a review of the Futenma plan, Gates said at a joint press conference after the talks, "We both [Clinton and Gates] reaffirmed the U.S. government's commitment to the 2006 realignment plan, but at the same time emphasized the importance of concrete progress over the course of the next year." As for exports of the SM-3 Block 2A interceptor missile being developed jointly by the two countries, they agreed to give access to the missile system to third parties "in cases where the transfer supports the national security of Japan and/or contributes to international peace and stability." In the wake of the March 11 earthquake and tsunami, the ministers also confirmed the importance of the U.S. military's participation in disaster drills initiated by Japanese

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municipalities. The ministers said "bilateral coordination centers" established by the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces following the disaster would serve as "a model for future responses to contingencies of all kinds."

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A2: Japan MilitarizationTurn: Japan's space policy actually mandates cooperation with other countries for diplomatic effortsSadeh 4/12 (Eligar, Principal Editor and Investigator of Astroconsulting International, 4/12/11, Secure World Foundation, "Towards a National Space Strategy: National Space Strategy Project (Workshop Report)," http://swfound.org/media/31158/National_Space_Strategy_Report-full.pdf)

Japanese space policy and strategy are framed by new approaches to space diplomacy and by the reform of space organizations. In regard to space diplomacy, the new Japanese Basic Law for Space Activities was established in 2008. According to the Basic Law, a new Minister and a new Strategic Headquarters were established for space activities. In 2009, the Strategic Headquarters announced the new Japanese Basic Plan for Space Activities. In the past, Japanese space activities were not been linked with diplomatic policies due to lack of coordination. The Basic Plan stipulates that Japan should advance both “space activities for diplomacy” and “diplomacy for space activities.” Space activities for diplomacy imply the use of space to accomplish diplomatic purposes. For this end, to illustrate, Japan should take better advantage of the International Space Station program , the Asia Pacific Disaster Management Support System through the Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum and the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization.50 In the area of diplomacy for space activities, Japan needs to better make use of foreign assistance through space cooperation to help developing states. By offering assistances and services through its advanced space science and technology capabilities, Japan can promote human security in developing countries. Japan should also be more active in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) and in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament to promote diplomacy for space activities.

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AT: Won’t be peacefulThe Aff's authors are alarmists - cooperation with the U.S. is what allows Japan to continue being peacefulCole 6/23 (J. Michael, staff reporter, 6/23/11, Taipei Times, "US, Japan Call for Strong Asia-Pacific Defense," http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/06/23/2003506460/1, MM)

Top US and Japanese defense and foreign affairs officials on Tuesday reaffirmed the US-Japan Alliance and called for peaceful resolution of disputes in the Taiwan Strait through dialogue, while admitting that plans to relocate US troops from a military base in Okinawa would miss their deadline. The Security Consultative Committee meeting, held in Washington, involved US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Takeaki Matsumoto and Japanese Minister of National Defense Toshimi Kitazawa. This was the first meeting of the committee, informally known as the “2+2 ministerial,” in four years. In a joint statement, the committee said it recognized the need to address a number of challenges in an “increasingly uncertain security environment,” which included expanding military capabilities and activities in the region, as well as the emergence of non-traditional security concerns. The US government reaffirmed its commitment to the defense of Japan and to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, including through regional alliances and the full range of US military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional. Japan reaffirmed its commitment to provide stable use of facilities and areas by US forces and to support their smooth operation. The statement said it welcomed continued developments and cooperation with Japan on theater ballistic missile defense — which for years has met strong opposition from Beijing — and called for the study of future issues in preparation for transition to production and deployment of the SM-3 Block IIA missile defense system. The US also reaffirmed its commitment, first made in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, to strengthen regional deterrence and to maintain and enhance its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. More specifically, in comments that ostensibly targeted China, it stated its intent to tailor its regional defense posture to address proliferation of nuclear technologies and theater ballistic missiles, anti-access/area denial capabilities and other evolving threats, such as to outer space and cyberspace. On China, the statement said the US and Japan encouraged Beijing’s responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, cooperation on global issues and its adherence to international norms of behavior. It also reiterated the need for China to improve openness and transparency with respect to its military modernization and activities, and to strengthen confidence-building measures. Although Taiwan was not mentioned, the statement said members welcomed progress in improving cross-strait relations. A similar statement following the committee meeting in 2005 resulted in strong condemnation by Beijing, which said at the time it “resolutely opposes the United States and Japan in issuing any bilateral document concerning China’s Taiwan, which meddles in the internal affairs of China, and hurts China’s sovereignty.” At press time, Beijing had yet to respond to Tuesday’s joint statement. Meanwhile, the US and Japan also acknowledged they would miss a 2014 deadline for the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on Okinawa. The force realignment plan aims to reduce the US military footprint on Okinawa, which hosts more than half of the 47,000 US troops in Japan. Despite the delay, the two sides confirmed that Marine air operations would be shifted to a less crowded part of Okinawa, where a new airfield is to be built, while about 8,000 Marines are to be shifted to Guam.

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AT: Alliance Keeps Countries MadUS-Japan cooperation spills overMoneycontrol.com 6/22 (6/22/11, moneycontrol.com, "US, Japan to Promote Trilateral Dialogue with India," http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/world-news/us-japan-to-promote-trilateral-dialogueindia_559420.html, MM)

Describing India as a strong and enduring Asia-Pacific partner, the US and Japan have said they would promote a trilateral dialogue with it to improve regional cooperation, while building trust with China. "(We) welcome India as a strong and enduring Asia-Pacific partner and encourage India''s growing engagement with the region and participation in regional architectures," said a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting here. It said they would "promote trilateral dialogue among the United States, Japan, and India." "We talked about our efforts to improve regional cooperation in a variety of multilateral forums and through a trilateral dialogue with India," US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told reporters at the end of the meeting last evening. The joint statement said the two countries also decided to encourage China's responsible and constructive role in the regional stability and prosperity, its cooperation on global issues and its adherence to international norms of behaviour, while building trust among the US, Japan, and China. The two sides stressed on improving openness and transparency with respect to China''s military modernisation and activities and, strengthening confidence building measures. "While welcoming the progress to date in improving cross-Strait relations, (they will) encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues through dialogue," the joint statement said.

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AT: Futenma Relocation Alt CauseKan and Obama are going to proceed with the relocation dealJapan Times 10 (Japanese Newspaper, “Kan, Obama agree on Futenma”, June 29th, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100629a4.html // Vish)

Japan and the United States agreed Sunday to proceed with the relocation of the Futenma air base in Okinawa in line with their accord reached in May, while working closely on responses to North Korea's sinking of a South Korean warship and Iran's nuclear quest. During their first formal meeting, held during the Group of 20 summit in Canada, Prime Minister Naoto Kan and President Barack Obama reaffirmed the importance of the security alliance between the two countries. "We both noted the significance of 50 years of a U.S.-Japan alliance that has been a cornerstone not only of our two nations' security but also of peace and prosperity throughout Asia," Obama said afterward. Kan said the Japan-U.S. alliance has played "an indispensable role" in ensuring peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Kan and Obama took up the issue of relocating U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and shared the view that Tokyo and Washington will proceed with the issue based on a fresh bilateral accord announced by the two countries May 28. The deal stipulates that Futenma's flight operations, now carried out in a crowded residential area in Ginowan, will be moved to a less densely populated coastal zone in Nago, roughly in line with the initial U.S.-Japan agreement struck in 2006. Kan is facing a tough challenge in appeasing local opposition to the plan, particularly after his predecessor, Yukio Hatoyama, raised hopes for moving the base out of the prefecture, or even out of Japan. In Sunday's talks, Obama reportedly told Kan that he realized it is not an easy issue for Tokyo and that he would make efforts to get U.S. forces more accepted in the region.

No impact to public outcry—they can’t force changeTelegraph 10 (“Eye on the main chance”, 6-20-2010)

The DPJ has had limited success in its battle against recession; the unemployment rate is still disturbingly high, but exports have slowly picked up. Getting rid of the American base in Okinawa has turned out to be a different story. Japan is, if no longer the second, at least the third largest industrial economy in the world; it is a valued member of the elite G-8 group of nations, its clout in both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund is much greater than that of China or India, it has never strayed in international discourse away from toeing the American line. And yet, on the demand for removing the US naval base in Okinawa, neither its economic prowess nor its formal political sovereignty has been of any avail . At the height of the anti-draft agitation in the 1960s, American youth, reluctant to go to Vietnam, would rent the sky with the full-throated chant, "Hell, no,/ We won't go." The US response to the notice served on them by the new Japanese administration to quit Okinawa has been identical: no, the United States will not oblige; Okinawa may be Japanese territory, Japan may be a fully independent and an economically powerful nation, the Americans could not care less; never mind the electoral verdict of the Japanese people, Okinawa will remain an American naval base, maybe for eternity, just like the one at Guantanamo in communist Cuba .

