On_Spiritual_Creatures.pdf

title: OnSpiritualCreatures:(DeSpiritualibusCreaturis)MedievalPhilosophicalTextsinTranslation;No.5

author: Thomas.;FitzPatrick,MaryC.;Wellmuth,JohnJames.

publisher: MarquetteUniversityPressisbn10|asin: 0874622050printisbn13: 9780874622058

ebookisbn13: 9780585197883language: Englishsubject Soul.

publicationdate: 1949lcc: B765.T53.D61949ebddc: 235

subject: Soul.

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St.ThomasAquinasonSpiritualCreatures(DeSpiritualibusCreaturis)

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MEDIAEVALPHILOSOPHICALTEXTSINTRANSLATIONNO.5

EDITORIALBOARD

JamesH.Robb,L.S.M.,Ph.D.,ChairmanTheRev.GerardSmith,S.J.,Ph.D.TheRev.MichaelV.Murray,S.J.,Ph.D.TheRev.RichardE.Arnold,S.J.,Ph.D.PaulM.Byrne,L.S.M.,Ph.D.TheRev.JohnSheets,S.J.,S.T.D.

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St.ThomasAquinasonSpiritualCreatures(DeSpiritualibusCreaturis)

TranslatedfromtheLatinwithanintroduction

byMaryC.FitzPatrick,Ph.D.

incollaborationwithJohnJ.Wellmuth,Ph.D.

MARQUETTEUNIVERSITYPRESSMILWAUKEE,WISCONSIN

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NihilObstat

GerardSmith,S.J.,censordeputatusMilwaukiae,die25mensisMartii,1949

ImprimiPotest

LeoD.Sullivan,S.J.,Praep.Provinc.Prov.Chicagiensis,die28mensisMartii,1949

Imprimatur

+MoysesE.KileyArchiepiscopusMilwaukiensisMilwaukiae,die5mensisAprilis,1949

ISBN-087462-205-0

©Copyright,1949,TheMarquetteUniversityPressMilwaukee,Wisconsin

PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica

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Contents

PrefatoryRemarks 1

Translator'sIntroduction

I.TheMediaevalDisputation 3

II.TheStructuralFormofaDisputedQuestion 5

III.DateandPlaceofcompositionofDeSpiritualibusCreaturis 5

IV.ThevalueoftheDisputedQuestions 10

V.Bibliography 12

ArticleIWhetheraspiritualsubstanceiscomposedofmatterandform.

15

ArticleIICanaspiritualsubstancebeunitedtoabody? 30

ArticleIIIIsthespiritualsubstance,whichisthehumansoul,unitedtothebodythroughamedium?

41

ArticleIVIsthewholesoulineverypartofthebody? 56

ArticleVIsthereanycreatedspiritualsubstancethatisnotunitedtoabody?

65

ArticleVIIsaspiritualsubstanceunitedtoaheavenlybody? 73

ArticleVIIIsaspiritualsubstanceunitedtoanetherealbody? 83

ArticleVIIIDoallangelsdifferinspeciesfromoneanother? 86

ArticleIXIsthepossibleintellectoneinallmen?

98

ArticleXIstheagentintellectoneintellectbelongingtoallmen? 111

ArticleXIArethepowersofthesoulthesameastheessenceofthesoul?

125

PrefatoryRemarksThistranslationwasoriginallyundertakenattherequestofMotherMargaretReilly,R.S.C.J.,presidentofBaratCollegeoftheSacredHeartinLakeForest,Illinois.Itscompletionisdueingreatparttoherkindencouragementbutmostofalltotheunfailingandunstintedworkofmycollaborator,FatherJohnJ.Wellmuth,S.J.,formerlychairmanoftheDepartmentofPhilosophyatLoyolaUniversityinChicagoandnowfillingalikepostatXavierUniversityinCincinnati.TohimIamgreatlyindebtedfornumerouselucidationsofthethoughtofSt.Thomas,muchhelpfulcriticism,andinnumerablesuggestionsformorefelicitousturnsofphrase.DuringthetimeofourworktogethertheentiremanuscriptwasrevisedandeveryeffortwasmadetokeepthestyleofthetranslationasclosetothatoftheoriginalastheexigenciesoftheEnglishlanguagepermit.

ThetranslationhasbeenmadefromthecriticaltextofFatherLeoKeeler.1Thateditor'snoteshavealsobeenincorporated.Thearrangementofthesehasbeenfaithfullypreserved,includingthereferencesatthebeginningofthenotesoneachArticletootherworksofSt.ThomasaswellastothoseofotherChristianwritersandancientormediaevalphilosopherswherethesameproblemsasarehandledintheArticlesarealsodiscussed.Allotherreferences,afterbeingcarefullycheckedandcorrectedoccasionallywheretypographicalerrorshadoccurredintheKeelertext,havebeenleftwithinbracketsinthebodyofthetranslation.EnglishwordswithinparenthesesowetheirpresencetotheparenthesesusedinFatherKeeler'stext.WhereverLatinwordsoccurinthebodyofthetranslation,theyhavebeentakenfromtheLatintexttoclarifythetranslationwherethatseemedadvisable.

1SanctiThomaeAquinatisTractatusDeSpiritualibusCreaturis(Rome,1937).

St.ThomasAquinasOnSpiritualCreaturesTranslator'sIntroduction

I.TheMediaevalDisputation

SinceDeSpiritualibusCreaturisbelongstothatformtowhichtheScholasticphilosophersappliedthenamedisputation,itwouldseemwelltoexamineinsomedetailtheorigin,thenatureandtheuseofthedisputationasateachingdeviceinthemediaevaluniversities.

DuringtheMiddleAgesmethodsofteachingwerelargelyconditionedbyapaucityoftexts,forprintingwasasyetunknownandtheonlyavailablebookswereintheformofmanuscriptsthathadbeenlaboriouslycopiedbyhand.Thesecouldonlybeobtainedwiththegreatestdifficultyeitherthroughpurchaseorrental.Consequentlythemasterwasforcedtoread(legere)2thosetextshewantedhisstudentstoknow.Duringthecourseofsuchreadingnotallthethoughtsortheimplicationsofthepassagewereclearlyunderstood.Inorderthathemightinsurehispupil'shavingafirmgraspofthethought,themasterfrequentlymadeexplanationsofdifficultpassageseitherbyaparaphraseorbystillfurtherexpositionofthethought.Attimesthepassagethatwasbeingreadmightraiseaprobleminastudent'smind.Inthatcasethestudentwasledtoaskquestionsor,failingthat,themasterhimselfmightraisetheissuethathewanteddiscussed,guidethepupiltowardthedesiredsolutionor,ifapupilutterlyfailedtograspthepoint,himselfgivetheexplanationorproof.Asstudentsadvancedinknowledgeandattainments,acapablemasterwouldoftenposequestionsondogmaticormoraltheology,canonlaw,orliturgy.Thesecouldtakethesimplestform,thatofquestionandanswer,ortheformofquestionthatwasknownasadisputation(disputatioordinaria;quaestiodisputata).

Bythethirteenthcenturythedisputationhadbeenentirelyseparatedfromtheinterpretationofanytextandwasaseparateandpublicpartofthemaster'slesson.Thequestionorthethesistobedisputedwassetinadvancebythemasterwhowastoconductthedisputation.It,togetherwithitsdate,wasannouncedintheotherschoolsofthefacultyinorderthattheotherfacultyandstudentmembersoftheuniversitymightattend.Usuallythesubjectschosenbyeachmastervaried,becauseordinarily

2HencethederivationofourEnglishword"lecture"andtheGermanvorlesungasateachingdevice.

eachprofessorheldbutasmallnumberofdisputationsannually.When,asSt.Thomasdid,amasterhelddisputationseverytwoweeksorevenweekly,hecouldtakeacentralthemeas,forinstance,DeSpiritualibusCreaturis,whichwouldformthematerialforamoreorlesslongseriesofdisputations.HisDisputedQuestionsvaryinlengthfromthefivethatcompriseDeUnioneVerbiIncarnatitotheonehundredtwenty-fourthatcomposeDeVeritate.

Onthedayofadisputationalllessonsgivenbytheothermastersandbachelorsofthefacultystopped.Onlythemasterwhowasgivingthedisputationonthatdayhadashortlessonforhisstudentsbeforetheothersarrived.Oncethevisitorswereassembled,thedisputationbegan.Itwasheldunderthemaster'sdirectionalthoughhehimselfdidnotdirectlydispute.Hisbachelortookontheroleofrespondentordefenderofthethesis,thusbeginninghisapprenticeshipinsuchexercises.Objectionstothethesiswerepresentedbytheothermastersandbachelorswhowerepresentand,ifthereweretime,bystudents.Thebacheloransweredtheargumentsand,ifnecessary,themastercametohisassistance,althoughthebachelorwasmeanttobearthebruntofsustainingtheargument.Theobjectionswerenotraisedaccordingtoanyorderthathadbeenestablishedbeforehand.Whenallobjectionswereinandanswered,theactualdisputationwasatanend.

Notesontheproceedingswerekeptwhich,however,attheendofthedisputationstillpresentedbutadisorderedandchaoticmassofmaterial.Inordertogiveitalogicalformthemasterworkedovertheargumentsproandcon,reducingthemtoadefiniteform;thenhe"determined"thetruthofthematter;thatis,gaveadefiniteformtotheviewsonthesubjectthatheproposedhenceforthtohold.Onlyamasterhadtherightto"determine"aquestion.

Thedeterminationtookplaceatthefirstmeetingoftheclassaftertheactualdisputation.First,thematerialwascoordinatedasfaraspossibleinlogicalorderbypresentingalltheobjectionsthathadbeenadvancedagainstthethesis.Thesewerefollowedbytheargumentsinfavorofthethesis.Fromthatpointhepassedontoafurtherexpositionofthequestion,theanswer(responsio),whichformedthecentralandessentialpartofthedetermination,whereinhedefinitelyformulatedhisownviewsonthequestion.Thisinturnwassucceededbyanindividualanswertoeachobjectionthathadbeenadvancedagainstthethesis.Iftherewasanyopportunitytodoso,thisinturnwasfollowedbysupplementaryinformation.Once"determined",thematterofthedisputationwascommittedtowritingbythemaster.

St.Thomasconductedhundredsofsuchdisputations,whichcollectivelyformhisQuaestionesDisputatae.Amongthemaretobefoundhis

disputationsDeVeritate,DePotentia,DeMalo,DeUnioneVerbiIncarnati,DeSpiritualibusCreaturis,DeAnimaandDeVirtutibus.

II.TheStructuralFormofaDisputedQuestion

DeSpiritualibusCreaturisbelongstothatgroupofSt.Thomas'workswhichisknownasQuaestionesDisputataeorDisputedQuestions.Whileallshareacommonform,thefollowingremarksapplyspecificallytotheseriesofDisputedQuestionsthatdealswithspiritualcreatures.

Thisseriesbreaksdownthebroadgeneraltopic"spiritualcreatures"intoelevensubdivisions,eachofwhichhandlesoneparticularaspectofthesubject.Theseareknownas"articles."Eachbeginswiththeposingofaquestionaboutspiritualcreatures;forinstance,ArticleIputsthefollowingquestion:"Isspiritualsubstancecomposedofmatterandform?"AnaffirmativeanswerfollowsimmediatelyinthisArticle,althoughthisisnotthecasewithregardtoallthearticles.TheanswerinArticleII,forexample,ismadeinthenegative.Objectionstothethesisarethenbroughtforward.ThesearebasedonstatementsthataretakenfromtheBible,theworksoftheChurchFathers,orthewritingsofpaganandChristianphilosophers.Aristotleisfrequentlycited,invariablyunderthenameof"thePhilosopher."Averroes,theArabiancommentatorontheworksofAristotle,isalsooftenreferredto,butalmostalwaysas''theCommentator."InArticleItwenty-fivesuchobjectionsareraised.Theseinturnarefollowedbyfourteenargumentsinsupportofthethesis.

Themostsignificantpartofanarticleis,however,the"answer",whereSt.Thomasresolvestheobjectionstothethesisand,bystatinghisownviewsonthematter,givesadefinitiveformtothedoctrinethatheholdsandproposestoteach.Thelastpartoftheanswerisalwaysdevotedtoapointbypointrebuttalofeachoftheobjectionsthathavebeenmadeagainstthethesis.Asinthecaseoftheobjections,viewsaresupportedbyquotationsfromecclesiasticalandphilosophicalwritings,soalsointherebuttalrecourseishadtothesamesortofwritings.

III.DateandPlaceofCompositionofDeSpiritualibusCreaturis

ThequestionofthedateandplaceofcompositionofDeSpiritualibusCreaturisconfrontstheinvestigatorwithmanydifficulties.Theproblemisanimportantone,forbyitsultimatesolutiondifferingdataconcerningSt.Thomas'lifeandthedevelopmentofhisthoughtcanbefixed.Duringthefirstthreedecadesofthispresentcenturyahealthycontroversyragedonthepoint,yetevennowthematterinallitsaspectshasbynomeansbeenconclusivelysettled,theevidencethusfarassembledbeingsubjecttomoreorless

subjectiveinterpretation.

Theargumentswherebythechieffiguresinthecontroversysupporttheirvariouspositionsarebasedon1)oldcataloguesoftheworksofSt.Thomas,2)apparentinterrelationsbetweenDeSpiritualibusCreaturis

andothersoftheQuaestionesDisputatae,3)variousbitsofinternalevidencewithintheworkitself.

Thedatatobegatheredfromthecataloguesishighlyunsatisfactory.3TheofficialcatalogueoftheproceedingsofSt.Thomas'canonizationdividestheQuaestionesDisputataeintothreegroups:1)thosewritteninParis(12561259);2)thosecomposedinItaly(12601268);3)thosewritteninParisduringtheSaint'ssecondstaythere(12681272).Onlyoneworkismentionedbynameforeachperiod,thisnamebeingfollowedbythecrypticphraseetultra.ConsequentlythereisnodefiniteinformationaboutDeSpiritualibusCreaturistobegleanedfromthissource.AsforthecataloguecompiledbyPtolemyofLucca,PtolemydefinitelyplacestheworkashavingbeenwritteninItalyinthetimeofPopeClementIV(12651268).Unfortunatelythisinformationisnotconclusive,asPtolemyisnotoriousfortheunreliabilityofhisinformation.Othercatalogues,suchasthoseofBernardoGuido,PierreRoget,LouisofValladolid,St.Antoninus,JohnofColonna,andtheTabulaScriptorumOrdinisPraedicatorumincludeourworkbynamebutfurnishnofurtherinformation.whilethatofWilliamofToccoomitsanymentionofit.Accordinglythecataloguesareoflittleornohelp.NorinthelistsofSt.Thomas'worksthatwerecirculatedbythebooksellersofParis4duringthethirteenthandfourteenthcenturiesdowefindmuchtoaidus.Theymentionourwork,butfollownofixedordernordotheymakeanyattempttoindicateitsdateoritsplaceofcomposition.

Nordoesthesecondtypeofevidencesupplyanymoredefiniteinformation.InseveralarticlesofDeSpiritualibusCreaturisSt.Thomassetsforthhisteachingonthesoul,asubjectthatisdiscussedmorefullyinDeAnima.ThiscircumstancecausedFatherMadonnettoassert5thatourworkwascomposedpriortoDeAnimaandtonotewhathetermedaparticularlyclosecorrespondencebetweenportionsofthetwo.6Inthisregard,however,FatherKeeler7remarksthatthereisnoexplicitreferenceineitherworktotheother.IntheplacealreadycitedFatherMandonnetalsomaintainsthatSigerofBrabantconsultedDeSpiritualibusCreaturisbeforewritinghisDeAnimaIntellectiva(q.7,adfin.)in1271,but,asFatherKeeleragainnotes,theinformationonwhichthisstatementismadeisnotentirelycertain.

3Cf.P.Mandonnet(RevueThomisteXXIII(1918)pp.277278),wheretheevidenceofthecataloguesisassembled.4ChartulariumUniv.Paris.I,p.646;II,p.108.5BulletinThomiste(1924)p.59.6Cf.DeAn.VI,ad13withDeSp.Cr.II,VIII;DeAn.VIIwithDeSp.Cr.I,II,III,V;DeAn.VIIIwithDeSp.Cr.II;DeAn.IXwithDeSp.Cr.I;DeAn.XIXwithDeSp.Cr.XI.

7DeSp.Cr.,ed.critica(Rome,1937)pp.xixii.

FatherGlorieuxusedtheaforesaidsimilaritybetweenourworkandDeAnimatobuilduphistheorythatDeSpiritualibusCreaturishadbeencomposedatViterboinItaly.8InhisviewSt.Thomas,nothavingtimetoeditthisseriesofquestionsbeforeleavingItaly,broughtthemalongtoPariswithhimwhere,afterworkingthemoveragain,heusedtheminhisbattlewiththeAverroists.ThissameevidenceFatherPelster9likewiseusesinsupportofanItalianoriginforDeSpiritualibusCreaturis.AccordingtohistheorytheAngelicDoctor,havingwrittenSummacontraGentiles,whichdealswithAverroism,whilehewasinItaly,thereisnoimprobabilityinhishavingwrittenourwork,whichinparttouchesonsomeofthesamethemes,atthesametime.Thesevarioustheoriesareextremelyingenious,butcanscarcelybeclassedasdefinitiveevidence.NorcanweplacemuchtrustinthearithmeticalcomputationsofMandonnet,10wherebyhesoughttoprovethenumberofdisputationsthatwereheldbySt.ThomasingivenyearsandtherebyestablishthedatesandplacesofcompositionofthevariousQuaestionesDisputatae,sincethesecomputationsaremuchtoosubjectiveanduncertaintobegivenmuchcredence.

Withregardtointernalevidence,muchhasbeenmadeofthepassageinArticleIX(ad11),apparentlyfirstnotedbyGeorgvonHertling11in1881,wheretheriverSeine12isreferredtointhisfashion:"astheSeineriverisnot'this'particularriverbecauseof'this'flowingwater,butbecauseof'this'sourceand'this'bedetc."FromityonHertlingmadethedeductionthattheexampleoftheSeinewouldbeappropriateonlyifthequestionhadbeendisputedatParis.ManyyearslaterMandonnet13alsobecameaferventchampionofthisviewandhasheatedlydefendeditagainstalladversaries.Others,seekingtocombatthisthesis,havebroughttolightseveralvariantreadingsinthemanuscripts.Atleastfifteendifferentmanuscriptswereexaminedrangingindatefromthethirteenthtothefifteenthcenturies.Oneofthese14yieldedthereadingfluviusRenus,whichhasbeentakentorefertotheGermanRhineonthebanksofwhichSt.ThomasstudiedunderAlbertus

8P.Glorieux,"LesQuestionsdisputéesdeS.Th.etleursuitechronologique."Recherchesdethéol.anc.etmédiévaleIV(1932)pp.1920.9F.Pelster,"ZurDatierungderQuaestiodisputatadeSp.Cr."GregorianumVI(1925)p.237.10P.Mandonnet."ChronologiedesQuestionsdisputéesdeS.Th.d'Aquin."RevueThomisteXXIII(1918)pp.341371.11"WoundwannverfassteTh.vonAquindieSchriftdeSp.Cr.?"Hist.Jahrb.V(1884)p.145;cf.J.A.EndresinG.vonHertling:HistorischesBeiträge(München,1914)pp.1619.12P.Synavemakesatellingpointwhenheinsiststhatthedemonstrativeshic,hanc,huncintheLatinofthispassagewouldnothavebeenusedhadtheSeinenotbeenanearbyriver(BulletinThomisteI,p.2).

13Op.cit.,pp.284ff.14Cod.Balliolensis47(ofthe13thor14thcentury).

Magnus.FatherPelster,15however,believesthatnottheRhineismeantbutratherthelittleriverRenusinItalywhichflowspastBologna,makingthisreadingservetobolsterhisthesisthatDeSpiritualibusCreaturiswaswritteninItaly.Anothermanuscript16suppliesfluviusCorezia,ariverwhichflowsthroughsouthernGermany.Stillanother17hasmerelythewordfluviuswiththeadditionofnoname.AlthoughsheernumbersisnotareliableindexfortheauthenticityofthereadingfluviusSequanaorfluviusSecana("SeineRiver"),yetthisreadingisverylikelythegenuineone,andthisisthereadingthatourprintedtextshaveadopted.AmongthemanuscriptsshowingthisreadingistheCodexBodleianus214,whichhadbeeninthepersonallibraryofArchbishopRobertofWinchelsea(12931313),apersonagewhoinalllikelihoodwouldhaveseenthathepossessedacarefullycopiedmanuscript.GrantedthenthatSequanaisthecorrectreading,FatherPelster'sargumentbasedonthereadingfluviusRenuswouldseemtobeseriouslyweakened.Consequently,ifthispassagehasanyworthforthecontroversyandgrantedthatfluviusSequanawerewordsthatmighthavebeenusedappropriatelyonlyinParis,itwouldseemthatDeSpiritualibusCreaturisoriginatedthere,asFatherMandonnethasalwayssturdilymaintained.

ButontheotherhandM.Grabmann18challengedthispositiononthegroundthathehadfoundamanuscriptwhichboreonthemarginofDeSpiritualibusCreaturisthewords:HicincipiuntquestionesfratrisThomed'AquinodisputateinYtalia.ThisheurgedinsupportofthethesisthattheserieswasdisputedinItaly.FatherMandonnet,19however,inareviewofGrabmann'sIndaginiescoperteintornoallacronologiadelleQuaestionesDisputatae,attackstheassertiononthegroundthatthelastthreewordsofthenotationhadbeenwrittenbysomeotherhandthanthatoftheoriginalscribe.InthesamereviewheagaincitesthepassageontheSeineRiverandinquireswithsomeheat,"IstherealiketextthatcanarisefromadisputationheldinItaly?"

Still,FatherGlorieux20verydefinitelythinksthattheevidenceofthismarginalnoteplusthatofasimilaroneinanothermanuscriptaretobetakeninsupportofthequestion'sItalianorigin.HisviewisthattheworkwasdisputedatViterboduringthefallof1262.Heupholdshisthesisbythefollowingarguments:a)theelevenarticleswhichcomposeourseriescorrespondtotheelevenweeksbetweentheopeningofthefallterminSeptemberandthetimeofSt.Thomas'departuretowardtheendof

15Op.cit.p.232;cf.Birkenmajer,"KleinereThomasfragen."Phil.Jahrb.XXXIV(1921)pp.3149,wherethisauthoralsoinclinestoPelster'sview.16Cod.Borghes.15(13thor14thcentury).17FI33,cod.14oftheUniversityofBasle.18EinführungindieSummaTheologiaedeshl.ThomasvonAquin,p.23;cf.DieWerkedeshl.

Thomas,pp.278279.19BulletinThomisteI(19241926)p.59.20Op.cit.,pp.533.

November,itbeingtheSaint'scustomatthistimetoconductweeklydisputations;b)DeSpiritualibusCreaturiswouldseemtobeincomplete,somethingwhichmightbeaccountedforbytheAngelicDoctor'ssuddendepartureforParis;c)knowingthattheMasterGeneraloftheDominicanorderwasplanningtosendhimtoParistodobattlewiththeAverroists,hewasworkingoutthisparticularseriesofdisputationsthathemightsearchoutdatatoenablehimtotakeapositiononthematterlater.Havingthusrationalizedhisstand,FatherGlorieuxthenproceededtoaccountfortheallusiontotheSeineinArticleX.ThisheflatlyascribedtoasubstitutionmadebytheParisianbooksellersoutoflocalpride,sincehefirmlystatedthatSt.Thomas,becauseofhissuddendeparturefromItaly,hadnottimetoedittheworkatViterboandconsequentlybroughtitalongtoParis,whereheediteditandhandeditontothecopyists.Allofthisislogicalenough,takingintoaccountasitdoesknownfactsoftheSaint'slife,butthewholechainofreasoningwouldseemtorestontheacceptanceasfactoftheauthorityofthreemanuscripts.

BesidesthehighlycontroversialinformationthatcentersaroundthepassageinArticleIX,therearethreeotherinternalsourcesthathavebeenemployedtoshedlightontheproblem.AllarebasedonquotationsfromtheworksofGreekphilosopherswhichweretranslatedintoLatinduringtheadultyearsofSt.ThomasandcanthusfurnishsomeindicationofthedateofcompositionofDeSpiritualibusCreaturis.OneoftheseinArticleIII(Resp.),citesSimplicius'commentaryonAristotle'sCategories.FromtheresearchesofGrabmann21weknowthatthiswasfirstmadeavailableinLatinthroughthetranslationofWilliamofMoerbekeinMarch1266.Thesecond(Art.IX,ad10)quotesfromAristotle'sPolitics,whichSt.Thomasknewafter1261.22Thelast(Art.X,Resp.)citesThemistius'commentaryonAristotle'sDeAnima,whichdatesinitsLatinversionfrom1270.23Thissaying,whereinSt.ThomasreferstoAristotleaccordingtoThemistiusashavingcomparedtheagentintellecttolight,whereasPlatocomparedittothesun,isveryoftenusedbySt.Thomas;24althoughSalman25notedthefactandstatedthatitdoesnotnecessarilyprovethatSt.Thomashadalreadyreadthecommentary.Granted,however,thathehad,1270wouldhavebeentheearliestdateatwhichDeSpiritualibusCreaturiscouldhavebeenwritten.However,sincethisismoreorlessconjectural,wearethrownbackto1266asthedefinitedatebeforewhichtheworkcouldnothavebeenwritten.

21ForschungenüberdielateinischenAristotelesübersetzungendesX/II.Jahrhunderts,p.148.22P.Glorieux,op.cit.,p.9.23Ibid.,p.17.24SummaTheologicaI,q.89a.4;DeMaloq.16a.12,ad1;DeUnitateIntellectus5,§120.

25BulletinThomiste(1933)p1091.

Inconclusion,theevidencejustifiesnomorethanthefollowingassumptions:thatDeSpiritualibusCreaturiswasnotwrittenbefore1266;thatitmayhavebeenwritteninItalybetweentheyears12661268;thatitmoreprobablywaswritteninParisin1269.

IV.TheValueoftheDisputedQuestions

TheDisputedQuestionshavelongbeenconsideredamongtheimportantworksofSt.Thomas.AsearlyastheseventeenthcenturytheDominicanFatherSantéMarialèswroteacommentaryonthem,sayingthatalthoughhewastheneightyyearsofageandhadalreadyspentanentirelifetimeinstudiouspursuits,hehadderivedmoreprofitfromthethreeorfouryearsoflaboronthemthanhehadfromwhathehadaccomplishedduringalltherestofhislife.26AndofrecentyearsGrabmannhasconsideredthem"thedeepestandmostprofoundworkthatThomashaswritten."27Theirpeculiarvalueliesinthefactthatagivendisputedquestionentereddeeplyintothediscussionofasubjectandwasnotconfinedtoonepointofdoctrine.Inthiswayasubjectcouldbecopiouslyandprofoundlytreated.AsDr.Pace28hassummedupthematter:"Thismethodfacilitatedanalysisandobligedthewritertoexamineeveryaspectoftheproblem.Itsecuredbreadthofviewandthoroughnessoftreatment,andwasatransparentmediumforreasonunbiasedeitherbysentimentorverbiage."Byreasonoftheirverynature,therefore,theywereasortofworkincollaborationwiththeAngelicDoctor'sadversaries,fortheirobjectionsforcedhimtosolvethedifficultiesthattheybroughtupagainsthistheoriesandideas.ThisnecessityofsubmittinghisthoughttoseverecriticismforcedSt.Thomastostatehisdoctrineswiththehighestprecisionandcoherence.Thishemightnothaveachievedhadtheybeentheproductsolelyofhisownmusings.

Thetopics29embracedundertheDisputedQuestionscontainagrandtotalof510articlesorseparatedisputations,farmorethananyothermasterofthetimeproduced.ThiswasdueinnosmallparttothestormyatmosphereofParisduringtheyearshespentthere.Hisdaysasayoungprofessorormaster(12561259)weredaysofconflictbetweentheorderpriestsandthesecularsoverthedispositionoftheteachingchairsintheologyattheUniversityofParis.Thiscontroversyreacheditscruxwhenthesecularpriestswithdrewentirely,thusthrowingtheburdenofteachingonthefriars.InthefaceofthisdifficultytheyoungmasterThomas'Aquinaschosetousethedisputationatregularandfrequentintervals

26CitedbyP.Mandonnet,"ChronologicdesQuestionsDisputéesdeSaintThomasd'Aquin."RevueThomisteI(1918)p.266.27Grabmann,DieWerkedeshl.Thomas,p.275.28Pace,E.A.,"ThomasAquinas"inLibraryoftheWorld'sBestLiteratureII,p.614.

29ThetitlesoftheseparateseriesareDeVeritate,DePotentia,DeMalo,DeUnioneVerbiIncarnati,DeSpiritualibusCreaturis,DeAnima,DeVirtutibus.

thathemightreachalargerbodyoflisteners.LaterinhislifewhenhewasrecalledfromItalytoteachasecondtimeatParis,hefoundthecityinviolentupheavalovertheburningquestionsofAugustinianismandAverroism,andagaindisputationswereheldatnolongintervals.

ButwemustnotimaginethatalltheDisputedQuestionswerewritteninParis.SometoowereheldinItaly,forthecompositionofthewholeseriesextendedovertheentireteachingcareerofSt.Thomas(12561272).InthemthematerialsanddoctrineswereelaboratedwhichheusedmorethanoncelaterinthecompositionoftheSummaTheologica.Becauseoftheirregularandsuccessivepublicationtheycanfurnishthemodernscholarwithascaleofcomparisonforthemorevoluminousworks,ascalebymeansofwhichwecanfollowthevariousphasesinthedevelopmentofthedoctrinesofSt.Thomas.

V.Bibliography

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deBruyne,Edgar,S.Thomasd'Aquin.(Paris,1928).

Glorieux,P.,"LesquestionsdisputéesdeS.Thomasd'Aquinetleursuite.chronologique."RecherchesdethéologieancienneetmédiévaleIV(1932)pp.533.

Grabmann,M.,ForschungenüberdieLateinischenAristoteles-überset-zungendesXIII.Jahrhunderts.(Münster,1916).

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Grabmann,M.,"BeiträgezurGeschichtederPhilosophiedesMittelalters."BaeumkerBeiträgeXXII(1930).

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Hourcade,René,"DesécritsauthentiquesdeSaintThomasd'Aquin."Bulletindelittératureecclésiastique(1912)pp.175180.

Mandonnet,P.,"ChronologiedesQuestionsdisputéesdeSaintThomasd'Aquin."RevueThomisteI(1918)pp.266287.

Mandonnet,P.,"ChronologiesommairedelavieetdesécritsdeS.Thomas."RevuedessciencesphilosophiquesetthéologiquesIX(1920)pp.148ff.

Mandonnet,P.,AreviewofM.Grabmann'sIndaginiescoperteintornoallacronologiadelleQuaestionesDisputataeeQuodlibetadiS.Tommaso.BulletinThomisteI(19241926)pp.5861.

Mandonnet,P.,QuaestionesDisputatae,Introduction,vol.I,pp.124,(Paris,1925).

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Pelster,F.,"ZurDatierungdesQu.dis.DeSpiritualibusCreaturis."GregorianumVI(1925)pp.231247.

Sertillanges,A.,S.Thomasd'Aquin.(Paris,1925).

Synave,P.,BulletinThomisteI(19241926)pp.121.

Synave,P.,"LeProblémechronologiquedesQuestionsDisputéesdeS.Thomasd'Aquin."RevueThomisteXXXI(1926)pp.154159.

TheTopictoBeInvestigatedIsConcerningSpiritualCreatures

ArticleIAndthefirstquestionis:Whetheraspiritualsubstanceiscomposedofmatterandform.1

Anditwouldseemthatitis.1ForBoethiussaysinhisbookDeTrinitate[II,PatrologiaLatinaLXIV,1250D]:Asimpleformcannotbeasubject.Butacreatedspiritualsubstanceisasubjectofknowledgeandofpowerandofgrace;therefore,itisnotasimpleform.Butneitherisitsimplematter,forinthatcaseitwouldexistinpotencyonly,andwouldhavenoactivity.Thereforeitiscomposedofmatterandform.

2Furthermore,anycreatedformislimitedandfinite.Butformislimitedthroughmatter.Therefore,anycreatedformisaforminmatter.Thereforenocreatedsubstanceisaformwithoutmatter.

3Furthermore,theprincipleofchangeabilityismatter;hence,accordingtothePhilosopher[MetaphysicaII,2,994b26],"itisnecessarythatmatterbeconceived2inathingthatismoved."Butacreatedspiritualsubstanceischangeable;foronlyGodisbynatureunchangeable.Thereforeacreatedspiritualsubstancehasmatter.

4Furthermore,AugustinesaysinXIIConfessiones[17,25]thatGodmademattercommontothingsvisibleandthingsinvisible.Nowthethingsinvisiblearespiritualsubstances.Thereforeaspiritualsubstancehasmatter.

5Furthermore,thePhilosophersaysinVIIIMetaphysica[6,1045a36]thatifanysubstanceiswithoutmatter,itisatoncebothbeing

1Cf.DeEnteetEssentia5;InISent.d.8,q.5,a.2(onthesoul);InIISent.*d.3,q.1,a.1(ontheangels);d.17,q.1,a.2(onthesoul):InBoethiumDeTrinitate5,a.4,ad4;InBoeth.DeHebdomadibuslec.2;SummaContraGentilesII,cap.50,51;DePotentiaVI,6,ad4;Quodl.IX,a.6(ontheangels);SummaTheologicaI,q.50,a.2(ontheangels);q.75,a.5(onthesoul);Q.DeAnima*6;DeSubst.Separatis58;Quodl.III,a.20(onthesoul);DeSp.Cr.art.9,ad9.(Passagesmarkedwithanasteriskshouldbereadbeforetheothers).Avicebron,Fonsvitae,tr.4,andelsewherepassim;PhilippusCancellarius,q.i.DeAn.;GuilelmusAlvernus,DeUniversoII,2,c.7etsqq.;DeAn.III,1;JoannesdeRupellaDeAn.I,c.13;AlexanderHalensis,SummaII,1,p.398;S.Bonaventura,IISent.,d.3,p.89;AlbertusM.,IISent.,d.3,vol.27,p.66;SummaTheol.II,tr.1,q.3,vol.32,pp.33,38;SummaPhilosophiae,tr.10,cc.6,7;RogerBacon,CommuniaNatur.IV,3,c.4pp.291294.Onthehistoryoftheproblem,cf.E.Kleineidam,DasProblemderhylomorphenZusammensetzung

dergeistigenSubstanzenim13Jahrh.behandeltbiszuTh.vonAquin,Liebenthal,1930;O.Lottin,"Lacompos.hylemorphiquedessubstancesspirituelles."RevueNéo-Scolastique,XXXIV(1932),pp.2144.Bothwritersgivetextspreviouslypublished.2St.ThomasusuallyquotestheArabicversionofthisstatement,inwhich"utimaginetur"isgivenfor

;cf.InISent.I,d.17,q.1,a.2.

andone(ensetunum),andthereisnoothercauseforittobebothbeingandone.Buteverythingthathasbeencreatedhasacauseofitsbeingandofitsunity.Thereforenocreatedthingissubstancewithoutmatter.Therefore,everycreatedspiritualsubstanceiscomposedofmatterandform.

6Furthermore,Augustine3saysinhisbookDeQuaestionibusVeterisetNoviTestamenti[q.23,PLXXXV,2229]thatAdam'sbodywasformedbeforethesoulwasinfusedintoit,becauseadwellingmustbemadebeforeadwellerisintroduced.Nowthesoulisrelatedtothebodyasadwellertoadwelling;butadwellerhasasubsistenceofitsown:thesoulaccordinglyhasasubsistenceofitsown,and,forallthegreaterreason,anangel.Butasubstancewithasubsistenceofitsowndoesnotseemtobemerelyaform.Thereforeacreatedspiritualsubstanceisnotmerelyaform;itis,therefore,composedofmatterandform.

7Furthermore,itismanifestthatthesoulisabletotakeoncontraries.Nowthiswouldseemtobeapropertyofacompositesubstance.Thereforethesoulisacompositesubstance,andbythesamereasoningsoisanangel.

8Furthermore,formisthatwherebyathingis(quoaliquidest).Whatever,therefore,iscomposedofthatwherebyitisandofthatwhichitis(quoetquodest)iscomposedofmatterandform.Noweverycreatedspiritualsubstanceiscomposedofthatwherebyitisandofthatwhichitis,asBoethius4makesclearinhisbookDeHebdomadibus[PLLXIV,1311].Therefore,everycreatedspiritualsubstanceiscomposedofmatterandform.

9Furthermore,therearetwokindsof"commonness"(duplexcommunitas):one,inthedivineorder,wherebytheessenceis"common"tothethreepersons;another,inthecreatedorder,wherebytheuniversalis"common"tothethingsthatcomeunderit(suisinferioribus).Nowitwouldseemtobeapeculiarityofthefirstsortof"commonness''thatthefeaturewhichmakesadifferencebetweenthosebeingswhichsharethecommonelementisnotreallyanythingelsethanthecommonelementitself.ForthepaternitybywhichtheFatherisdifferentfromtheSonisitselftheessencewhichiscommontotheFatherandtotheSon.Nowinthe"commonness"oftheuniversalthefeaturethatmakesadifferencebetweenthethingswhichareincludedunderthecommonelementmust

3Onthisapocryphalwork,seeDictionnairedethéologiecatholique,Art."S.Augustin,"2308.4Boethiusmakesadistinctionbetween"thatwhichis"(quodest)and"being"(esse);butGilbertdelaPorréeinhiscommentaryintroducedthedistinctionbetween"thatwhichis"and"thatwherebysomethingis"(quoest),whichthemediaevalphilosophersusedtoattributetoBoethiushimself.ComparethecautiouswordinginSum.Theol.I,q.75,a.5,ad4:"Andhence(aspirit)issaidbysomementobecomposedofthatwherebyathingisandofthatwhichis;forbeing(esse)itselfisthat

wherebyathingis."

besomethingelsethanthecommonelementitself.Ineverycreatedthing,therefore,whichisincludedinacommongenustherenecessarilyisacompositionofthecommonelementandofthatwherebythecommonelementitselfisrestricted.Nowacreatedspiritualsubstanceisinagivengenus.Thereforeinacreatedspiritualsubstancetheremustbecompositionofthecommonnatureandofthatwherebythecommonnatureisconfined.Nowthisseemstobeacompositionofformandofmatter.Thereforeinacreatedspiritualsubstancethereiscompositionofformandofmatter.

10Furthermore,theformofagenuscannotexistsaveintheintellectorinmatter.Butacreatedspiritualsubstance,suchasanangel,isinagivengenus.Accordingly,theformofthatgenusexistseitherintheintellectonly,orinmatter.Butifanangeldidnotpossessmatter,itwouldnotexistinmatter.Thereforeitwouldexistintheintellectonly,andso,supposingthatnobodyhadintellectualknowledgeofanangel,itwouldfollowthattheangeldidnotexist.Thisisanincongruity(inconveniens).Accordingly,itisnecessarytosay(asitseems)thatcreatedspiritualsubstanceiscomposedofmatterandform.

11Furthermore,ifacreatedspiritualsubstanceweremerelyform,itwouldfollowthatonespiritualsubstancewouldbepresenttoanother.Forifoneangelhasintellectualknowledgeofanother,eitherthishappensthroughtheessenceoftheunderstoodangel,andinthiscaseitwillbenecessaryforthesubstanceoftheunderstoodangeltobepresentintheintellectoftheangelunderstandingit;orelseithappensthroughaspecies,andinthatcasethesameconclusionfollows,ifthespeciesthroughwhichtheangelisunderstoodbytheotherangeldoesnotdifferfromtheverysubstanceoftheunderstoodangel.Nordoesitseempossibletoindicateanythingwhereinitdoesdiffer,ifthesubstanceoftheangeliswithoutmatter,asisitsintelligiblespeciesalso.Nowthislatterisanincongruity,thatoneangelshouldbepresentinanotherbyitsownsubstance,becauseitisonlytheTrinitythatentersintotherationalmind(mentirationaliillabitur).Thereforethefirstpointtoo,fromwhichthisfollows,isincongruous;namely,thatacreatedspiritualsubstanceisimmaterial.

12Furthermore,theCommentatorsaysinXIMetaphysica[XII,comm.36]thatiftherewereabox5withoutmatter,itwouldbethesameastheboxwhichexistsintheintellect.Consequentlytheconclusionseemsthesameasbefore.

13AugustinesaysinVIISuperGenesiadLitteram[6,9]that,justasthefleshhadmatter(thatis,earth)fromwhichitwasmade,soperhapsitmighthavebeenthecasethat,evenbeforethatverynature

5InthepassagecitedtheCommentatorspeaksof"abath"innatureandintheintellect;andhedoesnotbringintheexampleoftheboxinthatbook.

whichiscalledthesoulwasmade,ithadasitsowngenusakindofspiritualmatter,whichwasnotyetasoul.Thereforethesoulseemstobecomposedofmatterandform,andbythesamereasoninganangelalso.

14Furthermore,Damascenesays[DeFideOrthodoxaII,3&12,PatrologiaGraecaXCIV,867and919]that"Godaloneisessentiallyimmaterialandincorporeal."Thereforeacreatedspiritualsubstanceisnotimmaterialandincorporeal.

15Furthermore,everysubstancecircumscribedbythelimitsofitsownnaturehasalimitedandconfinedexistence.Buteverycreatedsubstanceiscircumscribedbythelimitsofitsownnature.Thereforeeverycreatedsubstancehasalimitedandconfinedexistence.Buteverythingwhichisconfinedisconfinedbysomething.Thereforeinanyandeverycreatedsubstancethereisaconfiningelementandaconfinedelement;andtheseseemtobematterandform.Thereforeeveryspiritualsubstanceiscomposedofmatterandform.

16Furthermore,nothingisactiveandpassiveonthesamebasis,buteachthingisactivethroughitsform,whereasitispassivethroughitsmatter.6Butacreatedspiritualsubstance,suchasanangel,isactivewhileitisenlighteningalowerangelandispassivewhileitisbeingenlightenedbyahigherangel.Similarly,thereisinthesoultheagentintellect(intellectusagens)andthepossibleintellect(intellectuspossibilis).Thereforeanangelaswellasthesouliscomposedofmatterandform.