They’re wrong—80% of the public like military presenceOros 10 (Andrew, political science and international studies professor, “The 50th Anniversary: Time for a “Renewal of Vows”, Asia Policy, Number 10 (July 2010), 1-41, http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP10/AP10_B_JapanRT.pdf)

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At another level, though, Japanese voters and bureaucrats have clearly indicated their preference for a continued close alliance relationship with the United States. The fact that the latest annual poll conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office in December 2009 found the highest level of friendly feelings toward the United States (78.9%) since the polling began in the mid-1970s and that 81.8% of respondents held a favorable view of U.S.-Japan relations should encourage leaders of both states. Voters have criticized the DPJ for undermining U.S.-Japan relations, criticism the DPJ must effectively address to remain in power. The latest Diplomatic Bluebook issued by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2010 also underscores the importance of the alliance to Japan’s overall foreign policy.

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Ext. Relocation HappeningDespite the lack of previous action, Washington and Tokyo are making progress towards relocationMontvel-Cohen 5/30 (Sharla Torre, Publisher and Editor-in-Chief at Guam Buildup News, “Obama, Kan Pursue ‘Solid Footing’: Runway Design For Futenma Marine Base Replacement Selected”, http://guambuildupnews.com/Buildup-News-Politics/Obama-Kan-Pursue-Solid-Footing-Runway-Design-for-Futenma-Marine-Base-Replacement-Selected.html)

Now that they've agreed how to configure the runway for a new Marine air base on Okinawa's northeastern coast, Washington and Tokyo say they will decide construction details at a high level meeting in June. Japan Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto visited Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima on May 28 to deliver the message: construction details for the new V-shaped, two-runway airstrip at Henoko in Okinawa's Nago region "will be decided at the next Two-Plus-Two meeting." This, despite the reiteration by Mr. Nakaima that: "It's impossible to carry out a relocation plan that doesn't have the approval of local residents." A new replacement facility that would relocate U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Nago has long been delayed by Tokyo politicking and Okinawan opposition. But Tokyo and Washington have redoubled their efforts in recent weeks to clear the way for a productive planning session on the new facility at next month's meeting of their Defense and Foreign ministers in Washington. The new air base is one linchpin in a massive plan to realign 30,000 U.S. forces throughout Asia Pacific, including the transfer of at least 8,600 Marines and their dependants and support staff from Okinawa to Guam. The deal stipulates that Futenma's flight operations, now carried out in a crowded residential area in Ginowan, will move to the less densely populated coastal area in Nago, following the initial U.S.-Japan agreement reached in 2006. While Okinawans welcome closure of the Futenma base and the reduction of troops that would result from the realignment, they remain opposed to hosting a replacement facility. The issue has put Okinawa at odds with Tokyo, even as Washington has continued to press its ally to follow through on their 2006 pact. The Okinawa governor does have the authority through the Japan Public Water Reclamation Act to block construction of the runway planned for reclaimed land on Henoko's Oura Bay. However, the central government can retake control of the issue through an act of Parliament to amend the law. Speaking at a news conference in Tokyo on May 22, Kurt Campbell, Washington's assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said that the U.S. is standing firm and moving forward on its plans for building a replacement facility in Okinawa. When President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Naoto Kan met on the sidelines of the G8 meeting in France last week, National Security Council senior director for Asian Affairs, Daniel Russel, said: " The two leaders agreed that it's important for Japan to continue its efforts to follow through on the agreement of last May to implement the realignment road map on Okinawa in order to ensure that the U.S.-Japan alliance and the basing arrangements are on a solid footing as we continue to work to enhance, revitalize and modernize our alliance."

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Ext. Support for FutenmaBroader public support is for FutenmaMDN 9/15 (The Mainichi Daily News, Disappointment in Okinawa over Kan's re-election as DPJ leader, 2010, http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20100915p2a00m0na004000c.html)

Kan won 249 of the 300 points allocated to rank-and-file party members and supporters in the election, but Ozawa, who suggested further negotiations with Okinawa officials over the Futenma issue, won 70 percent of the votes from Okinawa. "It was a result in which public opinion in mainland Japan was quite different from that in Okinawa," commented Sueko Yamauchi, deputy secretary-general of the DPJ's prefectural chapter.

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AT: Japan Won’t Use Space for SecurityThe Basic Law for Space Activities allows for Japan to use space for security – rising threats make space securitization more important to the JapaneseSuzuki 7 (Dr. Kazuto, Associate Professor of International Political Economy at the Public Policy School, Hokkaido University, in Japan, “Space: Japan’s New Security Agenda”, October 2007, Research Institute for Peace and Security Policy Perspectives, http://www.rips.or.jp/english/publications/policy_perspectives/pdf/RPP05_suzuki.pdf // Vish)

Kawamura also submitted this report to the LDP’s Policy Research Council. Because the LDP is Japan’s ruling party, the council has great influence on government policy. In turn, the council has the prerogative to initiate policies and legislative actions, and without its consent, no legislative proposal would be introduced to the Diet. Kawamura thus found it more productive to bring his ideas about reforming Japanese space policy to the LDP than to the government because he needed the support of Diet members to revise the 1969 resolution. With the support from Hidenao Nakagawa, then the Chairman of the Policy Research Council and the third-ranking member of the LDP, Kawamura established the Special Committee on Space Development (SCSD) with himself as its leader. With a large number of Diet members already on board, the SCSD attracted the attention of the media, and gradually more and more members began attending its meetings. By making space a priority of LDP policies, many Diet members began to realize its importance to the national strategy, and through the media coverage, the public, too, began to understand Kawamura’s intentions. In July 2006, when North Korea conducted a second missile test, the SCSD got another boost of support as public opinion quickly shifted from guarding its pacifist principles to demanding a more flexible interpretation of the 1969 resolution. In this atmosphere, the SCSD decided to submit to the Diet its draft Basic Law for Space Activities on June 20, 2007, although it was not scheduled to be discussed until after the summer recess. The first and the most important feature of the bill is its institutional renovation, in accordance with the Kawamura Consultation Group’s report. It proposes establishing a new Minister for Space Development and a Headquarters, which would serve as a forum of MEXT, METI and user ministries and several appointed members from academia and industry and which would be given a broad authority. This ministry would also enable the government to formulate a coherent space policy. The Minister for Space Development would be “specially designated” and would not be in charge of managing the ministry but would be a member of the Cabinet Office, coordinating space-related policies of various ministries. One such ministry is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), which is conducting a study of the utilization of Japan’s space technology as part of its foreign policy. This abrupt change of policy is ambitious. Given the Japanese government’s conservative attitude toward any reform, it is hoped that these new institutions will attract political attention and advance Japan’s space activities. The second feature of the bill pertains to security. Article 2 of the bill states that “Our space development shall observe the Outer Space Treaty and other international agreements and shall be conducted in accordance with the principle of pacifism upheld in the Constitution.” In other words, the traditional interpretation of “exclusively peaceful purposes” as “nonmilitary” should no longer apply . Instead, the policy should be to adopt the international standard interpretation of the “peaceful use” of space as the “nonaggressive” or “nonoffensive” use of space. The new bill would accordingly enable the Japanese defense authority to become involved in the development, procurement, and operation of space systems. In addition, Article 14 states that “the government shall take necessary measures to promote space development that will contribute to international peace and security and also to our nation’s security.” Because this statement is

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so general, Article 14 could be interpreted as allowing the government to use space systems for aggressive purposes. But because Article 2 stipulates that the use of space systems for national and international security comply with both the framework of international agreements and Japan’s constitution, it implies that Japan may use its space assets for crisis management and disaster monitoring in Asia and for peacekeeping missions outside its territory. Article 2 also suggests that Japan can use early warning satellites for its missile defense, as this falls into the category of self-defense. The bill therefore is designed to strengthen Japan’s capability in settling disputes and managing crises by peaceful means and is intended to change only the interpretation of the Diet resolution, preventing any use of space by Japan’s military authority. With the new bill on space development, the government will at last have a legal base for using space to strengthen its national security and expand diplomatic activities. This combination of security and diplomacy is important for two reasons. First, one of Japan’s primary objectives of using space for security is to acquire the capability to defend its own country, particularly by means of a missile defense system. Given the small size of Japan’s territory, space is not a very useful tool. It may not require a constant surveillance and communication capability . However, in the context of Japan’s expanding role in international security and the Japan-U.S. alliance, the SDF operations far from home would require long distance telecommunications and satellite intelligence. Such needs were confirmed by the Maritime SDF ships sent to the Indian Ocean to support U.S. and allied operations in Afghanistan as well as the Ground and Air SDF troops sent to Iraq.

And the Basic Law for Space Activities was passedBrown 9 (Peter J., reporter for the Asia Times, “Japan’s next chapter in space begins”, June 25th, 2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/KI09Dh01.html // Vish)

"We view China as a growing military power in the region. But there is no immediate military threat from China," said Dr Kazuto Suzuki, an associate professor of International Political Economy at Hokkaido University's School of Public Policy. Japan's new Basic Law for Space Activities or simply Basic Space Law (BSL) passed the Diet (parliament) in 2008, and in mid-2009, a new Basic Space Plan was completed. As a result, Japan's government is now able to fund military space activities, ending a ban on such activities that lasted 40 years. Japan's small fleet of Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) was allowed during this time because they were not funded or operated by Japan's Ministry of Defense (MoD), according to Suzuki. All IGS operations are overseen by the civilian Cabinet Secretariat, which includes Japan's central intelligence office.