17Furthermore,everythingthatiseitherisapureactorapurepotency,orissomethingcomposedofactandpotency.Butaspiritualsubstanceisnotapureact(forthisischaracteristicofGodalone),norisitapurepotencyeither.Thereforeitissomethingcomposedofpotencyandact,whichseemsthesameassomethingcomposedofmatterandform.

18Furthermore,PlatointheTimaeus[13,41AB]introducesthehighestgodassaying,whenspeakingtothecreatedgods:"Mywillisgreaterthanyourbond."AugustinequotesthesewordsinhisbookDeCivitateDei[XIII,16,1].Nowthecreatedgodsseemtobeangels.Thereforeinangelsthereisabondorcomposition.

19Furthermore,inthosethingswhicharecounted,andaredifferentinessence,thereismatter;becausematteristheprincipleofnumericaldistinction.Butspiritualsubstancesarecounted,andaredifferentinessence.Thereforetheyhavematter.

20Furthermore,nothingisactedonbyabodyexceptathingthathasmatter.Butcreatedspiritualsubstancesareactedonbybodilyfire,as

6Cf.Q.DeAn.6,resp.,wherethemainargumentoftheadversariesisexpressedasfollows:"thatinwhateverthingthepropertiesofmatterarefound,mattermustbefound.Andhence,sincethe

propertiesofmatterarefoundinthesoul,whicharereceiving,beingasubject,beinginpotency,andothersofthesort,hethinksitnecessaryformattertobeinthesoul."

AugustinemakesclearinDeCivitateDei[XXI,10].Thereforecreatedspiritualsubstanceshavematter.

21Furthermore,BoethiusinhisbookDeUnitateetUno[PLLXIII,107677]expresslysaysthatanangeliscomposedofmatterandform.

22Furthermore,BoethiussaysinhisbookDeHebdomadibus[PLLXIII,1311]thatthatwhichiscanhavesomethingelsemixedwithit.Butexistenceitselfhasabsolutelynothingelsemixedwithit;andwecansaythesameaboutallabstractandconcretethings.Forinmantherecanbesomethingotherthan"humanity",suchas"whiteness"orsomethingofthatsort;butin"humanity''itselftherecanbenothingotherthanwhatpertainstothecharacterof"humanity".If,therefore,spiritualsubstancesareabstractforms,therewillnotpossiblybeinthemanythingthatdoesnotpertaintotheirspecies.Butifsomethingthatpertainstothespeciesofathingbetakenaway,thethingiscorrupted.Since,therefore,everyspiritualsubstanceisincorruptible,nothingthatisinacreatedspiritualsubstancewillpossiblybelost;andsoitwillbeutterlyimmobile,whichisincongruous.

23Furthermore,everythingwhichisinagenusparticipatesintheprinciplesofthegenus.Nowacreatedspiritualsubstanceisinthecategoryofsubstance.Nowtheprinciplesofthiscategoryarematterandform,asBoethiusmakesclearinhisCommentumPraedicamentorum[PLLXIV,184],wherehesaysthatAristotle,leavingoutofconsiderationtheextremes,namely,matterandform,discussesthemean,namely,thecomposite;andgivesustounderstandthatthesubstance,whichisthecategoryaboutwhichheisspeakinginthatpassage,iscomposedofmatterandform.Thereforeacreatedspiritualsubstanceiscomposedofofmatterandform.

24Furthermore,everythingwhichisinagenusiscomposedofgenusanddifference.Nowthedifferenceisobtainedfromtheform,whereasthegenusisobtainedfromthematter,ashemakesclearinVIIIMetaphysica[2,1043a19;3,1043b30].Since,then,aspiritualsubstanceisinagenus,itseemsthatitiscomposedofmatterandform.

25Furthermore,thatwhichisfirstinanygenuswhateveristhecauseofthethingswhicharesubsequent;7asforinstance,thefirstactisthecauseofeverybeingthatisinact.ThereforebythesamereasoningeverythingthatisinpotencyinanywayWhateverhasthischaracterfromthefirstpotencywhichispurepotency,namely,fromprimematter.Butthereissomepotencyincreatedspiritualsubstances,becauseGodaloneispureact.Thereforeacreatedspiritualsubstancehasthischaracterfrommatter;whichcouldnotbesounlessmatterwereapartofit.Thereforeitiscomposedofmatterandform.

7TheScholasticsfrequentlyquotethisstatementasthoughitwereAristotle's;cf.Met.II,1,993b24;Met.X,2,1053b.

ButontheotherhandithereiswhatDionysiussaysinchapterIVofDeDivinisNominibus[lec.1]abouttheangels,thattheyare"incorporealandimmaterial."

Butyouwillsaythatiitheyarecalled"immaterial"becausetheydonothavematterthatissubjecttoquantityandtochange.Butthisisatvariancewithwhathehimselfsaysabove,that"theyarefreefromallmatter."

iiiFurthermore,accordingtothePhilosopherinIVPhysica[4,211a12],thequestionofplacewouldnotarisewereitnotformovement;andsimilarlyneitherwouldthequestionofmatterarisewereitnotformovement.Therefore,accordingasgiventhingshavemovement,onthisgroundmattermustbelookedforinthem;hencethosethingswhicharesubjecttogenerationandcorruptionhavematterwithrespecttotheirbeing;whilethosewhicharechangeableaccordingtoplacehavematterwithrespecttotheirplace.Butspiritualsubstancesarenotchangeableonthebasisoftheirbeing.Thereforematterforbeingisnotinthem,andsotheyarenotcomposedofmatterandform.

ivFurthermore,HughofSt.VictorsaysonDionysius'DeCaelestiHierarchia[V,PLCLXXV,1010B],thatinspiritualsubstancesthatwhichvivifiesandthatwhichisvivifiedisthesame.Butthatwhichvivifiesisform,whereasthatwhichisvivifiedismatter;forformgivesbeingtomatter,andinthecaseoflivingthings"tolive"is"tobe".Thereforeinangelsthereisnodistinctionofmatterandform.

vFurthermore,Avicenna[Met.IX,4]andAlgazel[I,tr.IV,3]saythattheseparatedsubstances,whicharecalledspiritualsubstances,areentirelydevoidofmatter.

viFurthermore,thePhilosophersaysinIIIDeAnima[8,431b29]that"thestonedoesnotexistinthesoul,butthespecies"ofstonedoes.Thisseemstobeduetothesoul'ssimplicity,namely,thefactthatmaterialthingscannotexistinit.Thereforethesoulisnotcomposedofmatterandform.

viiFurthermore,intheLiberdeCausis[§6]itissaidthatanintelligenceisasubstancewhichisnotdivided.Buteverythingwhichiscompositeisdivided.Thereforeanintelligenceisnotcompositesubstance.

viiiFurthermore,"inthosethingswhicharewithoutmatter,theunderstandingbeingandtheunderstoodbeingarethesame"[IIIDeAn.,4,430a3].Butthatwhichisunderstoodisanentirelyimmaterialintelligibleform.Thereforetheunderstandingsubstancealsoiswithoutmatter.

ixFurthermore,AugustinesaysinhisbookDeTrinitate[IX,4],thatthewholesoulunderstandsitself.Nowitdoesnotunderstandthroughmatter:thereforematterisnotapartofit(aliquideius).

xFurthermore,Damascenesays[DeFideOrth.II,12]thatthesoulissimple.Thereforeitisnotcomposedofmatterandform.

xiFurthermore,arationalsoulmorecloselyapproachestheabsolutelysimpleFirstBeing(namely,God)thantheanimalsoul(spiritusbrutalis)does.Buttheanimalsoulisnotcomposedofmatterandform.Thereforemuchlessistherationalsoul.

xiiFurthermore,theangelicsubstancemorecloselyapproachesthesimpleFirstBeingthanamaterialformdoes.8Butamaterialformisnotcomposedofmatterandform.Therefore,neitheristheangelicsubstance.

xiiiFurthermore,accidentalformisbelowsubstanceintheorderofimportance.ButGodmakesagivenaccidentalformsubsistwithoutmatter,asisevidentintheSacramentoftheAltar.Therefore,somuchthemoredoesHemakeagivenforminthegenusofsubstancesubsistwithoutmatter;andthisespeciallyseemstobespiritualsubstance.

xivFurthermore,AugustinesaysinXIIConfessiones[7]:Youhavemadetwothings,OLord,"onenexttoYourself",thatis,angelicsubstance,"anothernexttonothing",namely,matter.So,therefore,thereisnomatterinanangel,since"matter"isdistinguishedfrom"angel"asitscontrary.

ANSWER.Thereareavarietyofconflictingopinionsconcerningthisquestion.Forsomeassertthatacreatedspiritualsubstanceisacompositeofmatterandform;butsomedenythis.Andhence,inordernottoproceedtotheinvestigationofthistruthinanambiguousfashion,wemustconsiderwhatismeantbytheterm"matter."Foritisobviousthatsincepotencyandactaredivisionsofbeing(ens),andsinceanygenuswhateverisdividedintopotencyandact,theterm"primematter"isgenerallyusedtomeansomethingwhichisinthegenusofsubstanceasakindofpotency,whichisunderstoodasexcludingeveryspeciesandform,andevenasexcludingprivation,andyetisapotencycapableofreceivingbothformsandprivations;asAugustinemakesclearinXIIConfessiones[vii,viii,xv]andinISuperGenesiadLitteram[xiv,xv],andthePhilosopherinVIIMetaphysica[3,1029a20].

Nowifmatterbetakeninthissense,whichisitsproperandgenerallyacceptedmeaning,itisimpossibleformattertobeinspiritualsubstances.

8ThesearetheargumentswhichSt.Thomaseverywhereemphasizes.InInIISent.,d.17,theresponsiobeginsasfollows:"Itmustbesaidthatmatterdoesnotseemtometobeinthesoulorinanyspiritualsubstanceinanyway...althoughsomesayotherwise";inDePot.VI,6,ad4:"YetIbelieveratherthattheangelsarenotcomposedofmatterandform."Butinthelaterworksheattackshisadversariesmoresharply,perhapsbecauseheismorestronglyoftheopinionthattheirdoctrinetakesitsoriginfromAvicebron;cf.theunusualvehemenceofQ.De.An.6:"Butthis

reasoningisfrivolousandthepositionimpossible;""Itisobviousthatthereasoningmentionedaboveisfrivolous";"andthisisutterlyabsurd'',etc.

Foralthoughinoneandthesamegiventhingwhichissometimesinactandsometimesinpotency,potencyispriortoactintheorderoftime,yetintheorderofnatureactispriortopotency.9Nowthatwhichispriordoesnotdependonthatwhichissubsequent,butviceversa.Andconsequentlyonecomesuponafirstactinisolationfromallpotency;yetoneneverfindsinnatureapotencywhichisnotperfectedbysomeact,andonthisaccountthereisalwayssomeforminprimematter.Nowthefirstabsolutelyperfectact,whichhasinitselfallthefullnessofperfection,causesactualexistenceinallthings;butyetaccordingtoacertainorder.Fornocausedacthasallthefullnessofperfection,butincomparisonwiththefirstacteverycausedactisimperfect.Still,themoreperfectanactis,theneareritistoGod.Nowofallcreatures,thespiritualsubstancesarenearesttoGod,asDionysiusmakesclearinchapter4ofDeCaelestiHierarchia[§1].Andhencetheymostnearlyapproachtheperfectionofthefirstact,sincetheyarerelatedtolowercreaturesastheperfectistotheimperfectandasactistopotency.Thereforetheorderedschemeofthingsdoesnotinanysenseimplythatspiritualsubstances,fortheirownactualbeing,needprimematter,whichisthemostincompleteofallbeings;buttheyareonalevelthatisfaraboveallmatterandallmaterialthings.

Thisfactalsobecomesevidentifonetakesintoconsiderationtheactivitythatispropertospiritualsubstances.Forallspiritualsubstancesareintellectual.Nowthepotencyofeachindividualthingissuchasitsperfectionisfoundtobe;foraproperactrequiresitsownproperpotency.Nowtheperfectionofanyintellectualsubstance,insofarasitisintellectual,isintelligiblebecauseitisintheintellect.Thesortofpotencythenthatwemustseekinspiritualsubstancesisonethatisproportionatetothereceptionofanintelligibleform.Nowthepotencyofprimematterisnotofthissort,forprimematterreceivesformbycontractingittotheindividualbeing.Butanintelligibleformisintheintellectwithoutanysuchcontraction;forthustheintellectunderstandseachintelligibleasitsformisinit.Nowtheintellectunderstandstheintelligiblechieflyaccordingtoacommonanduniversalnature,andsotheintelligibleformisintheintellectaccordingtoitsuniversality(secundumrationemsuaecommunitatis).Therefore,anintellectualsubstanceisnotmadereceptiveofformbyreasonofprimematter,butratherthroughacharacterwhichis,inaway,theopposite.Henceitbecomesobviousthatinthecaseofspiritualsubstancesthekindofprimematterwhichofitselfisvoidofallspeciescannotbepartofthatsubstance.

Yetontheotherhandifweusetheterms"matter"and"form"tomeananytwothingswhicharerelatedtoeachotheraspotencyandact,

9Cf.Aristotle,IXMet.,8,1049b,withSt.Thomas'commentary,lec.7.

thereisnodifficultyinsaying(soastoavoidameredisputeaboutwords)thatmatterandformexistinspiritualsubstances.Forinacreatedspiritualsubstancetheremustbetwoelements,oneofwhichisrelatedtotheotheraspotencyistoact.Thisisclearfromthefollowing.Foritisobviousthatthefirstbeing,whichisGod,isinfiniteact,ashavinginitselftheentirefullnessofbeing,notcontractedtoanygenericorspecificnature.Henceitsveryexistencemustnotbeanexistencethatis,asitwere,putintosomenaturewhichisnotitsownexistence,becausethusitwouldbelimitedtothatnature.HencewesaythatGodisHisownexistence.Nowthiscannotbesaidofanyotherbeing.For,justasitisimpossibletounderstandthattherearemanyseparatewhitenesses,butiftherewere"whiteness"apartfromeverysubjectandrecipient,therewouldbebutonewhiteness,soitisimpossibletohaveaself-subsistingexistenceunlessthereisbutone.Accordingly,everythingwhichexistsafterthefirstbeing,becauseitisnotitsownexistence,hasanexistencethatisreceivedinsomething,throughwhichtheexistenceisitselfcontracted;andthusinanycreatedobjectthenatureofthethingwhichparticipatesinexistenceisonething,andtheparticipatedexistenceitselfisanother.Andbecauseanythingparticipatesinthefirstactthroughsimilitudeinsofarasithasexistence,theparticipatedexistencemustineachcaseberelatedtothenatureparticipatinginit,asactisrelatedtopotency,Accordingly,intheworldofphysicalobjects,matterdoesnotofitselfparticipateinactualexistence,butitdoesparticipatethereinthroughform;fortheformcominguponthemattermakesthematteritselfactuallyexist,asthesouldoestothebody.

Henceincompositeobjectstherearetwokindsofactandtwokindsofpotencytoconsider.Forfirstofall,matterisaspotencywithreferencetoform,andtheformisitsact.Andsecondly,ifthenatureisconstitutedofmatterandform,thematterisaspotencywithreferencetoexistenceitself,insofarasitisabletoreceivethis.Accordingly,whenthefoundationofmatterisremoved,ifanyformofadeterminatenatureremainswhichsubsistsofitselfbutnotinmatter,itwillstillberelatedtoitsownexistenceaspotencyistoact.ButIdonotsay,asthatpotencywhichisseparablefromitsact,butasapotencywhichisalwaysaccompaniedbyitsact.Andinthiswaythenatureofaspiritualsubstance,whichisnotcomposedofmatterandform,isapotencywithreferencetoitsownexistence;andthusthereisinaspiritualsubstanceacompositionofpotencyandact,and,consequently,offormandmatter,providedonlythateverypotencybecalledmatter,andeveryactbecalledform;butyetthisisnotproperlysaidaccordingtothecommonuseoftheterms.10

10St.ThomasislesstolerantwithsuchanimpropermodeofexpressioninQ.DeAn.6,resp.:"Andhencematterisnotfoundexceptincorporealthingsinthesenseinwhichphilosophershavespokenofmatter,unlessonewishestotake

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Astothefirstargument,therefore,itmustbesaidthatthecharacterofaformisinsharpcontrasttothecharacterofasubject:foreveryform,assuch,isanact,whereaseverysubjectisrelatedtothatofwhichitisthesubject,asapotencyisrelatedtoanact.Iftherefore,thereisanyformwhichisexclusivelyanact,suchasthedivineessence,itcannotinanysensebeasubject;anditisofthisformthatBoethiusisspeaking.Nowiftherehappenstobeaform,whichisinactinonerespectandisinpotencyinanother,itwillbeasubjectonlyinthatpreciserespectinwhichitisinpotency.Nowspiritualsubstances,althoughtheyaresubsistentforms,areneverthelessinpotencyinasmuchastheypossessafiniteandlimitedexistence.Andbecausetheintellect,asaconsequenceofitscharacter,hasacapacityforknowingallthings,andthewillhasacapacityforlovingallgood,therealwaysremainswithintheintellectandthewillofacreatedsubstanceapotencytowardsomethingwhichisoutsideofitself.Hence,ifoneviewsthematterrightly,spiritualsubstancesarenotfoundtobesubjects,exceptofaccidentswhichpertaintotheintellectandtothewill.

Astothesecond,itmustbesaidthattherearetwokindsoflimitationofform.Thereisoneinconsequenceofwhichtheformofthespeciesislimitedtotheindividual,andthiskindoflimitationofformcomesaboutthroughmatter.Thereisasecond,however,inconsequenceofwhichtheformofthegenusislimitedtothenatureofthespecies;andthiskindoflimitationofformdoesnotcomeaboutthroughmatter,butratherthroughamoredeterminateform,fromwhichthedifferenceisderived;forthedifferencewhenaddedtoagenusnarrowsdownthislattertothespecies.Andthiskindoflimitationistheonethatisinspiritualsubstances,inviewofthefactthattheyareformsofdeterminatespecies.

Astothethird,itmustbesaidthatchangeabilityisnottobefoundinspiritualsubstancesasaconsequenceoftheirbeing,butasaconsequenceoftheirintellectandtheirwill.Butthiskindofchangeabilityisnottheresultofmatter,butofthepotentialityoftheintellectandthewill.

Astothefourth,itmustbesaidthatAugustine'smeaningisnotthatthematterofthingsvisibleandthingsinvisibleisthesamenumerically;sincehehimselfsaysthattwokindsofformlessnessaremeantby"heaven"and"earth,"whicharesaidtohavebeencreatedfirst,sothatby"heaven''ismeantthespiritualsubstancethatisstillformless,whereasby"earth"ismeantthematterofcorporealobjects,whichconsideredinitselfisformless,sinceitiswithoutanyspecies;henceitisalsosaidto

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matterequivocally",butifonedoes,"heisobviouslydeceivedinconsequenceoftheequivocation".Cf.below,Art.9,ad9:"nothingpreventssomeoneelsefromcallingmatterwhatwe

callact;justas,forinstance,whatwecallstonesomeoneelsecancallass."

be"voidandempty",or"invisibleandnon-composite"accordingtoanotherreading,whereasheavenisnotdescribedas"voidandempty."Fromthisitisplainlymanifestthatmatter,whichiswithoutanyspecies,isnotapartoftheangelicsubstance.ButtheformlessnessofspiritualsubstanceisaconsequenceofthefactthatthesubstancehasnotyetbeenturnedtowardtheWordwherebyitisenlightened,andthisissomethingthatpertainstoitspowerofunderstanding.11Inthissense,therefore,hecallsthemboth"commonmatterofthingsvisibleandthingsinvisible,''accordingaseachisformlessinitsownway.

Astothefifth,itmustbesaidthatthePhilosopherisspeakinginthatpassagenotoftheagentcausebutoftheformalcause.Forthosethingswhicharecomposedofmatterandformarenotimmediatelybothbeingandone,butmatterisbeinginpotencyandbecomesactualbeingthroughthecomingoftheform,whichservesasthecauseofexistenceinitsregard.Butaformdoesnothavebeingthroughanotherform.Andhence,iftherebeasubsistingform,itisimmediatelybothbeingandone,nordoesithaveaformalcauseofitsownexistence;itdoesneverthelesshaveacausethatpoursexistenceintoit,butnotamovingcausesuchaswouldbringitintoactoutofpreviouslyexistentpotency.

Astothesixth,itmustbesaidthat,althoughthesoulhasasubsistenceofitsown,neverthelessitdoesnotfollowthatitiscomposedofmatterandform,becausetohaveasubsistenceofitsowncanalsobeanattributeofaformapartfrommatter.Forsincematterhasexistencethroughform,andnotconversely,thereisnothingtopreventagivenformfromsubsistingwithoutmatter,althoughmattercannotexistwithoutform.

Astotheseventh,itmustbesaidthatthecapacityofreceivingcontraryattributesischaracteristicofasubstancethatexistsinpotencyinsomewayorother,whetheritbecomposedofmatterandformorwhetheritbesimplesubstance.Nowthesubstanceofspiritualthingsisnotthesubjectofcontraryattributes,saveofthosepertainingtothewillandtotheintellect,sinceitisinconsequenceofthesethatitisinpotency,asisclearfromwhathasbeensaid.

Astotheeighth,itmustbesaidthattobecomposedof"thatwhichis"(quodest)andof"thatwherebysomethingis"(quoest)isnotthesameastobecomposedofmatterandform.12Foralthoughformcanbecalled"thatwherebysomethingis,"neverthelessmattercannotproperlybecalled"thatwhichis,"sinceitisnot,saveinpotency.But"thatwhichis"isthatwhichsubsistsinexistenceandthis,inthecaseofcorporealsubstances,isthethingitselfthatiscomposedofmatterand

11Cf.Augustine,DeGenesiadLitteramI,1,23.12InISent.d.8,q.5,a.2,resp.,thereistheexplanationofhow"incompoundsofmatterandform

thatwherebysomethingiscanbesaidinthreesenses";andinContraGentilesII,cap.5254,thequestionof"thatwhichis"and"thatwherebysomethingis"isdiscussedatlength.

form,whereasinthecaseofincorporealsubstancesitisthesimpleformitself.Now"thatwherebysomethingis"isparticipatedexistenceitself,becauseeachindividualis,insofarasitparticipatesinexistenceitself.AndhenceBoethiusalsousesthesewordsinthissenseinthebookDeHebdomadibus,sayingthatinthecaseofbeingsotherthantheFirst"thatwhichis"and"existence"(esse)arenotthesame.

Astotheninth,itmustbesaidthatathingis"under"somethingcommonintwosenses:inone,asanindividualis"under"aspecies;inanother,asaspeciesis"under"agenus.Wheneverthenmanyindividualsareunderonecommonspecies,thedistinctionbetweenmanyindividualsiseffectedthroughindividualmatter,whichhasnothingtodowiththeirspecificnature.Thisistrueinthecaseofcreatedthings.Butwhentherearemanyspeciesunderonegenustheformswherebythespeciesaredistinguishedfromoneanothershouldinrealitybesomethingotherthanthecommonformofthegenus.Forthroughoneandthesameformthisparticularindividualisputinthegenus"substance'',inthegenus"body",andsoondowntothemostspecificspecies.13Forifthisparticularindividualweretopossessitssubstantialityinconsequenceofsomeform,thennecessarilyitwouldhavetobethecasethattheotheradditionalformsinconsequenceofwhichitisplacedinlowergeneraandspecieswouldbeaccidentalforms.

Thisisclearfromthefollowing.Foranaccidentalformdiffersfromasubstantialformbecauseasubstantialformmakesthisgiventhingtobesomething,whereasanaccidentalformisaddedtoathingwhichalreadyexistsas"thissomething."Ifthenthefirstformbywhichtheindividualisplacedinagenuswillmaketheindividualtobe"thissomething,"alltheotherformswillbeaddedtoanindividualthatsubsistsinactuality,andconsequently,theywillbeaccidentalforms.Itwillalsofollowthatthroughtheadditionofthelaterformswherebysomethingisgivenitsplaceinthemostspecificspeciesorinsomesubordinatespecies,generationdoesnotoccur,andbythetakingawayoftheseformsthereisnocorruptioninanabsolutesensebutinaqualifiedsense(secundumaliquid).Forsincegenerationisachangeorientedtotheexistenceofathing,somethingissaidtobegenerated,absolutelyspeaking,ifitabsolutelybecomesabeing(ens)outofthatwhichisnon-beinginactbutbeinginpotencyonly.If,then,somethingcomesintobeingoutofsomethingthatispreviouslyexistinginact,whatwillbegeneratedisnotabeinginanabsolutesense,but"thisparticularbeing."Concerningcorruptionthesamereasoningholdsgood.Itmust,therefore,besaidthatthe

13Cf.G.Théry,"L'augustinismemediévaletleprobl,del'unitédelaformesubstantielle,"Actahebdom.Augus.-thom.(Rome,1931)pp.140200;yetinthisarticlethewell-knownauthorundulyrestrictstheproblemtothequestionofthevegetative,thesentient,andtheintellectualsoulinman.

formsofthingsarerangedinorder,andthatoneformexceedsanotherinperfection.ThisisclearbothfromwhatthePhilosophersaysinVIIIMetaphysica[3,1043b33],namely,thatthedefinitionsandspeciesofthingsarelikenumbers,inthecaseofwhichthespeciesaremultipliedbyaddingone;andalsofromthefactthatthroughinductionthespeciesofthingsappeartobemultipliedhierarchicallyaccordingtotheperfectandtheimperfect.

Thus,then,bythislineofargumentAvicebron's14positioninthebookFonsVitaeisruledout,totheeffectthatprimematter,somethingthatisregardedasentirelywithoutform,firstreceivestheformofsubstance;andoncethisformissupposedinanypartofitselfitreceives,inadditiontotheform"substance",anotherformthroughwhichitbecomesabody;andsooninsuccessiondowntoitsultimatespecies.Andinthatpartinwhichitdoesnotreceiveacorporealformitisincorporealsubstance,thematterofwhich,notbeingsubjecttoquantity,somecall"spiritualmatter".Moreover,thematteritself,alreadyperfectedthroughtheformofsubstancewhichisthesubjectofquantityandoftheotheraccidents,is''thekey",hesays,totheunderstandingofincorporealsubstances[II,6,p.35].Forthereasonwhysomeindividualthinghappenstobeanon-livingbodyandanotherhappenstobealivingbodyisnotthefactthatalivingindividualhassomeformofwhichthesubstantialformofabodyisasubstratum;butthereasonisthatthisparticularlivingindividualhasamoreperfectform,throughwhichithasnotonlysubsistenceandbodilyexistence,butalsolife;whereastheotherhasamoreimperfectform,throughwhichitdoesnotattaintolife,butonlytobodilyexistence.

Astothetenth,itmustbesaidthattheformofagenuswhereofmatterisanessentialpartcannotexistoutsidetheintellectexceptinmatter,liketheform"plant",forinstance,ortheform"metal".Butthisgenusofsubstanceisnotthesortofthingwhereofmatterisanessentialpart.Otherwiseitwouldnotbeametaphysicalgenusbutanaturalone.Hencetheformofthisgenusdoesnotdependonmatterasregardsitsownexistence,butcanbealsofoundoutsidematter.

Astotheeleventh,itmustbesaidthattheintelligiblespecieswhichisintheintellectoftheunderstandingangelisdifferentfromtheunderstoodangel,notinthewayof"somethingabstractedfromthematter"and"somethingconcretedofmatter",butasanintentionalbeingdiffersfromabeingwhichhasanestablishedexistenceinnature,asthespeciesofcolorintheeyediffersfromthecolorwhichisinawall.

14Cf.below,Art.3,resp.InDeEnteetEssen.5andInIISent.,d.3St.Thomassayshesitantly:"TheauthorofthispositionseemstohavebeenAvicebron;"thisdoubtlaterdisappears.HeoftenstatesandrefutesthedoctrineofthatHebrewphilosopher(SalomonbenGebirol,fl.1050,whomthemediaevalphilosophersbelievedtobeanArab),especiallyinDeSubst.Separatis,cc.58and

Astothetwelfth,itmustbesaidthatiftheboxwereself-subsistentapartfrommatter,itwouldbesomethingthatunderstandsitsownself,becauseimmunityfrommatteristheessentialcharacterofintellectuality.Andinviewofthis,theboxapartfrommatterwouldnotbedifferentfromanintelligiblebox.

Astothethirteenth,itmustbesaidthatAugustinebringsinthatpointasamattertobeinvestigated.Thisisclearfromthefactthatherejectstheassertioninquestion.

Astothefourteenth,itmustbesaidthatGodaloneissaidtobeimmaterialandincorporeal,becauseallthings,whencomparedtoHissimplicity,canbereckonedasmaterialbodies,althoughinthemselvestheyareincorporealandimmaterial.

Astothefifteenth,itmustbesaidthattheexistenceofaspiritualcreature'ssubstanceisconfinedandlimited,notbymatter,butbythefactthatitissomethingthathasbeenreceivedandparticipatedinanatureofadeterminatespecies,ashasbeensaid.

Astothesixteenth,itmustbesaidthatacreatedspiritualsubstanceisactiveandpassive,notinconsequenceofformormatter,butaccordingasitisinactorinpotency.

Astotheseventeenth,itmustbesaidthataspiritualsubstanceisneitherapureactnorapurepotency,butissomethingthathaspotencyalongwithact;yetitisnotcomposedofmatterandform,asisclearfromwhathasbeensaid.

Astotheeighteenth,itmustbesaidthatPlatogivesthenameof"secondgods"nottotheangels,buttotheheavenlybodies.

Astothenineteenth,itmustbesaidthatmatteristheprincipleofnumericaldistinctionwithinthesamespecies,butnotofthedistinctionbetweenspecies.Nowtheangelsarenotnumericallymanywithinthesamespecies,buttheirmanyness(multitudo)isthatofmanyself-subsistentspecificnatures.

Astothetwentieth,itmustbesaidthatspiritualsubstancesarenotactedonbybodilyfirebywayofamaterialalterationbutbywayofaconfinement(alligationis),asAugustinesays[DeCivitateDeiXXI,10,1].Andhenceitisnotnecessaryforthemtohavematter.

Astothetwenty-first,itmustbesaidthatthebookDeUnitateetUnoisnotabookofBoethius,15asitsverystyleindicates.

Astothetwenty-second,itmustbesaidthataseparatedform,inasmuchasitisanact,cannothaveanythingextraneousmixedwithit,butonlyinasmuchasitisinpotency.Andinthiswaythespiritualsubstances,inasmuchastheyareinpotencyasregardstheintellectandthewill,receivesomeaccidents.

15ItsrealauthorwasDominicGundisalvusSegoviensis(ca.1150);seeP.Correns,BaeumkerBeiträgeI,1,(1891).

Astothetwenty-third,itmustbesaidthatBoethiusdoesnotmeantosaythatitisessentialtosubstance,whichisagenus,tobecomposedofmatterandform,sincesubstancecomeswithinthepurviewofthemetaphysician,notofthenaturalphilosopher.Buthedoesmeantosaythat,sinceformandmatterdonotpertaintothegenusofsubstanceasaspeciesthereof,onlythatsubstancewhichissomethingcompositeisplacedwithinthegenusofsubstanceasaspecies.

Astothetwenty-fourth,itmustbesaidthatinthecaseofobjectscomposedofmatterandform,thegenusisobtainedfromthematterandthedifferencefromtheform:yetinsuchawaythatby"matter"isnotunderstoodprimematter,butmatteraccordingasitreceivesthroughtheformacertainbeing(esse),imperfectandmaterialincomparisonwithspecificbeing(esse);thus,forinstance,thebeing(esse)of"animal"isimperfectandmaterialincomparisonwith"man."Stillthattwo-foldbeing(esse)isnottheconsequenceoftwodifferentforms,butofoneform,whichconfersonmannotonly''animalbeing"(esse)but"humanbeing"(esse).Nowthesoulofanotheranimalconfersonitonly"animalbeing"(esse).Hencethecommonelement"animal"isnotonenumerically,butmentallyonly,becauseitisnotfromoneandthesameformthatamanandanassare"animal".Oncematteristakenaway,therefore,fromspiritualsubstances,thegenusandthedifferencewillremaininthem,notinconsequenceofmatterandform,butinconsequenceofconsideringinaspiritualsubstanceboththatelementwhichiscommontoitselfandtolessperfectsubstances,andalsothatelementwhichispropertoitself.

Astothetwenty-fifth,itmustbesaidthatthemoreathingisinact,themoreperfectitis;whereasthemoreathingisinpotency,thelessperfectitis.Now,imperfectbeingsderivetheiroriginfromperfectbeings,andnotconversely.Andhenceitdoesnothavetobethecasethateverythingwhichisinpotencyinanywaywhatevermustgetitspotentialityfromthepurepotencywhichismatter.AndonthispointAvicebronseemstohavebeendeceived,inhisbookFonsVitae,sincehebelievedthateverythingwhichisinpotency,orisasubject,hasthischaractersomehowfromprimematter.

ArticleIIThesecondquestionis:Canaspiritualsubstancebeunitedtoabody?1

Anditwouldseemthatitcannot.1ForDionysiussaysinthefirstchapterofDeDivinisNominibus[lec.1]thatincorporealthingscannotbecompletelygraspedbycorporealthings.Buteveryformiscompletelygraspedbymatter,sinceitisitsact.Therefore,anincorporealspiritualsubstancecannotbetheformofthebody.

2Furthermore,accordingtothePhilosopherinhisbookDenSomnoetVigilia[I,454a8],"Thethingtowhichanactionbelongsisthethingtowhichthecorrespondingpowerbelongs."Butunderstandingistheproperactivityofaspiritualsubstanceandcannotbelongtothebody,becauseunderstandingdoesnottakeplacethroughacorporealorgan,asisprovedinIIIDeAnima[4,429a25].Therefore,anintellectualpowercannotbetheformofthebody;thereforeneithercanaspiritualsubstance,whereinthissortofpowerhasitsbasis,betheformofthebody.

3Furthermore,whataccruestoathingafteritscompletedbeing(esse)accruestoitaccidentally.Butaspiritualsubstancehaswithinitselfsubsistentbeing(esse).If,then,abodyaccruestoit,itwillaccruetoitaccidentally.Therefore,itcannotbeunitedtoitasasubstantialform.

Butitwasobjected2thatthesoul,insofarasitis"spirit",isself-subsistent,whereasinsofarasitis"soul",itisunitedasaform.Butonthecontrary,4thesoulis"spirit"byitsveryessence:accordingly,itistheformofthebodyeitherbyitsveryessenceorelseinconsequenceofsomethingaddedtoitsessence.Nowifthesoulistheformofthebodyinconsequenceofsomethingaddedtoitsessence,sinceallthataccruestoathingoverandaboveitsownessenceisaccidental,itfollowsthatthesoulisunitedtothebodybymeansofsomeaccident;andthusmanisabeingperaccidens,whichisincongruous.Therefore,thesoulisunitedtothebodythroughitsessence,insofarasitis''spirit".

1InIISent.,d.1,q.2,a.4;d.17,q.2,a.1;ContraGentilesII,*cap.56,57,68,69,70;Sum.Theol.*I,q.76,a.1;Q.DeAn.,12;InIIDeAn.,lec.4(271277);InIIIDeAn.,lec.7(689699);DeUnitateIntellectus,c.3;CompendiumTheologiae80;87.Aristotle,DeAn.II,cc.23;III,c.4.AvicennaDeAn.V,c.3;VII,67.Averroes,InIIDeAn.comm.21,32;III,comm.46.Phil.Cancellarius,DeAn.,q.10(xvii).Guil.Alvernus,DeAn.V,24.Joan.deRupella,DeAn.I,3539.Alex.Halensis,SummaII,1,p.417.AlbertusM.,SummadeCreat.II,q.4,a.1,vol.35,pp.3238;SummaTheol.II,tr.13,q.77,m.1,vol.33,p.68.2Insuchpassagestheeditions(afterthatofLyons1569)generallyhave"Butitmustbesaid".Theauthor,however,seemstobereferringtoanobjectionactuallymadebyanobjectorinthedisputation

itself.

5Furthermore,aformdoesnothavebeingonaccountofmatter,butmatterhasbeingonaccountofaform.3Hencethesoulisnotunitedtothebodythatthebodymaybeperfected,butratherthebody,ifthesoulisaform,isunitedtoitforthesoul'sperfection.Butthesouldoesnotneedthebodyforitsownperfection,sinceitcanexistandcanunderstandapartfromthebody.Therefore,thesoulisnotunitedtothebodyasaform.

6Furthermore,theunionofformandmatterisnatural.Butasoul'sunionwithabodyisnotnatural,butmiraculous;foritissaidinthebookDeSpirituetAnima4[14,PLXL,790]:"Itwascompletelymiraculousthatthingssodiverseandsodividedcouldhavebeenmutuallyconjoined."Therefore,thesoulisnotunitedtothebodyasaform.

7Furthermore,accordingtothePhilosopherinthebookDeCaelo[II,6,288b14],"Everyweakeningiscontrarytonature."Hencewhateverweakensathingisnotunitedtoitnaturally.Butthesoulisweakenedthroughunionwiththebody,bothasfarasexistenceisconcerned,becausethebodyweighsdownthesoul,asissaidinthebookDeSpirituetAnima[XIV;passim],andasfarasactivityisconcerned,becausethesoulcannotknowitselfsavebywithdrawingitselffromallcorporealconnections(nexibus),asthesamebooksays[XXXII].Thereforethesoul'sunionwiththebodyisnotnatural;andsowecometothesameconclusionasbefore.

8Furthermore,theCommentatorsaysonVIIIMetaphysica[comm.16]thatwhenthatwhichisinpotencyactuallycomesintobeing(fitactu),thisdoesnottakeplacethroughanythingadditional.Butwhenthesoulisunitedtothebody,somethingextrinsicisaddedtothebody;becausethesouliscreatedbyGodandisinfusedintothebody.Thereforethesoulisnottheactortheformofthebody.

9Furthermore,aformisderivedfromthepotentialityofmatter.Butaspiritualsubstancecannotbederivedfromthepotentialityofcorporealmatter.Thereforeaspiritualsubstancecannotbeunitedtothebodyasaform.

10Furthermore,thecongruityofspirittospiritisgreaterthanthecongruityofspirittobody.Butaspiritcannotbetheformofanotherspirit.Thereforeneithercanaspiritualsubstancebetheformofthebody.

11Furthermore,Augustinesaysthatasoulandanangelare"likeinnatureandunlikeinfunction"[DeLiberoArbitrioIII,11,32].Butanangelcannotbetheformofthebody;thereforeneithercanthesoul.

12Furthermore,BoethiussaysinhisbookDeDuabusNaturis[I,PLLXIV,1342]:"Natureisthespecificdifferencethatinformseachthing."

3Thissaying,sooftenquotedbySt.Thomas,originatedwithAverroes(InIIPhysica,comm.26;

91).4Cf.Art.3,ad6.

Butthespecificdifferenceofanangelandofasoulisthesame;namely,"rational".Thereforethenatureofbothisthesame;andsowecometothesameconclusionasbefore.

13Furthermore,thesoulisrelatedtothewholeandtothepartsinthesameway,becauseitiswhollyinthewholebodyandwhollyineverysinglepart.Butaspiritualsubstance,whichtheintellectis,"isnotanactofanypartofthebody,"5asissaidinIIIDeAnima[II,1,413a7].Therefore,aspiritualsubstanceisnottheformofthewholebody.

14Furthermore,anaturalformexistinginthebodydoesnotactoutsidethebody.Butthesoulexistinginthebodyactsoutsidethebody,forintheCouncilofAncyra6itissaidofwomenwhothinktheygotoDianabynightthatwhattheythinktheysufferinbodyoccurstotheminspirit,andsoalsotheirspiritactsoutsidethebody.Therefore,aspiritualsubstanceisnotunitedtothebodyasitsnaturalform.

15Furthermore,inthebookDeArticulisFidei[I,4,ofAlanofLille]itissaid:"Neitherformwithoutmatternormatterwithoutformisasubject."Butthebodyisthesubjectofsomeaccidents;thereforethebodyisnotmatterwithoutform.If,then,aspiritualsubstanceaccruestoitasform,itwouldfollowthattherewillbetwoformsinoneandthesamething,whichisimpossible.

16Furthermore,thecorruptibleandtheincorruptibledifferingenus,norisanythingsaidofthemunivocally,asthePhilosopherandhisCommentatormakeclearinXMetaphysica[10,1058b28].Therefore,thecorruptibleandtheincorruptiblediffermorewidelythandotwocontrarieswhicharespeciesofonegenus.ButBoethiussays[InCategoriasIV,PLLXIV,282]thatoneoftwocontrariesdoesnotaidtheothertowardactualbeing.Therefore,aspiritualsubstance,sinceitisincorruptible,doesnotaidthecorruptiblebodytowardactualbeing;andhenceisnotitsform,sinceaformgivesactualbeingtomatter.

17Furthermore,whateverisunitedtoanotherthroughsomethingwhichisnotofitsownessenceisnotunitedtoitasaform.Buttheintellectisunitedtothebodythroughtheimagination,whichdoesnotbelongtothesubstanceoftheintellect,astheCommentatorsaysonIIIDeAnima[comm.5;36].Thereforethespiritualsubstancewhichistheintellectisnotunitedtothebodyasaform.

18Furthermore,everyspiritualsubstanceisintellectual.Noweveryintellectualsubstanceissetapartfrommatter,sinceitissomethingintel-

5ThisquotationisfrequentlycitedbytheScholasticphilosophersandisconstantlyreferredtoIIIDeAn.;where,however,itisnottobefound,exceptimplicitlyinc.4.

6ThedocumentinquestionistobefoundintheDecretaGratiani(c.12,C.26a.5,vol.I,p.1030),Richter-Friedburg,Leipzig,1879.TherethereferenceistotheconciliumAnquirenseorAncyrense.

lectualthroughitsfreedomfrommatter.Thereforenospiritualsubstanceisaforminmatter,andsoitcannotbeunitedtothebodyasaform.

19Furthermore,outofmatterandformasinglethingcomesintobeing.If,then,aspiritualsubstanceisunitedtothebodyasaform,outofthespiritualsubstanceandthebodyonesinglethingshouldcomeintobeing.Theintelligibleformswhicharereceivedintheintellectwillbereceivedincorporealmatter;whichisimpossible,becauseformsreceivedincorporealmatterareintelligibleonlyinpotency.Thereforethesubstanceisnotunitedtothebodyasaform.

ButontheotherhandthereiswhatDionysiussaysinthefourthchapterofDeDivinisNominibus[lec.1],thatthesoulisanintellectualsubstancewhichhasunfailinglife.Butthesoulistheformofthebody,asisclearfromthedefinitionofitsetdowninIIDeAnima[1,412b5].Thereforesomespiritualorintellectualsubstanceisunitedtothebodyasaform.

ANSWER.Itmustbesaidthatthedifficultyofthisquestionarisesfromthefactthataspiritualsubstanceisakindofself-subsistentthing.Nowaformmusthaveactualbeinginsomethingelse,thatis,inmatter,ofwhichitistheactandtheperfection.Henceitseemstobecontrarytothecharacterofaspiritualsubstancethatitshouldbetheformofthebody.AndforthisreasonGregoryofNyssa7inhisbookDeAnima[PGXLV,199]accusedAristotleofassertingthatthesoulisnotself-subsistent,andthatitiscorruptedwhenthebodyiscorrupted,becauseheasserteditastheentelechy,thatis,astheactorperfection,ofthephysicalbody.

Butyet,ifonecarefullystudiesthematter,itbecomesclearlyevidentthatsomesubstancemustbetheformofthehumanbody.Foritisobviousthatunderstandingbelongsto"thisparticularman"(as,forinstance,SocratesorPlato).Nownoactivitybelongstoanygiventhingexceptthroughsomeformwhichexistsinthethingitself,eitherasubstantialoranaccidentalform,becausenothingactsorfunctionsexceptinconsequenceofitsbeingactual.Noweachindividualthingisactualthroughsomeform,eithersubstantialoraccidental,sinceaformisanact;thus,forinstance,fireisactuallyfirethrough"fireness",andactuallyhotthroughheat.Accordingly,itmustbethecasethattheprincipleofthatactivitywhichisunderstandingshouldbein"thisman"inthewayofaform.Nowtheprincipleofthisactivityisnotaformwhoseactualbeingisdependentonmatterandtieddowntoorimmersedinmatter,becausethisactivityisnoteffectedbymeansofthebody,asisproveninIIIDeAnima[4,429a24];andhencetheprincipleofthisactivitypossesses

7Cc.23ofNemesiusEmesenus'workDeNaturaHominis,whichdealwiththesoul,werein

circulationintheMiddleAgesunderthenameofGregoryofNyssa,andwereprintedalsoamongGregory'swritingsbyMigne(PGXLV).

anactivitythathasnothingincommonwithcorporealmatter.Now,thewayinwhicheachthingactsisaconsequenceofitsbeing.Hencetheactualbeingofthatprinciplemustbeanactualbeingwhichisraisedabovecorporealmatterandnotdependentonit.Nowthisischaracteristicofaspiritualsubstance.Itisnecessarytosay,therefore,iftheprecedingconsiderationsareputtogether,thatsomekindofsubstanceistheformofthehumanbody.

Buttherearesomewho,whileadmittingthatunderstandingistheactofaspiritualsubstance,havedeniedthatsuchaspiritualsubstanceisunitedtothebodyasaform.AmongtheseAverroesassertedthatthepossibleintellect,initsactualbeing,isseparatedfromthebody.Hesawneverthelessthatunlessthereweresomeunionofitwith"thisman",itsactcouldnotpertainto"thisman".Foriftherearetwosubstancesentirelyunconnected,whenoneisactingorfunctioning,theotherisnotsaidtobefunctioning.Andhenceheassertedthatsuchanintellect,whichhesaidwasentirelyseparatedfromthebodyinitsactualbeing,isconnectedwith"thisman"throughphantasms,forthisreason,thattheintelligiblespecies,whichisaperfectionofthepossibleintellect,isbasedonthephantasmsfromwhichitisabstracted.8So,therefore,ithasatwo-foldkindofactualbeing:oneinthepossibleintellect,ofwhichitistheform,andtheotherinthephantasmsfromwhichitisabstracted.Nowthephantasmsarein"thisman''becausetheimaginativepowerisapowerwithinthebody;thatis,onewhichhasacorporealorgan.Theintelligiblespeciesitself,therefore,isthemediumwhichjoinsthepossibleintellectto"theindividualman".

Butthisconnectionisinnowaysufficienttoexplainthefactthat"thisindividualman"understands.For,asAristotlesaysinhisbookIIIDeAnima[7,431a14],thephantasmsarerelatedtothepossibleintellectascoloristothesight.9Accordingly,theintelligiblespeciesabstractedfromthephantasmsisinthepossibleintellectinthesamewayasthespecies"color"isinthesenseofsight.Nowtheintelligiblespeciesisinthephantasmsinthesamewayasaspecieswhichmakesseeingpossible(speciesvisibilis)isinthephysicalobjectwhichisawall.Nowowingtothefactthatthespecieswhichmakesseeingpossible,theform"sight",isbasedonthecolorofthewall,theactofseeingisnotconnectedwiththewallaswithaseeingobject,butaswithaseenobject:forby

8InalmostthesameformulasthisobscureopinionofAverroesontheintellect'sconnectionwithmaniselsewheresuccinctlyexpressed;cf.SummaTheol.I,q.76,a.1,resp.;Q.DeAn.2;DeUnit.Intell.,c.3,§63."Thisconnection,"saysScotusInIVSent.,d.43,q.2,5),"neitherhimself(theCommentator)noranyofhisfollowerscouldexplain,norcouldhebythatconnectionsavethethesisthatmanunderstands."9Cf.Q.DeAn.,2,resp.:"assensiblethingstothesenseandcolorstothesight",forthePhilosophersaysoion ;buttheexpression"ascolorstothesight"hasbeentakenfrom430a15,whereit

isusedoftheagentintellect.

meansofitthewalldoesnotsee,butisseen;forwhatconstitutesaknowerisnotthefactthatthereisinhimaformwhoseimageisinsomeknowingpower,butthefactthatthereisinhimthecognitivepoweritself.And"thisman,"accordingly,willnotbeonewhounderstandsbecauseofthefactthatinhimarephantasmswhoseimage,whichisanintelligiblespecies,isinthepossibleintellect;butitdoesfollowbecauseofthisfactthathisphantasmsareunderstoodbyhim.10Butthepossibleintellectitself,whichistheunderstandingpower,mustbein"thisman"inthewayofaform,preciselyinorderthat"thisman"mayunderstand.Heseemstohavemadeamistakealsoinregardtothecharacterofconnectionitself,sincetheintelligiblespeciesisnotonewiththepossibleintellect,saveinsofarasithasbeenabstractedfromthephantasms:foronlysoisitunderstoodinact,whereasinsofarasitisinthephantasmsitisunderstoodonlyinpotency.11Bythisfact,then,isprovedratherthedisconnectionofthepossibleintellectfromthephantasmsthanitsconnectionwiththem,foritmustbethecasethattwothingsareentirelydisconnectedwhensomethingcannotbeunitedtooneofthemunlessithasbeenpreviouslyseparatedfromtheother.

Settingasidethisviewthenasimpossible,wemustconsiderthatPlatoproducedabetterresultbyassertingthat"thisman"understands,andyetthataspiritualsubstanceisnotunitedtothebodyasaform.For,asGregoryofNyssa12tellsus[DeAn.PGXLV,216],Platoassertedthattheintellectualsubstancewhichiscalledthesoulisunitedtothebodybyakindofspiritualcontact:andthisisunderstoodinthesenseinwhichathingthatmovesoractstouchesthethingthatismovedorispassive,eventhoughitbeincorporeal;andforthisreasonAristotlesaysinIDeGeneratione[6,323a28]thatcertainthingstouchandyetarenottouched,becausetheyactandarenotpassive.AndhencePlatousedtosay,astheaforesaidGregoryrelates,thatmanisnotsomethingthatiscomposedofsoulandbody,butisasoulusingabody,sothatheisunderstoodtobeinabodyinsomewhatthesamewayasasailorisinaship;andAristotleseemstobetouchinguponthisinIIDeAnima[1,413a8].Thus,then,"thisman"alsounderstands,inasmuchas"thisman"istheveryspiritualsubstancewhichisthesoul,whoseproperactisunderstand-

10"Aliarumintellecta"("thingsunderstoodofother..."),asfoundinthemanuscripts,cannotbeletstand.ThesenseisclearfromtheparallelpassageinDeUnit.Intell.c.3,§66:"Fromthisitwouldfollowthatmanwouldnotunderstand,butthathisphantasmswouldbeunderstoodbythepossibleintellect."11AshesaysinDeUnit.Intell.,c.3,§65,thespeciesinthephantasmandintheintellectcannoteffecttheconnectionofthese,becausethespeciesisnotnumericallythesameinboth.ThisargumentofAquinasisunacceptabletoAegidiusRomanus(DePluralitateIntellectus),becausehethinksthespeciesisthesame,butthatitexistsinbothinadifferentway.

12ThetextofNemesiusEmesenusisgiveninDeUnit.Intell.(c.3,§76):Plato"doesnotmeanthatmanismadeupofbodyandsoul,butthatheisasoulusingabodyand,asitwere,clothedwithabody."

ing,eventhough,nevertheless,thissubstancedoesnotexistastheformofthebody.

ButfortheinvalidationofthisargumenttheonepointsufficeswhichAristotlebringsforwarddirectlyagainstthispositioninIIDeAnima[1,412a].Forifthesoulwerenotunitedtothebodyasaform,itwouldfollowthatthebodyanditspartswouldnothavespecificactualbeingthroughthesoul;andthisisseentobeobviouslyfalse:becauseoncethesouldeparts,onedoesnotsayeyeorfleshorbone,saveequivocally,asonesayspaintedeyeoreyeofstone.Andhenceitisobviousthatthesoulistheformand"theessenceofthisbody",thatis,thatfromwhichthisbodyhasthecharacterofitsownspecies.Exactlyhowthiscanbe,however,wemustproceedtoinvestigate.

Nowitmustbeborneinmindthatthemoreperfectaformis,themoredoesitsurpasscorporealmatter.Thisisclearfrominductioninregardtothevariousordersofforms.Fortheformofanelementdoesnothaveanyactivitybuttheonewhichtakesplacethroughactiveandpassivequalities,whicharethedispositionsofcorporealmatter.Buttheform"mineralbody"hasanactivitythatgoesbeyondactiveandpassivequalities,andisaconsequenceofitsspeciesbyreasonoftheinfluenceofaheavenlybody;forinstance,thatamagnetattractsiron,andthatasapphirecuresanabscess.13Andfurther,thevegetativesoul(animavegetabilis)hasanactivitytowhichtheactiveandpassiveorganicqualitiesofcoursecontribute;butnevertheless,overandabovethepowerofqualitieslikethese,thesoulitselfachievesaneffectofitsownbynurtureandgrowthuptoadefinitelimit,andbycarryingonotherfunctionsofthissort.Andthesensingsoul(animasensitiva)hasafurtheractivitytowhichtheactiveandthepassivequalitiesdonotextendinanyway,saveinsofarastheyareneededforthecompositionoftheorganthroughwhichthissortofactivityisexercised;suchasseeing,hearing,desiring,andthelike.

Butthemostperfectofforms,thehumansoul,whichistheendofallnaturalforms,hasanactivitythatgoesentirelybeyondmatter,anddoesnottakeplacethroughacorporealorgan;namely,understanding.Andbecausetheactualbeingofathingisproportionedtoitsactivity,ashasbeensaid,sinceeachthingactsaccordingasitisabeing(ens),itmustbethecasethattheactualbeingofthehumansoulsurpassescorporealmatter,andisnottotallyincludedinit,butyetinsomewayistoucheduponbyit.Inasmuch,then,asitsurpassestheactualbeingofcorporealmatter,havingofitselfthepowertosubsistandtoact,thehumansoulisaspiritualsubstance;butinasmuchas

13Cf.DeUnit.Intell.,c.1,§27:"justasthemagnethasthepowertoattractiron,andthesapphiretostopbleeding."

itistoucheduponbymatterandsharesitsownactualbeingwithmatter,itistheformofthebody.Nowitistoucheduponbycorporealmatterforthisreason,thatthehighestpointofthelowestalwaystouchesthelowestpointofthehighest,asDionysiusmakesclearintheseventhchapter[lec.4]ofDeDivinisNominibus;andconsequentlythehumansoul,whichisthelowestintheorderofspiritualsubstances,cancommunicateitsownactualbeingtothehumanbody,whichisthehighestindignity,sothatfromthesoulandthebody,asfromformandmatter,asinglebeingresults.Butifaspiritualsubstancewerecomposedofmatterandform,itwouldbeimpossibleforittobethebody'sform:becauseitisessentialtomatterthatitbenotinanythingelse,butthatitshoulditselfbetheprimarysubject.

Astothefirstargument,therefore,itmustbesaidthataspiritualsubstance,althoughitisnotcompletelygraspedbythebody,isneverthelessinsomewayorothertoucheduponbyit,ashasbeensaid.

Astothesecond,itmustbesaidthatunderstandingisanactivityofthehumansoul,inasmuchasthesoulgoesbeyonditsrelationtocorporealmatterandconsequentlyunderstandingdoesnotcomeaboutthroughanycorporealorgan.Yetwemaysaythatthecompositeitself(thatis,man)understands,inasmuchasthesoul,whichisitsformalpart,hasthisproperactivity,justastheactivityofanypartisattributedtothewhole;foramanseeswithhiseye,walkswithhisfoot,andinlikefashionunderstandsthroughhissoul.

Astothethird,itmustbesaidthatthesoulhassubsistentactualbeing,inasmuchasitsownactualbeingdoesnotdependonthebody,seeingthatitissomethingraisedabovecorporealmatter.Andyetitreceivesthebodyintoashareinthisactualbeinginsuchawaythatthereisoneactualbeingofsoulandofbody,whichistheactualbeingofaman.Nowifthebodywereunitedtoitinconsequenceofanotheractualbeing,itwouldfollowthatthisunionwasaccidental.

Astothefourth,itmustbesaidthatthesoulbyitsveryessence,andnotonthebasisofsomethingadded,istheformofthebody.Nevertheless,inasmuchasitisaffectedbythebody,itisaform;butinasmuchasitgoesbeyondarelationshipwiththebody,itiscalledaspiritoraspiritualsubstance.

Astothefifth,itmustbesaidthatnoparthastheperfectionofanature,whenseparatedfromthewhole.Andhencethesoul,sinceitisapartofahumannature,doesnothavetheperfectionofitsownnature,saveinunionwiththebody.Thisisclearfromthefollowingfact:thesoulitselfhassuchvirtualitythatcertainpowerswhicharenotactsofcorporealorgansflowfromit,inasmuchasitgoesbeyonditsrelationshipwiththebody;andagain,thatpowerswhichareactsoftheorgansflowfromit,inasmuchasitcanbe

dependentoncorporeal

matter.Norisathingperfectinitsownnatureunlesswhatisvirtuallycontainedinitcanbeactuallybroughtout.Andhencethesoul,althoughitcanexistandcanunderstandwhenseparatedfromthebody,neverthelessdoesnothavetheperfectionofitsownnaturewhenitisseparatedfromthebody,asAugustinesaysinXIISuperGenesiadLitteram[35,68].

Astothesixth,itmustbesaidthat"miracle"isnottobetakeninthatpassageinthesenseofsomethingopposedtonaturalactivity,butinthesenseinwhichevennaturalworksthemselvesarecalledmiracles,seeingthattheyproceedfromtheincomprehensiblepowerofGod.AndinthissenseAugustinesaysinSuperJoannem[24,1],thatthefactthatGodproducesfromafewseedsasgreatanumberofsheavesofgrainasissufficienttofeedthewholehumanraceismoremarvelousthanthatHefedfivethousandmenwithfiveloavesofbread.

Astotheseventh,itmustbesaidthatthatthroughwhichathingisweakened,onceitsnaturehasbeenpresupposed,isnotsomethingnatural.Neverthelessitfrequentlyhappensthatthereissomethingwhichpertainstothenatureofathing,inconsequenceofwhichthereneverthelessfollowssomeweaknessordefectinthatthing:thus,forinstance,tobecomposedofcontrariesissomethingnaturaltoananimal,andinconsequenceofthisdeathandcorruptionfollowinit.Andsimilarlyitissomethingnaturalforthesoultoneedphantasmsforunderstanding,andyetinconsequenceofthisitfollowsthatthesoul,initsunderstanding,ismadelessthanhighersubstances.Asforthestatementthatthesoulisweigheddownbythebody,thisisnotaconsequenceofthebody'snature,butofitscorruption,accordingtothatpassageinWisdomIX[15]:"Thebodywhichiscorruptedisaloaduponthesoul."Butasforthestatementthatthesoulwithdrawsitselffromcorporealconnectionsinordertounderstanditself,thismustbeunderstoodasmeaningthatitabstractsitselffromthemasitabstractsfromobjects,becausethesoulisunderstoodthroughthenegationofallcorporeity.14Yetthesoulisnotwithdrawnfromtheminitsactualbeing;nay,rather,ifcertaincorporealorganshavebeenharmed,thesoulcannotdirectlyunderstandeitheritselforanythingelse,aswhenthebrainisinjured.

Astotheeighth,itmustbesaidthatthehigheraformis,themoredoesitneedtobeproducedbyamorepowerfulagent.Hence,sincethehumansoulisthehighestofallforms,itisproducedbythemostpowerfulagent,namely,God;yetinawayquitedifferentfromthe

14ThisiscertainlytheAristotelianexplanationofthe"flightfromsensiblethings,"butitdoesnotreproducethefullmeaningofsuchstatementsintheworksofthePlatonists.

wayinwhichotherformsareproducedbyanyagentswhatever.Fortheotherformsarenotsubsistent:andhencetheydonotpossessactualbeing,butsomethingshavebeingthroughthem;andhencetheircomingintobeingisduetothefactthatsomematterorsubjectisbroughtfrompotencyintoact:andthisisabringingforthoftheformfromthepotencyofmatter,withouttheadditionofanythingextrinsic.Butthesoulitselfhassubsistentactualbeing;andhencecomingintobeingisstrictlyduetoit,andthebodyisbroughtovertoitsactualbeing.Andonthisaccountitissaidthatthesoulexistsfromtheoutsideandthatitisnotbroughtforthfromthepotencyofmatter.Andhencethesolutiontotheninthargumentisclear.

Astothetenth,itmustbesaidthatspiritfitsinwithspiritratherthanwithbodybyacongruityofnature.Butbyacongruityofrelationshipwhichisrequiredbetweenformandmatter,spiritfitsinwithbodymorethanspiritdoeswithspirit:sincetwospiritsaretwoacts,whereasthebodyisrelatedtothesoulaspotencyistoact.

Astotheeleventh,itmustbesaidthattheangelandthesoularealikeintheirgenericnature,inasmuchasbothareintellectualsubstances.Buttheangelissuperiorinitsspecificnature,asDionysiusmakesclearinthefourthchapterofDeCaelestiHierarchia[§2].

Astothetwelfth,itmustbesaidthat"rational",understoodinthestrictsense,isthedifferenceof"soul",notof"angel",butrather''intellectual",asDionysiususestheterm;becauseanangeldoesnotknowtruththroughdiscursivereasoning(discursumrationis),butthroughsimpleinsight,whichisunderstandinginthestrictsense.Nevertheless,if"rational"betakeninawidesense,thenitmustbesaidthatitisnottheultimatespecificdifference,butisdividedintootherspecificdifferencesbecauseofthedifferentdegreesofunderstanding.

Astothethirteenth,itmustbesaidthattheintellectisnotsaidtobetheactofanypartofthebody,inasmuchasitisapowerthatdoesnotmakeuseofanorgan.Neverthelessthesoul'sverysubstanceisunitedtothebodyasaform,ashasbeensaid.

Astothefourteenth,itmustbesaidthatwithreferencetothosewomentherunningabout(discursus)issaidtotakeplaceinthespirit,notthatthespirit(thatis,thesubstanceofthesoul)functionsoutsidethebody,butbecausevisionsofthissortareformedinthespirit;thatis,inthesoul'simagination(inphantasticoanimae).

Astothefifteenth,itmustbesaidthatmatterwithoutform,strictlyspeaking,cannotbeasubject,seeingthat"subject"is,strictlyspeaking,usedofsomethingthatisactualbeing;but"livingbody"receivesthecharacterofactualbeing,soastobeabletobeasubject,fromnootherformthanthesoul,aswillbedemonstratedbelow(Art.III).

Astothesixteenth,itmustbesaidthat"corruptible"and"incorruptible"donotbelongtothesamegenus,fromthestandpointofnaturalphilosophy,becauseofthedifferentmodeofactualbeingandthedifferentcharacterofpotencyineach;althoughtheymaybelongtothesamelogicalgenus,whichisunderstoodonabasisoftheirintelligibleconceptalone.Nowthesoul,althoughitisincorruptible,isneverthelessinnoothergenusthanthebodybecause,sinceitisapartofahumannature,tobeinagenusorinaspeciesortobeapersonorhypostasisisnotcharacteristicofthesoul,butofthecomposite.Andhence,also,itcannotbecalled"thissomething",ifbythisphraseismeantanhypostasisorperson,oranindividualsituatedinagenusorinaspecies.Butif"thissomething"meanseverythingwhichisabletobeself-subsistent,inthissensethesoulis''thissomething."

Astotheseventeenth,itmustbesaidthatthatstatementoftheCommentatorisimpossible,ashasbeenpointedout.

Astotheeighteenth,itmustbesaidthatitisessentialtointellectualsubstancethatitbefreefrommatteronwhichitsbeingwoulddependassomethingtotallytieddownbymatter.Andhencenothingpreventsthesoulfrombeinganintellectualsubstanceandtheformofthebody,ashasbeensaidabove.

Astothenineteenth,itmustbesaidthatoutofahumansoulandbodyasinglethingcomesintobeinginsuchawaythatthesoulneverthelesssurpassesitsrelationshiptothebody;andbecauseofthatpartbywhichitsurpassesthebody,intellectualpowerisattributedtoit.Andhencetheintelligiblespecieswhichareintheintellectneednotbereceivedincorporealmatter.

ArticleIIIThethirdquestionis:Isthespiritualsubstance,whichisthehumansoul,unitedtothebodythroughamedium?1

Anditwouldseemthatitis.1ForDionysiussaysinthethirteenthchapterofDeCaelestiHierarchia[§3]thatthehighestthingsarejoinedtothelowestthroughintermediates.Butbetweenaspiritualsubstanceandabodythereareintermediates,thevegetativesoulandthesentientsoul.Thereforethespiritualsubstancewhichistherationalsoulisunitedtothebodythroughthemediumofthevegetativeandthesentientsouls.

2Furthermore,thePhilosophersaysinIIDeAnima[1,412b5]that"itistheactofanorganicbodyhavinglifepotentially."Thephysicalorganicbody,therefore,havinglifepotentially,isrelatedtothesoulasmatteristoform.Butthislatter,namely,thephysicalorganicbody,doesnotexistexceptthroughsomesubstantialform.Thereforethatsubstantialform,whateveritmaybe,ispresentinmatterbeforethespiritualsubstancewhichistherationalsoul,andsoforthesamereasonaretheothersubsequentforms,whicharethesentientandthevegetativesouls.

3Furthermore,althoughmatterisnotagenusandformisnotadifference,becauseneitheroftheseispredicatedofthecompositewhereasgenusanddifferencearepredicatedofthespecies;nevertheless,accordingtothePhilosopherinVIIIMetaphysica[2,1043a19;3,1043b30]thegenusisderivedfromthematterandthedifferencefromtheform.Butthegenusofmanis"animal",whichisderivedfromasentientnature,whereasthedifferenceis"rational",whichisderivedfromtherationalsoul.Thereforethesentientnatureisrelatedtotherationalsoulasmatteristoform.Butthesentientnatureisperfectedbythesentientsoul.Thereforethesentientsoulexistsinnaturebeforetherationalsoul,andforthesamereasonsodoalltheotherpreviousforms.

4Furthermore,asisproveninVIIIPhysica[4,254b22],everyself-movingthingisdividedintotwoparts,ofwhichoneisthemoverandtheothertheobjectmoved.Butmanandanyanimalwhateverisaself-movingthing;nowthemotorpartofitisthesoul,andthe

1DeNaturaMateriae,cc.89(aworkthatisprobablygenuine);ContraGentilesII,cap.71;SummaTheol.*,I,q.76,a.3,4,6,7;Q.DeAnima*9;InIIDeAn.,lec.1,234;InVIIIMet.lec.5;Quodl.I,a.6;XII,a.9;Compend.theol.,9192;(ThequestionisnottakenupinComment.inSent.,andisscarcelyraisedinContraGentiles;lateritwashiscustomtotreatitindetail.)Avicenna,LiberDeSufficientia1,c.2(ontheformofcorporeity)IsaacdeStella,EpistolaDeAnions,PL194,1881.AlcherusdeClaravalle,DeSpirituetAnimaPLXL,780,c.14andelsewhere.

Phil.Cancellarius,DeAn.,q.10b(xvii).Guil.Alvernus,DeAn.VI,3536(indirectly).Ioan.deRupella,DeAn.I,3537.Alex.Halensis,SummaII,1,p.419sqq.SummaPhilos.,tr.4,c.13(andelsewhere,teachingthepluralityofforms).RogerBacon.Comm.Nat.IV,3,c.4.AlbertusM.,SummaTheol.II,tr.13,q.77,m.1,vol.33p.68.

movedpartcannotbemerematterbutmustbeabody,becauseeverythingthatismovedisabody,asisproveninVIPhysica[4and10].Nowabodyexiststhroughsomeform.Thereforesomeformexistsinmatterprevioustothesoul;andsowecometothesameconclusionasbefore.

5Furthermore,Damascenesays[DeFideOrth.III,6,PG,XCIV,1006]thatsogreatisthesimplicityoftheDivineEssence,thatitisnotfittingfortheWordtobeunitedtothefleshexceptthroughthemediumofasoul.Thereforeadifferencebasedon"simple"and"composite"preventssomethingsfrombeingabletobeconjoinedwithoutamedium.Buttherationalsoulandthebodydifferverywidelyonabasisof''simple"and"composite."Therefore,itmustbethecasethattheyareunitedthroughamedium.

6Furthermore,St.AugustinesaysinhisbookDeSpirituetAnima[XIV,PLXL,789]that"thesoulwhichistrulyaspiritandthefleshwhichistrulyabodyareeasilyandconvenientlyconjoinedintheirextremities,thatis,inthesoul'simagination(inphantasticoanimae),whichisnotabodybutislikeabody,andinthebody'ssense-appetite(sensualitate),whichisalmostaspirit,becauseitcannotcomeintobeingwithoutthesoul."Thesoul,then,isconjoinedtothebodythroughtwomedia,namely,theimaginationandthesense-appetite.

7Furthermore,inthesamebook[XV]itissaid:"Althoughthesoulisincorporeal,itmanagesthebodythroughthemoresubtlepartofthenatureofitsbody,thatis,throughfireandair."2Nowthesoulmanagesthebodyinthesamewayinwhichitisunitedtoit;forwhentheelementsthroughwhichthesoulmanagesthebodyarelacking,thesouldepartsfromthebody,asAugustinesaysinVIISuperGenesiadLitteram[19].Thereforethesoulisunitedtothebodythroughamedium.

8Furthermore,thingswhichdiffermostwidelyarenotconjoinedunlessthroughamedium.Butthecorruptibleandtheincorruptiblediffermostwidely,asissaidinXMetaphysica[10,1058b28].Thereforethehumansoul,whichisincorruptible,isnotunitedtothecorruptiblebodyexceptthroughamedium.

9Furthermore,acertainphilosopher3saysinthebookDeDifferentiaSpiritusetAnimaethatthesoulisunitedtothebodythroughthemediumofaspirit.Thereforeitisunitedtoitthroughamedium.

2ThisisfoundalmostwordforwordinAugustinealso(DeGen.adLitt.III,5,7;VII,19,25).3CostabenLuca,whoseworkwastranslatedinthetwelfthcenturybyJohnofSpain,andwaslecturedoninthefacultyofartsoftheUniversityofParis.C.S.Baruchhaspublishedsomeselections(Bibliothecaphilos.mediaeaetatis,Innsbruck,1878).

10Furthermore,thosethingswhichareessentiallydifferentarenotunitedwithoutamedium.Fortheremustbesomethingwhichmakestheseone,asisclearfromVIIIMetaphysica[6,1045a].Butthesoulandthebodyareessentiallydifferent.Thereforetheycannotbeunitedexceptthroughamedium.

11Furthermore,thesoulisunitedtothebodyinorderthatitmaybeperfectedbyaunionofthissort,becausetheformdoesnotexistformatter,butmatterforform.Nowthesoulisperfectedinconsequenceofitsunionwiththebody,especiallyasregardsunderstandingthroughphantasms,namely,insofarasitunderstandsbyabstractingfromphantasms.Thereforeitisunitedtothebodythroughphantasms,whichareneitheroftheessenceofthebodynoroftheessenceofthesoul.Thereforethesoulisunitedtothebodythroughamedium.

12Furthermore,beforethecomingoftherationalsoulthebodyinthewombofthemotherhassomeform.Nowwhentherationalsoulcomes,itcannotbesaidthatthisformdisappears,becauseitdoesnotlapseintonothingness,norwoulditbepossibletospecifyanythingintowhichitmightreturn.Thereforesomeformexistsinthematterprevioustotherationalsoul.

13Furthermore,intheembryobeforethecomingoftherationalsoul,vitalfunctionsaremanifest,asisclearfromXVIDeAnimalibus[DeGenerationeAnimaliumII,3,736b12].Butvitalfunctionscomeonlyfromthesoul.Thereforeanothersoulexistsinthebodybeforethecomingoftherationalsoul;andthusitseemsthattherationalsoulisunitedtothebodythroughthemediumofanothersoul.

14Furthermore,since"abstractionisnotfalsification,"asissaidinIIPhysica[2,193b35],thebodyaboutwhichmathematiciansspeakmusthavesomesortofactualbeing.Since,therefore,itisnotseparatedfromsensiblethings,itfollowsthatitisinthesensiblethings.Butfortheverybeingofabodythereisneededaformofcorporeity.Thereforetheformofcorporeity,atleast,ispresupposedinthehumanbody,whichisasensiblebody,priortothehumansoul.4

15Furthermore,inVIIMetaphysica[11,1036a26]itissaidthateverydefinitionhasparts,andthatthepartsofadefinitionareforms.Inanythingthatisdefined,therefore,theremustbeseveralforms.Since,therefore,manisakindofdefinedthing,itisnecessarytopositinhimseveralforms;andsosomeformexistsbeforetherationalsoul.

16Furthermore,nothingimpartswhatitdoesnotpossess.Buttherationalsouldoesnotpossesscorporeity,sinceitisincorporeal;thereforeitdoesnotimpartcorporeitytoman,andsomanmusthavethisfromanotherform.

4HereheseemstobereferringtoAvicenna,LiberSufficientiaeI,c.2,whereitisprovedthatthereisaformofcorporeity.

17Furthermore,theCommentatorsays[InIMet.,comm.17]thatprimematterreceivesuniversalformsbeforeparticularones;thus,itreceivestheform"body"beforetheform"animatebody",andsoforth.Since,therefore,thehumansoulistheultimateformandthemostspecificone,itseemsthatitpresupposesotheruniversalformsinmatter.

18Furthermore,theCommentatorsaysinhisbookDeSubstantiaOrbis[I]thatdimensionsexistinmatterbeforetheelementaryforms.Butdimensionsareaccidents,5andpresupposesomesubstantialforminmatter;otherwiseaccidentalactualbeingwouldbepriortosubstantialactualbeing.Therefore,priortotheformofasimpleelementthereexistsbeforehandinmattersomeothersubstantialform;hence,forallthegreaterreason,priortotherationalsoul.

19Furthermore,accordingtothePhilosopherinhisbookDeGeneratione[II,4,331a],airismoreeasilyconvertedintofirethanwaterisbecauseofthefactthatitagreeswithfireinonequality,namely,heat.When,therefore,firecomesintobeingoutofair,itisnecessarythattheheatremainspecificallythesame:becauseiftheheatoffireandtheheatofairwerespecificallydifferent,therewouldbeeightprimaryqualitiesandnotfouronly;forthesamereasoningwouldapplytotheotherqualities,everyoneofwhichisfoundintwoelements.If,therefore,oneweretosaythatitremainsspecificallythesamebutnumericallydifferent,6theconversionofairintofirewillnotbeeasierthanthatofwaterintofire,becausetheformoffirewillhavetobreakuptwoqualitiesintheairjustasitdoesinwater.Theonlyremainingalternative,therefore,isthattheheatisnumericallythesame.Butthiscannotbeunlessthereisalreadyinexistencesomesubstantialform,whichremainsoneinbothandpreservesthesubjectofheatasone;foranaccidentcannotbenumericallyoneunlessitssubjectisalreadyone.Onemustthereforesaythatpriortotheformofasimplebody,somesubstantialformispresupposedinmatter;muchmoreso,then,priortotherationalsoul.

20Furthermore,primematterconsideredsimplyinitselfisquiteindifferenttoallforms.If,then,certainformsanddispositions,throughwhichprimematterisspecializedtothisortothatparticularform,donotexistbeforeothers,thisparticularformwillnotbereceivedinprimematterinpreferencetoanotherparticularform.

5Dimensions,namely,indeterminatedimensions,whichSt.Thomasdefendsinseveralplaces(v.g.,InIVSent.,d.12,q.1,a.2,sol.4;InBoeth.DeTrin.,q.4,a.2;ContraGentilesIV,cap.81,etc.),butinthe(genuine?)workDeNaturaMateriae(c.4),herefutesthemwithmanyarguments,nordoeshesubscribetotheminhislaterworks.6Namely,inairthehotandthemoist,inwaterthecoldandthemoist.ThiswholedifficultyisdiscussedatlengthinDeNaturaMateriae(cc.89).

21Furthermore,matterisunitedtoformthroughthepotencywherebyitisabletounderlieform.Butthatpotencyisnotthesameastheessenceofmatter:forinthatcasematterwouldbeexactlyassimpleasGod,WhoisHisownpotency.Somemedium,therefore,comesinbetweenmatterandthesoulandanyotherform.

Butontheotherhand,ithereisthispassageinthebookDeEcclesiasticisDogmatibus[XV,PLXLII,1216]:"Neitherdowesaythattherearetwosoulsinman,...one,ananimalsoul,whichgiveslifetothebody,...theother,aspiritualsoul,whichsubservesreason."Fromthisweargueasfollows:justasmanbelongstothegenus"animal",sohebelongstothegenus"animatebody",and"body",and"substance''.Butthroughthatoneandthesameformwhichisthesoul,heisbothmanandanimal,asisclearfromthepassagequotedabove.Bythesamereasoning,therefore,throughthatoneandthesameformheisgivenaplaceinallthehighergenera;andthustheredoesnotexistanyforminmatterpriortothesoul.

iiFurthermore,Godandthesouldiffermorewidelythandosoulandbody.ButinthemysteryoftheIncarnation,theWordwasunitedtothesoulimmediately.Therefore,forallthegreaterreasoncanthesoulbeimmediatelyunitedtothebody.

iiiFurthermore,whatisintermediatemusthavesomethingincommonwithbothoftheextremes.Buttherecannotbeanythingwhichispartlycorporealandpartlyspiritual.Therefore,therecannotbeanymediumbetweensoulandbody.

ivFurthermore,theMastersaysinhisfirstdistinction[PL,CLXXXXII,655]ofIISententiaethattheunionofthesoulwiththebodyisanillustrationofthatblessedunionwherebythebeatifiedsoulisconjoinedwithGod.Butthatconjunctiontakesplacewithoutanymedium.Thereforetheformeruniondoesalso.

vFurthermore,thePhilosophersaysinIDeAnima[6,411b7]thatthebodydoesnotholdthesoultogether,butratherthesoulholdsthebodytogether;andinthesameplacetheCommentatorsays[comm.90,91]thatthesoulisthecauseofthebody'scontinuity.Butthebody'scontinuitydependsonthesubstantialformwherebythebodyisabody.Thereforetherationalsoulitselfistheforminmanwherebythebodyisabody.

viFurthermore,therationalsoulismoreefficaciousandmorepowerfulthanistheformofasimpleelement.Butfromtheformofasimpleelementasimplebodypossesseswhateveritsubstantiallyis.Therefore,forallthegreaterreasondoesthehumanbodyhavefromthesoulwhateveritsubstantiallyis;andsotheredoesnotexistbeforehandanyformoranymedium.

ANSWER.Itmustbesaidthatthetruthofthisquestiondependstosomeextentontheprecedingone.Foriftherationalsoulisunitedtothebodyonlythroughvirtualcontact,likeamover,assomehaveasserted,nothingwouldpreventusfromsayingthattherearemanyintermediatesbetweenthesoulandthebody,andmoresobetweenthesoulandprimematter.Butifitbeassertedthatthesoulisunitedtothebodyasaform,itmustbesaidthatitisunitedtothebodyimmediately.Foreveryform,whethersubstantialoraccidental,isunitedtomatterortoasubject.Foreachindividualthingisoneonthesamebasisonwhichitisabeing.Now,eachindividualthingisactuallyabeingthroughaform,whetherinthecaseofactualsubstantialbeingorinthecaseofactualaccidentalbeing.Andhenceeveryformisanact,andasaconsequenceitisthereasonfortheunitywherebyagiventhingisone.Therefore,justaswecannotsaythatthereisanyothermediumwherebymatterhasactualbeingthroughitsownform,soitcannotbesaidthatthereisanyothermediumunitingaformtomatterortoasubject.Inconsequenceofthefactthatthesoul,then,istheformofthebody,therecannotbeanymediumbetweenthesoulandthebody.Butinconsequenceofthefactthatitisamover,fromthispointofviewnothingpreventsourassertingmanymediathere:forobviouslythesoulmovestheothermembersofthebodythroughtheheart,andalsomovesthebodythroughthespirit.7

Butthenthereisstilladoubtaboutwhatisthepropersubjectofthesoul,whichisrelatedtoitasmatteristoform.Foronthispointtherearetwoopinions.Forsomesaythattherearemanysubstantialformsinthesameindividual,andthatoneoftheseisthesubstrateofanother;andonthisviewprimematterisnottheimmediatesubjectoftheultimatesubstantialform,butunderliesit,withintermediateformsactingasmedia,sothatmatteritself,viewedassubjectofaform,istheproximatesubjectofthesecondform;andsoondowntotheultimateform.Thus,then,theproximatesubjectoftherationalsoulisthebodyperfectedbythesentientsoul,andtothislatterisunitedtherationalsoulasaform.Theotheropinionisthatinoneindividualthereisbutonesubstantialform;andonthisviewitisnecessarytosaythatthroughthesubstantialform,whichisthehumansoul,thisindividualhasnotonly"beingman",but"beinganimal",and"beingalive",and''beingbody",and"substance",and"being."Andthusinthisparticularman

7Cf.Q.DeAn.(9,ad13):"Itmustbesaidthattheheartistheprimaryinstrumentbymeansofwhichthesoulmovestheotherpartsofthebody;andthereforethroughitasamediumthesoulisunitedtotheotherpartsofthebodyasthemover";ibid.,ad7:"althoughthesameeffectispartlyproducedbythedissolution,causedbytheblood,ofthosehumorswherebytheheartisdilatedandcontracted."Perhapsthenourtextoughttoread:"andalsomovestheheartthroughthespirit."

noothersubstantialformispriortothehumansoul,andconsequentlyneitherisanyaccidentalform;becauseinthatcaseonewouldhavetosaythatprimematterisfirstperfectedthroughanaccidentalformratherthanthroughthesubstantialform,whichisimpossible:foreveryaccidentmustbegroundedonsomesubstance.

Nowthediversityofthesetwoopinionsproceedsfromthefactthatsome,inordertoinvestigatethetruthsofnature,havetakenastheirstartingpointintelligibleessences,andthiswascharacteristicofthePlatonists;whereassomebeganwithsensiblethings,andthiswascharacteristicofthephilosophyofAristotle,asSimpliciussaysinhiscommentarySuperPraedicamenta[Preface].ThePlatonistsenvisagedadefiniteorderofgeneraandspecies,andheldthatthehighercanalwaysbeunderstoodapartfromthelower,as,forinstance,"man"apartfrom"thisman",and''animal"apartfrom"man",andsoon.Theythoughtalsothatwhateverisabstractintheintellectisabstractinreality;otherwiseitseemedtothemthattheabstractingintellectwouldbefalseorfutile,iftherewerenoabstractthingcorrespondingtoit;andonthisaccounttheyalsobelievedthatmathematicalobjectsexistapartfromsensiblethings,becausetheyareunderstoodapartfromthem.8Hencetheyasserted"manintheabstract"apartfrom"thesemen",andsoonupto"being",and"one",and"good",whichtheyassertedasthehighestvirtueofthings.Fortheysawthatthelowerisalwaysmoreparticularthanwhatisaboveit,andthatthenatureofthehigherisparticipatedbythelower;now,thatwhichparticipatesservesasthematerialelementforthatwhichisparticipated,andhencetheyassertedthatamongabstractthingsthemoreuniversalathingis,themoreitissomethingformal.

Butsome,startingoutalongthesameroad,assertedonthecontrarythatthemoreuniversalaformis,themorematerialitis.AndthisisthepositionofAvicebroninhisbookFonsVitae9:heassertedaprimematterwithoutanyformwhichhecalleduniversalmatter;andhesaidthatitiscommontospiritualandcorporealsubstances,andtoit,hesaid,thereisaddedauniversalformwhichistheformofsubstance.Now,matterthusexistingundertheformofsubstance,hesaid,receivesinapartofitselftheformofcorporeity,whileanotherpartofitwhichpertainstospiritualsubstancesremainswithoutaformofthissort.Andsoheproceededtoassertinmatteroneformunderanotheraccordingtotheorderofgeneraandspecies,downtotheulti-

8Itmaybethecasethatchangesfromthepluraltothesingularnumber,whicharecommontoallourmanuscripts,wereintheautographtextitself,theauthorsometimesthinkingofthePlatonists,sometimesofPlato.9CompareasimilarexpositionandrefutationofAvicebron'sdoctrineinArt.I,ad9.TherepetitioncanbeexplainedonthegroundthatSt.ThomasherewishestoshowthesimilaritybetweenAvicebron'sdoctrineandthatofthePlatonists.

matespecificspecies.Andthisposition,althoughitseemstodisagreewiththefirst,neverthelessinactualtruthagreeswithitandisaconsequenceofit.ForthePlatonistsassertedthatthemoreuniversalandthemoreformalacauseis,themoreremoteisitsperfectioninagivenindividual:andhenceasaneffectofthefirstabstract,thatis,ofthegood,theyputdownprimematter,10inordertohaveaprimarysubjectcorrespondingtothesupremeagent;andsofollowing,accordingtotheorderofabstractcausesandformsthathaveashareinmatter,justasamoreuniversalabstractismoreformal,soamoreuniversalparticipatedformismorematerial.