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---Aff---

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Relations Impact Turn – Chinese WarDeeper Japan-US relations concerns China leading to inevitable conflictSymonds 5 (Peter, author for World Socialist Web Site who focuses on Japanese relations, 4/26/05, World Socialist Web Site, "Washington Fuels Japanese Militarism: Part Two," http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/apr2005/japa2-a26.shtml, MM)

Two significant shifts in Japan’s defence posture have been set out in recent documents. Last December the government released a comprehensive security statement—the National Defence Program Outline (NDPO)—which for the first time named China, along with North Korea, as a potential threat to Japan. “China... is attempting to expand its sphere of maritime activity while driving the modernization of its nuclear and missile forces as well as naval and air forces. Japan needs to pay attention to these trends,” it declared. The NDPO reflects similar US defence and intelligence reviews that also paint an overblown picture of the present and future Chinese defence capacities. It should be recalled that, while paying lip service to the pacifist clause of the constitution, Japan has, over the last five decades, built its “self-defence forces” into one of the best-equipped and largest military forces in the world. Japan’s official military spending is more than double that of China. In mid-February 2005, a top-level meeting of Japanese and US defence and foreign ministers marked a second decisive change. The joint statement specifically named Taiwan as a mutual security concern for the first time . While the reference was very tame—the need for “a peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait”—the meaning was undeniable. It represented a shift from Tokyo’s previous scrupulous support for the “One China” policy to Washington’s ambiguous stance, which nominally recognizes Taiwan as part of China, but is nevertheless committed to defending it against Beijing. The significance of the statement was not lost on Beijing, which responded by angrily denouncing Japan for interfering in China’s internal affairs. Beijing is justifiably concerned that the deepening collaboration between the US and Japan, the world’s two largest economic powers, is the most dangerous element of a US strategy of encirclement . This fear has only been heightened since September 2001 by the establishment of US military bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia; closer US security relations with India and Nepal, as well as US efforts to reestablish its military presence in South East Asia. Behind the scenes, a major reorganization of US-Japan military relations is well underway as part of a broader global repositioning of the American military. The Washington Times noted on April 15 that over the coming months US and Japanese military officers and defence officials will hold meetings in Washington, Tokyo and the US Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii “to determine ways to put muscle behind the swiftly maturing alliance between the United States and Japan”. The object of this intense discussion is to prepare for a joint declaration later this year that will effect “the most fundamental and far-reaching revision of the alliance” since the US Japan Security Treaty was rewritten in 1960. According to the Washington Times, the new relationship will be a partnership of “near equals” that will involve a more thorough cooperation on training, intelligence, war planning and operations. The Asahi Shimbun reported on April 13 that the Japanese government has given approval in principle for one key element of the plans: the transfer of the command headquarters of the US army’s 1st Corps from Washington state to Camp Zama near Yokohama, south of Tokyo. The move is aimed at reinforcing US-Japan military ties at the top-level, even as American forces in Japan and South Korea are cut, in line with the Pentagon’s plans for a more flexible, mobile US military, capable of striking anywhere in the world.

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Continued cooperation with Japan just threatens other countries, their relations good evidence doesn't assume the deterioration in US-Japanese efforts to cooperate with ChinaChina Daily 6/23 (China Daily, 6/23/11, "Cooperation, not Threats," http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-06/23/content_12756554.htm, MM)

The United States and Japan have upgraded their alliance based on a new set of "common strategic objectives". On Tuesday, Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto released a joint statement with US Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calling on China to play "a responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity". They also asked China to adhere to international norms of behavior and claimed they sought to encourage China's cooperation on global issues. In the joint statement, the US guaranteed the security of Japan and the two countries will seek to enhance their capability to address a variety of contingencies. They also said they will strengthen security and defense cooperation with Australia and the Republic of Korea and will promote trilateral dialogue between the US, Japan and India. It is not hard to see that the two allies view China as a thorn in their sides. The US and Japan are concerned about China's economic, political and military clout, to the extent that some in the US and Japan favor containing China. During his visit to Tokyo in January, Gates said the US military presence in the Pacific is essential to restrain Chinese assertiveness, adding that advances by China's military in cyber and anti-satellite warfare technology could challenge the ability of US forces to operate in the Pacific. He also highlighted the territorial dispute between China and Japan as an example of why the US alliance with Japan is important. Although China is its biggest trade partner, Japan is nervous about the rise of its neighbor. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal in April, Kitazawa called for stronger military ties with its allies to balance China's growing influence. However, although the US and Japan call for confidence building measures, they are doing just the opposite. The US-Japan joint statement defines the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region as "increasingly uncertain". It calls China's growing military capabilities and activities in space, the high seas and cyberspace as challenges the two countries need to address. But when the US and Japan strengthen their alliance, other countries have reason to strengthen their own military capability. Clearly the future interactions between the US, Japan and China will shape the strategic map of Northeast Asia. Cooperation rather than confrontation will be better for all. The US and Japan have already benefited from China's economic growth and its contributions to regional and global issues. The three countries need to create a situation where they can cooperate and coexist and avoid the tragedy of a competition for power.

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Relations Impact Turn- HegCooperation kills US military and economic compeitiveness – PAR modelCrow 92 (Stanley Jr, Captain, USAF, Masters in international studies, AEROSPACECOLLABORATION Theories and Case Studies From the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korean Experience: Implications for Theater Missile Defense, p.dtic 6/26/11 K. Harris)

The analytical approach used for this study will be the "Partners and Rivals" (PAR) model developed by Jonathan Tucker.24 His approach is to examine "mixedmotive situations ... in which the players pursue common interests at one level and competing interests at another. ,,25 In keeping with the factors described above that simultaneously encourage and discourage collaboration, Tucker sees that a fundamental characteristic of international collaboration in advanced technology is that the players have a mixture of common and conflicting interests: a mutual desire to combine their resources synergistically to increase the size of the "pie," yet divergent interests when deciding how the joint benefits from collaboration (such as gains in technological knowhow) are divided between them." In this mixed-motive situation, actors seek both absolute gains in capability and relative gains vis-a-vis their competitors. Collaborating tends to increase absolute gains for all actors but carries risks of relative losses, particularly for the leader. On the other hand independent action freezes relative positions, protecting the leader's position for the time being but is oftenunsatisfactory due to the aforementioned high costs and risk of autarky. There is no single point at which relative and absolute gains will be optimized for all actors. Rather, there is a range of policy options that include varying degrees of autonomy and collaboration. This analytical framework borrows from Robert Gilpin's discernment of "indifference curves" in state behavior that describe sets of equally valued results sought by states using a "satisficing" strategy.f The PAR model assumes first that in any collaborative scenario, there will be a certain degree of disparity in aggregate capabilities between the participants. In calculating whether and how to proceed, each player pursues two types of payoffs from collaboration: a short-term welfare payoff and a longer-tern positional payoff. The welfare payoff is the short-term benefit to both players in terms of added profits, risksharing, economies of scale, and larger markets. The positional payoff refers to each player's net gain or loss in relative capabilities. Without special procedures to control the flow of technology, Tucker sees a natural tendency for the weaker partner to realize a net positional gain over time as know-how flows to it. Thus the motives for collaboration will be based on the following evaluations: For the weaker partner: For the stronger partner: net payoff = welfare payoff+ positional payoff net payoff = welfare payoff - positional payoff Thus the weaker participant always _has at! incentive to participate In a collaborative undertaking; the net payoff is always positive. But the stronger partner must weigh the welfare benefit against the positional loss in determining its desire to participate. Each of these payoffs varies in proportion to the ratio ofcapabilities between the two partners. The impact of welfare and positional payoffs on net payoff for the stronger partner can be represented graphically as shown in Figure 1. For the stronger player, welfare payoffs increase as the levels of capabilities converge due to the increased ability ofthe junior partner to contribute to the joint endeavor. Concern over positional losses is small if the disparity in overall capabilities is great since the weaker side will be unable to significantly capitalize on the knowledge acquired. But if the players are nearly equal, any positional change may be unacceptable to the leader since it could jeopardize its leadership position. The conclusion Tucker reaches is that collaboration will be most successful in cases where the disparity in capabilities between the two participants is "moderately large" -- enough that concerns regarding positional losses are not excessive while not so much that the weaker player has nothing to contribute: "Contrary to the conventional wisdom, then, 'equals' do not make the best partners.,,29 When parties with roughly equivalent capabilities consider collaboration, special steps must be taken to mitigate the concerns of positional losses if the endeavor is to succeed. Tucker describes a variety of methods to reduce the stronger firm's sensitivity to relative gains by the weaker. The two of these most relevant here are "strict reciprocity" provisions and "strategic alliances." The first consists of measures negotiated by the parties to either guarantee equal shares of the technologically-sensitive work or to equally share new technologies developed through the venture. Such measures increase the complexity of the collaboration but can provide reasonable assurance that both participants will benefit proportionally. The second measure, forming a strategic alliance, reduces positional concerns by tying the players to a common interest that will persist for a relatively long period of time. As Tucker explains, Until recently, firms participated primarily in ad hoc, contract-specific consortiums in which today's partner could be tomorrow's competitor. As a result, the players had reason to worry that transfers of technology in one collaborative project could boomerang in the next. Over the past few years, however, firms have increasingly sought to hedge against the risk of defection by establishing more stable partnerships ("strategic alliances") extending over a series of projects. A common way for firms to form an alliance is to exchange capital through reciprocal

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shareholding arrangements, with equity ownership ranging from 5 to 20 percent.30 Thus the theoretical material concerning collaboration on international aerospace projects indicates there are factors both supportive of and detrimental to collaboration. The analytical model used herein is Tucker's "Partners and Rivals" model which proposes a method of evaluating benefits to players in mixed motive situations. The model can be applied at both the firm and state levels to provide a composite understanding of the motives of all actors in a given project. The next section will present more detail regarding the interests of state actors so that the PAR model can be applied to specific aerospace projects thereafter.