Butthisposition,accordingtothetrueprinciplesofphilosophywhichAristotleconsidered,isanimpossibleone.Inthefirstplace,becausenoindividualinstanceofsubstancewouldbe"one"inanunqualifiedsense.Forathingthatisoneinanunqualifiedsensedoesnotcomeintobeingfromtwoacts,butfrompotencyandactinasmuchasthatwhichisinpotencycomesintobeingactually.Andonthisaccount"whiteman"isnotoneinanunqualifiedsense,but''two-footedanimal"isoneinanunqualifiedsense,becausetheverythingwhichisanimalistwo-footed.Butif"animal"weresomethinginisolation,andif"two-footed"weresomethinginisolation,"man"wouldnotbeonebutseveral,asthePhilosopherarguesinIIIandinVIIIMetaphysica[4,999b25;6,1045a16].Itisobvious,therefore,thatiftherewereamanifoldofmanysubstantialformsinoneindividualinstanceofsubstance,theindividualinstanceofsubstancewouldnotbeoneinanunqualifiedsense,butinaqualifiedsense,like"whiteman."

Secondly,becausetheessentialcharacterofanaccidentconsistsinthefactthatitisinasubject,yetinthissense,thatbyasubjectismeantanactualbeingandnotonemerelyinpotency,andinthissenseasubstantialformisnotinasubjectbutinmatter.Wheneverthereisaform,therefore,ofwhichsomeactualbeingisasubstrateinanysense,thatformisanaccident.Nowitisobviousthatanysubstantialform,whateveritmaybe,makesabeingactualandisaconstituentthereof;andhenceitfollowsthatonlythefirstformwhichcomestomatterissubstantial,whereasallthosethatcomelaterareaccidental.11Andthisisnotruledoutbywhatsomesay,thatthefirstformisinpotencytothesecondform;becauseeverysubjectisrelatedtoitsownaccidentaspotencyistoact.Besides,aformofabodywhichwouldbestowcapacityforlifewouldbemorecompletethanonewhichdid

10SuchisthedoctrineofProclus(Instit.Theol.,72),butnotofPlotinus,namely,thatthemostformalanduniversalcause,becauseitspowerhasthewidestrange,producesthelowestand,asitwere,themostdistanteffectinthings;andthiseffectismatter.11AshesaysinQ.De.An.9,resp.:"betweensubstantialformandmatter,therecannotoccuranyintermediatesubstantialform."

not:andhence,iftheformofanon-livingbodymakesthatbodytobeanactualsubject,muchmoredoestheformofabodythathaslifeinpotencymakethatbodytobeanactualsubject;andthusthesoulwouldbeaforminasubject,whichistheessentialcharacteristicofanaccident.

Thirdly,becauseitwouldfollowthatintheacquiringofthelastform,therewouldbegenerationnotinanunqualifiedsensebutinaqualifiedsenseonly.Forsincegenerationisachangingoverfromnonbeingintoactualbeing,athingisgeneratedinanunqualifiedsensewhenitbecomesabeing,unqualifiedlyspeaking,fromnon-beinginanunqualifiedsense.Nowathingwhichisalreadyinexistenceasanactualbeingcannotbecomeabeinginanunqualifiedsense,butitcanbecome"thisparticularbeing",as,forinstance,"whitebeing"or"largebeing",andthisisbecominginaqualifiedsense.Since,then,itistheprecedingforminmatterwhichproducesactualbeing,asubsequentformwillnotproduceactualbeinginanunqualifiedsense,but"beingthisparticularthing",as,forinstance,''beingman"or"beingass"or"beingplant";andsotherewillnotbegenerationinanunqualifiedsense.Andonthisaccount,alltheancientswhoassertedthatprimematterisactuallysomething,suchasfireorairorwaterorsomethinginbetween,saidthatbecomingwasnothingbutchange;12andAristotlesolvestheirdifficultybyassertingthatmatterexistsonlyinpotency,andhesaysthatitisthesubjectofgenerationandcorruptioninanunqualifiedsense.Andbecausematterisneverdenudedofallform,onthisaccountwheneveritreceivesoneformitlosesanother,andviceversa.

Thus,therefore,wesaythatin"thisman"thereisnoothersubstantialformthantherationalsoul,andthatbyitmanisnotonlyman,butanimal,andlivingbeing,andbody,andsubstance,andbeing.Andthiscanbethoughtoutinthefollowingway.Fortheformisalikenessoftheagentinthematter.13Now,inthecaseofactiveandfunctioningpowerswhatwefindisthis,thatthehigherapoweris,themorethingsdoesitincludewithinitself,notincompositefashionbutasaunit;thus,forinstance,asasinglepowerthecommonsenseextendsitselftoallsense-objects,whichthespecialsensesapprehendasdifferentpowers.Now,itischaracteristicofamoreperfectagenttoproduceamoreperfectform.Andhenceamoreperfectformdoesbymeansofonethingallthatlowerformsdobymeansofdifferentthings,andstillmore:forexample,iftheformofnon-livingbodyconfersonmatter"actualbeing"and"beingabody",theformofplantwillconferonitthistoo,and"life"besides;andthesentientsoulwillconfer

12ThispassagecoincidesalmostverbatimwithSummaTheol.I,q.76,a.4,resp.13Foranagentproducessomethingthatislikeitself,anditactsbyintroducingaform.

thistooandbesidesitwillconfer"sentientbeing";andtherationalsoulwillalsoconferthisandbesidesitwillconfer"rationalbeing".Forthisisthewayinwhichtheformsofnaturalthingsarefoundtodifferintheorderofincreasingperfection,asiscleartoanyonewholooksatallthegeneraandspeciesofnaturalthings;andonthisaccountthespeciesarecomparedtonumbers,asissaidinVIIIMetaphysica[3,1043b33],thespeciesofwhicharemadedifferentthroughaddingandsubtractingone.AndhenceAristotlealsosaysinIIDeAnima[3,414b31]:"Thevegetativeisinthesentient,"andthesentientisintheintellectual,14as"atriangleisinaquadrilateral''andaquadrilateralinapentagon;forapentagonvirtuallycontainsaquadrilateral:forithasthisandstillmore;notthatsomethingpropertoaquadrilateralandsomethingpropertoapentagonexistsoutsidethepentagon,asthoughthereweretwofigures.Soalsotheintellectualsoulvirtuallycontainsthesentientsoul,becauseithasthisandstillmore,yetnotinsuchawaythattherearetwosouls.Nowifweweretosaythattheintellectualsouldifferedessentiallyfromthesentientsoulinman,noreasoncouldbegivenfortheunionoftheintellectualsoulwiththebody,sincenoactivitypropertotheintellectualsoultakesplacethroughacorporealorgan.

Astothefirstargument,therefore,itmustbesaidthatthequotationfromDionysiusmustbeunderstoodasreferringtoefficientcauses,nottoformalcauses.

Astothesecond,itmustbesaidthatsincethemostperfectformimpartseverythingwhichthemoreimperfectformsimpartandstillmore;matter,accordingasitisperfectedbythisforminthesamekindofperfectionwhereinitisperfectedbymoreimperfectforms,isconsideredaspropermatterinrelationtothatkindofperfectionwhichthemoreperfectformaddsoverandabovetheothers;yetinsuchawaythatthisdistinctionamongformsisnotunderstoodassomethingbasedontheiressence,butonlyassomethingbasedontheirintelligibleconcept.Thus,therefore,matteritselfaccordingasitisunderstoodtobeperfectincorporealbeingcapableofreceivinglife,isthepropersubjectofthesoul.

Astothethird,itmustbesaidthatsince"animal"isthatwhichisreally"man",thedistinctionofanimalnaturefrommanisnotbasedonarealdiversityofformsasthoughtherewereoneformwherebythebeingisanimal,andanothersuperaddedformwherebyitisman;butthisdistinctionisbasedonintelligibleconcepts.Foraccordingas

14Thereadingofthemanuscriptsiscertainlyincorrect;cf.Q.DeAn.2,obj.3:"ThePhilosophersaysinDeAn.IIthatjustasatriangleisinaquadrilateralandaquadrilateralisinapentagon,sothenutritivepowerisinthesentient,andthesentientisintheintellectual":andsoinmanyotherplacestothesameeffect.TheanalogyisexplainedmorefullyinDeUnit.Intell.,c.1,§49.

thebodyisunderstoodasperfectedinsensiblebeingbythesoul,inthissenseitisrelatedtotheultimateperfection,whichcomesfromtherationalsoulassuch,asamaterialelementisrelatedtoaformalelement.Forsincegenusandspeciessignifycertainconceptualentities,arealdistinctionofformsisnotneededforthedistinctionbetweenaspeciesandagenus,butonlyamentaldistinction.

Astothefourth,itmustbesaidthatthesoulmovesthebodythroughknowledgeandappetite.However,thesentientandtheappetitivepowerinananimalhaveadefiniteorgan,andthusthemovementoftheanimaloriginatesinthatorganwhichistheheart,accordingtoAristotle[DeGener.Anim.II,6,etsaepe].Thus,then,onepartoftheanimaliswhatdoesthemovingandtheotheristhepartthatismoved,sothatthemovingpartmaybetakentobetheprimaryorganoftheappetitivesoul,andtheremainderofthebodyiswhatismoved.Butbecauseinmanthemovingisdonebythewillandtheintellect,whicharenotactsofanyorgan,thethingthatdoesthemovingwillbethesoulitself,consideredonitsintellectualside,whereasthemovedthingwillbethebody,consideredassomethingwhichisperfectedbythatsoulincorporealbeing.

Astothefifth,itmustbesaidthatintheIncarnationoftheWord,thesoulissetdownasanintermediarybetweentheWordandtheflesh,notofnecessitybutbecauseoffitness;andhencealso,whenthesoulwasseparatedfromthebodyatthedeathofChrist,theWordremainedimmediatelyunitedtotheflesh.

Astothesixth,itmustbesaidthatthatbookis.notAugustine's,15norisitveryauthentic,andinthisquotationthelanguageisratherinexact.Forboththingspertaintothesoul,boththeimaginationandthesense-appetite:nevertheless,thesense-appetiteissaidtobeconnectedwiththeflesh,insofarasitisanappetiteforthingspertainingtothebody;whereastheimaginationissaidtobeconnectedwiththesoul,insofarasinittherearelikenessesofbodiesapartfrombodies.Nowthesearesaidtobeintermediatebetweenthesoulandtheflesh,notconsideringthesoulastheformofthebody,butconsideringitasthemover.

Astotheseventh,itmustbesaidthatthemanagementofthebodypertainstothesoulinsofarasitisthemover,notinsofarasitistheform.Andalthoughthosethingsbywhichthesoulmanagesthebodyarenecessaryforthesoul'sbeinginthebody,astheproperdispositionsofthissortofmatter,neverthelessitdoesnotfollowfromthisthatthe

15AlcherofClairvauxwroteitabout1165.Cf.below,Art.XI,ad2;andQ.DeAn.12,ad1;"ItmustbesaidthatthebookDeSpirituetAnimaisnotAugustine's,butissaidtohavebeenthatofacertainCistercian;norismuchaccounttobetakenofwhatissaidinit."

characterofthemanagementandoftheformalunionisthesame.Forjustasthesoul,whichisthemoverandtheform,isinsubstancethesamesoul,butisthoughtofasdifferent,soalsothethingswhicharenecessaryfortheformalunionandforthemanagementarethesamethings,althoughnotconsideredfromthesamepointofview.

Astotheeighth,itmustbesaidthatthefactthatthesouldiffersfromthebodyaswhatiscorruptiblefromwhatisincorruptibledoesnotexcludeitsbeingtheformofthebody,asisclearfromwhatwassaidabove[Art.II,ad16];henceitfollowsthatitisunitedimmediatelytothebody.

Astotheninth,itmustbesaidthatthesoulissaidtobeunitedtothebodythroughthespirit,insofarasitisthemover,becausethatwhichismovedfirstbythesoulinthebodyisthespirit,asAristotlesaysinhisbookDeCausaMotusAnimalium16[X,703a10];yetthatbooktooisnotveryauthoritative.

Astothetenth,itmustbesaidthatifanytwothingsareessentiallydifferentinsuchawaythateachhasthecompletenatureofitsownspecies,theycannotbeunitedexceptthroughsomebindingandunitingmedium.Now,thesoulandthebodyarenotofthissort,sincetheyarebothnaturallyapartofman,buttheyarerelatedtoeachotherasmatteristoform,andtheirunionisimmediate,ashasbeenshown.

Astotheeleventh,itmustbesaidthatthesoulisunitedtothebodynotmerelyinordertobeperfectedasregardsunderstandingthroughphantasms,butalsoasregardsitsspecificnatureandasregardstheotheractivitieswhichitexercisesthroughthebody.Nevertheless,evengrantingthatthesoulisunitedtothebodymerelyforthesakeofunderstandingthroughphantasms,itwouldnotfollowthattheunionwouldtakeplacethroughthemediumofaphantasm:forthesoulisunitedtothebodyforunderstandinginthissense,thatthroughitmanmayunderstand;andthiswouldnotbethecaseiftheuniontookplacethroughphantasms,aswasshownabove.

Astothetwelfth,itmustbesaidthatthebody,beforeitreceivesasoul,hassomeform;however,thatformdoesnotremainwhenthesoulcomes.Forthecomingofthesoultakesplacethroughakindofgeneration,andthegenerationofonethingdoesnotoccurwithoutthecorruptionoftheother;thus,forinstance,whentheformoffireisreceivedinthematterofair,theformofairceasestobeinitactuallyandremainsinpotencyonly.Normustitbesaidthattheformcomesintobeingoriscorrupted,becausecomingintobeingandbeingcorruptedarecharacteristicsofthatwhichhasactualbeing,andactualbeingdoesnotbelongtoaformastosomethingthatexists,butastothatwhereby

16 isgenerallyregardedasspurious.

somethingis.Andhence,too,nothingbutthecompositeissaidtocomeintobeing,insofarasitisbroughtfrompotencyintoact.

Astothethirteenth,itmustbesaidthatintheembryocertainvitalfunctionsaremanifest.Butsomehavesaidthatsuchfunctionscomefromthesoulofthemother;butthisisimpossiblebecauseitisanessentialcharacteristicofvitalfunctionsthattheycomefromanintrinsicprinciplewhichisthesoul.Ontheotherhand,somehavesaidthatfromtheoutsetthevegetativesoulispresent;andthatsamesoul,whenitisfurtherperfected,becomesthesentientsoul,andatlengthbecomestheintellectualsoul,butthroughtheactionofanoutsideagentwhichisGod.Butthisisimpossible:first,becauseitwouldfollowthatasubstantialformissusceptibleofdegreesandthatgenerationisacontinuousmovement;secondly,becauseitwouldfollowthattherationalsouliscorruptible,solongasitisassertedthatthefoundationoftherationalsoulisavegetativeandsentientsubstance.Nowitcannotbesaidthattherearethreesoulsinoneman,ashasbeenshown.Theonlythinglefttosayisthatinthegenerationofmanorofanimal,therearemanygenerationsandcorruptionssucceedingoneanotherreciprocally,17forwhenamoreperfectformcomesthelessperfectformfadesaway.Andthus,althoughintheembryothereisfirstthevegetativesoulonly,whenithasattainedagreaterperfectiontheimperfectformistakenaway,andthemoreperfectformtakesitsplace,i.e.,asoulwhichisvegetativeandsentientsimultaneously;andwhenthelastdepartstherecomesinthemostcompleteultimateform,whichistherationalsoul.

Astothefourteenth,itmustbesaidthatamathematicalbodyiscalledanabstractbody;andhence,tosaythatamathematicalbodyexistsinsensiblethingsistosaytwooppositethingsatthesametime,asAristotlearguesinIIIMetaphysica[2,998a7]againstcertainPlatonistswhomakethisassertion.Andyetitdoesnotfollowthatabstractionisfalsification,iiamathematicalbodyexistsintheintellectonly:becausetheabstractingintellectdoesnotthinkthatsomebodyexistswhichisnotinsensiblethings,butitthinksthatbodybynotthinkingsensibleobjects;thus,forinstance,ifsomeonethinks"man",notthinkinghisrisibility,heisnotfalsifying;buthewouldbefalsifyingifhethought"manisnotarisiblebeing."Isay,nevertheless,thatif"mathematicalbody"werein"sensiblebody",thensince"mathematicalbody''hasdimensions,itpertainsonlytothegenusofquantity;hencenosubstantialformwouldbeneeded.But"body"whichisinthegenusofsubstancehasasubstantialform'whichiscalled"corporeity",which

17RogerBaconattacksmostbitterlythisviewofSt.Thomasonthegenerationofman,which(hesays)"theologiansinEnglandandallphilosophersstill"contradict(Comm.Nat.IV,3,c.l,p.281sqq.).

isnotthreedimensions,butisanysubstantialformwhateverfromwhichthethreedimensionsfollowinmatter,andthisforminfireis"fireness",intheanimalthesentientsoul,andinmantheintellectualsoul.

Astothefifteenth,itmustbesaidthatthepartsofadefinitionareformalorspecificparts,notbecauseofarealdistinctionbetweenforms,butonthebasisofamentaldistinction,ashasbeensaid.

Astothesixteenth,itmustbesaidthatalthoughthesoup18doesnothavecorporeityinact,yetithasitvirtually,justasthesunhasheat.

Astotheseventeenth,itmustbesaidthatthatorderuponwhichtheCommentatortouchesisaconceptualorderonly;becausematterisunderstoodtobeperfectedbyauniversalformbeforeitisunderstoodtobeperfectedbyaspecialform,justasbeingisunderstoodassomethingpriortolivingbeing,livingbeingpriortoanimal,andanimalpriortoman.

Astotheeighteenth,itmustbesaidthatanygenericorspecificactualbeingwhateveristhethingofwhichtheproperaccidentsofthatgenusorspeciesareaconsequence.Andhence,whenmatterisalreadyunderstoodtobeperfectinthegenuswhichis"body",itisquitepossibletounderstandthereindimensions,whicharetheproperaccidentsofthisgenus:andinthiswaythedifferentelementaryformsfollowoneaftertheotherinmatter,accordingtoitsdifferentparts,inanintelligibleorder.

Astothenineteenth,itmustbesaidthatspecificallythesameheatisinfireandinair,becauseanyqualityisespeciallyattributedtooneelementinwhichitexistsperfectly,andisattributedconcomitantlyorderivativelytoanotherelement,yetinamoreimperfectway.When,therefore,"fire"comesintobeingfrom"thisair",theheatremainsspecificallythesame,butitisaugmented;nevertheless,itisnotthesamenumerically,19becausethesamesubjectdoesnotpersist.Nordoesthistendtocreateadifficultyasregardschange,sincetheheatgoesoutofbeinginanaccidentalway,asaresultofthesubject'spassingaway,andnotasaresultofanoppositeagent.

Astothetwentieth,itmustbesaidthatmatter,whenlookedatbyitself,isrelatedtoallformsindifferently;butitisdeterminedtospecialformsthroughthepowerofthemover,asistaughtinIIDeGeneratione[9,335b],andcorrespondingtotheintelligibleorderofformsinmatterthereisanorderofnaturalagents.Foramongthe

18Thisdifficulty,whichlaterwritersmadesomuchof,namely,thatthesoul,beingsimpleandwithoutquantity,cannotgivematterquantitybyinformingit,doesnottroubleSt.Thomasmuch.Everywhereheanswersbysayingthatthehigherformvirtuallycontainsthatwhichthelowercontains,byappealingtotheexampleofnumbersandfigures.

19InDeNaturaMateriae(cc.89)accidentsaresaidtoremainnumericallythesame,becausetheformsthemselvesarepresent"essentially,butnotexistentially."

celestialbodiesthemselves,oneismoreuniversallyactivethananother:nordoesthemoreuniversalagentactapartfrominferioragents,buttheultimateproperagentactsinvirtueofallthehigheragents.Andhencedifferentformsarenotimplantedbydifferentagentsinoneindividual,butthereisoneformwhichisimplantedbytheproximateagentthatvirtuallycontainsinitselfalltheprecedingforms;andmatter,inasmuchasitisconsideredtobeperfectedbythecharacterofthemoreuniversalformandtheconsequentaccidents,isspecializedtothesubsequentperfection.

Astothetwenty-first,itmustbesaidthatalthougheachgenusisdividedintopotencyandact,thatpotencyitselfwhichisinthegenusofsubstanceismatter,asformisact.Andhence,matterdoesnotexistunderformthroughthemediumofsomeotherpotency.

ArticleIVThefourthquestionis:Isthewholesoulineverypartofthebody?1

Anditwouldseemthatitisnot.1ForAristotle2saysinhisbookDeCausaMotusAnimalium[10,703a32]:"Thereisnoneedforthesoultobeanyonepartofthebody,butthereisneedforittoexistinsomeprincipleofthebody."Nowinnaturenothingisinvain.Thereforethesoulisnotineverypartofthebody.

2Furthermore,ananimalismadeupofbodyandsoul.If,then,thesoulwereineverypartofthebody,everypartofananimalwouldbeananimal;whichisincongruous.

3Furthermore,inanythinginwhichasubjectis,thepropertyofthesubjectalsois.Butallthepowersofthesoulareintheessenceofthesoul,justaspropertiesareinasubject.Therefore,ifthesoulwereineverypartofthebody,itwouldfollowthatallthepowersofthesoulwereineverypartofthebody,andthushearingwillbeintheeyeandsightintheear;whichisincongruous.

4Furthermore,noformwhichdemandsadissimilarityofpartsisfoundineverypart;asisclearregardingtheform"house",whichisnotineverypartofahousebutinthehouseasawhole.Butformswhichdonotdemandadissimilarityofpartsareintheindividualparts,as,forinstance,theform"fire"andtheform"air".Nowthesoulisaformthatdemandsadissimilarityofparts,asisclearinthecaseofallanimatethings.Thereforethesoulisnotineverypartofthebody.

5Furthermore,noformwhichisextendedincorrespondencewiththeextensionofmatterisentirelyineverypartofitsmatter.Butthesoulisextendedincorrespondencewiththeextensionofmatter;foritissaidinthebookDeQuantitateAnimae[V,7]:Ijudgethesoultobeaslarge"astheextentofthebodyallowsittobe."Thereforethesoulisnotentirelyineverypartofthebody.

6Futhermore,thatthesoulisineverypartofthebodyseemsparticularlyapparentfromthefactthatitactsineverypartofthebody.Butthesoulactswhereitisnot;forAugustinesaysinhislettertoVolusianus[EpistolaCXXXVII,II,5]:thesoulfeelsandseesinthe

1InISent.,d.8,q.5,a.3;ContraGentilesII,cap.72;SummaTheol.I,q.76,a.8;Q.deAn.*,10;InDeAn.I,lec.14.St.Augustine,DeQuant.Animae;DeImmort.Animaexvi;DeTrin.VI,vi.Avicenna,DeAn.V,cc.23.AlcherusdeClaravalle,DeSpirituetAnima,1819.Phil.Cancellarius,q.9DeAn.Guil.Alvernus,DeAn.VI,3839.Ioan.deRupella,DeAn.1,40.AlbertusM.,SummaTheol.II,tr.13,q.77,m.4,vol.33,p.100.(Therewasnocontroversyonthismatter,exceptas

regardsthewayofexpressingit,orfurtherdevelopments,forallapprovedofwhatAugustinehadsaid).2Cf.Art.III,n.15.ThewholepassageiscitedinQ.DeAn.,10,obj.4.

heavens,whereitisnot.Itisnot,therefore,necessaryforthesoultobeineverypartofthebody.

7Furthermore,accordingtothePhilosopher[DeAn.I,3,406b],whenwemovethosethingswhicharewithinusaremoved.Nowitmaybethecasethatonepartofthebodyismovedwhileanotherisatrest.If,therefore,thesoulisineverypartofthebody,itfollowsthatitisbothinmotionandatrestatthesametime;whichseemsincongruous.

8Furthermore,ifthesoulisineverypartofthebody,eachpartofthebodywillhaveanimmediaterelationtothesoul,andthustheotherpartswillnotdependontheheart.ThisiscontrarytoJeromeinhisSuperMatthaeum[XV,PLXXVI,109]whosaysthat"themostimportantthinginmanisnotinthebrain,asPlatosays,butintheheart,asChristsays."

9Furthermore,noformwhichdemandsadefiniteshapecanbewherethatshapeisnot.Butthesoulisinthebodyinconnectionwithadefiniteshape;fortheCommentatorsaysonIDeAnima[comm.53,f.119r]thateveryanimal'sbodyhasitsownpropershape,andthisfactisevidentinthecaseofthespecies:"forthelion'smembersdonotdifferfromthestag'smembersexceptbecauseofthedifferenceoftheirsouls."Therefore,sincetheshapeofthewholeisnotfoundinapart,thesoulwillnotbeinapart.AndthisiswhatthesameCommentatorsaysonthesamebook[comm.94,f.126r],"thatifthehearthasanaturalcapacityforreceivingasoulbecauseithasaparticularkindofshape,itisobviousthatapartofitdoesnotreceivethatsoul,becauseapartdoesnothavethatparticularshape."

10Furthermore,themoreabstractathingis,somuchthelessisitlimitedtosomethingcorporeal.Butanangelismoreabstractthanasoul.Nowanangelislimitedtosomepartofthemovableobjectwhichitmovesandisnotineverypartofit,asthePhilosophermakesclearinIVPhysica[VIII,10,267b7],wherehesaysthatthemoveroftheheavensisnotinthecentre,butinacertainpartofthecircumference.Muchlessthenisasoulineverypartofitsbody.

11Furthermore,ifthesoul'sactivityisinanyparticularpartofthebody,thesoulitselfisthere.Andbyaparallelargument,inwhateverpartofthebodythereistheactivityofthepowerofsight,thereisthepowerofsight.Buttheactivityofthepowerofsightwouldbeinthefoot,iftheorganofthepowerofsightwerethere;hencethefactthattheactivityofsightisnottherewillbeduemerelytotheabsenceoftheorgan.Accordingly,thepowerofsightwillbethere,ifthesoulisthere.

12Furthermore,ifthesoulisineverypartofthebody,itmustbethecasethatwhereveragivenpartofthebodyis,thereisthesoul.

Butinthecaseofagrowingchild,partsbegintoexistthroughgrowth,wheretheypreviouslywerenot;therefore,hissoultoobeginstoexistwhereitpreviouslywasnot.Butthisseemsimpossible.Fortherearethreewaysinwhichathingbeginstoexistwhereitpreviouslywasnot:eitherthroughthefactthatsomethingquitenewcomesintobeing,aswhenthesouliscreatedandisinfusedintothebody;orthroughachangingoverofthethingitself,aswhenthebodyischangedfromplacetoplace;orthroughthechangeofanotherthingintothethingitself,aswhenChrist'sbodybeginstoexistonthealtar.Andnoneofthesecanbesaidtohappeninthiscase.Thereforethesoulisnotineverypartofthebody.

13Furthermore,thesoulisonlyinthebodywhoseactitis.Nowitis"theactofanorganicbody,"asIIDeAnima[1,412b5]says.Since,then,noteverypartofthebodyisanorganicbody,itwillnotbeineverypartofthebody.

14Furthermore,thereisagreaterdifferencebetweenthefleshandtheboneofanyonemanthanbetweenthefleshofonemanandthefleshofanother.Butonesoulcannotbeintwobodiesofdifferentmen.Thereforeitcannotbeinallthepartsofanyoneman.

15Furthermore,ifthesoulisineverypartofthebody,itmustbethecasethatifanypartofthebodyistakenaway,eitherthesoulmustbetakenaway:whichisclearlyfalse,sinceamanremainsalive;orelseitmustbetransferredfromthatparttootherparts:whichisimpossible,sincethesoulissimpleandconsequentlyimmovable.Thereforeitisnotineverypartofthebody.

16Furthermore,nothingthatisindivisiblecanbeinanythingbutanindivisibleobject,sinceaplacehastobecommensuratewithwhatisinthatplace.Nowinthebodyitispossibletospecifyanindefinitenumberofindivisibles.If,then,thesoulisineverypartofthebody,itwillfollowthatitisinanindefinitenumberofplaces.Andthiscannotbe,sinceitisoffinitepower.

17Furthermore,sincethesoulissimpleandwithoutdimensionalquantity,itseemsthatnowholenesscanpossiblybeattributedtoitsavethatofpower.Butitisnotineverypartofthebodyasregardsitspowers,inwhichthewholenessofitspowerisconsideredtobe.Thereforethewholesoulisnotineverypartofthebody.

18Furthermore,thatathingcanbewhollyinawholeandinallpartsseemstobeduetoitssimplicity.Forinthecaseofbodiesweseethatthiscannothappen.Butthesoulisnotsimple,butiscomposedofmatterandform.Thereforeitisnotineverypartofthebody.Proofoftheminor:thePhilosopherinIIMetaphysica[I,8,988b24]censuresthosewhoassertthatcorporealmatteristhefirstprinciple,because"theyassertedonlytheelementsofbodies,butnotofthingsthatdo

nothavebodies."Thereisaccordinglysomeincorporealelementtoo.Butanelementisamaterialprinciple.Thereforeincorporealsubstancesalso,suchasanangelandasoul,haveaprincipletoo.

19Furthermore,"certainanimalslive,evenwhencutintwo".3Nowitcannotbesaidthateitherofthetwopartslivesthroughthewholesoul.Thereforeevenbeforethecutting,thewholesoulwasnotinthatpart,butpartofthesoulwas.

20Furthermore,"whole"and"perfect"areidentical,asissaidinIIIPhysica[6,207a13].Nowathingisperfect"whichattainsitsproperexcellence",asissaidinVIPhysica[3,246a13].Nowtheproperexcellenceofthehumansoul,asregardstheintellect,isnotanactofanypartofthebody.Thereforethesoulisnotentirelyineverypartofthebody.

ButontheotherhandithereiswhatAugustinesaysinIIIDeTrinitate[VI,6,8],thatthesoul"iswhollyinthewholebeingandwhollyineverypartofit."

iiFurthermore,Damascenesays[DeFideOrth.I,13,PGXCIV,854A;II,3,870C]thatanangeliswhereitacts;byaparallelargument,therefore,alsothesoul.Butthesoulactsineverypartofthebody,becauseeverypartofthebodyisnourished,grows,andissentient.Therefore,thesoulisineverypartofthebody.

iiiFurthermore,thesoulisofgreaterpowerthanmaterialforms.Butmaterialforms,suchasfireorair,areineverypart;muchmoreso,thesoul.

ivFurthermore,itissaidinthebookDeSpirituetAnima[XVIII,PLXL,793]that"Thesoulbyitspresencevivifiesthebody."Buteverypartofthebodyisvivifiedbythesoul.Thereforethesoulispresentineverypartofthebody.

ANSWER.4Itmustbesaidthatthetruthofthisquestiondependsontheprecedingones.Forithaspreviouslybeenpointedoutthatthesoulisunitedtothebodynotonlyasamover,butasaform.Andlateronitwasshownthatasouldoesnotpresupposeinmatterothersubstantialforms,whichwouldgivesubstantialactualbeingtoabodyortoitsparts;butthatboththewholebodyandallitspartshaveactualsubstantialandspecificbeingthroughthesoul,and,whenthesouldeparts,justas"man"or"animal"or"livingbody"doesnotremain,soneither''eye"nor"flesh"nor"bone"remain,exceptinanequivocalsense,likethingspaintedormadeofstone.5Thus,then,sinceevery

3ThisstatementiscitedfromMet.VII,c.16,1040b13;butcf.ratherIDeAnima,c.5,411baswellasSt.Thomas'commentary.4ThecorrespondencebetweenthisresponsioandthatgiveninQ.DeAn.,10isremarkable.5ThusAristotle,II,DeAn.,1,412b21.

actisinthatofwhichitistheact,itmustbethatthesoul,whichistheactofthewholebodyandofalltheparts,isinthewholebodyandineveryoneofitsparts.

Butyetthewholebodyisrelatedinonewaytothesoulandinanothertoitsparts,Forthesoulisindeedtheactofthewholebodyprimarilyandessentially,butofthepartsintheirrelationtothewhole.Tomakethisclearitmustbeconsideredthat,sincematterisforthesakeofform,themattermustbesuchassuitstheform.Inthosethingswhicharesubjecttocorruptionthemoreimperfectforms,whichareofweakerpower,havefewactivities,forwhichdissimilarityofpartsisnotrequired,asisclearinthecaseofallinanimatebodies.Butthesoul,sinceitisaformofhigherandgreaterpower,canbetheprincipleofdifferentactivities,forthecarryingoutofwhichdissimilarpartsofthebodyarerequired.Andconsequentlyeverysoulrequiresadiversityoforgansinpartsofthebodyofwhichitistheact;andallthegreaterdiversityinproportionasthesoulismoreperfect.Thus,then,thelowestformsperfecttheirmatterinauniformway,butthesouldoesthisinanon-uniformway,withtheresultthattheentiretyofthebodyofwhichthesoulisprimarilyandessentiallytheactismadeupofdissimilarparts.

Butwestillhavetoinquireintothestatement:thesouliswhollyinthewholeandwhollyineachindividualpart.Tomakethisclear,wemustconsiderthatwholenessisprimarilyandmoreobviouslysomethingbasedonquantity,inasmuchasawholeiscalledaquantum,whichisnaturallysusceptibleofdivisionintoquantitativeparts;andthissortofwholenesscannotbeascribedtoformsexceptinanaccidentalsense,namely,insofarastheyareaccidentallydividedbythedivisionofaquantity,aswhitenessisdividedbythedivisionofasurface.Butthisischaracteristicofthoseformsonlywhichareextendedalongwithquantity;andthereasonwhythislatterpropertybelongstosomeformsisthattheyhavesimilar,oralmostsimilar,matterintheirwholeandinapart.Andhenceformswhichrequiregreatdissimilarityinthepartsdonothavethissortofextensionandwholeness,as,forinstance,souls,especiallythoseofperfectanimals.Nowthesecondkindofwholenessisconsideredonthebasisoftheperfectionofanessence,andisawholenesstowhichessentialpartscorrespond:thephysicalparts,matterandform,inthecaseofcomposites,andthelogicalparts,genusanddifference;andthisperfectionissusceptibleofdegreesinthecaseofaccidentalforms,butnotinthecaseofsubstantialforms.Thethirdsortofwholenessisonabasisofpower.6If,then,weweretospeakofagivenformwhichhasextensioninmatter,suchas"whiteness",

6Cf.Q.DeAn.,10,resp.:"Inathirdsensetheword'whole'isusedinreferencetovirtualorpotentialparts,andthesepartsarebasedonadivisionofactivities."

wemightsaythatthewhitenessiswhollyineverypartbyawholenessofessenceandofpower,butnotbythefirstsortofwholeness,whichbelongstoitaccidentally;thusthewholecharacterofthespecies"whiteness"isfoundineverypartofthesurface;thetotalquantitywhichitaccidentallypossesses,however,isnot,butpartofthisisinapart.

Nowthesoul,7andespeciallythehumansoul,doesnothaveextensioninmatter.Hencethefirstsortofwholenessdoesnottakeplaceinit.Theremainingalternative,therefore,isthatfromtheviewpointofwholenessofessence,itmaybestatedabsolutelythatitiswhollyineverypartofthebody;not,however,fromtheviewpointofwholenessofpower,becausethepartsareperfectedindifferentwaysbythesoulitselffordifferentactivities,andadefiniteactivitybelongstoit,namely,understanding,whichitdoesnotperformthroughanypartofthebody.Andhenceifthesoul'swholenessistakeninthesenseofwholenessofpower,notonlyisthesoulnotwhollyineverypart,butneitherisitwhollyinthewholebody;becausethepowerofthesoulexceedsthebody'scapacity,ashasbeensaidabove[Art.II,Resp.].

Astothefirstargument,therefore,itmustbesaidthatthePhilosopherinthatpassageisspeakingofthesoulwithreferencetoitspowerofmoving,whichisprimarilyseatedintheheart.

Astothesecond,itmustbesaidthatthesoulisnotineverypartofthebodyprimarilyandessentially,butinrelationtothewhole,ashasbeensaid,andconsequentlynoteverypartofananimalisananimal.

Astothethird,itmustbesaidthat,accordingtothePhilosopherinhisbookDeSomnoetVigilia[I,454a8]:"Anactionbelongstothatwhichhasthepotencyforthataction."Andhencethosepowerswhoseactivitiesdonotbelongtothesoulalonebuttothecompositeareinanorganasinasubject,butinthesoulasintheirroot.Now,onlythosepowersareinthesoulasinasubjectwhoseactivitiesthesouldoesnotcarryoutthroughanorganofthebody;andyetthesepowersbelongtothesoulinasmuchasitissuperiortothebody.Henceitdoesnotfollowthatallthepowersofthesoulareineverypartofthebody.

Astothefourth,itmustbesaidthattheform"house",sinceitisanaccidentalform,doesnotgivespecificactualbeingtotheindividualpartsofthehouse,asthesoulgivesittotheindividualpartsofthebody;andconsequentlythereisnocomparison.

7Thegeneralsolutionisvalidalsoconcerningthesoulsofmoreperfectbruteanimals;cf.ContraGentilesII,cap.72:"If,then,thereissomeformwhichisnotdividedbythedivisionofitssubject,andsucharethesoulsofperfectanimals,therewillbenoneedofdistinction,inasmuchasonlyonewholenessisapplicabletothem;butitmustbesaidwithoutqualificationthatthisformiswholeineverypartofthebody."

Astothefifth,itmustbesaidthatthepassagetherequotedisnotunderstoodtomeanthatthehumansoulisextendedincorrespondencewiththebody'sextension,butthatthevirtualquantityofthesouldoesnotreachouttoagreaterquantitythanthatofthebody.

Astothesixth,itmustbesaidthateveryactivityissomehowunderstoodasintermediatebetweentheonewhoperformstheactivityandtheobjectoftheactivity,eitherinreality(asinthecaseofthoseactionswhichgooutfromanagenttosomethingexternalthatistobechanged),orinafigurativesense,as,forinstance,understanding,willing,andthelike,which,althoughtheyareactionsthatremainwithintheagent,asissaidinIXMetaphysica[8,1050a35],areneverthelessreferredtoafterthefashionofotheractionsastendingfromonethingtoanother.Thus,therefore,whensomeoneissaidtobeactinginthisorinthatplace,thatstatementcanbeunderstoodintwosenses.Inonesense,thatbyadverbsofthissorttheverbismodifiedfromthestandpointoftheactivitygoingoutfromtheagent,andinthissenseitistruethatwhereverthesoulacts,thereitis.Inanothersense,fromthestandpointoftheactivity'sbeingunderstoodasterminatinginsomethingelse,andinthissenseitisnottruethatwhereveritactsthereitis;forinthislattersensethesoulfeelsandseesintheheavens,inasmuchastheheavensarefeltandseenbyit.

Astotheseventh,itmustbesaidthatthesoul,whenthebodyismoved,ismovedaccidentallyandnotofitself.Nowitisnotincongruousthatathingbeatoncemovedandatrestaccidentally,indifferentrespects.Itwould,however,beincongruousifofitselfitwereatthesametimeatrestandbeingmoved.

Astotheeighth,itmustbesaidthat,althoughthesoulistheactofeverypartofthebody,neverthelessnotallpartsofthebodyareperfectedbyitinauniformway,ashasbeensaid;butonepartmorenotablyandmoreperfectlythananother.

Astotheninth,itmustbesaidthatasoulissaidtobeinabodythroughadefiniteshape,notinthesensethattheshapeisthecauseofitsbeinginthebody,butrathertheshapeofthebodyresultsfromthesoul;andhencewherethereisnoshapesuitedto"thissoul","thissoul"cannotactuallybe.Butthesoulrequiresoneshapeinthewholebodyofwhichitisinapriorsensetheact,andanotherinapart,ofwhichitistheactinrelationtothewhole,ashasbeensaid.Andhenceinthecaseofanimalsinwhichtheshapeofapartisalmostofthesameformastheshapeofthewhole,apartreceivesthesoulasakindofwhole;andthereforeapartthathasbeencutoffisalive.Yetinthecaseofperfectanimals,inwhichtheshapeofapartwoulddiffergreatlyfromtheshapeofthewhole,apartdoesnotreceivethesoulaswouldsomethingwholeandprimarilyperfectible,soastobealivewhen

cutoff;itdoesneverthelessreceivethesoulinrelationtothewhole,soastobealivewhenunitedtothewhole.

Astothetenth,itmustbesaidthatanangelisrelatedtothecelestialbodywhichitmoves,notasaformbutasamover;andhencethereisnocomparisonbetweenitandthesoul,whichistheformofthewholeandofeverypart.

Astotheeleventh,itmustbesaidthatiftheeyewereinthefoot,thepowerofsightwouldbethere,becausethispoweristheactofthiskindofanimateorgan.Butwhentheorganisremoved,thesoulremainsthere,butthepowerofsightdoesnot.

Astothetwelfth,itmustbesaidthatgrowthdoesnotoccurwithoutlocalmovement,asthePhilosophersaysinIVPhysica[1,209a28;6,213b4].Andhencewhenaboygrows,justassomepartofthebodybeginstoexistonitsownaccountinaplacewhereitpreviouslywasnot,soalsodoesthesoul,inanaccidentalway,andbyachangingoverofitself,inasmuchasitismovedinanaccidentalwaywhenthebodyismoved.

Astothethirteenth,itmustbesaidthattheorganicbodyisperfectiblebythesoulprimarilyandessentially,whereastheindividualorgansandpartsoforgansareperfectibleinrelationtothewhole,ashasbeensaid.

Astothefourteenth,itmustbesaidthatmyfleshismoreinagreementwithyourflesh,inviewofitsspecificcharacter,thanismyfleshwithmybone.Butincomparisonwiththewhole,theconverseistrue;formyfleshandmybonecanbesoorderedastoconstituteonewhole,whereasmyfleshandyourfleshcannot.

Astothefifteenth,itmustbesaidthatwhenapartiscutoff,itdoesnotfollowthatthesoulistakenaway,orthatitischangedtoanotherpart,unlessitweretobeassertedthatthesoulwasinthatpartalone;butitdoesfollowthatthatpartceasestobeperfectedbythesoulofthewhole.