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No CooperationSignificant obstacles prevent effective US-Japan cooperation after quakeNegishi and Walet 6/24 (Mayumi, Leonora, Negishi is a journalist for Reuters, Walet is an Asia Green Investment Correspondent, 6/24/11, reuters.com, "Japan Inc Balks at Staying Put Amid Quake, Power Risks," http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/24/us-japan-summit-manufacturing-idUSTRE75N0PX20110624, MM)

(Reuters) - The threat of more quakes, power shortages and loss of clientele is forcing Japanese firms to shift more production, much of it offshore and with a new sense of urgency. Big manufacturers, hurting after the March 11 earthquake, tsunami and subsequent nuclear crisis wreaked havoc with the supply of parts, are demanding that suppliers diversify output facilities, especially those with key technologies . "If you are the only supplier for any particular good, we're going to ask you to have at least two production plants and not in the same area," Nissan Motor Co (7201.T) Chief Executive Carlos Ghosn said at the Reuters Rebuilding Japan Summit this week. "You don't want to be in a situation where you have one supplier in one plant producing everything you need," he said. "If there's one supplier, we need two plants. If not, we need two suppliers." This type of pressure may be the final straw for many who have until now stayed put, accepting Japan's high labor and electricity costs as a necessary price to pay for quality and intellectual property control. Some 70 percent of domestic manufacturers expect at least one partner in their supply chains to speed up relocation efforts overseas, a trade ministry poll showed, accelerating a nearly two decade-long migration of Japanese manufacturing capability overseas. "Relocating is on the table for many executives. If a key supplier or partner moves, that could trigger a large exodus," said Shuzo Takada, director of the ministry's industrial revitalization division. Several Japanese companies have already announced moves offshore as part of post-quake strategies to diversify output. Hoya Corp (7741.T), the world's second largest maker of optical glass for cameras, is planning its first overseas plant in China while Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co (5706.T), which supplies 90 percent of the ultra-thin copper foil used in smartphones, is building a backup production line in Malaysia. Fujitsu (6702.T) plans to shift more chip output to a factory in China. Renesas Electronics (6723.T), which decided to outsource more microcontroller production to Taiwan's TSMC (2330.TW) and Globalfoundries in Singapore CSMF.UL after the quake shut down a key semiconductor plant for nearly three months, is also considering moving some output overseas. Japanese manufacturers are making steady progress in restoring supply chains and expectations are high that output levels will return to pre-quake levels in the July-September quarter but the potential for power shortages in the summer and beyond has rattled and irked the corporate world. With much nuclear capacity still offline, large industrial customers in Tokyo and its surrounding areas face a mandatory 15 percent cut this summer while others, including those in western Japan, have been asked to try to cut back usage by 15 percent. " We will do our best to meet utilities' calls to conserve power, but we will not sacrifice work quality and volume to meet a power quota," Shigenobu Nagamori, the visibly annoyed president of precision motor maker Nidec Corp (6594.OS), said at a recent news conference. On one hand, the potential power shortages have been a boon for generator makers like Kawasaki Heavy (7012.T) and Meidensha Corp (6508.T), which are working at full capacity but are still unable to meet a sudden surge in orders. But in a world of clean rooms, lithography machines and silicon furnaces, generators offer little comfort. Even a momentary blip in wattage can mean wasted raw materials as well as days of recalibration and testing before production can resume. Japan has also been shutting down its nuclear reactors one by one for scheduled maintenance, and regional officials, fearful of widespread anti-nuclear sentiment, have so far refused to allow the reactors to restart. That has sparked fears that all of the country's nuclear reactors could be offline in April next year. Public jitters about nuclear power have prompted government officials and Bank of Japan policy board member Yoshihisa Morimoto, a former Tokyo Electric Power (9501.T) executive, to warn that prolonged shutdowns of nuclear plants would have a serious impact on the economy. Power outages would also probably raise Japan's high

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electricity prices even further . In 2009, Japanese companies grappled with industry-use electricity prices of 15.8 cents per kilowatt hour, compared with 5.8 cents in South Korea and 6.8 cents in the United States. Average operating profit margins for manufacturers remain under 5 percent in Japan and transferring production sites abroad just makes sense, said Yukio Noguchi, a professor of finance at Waseda University. Japan's government hopes to stem the tide, calling for corporate tax cuts, support for new technology research, and incentives for consolidation. But those measures have little hope of quick fruition given the dire state of public finances. "The quake has reduced even further the advantage of keeping production in Japan," Noguchi said. "It is impossible to stop firms from producing overseas." (This story is corrected in the 10th paragrapth to say the cause of the Renesas plant shutdown was an earthquake, not a tsunami.)

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Impact DefenseUS- Japan alliance is ineffective – Political turmoil, Budget problems and constitutional constrainsChanlett-Avery 11 (Emma Chanlett-Avery is an Analyst in Asian Affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade division of Congressional Research Service, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance” 1/18/11 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf 6/25/11 )

Since 2007, Japanese politics has been beset by turmoil. Five men have served as prime minister during that time, making coherent policy formation in Tokyo difficult and complicating many aspects of U.S.-Japan relations . The landslide victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the August 2009 elections for the Lower House of Japan’s legislature, which brought an end to the 55-year period of nearly uninterrupted rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), brought promise of a new stability in Tokyo politics. However, the DPJ’s tenure in power has been rocky, making it difficult for Japan to assert itself internationally and creating problems in U.S.-Japan relations. After the Upper House elections in July 2010, the DPJ lost control of one chamber of the Diet (Japan’s legislature), therefore allowing the opposition to block much legislation. With the ruling government forced to cobble together ad-hoc coalitions on particular legislative priorities, Tokyo has struggled to advance national security issues that would help to improve the alliance relationship. Ambitious plans like amending Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, passing a law that would allow for a more streamlined dispatch of Japanese troops, or altering the current interpretation of collective self defense are far more difficult to accomplish given the political gridlock. Budgetary Pressure U.S. officials are concerned that Japan will face severe budgetary constraints that will preclude major alliance development. Japan’s public debt stands at around 200% of its GDP. 14 Japanese leaders are under pressure to stem government spending overall, and many ministries face budget cuts as part of ongoing fiscal reform. Japan’s defense budget, at $51 billion, is the sixth-largest in the world. 15 Defense spending in Japan has traditionally been capped at 1% of GDP; most leaders are wary of surpassing that symbolic benchmark, although the cap is not a law. According to U.S. defense officials, Japan should expect to pay up to $20 billion for the realignment costs alone. If costs of the troop realignment come from the defense budget, some analysts say that Japan’s military could face degraded capability because expensive equipment purchases will have to be forgone . In interviews, U.S. military officials have voiced concerns that the SDF runs the risk of becoming a “hollow force” because of its insufficient procurement system. Funding is also needed from the Japanese in order to increase the amount of joint training with U.S. forces. Budget pressure is likely to remain high in Japan due to the demographic reality of an aging and shrinking population with a shortage of workers. Constitutional and Legal Constraints Several legal factors could restrict Japan’s ability to cooperate more robustly with the United States. The most prominent and fundamental is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, drafted by American officials during the post-war occupation, that outlaws war as a “sovereign right” of Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.” It stipulates that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained .” However, Japan has interpreted this clause to mean that it can maintain a military for self-defense purposes and, since 1991, has allowed the SDF to participate in non-combat roles overseas in a number of U.N. peacekeeping missions and in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. The principle of “collective self-defense” is also considered an obstacle to close defense cooperation. The term comes from Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which provides that member nations may exercise the rights of both individual and collective

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self-defense if an armed attack occurs. The Japanese government maintains that Japan has the sovereign right to engage in collective self-defense, but a 1960 decision by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau interpreted the constitution to forbid collective actions because it would require considering the defense of other countries, not just the safety of Japan itself. Participation in non-combat logistical operations and rear support of other nations, however, has been considered outside the realm of collective selfdefense. Former Prime Minister Abe had spoken out about the need to reconsider this restriction, but efforts to alter the interpretation stalled after his resignation in 2007. During the deployment of Japanese forces to Iraq, the interpretation prevented them from defending other nations’ troops. 16 Some Japanese critics have charged that Japanese Aegis destroyers should not use their radar in the vicinity of American warships, as they would not be allowed to respond to an incoming attack on those vessels. As the United States and Japan increasingly integrate missile defense operation, the ban on collective self-defense also raises questions about how Japanese commanders will gauge whether American forces or Japan itself is being targeted. Under the current interpretation, Japanese forces could not respond if the United States were attacked.