Astothesixteenth,itmustbesaidthatthesoulisnotindivisibleasapointsituatedinacontinuumis,towhoseverycharacterbeinginadivisibleplacewouldbecontrary.8Butthesoulisindivisiblebybeingquiteapartfromthewholegenus"continuum";andhenceitisnotcontrarytoitscharacterifitbeinsomedivisiblewhole.

Astotheseventeenth,itmustbesaidthatinconsequenceoftheveryfactthatitisindivisible,itfollowsthatthesouldoesnothavequantitativewholeness.Norareweleftonthisaccountwiththeconclusionthatthereisinitmerelyawholenessofpowers;forthereisinitawholenessbasedonthecharacterofitsessence,ashasbeensaid.

8St.ThomasseemstohavebeforehimAvicenna'sargument(DeAn.V,c.2,abinit.).

Astotheeighteenth,itmustbesaidthatthePhilosopherinthatbook[Met.I]intendstoinvestigatetheprinciplesofallbeings,notonlymaterialprinciples,butalsoformal,efficient,andfinalones.Andconsequentlythenaturalphilosophersofold,wholaiddownonlyamaterialcause,whichhasnoplaceamongincorporealthings,arerefutedbyhim;andsotheywerenotabletolaydowntheprinciplesofallbeings.Hedoesnot,therefore,intendtosaythatthereissomematerialelementofincorporealthings,butthatthosemenaretobecensuredwhoneglectedtheprinciplesofincorporealthings,layingdownonlyamaterialcause.

Astothenineteenth,itmustbesaidthatinthecaseofthoseanimalswhichlivewhencutintwo,thereisonesoulinactandmanyinpotency.Nowthroughtheactofcuttingtheyarebroughtforthintoactualmanyness,ashappensinthecaseofallformswhichhaveextensioninmatter.

Astothetwentieth,itmustbesaidthat,whenthesoulissaidtobewhollyineverypart,"whole"and"perfect"areunderstoodonabasisofthecharacteroftheessence,andnotonabasisofthecharacterofpowerorexcellence,asisclearfromwhathasbeensaidabove.

ArticleVThefifthquestionis:Isthereanycreatedspiritualsubstancethatisnotunitedtoabody.?1

Anditwouldseemnot.IForOrigensaysinIPeriArchon[VI,PGXI,170]:"ItispropertoGodalone,thatis,totheFather,totheSon,andtotheHolyGhostthat...Hebeunderstoodtoexistwithoutanyadditionofacorporealunion."Thereforenocreatedspiritualsubstancecanexistthatisnotunitedtoabody.

2Furthermore,PopePaschalsays[Decret.II,7,C.I,q.iii]thatspiritualthingscannotsubsistapartfromcorporealthings.Thereforeitisnotpossibleforspiritualsubstancestoexistthatarenotunitedtobodies.

3Furthermore,BernardinSuperCanticum[sermoV,PLCLXXXIII,800]says:"Itisclearthateverycreatedspirit...needsbodilycomfort."Nowitisobviousthat,sincenaturedoesnotfallshortinwhatisnecessary,muchlessdoesGod.Thereforenocreatedspiritisfoundwithoutabody.

4Furthermore,ifanycreatedspiritualsubstanceisentirelydissociatedfromabody,itmustbeabovetime,fortimedoesnotgobeyondcorporealthings.Butcreatedspiritualsubstancesarenotentirelyabovetime.Forsincetheyhavebeencreatedfromnothingnessandconsequentlytaketheirbeginningfromchange,theymustbesubjecttochangeinsuchawaythattheycanlapseintonon-beingunlessheldtogetherbysomeotherbeing.Nowthatwhichcanlapseintonon-beingisnotwhollyabovetime.Foritcanbeatonetimeandnotbeatanother.Thereforeitisnotpossibleforanycreatedsubstancestobewithoutbodies.

5Furthmore,theangelsassumecertainbodies.2Nowthebodyassumedbyanangelismovedbyit.Since,then,beingmovedlocallypresupposessensationandlife,asisclearfromIIDeAnima[23],itwouldseemthatthebodiesassumedbyangelshavesensationandlife,

1ContraGentilesII,cap46,91,*92;DePotentia*VI,a.6;SummaTheol.I,q.50,a.1;InLib.deCausis,comm.7;DeSubst.Separatis,18;Compend.Theol.,7475.Aristotle,XII,Met.,c.8.St.Augustine(lookintheindexoftheMaurineedition,undertheheading"Angeli,anhabeantcorpora").Avicebron,FonsVitaeIII.Guil.Alvernus,DeUniversoII,2,cc.14.Alex.Halensis,SummaII,1,pp.131133.AlbertusM.,IISent>.,d.3,a.1,vol.27,p.60.St.Bonaventure,InIISent.,d.1,p.41;SummaPhilos.,tr.10,c.1.ThehistoryofthecontroversyisadequatelysetforthintheDict.dethéol.cath.,art."Anges."ItisnotusualforthedefinitionoftheFourthLateranCouncil(A.D.1215,Denz428)tobecitedbythedoctorsofthattime:"Thecreatorofallthingsvisibleandinvisible,spiritualandcorporeal;WhobyHisownomnipotentpower,rightfrom

thebeginningoftimecreatedfromnothingbothcreations,thespiritualandthecorporeal;namely,theangelicandthemundane;andthenthehuman,commontoboth,asitwere,madeupofspiritandbody."2HereSt.ThomasisquotingratherfreelyfromJohnDamascene(DeFideOrth.II,c.27,PGXCIV,959).

andsotheyarenaturallyunitedtobodies;andyetasregardstheangelsitwouldseemthattheyespeciallyarefreefrombodies.Thereforethereisnocreatedspiritualsubstancewhichisnotunitedtoabody.

6Furthermore,anangelisnaturallymoreperfectthanasoul.Nowthatwhichlivesandgiveslifeismoreperfectthanthatwhichmerelylives.Since,then,thesoullivesandgiveslifetothebodybythefactthatitisitsform,forallthegreaterreasonitwouldseemthatanangelnotonlylivesbutisalsounitedtothesamebodytowhichitgiveslife;andthuswereachthesameconclusionasbefore.

7Furthermore,itisobviousthatangelsknowsingularthings;otherwiseitwouldbepointlesstoassignthemtomenasguardians.Nowtheycannotknowsingularthingsthroughuniversalforms,becauseinthateventtheirknowledgewouldbethesamewithreferencetothepastandtothefuture,andthisinspiteofthefactthattoknowthefuturebelongstoGodalone.Accordinglyangelsknowsingularthingsthroughparticularforms,whichrequirecorporealorganswhereintheymaybereceived.Thereforeangelshavecorporealorgansunitedtothemselves;andthusitwouldseemthatnocreatedspiritisentirelyfreefromabody.

8Furthermore,theprincipleofindividuationismatter.Nowangelsareindividualsofasort;otherwisetheywouldnothaveactionsoftheirown;fortoactischaracteristicofparticularindividuals.Since,then,theydonothavematterofwhichtheyareconstituted,aswassaidabove,theyseemtohavematterwhereintheyexist,namely,thebodiestowhichtheyareunited.

9Furthermore,sincecreatedspiritsarefinitesubstances,theymustbeinadefinitegenusandspecies.Accordinglythereistobefoundinthemtheuniversalnatureofaspecies.Nowtheydonotreceivetheirindividuationfromthisuniversalnatureitself.Thereforetheremustbesomethingadditionalwherebytheyareindividuated.Nowthiscannotbeanythingmaterialwhichwouldenterintothecompositionofanangel,sinceangelsareimmaterialsubstances,aswassaidabove.Itmustbethecase,therefore,thatsomecorporealmatterisaddedtothem,wherebytheyareindividuated;andthuswereachthesameconclusionasbefore.

10Furthermore,createdspiritualsubstancesarenotmerelymatter,becauseinthatcasetheywouldbeinpotencyonlyandwouldnothaveanyaction;andinthesecondplacetheyarenotcomposedofmatterandform,aswasshownabove[Art.I].Theonlyremainingalternativethenisthattheyaremerelyforms.Nowitisessentialtoaformthatitbeanactofmattertowhichitisunited.Itwouldseem,therefore,thatcreatedspiritualsubstancesareunitedtocorporealmatter.

11Furthermore,whenthingsarealikethesamejudgmentispassedonthem.Butsomecreatedspiritualsubstancesareunitedtobodies.Thereforeallare.

ButontheotherhandthereisiwhatDionysiussaysinthefourthchapter[lec.1]ofDeDivinisNominibus,thatangelsare"incorporealandimmaterial."

iiFurthermore,accordingtothePhilosopherinVIIIPhysica[5,256b20],ifanytwothingsarefoundconnected,oneofwhichcanbefoundwithouttheother,thesecondalsomustbefoundwithoutthefirst.Nowwedofindamovedthingthatisamover,andhence,ifsomethingismovedbutisnotamover,thereisalsotobefoundsomethingthatisamoverbutnotmoved.Butthereistobefoundsomethingcomposedofbodilyandofspiritualsubstance.Since,then,abodycanbefoundthatiswithoutaspirit,itwouldseemthatsomespiritcanbefoundthatisnotunitedtoabody.

iiiFurthermore,RichardofSt.Victor[DeTrinitateIII,9,PLCXCVI,921]arguesasfollows'inthedivineorderseveralpersonsarefoundinonenature,whereasinthehumanorderonepersonisfoundintwonatures,namely,insoulandinbody.Therefore3somethingintermediateisalsotobefound,namely,thatonepersonisinonenature;andthiswouldnotbethecaseifaspiritualnaturewereunitedtoabody.

ivFurthermore,anangelisinanassumedbody.If,therefore,anotherbodywerenaturallyunitedtoit,itwouldfollowthattwobodieswouldbeinthesameplaceatthesametime,whichisimpossible.Therefore,therearesomecreatedspiritualsubstanceswhichdonothavebodiesnaturallyunitedtothemselves.

ANSWER.Itmustbesaidthat,becauseourknowledgehasitsbeginningfromsensationandsensationbelongstocorporealthings,fromthebeginningmensearchingoutthetruthwereabletograsponlycorporealnature,tosuchanextentthatthefirstnaturalphilosophersusedtothinkthatnothingexistedbutbodies;andhencetheyalsousedtosaythatthesoulitselfisabody.TheManichaeanheretics,whothoughtthatGodisakindofcorporeallightextendedoverinfinitespace,alsoseemtohavefollowedthem.SotootheAnthropomorphites,4whofabricatedGodasabeingformedwiththefeaturesofthehumanbody,surmisedthatnothingexistedbeyondbodies.

Butlaterphilosophers,transcendingcorporealthingsinarationalwaythroughtheintellect,arrivedataknowledgeofincorporealsub-

3Thisconclusion"Thereforethereisalsotobefound"isnotdrawnbyRichard,atleastnotinthepassagecited.4ConcerningtheAnthropomorphites,seeAugustine(Epist.148,iv,PLXXXIII,628),wherehecitesJerome.

stance.FirstamongthesewasAnaxagoras5who,becauseheassertedthatfromthebeginningallcorporealthingsweremixedtogether,wasforcedtoassert,inadditiontothecorporeal,somethingincorporealandunmixed,whichwoulddifferentiateandmovecorporealthings.Andthisheusedtocall"mind",whichdifferentiatesandmovesallthings,andwecallitGod.Plato,however,employedanotherwayofassertingincorporealsubstances.Forhethoughtthatpriortobeingwhichparticipates,somethingabstractandunparticipatedshouldbeasserted.Andhence,sinceallbodiesthatcanbesensedparticipateinthosethingswhicharepredicatedofthemselves,namely,genericandspecificnaturesandthenaturesoftheotherpredicatesuniversallyappliedtothem,heassertednaturesofthissort,abstractedfromwhatissensibleandself-subsistent,andthesehecalled"separatedsubstances."

Arisotole,however[Met.XII,8,1073a],proceededtoassertseparatedsubstancesasaresultoftheperpetuityofthemovementoftheheavens.Foronemustassignsomeend6forthemovementoftheheavens.Now,iftheendofagivenmovementisnotalwaysconstantinitsmodeofbeing,butitismovedofitselforaccidentally,themovementmustnecessarilybelackinginuniformity.Andhencethenaturalmovementofheavyoroflightbodiesbecomesstrongerwhenitgetsnearertothestateof"beinginitsproperplace".Nowweseethatinthemovementsofheavenlybodiesuniformityisalwayspreserved,andfromthisheconcludedtotheperpetuityoftheuniformmovement.Accordinglyhehadtoassertthattheendofthisparticularmovementwassomethingthatisnotmovedeitherofitselforaccidentally.Noweverybodyoranythingelsewhichisinabodyismovableeitherofitselforaccidentally.Thus,therefore,hehadtopositsomesubstanceentirelyseparatedfromabody,whichwouldbetheendofthemovementoftheheavens.

Nowthethreepositionsmentionedaboveseemtodifferinthisrespect:thatAnaxagoras,onthebasisoftheprincipleslaiddownbyhim,didnotconsideritnecessarytopositmorethanoneincorporealsubstance.Plato,however,considereditnecessarytopositmanysubstancesthatweremutuallyorderedaccordingtothenumberandorderofgeneraandspeciesandoftheotherthingsWhichhepositedasabstracts.Forhepositedafirstabstract,whichwouldbeessentiallythegoodandtheone,andafterthatthedifferentordersofintelligiblethingsandofintellects.AsforAristotle,hepositedseveralseparatedsubstances.For,sincethereappearintheheavensmanymovementsofwhichheasserted

5TheseviewsofAnaxagorasaretakenfromvariouspassagesinAristotle(Met.I,c.3,984ab;Phys.I,c.4,187a;Phys.VIII,c.1,250b,etc.).IntheworkDeSubst.Separatisthevariousopinionsaremorefullysetforthandcomparedwithoneanother.6Namely,thatonaccountofwhichthemovementtakesplace.

thateveryonewasuniformandperpetualandforeachandeverymovementtherehadtobeaproperend,andsincetheendofamovementofthissortoughttobeanincorporealsubstance,theconsequencewasthathepositedmany7incorporealsubstances,mutuallyorderedaccordingtothenatureandorderofthemovementsoftheheavens.Nordidheproceedfurtherinassertingthem,becauseitwascharacteristicofhisphilosophynottodepartfromobviousdata.

Butthosewaysarenotverysuitableforus,becausewedonotassertwithAnaxagorasthemixingofsensiblethings,norwithPlatotheseparatenessofuniversals,norwithAristotletheperpetuityofmovement.Hencewemustproceedbyotherwaystoademonstrationofthepointproposed.8

Firstthenitisapparentthattherearesomesubstanceswhollyfreefrombodies,inconsequenceoftheperfectionoftheuniverse.Fortheperfectionoftheuniverseseemstobesuchthatitdoesnotlackanynaturewhichcanpossiblyexist,andthisiswhy[GenesisI]eachthingissaidtobegood,andallthingstogetherexceedinglygood.9Nowitisobviousthatifthereareanytwothings,oneofwhichdoesnotdependontheotheronthebasisofitsowncharacter,itispossiblefortheonetobefoundapartfromtheother:thus,forinstance,''animal"onthebasisofitsowncharacterdoesnotdependon"rational".Andhenceitispossibletofindanimalsthatarenotrational.Nowitischaracteristicofsubstancetobeself-subsistent,anditdoesnotdependinanywayonthecharacterof"body",sincethecharacterof"body"issomehowrelatedtocertainaccidents(namely,dimensions)bywhichsubsistenceisnotcaused.ThereforetheonlyremainingalternativeisthatafterGod,Whoisnotincludedinanygenus,therearetobefoundinthegenus"substance"somesubstanceswhicharefreefrombodies.

Inthesecondplace,thesameconsiderationcanbearrivedatinconsequenceoftheorderlyarrangementofthings,whichisfoundtobesuchthatwecannotgofromoneextremetotheotherexceptthroughintermediates:thus,forinstance,fireisfoundimmediatelybeneath

7Followingtheastronomicaltheoriesofhistime,Aristotleheldthenumber"55"asmoreprobable.8Amongthephilosophersknowntothemediaevalwriters,theonewhomadethemostelaborateattempttodemonstratetheexistenceofsimplesubstancesbelowGodwasAvicebron,whosetreatiseIII(FonsVitae)isnothingbut"anassertionofsimplesubstances;"namely,that(§1)"betweenthefirsthighandholymakerandbetweenthesubstancewhichsupportstheninecategoriesthereisanintermediatesubstance";and(§11)"thereisnotonesubstancebutmany."WilliamofAuvergne(I,1235)seemstohavebeenthefirsttheologiantodevelopargumentsfromreasonthatangelsexist,andweknowhowhighlyheesteemedAvicebron.ButindiscussingthispointSt.ThomasdoesnotmentionAvicebron,butratherhasreferencetopreviousScholastics,Pseudo-Dionysius,andtheLiberdeCausis.

9Cf.Augustine,Conf.XIII,xxviii,43:"Forindividualthingsweremerelygood;butallthingscollectivelywerebothgoodandexceedinglygood."

"heavenlybody",andbeneaththisair,andbeneaththiswater,andbeneaththisearth,followingthesequenceofthenobilityandsubtilityofthesebodies.Nowatthetopmostsummitofthingsthereisabeingwhichisineverywaysimpleandone,namely,God.Itisnotpossible,then,forcorporealsubstancetobelocatedimmediatelybelowGod,foritisaltogethercompositeanddivisible,butinsteadonemustpositmanyintermediates,throughwhichwemustcomedownfromthehighestpointofthedivinesimplicitytocorporealmultiplicity.Andamongtheseintermediates,somearecorporealsubstancesthatarenotunitedtobodies,whileothers,onthecontrary,areincorporealsubstancesthatareunitedtobodies.

Thirdly,thesameisapparentfromthespecialcharacteroftheintellect.Forunderstandingisobviouslyanactivitywhichcannottakeplacebymeansofthebody,asisproveninIIIDeAnima[4,429ab].Andhencethesubstancewhereofthisisanactivitymusthaveactualbeingthatdoesnotdependonthebody,butisraisedabovethebody,fortheactivityofeachthingcorrespondstoitsbeing.If,therefore,someunderstandingsubstanceisunitedtoabody,itwillnotbesounitedinsofarasitunderstands,butonsomeotherbasis;thusitwassaidabovethatitisnecessaryforthehumansoultobeunitedwithabodyinsofarasitlackstheactivitieswhichareexercisedthroughthebodytomakeitsintellectualactivitycomplete,seeingthatitunderstandsbyabstractingfromphantasms.Actuallythislatterissomethingaccidentaltointellectualactivity,anditpertainstoitsimperfectiontogetknowledgefromthingswhichareintelligibleonlyinpotency;justasitpertainstotheimperfectionofthesightofthebatthatithasneedtoseeinthedark.Nowwhateverisaccidentallyconnectedwithathingisnotfoundwithitinallcases.Besides,itmustbethecasethat,priortoanimperfectbeinginagivengenus,thereistobefoundaperfectbeinginthatgenus,becausetheperfectisnaturallypriortotheimperfect,asactispriortopotency.Theonlyremainingalternative,then,isthatonemustpositsomeincorporealsubstancesthatarenotunitedtoabody,asnotneedingabodyforintellectualactivity,10

Astothefirstargument,therefore,itmustbesaidthatonthispointthequotationfromOrigen11isnotacceptable;becausehemakesmany

10AlthoughtheAngelicDoctorexpoundstheseargumentssofirmlyandsystematically,hecertainlyperceivedthattheyprovenomorethanakindoffitness,andintheDeSubst.Separatis,leavingoutallproofsfromreason,hecitesonlyauthorities.Thisisaninstanceofthestyleofwritingandtypeofspeakingwhereinhedrawsupandsetsforthargumentsthataremerelyprobablealongthelinesofademonstration.Cf.P.Rousselot,L'intellectualismedeS.Thomas,pp.156sqq.(2edit.,Paris,1924).11HesaysquiteexactlyinDePot.VI,6,ad2:"Andhence(Origen)seemstohavebeenoftheopinionthatallincorporealsubstancesareunitedtobodies;althoughhedoesnotassertthis,but

proposesitdoubtfully,andalsotouchesonanotheropinion."

erroneousstatementsinthatbook,followingtheviewsoftheancientphilosophers.

Astothesecond,itmustbesaidthatPaschalisspeakingofspiritualthingswithwhichtemporalthingsareconnected,andwiththebuyingorsellingoftheselatter,spiritualthingsthemselvesareunderstoodtobeboughtorsold.Forspiritualrightsorconsecrationsdonothaveasubsistenceoftheirownapartfromthecorporealortemporalthingsthatareconnectedwiththem.

Astothethird,itmustbesaidthateverycreatedspiritneedsbodilycomfort:somefortheirownsake,suchasrationalsouls;othersforoursake,suchastheangels,whoappeartousinassumedbodies.12

Astothefourth,itmustbesaidthatcreatedspiritualsubstances,asregardstheiractualbeing,aresaidtobemeasuredbyeternity(aevo),althoughtheirmovementsaremeasuredbytime,accordingtoAugustine'sstatementinIVSuperGenesiadLitteram[VIII,22,43],"thatGodmovesthespiritualcreationduringtime."Andasforthestatementthatcreatedspiritualsubstancecanbechangedintonon-being(nonesse),thishasnoreferencetoanypotencyexistinginthem,buttoapoweroftheagent.For,justasbeforetheyexistedtheywereabletoexistonlythroughthepowerofanagent,so,whentheydoexist,theycanceasetoexistonlythroughthepowerofGod,WhocantakeawayHisconservinghand.Butinthemthereisnopotencyfornon-being,suchthattheymaybemeasuredbytimeinthewayinwhichthingsthatcanbemoved,eventhoughtheyarenotmoved,aremeasuredbytime.

Astothefifth,itmustbesaidthattobemovedlocallybyanintrinsicandconjoinedmovingpowerdoespresupposesensationandlife.Butthebodiesassumedbyangelsarenotmovedinthisfashion;andhencetheargumentdoesnotfollow.

Astothesixth,itmustbesaidthattoliveandgivelifeasanefficientcausedoesismorenoblethanmerelytolive.Buttogivelifeasaformalcausedoesischaracteristicofasubstancelessnoblethanonewhichliveswithasubsistenceofitsownapartfromabody.Forthebeingofthatintellectualsubstancewhichistheformofthebodyisrathersomethingthatislowestandnearesttoacorporealnature,inasmuchasitcanbecommunicatedtoit.

Astotheseventh,itmustbesaidthatangelsknowparticularthingsthroughuniversalforms,whicharethelikenessesoftheidealcharacterswherebyGodknowsbothuniversalthingsandsingularthings.Neverthelesstheyneednotknowthesingularswhichwillexist,whichhavenotyetparticipatedinthenatureandtheformwhichisrepresentedthroughthespeciesoftheangelicintellect.Nowitisotherwisewith

12NeverthelessinthesermonreferredtoSt.Bernardopenlycontendsthatallangelshavebodiesconjoinedtothem.

thedivineintellect,which,establishedintheeternalpresent,hasafullviewofalltimeinasingleglance.

Astotheeighth,itmustbesaidthatmatteristheprincipleofindividuation,inasmuchasithasnotthenaturalcapacityofbeingreceivedinsomethingelse.Butformswhichhavethenaturalcapacityofbeingreceivedinasubjectcannotbythemselvesbeindividuated;becausesofarastheirowncharacterisconcerned,itisamatterofindifferencetothemwhethertheyarereceivedinoneorinmany.Butiftherebeagivenformwhichisnotabletobereceivedinsomething,ithasindividuationfromthisveryfact,becauseitcannotexistinmany,butremainsinitselfbyitself.AndhenceAristotleinVIIMetaphysica[14,I039a30]arguesagainstPlatothatiftheformsofthingsareabstracts,theymustbesingular.

Astotheninth,itmustbesaidthatinthingscomposedofmatterandformtheelementofindividualityaddstothespecificnatureadefiniteamountofmatterandtheindividualaccidents.13Butinthecaseofseparatedformstheelementofindividualitydoesnotreallyaddanythingtothespecificnature,becauseinsuchformstheessenceoftheformistheself-subsistentindividualitself,asthePhilosophermakesclearinVIIMetaphysica[ibid.].Neverthelessitdoesaddsomethingconceptually,namely,thecharacterofnotbeingabletoexistinmany.

Astothetenth,itmustbesaidthatsubstanceswhichareseparatedfrombodiesaremerelyforms;yettheyarenotactsofanymatter.For,althoughmattercannotexistwithoutform,yetformcanexistwithoutmatter,becausematterhasexistencethroughaform,andnotviceversa.

Astotheeleventh,itmustbesaidthatasoul,becauseitisthelowestamongspiritualsubstances,hasagreateraffinitythanhighersubstanceswithcorporealnature,sothatitisabletobeitsform.

13InQuodl.II,a.4(Paris,12691272)heteachesthatthesuppositeaddssomethingreal,overandabovethenatureoftheangels.Inexplainingthis,JohnofNapleswrote(ca.1323A.D.):"HeexpresslysaysinhisQuodl.II,4thatintheangelsthesuppositediffersfromthenature,becauseinthemthesuppositealsoaddsbeingoverandabovenature."Cf.Xeniathom.III,p.89(Rome,1925).

ArticleVIThesixthquestionis:Isaspiritualsubstanceunitedtoaheavenlybody?1

Anditwouldseemthatitis.1ForDionysiussaysinchapterseven[lect.4]ofDeDivinisNominibusthatthedivinewisdom"conjoinstheendsofprimarybeingstothebeginningsofsecondarybeings."Andfromthisitcanbegatheredthatalowernatureatitshighestpointtouchesahighernatureatitslowestpoint.Nowthehighestthingincorporealnatureisaheavenlybody,andthelowestthinginspiritualnatureisasoul.Thereforeaheavenlybodyisanimate.

2Furthermore,theformofamorenoblebodyismorenoble.Nowaheavenlybodyisthenoblestofbodies,andasoulisthenoblestofforms.If,therefore,somelowerbodiesareanimate,muchmorewillaheavenlybodybeanimate.

Buttheobjectorsaidthat,althoughaheavenlybodyisnotanimate,yettheformwherebythatbodyisabodyismorenoblethantheformwherebyman'sbodyisabody.Butontheotherhand,3eitherthereisanothersubstantialforminthehumanbodybesidetherationalsoul,whichgivesactualbeingtothebody,orthereisnot.Ifthereisnot,butthesoulitselfgivesactualsubstantialbeingtoabody:sincethesoulisthenoblestofforms,itwillfollowthattheformthroughwhichthehumanbodyisabodyismorenoblethantheformthroughwhichaheavenlybodyisabody.Butifthereshouldbeanothersubstantialforminmanwhichgivesactualbeingtothebodybesidesarationalsoul,itisobviousthatthroughthatformahumanbodyisabletotakeonarationalsoul.Nowthatwhichisabletotakeonperfectgoodnessisbetterthanthatwhichisnot,asissaidinIIDeCaeloetMundo[12,292b].If,therefore,aheavenlybodyisnotabletotakeonarationalsoul,itwillstillfollowthattheformthroughwhichthehumanbodyisabodyismorenoblethantheformthroughwhichtheheavenlybodyisabody;whichseemsincongruous.

1InIISent.,d.14,q.1,a.3;DeVeritateV,a.9,ad14;ContraGentilesIIc.70;ContraGentilesIII,*c.23,24;DePot.*VI,a.6;SummaTheol.I,q.70,3;Q.DeAn.8,ad3,ad17,ad18;Quodl.XII,a.8:InIIDeCaelo,lec.3and13;InXIIMet.,lec.9;Resp.de36Articulos,13;Resp.ad42Articulos,118.Aristotle,DeCaeloII,c.2;Met.XII,cc.78.Avicenna,Met.IX,cc.12.Algazel,I,tr.4,cc.23.Averroes,InXIIMet.,comm.44;DeSubstantiaOrbis,c.2;etc.Gull.Alvernus,DeUniversoII,1,cc.37,pp.808sqq.AlbertusM.,SummadeCreat.I,tr.3,q.16,a.2,vol.34,p.439;InIISent.,d.14,a.6,vol.27,p.265;SummaTheol.II,tr.11,q.53,m.3,vol.32,p.566.St.Bonaventure,InIISent.,d.14,a.3,q.2,p.347(here,cf.themarginalnote);SummaPhilos.,tr.15,cc.1013.Avicennahadsaidthatheavenlybodiesareinformedbyasentientsoulalso,butAverroesthattheywereinformedbyanintellectualsoulonly.ThemorecommonbeliefamongdoctorsatthetimeofSt.

Thomaswasthattheyarenotanimatedinthepropersense,yetaremovedbyangels.AndthisdoctrineSt.Thomashimselfconstantlyprofesses,evenifhedoesnotalwaysobservethesamemannerofspeaking.

4Furthermore,theperfectionoftheuniverserequiresthattonobodybedeniedthattowardwhichithasanaturalinclination.Noweverybodyhasanaturalinclinationtowardthatwhichitneedsforitsownactivity.Theproperactivity,however,ofaheavenlybodyiscircularmovement,andforthisitstandsinneedofaspiritualsubstance:forthismovementcannotbetheconsequenceofanycorporealform,asarethemovementsofheavyandoflightobjects;becausethemovementwouldhavetoceasewhenitarrivedatsomedefiniteplace,ashappensinthecaseofheavyandoflightobjects.Thisisclearlyfalse.Thereforetheonlyremainingalternativeisthatheavenlybodieshavespiritualsubstancesunitedtothemselves.

5Furthermore,everythingwhich,whileexistinginaparticularcondition,isnaturallymoved,cannotbeatrestwhileexistinginthatsamecondition,saveinaviolentfashion;anexampleofthisisaheavyoralightbodythatexistsoutsideitsownplace.Butifthemovementoftheheavenscomesfromanaturalform,theymustbenaturallymovedwhileexistinginanyplacewhatever;therefore,inwhateverplaceitbesaidthattheyareatrest,theywillnotbeatrestexceptthroughviolence.2Nownothingviolentcangoonforever.Thereforetheheavensarenotforeveratrestafterthedayofjudgmentasweassertaccordingtofaith.Since,therefore,thisisincongruous,itwouldseemnecessarytosaythattheheavensaremovedbyavoluntarymovement.Andsoitfollowsthattheheavensareanimate.

6Furthermore,inanygenusthatwhichexistsofitselfispriortothatwhichexiststhroughsomethingelse.Buttheheavensareprimaryinthegenusofmovablethings.Thereforetheyaremovedofthemselves,asself-movingmovers.Noweveryself-movingmoverisdividedintotwoparts:oneofwhichisthatwhichdoesthemovingthroughappetite,as,forexample,thesoul,andtheotherthatwhichisthemoved,as,forexample,thebody.Consequentlyaheavenlybodyisanimate.3

7Furthermore,nothingwhichismovedbyanentirelyextrinsicmoverhasanaturalmovement.Since,therefore,themovementoftheheavenscomesfromaspiritualsubstancebecauseaccordingtoAugustineinIIIDeTrinitate[IV,9],Godmanagescorporealsubstancethroughspiritualsubstanceifthatsubstancewerenotunitedtoit,butwereentirelyextrinsic,themovementoftheheavenswouldnotbenatural.ThiscontradictsthePhilosopher4inIDeCaelo[8,176b].

8Furthermore,thatspiritualsubstancewhichmovestheheavens,ifitweremerelyextrinsic,couldnotbesaidtomovetheheavensonly

2Cf.Aristotle,DeCaeloII,c.3,286a.3Cf.thePhilosopher,Phys.VIII,c.4.

4Cf.Aristotle,DeCaeloII,c.3,286a,wherethematterisputmoreclearly.

bywilling;becauseinthatcaseitswillingwouldbeitsacting,whichischaracteristicofGodalone.Itaccordinglywouldbenecessarytoimpartsomethinginordertoproducemotion;andinthatcase,sinceitspowerislimited,itwouldfollowthatfatiguewouldcomeuponitinitsmovingoveralongcourseoftime.5Thisisincongruous,andparticularlysoaccordingtothosewhoasserttheeternityofmovement.Thereforethespiritualsubstancewhichmovestheheavensisunitedthereto.

9Furthermore,asisheldinIVPhysica[VIII,5],themoversofthelowerspheresaremovedaccidentally,butthemoverofthehighersphereisnot.Butthemoverofahighersphereisunitedtoitsownsphereasmover.Thereforethemoversofthelowerspheresareunitedtothemnotonlyasmoversbutasforms;andthusthelowerspheresatleastareanimate.

10Furthermore,astheCommentatorsaysonXIMetaphysica[XII,comm.48],theseparatedsubstancesareinthebestdispositioninwhichtheycanpossiblybe:andthismeansthateachoneofthemmovesaheavenlybodybothasanagentandasanend.Nowthiscouldnotbethecaseunlesstheyweresomehowunitedtothem.Thereforeincorporealsubstancesareunitedtotheheavenlybodies;andthustheheavenlybodieswouldseemtobeanimate.

11Furthermore,theCommentator,inthesamebook[comm.25],expresslysaysthattheheavenlybodiesareanimate.

12Furthermore,nothingactsoutsideitsownspecies;foraneffectcannotbemorepowerfulthanitscause.Nowlivingsubstanceisbetterthannon-livingsubstance,asAugustinesaysinDeVeraReligione[LV109].Since,therefore,heavenlybodiescauselife,especiallyinthecaseofanimalsgeneratedfromputrefaction,itwouldseemthattheheavenlybodiesliveandareanimate.

13Furthermore,theCommentatorsaysinhisbookDeSubstantiaOrbis[II]that"circularmovementispropertothesoul."Thereforethosebodiesespeciallyseemtobeanimateforwhichitisnaturaltobemovedinacircularfashion.Nowsucharetheheavenlybodies.Thereforetheheavenlybodiesareanimate.

14Furthermore,topraise,toshowforth(enarrare),andtorejoiceareproperonlytoananimateandknowingthing.ButtheaforesaidactionsareattributedtotheheavensinHolyScripture,accordingtothePsalm[CXLVIII,4]:"Praisehim,yeheavensofheavens;"[XVIII,1]:"TheheavensshowforththegloryofGod;"andApocalypseXIV[XVIII,20]:"Rejoiceoverher,thouheaven."Thereforetheheavensareanimate.6

5Cf.Aristotle,II,c.1,284a17.

6ThisistheargumentofRabbiMoses;cf.Q.DeAn.8,ad19.

ButontheotherhandthereisiwhatDamascenesaysinbookII[DeFideOrth.,VI,PGXCIV,886]:"Letnoonethinkthattheheavensorthestarsareanimate;fortheyareinanimateandinsensible."

iiFurthermore,asoulunitedtoabodyisnotseparatedfromitsavebydeath.Buttheheavenlybodiescannotbemortal,sincetheyareincorruptible.Thereforeifsomespiritualsubstancebeunitedtothemassouls,theywillbeperpetuallyboundtothem;andthisseemsincongruous,thatsomeangelsshouldbeperpetuallyassignedtosomebodies.

iiiFurthermore,theheavenlysocietyoftheblessedconsistsofangelsandofsouls.Butthesoulsoftheheavens,iftheheavensareanimate,areincludedinneitherdivision.Thereforetherewouldbesomerationalcreatureswhichcannotbeparticipantsinbeatitude;andthisseemsincongruous.

ivFurthermore,everyrationalcreature,consideredaccordingtoitsownnature,isabletosin.If,then,somerationalcreaturesareunitedtoheavenlybodies,therewouldbenothingagainstsomeoneofthemhavingsinned,andthusitwouldfollowthatsomeoneoftheheavenlybodiesismovedbyanevilspirit;whichseemsabsurd.

vFurthermore,weoughttoimploretheintercessionofthegoodspirits.If,then,somespiritsareunitedtoheavenlybodies,sinceitisnotfittingtoassertthattheyareevil,butitshouldbeassertedthattheyaregood,seeingthattheyassistGodinthemanagementofcorporealnature,itwouldfollowthattheirintercessionoughttobeimplored.Butitwouldseemabsurdifanyoneweretosay"OSun"or"OMoon,prayforme."Itshould,therefore,notbeassertedthatsomespiritsareunitedtoheavenlybodies.

viFurthermore,asoulholdstogetherthebodytowhichitisunited,accordingtothePhilosopherinIDeAnima[5,411b7].If,then,heavenlybodiesareanimate,itwouldfollowthatsomecreatedspiritualsubstanceholdstogetherthewholeheavens:andthisisabsurd,sincethisischaracteristicofUncreatedWisdomalone,inWhosepersonitissaidinEcclesiasticusXXIV[8]:"Ialonehavecompassedthecircuitoftheheavens."

ANSWER.Itmustbesaidthatconcerningthisquestiontherehavebeendifferentopinions,bothamongtheancientphilosophersandalsoamongthedoctorsoftheChurch.Anaxagoras,however,thoughtthattheheavenlybodieswereinanimate;andhencehewaskilledbytheAthenians,forhesaid,"Thesunisastoneonfire."7ButPlatoandAristotleandtheirfollowersassertedthattheheavenlybodiesareanimate.LikewisealsoamongthedoctorsoftheChurch,Origenassertedthattheheavenly

7Cf.Diog.Laert.II,8,butSt.ThomashadthisfromAugustine(DeCivitateDeiXVIII,41)andhereferstothispassageinSummaTheol.I,q.70,a.3.

bodiesareanimate.AndJeromefollowedhim,asisclearfromacertainglossonEcclesiastesI[6]:"Thespiritgoethforwardsurveyingallinitscircuit."8However,Damasceneaffirmsthatheavenlybodiesareinanimate,asisclearfromthepassagequotedabove.ButAugustineleavesthequestiondoubtfulinIISuperGenesiadLitteram[XVIII,38]andinhisEnchiridion[LVIII].

Bothopinions,however,havethecharacterofprobability.Fortheconsiderationofthenobilityoftheheavenlybodiesleadstoassertingthattheyareanimate,sinceinthegenusof"things"livingthingsarepreferredtoallnon-livingthings.Buttheconsiderationofthenobilityofspiritualsubstancesleadsustothecontraryview.Forhigherspiritualsubstancescannothaveanyoftheactivitiesofthesoulexceptthosewhichpertaintotheintellect:becausetheotheractivitiesoflifearetheactsofthesoulinsofarasitistheformofacorruptibleandchangeablebody;fortheseactivitiestakeplacealongwithacertainchangeandcorporealalteration.Nordoestheintellectofhighersubstancesseemtoneedtogetknowledgefromsensiblethings,asourintellectdoes.If,therefore,noneoftheactivitiesoflifeareinthemexceptunderstandingandwilling,whichdonotneedacorporealorgan,theirdignitywouldseemtoexceedunionwithabody.Ofthesetwoconsiderations,however,thesecondismoreeffectivethanthefirst.Fortheunionofsoulandbodydoesnottakeplaceforthesakeofthebody,namely,thatthebodymaybeennobled,butforthesakeofthesoul,whichneedsthebodyforitsownperfection,aswassaidabove[Art.II,Obj.5].

Now,ifonestudiesthemattermoreclosely,hewillperhapsfindthatthereiseitherlittleornodiscrepancybetweenthesetwoopinions;andthisistobeunderstoodasfollows.Foritcannotbesaidthatthemovementofaheavenlybodyisaconsequenceofsomecorporealform,asmovementupwardsisaconsequenceoftheform"fire".Foritisobviousthatasinglenaturalformtendstowardbutonething.Nowthecharacterofmovementisatvariancewithoneness,becauseitisoftheessenceofmovementthatathingshouldbeotherwiseinthepresentandataprevioustime.Andhenceanaturalformdoesnottendtowardmovementforthesakeofthemovementitselfbutforthesakeofbeinginsomeplace,andwhenthishasbeenreachedthemovementceases;andthisiswhatwouldhappeninthecaseofthemovementoftheheavensifitwereaconsequenceofsomenaturalform.Oneshouldsaythenthatthemovementoftheheavenscomesfromsomeintelligentsubstance.Fortheendofthismovementcanonlybeacertainabstractintelligiblegood,

8CfPLXXIII,1016:"orifhehascalledthesunitself'spirit'becauseitgiveslife(somecodicesread:Becauseitisanimal),andbreathes,andhasstrength."ThepassageiscitedbySt.Thomas,DeVeritateV,9,ad14:"Hehascalledthesun'spirit'because,likeananimal,itbreathesandhasstrength."ElsewhereJeromedoesnotteachthattheheavensareanimate.

forthesakeofwhichtheintelligentsubstancewhichmovestheheavensdoesitsmoving,namely,inorderthatitmaytakeonalikenessofthatgoodinitsworkingandinorderthatwhatisvirtuallycontainedinthatintelligiblegoodmaybemadeexplicitinact;andespeciallythefillingupofthenumberoftheElect,forwhosesakeallotherthingsseemtoexist.9

Thus,then,therewillbetwoordersofspiritualsubstances.Someofthesewillbemoversoftheheavenlybodiesandareunitedtothemasmoversaretomovablethings,asAugustinealsosaysinIIIDeTrinitate[IV,9]thatallbodiesareruledbyGodthroughtherationalspiritoflife;andthesameviewisheldbyGregoryinIVDialogi[VI,PLLXXVII,329].Butsomesubstanceswillbeendsofthesemovements,andthesearewhollyabstractedandnotunitedtobodies;butothersareunitedtoheavenlybodiesinthewayinwhichamoverisunitedtoamobilething.ThisseemstosufficeforpreservingthemeaningofPlatoandofAristotle.WithrespecttoPlato,thispointisobvious;forPlato,ashasbeensaidabove,didnotsaythateventhehumanbodyisanimateinanyothersenseexceptinsofarasthesoulisunitedtothebodyasamover.ButfromthestatementsofAristotleitisobviousthathedidnotassertintheheavenlybodiesanyofthevirtuesofthesoulsavetheintellectual.Buttheintellectaccordingtohimisnottheactofanybody.