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Japan Tech SucksRecent Earthquake means substantial setbacks in Japan's Space Program Malik 3/11 (Tariq, Managing Editor of Space.com, 3/11/11, Space.com, "Earthquake Forces Closure of Japan's Space Station Control Center," http://www.space.com/11110-japan-earthquake-tsunami-space-station.html)

Japan has shut down its primary space center — including a control room for part of the International Space Station — after the massive earthquake and tsunami that struck the country today (March 11). JAXA, Japan's space agency, evacuated its Tsukuba Space Center in Tsukuba, Japan, following an 8.9-magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami that have devastated the country. .The space center oversees Japan's Kibo laboratory on the space station, as well the JAXA's unmanned cargo ships that deliver supplies to the orbiting lab. Flight controllers with Tsukuba's Space Station Integration and Promotion Center have been sent home for safety, JAXA officials said. "They will stay with their families and take care of them during the weekend," JAXA spokeswoman Kumiko Sagara told SPACE.com via e-mail from NASA's Johnson Space Center in Houston. "They will come back on Monday and check up on how much the damage is." The Tsukuba Space Center sustained some damage , according to photos provided to the website collectSPACE.com, a SPACE.com partner site. Space station crew alerted Earlier today, flight controllers at NASA's Mission Control center in Houston radioed news of the earthquake in Japan to the six astronauts living aboard the International Space Station . The station is currently home to two American astronauts, an Italian astronaut and four Russian cosmonauts. "How bad is the situation there?" asked space station commander Scott Kelly after hearing the news. "We're hearing that they're having some power outages, and that there has been some damage in the Tsukuba area, but we really don't have a lot of details at this point," Mission Control replied. No NASA astronauts or crew members assigned to an upcoming station mission from other partner nations were scheduled to be in Japan at the time of the earthquake, Mission Control said. Mission Control also offered to beam a CNN news feed to the space station to keep the crew informed of developments in Japan. To date, Japan has trained eight astronauts to fly in space, with three more in preparation. Photos of the Tsukuba Space Center show damage from collapsed roofs, fallen cabinets and other debris. A small team of JAXA flight controllers was visiting NASA's Johnson Space Center at the time of the quake and is available to provide assistance should it be required, NASA spokesman Kelly Humphries told SPACE.com. NASA flight controllers at the Houston center and at a payload operations center at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala., are overseeing the station's Japanese systems, Humphries said. The International Space Station has experienced Mission Control shutdowns in the past . For example, NASA's Mission Control room has experienced partial closings or set up remote, off-site operations when hurricanes have forced center closings in Houston, Humphries said. Japan's space station role The $100 billion International Space Station is being built by five different space agencies representing 15 different countries. In addition to Japan's JAXA and NASA, the space agencies of Europe, Russia and Canada are major contributors to the station, which is nearing completion after 11 years. Japan's Kibo laboratory is a massive space module that is currently the space station's largest single laboratory . The name Kibo means "Hope" in Japanese. It actually consists of two different rooms: a large, bus-size main laboratory and a smaller rooftop module that serves as a storage room. The Kibo laboratory also has two windows and a small airlock that allow astronauts to pass experiments to an exterior porch-like platform using a robotic arm. Japan also provides robotic cargo ships that ferry tons of supplies to the International Space Station . The second of these

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unmanned space freighters, called the H-2 Transfer Vehicles (HTVs), is currently docked at the station. Yesterday (March 10), the station's crew moved the HTV-2 cargo ship from a rooftop docking port to an Earth-facing port on the bottom of the station. The astronauts were scheduled to open the hatch and enter the cargo ship soon after, but mission managers have now delayed that chore until next week when the Tsukuba space center is expected to be back online. Japan also has a rocket complex used to launch spacecraft and satellites into orbit called the Tanegashima Space Center on the island of Tanegashima in the country's southern region. Sagara said that she has not received any reports of damage at that space center from the earthquake. Sagara added that the spaceport is relatively far from the earthquake’s main destruction zones. It is also built on top of a cliff, offering protection from any tsunami waves, she added.

Japan lacks the technology required in a successful partnership with the US in spaceAFP 3 (Tokyo (AFP), 11/30/03, SpaceDaily, "Failure to Launch Rocket Casts Shadow on Japan's Space, Defense Plans," http://www.spacedaily.com/2003/031130074252.tehciik1.html, MM)

Japan's failed launch this weekend of a rocket carrying spy satellites has cast a shadow over its ambitions to lead Asia's space race, especially following China's successful manned space flight, experts said Sunday. The unsuccessful launch Saturday of two spy satellites to monitor North Korea also dealt a severe blow to Tokyo's space defence programme, meant as a response to Pyongyang's military threat, they said . A Japanese H-2A rocket with two spy satellites on board appeared to have lifted off smoothly from a launch site on the southern island of Tanegashima some 1,000 kilometres (620 miles) southwest of Tokyo. But the space center decided to destroy the rocket and the satellites about 10 minutes after take-off after one of the two rocket boosters failed to separate from the fuselage in the second phase of the flight. "With the failure, international trust in Japan's space technology has been damaged considerably," Hideo Nagasu, former chief of Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, told AFP. "The failure is seen in sharp contrast to China's remarkable success," Nagasu said of Beijing's launch into orbit last month of a Chinese astronaut, who circled the Earth 14 times during a 21-hour flight. China, the world's newest space power, said last week it planned to send a spacecraft into orbit around the moon by 2007, while it is set to launch the first satellite in its "Double Star" project before the end of the year. Japan's failure came after five consecutive successful rocket launches, which followed two straight failures in 1998 and 1999. Experts forecast Japan will be forced to delay the planned launch of another H-2A rocket in February which was to carry a satellite to be used for weather observation. The failure also means a major setback in Japan's plans to set up a satellite defence scheme after the successful launch in March of its first spy satellites, analysts said. "It was a severe blow to its plan to begin satellite intelligence activities," said Hideshi Takesada, professor at National Institute for Defence Studies. "Operating only two satellites is insufficient as we need 16 satellites ideally," Takesada told AFP. "And North Korea's missile threat remains unchanged," said Takesada. "Japan really needs to rush to look into the failure, fully review the programme and relaunch more satellites as quickly as possible." The satellite project, worth 250 billion yen (2.3 billion dollars), was intended as a response to North Korea's firing of a suspected Taepodong ballistic missile over Japan into the Pacific Ocean in August 1998 -- a move that sent shockwaves around the region. The weekend's failed launch came at a sensitive time for Japan and North Korea as the two countries prepare to sit down at six-way talks to resolve the crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions. North Korea denounced the deployment of the first two satellites as a "hostile act" which could trigger a renewed arms race. "The failure is expected

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to have little impact on the upcoming six-way talks as North Korea still considers Japan's abilities in satellite defence to be low, " said Hajime Izumi, professor of Shizuoka Prefectural University. "I believe the North's missile threat is not imminent, but we have to be on alert when North Korea obtains technology to produce a nuclear warhead. That would be a real crisis," he told AFP. Despite being under the US security umbrella since the end of World War II, Japan awoke to the need for self-defence following a series of missile tests by North Korea. "It was extremely regrettable as we have needed to strengthen our ability to collect intelligence," Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said Saturday. "We will consider our future action while pursuing an investigation into the cause immediately, strictly and thoroughly."

Technical difficulties prevent Japan from participating in a successful alliance, alternative cooperations solveJaramillo 10 (Cesar, managing editor of the Governance Group for the Space Security Index, 8/?/10, 2010 spacesecurity.org, "Space Security 2010," page. 108, http://swfound.org/media/29039/space%20security%20index%202010%20full%20report.pdf, MM)

Japanese commercial efforts have suffered from technical difficulties and its H-2 launch vehicle was shelved in 1999 after flight failures.56 Although the H-2 was revived in 2005, Japan lags behind Russia, Europe, the US, and China in global launches.57 In May 1999 India’s Augmented Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle performed the country’s first Low Earth Orbit (LEO) commercial launch, placing German and South Korean satellites in orbit.58 Top commercial launch providers include Boeing Launch Services and Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services (vehicles procured through United Launch Alliance) and Orbital Sciences Corporation in the US; Arianespace in Europe; ISC Kosmotras, Polyot (with partners), and ZAO Puskovie Uslugi in Russia; Antrix in India; China Great Wall Industry Corporation in China; and international consortia Sea Launch, International Launch Service (ILS), Eurockot Launch Services GmbH, and Starsem. Sea Launch — comprised of Boeing (US), Aker Kvaerner (Norway), RSC-Energiya (Russia), and SDO Yuzhnoye/PO Yuzhmash (Ukraine) — operates from a mobile sea-based platform located on the equator in the Pacific Ocean. ILS was established as a partnership between Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center (Russia), Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services (US), and RSC-Energiya (Russia). In 2006 Lockheed sold its share to US Space Transport Inc. Eurockot is a joint venture between EADS Space Transportation and Khrunichev, while Starsem is a joint venture between the Russian Federal Space Agency, TsSKB-Progress, EADS Space Transportation, and Arianespace. Commercial launch vehicle builder such as Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) have become increasingly active in research and development and are seeking to compete by providing cheaper, reusable launch vehicle systems such as the Falcon 9.