Nowtosayfurtherthatheavenlybodiesareanimateinthisway,likelowerbodieswhichgrowandsensethroughasoul,iscontrarytotheincorruptibilityoftheheavenlybodies.Thus,then,itmustbedeniedthatheavenlybodiesareanimateinthewayinwhichlowerbodiesareanimate.Butitmustnotbedeniedthattheheavenlybodiesareanimate,ifbyanimationnothingelseismeantthantheunionofamovertoamobilething.10AugustineseemstotouchonthesetwowaysinIISuperGenesiadLitteram[XVIII];forhesays:"Itisusuallyaskedwhether

9Themovingangel,understandinganddesiringsomehighergood(whetherGodorahigherangel),aimsatassimilatinghimselftothatgoodinhisactivity,byproducingthemostperfectmovementofhisownsphere,thatis,thecircular,bywhichmovementtheprocessofgenerationandcorruptioniscarriedforwardinthissublunarworld,particularlythegenerationandevolutionofmen,inorderthatthenumberoftheElectmaybecompleted.InthefollowingpassagesSt.Thomasfavorstheview(ofAverroesinMet.XII;cf.below,ad10)whichassignstotheindividualspheres,besidesanangelwhomovesasanefficientcause,anotherhigherangelwhichisaimedatbythatoneasitsend.SoalsoinIISent.,d.14,q.1,a.3:"Onthispoint,moreover,(thepositionofthephilosophers)canbeupheld,sothatwemaysaythathigherangels,whichhavemoreuniversalforms,areseparateandremotemovers;whereaslowerangels,whichhavemoreparticularforms,...areproximatemovers."Yetforthemostparthesaysnothingaboutremotemovers.10InRespons.ad42Articulos(ad3)hesays:"Irememberhavingreadthatthestatement:heavenlybodiesaremovedbyaspiritualcreature,wasdeniedbynooneofthesaintsorphilosophers."YetthedifficultiesraisedinthatpassageandinRespons.adlect.Venetum(madeupof36articles)showthat

someofhiscontemporariesdoubtedthis.

thestarsoftheheavensarethoseconspicuousbodiesalone,orwhethertheyhavecertainrulingspiritsoftheirown;andiftheyhave,whethertheyarealsovitallyinspiredbythem,asbodiesareanimatedbythesoulsofanimals.''Butalthoughhehimselfleavesbothsuppositionsdoubtful,asisclearfromwhatfollows,itmustbesaidaccordingtotheaboveconsiderationsthattheyhaverulingspirits,bywhichneverthelesstheyarenotanimatedinthesamefashionasloweranimalsareanimatedbytheirsouls.

Astothefirstargument,therefore,itmustbesaidthataheavenlybodybordersonspiritualsubstances,insofarasalowerorderofspiritualsubstancesisunitedtotheheavenlybodiesafterthemannerofamover.

Astothesecond,itmustbesaidthataccordingtoAverroes'viewtheheavensarecomposedofmatterandform,justasananimalisamonglowerbeings.But"matter"isneverthelessusedequivocallyinbothinstances:forinhigherthingsitisnotapotencytowardactualbeingasinlowerthings,butonlytowardplace.Henceanactuallyexistingbodyisitselfmatter,anddoesnotneedaformtogiveitactualbeing,sinceitisactuallyabeing(ensactu),butonlytogiveitmotion.Andsoaheavenlybodyhasamorenobleformthanahumanbody,butinanotherway.If,however,itbesaid,asotherssay,thataheavenlybodyisitselfcomposedofmatterandcorporealform,thenonewillstillbeabletosaythatthatcorporealformwillbethemostnoble,inasmuchasitisaformandanactwhichfulfilsthewholepotentialityofmatter,sothattheredoesnotremaininitapotentialitytoanotherform.

Andthroughthisthesolutiontothethirdisalsoclear.

Astothefourth,itmustbesaidthatfromthefactthataheavenlybodyismovedbyaspiritualsubstance,itfollowsthatithasaninclinationtowardthesubstanceitselfastowardamover,andnototherwise.

Andthesamethingmustbesaidastothefifthandthesixth.

Astotheseventh,itmustbesaidthataspiritualsubstancewhichmovestheheavenshasanaturalpowerwhichisdeterminedwithrespecttothemovementofsuchabody;andlikewisethebodyoftheheavenshasanaturalaptitudeforbeingmovedbysuchamovement.Andonthisaccountthemovementoftheheavensisnatural,althoughitcomesfromanintelligentsubstance.

Astotheeighth,itmustbesaidthatthereisprobabilityinthestatementthataspiritualsubstancemovesaheavenlybodybyacommandofthewill.Foralthoughinregardtoachangeofformcorporealmatterdoesnotobeyacreatedspiritaccordingtothewillofthelatter,butobeysonlyGod,asAugustinesaysinIIIDeTrinitate[viii,13],yetthefactthat

itcanobeysuchaspiritaccordingtoitswillinregardtoachangeofplaceisevidenteveninthecaseofourselves,inwhom,immediatelyafteracommandofthewill,therefollowsamovementof

ourbodilymembers.Ifneverthelessoverandaboveacommandofthewillthereshouldbeaddedalsotheinfluenceofsomepower,thereisnotonthisaccountanyfatiguethatfollowsfromthelimitedcharacterofthepower;foreverypowerofahigherorder,althoughitislimitedinitselfandinrelationtosomethinghigherthanitself,isneverthelessunlimitedinrelationtoitsowninferiors,11as,forinstance,thepowerofthesunalsoisunlimitedinrelationtothingscapableofgenerationandcorruption,andthroughtheproductionofthesethings,evenifitweretogoonforever,itwouldnotbelessened;andsimilarlythevirtueoftheintellectisunlimitedinrelationtosensibleforms.Andsotoothepowerofaspiritualsubstancewhichmovestheheavensisunlimitedinrelationtocorporealmovement;andhencefatigueinitdoesnotfollow.

Astotheninth,itmustbesaidthatthesoulwhichmovescorruptibleanimalsisunitedtotheminrespectoftheiractualbeing,butthespiritualsubstancewhichmovestheheavenlybodiesisunitedtothemmerelyinrespectoftheirbeingmoved.Andhencebeingmovedaccidentallyisattributedtothesoulofacorruptibleanimalbyreasonofitsveryself.Forwhenthebodywithwhichitisoneinbeingismoved,itmustitselfbemovedaccidentally.Butbeingmovedaccidentallyisattributedtothemoverofalowersphere,notbyreasonofitsveryself,butbyreasonofthemobilething,insofar,thatis,asthelowersphereismovedaccidentally,ashavingbeenbroughtdownwardbythemovementofthehighersphere.Butthemoverofahighersphereisnotmovedaccidentallyineitherway,becauseitssphereisnotbroughtdownwardbutbringsothersdownward.

Astothetenth,itmustbesaidonthispointwefindthatAverroeshasexpresseddifferentviews.ForinthebookDeSubstantiaOrbis[1,postmed.],hesaidthatwhatmovestheheavenlybodiesasagentandasendisoneandthesame;andthisissurelyquiteerroneous,particularlyinrelationtotheviewwherebyheassertsthatthefirstcauseisnotabovethesubstancesthatmovethefirstheaven.12ForonthisviewitfollowsthatGodisthesoulofthefirstheaven,inasmuchasthesubstancewhichmovesthefirstheavenasagentiscalleditssoul.Andtheargumentonwhichhemadethisstatementisveryinadequate:forbecauseinthecaseofsubstancesseparatedfrommatterthethingthatunderstandsandthethingthatisunderstoodarethesame,hethoughtthatthethingwhichdesiresandthethingwhichisdesiredarethesame;andthereisnoparallelhere.Forknowledgeofanythingwhatevertakesplaceaccordingasthethingknownisintheknower;butdesiretakesplacebywayofaturningofthedesirertowardthething

11Cf.LiberdeCausis,§15.12ForhesaysthatGodHimselfisthemoverofthefirstsphere,whileAvicennaaffirmsthatthefirstheavenismovedbythefirstcreatedintelligence.

desired.Nowifthegooddesiredwerepresentinthedesirerofitsveryself,itwouldnotbepropertoittodoanymovingtowardtheattainmentofthedesiredgood.Andhenceoneshouldsaythatthedesiredgood,whichmovesasanend,issomethingotherthanthedesirer,whichmovesasanagent.Andthis,too,istheverysamestatementwhichtheCommentatormakesonXIMetaphysica[XII,comm.38;41];forthereheassertstwomovers:oneconjoined,whichhecallsthesoul,andtheotherseparated,whichmovesasanend.Neverthelessfromallthiswegetnothingmorethanthefactthataspiritualsubstanceisunitedtoaheavenlybodyasitsmover.

Astotheeleventh,itmustbesaidthathesaysheavenlybodiesareanimate,becausespiritualsubstancesareunitedtothemasmovers,andnotasforms.13HenceonVIIMetaphysica[comm.31],hesaysthattheformativepowerofsemen"doesnotactsavethroughtheheatwhichisinthesemen,notinthesenseofbeingaforminit,likethesoulinnaturalheat,butinthesenseofbeingenclosedthere,asasoulisenclosedinheavenlybodies."

Astothetwelfth,itmustbesaidthataheavenlybody,inasmuchasitismovedbyaspiritualsubstance,isitsinstrument.Andsoitdoesitsmovinginvirtueofaspiritualsubstancetoproducelifeinthoselowerbodies,justasasawactsinvirtueofanarttomakeabox.

Astothethirteenth,itmustbesaidthatfromthisreasoningnothingmorecanbegatheredthanthattheheavenlybodiesaremovedbyspiritualsubstances.

Astothefourteenth,itmustbesaidthataccordingtoDamascenetheheavensaresaidtoshowforththegloryofGod,topraise,ortorejoice,inamaterialsense,insofarastheyare,formen,thematterofpraisingorshowingforthorrejoicing.ForsimilarsayingsarefoundintheScripturesaboutmountains,hills,andotherinanimatecreatures.

Butastothefirstoftheobjectionswhichareraisedtothecontrary,itmustbesaidthatDamascenedeniesthattheheavenlybodiesareanimateinthesensethatspiritualsubstancesareunitedtothemasforms,astocorruptiblelivingthings.

Astoii,itmustbesaidthatoneangelisassignedtotheguardianshipofonemanforaslongashelives;andhencethereisnoincongruityifoneangelisassignedtomoveaheavenlybodyforaslongasitismoved.

13InIISent.,d.14,i,3,andinDeVer.V,ad14,hedoesnotwantthemtobecalledforms.InDePot.VI,a.6,thematterisnotentirelyclear.Moreover,hewritesinContraGentilesII,c.72:"Itwillbenecessarytosaythattheintellectissubstantiallyunitedtoaheavenlybodyasaform";andsimilarlyinQ.DeAn.8,ad3.But,ashere,soinSummaTheol.I,q.70,a.3,heagainfindsfaultwiththeword"form":"Butinorderthatitmaydoitsmoving,itneednotbeunitedtoitasaform,

butthroughthecontactofpower,asamoverisunitedtoamobilething."

Astoiii,itmustbesaidthat,ifheavenlybodiesareanimate,thespiritspresidingoverthemarecountedamongthecompanyoftheangels.HenceAugustinesaysinhisEnchiridion[LVIII,PLXL,260]:"NordoIknowforcertainwhetherthesun,themoon,andallthestarsbelongtothecompanyoftheangels;althoughtosometheymayseemtobeluminousbodies,nothavingsenseorintelligence."

Astoiv,itmustbesaidthatonthispointthereisnodoubt,ifwefollowtheopinionofDamascene[DeFideOrth.II,4,PGXCIV,875],whoassertsthattheangelswhosinnedbelongedtothenumberofthosewhoaresetovercorruptiblebodies.Butif,accordingtoGregory'sbelief,someofthehigheralsosinned,itmustbesaidthatGodpreservedfromafallthosewhomheappointedtothisservice,asHedidmanyoftheothersalso.

Astov,itmustbesaidthatwedonotsay:"OSun,prayforme,"bothbecauseaspiritualsubstanceisnotunitedtothebodyoftheheavensasaformbutmerelyasamover,andalsotoremovealloccasionofidolatry.

Astovi,itmustbesaidthataccordingtothePhilosopherinIVPhysica[VIII,10,267b7],themoveroftheheavensisinsomepartofthem,andnotinthewhole;andsoitdoesnotcompassthecircuitofheaven.Butitisotherwisewiththesoul,whichgivesbeingtothebodyasawholeandinitsparts.

ArticleVIITheseventhquestionis:Isaspiritualsubstanceunitedtoanetherealbody?1

Anditwouldseem.thatitis.1ForAugustinesaysinIIISuperGenesiadLitteram[X,14]andinIVDeCivitateDei[VIII,16;XV,23]thatdemonshaveetherealbodies.Butdemonsarespiritualsubstances.Thereforeaspiritualsubstanceisunitedtoanetherealbody.

2Furthermore,AugustinesaysinhisbookDeDivinationeDaemonum[III,7,PLXL,584]thatdemonsarebeyondthehumansensesbecauseofthesubtilityofanetherealbody.Nowthiswouldnotbethecase,unlesstheywerenaturallyunitedtoanetherealbody.Thereforespiritualsubstancesareunitedtoanetherealbody.

3Furthermore,themeandoesnotdifferwidelyfromtheextremes.Butintheregionofheavenlybodieslifeisfound,accordingtothosewhoassertthattheheavenlybodiesareanimate;andintheregionofearthlifeisfoundinanimalsandinplants.Thereforeinthemiddleregionalso,thatoftheair,lifeisfound.Norcanthishavereferencetobirdlife,becausebirdsareraisedabovetheearthalittledistanceintheair,anditwouldnotseemfittingthatalltheotherairspaceshouldremaindevoidoflife.Onemustthenassert,asitseems,thatsomeethereallivingbeingsexistinit,fromwhichitfollowsthatsomespiritualsubstancesareunitedtoanetherealbody.

4Furthermore,abodythatismorenoblehasamorenobleform.Butairisamorenoblebodythanearth,inasmuchasitismoreformalandmorefine.Ifthenaspiritualsubstancesuchasthesoulisunitedtoanearthlybody,namely,ahumanbody,forallthegreaterreasonwoulditbeunitedtoanetherealbody.

5Furthermore,inthecaseofthingswhichagreemoreclosely,unioniseasier.But"air"seemstoagreemorewith"soul"thandoesamixedbody,suchasman'sbodyis;because,asAugustinesaysinSuperGenesiadLitteram[VII,15and19],thesoulmanagesthebodythroughair.Thereforethesoulisnaturallymoreapttobeunitedtoanetherealbodythaneventoamixedbody.

6Furthermore,itissaidinthebookDeSubstantiaOrbis[ofAverroes,II]:"Circularmovementischaracteristicofthesoul,"andthisforthereasonthatthesoul,sofarasitisitselfconcerned,isdisposedtodoitsmovinginalldirectionswithoutanydifference.Butthisalso

1InIISent.,d.8,q.1,a.1;ContraGentilesII,cap.90,91;DePot.VI,6;SummaTheol.I,q.51,

a.1;DeMalo,*XVI,1;DeSubst.Separatis,1819.St.Augustine(invariouspassageswhereheisrecordingtheviewsofthePlatonists,whichhesometimesseemstoapproveof,atleastasregardsdemons).Gull.Alvernus,DeUniversoII,2,cc.5,27,28.Alex.Halensis,SummaII,1,p.238.St.Bonaventure,InIISent.,d.8,p.210.AlbertusM.,InIISent.,d.8,A,a.1,vol.27,p.168.SummaPhilos.tr.10,c.1andfollowing.

seemstobecharacteristicoftheair,becauseitislightincombinationwithlightobjectsandheavyincombinationwithheavyobjects.Thereforethesoulwouldseemmostofalltobeunitedtoair.

Butontheotherhand,thesoulistheactof.anorganicbody.Butanetherealbodycannotbeorganicbecause,sinceitcannotbeboundedbyaboundaryofitsownbutonlybytheboundaryofsomethingelse,itcannothaveanyshape.Thereforeaspiritualsubstance,whichthesoulis,cannotbeunitedtoanetherealbody.

ANSWER.Itmustbesaidthatitisimpossibleforaspiritualsubstancetobeunitedtoanetherealbody.2Thiscanbeclearlyshowninthreeways.Inthefirstplace,becauseamongallotherbodiesthesimplebodiesofelementsarethemoreimperfect,3sincetheyarelikematterinrelationtoallotherbodies.Andhenceitisnotconsistentwiththeschemeofthingsforsomesimpleelementarybodytobeunitedtoaspiritualsubstanceasaform.Thesecondreasonisthatairisabody,whichishomogeneousasawholeandinallitsparts.Henceifsomespiritualsubstanceisunitedtoanyonepartoftheair,forthesamereasonitwillalsobeunitedtothewholeair,andlikewisetoeveryotherelement,whichseemsabsurd.Thethirdreasonisthataspiritualsubstanceisfoundtobeunitedtoagivenbodyintwoways:inoneway,inordertofurnishmovementtoabody,as,forinstance,itwassaidthatspiritualsubstancesareunitedtotheheavenlybodies;inanotherway,inorderthataspiritualsubstancemaybehelpedbyabodyasregardsitsownproperactivity,whichisunderstanding,asahumansoul,forinstance,isunitedtoabodyinorderthatitmayacquireastoreofknowledgethroughthebodilysenses.Butaspiritualsubstancecannotbeunitedtotheair;notbyreasonofmovement,becauseairhasacertainconnaturalmovementwhichisaconsequenceofitsnaturalform,noristheretobefoundanymovementinthewholeairorinanypartthereofwhichcannotbereferredbacktosomebodilycause;andhencefromitsmovementitdoesnotappearthataspiritualsubstanceisunitedtoit.Noryetisaspiritualsubstanceunitedtoanetherealbodyfortheperfectionofintellectualactivity:forasimplebodycannotbeaninstrumentofsense,asisproveninDeAnima[III,12,434b10].Hencetheonlyremainingalternativeisthatspiritualsubstanceisinnowayunitedtoabody.

2Butwemustnotethatitisanentirelydifferentquestionwhetherangelscaneverassumeetherealbodies,ofwhichtheyarethemoversandnottheforms;andthisisadmitted.Cf.SummaTheol.I,q.51,a.23.3InDeMalo(XVI,1,reap.)St.Thomaswarnsusthat"thePeripatetics,Aristotle'sfollowers,didnotassertthattherearedemons."Andthereheadmits(ad3)that"ItisprobableenoughthatDionysius,whowasinmanyrespectsafollowerofthePlatonistview,thoughtincompanywiththemthatdemonsareakindoflivingbeingswhichhavesense-appetiteandsense-knowledge",andinad7hethinksthatDamasceneheldwithOrigenthatdemonshavebodies.

Astothefirstargument,therefore,itmustbesaidthatwhereverAugustinesaysthatdemonshaveetherealbodies,hedoesnotsaysoasanassertionofhisownbelief,butaccordingtotheopinionofothers.AndhencehehimselfsaysinXIIDeCivitateDei[X,1]:"Evendemonshaveakindofbodyoftheirown,aslearnedmenhavethought,ofthatthickandhumidair...Butifanyoneshouldassertthatdemonshavenobodies,thereisnoneedeithertoworkoutalaboriousinvestigationofthismatterortoquarrelaboutitincontentiousargument."

Andthroughthisthesolutiontothesecondisclear.

Astothethird,itmustbesaidthattheplaceforthemixingoftheelementsisinthelowerregion,namely,thataroundtheearth.Nowmixedbodies,theclosertheycometoanequalmixture,thefartherdotheyrecedefromtheextremesofcontraries;andthustheyacquireakindoflikenesstotheheavenlybodies,whicharewithoutcontrariety.Andsoitisclearthatlifeismoreabletoexistinthehighestandinthelowestregionthaninthemiddleone;especiallywhen,inthecaseofthoselowerones,thebodyisallthemorepreparedforlifetheneareritcomestoanequalityofconstituency.

Astothefourth,itmustbesaidthatthebody"air"ismorenoblethanthebody"earth."Butabodyofequalconstituencyismorenoblethanboth,becauseitismoredistantfromcontrariety;andthiskindofbodyonlyisfoundtobeunitedtoaspiritualsubstance.Init,nevertheless,thelowerelementmustbemateriallymoreabundantinordertoconstituteequality,onaccountoftheexcessofactivepowerintheotherelements.

Astothefifth,itmustbesaidthatasoulissaidtomanageitsownbodythroughairsofarasmovementisconcerned,becauseairismoresusceptibletomovementthanareotherdensebodies.

Astothesixth,itmustbesaidthatairisnotindifferenttoeverymovement,butincombinationwithcertainbodiesitislight,incombinationwithothersitisheavy;andhencefromthiswecannotconcludethatairisperfectiblethroughasoul.

ArticleVIIITheeighthquestionis:Doallangelsdifferinspeciesfromoneanother?1

Anditwouldseemthattheydonot.1AugustinesaysinhisEnchiridion[XXIX]:"Therationalcreaturehoodwhichwasinmen,sincebyreasonofsinsandpenalties...ithadwhollyperished"deserved"inparttoberenewed."Andfromthisitisarguedasfollows.Ifallangelsweredifferentfromoneanotherintheirspecificnature,then,sincemanyangelsfellirreparably,manynatureswouldhaveirreparablyperished.ButDivineProvidencedoesnotallowanyrationalnaturetoperishentirely,asisclearfromthepassagequoted.Thereforenotallangelsdifferfromoneanotherinspecificnature.

2Furthermore,theclosersomethingsaretoGod,inWhomthereisnodiversity,thelessdifferenttheyare.NowaccordingtotheorderofnatureangelsareclosertoGodthanmenare.Butbeingswhichdiffernumericallyandspecificallyaremoredifferentfromoneanotherthanarethosewhichdiffernumericallyandagreespecifically.Since,therefore,mendonotdifferspecifically,butonlynumerically,itwouldseemthatangelstoodonotdifferspecifically.

3Furthermore,anagreementofthingsintheirformalprinciplecausesthemtobespecificallythesame,butadifferenceintheirmaterialprinciplemakesthemdifferonlynumerically.Nowinangelstheirveryexistenceservesastheformalelementwithregardtotheangel'sessence,ashasbeensaidabove.Sincethenallangelsagreeinexistencebutdifferinessence,itwouldseemthatangelsdiffer,notspecifically,butonlynumerically.

4Furthermore,everysubsistingcreatedsubstanceisanindividual,includedundersomenaturecommontoaspeciesinsuchawaythatiftheindividualbeacomposite,thespecificnaturewillbepredicatedofitaccordingtoitscharacterasacomposite,butiftheindividualissimple,thespecificnaturewillbepredicatedofitinconsiderationofitssimplecharacteristics.Nowanangelisasubsistingcreatedsubstance.Whether,then,itbecomposedofmatterandformorwhetheritbesimple,itmustbeincludedundersomespecificnature.Butthefactthatitcanhavemanysuppositesdoesnotdetractfromaspecificnature;

1DeEnteetEssent.,5;DeNaturaMateriae,3;InIISent.*,d.3,q.1,a.45;InIVSent.,d.12,q.1,a.1,sol.3,ad3;ContraGentilesII,cap.93,95;SummaTheol.*I,q.50,a.4;Q.DeAn.7(indirectly);InLibrumdeCausis,lec.4;DeUnit.Intell.5,§105(butveryroughly);DeSubst.Separatis8;Quodl.II,a.4.Avicenna,Met.V,c.2;IX,c.4.Algazel,tr.IV,c.3,adfin.LiberdeCausis,§4.Guil.Alvernus,DeUniversoII,2,cc.912,p.852.Alex.Halensis,SummaII,1,p.154.AlbertusM.,SummadeCreat.I,

tr.4,q.28,a.2,vol.34,pp.495496;InIISent.,d.3,A,a.5,vol.27,p.69;ibid.,d.9,a.7,p.203.St.Bonaventure,InIISent.,d.3,p.1,a.2,q.1,p.102;ibid.,d.9,a.1,q.1.(AmongthearticlescensuredatParisintheyear1277wasthis(42):"ThatGodcouldnotmultiplyindividualswithinonespecieswithoutmatter.")

sotoothefactofhavingsomethinglikeitselfinthesamespeciesdoesnotdetractfromanindividualexistingundersuchanature.Thereforeitwouldseemtobepossiblethattherearemanyangelsbelongingtoonespecies.Butinthecaseofeternalbeingsthereisnodifferencebetween"actual"and"possible",asissaidinIIIPhysica[4,203b30].Therefore,amongtheangelstherearemanyindividualsofasinglespecies.

5Furthermore,amongtheangelsthereisperfectlove(dilectio);accordinglynothingwhichpertainstotheperfectionoflovemustbetakenawayfromthem.Butthefactthattherearemanybelongingtoonespeciespertainstotheperfectionoflove,becausealllivingbeingsofonespeciesnaturallyloveoneanother,accordingtothewordsofEcclesiasticusXIV[XIII,19]"Everylivingbeinglovethitslike."Thereforeinthecaseofangelstherearemanybelongingtoonespecies.

6Furthermore,sinceaspeciesalonehasadefinition,accordingtoBoethius[InPorphyr.,PLLXIV,79D],allthingswhichagreeintheirdefnitionwouldseemtoagreeintheirspecies.ButallangelsagreeinthatdefinitionwhichDamascenelaysdowninhisthirdbook[IIDeFideOrth.,3,PGXCIV,866]:"Anangelisanintellectualsubstance,alwaysmobile,freeinitswill,incorporeal,servingGod,receivingimmortalityinconsequenceofgrace(notbynature)."2Thereforeallangelsbelongtoonespecies.

7Furthermore,accordingtotheorderofnatureangelsareclosertoGodthanmenare.ButinGodtherearethreepersonsofnumericallyonenature.Sincethenthereare,amongmen,manypersonsofonespecificnature,itwouldseemthatforallthegreaterreasonamongtheangelstherearemanypersonsagreeinginonespecificnature.

8Furthermore,Gregorysays[Homil.inEvang.XXXIV,PLLXXVI,1255C]thatinthatheavenlycountrywherethereisafullnessofgood,althoughcertainattributeshavebeenbestowedinanoutstandingdegree,yetnoneoftheseispossessedinanindividualway;forallattributesareinall,notindeedequally,sincesomeangelspossesstheminamoresublimedegreethanothers,andyetallhavethem.Thereis,therefore,nodifferenceinangelsexceptoneof"moreandless".But"moreandless"donotconstituteaspecificdifference.Thereforeangelsdonotdifferspecifically.

9Furthermore,thingswhichagreeinwhatismostnobleagreeinspecies,becausethatwhichputssomethinginaspeciesismorenoblethanthatwhichputsathinginagenus;foraspecificdifferenceissomethingformalinrelationtoagenus.Butallangelsagreeinthemostnoblethingthatisinthem,namely,inintellectualnature.Thereforeallangelsagreeinspecies.

2ThereadinginMigneis not .

10Furthermore,ifagivengenusisdividedbytwodifferences,oneofwhichismoreimperfectthantheother,themoreimperfectdifferenceismorecapableofmultiplicationthanisthemoreperfect;thus,forinstance,"irrational"ismultipliedinmorespeciesthanis"rational".Nowspiritualsubstanceisdividedby"capableofunion"(unibile)and''notcapableofunion"(nonunibile);but"capableofunionwithabody"issomethingmoreimperfect,inthecaseofspiritualsubstances.Sincethenaspiritualsubstancecapableofunionwithabody,namely,thehumansoul,isnotdividedintomanyspecies,forallthegreaterreasonaspiritualsubstancewhichisnotcapableofunion,namely,anangel,isnotmultipliedinmanyspecies.

11Furthermore,PopeBoniface[Epist.II,PLLXV,4344]saysthatministerialfunctionsinthechurchmilitantaremodelledaftertheheavenlyhost,whereinangelsdifferinordersandinpower.Butinthechurchmilitant,adifferenceinordersandinpowerdoesnotmakemendifferspecifically.Therefore,neitherintheheavenlyhostofangelsdoangelsdifferspecifically,eventhosewhoareofdifferentordersorhierarchies.

12Furthermore,justasthelowerelementsareadornedwithplantsandanimals,andthesiderealheavenwithstars,sun,andmoon,sotootheempyreanheavenisadornedwithangels.Butamongplantsandanimalsmanyofthesamespeciesarefound;likewisealsoitwouldseemthatallthestarsbelongtothesamespecies,becausetheyshareinonemostnobleform,whichislight.Thereforeitwouldseembyaparallelargumentthateitherallangelsorsomeangelsagreeinonespecies.

13Furthermore,ifmanyangelsarenotassertedtoagreeinonespecies,thisisonlybecausethereisnomatterinthem.Buttheremovalofmatternotonlytakesawaypluralityofindividuals,butalsotheirunity:becauseanindividualisnotputintoaspeciesexceptthroughmatter,becausematteristheprincipleofindividuation.If,therefore,itmustbeassertedthatangelsareindividualsinsomesense,byaparallelargumentitcanalsobeassertedthattherearemanyinonespecies.

14Furthermore,"inthosethingswhichareseparatedfrommatter,thebeingwhichunderstandsandthatwhichisunderstoodarethesame,"accordingtothePhilosopher[IIIDeAn.,4,430a3].If,then,angelswerewithoutmatter,theangelwhichunderstandsandtheangelwhichisunderstoodwouldbethesame.Buteveryangelunderstandseveryotherangel.Thereforeitwouldfollowthatthereisbutoneangel,whichisfalse.Onemustnot,therefore,assertthatangelsarewithoutmatter,andsoneithermustitbeassertedthatalltheangelsdifferspecifically.

15Furthermore,numberisaspeciesofquantity,whichisnotapartfrommatter.If,then,therewerenomatterintheangels,therewouldbenonumberinthem,whichisfalse.Thereforewereachthesameconclusionasbefore.

16Furthermore,inthosethingswhicharewithoutmatterthereisnomultiplicationexceptonabasisofcauseandeffect,asRabbiMosessays[Duxperplex.I,79]3If,then,angelsarewithoutmatter,eitherthereisnomanynessamongthemoroneisthecauseofanother;andboththesealternativesarefalse.Thereforewereachthesameconclusionasbefore.

I7Furthermore,creatureshavebeencreatedbyGodinorderthatthedivinegoodnessmayberepresentedinthem.Butinasinglespeciesof"angel"thedivinegoodnessismoreperfectlyrepresentedthaninthesinglespeciesof"man".Therefore,oneshouldnotpositmanyspeciesofangels.

18Furthermore,differentspecieswhicharedividedasaresultofbeingoppositesdifferbyaspecificdifference.Nowitisimpossibletoindicateanumberofoppositespecificdifferencesasgreatasthemultitudeoftheangelsisassertedtobe.Thereforenotallangelsdifferspecifically.

Butontheotherhand,iifsomeangelsagreespecifically,thiswouldseemtobeparticularlythecasewiththosewhoareofoneorder.Butthosewhoareofoneorderdonotagreespecifically,sincethereareinthesameorder"thefirst,theintermediate,andthelast,"asDionysiussaysinthetenthchapterofDeCaelestiHierarchia[§1;ratherIV,PGI,194A].Aspecies,however,isnotpredicatedofitsownindividualsinanorderofsequence,asissaidinIIIMetaphysica[3,999a6].Therearenot,therefore,manyangelsofonespecies.

iiFurthermore,onlythosethingswhicharecorruptiblewouldseemtobemultipliednumericallyinonespecies,inorderthatthespecificnature,whichcannotbepreservedinone,maybepreservedinmany.Buttheangelsareincorruptible.Thereforetherearenotmanyangelsofonespecies.

iiiFurthermore,themultiplicationofindividualsinonespeciestakesplacethroughadivisionofmatter.Buttheangelsareimmaterial,because,asAugustinesaysinXIIIConfessiones[XII,7],matteris"nexttonothing",whereastheangelsare"nexttoGod."Thereforeinangelsthereisnomultiplicationofindividualsinthesamespecies.

ANSWER.Itmustbesaidthatsomehaveexpressedthemselvesindifferentwaysconcerningthisquestion:4Forsomehavesaidthatall

3IntheFrenchtranslationeditedbyS.Munk,I,p.434.

4ThisquestionwasnotdebatedamongtheLatinsbeforethecominginofPeripateticphilosophy.TheAristotelians,ofcourse,GreeksaswellasArabs,all


spiritualsubstancesbelongtoonespecies,butothers,thatalltheangelsofonehierarchy,oragain,ofoneorder,do.Butothershavesaidthatalltheangelsdifferfromoneanotherinspecies,andthisseemstomealsotobetrue,forthreereasons.

Thefirstreasonisderivedfromthemakeupoftheirsubstance.Foritisnecessarytosayeitherthattheyaresimpleformssubsistingapartfrommatter,aswasheldabove,orthattheyareformsthatarecomposedofmatterandform.Nowifanangelisasimpleformsetapartfrommatter,itisimpossibleeventoconceiveseveralangelsofonespecies;becauseanyformwhatever,howevermaterialandIow,ifitbesetdownasabstracteitherinactualbeingorintheintellect,remainsbutoneforminonespecies.5Forlet"whiteness"beunderstoodassomethingsubsistingapartfromeverysubjectanditwillnotbepossibletopositmanywhitenesses,sinceweseethat"thiswhiteness"doesnotdifferfrom''thatwhiteness"savethroughthefactthatitisinthisorinthatsubject.Insimilarfashion,iftherewereanabstract"humannature",therewouldbebutoneonly.Butifanangelisasubstancethatiscomposedofmatterandform,itisnecessarytosaythatthemattersofdifferentangelsaresomehowdistinct.Nowthedistinctionofmatterfrommatterisfoundtobeoneofonlytwokinds:oneaccordingtothepropercharacterofmatter,andthisisaccordingtoitsrelationship(habitudo)todifferentacts:for,sincematteraccordingtoitspropercharacterisinpotency,whereaspotencyisspokenofinrelationtoact,adistinctionamongpotenciesandmattersismadefromthestandpointoftheorderofacts.Andinthiswaythematteroflowerbodies,whichisapotencytoactualbeing,differsfromthematteroftheheavenlybodies,whichisapotencytoplace.Theseconddistinctionofmatter,however,isbasedonquantitativedivision,inasmuchasmatterwhichexistsundertheseparticulardimensionsisdistinguishedfromthatwhichisunderotherdimensions.Andthefirstdistinctionofmattercausesagenericdiversity6because,accord-


maintainedthatseparatedsubstancesarenotmultipliedwithinonespecies;andsodidtheLatinAverroists.ButIdonotknowwhetheranytheologianbeforeSt.Thomastaughtthisdoctrineclearlyandconsistentlyabouttheangels.Albert(InIISent.,d.9,a.7),aftersayingthatcertainphilosophersheldthat"allangelsdifferinspecies,andthisseemstomemoreprobable,"goesondefendingthecontraryview,"thatallareinonespecies,"becauseitis"themorecommonopinionamongthedoctors."5CompareInIISent.,d.3.q.1,a.4,resp.andSummaTheol.I,q.50,a.4:"Yetifangelshadmatter,eventhentherecouldnotbemanyangelsofonespecies.Forthustheprincipleofdistinctionofonefromanotherwouldhavetobematter,notindeedbywayofadivisionofquantity,sincetheyareincorporeal,butbywayofadiversityofpotencies;andsuchadiversityofmattercausesadiversitynotonlyofspeciesbutalsoofgenus."

6InthissentencealoneiscontainedthefundamentalargumentofSt.Thomas.Inthosewhichfollowherathertriestoturnagainsthisadversariesthoseargumentswhichtheywereaccustomedtourgeinbehalfofthecontraryview.ManyweightyauthorshavebelievedthatSt.Thomasconcedesthepossibilityofamultiplication


ingtothePhilosopherin'VMetaphysica[28,1024b10],differentthingsaregenericallydifferentonabasisofmatter.Theseconddistinctionofmatter,however,causesadiversityofindividualswithinthesamespecies.Nowthisseconddistinctionofmattercannotexistamongdifferentangels,sinceangelsareincorporealandentirelywithoutquantitativedimensions.Theonlyremainingalternative,therefore,isthatiftherebemanyangelsthatarecomposedofmatterandform,thereisadistinctionofmattersamongthemaccordingtothefirstmode:andthusitfollowsthattheydiffernotonlyspecificallybutalsogenerically.

Thesecondreasonisderivedfromtheorderoftheuniverse.Foritisobviousthatthegoodoftheuniverseisoftwokinds:somethingthatisseparate,namely,God,Whois,asitwere,theleaderinanarmy;andacertainsomethinginthingsthemselves,andthisistheorderofthepartsoftheuniverse,justastheorderofthepartsofthearmyisthegoodofthearmy.HencetheApostlesaysinRomansXIII[1]:"ThethingswhicharefromGodareordered."Nowthehigherpartsoftheuniversemusthaveagreatershareinthegoodoftheuniverse,whichisorder.Butthosethingsinwhichthereisorderofthemselveshaveamoreperfectshareinorderthandothoseinwhichthereisorderonlyaccidentally.Nowitisobviousthatamongalltheindividualsofonespeciesthereisnoorderexceptaccidentally:fortheyagreeinthenatureofthespeciesanddifferaccordingtoindividuatingprinciplesanddifferentaccidents,whicharerelatedinanaccidentalwaytothenatureofthespecies.Butthingswhichdifferinspecieshaveorderofthemselvesandonabasisoftheiressentialprinciples.Foramongthespeciesofthings,oneisfoundtobegreaterthananother,asisalsothecaseinthespeciesofnumbers,asissaidinVIIIMetaphysica[3,1043b36].7However,inthecaseofthoselowerthingswhicharesubjecttogenerationandcorruptionandmakeupthelowestpartoftheuniverseandhavealessershareinorder,notalldifferentthingsarefoundtohaveorderofthemselves,butcertainoneshaveorderonlyaccidentallyas,forexample,theindividualsofonespecies.Butinthehigherpartoftheuniverse,namely,amongtheheavenlybodies,orderisnotfoundaccidentallybutonlyessentially,sinceallheavenlybodiesdifferfromoneanotherinspecies,andtherearenotamongthemseveralindividualsofonespecies,butonesunonly,andonemoon,andsooftheothers.Muchmoreso,therefore,inthehighestpartoftheuniversetherearenottobefound


ofangelsinonespeciesbyamiracle,inapassageofDeUnitateIntellectus(5,§105);butelsewhereIhaveshownthathisapparentstandisdueingreatparttothecorrupttext(DeUnit.Intell.,ed.critica,Rome1936,adloc.).ConcerningQuodl.II,a.4,seeabove,Art,5,n.12.7CompareArist.,Met.XII,c.10,1075a12.

anybeingsthatareorderedaccidentallyandnotessentially.Andsotheonlyremainingalternativeisthatallangelsdifferfromoneanotherinspecies,accordingtoagreaterandalessperfectionofsimpleforms,asaresultofagreateroralessnearnesstoGod,Whoispureactandofinfiniteperfection.

Butthethirdreasonisderivedfromtheperfectionoftheangelicnature.Foreachindividualthingissaidtobeperfectwhenitlacksnoneofthosethingswhichpertaintoit.Andinfactthedegreeofthisperfectioncanbecalculatedfromtheextremesofthings.FortoGod,Whoisattheapexofperfection,noneofthethingswhichbelongtothecharacterofactualbeingasawholeislacking;forHehasbeforehandinHimselfabsolutelyandinthehighestdegreealltheperfectionsofthings,asDionysiussays[DeDivinisNominibus,V,lec.I].Butanindividualinthelowestpartoftheworldwhichcontainsbeingsthataresubjecttogenerationandcorruptionisfoundtobeperfectfromthefactthatithaswhateverpertainstoitself,accordingtoitsownindividualcharacter,butnotwhateverpertainstoitsownspecificnature,sinceitsownspecificnatureisalsofoundinotherindividualbeings.Andthisquiteobviouslypertainstoimperfection,notonlyinthecaseofanimalsthataresubjecttogeneration,amongwhichoneanimalneedsanotherofitsownspeciesforcommonlife,butalsointhecaseofallanimalsthataregeneratedinanywaywhateverfromsemen,inwhichthemaleneedsthefemaleofitsownspeciesinordertogenerate;andfurther,inthecaseofallbeingsthataresubjecttogenerationandcorruption,whereinagroupofindividualsofonespeciesisnecessaryinorderthatthespecificnature,whichcannotbeperpetuallyconservedinoneindividualbeingbecauseofitscorruptibility,maybeconservedinmany.Butinthehigherpartoftheuniverseahigherdegreeofperfectionisfound,whereinoneindividualbeing,suchasthesun,issoperfectthatitlacksnoneofthethingsthatpertaintoitsownspecies,andhencealsothewholematterofthespeciesiscontainedinoneindividualbeing;andthesameistrueoftheotherheavenlybodies.Muchmoreso,therefore,thisperfectionisfoundinthehighestpartofcreatedthingswhichisnearesttoGod,namely,amongtheangels:thatoneindividuallacksnoneofthethingswhichpertaintoawholespecies,andthustherearenotseveralindividualsinonespecies.ButGod,Whoisatthesummitofperfection,doesnotagreewithanyotherbeing,notonlyinspeciesbutnoteveningenus,norinanyotherunivocalpredicate.

Astothefirstargument,therefore,itmustbesaidthatAugustineistherespeakingofangelicandhumannature,notaccordingastheyareconsideredintheirnaturalactualbeing,butaccordingastheyareorderedtowardbeatitude;forinthissensesomeintheangelicand

inthehumannaturehaveperished.Asfortheorderofbeatitude,humannatureiscontrastedwiththewholeangelicnature,becausethewholeangelicnatureisnaturallysuchashasbeenproducedtoattaintobeatitudeortofallshortofitinonesingleway,irreparably,namely,rightatthefirstchoice;buthumannature,inthecourseoftime.Andconsequently,Augustineisspeakingthereofallangelsasofonenature,byreasonofthesinglemodeoftheirrelationtobeatitude,althoughtheyaredifferentinthespeciesofthatnature.

Astothesecond,itmustbesaidthatwheneveroneinquiresintospecificdifferenceorsimilarity,thingsarebeingstudiedfromthestandpointoftheirnatures.Andonthisbasis,onemustnotspeakofallangelsasofonenaturethatisclosesttoGod,butonlythefirstangelwas,fromthispointofview,thenatureclosesttoGod.Andinthisnaturethereistheleastpossiblediversity,becausethereisneitherspecificnornumericaldiversity.

Astothethird,itmustbesaidthatactualbeingitselfisrelatedasanact,bothtocompositenaturesandtosimplenatures.Therefore,justasinthecaseofcompositenaturesthespeciesisnotderivedfromtheiractualbeingitself,butfromtheirform,becauseaspeciesispredicatedassomethingessential,whereasactualbeingseemstopertaintothequestionofathing'sexistence;andhence,neitherinthecaseofangelicsubstancesisthespeciesobtainedonabasisofactualbeingitself,butonabasisofsimplesubsistentforms,whosedifferencedependsontheorderofperfection,ashasbeensaid.

Astothefourth,itmustbesaidthatjustasaform,whichisinasubjectorinmatter,isindividuatedbythefactthatitisinthisparticularthing,soaseparatedformisindividuatedbythefactthatitisnotnaturallysuchastoexistinanything.For,justasactuallybeinginthisparticularthingexcludesthecommonnessofauniversal,whichispredicatedofmanyindividuals,sodoesnotbeingabletoexistinsomesubject.Accordingly,justas"thisparticularwhiteness"isnotpreventedfromhavingmanyindividualsunderitinconsequenceofthefactthatitiswhiteness,whichpertainstoitsspecificcharacter,butinconsequenceofthefactthatitisin"thisparticularsubject",whichpertainstoitsindividualcharacter,sothenatureof''thisparticularangel"isnotpreventedfromexistinginmanyinconsequenceofthefactthatitisanatureinagivenorderofthings,whichpertainstoitsspecificcharacter,butinconsequenceofthefactthatthisnaturehasnotanaturalcapacityforbeingreceivedinagivensubject,whichpertainstothecharacterofanindividual.