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Cooperation -> MilitarizationMore collaboration with U.S. militarizes Japan – opposition to Washington’s calls for militarization and rearmamentSymonds 5 (Peter, author for World Socialist Web Site who focuses on Japanese relations, 4/26/05, World Socialist Web Site, "Washington Fuels Japanese Militarism: Part Two," http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/apr2005/japa2-a26.shtml, MM)

Growing military collaboration between the US and Japan has generated new pressures for constitutional change in Japan. Article 9 has been stretched beyond recognition to allow Japanese troops to be deployed in an active overseas war zone in support of the US occupation of Iraq. Koizumi has used the subterfuge that Japanese military forces are simply engaged in humanitarian efforts—just like the pretext that was used to justify the dispatch of Japanese troops as “peace-keepers” to Cambodia and East Timor in the 1990s. Article 9 nevertheless remains a legal obstacle to the dispatch of military forces to an overseas war, either as part of an alliance or directly by Japan. Even within the immediate North East Asian region, the constitution creates problems for joint planning and operations by US and Japanese forces . The Koizumi government has passed legislation allowing for the Japanese military to collaborate with the Pentagon, not only in the immediate defence of Japan, but in support of broader US operations in the region. Nevertheless, the difficulty of justifying Japanese involvement as “self-defence” in, say, the US military backing for Taiwan, remains. The issue is particularly acute when it comes to US-Japanese collaboration on a ballistic missile defence shield. Koizumi has justified support for the US project on the grounds that Japan needs to be able to defend itself from a North Korean missile attack. This political ruse barely disguises the fact that the shield’s primary purpose is to neutralize China’s missile arsenal. But it does complicate the joint deployment of the anti-missile system for purposes other than the defence of Japan . An article entitled “The revival of the US-Japanese Alliance” published in February/March by the influential right-wing US think-tank, the American Enterprise Institute, enthusiastically endorsed closer military ties between the two countries. However, author Dan Blumenthal noted the problems that would emerge when the US called on Japan to deploy naval assets to assist in missions not directly related to “self-defence”. “Given the short time frames involved in a decision to intercept a missile, drawn out security deliberations by policymakers will be impossible. Military personnel will have to make on-the-spot decisions to activate the system without necessarily deciphering whether the missile being intercepted is targeted at Japan, another US ally, or at the US homeland,” he explained. Plans for an overhaul of the Japanese constitution are already well advanced . A panel of the Diet’s lower house submitted its final report summing up five years of discussion on April 15. The report dealt with a number of different aspects of the constitution, but among the most controversial were proposed changes to Article 9. As the panel comprises representatives of all parliamentary parties, no clear-cut recommendation was made. However, the thrust of the proposals was to explicitly allow for “self-defence” and “collective defence”—a phrase that would clear the way for far more active defence alliances with the US, in particular. A similar upper house report is being prepared. Koizumi is actively pushing for the constitutional amendments. An LDP committee is due to release draft constitutional amendments as early as next month. But the government faces major obstacles to constitutional change, which requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament and the support of a majority of voters at a referendum. While the LDP, coalition partner New Komeito Party and the opposition Democratic Party of Japan have backed the report, the Social Democratic Party and the Japanese Communist Party have opposed it. On the crucial issue of

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“collective defence”, the panel was split three ways between opponents, supporters and those who supported a more limited amendment. The parliamentary opposition and reservations about changing Article 9 reflect several concerns. For postwar governments, the pacifist clause has proven to be a convenient diplomatic device to deflect criticism from China and other countries over Japanese rearmament. More fundamentally, however, Japan’s brutal militarist regime of the 1930s and 1940s generated deeply felt antagonisms among working people to imperialist war. These sentiments remain, despite Koizumi’s efforts to whip up nationalist sentiment. They are reflected in the hostility to the deployment of Japanese troops to Iraq and changes to Article 9. A Mainichi Shimbun poll last May found that, while 78 percent of Japanese favoured constitutional change, 70 percent opposed changes to Article 9.

Japanese militarization will cause conflictSymonds 5 (Peter, author for World Socialist Web Site who focuses on Japanese relations, 4/26/05, World Socialist Web Site, "Washington Fuels Japanese Militarism: Part Two," http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/apr2005/japa2-a26.shtml, MM)

S ome of the most strident support for amending Article 9 and rearming Japan is to be found in Washington, rather than Tokyo . In an interview last August, US Secretary of State Colin Powell warned that Tokyo must consider changing the clause if it wants a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. “ If Japan is going to play a full role on the world stage and become a full active participating member of the Security Council, and have the kind of obligations that it would pick up as a member of the Security Council, Article Nine would have to be examined in that light,” he stated. His comments reflect the Bush administration’s alignment not simply with Japan, but with the most right wing, militarist sections of its political establishment . During her trip to Asia last month, Powell’s successor Condoleezza Rice enthused: “Japan has earned its honorable place among the nations of the world by its own effort and by its own character. That is why the United States unambiguously supports a permanent seat for Japan on the United Nations Security Council.” Speaking at Sophia University in Tokyo, Rice lauded Japan as a model for “political and economic progress in all of East Asia” and a partner in the “global war on terrorism”. She declared that US alliances with Japan and other countries were “not against China” but then added, “we want to push, prod and persuade China on a positive course”. In South Korea, she brushed off comments from reporters questioning US support for Japanese rearmament and a UN Security seat by reiterating her praise for the US-Japan alliance. In his recent American Enterprise Institute (AEI) article, Dan Blumenthal was not so reticent about the target of Washington’s strategy. After declaring that US policy makers should welcome and support Japan’s emergence as a strong American ally, he stated: “ While the upgrading of the alliance serves a number of Tokyo’s strategic purposes, there is no mistaking the fact that Japan has decided to join the United States in its grand strategy of checking China’s great-power ambitions . Under the leadership of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Tokyo has taken advantage of the US-led war on terrorism, Washington’s encouragement of Japanese efforts to bolster its defence capabilities, and the North Korean nuclear standoff to assert a defence posture commensurate to its stature in the international community.” Blumenthal’s praise for Koizumi’s adroitness points to another feature of the US alignment with Tokyo: an increasingly open defence of the government’s efforts to stir up Japanese nationalism. Just as Bush is relying on extreme right-wing Christian fundamentalists in the US, so Koizumi is basing himself on militarist layers who regard Japan’s colonial adventures in Asia as “a war of liberation” from Western imperialism and, in the manner of the pro-Nazi holocaust deniers, flatly declare that atrocities like the Rape of Nanking are a Western fabrication. It is not surprising therefore that supporters of the Bush administration have no difficulty in joining the apologists for Japanese militarism—as long as it

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advances US interests. Blumenthal pays tribute to Koizumi’s cleverness in playing what he terms “the history card”—that is, visiting the notorious Yasakuni Shrine and defending the publication of history texts that whitewash Japan’s war record . “In fashioning his China strategy, Koizumi had to both build public support and overcome Chinese pressure. Koizumi has accomplished these dual goals by skillfully turning the Achilles heel of Japan’s China policy—the ‘history card’—into a political advantage.” According to Blumenthal, Koizumi’s great skill, along with sharply polarizing public opinion in Japan, has been to inflame regional tensions by promoting the symbols of wartime Japanese imperialism as a cover for his more fundamental objective of Japanese rearmament . “Because the Chinese leadership continues to emphasize this symbolic issue, Koizumi’s substantive reforms of Japan’s defence posture have received far less criticism than they otherwise would. Indeed, China has overplayed its hand by allowing Japan-bashing to boil over within the Chinese populace.” In a comment in the Wall Street Journal on April 13, James Lilley, one of Blumenthal’s colleagues at the American Heritage Institute, makes a similar point about the latest anti-Japanese protests in China. Lilley notes that regional reactions to Japan’s territorial claims and controversial textbooks “reflect deep historic animosities and distrust” but then openly defends Koizumi’s actions, stating: “Japan has been bludgeoned unmercifully by China and Korea for its brutality during its invasions and occupations of the 20th century. Some of this represents genuine emotion, but it also reflects an attempt to put Japan on the defensive while at the same time gobbling up its goods and superior technology.” China and South Korea clearly exploit nationalist sentiment for their own political purposes. The Beijing bureaucracy, which has presided over two decades of free market restructuring and is integrating itself into the emerging capitalist class, has all but given up its past socialist pretences . The Chinese leaders, like their counterparts in Japan, are deliberating whipping up nationalism to divert widespread and deepening hostility over poverty and unemployment as well as to push for a greater role for China in the region and internationally. At the same time, however, there is an understandable fear among broad layers of the population in Asia, that the justifications being advanced for the past crimes of Japanese imperialism are aimed at preparing for new ones. As in the 1930s, Japan is heavily dependent on the import of raw materials, particularly oil, to feed its huge manufacturing base. After a decade and a half of economic slump and crisis, sections of Tokyo’s ruling elite support a more aggressive and expansionist strategy to secure access to cheap commodities, labour and markets. It is no accident that its territorial conflicts with China, Russia and South Korea all involve areas in the surrounding seas that are potential sources of oil and gas. To back its ambitions, Japan needs to be able to exert its military muscle. Not all sections of the US ruling elite welcome the reemergence of Japanese militarism. Some can still recall a time when US imperialism was compelled to fight a devastating war in the Pacific to defend its economic and strategic interests in Asia. They regard the present foreign policy of the Bush administration as shortsighted and reckless. At present, Tokyo may be prepared to play second fiddle to Washington as the means for rearming and asserting its status as “a normal nation”. But alignments can change. Japanese interests not only conflict with those of China, but, more fundamentally, with Washington’s long-term plans to establish US control over the resource-rich regions of the Middle East and Central Asia. These were the seeds of the Pacific war that erupted in December 1941. They could also become the trigger for another bloody conflagration. In a scathing recent attack on current US policy towards Japan entitled “The real ‘China threat’”, academic Chalmers Johnson made the following observations: “I recall 40 years ago, when I was a new professor working in the field of Chinese and Japanese international relations that Edwin O Reischauer once