Astothefifth,itmustbesaidthat,sinceaffectionfollowsknowledge,themoreuniversalknowledgeis,somuchthemoredoestheaffectionwhichfollowsitlooktowardthecommongood;andthemoreparticular

theknowledgeis,somuchthemoredoestheaffectionwhichfollowsitlooktowardaprivategood;andhenceamongustoo,individuallovearisesasaconsequenceofsenseknowledge,buttheloveofthecommonandabsolutegoodarisesasaconsequenceofintellectualknowledge.Accordingly,becausetheangels,inproportionastheyarehigher,possessamoreuniversalknowledge,asDionysiussaysinthetwelfthchapterofDeCaelestiHierarchia[§2,PGI,298],sodoestheirlove,asaconsequence,lookespeciallytothecommongood.Consequentlytheyloveoneanothermoreiftheydifferinspecies,whichpertainsrathertotheperfectionoftheuniverse,ashasbeenshown,thaniftheyweretoagreeinspecies,whichwouldpertaintotheprivategoodofasinglespecies.

Astothesixth,itmustbesaidthatoursoulwhenitisunitedtothebodycannotunderstandseparatedsubstancesintheiressences,soastoknowofthemwhattheyare;becausetheiressencesareabovethegenusofsensiblenaturesandoutofproportiontothem,andfromtheseourintellectgetsitsknowledge.Andconsequentlyseparatedsubstancescannotbedefinedbyusinthestrictsense,butonlythroughnegationorthroughsomeactivityofthesesamesubstances.AndinthiswayDamascenedefinesanangel,notbyadefinitionbelongingtothemostspecificspecies,buttoasubordinategenus,whichisagenusandaspecies,andhenceadefinitionispossible.

Astotheseventh,itmustbesaidthatthemodeofdistinctionbetweenthedivinepersonsisunconnectedwithdiversityofessence,andthisacreatednaturedoesnotallow;andconsequentlythisfactcannotleadtoaconclusioninthecaseofcreatures.

Astotheeighth,itmustbesaidthat"moreandless"istakenintwosenses;inonesense,withreferencetoadifferentmannerofparticipatinginoneandthesameform,justasamorewhitethingissaidtobemorebrightthanalesswhitething,andinthissense"moreandless"donotconstituteaspecificdifference.Inanothersense,"moreandless"isusedwithreferencetoadegreeofdifferentforms;thus,forinstance,somethingwhiteissaidtobemorebrightthanredorgreen;andinthissense"moreandless"doconstituteaspecificdifference;andinthiswayangelsdifferinnaturalspiritualgiftsonabasisof''moreandless".

Astotheninth,itmustbesaidthatwhatestablishessomethinginaspeciesismorenoblethanwhatestablishessomethinginagenus,inthesenseinwhichsomethingdeterminateismorenoblethansomethingindeterminate;forthedeterminateisrelatedtotheindeterminateasactisrelatedtopotency;not,however,inthesensethatwhatestablishessomethinginaspeciesalwaysbelongstoamorenoblenature,asisevidentinthespeciesofirrationalanimals:forspeciesofthissort

arenotconstitutedbytheadditionofanothermorenoblenatureoverandabovethesentientnature,whichisthenoblestnatureinthem,butthroughtheirbeingdeterminedtodifferentdegreeswithinthatnature.Andsomethingsimilarmustbesaidoftheintellectualnature,whichisthecommoncharacteristicinangels.

Astothetenth,itmustbesaidthatitdoesnotseemtobeuniversallytruethatamoreimperfectgenericdifferenceismultipliedintoseveralspecies.For"body"isdividedinto"animatebody"and"inanimatebody";yettherewouldseemtobemorespeciesofanimatebodiesthanofinanimate,particularlyiftheheavenlybodiesareanimate,andifallthestarsdifferfromoneanotherinspecies.Butbothinplantsandinanimalsthereisaverygreatdiversityofspecies.Still,inorderthatthetruthofthismattermaybeinvestigated,itmustbeborneinmindthatDionysiuswouldseemtopresentaviewthatiscontrarytothePlatonists.ForthePlatonistssaythatthenearersubstancesaretotheprimaryone,thelessnumeroustheyare.ButDionysiussaysinthefourteenthchapterofDeCaelestiHierarchia[PGI,322]thatangelstranscendallmaterialmanyness.Now,thatboththesestatementsaretrue,anyonecanperceivefromcorporealobjects,amongwhichthehigheragivenbodyisfoundtobe,thelessmatterithas,butthegreaterisitsquantitativeextent.Andhence,sincenumberis,inaway,thecauseofcontinuousquantity,seeingthatunityconstitutesapointandapointconstitutesaline(speakingafterthefashionofthePlatonists),soalsoisitthecaseinthewholeuniversethatthehighersomethingsareamongbeings,themoredotheyhaveofformalmanyness,whichisreckonedaccordingtoadistinctionofspecies,andinthissensethesayingofDionysiusissaved;whereastheyhavelessofmaterialmanyness,whichisreckonedaccordingtoadistinctionbetweenindividualswithinthesamespecies:andinthissensethesayingofthePlatonistsissaved.Nowthefactthatthereisonlyonespeciesofrationalanimal,althoughmanyspeciesofirrationalanimalsexist,arisesfromthefactthat"rationalanimal"isconstitutedonthisbasis:thatcorporealnatureatitshighestpointtouchesthenatureofspiritualsubstancesatitslowestpoint.Nowthehighestlevelofanynature,oreventhelowestlevel,isoneonly.Althoughitmightbesaidthattherearemanyspeciesofrationalanimals,ifoneweretoholdthattheheavenlybodiesareanimate.

Astotheeleventh,itmustbesaidthatmenareincludedamongcorruptiblecreatures,whichformthelowestpartoftheuniverse,whereinarefoundsomebeingsthatarerelatednotonlyessentially,butalsoaccidentally.Andconsequentlyinthechurchmilitant,adifferenceinpowerandinordersdoesnotmakeadifferenceofspecies;butitisotherwiseinthecaseoftheangels,whoformthehighestpartofthe

universe,ashasbeensaid.Nowthereisinmenalikenesstoangels,althoughnotaperfectlikeness,butonethatisaccidental,ashasbeensaid.

Astothetwelfth,itmustbesaidthattheornamentsofearthandofwater,becausetheyarecorruptible,needmanynesswithinthesamespecies,ashasbeensaid.Nowtheheavenlybodiesalsoareofdifferentspecies,ashasbeensaid.Forlightisnottheirsubstantialform,sinceitisadirectlysensiblequality,andthiscannotbesaidofanysubstantialform;andfurthermore,lightdoesnothavethesamecharacterinallthings,asisclearfromthefactthattheradiationsofdifferentbodieshavedifferenteffects.

Astothethirteenth,itmustbesaidthatindividuationinthecaseoftheangelsisnotthroughmatter,butthroughthefactthattheyareself-subsistentforms,whichdonothaveanaturalcapacityforexistinginasubjectorinmatter,ashasbeensaid.Astothefourteenth,itmustbesaidthattheearlyphilosophersassertedthattheknowingsubjectshouldbeofthesamenatureasthethingknown.HenceEmpedocles[Aristotle,IDeAn.,2,404b13]saidthat"Weknowtheearththroughearthandthewaterthroughwater."Buttorulethisout,Aristotle[IIIDeAn.,4,429a21]assertedthattheknowingpowerinus,accordingasitisinpotency,isvoidofthenatureofthethingsthatcanbeknown;thus,thepupiloftheeye,forinstance,isvoidofcolor.Butyetthesenseinactisthethingsensedinact,inasmuchasthesenseisputinactthroughbeinginformedbythesensiblespecies;andbythesamereasoningtheintellectinactisthethingunderstoodinact,inasmuchasitisinformedbytheintelligiblespecies:"forastonedoesnotexistinthesoul,butthespeciesofastone",ashehimselfsays[IIIDeAn.,8,431b29].Nowthereasonwhysomethingisintelligibleinactisthatitisseparatedfrommatter;andconsequentlyhesays[IIIDeAn.,4,430a2]that"Inthosethingswhicharewithoutmatter,theunderstandingsubjectandthethingwhichisunderstoodarethesame."Thereforetheunderstandingangelneednotbethesameinsubstanceastheunderstoodangel,iftheyareimmaterial;buttheunderstandingoftheonemustbeinformedbyalikenessoftheother.8

Astothefifteenth,itmustbesaidthatthenumberwhichiscausedbythedivisionofacontinuumisaspeciesofquantity,anditexistsonlyinmaterialsubstances.Butinimmaterialsubstancesthereisamanynesswhichderivesfromthetranscendentals,inasmuchas"one"and

8ComparethelongquestionDeVer.VIII,7:"Doesoneangelunderstandanother?"

"many"aredivisionsofbeing;andthismanynessistheresultofaformaldistinction.9

Astothesixteenth,itmustbesaidthatadifferenceofcauseandeffectisassertedbysometomultiplyseparatedsubstances,inasmuchastheyassertthatdifferentdegreesariseamongthem,insofarasaneffectislowerthanitscause.Henceifweassertdifferentdegreesamongspiritualsubstancesinconsequenceofthearrangementofthedivinewisdomwhichistheircause,thecharacterofthedistinctionwillremainthesame,eventhoughoneofthesesubstancesisnotthecauseoftheother.

Astotheseventeenth,itmustbesaidthatnocreatednature,sinceitisfinite,representsthedivinegoodnessasperfectlyasamultitudeofnaturesdoes,becausewhatiscontainedinmanynaturesinamultiplewayisincludedinGodasaunit;andconsequentlythereoughttobemanynaturesintheuniverse,andalsoamongtheangelicsubstances.

Astotheeighteenth,itmustbesaidthattheoppositionofthedifferencesthatconstitutetheangelicspeciesisunderstoodonabasisofperfectandimperfect,ortheexceedingandtheexceeded;asisthecasealsoinnumbers;andthusalso,animateisrelatedtoinanimate,andotherthingsofthesort.

9HowimmaterialsubstancescanexistandhowtheyarenumericallymanyismorefullyexplainedinDeUnit.Intell.5,§§101103,107.

ArticleIXTheninthquestionis:Isthepossibleintellectoneinalimen?1

Anditwouldseemthatitis.1ForAugustinesaysinthebookDeQuantitateAnimae[XXXII,69,PLXXXII,1073]:"IfeverIsaythattherearemanysouls,Ishallbesmilingatmyself."Itseemslaughable,therefore,tosaythattherearemanyintellectualsouls.

2Furthermore,inthosethingswhicharewithoutmatter,thereisoneindividualinonespecies,ashasbeenshown[Art.VIII].Butthepossibleintellect,ortheintellectualsoul,sinceitisaspiritualsubstance,isnotcomposedofmatterandform,aswasshownbefore[Art.I].Thereforethereisonlyoneintellectualsoul,orpossibleintellect,inthewholehumanspecies.

Buttheobjectorsaidthateveniftheintellectualsouldoesnothavematterofwhichitismade,neverthelessithasmatterinwhichitexists,namely,thebody,andinconsequenceofthemultiplicationoftheseintellectualsoulsaremultiplied.Butontheotherhand3,whenthecauseisremovedtheeffectisremoved.If,then,themultiplicationofbodiesisthecauseofthemultiplicationofsouls,whenthebodiesareremovedamultiplicityofsoulscannotremain.

4Furthermore,individuationtakesplacebywayofadeterminationofessentialprinciples:for,justasitisoftheessenceofmantobecomposedofasoulandabody,soitisoftheessenceofSocratestobecomposedof"thisparticularsoul"and"thisparticularbody",asisclearfromthePhilosopherinVIIMetaphysica[10,1035b29].Butthebodyisnotoftheessenceofthesoul.Thereforeitisimpossibleforasoultobeindividuatedbyabody,andsosoulswillnotbemultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofbodies.

5Furthermore,Augustine2saysinContraFelicianum[XII,PLXLII,1167]:"Ifweseektheoriginofthepowerofalivingthing,thesoulispriortothemother,anditseemstohavebeenbornofheragainalongwiththeoffspring,"andheisspeakingof"thesoulbywhichthemotherisanimated,"asheimmediatelyadds.Fromthisheseems

1InIISent.,d.17,q.2,a.1;ContraGentilesII,cap.59,73,75;SummaTheol.I,q.76,a.12;Q.DeAn.23*;InDeAn.III,lec.7(689699)and8(719);DeUnitateIntell.*,cc.45;Compend.Theol.,85.Aristotle,DeAn.III,c.4.Avicenna,DeAn.,c.3.Algazel,DeAn.II,tr.4,c.5.Averroes,InIIIDeAn.,comm.48and36.Gull.Alvernus,DeUniversoII,1,cc.101(p.817);DeAn.VII,cc.34.AlbertusM.,SummadeCreat.II,1,q.2,a.5andq.3,a.2,vol.35,pp.17and29;InIIIDeAn.,tr.2,

c.7,vol.5,p.340;Opusc.DeUnit.lntell.,vol.9,p.437(almostthesameasinSummaTheol.II,q.77,vol.33,p.75).St.Bonaventure,InIISent.,d.18,a.2,q.1,p.446.SummaPhilos.,tr.II,c.10(brieflyattheend).RogerBacon,Comm.Nat.IV,3,C.3,pp.286291.(AmongtheoutstandingPeripateticsonlyAverroesassertedthatthepossibleintellecttooisoneandseparate.)2ThetrueauthoriathoughttohavebeenVigiliusTapsensis.

tosaythatthereisthesamesoulinthemotherandintheson,andforthesamereasoninallmen.

6Furthermore,ifthepossibleintellectwereonethinginmeandanotherinyou,thethingthatisunderstoodwouldhavetobeonethinginmeandanotherinyou,sincethethingthatisunderstoodisintheintellect;andthusthethingthatisunderstoodwouldhavetobecountedbycountingindividualmen.Butallthingswhicharecountedbycountingindividualshaveincommonathingthatisunderstood;andthusforathingthatisunderstoodtherewillbeathingthatisunderstood,andontoinfinity,3whichisimpossible.Thereforethereisnotonepossibleintellectinmeandanotherinyou.

7Furthermore,iftherewerenotonepossibleintellectinallmen,wheneverithappensthatknowledgeiscausedinapupilbyateacheritwouldhavetobethecasethateitherthenumericallysameknowledgewhichisintheteacherwouldflowintothepupil,orthattheknowledgeoftheteacherwouldcausetheknowledgeofthepupilastheheatoffirecausesheatinfaggots,4orelselearningwouldbenothingbutremembering.Forifapupilhastheknowledgethathelearnsbeforehelearnsit,learningisremembering.Butifhedoesnothaveitpreviously,eitherheacquiresitassomethingthatexistspreviouslyinanother,namely,intheteacher;orassomethingthatdoesnotexistpreviouslyinanother;andinthatcaseitwouldhavetobecausedinhimanewbyanother.Nowthesethreethingsareimpossible.For,sinceknowledgeisanaccident,thenumericallysameknowledgecannotpassoverfromsubjecttosubject,because,asBoethiussays[InCateg.I,PLLXIV,173],accidentscanbecorruptedbuttheycannotbetransmuted.Similarly,also,itisimpossiblefortheknowledgeoftheteachertocauseknowledgeinthepupil,notonlybecauseknowledgeisnotanactivequalitybutalsobecausethewordswhichtheteacheruttersonlystimulatethepupiltounderstanding,asAugustinesaysinthebookDeMagistro[passim].Moreover,thestatementthatlearningisrememberingiscontrarytothePhilosopherinIPosteriora[1,71a].Therefore,therearenotdifferentpossibleintellectsinallmen.

8Furthermore,everycognitivepowerwhichisincorporealmatterknowsonlythosethingswhichhaveanaffinitywiththematterinwhichitis;thus,forinstance,thesightknowsonlycolors,whichhave

3AccordingtothestatementofAverroes(InIIIDeAn.,comm.5,f.166r):"Andthusthethingthatisunderstoodwillpossessathingthatisunderstood.andsothereisaninfiniteprocess."Cf.below,obj.13.4"Thus,"saysAverroes(InIIIDeAn.,comm.5),"itwillbeimpossibleforthepupiltolearnfromthemaster,unlesstheknowledgewhichisinthemasterisapowerthatcreatesandgeneratestheknowledgewhichisinthepupil,inthemannerinwhichfiregeneratesanotherfireliketoitselfin

species;whichisimpossible."

anaffinitywiththepupil,whichisabletotakeoncolorsbecauseofitsowntransparency.Butthepossibleintellectisnotabletotakeononlythosethingswhichhaveanaffinityeitherwiththewholebodyorwithsomepartofit.Therefore,thepossibleintellectisnotacognitivepowerincorporealmatter,neitherinthewholebodynorinanypartofit.Thereforeitisnotmultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofbodies.

9Furthermore,iftheintellectualsoulorthepossibleintellectismultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofbodies,thisisthecaseonlybecauseitistheformofthebody.Butitcannotbetheformofthebody,sinceitiscomposedofmatterandform[itcannotbetheformofanything],5asmanyassert;forathingthatiscomposedofmatterandformcannotbetheformofanything.Thereforetheintellectualsoulorthepossibleintellectcannotbemultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofbodies.

10Furthermore,asCypriansays[Epist.adMagnum,PLIII,1143],theLordforbadehisdisciplestoenterthecityoftheSamaritansbecauseofthesinofschism,becausethetentribeshadsecededfromthekingdomofDavid,afterwardsestablishingasovereignkingdomforthemselvesinSamaria.NowitwasthesamepeopleinthetimeofChristasithadpreviouslybeen.Nowapeopleistoapeopleasamanistoamanandasoulistoasoul.Therefore,bythesamereasoningonesoulisinhimwholivedformerlyandinanotherwhofollowsafter;andsothroughthesamereasoningthesamesoulwillbeineachindividualman.

11Furthermore,anaccidentdependsonitssubjectmorethanaformdependsonitsmatter,sincetheformgivesactualbeingtothematterabsolutely,whereasanaccidentdoesnotgiveactualbeingtoasubjectabsolutely.Butoneaccidentcanexistinmanysubjects,justasthereisonetimeinmanymovements,asAnselmsays[Dialogusdeveritate,fin.,PLCLVIII,486].Thereforemuchmorecanonesoulbelongtomanybodies,andthustheredonothavetobemanypossibleintellects.

12Furthermore,theintellectualsoulismorepowerfulthanthevegetative.Butthevegetativesoulisabletoquickensomethingoutsidethebodywhoseformitis;forAugustinesaysinVIDeMusica[VIII,21]thatthesightrays6arequickenedbythesouloftheonewhosees,andareevenprojectedfarouttothethingthatisseen.Therefore

5Thewordswithinbrackets[]wereevidentlytakenbythescribefromthefollowinglinebymistake;andyettheyarepresentinallourmanuscripts.6AccordingtoAugustinetheeyessendforthraysoflight,throughthemediumofwhichthingsareseenbythesoul.

muchmorecantheintellectualsoulperfectotherbodiesinadditiontothebodywhereinitis.

13Furthermore,7ifthepossibleintellectismultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofbodies,theintelligiblespecies,whichareinthepossibleintellectinmeandinyou,mustbemultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofbodies.Butfromallformsthataremultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofcorporealmattertherecanbeabstractedsomecommonnotion.Thereforefromtheformsthatareunderstoodthroughthepossibleintellecttherecanbeabstractedsomecommonnotionthatisunderstood;andbythesamereasoning,sincethatunderstoodnotionismultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofthepossibleintellect,therewillbeanabstractingofanotherunderstoodnotion,ontoinfinity.Nowthisisimpossible.Thereis,then,onepossibleintellectinallmen.

14Furthermore,allmenagreeonfirstprinciples.Butthiswouldnotbethecaseifthatwherebytheyknowfirstprincipleswerenotonethingcommoninallmen.Nowsuchisthepossibleintellect.Thereis,then,onepossibleintellectinallmen.

15Furthermore,noformthatisindividuatedandmultipliedthroughmatterisunderstoodinact.Butthepossibleintellect,wheneveritactuallyunderstands,istheintellectinact;andtheintellectinactisthethingthatisunderstoodinact,asissaidinIIIDeAnima[7,431a1].justasthesenseinactisthethingthatissensedinact.Thereforethepossibleintellectisnotindividuatednormultipliedthroughcorporealmatter;andsoitisoneinallmen.

16Furthermore,athingthatisreceivedisintherecipientaccordingtothemodeoftherecipient.Butanintelligiblespeciesisreceivedintheintellectassomethingunderstoodinactandnotindividuatedbymatter;thereforeneitherisitmultipliedbythemultiplicationofcorporealmatter.

17Furthermore,thepossibleintellectevenofSocratesorofPlatounderstandsitsownessence,sincetheintellectreflectsonitself;thereforetheveryessenceofthepossibleintellectisunderstoodinact.Butnoformthatisindividuatedandmultipliedbymatterisunderstoodinact.Thereforethepossibleintellectisnotindividuatedandmultipliedbycorporealmatter;andthustheonlyremainingalternativeisthatthereisonepossibleintellectinallmen.

ButontheotherhandithereiswhatissaidinApocalypseVII[9]:"AfterthisIsawagreatmultitude,whichnomancouldnumber."Nowthatmultitudewasnotcomposedofmenlivinginabodilyway,butofsoulssetfreefromthebody.Thereforetherearemanyintellec-

7Thisisthesameobjectionasthesixthabove.

tualsouls,notonlynow,merelywhentheyareunitedtothebody,butalsowhentheyaresetfreefrombodies.

iiFurthermore,Augustine8saysinContraFelicianum[XII,PLXLII,1166,1167]:"Letusimagine,asmanywish,thatthereisauniversalsoulintheworld";andafterwardsheadds'"Whenweproposesuchthings,letussayinadvancethattheyareobjectionable."Thereforeitisunlikelythatthereisonesoulbelongingtoallmen.

iiiFurthermore,theintellectualsoulismorecloselyboundtothehumanbodythanitsmoveristoaheavenlybody.ButtheCommentatorsaysinIIIDeAnima[cf.comm.5,f.166r]thatiftherewereseveralmovablebodiestherewouldbeseveralmoversintheheavenlyspheres.Allthemore,therefore,sincetherearemanyhumanbodies,willtherebemanyintellectualsouls,andnotjustonepossibleintellect.

ANSWER.Itmustbesaidthattomakethisquestionclearitisnecsarytounderstandinadvancewhatismeantbytheterm"possibleintellect"and"agentintellect".NowitmustbenotedthatAristotle[III,4,429a13]wentontoastudyoftheintellectbywayofacomparisonwiththesenses.Nowasregardsthesenses,sincewefindourselvessometimessensinginpotencyandsometimesinact,itisnecessarytopositinussomesensepowerwherebywemaybesensinginpotency,andthispowermustbeinpotencytothespeciesofsensiblethings,andnothaveanyofthesespeciesactuallyinitsownessence;otherwise,ifthesensesweretopossesssensiblethingsinact,astheancientphilosophersasserted,itwouldfollowthatwewouldalwaysbesensinginact.Similarly,sincewefindourselvessometimesunderstandinginactandsometimesinpotency,itisnecessarytopositsomepowerwherebywemaybeunderstandinginpotency,andthispowerdoesnothaveinitsownessenceandnatureanyofthenaturesofsensiblethingswhichwecanunderstand,butitshouldbeinpotencytoallthings;andonthisaccountitiscalledthepossibleintellect;justasthesensepowertoo,accordingasitisinpotency,mightbecalledthe"possiblesense."Nowasensewhichisinpotencyisreducedtoactthroughobjectsthatareactuallysensible,whichareoutsidethesoul,andhenceitisnotnecessarytopositanagentsense.Andsimilarlyitwouldnotbenecessarytopositanagentintellectiftheuniversalswhichareactuallyintelligiblesubsistedofthemselvesoutsidethesoul,asPlatoasserted.ButbecauseAristotleassertedthattheseuniversalsdonotsubsistexceptinsensibleobjects,whicharenotactuallyintelligible,henecessarilyhadtopositsomepower,whichwouldmaketheobjectsthatareintelligibleinpotencytobeactuallyintelligible,byabstractingthespecies

8VigiliusTapsensis.

ofthingsfrommatterandfromindividuatingconditions;andthispoweriscalledtheagentintellect.

Concerningthepossibleintellect,AverroesinCommentumIIIDeAnima[comm.f.164]assertedthattherewasakindofsubstanceexistentiallyseparatedfromthebodiesofmen,butthatitwasconnectedwithusthroughphantasms;9andsecondly,thattherewasonepossibleintellectforall.Nowthatthisassertioniscontrarytofaithiseasytosee:forittakesawaytherewardsandpunishmentsofafuturelife.Butitmustbeshownthatthisassertionisinitselfimpossible10accordingtothetrueprinciplesofphilosophy.Nowitwasshownabove[Art.II]whenwewerediscussingtheunionofaspiritualsubstancewithabodythatonthisviewitwouldfollowthatnoparticularmanwouldunderstandanything.Butgranted,forthesakeofargument,thatsomeparticularmanwouldbeabletounderstandthroughanintellectthatissoseparated,threeincongruitiesfollowifitbeassertedthatthereisonepossibleintellectforallmen,wherebytheyallunderstand.

Thefirstisthatitisnotpossibleforonepowertohavemanyactionsatoneandthesametimewithrespecttothesamesubject.Nowithappensthattwomenatoneandthesametimemayunderstandoneandthesameintelligiblething.If,then,theybothunderstandthroughonepossibleintellect,itwouldfollowthattheybothhavenumericallyoneandthesameintellectualactivity;thus,forinstance,iftwomenweretoseebymeansofasingleeye,itwouldfollowthatthesameactofseeingbelongstoboth.Itisclearthatthisisutterlyimpossible.Norcanitbesaidthatmyactofunderstandingisdifferentfromyouractofunderstandingbyreasonofthediversityofthephantasms;becauseaphantasmisnotathingthatisunderstoodinact,butthislatterissomethingabstractedfromit,whichisheldtobeaword.Hencethediversityofthephantasmsisextrinsictointellectualactivity,andthuscannotcausedifferencesinit.11

Thesecondisthatitisimpossibleforthatwherebyindividualsobtaintheirspeciestobenumericallyoneintheindividualsofthesamespecies.Foriftwohorsesshouldagreeinthatnumericallysamerealitywherebytheyobtainedtheirspecies"horse",itwouldfollowthattwo

9HowthatconnectionismadeaccordingtoAverroes,St.Thomasexplainedabove(Art.2,resp.).10ThisdifficultyisrepeatedlyurgedbySt.Thomas(Q.DeAn.3,resp.;DeUnit.Intell.4,§§9091).AnditiscitedagainbySigerofBrabant(DeAnimaIntellectiva,q.7)amongthoseargumentswhichtohimcastdoubtonthesingleintellectforallmen.11CompareDeUnit.Intell.5,§91:"Forphantasmsarepreliminarytotheactionoftheintellect,ascolorsaretotheactionofseeing;andhencethroughtheirdiversitytheactionoftheintellectcouldnotbediversified,especiallyinregardtosomeoneintelligible."

horsesareonehorse,whichisimpossible.AndonthisaccountitissaidinVIIMetaphysica[10,1035b30]thattheprinciplesofaspecies,oncetheyaredeterminate,constituteanindividual:thus,iftheessenceofmanisthathebecomposedofsoulandbody,itisoftheessenceof''thisman"thathebecomposedof"thissoul"and"thisbody".Hencetheprinciplesofeveryspeciesmustbemultipliedintheseveralindividualsofthesamespecies.Nowthatfromwhichathingobtainsitsspeciesisknownthroughsomeproperactivitythatisaconsequenceofthespecies.Forwejudgethattobetruegoldwhichhastheproperactivityofgold.Nowtheproperactivityofthehumanspeciesisunderstanding;andhence,inaccordancewiththisactivitythePhilosopherinXEthica[7]setsforththeultimatehappinessofman.Nowtheprincipleofthisactivityisnotthepassiveintellect,12thatis,thecogitativepowerorthesense-appetitewhichsomehowparticipatesinreason,sincethesepowershavenoactivityexceptthroughacorporealorgan;whereastheactofunderstandingcannottakeplacethroughacorporealorgan,asisproveninIIIDeAnima[4].Andthustheonlyremainingalternativeisthatthepossibleintellectisthatwherebythisparticularmanobtainshishumanspecies,andnotthepassiveintellect,asAverroesimagines[InIIIDeAn.,comm.20].Theonlyremainingalternative,therefore,isthatitisimpossiblethattherebeonepossibleintellectinallmen.

Thirdly,itwouldfollowthatthepossibleintellectwouldnotreceiveanyspeciesthatareabstractedfromourphantasms,ifoneintellectbelongstoallthosewhoareandwhohavebeen.Because,nowthatmanymenwhoknewmanythingshavealreadygonebeforeus,itwouldfollowthatwithrespecttoallthosethingswhichtheyknewthepossibleintellectwouldbeinactandnotinpotencytoreceivethem,becausenothingreceiveswhatitalreadyhas.13Andfromthisitwouldfurtherfollowthatifwearemadeunderstandingandknowingthroughthepossibleintellect,knowinginourcaseisnothingbutremembering.Andyettoothisverythinginitselfwouldseemincongruous:thatthepossibleintellectifitbeanexistentiallyseparatedsubstanceshouldbereducedtoactthroughthephantasms,sincethehigherthingsamongbeingsdonotneedlowerthingsfortheirown

12Manycommentatorshavedistinguishedthepassiveintellectfromtheintellectinpotency,orthepossibleintellect,onthegroundthatAristotleinIIIDeAn.afterhavingsaid(c.4)thatthislatterisunmixedandseparable,declaredthatthepassiveintellect(c.5)iscorruptible.Cf.St.ThomasInIIIDeAn.,lec.10,74513CompareDeUnit.Intell.5,§94:"If,therefore,throughanyoftheprecedingmenoneintellecthasbeenactuatedasregardssomeintelligiblespeciesandhasbeenperfectedbyahabitofknowledge,thathabitandthosespeciesremaininit.Now,sinceeverythingthatreceivesisvoidofthatwhichitisreceiving,itisimpossiblethatthosespeciesareacquiredinthepossibleintellectbymyactoflearningorremembering."

perfection.Forjustasitwouldbeincongruoustosaythatheavenlybodiesareperfectedinactbyreceivingsomethingfromlowerbodies,similarly(andallthemoreso)itisimpossibleforaseparatedsubstancetobeperfectedinactbyreceivingsomethingfromphantasms.

ItisalsoobviousthatthisassertionisopposedtothewordsofAristotle.14Forwhenhebeginshisinvestigationofthepossibleintellect,rightfromthebeginninghecallsita"partofthesoul",saying[IIIDeAn.,4,429a10]:"Nowaboutthepartofthesoulwherebythesoulknowsandperceives."Butwhenhewishestoinvestigatethenatureofthepossibleintellect,hefirststatesadifficulty,namely,whethertheintellectualpartisseparablefromtheotherpartsofthesoulasasubsistentthing,asPlatoasserted,ormentallyonly;andthisiswhathesays[429a11]:"Whetheritbeseparableasanexistingthingorinseparablespatiallybutmentally.''Fromthisitisclearthatwhicheveroftheseassertionsismade,theopinionwhichhehadinmindconcerningthepossibleintellectwillstillholdgood.15Butitwouldnotholdgoodthatthepossibleintellectisseparatedonlymentally,iftheassertionthatwasmentionedbeforewereatrueone.HencetheopinionthatwasmentionedbeforeisnottheviewofAristotle.Afterwardshealsoadds[429a23]thatthepossibleintellectis"thatwherebythesoulformsopinionsandunderstands",andmanyotherthingsofthiskind;andfromthesestatementshemanifestlygivesustounderstandthatthepossibleintellectissomethingbelongingtothesoulandisnotaseparatedsubstance.

Astothefirstargument,therefore,itmustbesaidthatAugustinemeansthatitislaughablethatmanysoulsareassertedtobelongtodifferentmen,onlyinthissense,thattheydifferinnumberandinspecies;andespeciallyfromthepointofviewofthePlatonists,whohavepositedsomeonegeneralsubsistingbeingaboveallthethingswhichbelongtoonespecies.

Astothesecond,itmustbesaidthattheangels,justastheypossessnomatterofwhichtheyaremade,sotheydonotpossessmatterinwhichtheyexist;butthesoulhasmatterinwhichitexists,andconsequentlytheangelscannotbemanyinonespecies,butsoulscanbemanyofonespecies.

Astothethird,itmustbesaidthatasthebodyisrelatedtothesoul'sactualbeing,soitistoitsindividuation,becauseeachindividualthingisbothoneandabeingonthesamebasis.Nowasoul'sactualbeingaccruestoitinconsequenceofitsbeingunitedtoabodywithwhich

14ThroughouttheentirefirstchapterofDeUnit.Intell.thetruemindofAristotleisexplored.15Inotherwords,inthatpassageAristotlesosetsforthhisviewonthepossibleintellectthatitis

validinbothhypotheses,whetherthepossibleintellectbeseparatedornot;thereforehedoesnotsupposeanAverroisticdoctrine.

itsimultaneouslyconstitutesonenature,whereofbothareapart.Andyet,becausetheintellectualsoulisaformthattranscendsthecapacityofthebody,itpossessesanactualbeingofitsownonahigherlevelthanthebody;andhenceafterthebodyhasbeendestroyed,thesoul'sactualbeingstillremains.Andsimilarly,soulsaremultipliedalongwithbodies,andyetwhenthebodieshavebeenremoved,amultiplicityofsoulsstillremains.

Astothefourth,itmustbesaidthatalthoughthebodyisnotoftheessenceofthesoul,yetthesoulbecauseofitsownessencehasarelationtothebody,inasmuchasitisessentialforittobetheformofabody;andaccordinglybodyissetdowninthedefinitionofthesoul.Justas,accordingly,itisessentialtothesoulthatitbetheformofabody,soitisessentialto"thissoul",insofarasitis"thissoul",thatithavearelationto''thisbody."

Astothefifth,itmustbesaidthatAugustine'sstatementinthatpassageisbasedontheopinionofthosewhoassertthatthereisoneuniversalsoul,asisclearfromtheprecedingcontext.

Astothesixth,itmustbesaidthatAverroesseemstolayspecialstressonthisargument[InIIIDeAn.,comm.5,f.166],becauseitwouldfollow,ashehimselfsays,thatifthepossibleintellectwerenotoneinallmenthethingthatisunderstoodwouldbeindividuatedandcountedbymeansoftheindividuationandcountingofindividualmen;andthusitwouldbeunderstoodpotentiallyandnotinact.Itmustaccordinglybeshownthat,first,thoseincongruitiesfollownolessforthosewhoassertthatthereisonepossibleintellectthanforthosewhoassertthatitismultipliedinmany.Andfirstofallasregardsindividuation,itisobviousthataformthatexistsinsomeindividualisindividuatedbythatindividualinthesameway,whetheritbetheonlyindividualinsomeonespecies,likethesun,orwhethertherebemanyinonespecies,likepearls:forinbothcasesthespecies"brightness"isindividuated.Foronemustsaythatthepossibleintellectisakindofsingularindividualthing;foractsbelongtoindividuals.Whether,then,itisoneinonespecies,ormany,thethingthatisunderstoodwillbeindividuatedinitinthesameway.Butasregardsmultiplication,itisobviousthatiftherearenotmanypossibleintellectsinthehumanspecies,thereareneverthelessmanyintellectsintheuniverse,andmanyofthemunderstandoneandthesamething.Thesamedifficulty,therefore,willremainwhetherthethingthatisunderstoodisoneormanyindifferentmen.Thereforeitisnotpossibletoprovehispointbythismeans,becauseevenafterthisstandhasbeentaken,thesameincongruitieswillstillremain.

Andconsequently,forthesolutionofthisproblemitmustbeborneinmindthatifwehavetospeakoftheintellectbywayofacomparison

withthesenses,asisclearfromtheprocedureofAristotleinIIIDeAnima,wemustsaythatthethingwhichisunderstoodisnotrelatedtothepossibleintellectasanintelligiblespecieswherebythepossibleintellectisactuated,butthatspeciesisasaformalprinciplewherebytheintellectunderstands.Nowthatwhichisunderstood,orthethingwhichisunderstood,16isassomethingwhichisconstitutedorformedthroughtheactivityoftheintellect,whetherthisthingbeasimplequiddityorwhetheritbethecompositionanddivisionofaproposition.ForAristotlespecifiesthesetwoactivitiesoftheintellectinIIIDeAnima[6],theoneactivity,namely,whichhecalls"theunderstandingofindivisiblethings",wherebytheintellectapprehendstheessenceofagiventhing,andthistheArabscall"formation"or"imaginationbytheintellect",17buthepositsanotheractivity,namely,thecombiningandseparatingofconcepts,whichtheArabscall''belief"or"faith".Nowforbothoftheseactivitiesanintelligiblespeciesispresupposed,wherebythepossibleintellectisactuated;becausethepossibleintellectdoesnotactexceptaccordingasitisinact,justasthesightdoesnotseeexceptthroughbeingactuatedbyaspecieswhichmakesseeingpossible.Andhencethespecieswhichmakesseeingpossibleisnotasathingwhichisseen,butasthatwherebytheobjectisseen.Andthesameistrueofthepossibleintellect,exceptthatthepossibleintellectreflectsuponitselfanduponitsownspecies,whereasthesightdoesnot.

Accordingly,athingthatisunderstoodbytwointellectsisinawayoneandthesamething,andinawayitismanythings:becauseonthepartoftheobjectwhichisknownitisoneandthesamething;butonthepartoftheknowledgeitselfitistwodifferentthings.Thus,forinstance,iftwopersonsshouldseeonewall,itisthesamethingwhichisseensofarasthethingwhichisseenisconcerned,yetitistwodifferentthingsfromthestandpointofthedifferentactsofseeing;andtherewouldbesomethingexactlylikethisonthepartoftheintellect,ifthethingwhichisunderstoodsubsistedoutsidethesoulasdoesthethingwhichisseen,asthePlatonistsasserted.ButaccordingtotheviewofAristotlethereseemstobeagreaterdifficulty,althoughtheexplanationisthesameifonelooksintothematterrightly.ForthereisnodifferencebetweenAristotleandPlato,exceptinthis:thatPlato

16HereSt.Thomasmeansthespeciesthatisexpressedthroughtheintellector"thethingthatisunderstood"ofAverroes.ConcerningthisRogerBaconsays(Comm.Nat.IV,c.3):"Butmanyexplainitinseveralways,someasreferringtothethingthatisunderstood,andsomeasreferringtothespeciesofthethinginthemind."ComparethelongdiscussioninDeUnit.Intell.(5,§§109112.)17Algazel'sLogicbeginsthus:ofthesciences"therearetwoproperties,imaginationandbelief.Imaginationistheapprehensionofthethingswhichsinglewordssignify...Butbeliefislikewhenonesays:theworldbegantoexist."Butwemustnotbelieve,becauseofsuchterminology,thattheArabsconceivedtheseactsdifferentlyfromtherestofthePeripatetics.

assertedthatthethingwhichisunderstoodhasactualbeingoutsidethesoulinexactlythesamewayastheintellectunderstandsit,thatis,assomethingabstractanduniversal;butAristotleassertedthatthethingwhichisunderstoodisoutsidethesoul,butinanotherway,becauseitisunderstoodintheabstractandhasactualbeingintheconcrete.Andjustas,accordingtoPlato,thethingitselfwhichisunderstoodisoutsidethesoulitself,soitisaccordingtoAristotle:andthisisclearfromthefactthatneitherofthemassertedthatthescienceshavetodowiththosethingswhichareinourintellect,aswithsubstances;butwhereasPlatosaidthatthescienceshavetodowithseparatedforms,Aristotlesaidthattheyhavetodowiththequidditiesofthingsthatexistinthosethings.Butthecharacterofuniversality,whichconsistsincommonnessandabstractness,ismerelytheresultofthemodeofunderstanding,inasmuchasweunderstandthingsabstractlyanduniversally;butaccordingtoPlatoitisalsotheresultofthemodeofexistenceoftheabstractforms:andconsequentlyPlatoassertedthatuniversalssubsist,whereasAristotledidnot.Thusthenitisclearhowthepluralityofintellectsdoesnotmilitateagainsttheuniversality,northegenerality,northeunityofthethingthatisunderstood.

Astotheseventh,itmustbesaidthatknowledgeiscausedbyateacherinapupil,notasheatiscausedinfaggotsbyfire,butashealthinasickpersonbyadoctor,whocauseshealthinasmuchashefurnishessomeremedieswhichnaturemakesuseoftocausehealth;andconsequentlythedoctorproceedsinthesameorder,inhiscuring,asnaturewouldcure.Forjustastheprincipalhealingforceisone'sinteriornature,sotheprinciplewhichchieflycausesknowledgeissomethingintrinsic,namely,thelightoftheagentintellect,wherebyknowledgeiscausedinus,whenwedescendthroughtheapplicationofuniversalprinciplestosomespecialpoints,whichwegainthroughexperienceindiscovery.Andsimilarlytheteacherdrawsuniversalprinciplesdowntospecialconclusions;andhenceAristotlesaysinIPosteriora[2,71b]that"ademonstrationisasyllogismthatcausesknowledge."

Astotheeighth,itmustbesaidthatinthisreasoningAverroesalsowasdeceived;forhethoughtthatbecauseAristotlesaidthatthepossibleintellectissomethingseparate,itwouldbeseparatedexistentially,andasaconsequencewouldnotbemultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofbodies.ButAristotlemeansthatthepossibleintellectisapowerofthesoul,whichisnotanactofanyorgan,asthoughitweretohaveanactivityofitsownthroughsomecorporealorgan,justasthevisualpoweristhepowerofanorganandhasitsactivitythroughacorporealorgan.Andbecausethepossibleintellectdoesnothaveitsactivitythroughacorporealorgan,itisconsequentlynotnecessarythat

itknowonlythosethingswhichhaveanaffinityeitherwiththewholebodyorwithapartofthebody.