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commented, ‘The great payoff from our victory of 1945 was a permanently disarmed Japan . ’ Born in Japan and a Japanese historian at Harvard, Reischauer served as US ambassador to Tokyo in the administrations of presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Strange to say, since the end of the Cold War in 1991 and particularly under the administration of George W Bush, the United States has been doing everything in its power to encourage and even accelerate Japanese rearmament. “Such a development promotes hostility between China and Japan, the two superpowers of East Asia, sabotages possible peaceful solutions in those two problem areas, Taiwan and North Korea, left over from the Chinese and Korean civil wars, and lays the foundation for a possible future Sino-Japanese conflict that the United States would almost surely lose. It is unclear whether the ideologues and war lovers of Washington understand what they are unleashing—a possible confrontation between the world’s fastest industrial economy, China, and the world’s second-most-productive, albeit declining, economy, Japan; a confrontation that the United States would have caused and in which it might well be consumed.” Washington’s reaction to the latest tensions between Japan and China, along with the record of the last five years not only in North East Asia but internationally, makes clear that, whether they understand what they are unleashing or not, the warmongers of the Bush administration are intent on pursuing a military alliance with Japan, regardless of its potentially catastrophic consequences.

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Ext. Cooperation -> MilitarizationContinued cooperation with US causes Japan to militarizeSawako 9 (Maeda, physicist specializing in upper atmosphere physics and a member of Kyoto's Women's University Faculty for the Study of Contemporary Society, 11/2/09, Asia-Pacific Journal, volume. 44-1-09, "Transformation of Japanese Space Policy: From the "Peaceful Use of space" to "the Basic Law on Space," http://www.japanfocus.org/-Maeda-Sawako/3243, MM)

Japanese space activity started in 1955. After fourteen years of rocket and satellite experimentation, space activity was initiated in such practical realms as weather forecasting and broadcasting. Scientific missions extending from the near-Earth region to deep space were organized by the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), which was founded at Tokyo University in 1964. Other missions such as weather satellites, communication satellites, broadcasting satellites and environment monitoring satellites were managed mainly by the National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA), which was established in 1969. The two organizations together with the National Aerospace Laboratory were merged to form the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) in 2003. When NASDA was founded, the Diet unanimously adopted a resolution stating that Japan’s space programs were exclusively for peaceful purposes, consistent with Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The word “peaceful purposes” was strictly interpreted to mean that Japan could use and exploit space only for “non-military” purposes. Japan’s “non-nuclear” policy was simultaneously proclaimed. The Diet resolution of 1969 established “the principle of peaceful use of space” as the bedrock of Japan’s space policy. As discussed below, military space activity would infiltrate the space program despite the principle. Indeed, Japan would become the most active military partner of the U.S. with respect to so-called "missile defense" systems. Even the “non-nuclear” policy has been discarded in practice through official tolerance of entry into Japan of U.S. nuclear submarines and nuclear missiles. After two decades of inconsistency between “the Principle of peaceful use of space” and the reality of militarized space activity, the new Japanese space law enacted in 2008 lifted the ban on the use of space technology for military purposes. The Diet resolution of 1969 stipulates four purposes of exploration and utilization of space. The purposes are to advance science, to improve people’s lives and promote the welfare of mankind, to contribute to the development of industrial technology, and to foster international cooperation. In order to advance “the peaceful use of space”, four additional principles were approved as supplements to the resolution: “independence”, “democracy”, “openness”, and “international cooperation”. “The principle of peaceful use of space” and the four supplements made Japanese space activity unique. Space science covers sciences of the Earth and solar systems, evolution of the solar system, and evolution and structure of space. Japanese space science has played a leading role despite very limited funds and manpower. The non-military space budget of Japan in 1998 was about 15% of that of the U.S. and 50% of Europe’s. Nevertheless, Japanese space science achieved significant advances. Militarization of Japan’s space activity began in the mid-1980s . In 1985, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (SDF) bought receiving equipment to obtain information provided by the U.S. Navy FLEETSAT satellite. The Japanese government excused a violation of “the Principle for peaceful use of space” in terms of the so-called “generalization theory” which allows the SDF to use ‘commonly’ used satellites ( those used in the civilian sector) or satellites that have equivalent capabilities. Reconnaissance spy satellites were introduced in 1988. These were called “information gathering satellites” （ IGS ） in order to avoid violation of “the principle of peaceful use of space”. The introduction of IGS was also justified by “generalization theory”. The spatial resolution of the IGS imagery data was similar to that of the

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U.S. commercial-satellite, IKONOS, a remote-sensing satellite developed using reconnaissance technology. Although the purpose of IGS was clearly to monitor military activities of ‘possible’ threats, it was disguised as a "multi-purpose" satellite. Just after North Korea (D.P.R.K.) launched its first intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), Taepodong in 1998, development of IGS began. In order to avoid the appearance of conflict with the Diet resolution of 1969, the government placed control of IGS not under the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) but under the Cabinet Secretariat, a small office with national intelligence gathering mission and crisis management functions. IGS was formally designed as a "crisis management satellite", but one that had both civilian and military applications. At the time of the ‘Niigata-Chuetsu earthquake in 2004, however, rather than use IGS data, the Cabinet office utilized the IKONOS data. In 2000, the first Japanese astronaut, Mohri Mamoru, participated in the U.S. Department of Defense mission during his second Shuttle flight. The mission was devoted to military use of satellite data of the global three dimensional land surface for guided missiles. Space militarization has accelerated in the last ten years. The development of IGS has been funded since 1998. As shown in the following figure, the budget rose steeply in the initial phase of development to 77 billion yen in FY2000-FY2001. The first IGS was launched in 2003. The IGS budget has remained above 60 billion yen thereafter. The four IGS systems (two satellites have optical sensors and two others have imaging radar capabilities), which make it possible to scout any point on the Earth at least once every day, were completed in 2007. Three new-generation IGS are scheduled to be launched between 2009 and 2014. The total IGS budget is estimated to be 1,000 billion yen. As for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), U.S. consultations began in December, 1993. The Koizumi cabinet participated in the U.S. BMD program from the end of 2003, a major step toward Japan’s militarization of space. The government disguised the change by claiming that “the BMD system is purely defensive and presents no threat to neighboring countries”. The BMD system, far from being purely defensive, is an offensive weapon system. The BMD system exemplifies the principle of “collective defense” which successive cabinets recognized to be a violation of the Article 9. The BMD system has been funded since 2004. The Aegis vessel ‘Kongo’ conducted the first standard missile SM3 flight test in 2007. The SM3 missiles are on board Japan’s four Aegis vessels. There are plans to upgrade the ship’s BMD capability. The first Patriot PAC-3 missile was set in place in 2007. Subsequently PAC-3 missiles have been placed in nine SDF bases, with four more planned for 2010. A budget of 94 billion yen has been requested to extend the PAC-3 program in FY2010.

[analytical] (there are cards on this in the other research section but I just wanted to continue that train of thought here) When other countries see Japan's continued militarization in space, this will cause a space arms race and accelerated space developement, leading to increased risk of space debris and conflict.

Militarization and M-V rocket loss cripple Japan technology, the neg just links to destructive cycle of Japan's space technology Sawako 9 (Maeda, physicist specializing in upper atmosphere physics and a member of Kyoto's Women's University Faculty for the Study of Contemporary Society, 11/2/09, Asia-Pacific Journal, volume. 44-1-09, "Transformation of Japanese Space Policy: From the "Peaceful Use of space" to "the Basic Law on Space," http://www.japanfocus.org/-Maeda-Sawako/3243, MM)

Administration and organization of Japanese space activity were drastically changed in 2003 when ISAS and NASDA merged to form JAXA. ISAS survived as a sub-unit devoted strictly to science. National security-oriented space activities moved ahead with strengthened cooperation

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of JAXA with JDA and SDF. JDA, which was raised to the Ministry of Defense (MoD) in January 2007, set up a new “Strategy Planning Office” that year. The new office was to strengthen the ability of defense policy-making, and space policy was one of its pillars. The JAXA aeronautical program published in 2007 designated an institute of SDF as one of its cooperative organizations. Among the three astronauts employed by JAXA in 2009, two are SDF officials, an Air-SDF pilot of the F-15 and a Maritime-SDF medical doctor. In 2005, the Koizumi cabinet suddenly stopped development of the M-V rocket, which was Japan’s largest rocket for launching scientific satellites, with the highest payload ratio (the ratio of weight of launched satellite to weight of launching rocket) in the world. The last mission of the M-V rocket on September 2006 was the launch of the solar observation satellite HINODE, a successful Japanese scientific satellite. The M-V rocket has been acknowledged as the quintessence of Japanese space science and technology. The strong demand of the science community to develop the M-V rockets was an obstacle to proceeding with the military GX-rocket project. The loss of the M-V rocket crippled Japan’s scientific exploration. What is certain is that the militarization of Japan’s space activity which followed was propelled at the cost of long-term scientific and technological results.

Joint coordination with the US causes Japan militarizationSawako 9 (Maeda, physicist specializing in upper atmosphere physics and a member of Kyoto's Women's University Faculty for the Study of Contemporary Society, 11/2/09, Asia-Pacific Journal, volume. 44-1-09, "Transformation of Japanese Space Policy: From the "Peaceful Use of space" to "the Basic Law on Space," http://www.japanfocus.org/-Maeda-Sawako/3243, MM)

Military use of space has been promoted in step with the industrialization of space activity. Strong demand from Japanese aerospace industries (most are also defense industries) to extend space activity for national security has been a driving force for the change in Japanese space policy. Promotion of Japanese aerospace industries was delayed as a result of Article 301 of the U.S. Trade Act (so-called "super 301"), in which the U.S. government demanded that Japan open government satellite procurement for public tender. The agreement hit Japanese satellite industries, whose competitiveness was much lower than that of U.S. companies. Subsequently almost all communication, broadcast and weather satellites were procured from U.S. manufacturers. In order to acquire a bigger share of the pie without serious conflict with U.S. industries, Japanese aerospace and defense industries targeted the extension of space use for military purpose. They recognize the Diet resolution of 1969 as an impediment to industrialization of Japanese space activity. Keidanren, the Japanese Business lobby, has strongly promoted reform of space policy.“The Basic Law on Space” was passed on 28 May 2008 after just four hours discussion in the Diet. “The Basic Law on Space” replaced the 1969 Diet resolution with the United Nations Space Treaty proclaimed in 1967 as the basic guideline for space activity. The concept of “peaceful purposes” in the Treaty differs from that adopted in the 1969 Diet resolution. The Treaty calls upon states to refrain from placing in orbit around the Earth any object carrying nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction or from installing such weapons on celestial bodies. It does not, however, explicitly prohibit placing weapons other than those of mass destruction and nuclear weapons in orbit around the Earth. Nor does it ban placing even nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in orbits other than those around the Earth. The concept “peaceful” in the Treaty does not mean “non-military” but “non-aggressive” or “defensive”. Hence various missiles carrying even nuclear warheads have been developed and experimented for the purpose of security and self-defense. Japanese space policy reformed in 2008 implies the revision of the meaning of

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“peaceful” use from “non-military” use to “non-aggressive” use. The revision raises a serious conflict with the second paragraph of Article 9 of the Constitution, which declares that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained”. The first priority of space use in “the Basic Law on Space” is given to international and national security. Industrial development is next. “The Basic Law on Space” unifies policies related to the comprehensive development and utilization of space. The Strategic Headquarters for Space Development, chaired by the prime minister, is located in the Cabinet with the participation of all ministers. The new policy buried the four supplementary principles of the Diet resolution of 1969; independence, democracy, openness, and international cooperation . The Science Council of Japan and some academic societies (the Japan Geoscience Union, the Physical Society of Japan, etc.) drew the attention of policy makers to the principles. A substructure of the Headquarters, the special committee on space policy chaired by Terashima Jitsuro (the chairperson of the Japan Research Institute Ltd.) and composed of 15 members (six representatives of industries including the leader of Keidanren, two lawyers, three specialists of the space science and technology, the astronaut Mohri Mamoru, a journalist, a weather forecaster, and a comic artist) formulated “the Basic Plan on Space Policy”, which was published on 2 June, 2009 by the Strategic Headquarters. The Plan aims at realizing “a safe, secure and affluent society through the development of space use as well as strengthening national security through the development of space use”. All the proceedings of the committee were closed to the public. “The Basic Plan on Space Policy” projected state strategy for 5 years through 2013, with nine projects selected; five systems for space use (monitoring system of land and sea surface in Asia, weather forecasts and environment monitoring by meteorological satellites, satellite communication and broadcasting, navigation by the global positioning system, and a self-defense system) and 4 research programs (space science, manned space activity, solar power generation, and a small demonstration satellite). The priorities are characterized by a shift from research to utilitarian and military applications. Development of high-resolution reconnaissance satellites and further research on sensors of a warning satellite for early detection of ballistic missile launches have been stated in “the Basic Plan on Space Policy” as the Japanese project of the BMD system. Japan has not yet developed its own manned spacecraft and is not currently developing one. So far, a manned space mission has not been considered crucial from the scientific point of view. “The Basic Plan on Space Policy” includes humanoid-robotic lunar exploration, which will be conducted by around 2020, and manned exploration is projected for around 2030. In 2003-2009, EU, China, India and U.S. launched lunar probes. Japan also launched the lunar-orbiting satellite ‘KAGUYA’ in 2007.Kaguya launch. Japan, U.S., England, Germany, Russia, China and Korea have been planning to launch unmanned/manned lunar probes within a few decades. Many of these aim at exploration of natural resources such as rare metals, radioactive isotopes and Helium 3 (the isotope of Helium sought for use in nuclear fusion research). It should be noted that “the UN Moon Agreement” (Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) entered into force in 1984 declares that the moon (including all celestial bodies) should be used for peaceful purposes and prohibits any military use including weapons testing or establishment of military bases. It declares that the moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind, that all states have equal right to conduct research on the moon, and the moon shall not become the property of any state, organization or person. As of 19 December, 2008, only 13 states had ratified it and 5 states had signed but not ratified it. As it has not been ratified by any major space-faring power (including the U.S. and Japan) and is unsigned by most nations, it hardly defines current space activities. In response to the approval of “the Basic Law on Space”, the FY2009 space budget is weighted even more heavily toward military purposes. The new BMD budget was appropriated as a space-related project. The total budget for space development is about 349 billion yen with a 10% increase over the FY2008 budget. Most of the increase

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is in military fields such as IGS, the space-related part of the BMD system, the GX rockets, and the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS). The GX rocket has been under development since 2003 in a joint venture among JAXA, Lockheed Martin Corporation, and several Japanese private companies in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force. It is suspected that the GX rocket system will assist the Pentagon in launching military space missions. The total cost for Japan of the GX-rocket project through 2008 was about 30 billion yen. The Space Activities Commission under MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) recommended suspension of the GX-rocket project in May 2008. But at that time “the Basic Law on Space” was approved, and the project has continued to be funded. The QZSS makes it possible to provide high accuracy satellite positioning services covering close to 100% of Japan with assistance of GPS satellite data, and can be used in a broad array of fields including car navigation and land surveying with military applications. The non-military budget is 198.9 billion yen, mostly for utilitarian application, with only 5 % increase. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) has evaluated the enactment of “The Basic Law on Space” as a chance to develop and use outer space for defensive purposes. In order to strengthen the space-related defense policies, MoD established the Committee on promotion of outer space development and use. The National Defense Program Guideline and the Formulation of the Mid-term (five years) Defense Build-up Program would have been reviewed and revised at the end of 2009 by the former government of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Due to the change of the 2009 election results, however, the new government of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has postponed the review for a year. The new government’s defense policies are not yet clear. Some political leaders of the LDP and of the DPJ have claimed the right to preemptive attack by firing missiles and even nuclear weapons with specific reference to the Korean Peninsula. Such armaments inevitably contradict the Constitution, particularly the second paragraph of Article 9 which prohibits Japan from holding any kind of war potential. Pressures for reform of Article 9 have continued to come from many quarters. Just before the change of the political party in power in August 2009, the Council on Security and Defense Capability (a private council of the prime minister) published a report emphasizing that “We should decide the basic principles on national security policy” in place of “the Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy”. The report calls for review of the constitutional interpretation on the right of collective self-defense, making it lawful in order to make it possible to intercept a missile on its way to the U.S. The Japanese Constitution faces a great challenge.

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