Astotheninth,itmustbesaidthattheopinionwhichholdsthatthesouliscomposedofmatterandformisentirelyfalseandunprovable.Foritcouldnotbetheformofthebodyifitwerecomposedofmatterandform.Forifthesoulweretheformofthebodyinviewofitsownformonly,itwouldfollowthatoneandthesameformwouldperfectthedifferentkindsofmatterofdifferentgenera,namely,thespiritualmatterofthesoulandcorporealmatter;andthisisimpossiblesinceaproperpotencyhasitsownproperact.Andfurthermore,thatthingcomposedofmatterandformwouldnotbethesoul,butteeformofthesoul.Forwheneverwesay"soul"wemeanthatwhichistheformofthebody.Butiftheformofthesoulweretheformofthebodythroughthemediumofitsownmatter,ascolorisanactofabodythroughthemediumofthesurface,sothatinthiswaythewholesoulcouldbecalledtheformofthebody,thisisimpossible,becauseby"matter"wemeanthatwhichisinpotencyonly;butwhatisinpotencyonlycannotbetheactofanything,thatis,beaform.Butifsomeoneweretomeanbytheterm"matter"agivenact,weneednotmind;becausenothingpreventssomeoneelsefromcalling''matter"whatwecall"act";justas,forinstance,whatwecall"stone"someoneelsecancall"ass".18

Astothetenth,itmustbesaidthatastheSeineriver19isnot"thisparticularriver"becauseof"thisflowingwater",butbecauseof"thissource"and"thisbed",andhenceisalwayscalledthesameriver,althoughtheremaybeotherwaterflowingdownit;likewiseapeopleisthesame,notbecauseofasamenessofsoulorofmen,butbecauseofthesamedwellingplace,orratherbecauseofthesamelawsandthesamemannerofliving,asAristotlesaysinIIIPolitica[1].

Astotheeleventh,itmustbesaidthattimeisrelatedtoonemovementonlyasanaccidentistoasubject,namely,tothemovementofthefirstmovablethingbywhichallothermovementsaremeasured.Nowtoothermovementstimeisrelatedasameasuretoathingthatismeasured;so,forinstance,anellisrelatedtoawoodenrodastoasubject,buttoapieceofclothwhichismeasuredbyitastoathingthatismeasuredonly;andconsequentlyitdoesnotfollowthatoneaccidentisinmanysubjects.

Astothetwelfth,itmustbesaidthatseeingisnotcausedbyraysthataresentout,asamatteroffact;butAugustinesaysthisaccord-

18Cf.Art.I,resp.19IntheIntroductionwehavealreadyspokenoftheimportanceofthisremarkindiscussionsconcerningtheyearandtheplacewherethisquestionwascomposed.

ingtotheopinionofothers.20Butsupposingthistobetrue,thesoulwouldquickenrays,howeverfartheyaresentout,notasforeignbodies,butinsofarastheyareconnectedwithitsownbody.

Astothethirteenth,itmustbesaidthat,asisclearfromwhathasbeensaidabove,athingthatisunderstoodisnotindividuatednormultipliedexceptfromthestandpointofintellectualactivity.Nowitisnotincongruousthatfromathingthatisunderstood,insofarasitisunderstood,thereisstillabstractedathingthatisunderstoodinanabsolutesense,justasfrom"thisparticularunderstandingbeing",forinstance,isabstracted"understanding"inanabsolutesense.Nordoesthismilitateagainstthecharacterofuniversality.Foritisaccidentaltomanortotheconcept''species",thatitisunderstoodbyme;henceitisnotessentialtotheunderstandingofmanortheconcept"species"thatitbeunderstoodbymeorbysomeoneelse.

Astothefourteenth,itmustbesaidthatagreementonfirstprinciplesisnotcausedbyaonenessofthepossibleintellectbutbythatlikenessofnatureinconsequenceofwhichweallareinclinedtowardthesamething;thus,forinstance,allsheepagreeinconsideringawolfasanenemy;yetnoonewouldsaythatthereisonlyonesoulinthem.

Astothefifteenth,itmustbesaidthat"tobesomethingindividual"isnotincompatiblewith"beingunderstoodinact":becauseseparatedsubstancesareunderstoodinactalthoughtheyareneverthelessindividualsubstances;otherwisetheywouldnothaveactions,whichbelongtosingularthings.But"tohavematerialbeing"isincompatiblewith"beingunderstoodinact";andconsequentlyindividualformswhichareindividuatedbymatterarenotunderstoodinact,butinpotencyonly.Nowtheintellectualsoulisnotsoindividuatedbymatterastobecomeamaterialform,especiallyinviewofitsintellect,inconsequenceofwhichittranscendsitsrelationshiptocorporealmatter;butinthissenseitisindividuatedonthebasisofcorporealmatter,ashasbeensaid,namely,inasmuchasithasanaptitudeforbeingtheformof"thisparticularbody".Andhenceitisnottherebyimpossibleforthepossibleintellectof"thisparticularman"tobeunderstoodinact,andthesameappliestothosethingswhicharereceivedintheintellect.

Andthroughthisthesolutiontothetwofollowingargumentsisclear.

20ThisalsoseemstobetheopinionofAugustinehimself;cf.DeQuant.AnimaeXXIII,43;DeGen.adLitt.I,xvi,31;ibid.IV,xxiv,54;DeTrin.IX,iii,3.

ArticleXThetenthquestionis:Istheagentintellectoneintellectbelongingtoallmen?1

Anditwouldseemthatitis.21FortoenlightenmenispropertoGod,accordingtothatpassageinJohnI[9]:"Thatwasthetruelightwhichenlighteneth"andsoon.Butthispertainstotheagentintellect,asisclearfromIIIDeAnima[5,430a15].ThereforetheagentintellectisGod.NowGodisone;thereforetheagentintellectisoneonly.

2Furthermore,nothingwhichisseparatedfromthebodyismultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofbodies.Buttheagentintellectisseparatedfromthebody,asissaidinIIIDeAnima[5,430a17].Thereforetheagentintellectisnotmultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofbodies,andconsequentlynotinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofmen.

3Furthermore,thereisnothinginoursoulwhichalwaysunderstands.Butthisisanattributeoftheagentintellect;foritissaidinIIIDeAnima[5,430a22]that"itisnotthecasethatitsometimesunderstandsandsometimesdoesnot."Thereforetheagentintellectisnotsomethingbelongingtothesoul,andsoisnotmultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofsoulsandofmen.

4Furthermore,nothingreducesitselffrompotencytoact.Butthepossibleintellectisreducedtoactthroughtheagentintellect,asIIIDeAnima[5,430a14]makesclear.Thereforetheagentintellectisnotrootedintheessenceofthesoul,whereinthepossibleintellectisrooted;andthuswereachthesameconclusionasbefore.

5Furthermore,everymultiplicationfollowsuponsomedistinction.Buttheagentintellectcannotbedistinguishedthroughmatter,sinceitisseparated;northroughform,forinthiscaseitwouldbespecificallydifferent.Thereforetheagentintellectisnotmultipliedinmen.

6Furthermore,thatwhichisacauseofseparationisinthehighestdegreeseparated.Buttheagentintellectisacauseofseparation;foritabstractsspeciesfrommatter.Thereforeitisseparated,andthusisnotmultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofmen.

1InIISent.,d.17,q.2,a.1;DeVer.X,6;ContraGentilesII*,cap.7678;SummaTheol.I,q.79,45;Q.DeAn.,4,5*,16;InIIIDeAn.,lec.10;Compend.Theol.86.Aristotle,DeAn.III,c.5.Avicenna,DeAn.V,c.5;Met.IX,c.3.Algazel,II,tr.5,cc.13.Averroes,InIIIDeAn.,comm.1720,and36.Gull.Alvernus,DeUniversoII,1,c.14sqq.;DeAn.V,2and7;ibid.,VII,4.Ioan.deRupella,DeAn.II,c.37.Alex.Halensis,SummaII,1,p.451.St.Bonaventure,InIISent.,d.24,p.567.AlbertusM.,SummadeCreat.II,q.55,a.3,vol.35,p.461;InIIIDeAn.,

vol.5,p.363;SummaTheol.II,tr.13,q.77,m.3,andtr.15,q.93,m.12.SummaPhilos.,tr.15,c.11.RogerBacon,OpusMaiusII,c.5;OpusTertium,c.23.2WilliamofAuvergneandRogerBaconhadmadethisassertion.Later,manyotherAugustinianssaythesame.

7Furthermore,nopowerwhichcanactthemore,themoreitacts,hasalimitonitsactivity.Buttheagentintellectisofthiskind;because"wheneverweunderstandsomegreatintelligiblething,wearenotlessabletounderstand,butmore",asissaidinIIIDeAnima[3,429b2].Thereforetheagentintellectdoesnothaveanylimitonitsactivity.Nowactualcreatedbeinghasalimitonitsactivity,sinceitisoffinitepower.Thereforetheagentintellectisnotsomethingcreated,andthusisoneonly.

8Furthermore,AugustinesaysinDeDiversisQuaestionibusLXXXIII[IX,PLXL,13]:"Everythingwhichthecorporealsensetouches...ischangedwithoutanytemporalinterruption...Nowsomethingwhichischangedwithoutanyinterruptioncannotbecomprehended.Theclearnessoftruthis,therefore,nottobeexpectedfromthesensesofthebody."Andafterwardsheadds:"Nothingisperceptibletothesense,whichdoesnotpossessalikenesstowhatisfalse,withtheresultthatitcannotbedistinguished.Butnothingcanbeperceivedwhichisnotdistinguishedfromthefalse.Judgmentofthetruth,then,isnotestablishedinthesenses."Inthisway,therefore,heprovesthatwecannotjudgeoftruththroughsensiblethings,bothbecauseofthefactthattheyarechangeable,andbecauseofthefactthattheyhavesomethingthatissimilartofalsity.Butthisholdsgoodofeverycreature:therefore,throughnocreaturecanwejudgeoftruth.Butwedojudgeoftruththroughtheagentintellect:thereforetheagentintellectisnotsomethingcreated;andthuswereachthesameconclusionasbefore.

9Furthermore,AugustinesaysinIV3DeTrinitate[XIV,15,21]thattheimpious"rightlycensureandrightlypraisemanythingsinthecustomsofmen.Bywhatstandards,pray,dotheyjudgethesethings,unlessbythoseinwhichtheyseehoweachmanshouldlive,eveniftheythemselvesdonotliveinthesameway?Wheredotheyseethesestandards?Notintheirownnature,since...theirmindsareevidentlychangeable,buttheserulesareunchangeable...Nordotheyseetheminahabitoftheirmind,sincetheserulesarerulesofjusticebuttheirmindsareevidentlyunjust...Where,therefore,havetheybeenwrittenexceptinthebookofthatlightwhichiscalledtruth?"Fromthisitwouldseemthatwearecompetenttojudgeofwhatisjustandwhatisunjustonthebasisofalightwhichisaboveourminds.Nowjudgmentinspeculativeaswellasinpracticalmattersisanattributeofoursinconsequenceoftheagentintellect.Thereforetheagentintellectisalightaboveourmind.Thereforeitisnotmultipliedalongwiththemultiplicationofsoulsandofmen.

3ItisstrangehowofteninourmanuscriptsthenumeralIViswrittenforanothernumber.

10Furthermore,AugustinesaysinthebookDeVeraReligione[XXXI,XXXII]that,concerninganytwothingsneitherofwhichisthebestthing,wecannotjudgewhichofthemisbetterthantheother,exceptthroughsomethingwhichisbetterthanboth.Nowwejudgethatanangelisbetterthanasoul,althoughneverthelessneitherofthemisthebestthing.Thereforeitmustbethecasethatthisjudgmentismadethroughsomethingwhichisbetterthanboth,andthisisnothingotherthanGod.Since,therefore,wejudgethroughtheagentintellect,itwouldseemthattheagentintellectisGod;andthuswereachthesameconclusionasbefore.

11Furthermore,thePhilosophersaysinIIIDeAnima[5,430a12]thattheagentintellectistothepossibleintellect"asartistothematerial."Butinnokindofartificialproductiondotheartandthematerialcoincideinthesameobject;noringeneraldoanagentandmaterialcoincideinanumericallysameobject,asissaidinIIPhysica[7,198a].Thereforetheagentintellectisnotsomethingintheessenceofthesoulinwhichthepossibleintellectis;andsoitisnotmultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofsoulsandofmen.

12Furthermore,AugustinesaysinIIIDeLiberoArbitrio[II,8,20,PLXXXII,1251]that"thetrueessenceofnumberispresenttoallreasoningpersons."Butthetrueessenceofnumberisone.Thereforetheremustbesomeonethingwherebyitispresenttoall.Nowthisistheagentintellect,bythepowerofwhichweabstractuniversalcharactersfromthings.Thereforetheagentintellectisoneinallmen.

13Furthermore,inthesamebook[IX,27]itissaid:"Ifthehighestgoodisonethingforall,itmustalsobethecasethatthetruthwhereinitisdiscernedandcomprehended,thatis,wisdom,isonetruthcommontoallmen."Butthehighestgoodisdiscernedandcomprehendedbyusthroughtheintellect,andespeciallythroughtheagentintellect.Thereforetheagentintellectisoneinallmen.

14Furthermore,likenaturallytendstocauselike.Butauniversalisonethinginallmen.Since,therefore,itischaracteristicoftheagentintellecttocauseauniversal,itwouldseemthattheagentintellectisoneinallmen.

15Furthermore,iftheagentintellectisapartofthesoul,itmusteitherbecreatedclothedorfilled4withspecies:andinthatcaseitplacesthosespeciesalsointhepossibleintellect,andwillnotneedtoabstractintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasms;orelseitiscreatednakedandlackinginspecies:andinthatcaseitwillnotbeeffectuallyabletoabstractspeciesfromphantasms,becauseitwillnotrecognizethatspecieswhichitisseeking,afterithasabstractedit,unlessitpreviouslyhad

4Thetext"orfilled...possible"isnotcertain,butthesenseseemstobeentirelyclear.

somenotionofit;justasamanwhoislookingforarunawayslavedoesnotrecognizehimwhenhehasfoundhim,unlesspreviouslyhehadsomeknowledgeofhim.5Thereforetheagentintellectisnotapartofthesoul;andthusitisnotmultipliedalongwithsoulsandmen.

16Furthermore,onceasufficientcausehasbeenasserted,itissuperfluoustoassertanothercauseforthesameeffect.Butthereisanextrinsiccausesufficientfortheenlightenmentofmen,namely,God.Thereforeitisnotnecessarytoassertthatanagentintellect,whosefunctionitistoenlighten,issomethinginthesoulofmen;andthusitisnotmultipliedalongwithsoulsandmen.

17Furthermore,iftheagentintellectisputdownaspartofthesoulofman,itmustbethatitcontributestosomethinginthecaseofman;becausenothingamongthethingscreatedbyGodisidleandvain.Buttheagentintellectdoesnotcontributetoman'sknowing,inthesensethatitenlightensthepossibleintellect:becausethepossibleintellect,onceithasbeenactuatedthroughanintelligiblespecies,isfullyabletoactonitsownaccount,justasanythingelseiswhichhasaform.Similarly,itdoesnotmakeanycontributioninthematteroflightingupthephantasms,abstractingintelligiblespeciesfromthem:because,justasaspecieswhichisreceivedinasenseimprintsitslikenessontheimagination,soitwouldseemthataformwhichisintheimagination,sinceitismorespiritualandforthisreasonmorepowerful,isabletoimprintitslikenessonafurtherpower,namely,onthepossibleintellect.Theagentintellectisnot,therefore,apartofthesoul;andthusitisnotmultipliedinmen.

ButontheotherhandthereisiwhatthePhilosophersaysinIIIDeAnima[5,430a13],6thattheagentintellectisapartofthesoul.Thereforeitismultipliedinconsequenceofthemultiplicationofsouls.

iiFurthermore,AugustinesaysinIVDeTrinitate[XVI,21]that"philosophershavenotcontemplatedintellectually,betterthanothers,inthosesupremeandeternalnotions,"thethingswhichtheyhavediscussedinanhistoricalway;7andsoitwouldseemthattheyhavecontemplatedthesethingsinsomelightthatisconnaturaltothem.Nowthelightwhereinwecontemplatetruthistheagentintellect.Therefore

5CompareAvicenna(DeAn.V,c.7):"Ifthesoulhadnotknownatsometimewhatitnowdoesnotknowandseekstogetknowledgeof:whenitobtainedthisitwouldnotknowthatitwasthethingwhichithadsought,as,forexample,hewhoseeksafugitiveprisoner..."6Whereheasserts:"Itisnecessaryforthesedifferencestobeinthesoul."7Becauseempiricalandhistoricalknowledgeofthissortisdistinguishedfrompurelyintelligiblethings,AugustineissayingthatthePlatonistsknewthelatterintheeternalideas,butnottheformer.Andyet,becausetheyknewmanythingsempirically,andthisthroughtheaidofanintelligiblelight,it

mustbethecasethattheyknewthesethingsbythelightoftheagentintellect,whichisproperandconnaturaltothemselves.

theagentintellectisapartofthesoul,andthuswereachthesameconclusionasbefore.

iiiFurthermore,AugustinesaysinXIIDeTrinitate[XV,24]:"Wehavetobelievethatthenatureoftheintellectualmindissoconstituted...thatitseestheabove-mentionedthingsinasortofincorporeallightwhichisuniqueofitskind,justasthebodilyeyeseesthethingsthatlieaboutitinthiscorporeallight."Nowthatlightwherebyourmindunderstandsistheagentintellect.Thereforetheagentintellectissomethingofthenatureofthesoul,8andthusitismultipliedthroughthemultiplicationofsoulsandmen.

ANSWER.Itmustbesaidthat,ashasbeenmentionedbefore[Art.IX],itisnecessaryforAristotletoposittheagentintellect;becausehedidnotassertthatthenaturesofsensiblethingshaveasubsistenceoftheirownapartfrommatter,soastobeactuallyintelligible,andconsequentlytherehadtobesomepowertomakethemactuallyintelligible,byabstractingfromindividualmatter;andthispoweriscalledtheagentintellect.Somehaveassertedthatthisisasortofseparatedsubstance,notmultipliedincorrespondencewiththenumberofmen;butothershaveassertedthatitisinitselfasortofpowerofthesoul,andismultipliedinmanymen.Andbothoftheseassertionsaretrueinasense.9

Foritmustbethecasethatabovethehumansoulthereissomeintellectonwhichitsunderstandingdepends;andthiscanbemadeevidentonthreegrounds.Firstofall,becauseeverythingthatbelongstoathinginapartialwayispreviouslyinsomethinginasubstantialway;thus,forinstance,ifapieceofironisfieryhot,theremustbesomethingamongthingswhichis"fire"initsownnatureandsubstance.Nowthehumansoulisintellectualinapartialway:foritdoesnotunderstandineverypartofitself,butinitshighestpartonly.Theremustthenbesomethinghigherthanasoul,whichisintellectinitswholenature,fromwhichtheintellectualityofthesoulisderivedanduponwhichitsactofunderstandingdepends.Secondly,becauseitisnecessarythatpriortoeverythingthatismovabletheremustbesomethingthatisimmovableinrelationtothatmovement,justasabovethethingsthataresubjecttoalterationthereissomethingnotsubject

8AccordingtoSt.Thomas.theexpression"suigeneris"signifies"ofthegenusofthesoulitself";butthisseemslessprobable.ForveryoftenAugustinecallseventhepowerofsensingandimaginingakindof"incorporeallight";butintelligiblelightisanotherandfarmorenoblelight:"uniqueofitskind.''9InthefirstparagraphhepointsoutinwhatsenseGodisthatwhichenlightensallintellects;andinthesecond,whatmustbeputinoursoulitself.St.Thomasalwayshadthesameviewaboutthetheoryofaseparateagentintellect:1)thatthetheoryismuchlessabsurdthanthedoctrineofaseparatedpossibleintellect;indeed,thatitcouldinasensebedefended;2)butthatithadnotbeentaughtbyAristotle;3)thattheagentintellectofwhichAristotlespeakscannotbestretchedtoincludethismeaning.

toalteration,likeaheavenlybody;foreverymovementiscausedbysomethingthatisimmovable.Nowtheveryunderstandingofthehumansoultakesplaceasamovement;forthesoulunderstandsbyreasoningdiscursivelyfromeffectstocauses,andfromcausestoeffects,andfromlikestolikes,andfromoppositestoopposites.Theremust,then,beabovethesoulsomeintellectwhosepowerofunderstandingisfixedandatrestwithoutdiscursivethinkingofthissort.Thirdly,becauseitisnecessarythat,althoughinoneandthesamebeingapotencyispriortoanact,nevertheless,absolutelyspeaking,someactispriortoanypotencyinanotherbeing;andsimilarly,priortoeveryimperfectthingtheremustbesomethingthatisperfect.Nowthehumansoulattheoutsetisinpotencytointelligiblethings;anditisfoundtobeimperfectinunderstandingbecauseneverinthislifewillitattainthetruthofallintelligiblethings.Theremustbe,then,abovethesoulsomeintellectthatalwaysexistsinactandiswhollyperfectinitsunderstandingoftruth.

However,itcannotbesaidthatthathigherintellectmakesthingsactuallyintelligibleinusimmediately,apartfromsomepowerfromitinwhichoursoulhasashare.Foritisquitegenerallytrueeveninthecaseofcorporealthings,thatinlowerthingstherearetobefoundparticularpowersthatareactiveinrespecttodefiniteeffects,besidestheuniversalactivepowers;thus,forinstance,perfectanimalsarenotgeneratedasaresultoftheuniversalpowerofthesunonly,butasaresultoftheparticularpowerwhichisinthesemen;althoughsomeimperfectanimalsaregeneratedwithoutsemenasaresultofthepowerofthesun,andyetevenintheirgenerationthereisnotlackingtheactionofaparticularpowerthataltersanddisposesthematter.Nowthehumansoulisthemostperfectofthosebeingswhichexistamonginferiorthings.Henceitmustbethecasethatinadditiontotheuniversalpowerofthehigherintellect,thereshouldbeimpartedtoitsomepowerthatis,asitwere,particularinrespecttothisdefiniteeffect,namely,thatthingsbecomeactuallyintelligible.Anditisclearfromexperience10thatthisistrue;foroneparticularman,suchasSocratesorPlato,makesthingsintelligibleinactwhenhepleases,thatis,byapprehending11auniversalformfromparticulars,whenheseparatesthatwhichiscommontoallindividualmenfromthosethingswhicharepeculiartoeach.Thusthentheactionoftheagentintellect,whichistoabstracttheuniversal,isanactionof"thisparticularman",asisalsotheactofconsideringorjudgingaboutacommonnature,which

10CompareSummaTheol.I,q.79,a.4,resp.:"Andthisweknowbyexperience;"Q.DeAn.5,resp.:"Nowweexperiencebothoftheseactivitiesinourselves;forwebothreceivethingsthatareintelligibleandweabstractthem."11Ibelievethatfor"apprehendo"weshouldread"abstrahendo."

istheactionofthepossibleintellect.Noweveryagentthatdoesanyactionhaswithinitselfbywayofaformthepowerwhichistheprincipleofthiskindofaction.Hence,justasitisnecessarythatthepossibleintellectbesomethingthatisformallyinherentinman,asweshowedabove,soitisnecessarythattheagentintellectbesomethingthatisformallyinherentinman.Aconnectionbywayofphantasmsdoesnotsufficeforthis,asAverroesimagines,aswasalsoshownaboveinregardtothepossibleintellect[Art.IIandIX].AnditseemsclearthatAristotlerealizedthiswhenhesaid[IIIDeAn.,5,430a13]that"theremustbethesedifferencesinthesoul,"namely,theagentandthepossibleintellects;andagainhesays[430a15]thattheagentintellectis"asitwere,abrightnesswhichisaparticipatedlight."ButPlato,asThemistiussaysinhisCommentumdeAnima[III,5],consideringtheintellectapartandnotconsideringtheparticipatedpowerofthesoul,comparedtheintellecttothesun.

Butwemustconsiderwhatthatseparatedintellectis,uponwhichthehumansoul'sunderstandingdepends.Forsomehavesaidthatthisintellectisthelowestoftheseparatedsubstances,12whichisconnectedwithoursoulsbyitsownlight.Butthisiscontrarytothetruthoffaithinmanyrespects.Firstofallbecause,sincethisintellectuallightpertainstothenatureofthesoul,itcomesfromHimalonebyWhomthenatureofthesouliscreated.NowGodaloneisthecreatorofthesoul,andnotsomeseparatedsubstancewhichwecallanangel;henceitissaidsignificantlyinGenesisI[II,7]thatGodHimself"breathedintothefaceofmanthebreathoflife."Hencetheonlyremainingalternativeisthatthelightoftheagentintellectisnotcausedinthesoulbyanyotherseparatedsubstance,butiscausedimmediatelybyGod.Secondly,becausetheultimateperfectionofeachindividualagentisthatitcanattaintoitsownprinciple.Nowtheultimateperfectionorbeatitudeofmanisbasedonintellectualactivity,asthePhilosopheralsosaysinEthicaX[7].If,then,theprincipleandcauseoftheintellectualityofmenweresomeotherseparatedsubstance,itwouldhavetobethecasethattheultimatebeatitudeofmanwouldbesituatedinthatcreatedsubstance;andthosewhoholdthisviewclearlyassertthis:fortheyassertthattheultimatefelicityofmanistobeconnectedwiththeagentintelligence.13Nowthetruefaithassertsthattheultimate

12Namely,thetenthintelligence,"whichisrelatedtooursoulsandtothewholesphereofactiveandpassivethingsasthehigherseparatedsubstances,whichtheycallintelligences,arerelatedtothesoulsoftheheavenlybodieswhichtheyassertasanimate,andtotheheavenlybodiesthemselves."Q.DeAn.5,resp.HerefersespeciallytothedoctrineofAvicenna.13InthisalltheArabianPeripateticsagree.Cf.Avicenna(DeAn.V,c.6):"Nowwhenthesoulwillbefreedfromthebodyandfromtheaccidentsofthebody,thenitwillbeabletobeconjoinedtotheagentintelligence;andthenitwillfindthereinintelligiblebeautyandperennialdelight."

beatitudeofmanisinGodalone,accordingtothisquotationfromJohnXVII[3]:"Thisistheeternallife,thattheymayknowThee,theonlytrueGod";andthatinparticipatinginthisbeatitude,menare"equaltotheangels,"asisheldbyLukeXX[36].Thirdly,becauseifmanweretohaveashareintheintellectuallightfromanangel,itwouldfollowthatmanasregardshismindwouldnotbemadetotheimageofGodHimself,buttotheimageofangels,contrarytowhatissaidinGenesisI[26]:''Letusmakemantoourimageandlikeness,"thatis,tothecommonimageoftheTrinity,nottotheimageoftheangels.

Andhencewesaythatthelightoftheagentintellect,ofwhichAristotleisspeaking,isimpresseduponusimmediatelybyGod,andbythislightwediscerntruthfromfalsity,andgoodfromevil.AndconcerningthisitissaidinthePsalms[IV,6,7]:"Manysay,Whoshowethusgoodthings?ThelightofThycountenance,OLord,issigneduponus,"i.e.,bywhichgoodthingsareshowntous.Thus,then,thatwhichmakesthingsactuallyintelligibleinusafterthemannerofaparticipatedlightisapartofthesoul,andismultipliedalongwiththenumberofsoulsandofmen.Butthatwhichmakesthingsintelligibleafterthemannerofthesun,whichilluminates,issomethingthatisoneandseparate,whichisGod.HenceAugustinesaysinISoliloquia[VI,12]:"Reasonpromises...toshowGodtomymindasthesunisshowntotheeyes;fortheeyesofthemind,sotospeak,arethesensesofthesoul.Butallthemostcertainbranchesoflearningareofsuchanatureasthingsilluminedbythesun,sothattheycanbeseen...andGodHimselfistheonewhoillumines."NowthisoneseparateprincipleofourknowledgecannotbeunderstoodtobetheagentintellectofwhichthePhilosopherisspeaking,asThemistiussays[InDeAn.III,5],becauseGodisnotinthenatureofthesoul;buttheagentintellectisthenamegivenbyAristotletothelightthatisreceivedinoursoulfromGod.Andinviewofthisitremainstobesaidwithoutqualificationthattheagentintellectisnotoneinallmen.

Astothefirstargument,therefore,itmustbesaidthatitispropertoGodtoenlightenmenbyimpressingonthemthenaturallightoftheagentintellect,andinadditiontothisthelightofgraceandglory.Buttheagentintellectlightsupthephantasms,asalightthatisimpressedbyGod.

Astothesecond,itmustbesaidthattheagentintellectiscalled"separated"byAristotle,14notasthoughitwereakindofsubstancethathasactualbeingoutsidethebody,butbecauseitisnotanactof

14ThisfamouspassageisexplainedmorefullyinContraGentilesII,cap.78.TheprincipaldifficultyintheinterpretationgivenisthataccordingtoitAristotlewouldbedistinguishinginthatbriefparagraphnottwointellectsonly,namely,thepossibleandtheagent,butfour:thepossible

intellect,theagentintellect,theintellectinact,thepassiveintellect.

anypartofthebodyinthesensethatitsactivitytakesplacethroughsomecorporealorgan,aswassaidofthepossibleintellect.

Astothethird,itmustbesaidthatAristotledoesnotmakethatstatementabouttheagentintellect,butabouttheintellectinact.Forfirsthespokeofthepossibleintellect,andafterwardsoftheagentintellect,andfinallyhebeginstospeakoftheintellectinact,whenhesays[IIIDeAn.,5,430a20]:"Actualknowledgeofathingisidenticalwithitsobject."Andhedistinguishestheintellectinactfromtheintellectinpotencyinthreeways.Firstofall,becausetheintellectinpotencyisnotthethingthatisunderstoodinpotency,buttheintellectinact,orknowledgeinact,isthethingthatisunderstoodorknowninact.Sotoohehadsaidofthesensesthatthesenseinpotencyandthethingthatcanbesensedinpotencyaredifferent.Secondly,hecomparestheintellectinacttotheintellectinpotency,becausetheintellectinpotencyistemporallypriorinoneandthesamemantotheintellectinact;fortemporallyanintellectisinpotencybeforeitisinact.Butnaturallyactispriortopotency;andspeakinginanabsolutesense,wemustpositsomeintellectinactpriorevenintimetoanintellectinpotency,whichisreducedtoactthroughsomeintellectinact.Andthisiswhatheadds[430a21]:"Andthisinpotencyistemporallypriorinoneindividual;butingeneralitisnotprioreventemporally."AndheemploysthiscomparisonbetweenpotencyandactalsoinIXMetaphysica[8,1049b]andinmanyotherplaces.Thirdly,hepointsoutadifferenceinthisrespect,thattheintellectinpotencyorthepossibleintellectissometimestobefoundunderstandingandsometimesnot;butthiscannotbesaidoftheintellectinact.Justasthevisualpowersometimesseesandsometimesdoesnotsee;butthesightinactconsistsinactuallyseeing.Andthisiswhathesays[430a22]:"Butitisnottruethatitsometimesunderstandsandsometimesdoesnot;''andafterwardsheadds:"Butthatthingonlyisseparatewhichtrulyis;"andthiscannotbeunderstoodeitheroftheagentintellectorofthepossibleintellect,sinceabovehehascalledbothseparate;butitmustbeunderstoodofeverythingwhichisrequiredfortheintellectinact,thatis,ofthewholeintellectualpart.Andhencealsoheadds[430a23]:"Andthisaloneisimmortalandeternal;"andifthisbeexplainedasreferringtotheagentintellect,itwillfollowthatthepossibleintellectiscorruptible,asAlexanderunderstood;butthisiscontrarytowhatAristotle.hadsaidaboveaboutthepossibleintellect.NowithasbeennecessarytoexplainthesewordsofAristotlehereinorderthattheymaynotbeanoccasionoferrortoanyone.

Astothefourth,itmustbesaidthatnothingpreventsanytwothingsthatarerelatedtoeachotherfrombeingsuchthateachofthemisbothapotencyandanactasregardstheother,ondifferentgrounds;

thusfire,forinstance,ispotentiallycoldandactuallyhot,butwatertheopposite;andforthisreasonnaturalagentsareatthesametimepassiveandactive.If,then,theintellectualpartbecomparedtothephantasms,inonerespectitwillbeinpotencyandinanotheritwillbeinactwithreferencetothem.Aphantasmactuallycontainsalikenessofadefinitenature;butthislikenessofadefinitespeciesisinthephantasminpotency,abletobeabstractedfrommaterialconditions.Butontheintellectualsidetheoppositeisthecase;foritdoesnotactuallypossesslikenessesofdistinctthings;butyetitactuallypossessesanimmateriallightwhichhasthepowerofabstractingthosethingswhichareabletobeabstractedinpotency.15Andthusnothingpreventstherebeingfoundinthesameessenceofthesoulapossibleintellect,whichisinpotencywithrespecttothespecieswhichareabstractedfromthephantasms,andanagentintellect,whichabstractsthespeciesfromthephantasms.Weshouldhavesomethingsimilariftherewereoneandthesamebodywhichwouldbetransparent,beinginpotencytoallcolors;andifalongwiththisitwouldhavealightwherebyitcouldilluminatecolors,asissomehowapparentintheeyeofacat.16

Astothefifth,itmustbesaidthatthelightoftheagentintellectismultipliedimmediatelythroughthemultiplicationofthesouls,whichparticipateintheverylightoftheagentintellect.Nowsoulsaremultipliedalongwithbodies,aswassaidabove.

Astothesixth,itmustbesaidthatthisveryfactthatthelightoftheagentintellectisnotanactofanycorporealorganthroughwhichitactsissufficientforitsbeingabletoseparateintelligiblespeciesfromphantasms;sincetheseparatenessofintelligiblespecies,whicharereceivedinthepossibleintellect,isnotgreaterthantheseparatenessoftheagentintellect.

Astotheseventh,itmustbesaidthatthatargumentwouldbemoreconclusiveasregardsthepossibleintellectthantheagentintellect.ForthePhilosopherbringsinthispointconcerningthepossibleintellect,thatwhenithasunderstoodthemostintelligiblethingitwillnotlessunderstandtheleastintelligiblething.Butnomatterwhatthisrefersto,itdoesnotfollowthatthepoweroftheintellectbymeansofwhichweunderstandisinfiniteinanabsolutesense,butthatitisinfinitewithreferencetosomegenus.Fornothingpreventsapower,whichisinitselffinite,fromnothavingalimitinsomedefinitegenus,butnever-

15CompareSummaTheol.I,q.79,a.4,ad4:"Theintellectualsoulisindeedactuallyimmaterial,butitisinpotencywithrespecttodefinitespeciesofthings;thephantasms,however,ontheotherhand,areactuallylikenessesofcertainSpecies,butarepotentiallyimmaterial."16CompareQ.DeAn.5:"Andsomethinglikethisisapparent,inasense,inthecaseofanimalsthatseebynight.Theirpupilsareinpotencywithrespecttoallcolors,insofarastheyhavenodefinite

colorinact;butthroughakindoflightthatisinthemtheysomehowmakecolorsactuallyvisible."

thelessitdoeshavealimitinasmuchasitcannotextenditselftoahighergenus:thussightdoesnothavealimitinthegenus"color"because,ifcolorsweremultipliedtoinfinity,theycouldallbeknownbythesight;butyetthesightcannotknowthosethingswhichbelongtoahighergenus,as,forinstance,theuniversals.Similarlyourintellectcondoesnothavealimitinrespecttotheintelligiblethingswhicharenaturaltoitself,whichareabstractedfromthingsthatcanbesensed;butneverthelessithasalimit,because,inregardtohigherintelligiblethings,whichareseparatedsubstances,itfails;foritisrelatedtothemostmanifestofthings"astheeyeoftheowltothelightofthesun",asissaidinIIMetaphysica[1,993b9].

Astotheeighth,itmustbesaidthatthatargumentisnottothepoint.Fortopassjudgmentonatruth"bymeansof"somethingisusedintwosenses.Inonesense,as"throughthemediumof";thuswepassjudgmentonconclusions"bymeansof"principles,andonthingsthatareregulated''bymeansof"arule.AndthisseemstobethesenseinwhichAugustine'sargumentsarecarriedon.Forthatwhichischangeableorthatwhichhasalikenesstothefalsecannotbeaninfallibleruleoftruth.Butinanothersense,topassjudgmentonsometruth"bymeansofsomething"isusedthus:"bymeansofourpowerofjudging,"andinthissensewepassjudgmentonatruthbymeansoftheagentintellect.

ButyetinordertoexaminemoresearchinglythemeaningofAugustineandwhatthetruthisonthispoint,itmustbenotedthatcertainancientphilosophers,whodidnotassertanywayofknowingexceptsensationnoranyentitiesbesidessensiblethings,declaredthatnocertaintyconcerningtruthcouldbehadbyus;andthisfortworeasons.Firstofall,becausetheyassertedthatsensiblethingsarealwaysinfluxandthatthereisnothingstableinthings.Secondly,becausesomepeoplearetobefoundwhomakedifferentjudgmentsaboutthesamething;thus,forinstance,someonewhoisawakejudgesinonewayandonewhoisasleepinanother,andonewhoissickjudgesinonewayandhewhoiswellinanother.Norcananythingbehadtodeterminewhichofthemhasthetruerestimate,sinceeveryoneofthemhassomeappearanceoftruth.AndthesearethethetworeasonswhichAugustinetoucheson,becauseofwhichtheancientssaidthattruthcannotbeknownbyus.Andhencetoo,Socrates,despairingofgraspingthetruthofthings,devotedhimselfentirelytomoralphilosophy.ButPlato,hisdisciple,agreeingwiththeancientphilosophersthatsensiblethingsarealwaysinfluxandthatthesensepowerhasnocertainjudgmentofthings,inordertoestablishthecertaintyofscientificknowledgepositedontheonehandspeciesofthingsseparatedfromsensiblethingsandimmovable,andhesaidthatthesciencesareaboutthese;ontheother

handhepositedinmanaknowingpowerhigherthansense,namely,themindorintellect,illuminedbyakindofhigherintelligiblesun,asthesightisilluminedbythevisiblesun.

Augustine,however,followingPlatoasfarastheCatholicFaithallowed,didnotpositspeciesofthingswithasubsistenceoftheirown,butinsteadofthemhepositedideasofthingsinthedivinemindandsaidthatthroughthese,byanintellectthatisilluminedbydivinelight,weformjudgmentsaboutallthings;notindeedinsuchawaythatweseetheideasthemselves,forthiswouldbeimpossibleunlessweweretoseetheessenceofGod,butaccordingtowhatthesesupremeideasimprintuponourminds.ForPlatoheldthatthescienceswereconcernedwiththeseparatespeciesinthissense:notthattheselattercouldbeseenthemselves;butaccordingasourmindparticipatesinthemithasknowledgeofthings.Andhencetooinacertainglossonthispassage:"Truthsarelessenedbythesonsofmen"[August.,Enarr.inPsalmXI,1],itissaidthatjustasfromonefacemanylikenessesshineforthinmirrors,sofromtheoneprimarytruththereresultmanytruthsinourminds.Aristotle,however,proceededalonganotherway.17Forfirstheshowedinmanywaysthatthereissomethingstableinsensiblethings.Secondly,thatthejudgmentofthesenseistrueconcerningproperobjectsofsense,butthatitismistakenaboutcommonobjectsofsense,andmoresoaboutthingsthatcanbesensedbyaccident.Thirdly,thatabovethesensethereisanintellectualpowerwhichmakesjudgmentsconcerningtruth,notthroughanyintelligiblethingsthatexistoutside,butthroughthelightoftheagentintellect,whichmakesthingsintelligible.NowitdoesnotmattermuchifwesaythatintelligiblethingsthemselvesareparticipatedinfromGod,orthatthelightwhichmakesthemintelligibleisparticipatedinfromGod.18

Astotheninth,itmustbesaidthatthoseruleswhichtheimpiousseearethefirstprinciplesofaction,andthattheyareseenthroughthelightoftheagentintellectthatisparticipatedfromGod,justasarealsothefirstprinciplesofthespeculativesciences.

Astothetenth,itmustbesaidthatthatwherebyonejudgeswhichoftwothingsisthebetteroughttobebetterthanboth,ifonejudges

17AndfromthisexplanationitisobviousthatSt.ThomasclearlyperceivedtheprofounddifferencesbetweenhisownPeripateticismandSt.Augustine'sdoctrineofknowledge,althoughheusuallyinterpretsthesayingsofAugustineondivinelightandilluminationaccordingtohisownprinciples.ThesameisclearfromDeVer.(X,6,resp.),whichrefersespeciallytotheAugustiniandoctrine:"Butothershavesaidthatthesoulisuntoitselfacauseofknowledge(scientia).Foritdoesnotreceiveknowledgefromsensiblethings,asthoughbytheactionofsenseobjectsthelikenessesofthingssomehowreachthesoul;butthesoulitselfinthepresenceofsenseobjectsforms"andsoon.18Evidentlythedifferencewilldependuponthemeaningwhichisassignedtosuchformulas.

bythisasbyaruleorameasure.Forinthissensewhiteistheruleormeasureofallothercolors,andGodofallbeings;becauseeachindividualthingisbetter,theneareritapproachesthebestthing.Butthatwherebywejudgeagiventhingtobebetterthananother,asbyaknowingpower,neednotbebetterthanboth.Nowinthiswaywejudgethroughtheagentintellectthatanangelisbetterthanasoul.

Astotheeleventh,thesolutionisclearfromwhathasbeensaid:fortheagentintellectisrelatedtothepossibleintellectasanagentandamoverisrelatedtothematerial,inasmuchasitmakesintelligibleinactthingstowhichthepossibleintellectisinpotency.Nowithasbeensaidhowthesetwocanberootedintheonesubstanceofthesoul.

Astothetwelfth,itmustbesaidthatthereisoneessenceofnumbersinallminds,justasthereisalsooneessenceofastone;andthisessenceisoneonthepartofthethingthatisunderstood,butnotonthepartoftheactofunderstanding,whichisnotessentialtothethingthatisunderstood;foritisnotessentialtoastonethatitbeunderstood.19Andhencethissortofunityoftheessenceofnumbersorofstonesorofanythingwhateverdoesnotmakeforaunityofthepossibleoroftheagentintellect,aswasexplainedmorefullyabove[Art.IX,ad6].

Astothethirteenth,itmustbesaidthatthattruthwhereinthehighestgoodisapprehendediscommontoallminds,eitherbyreasonoftheonenessofthethingorbyreasonoftheonenessoftheprimarylightwhichflowsintoallminds.

Astothefourteenth,itmustbesaidthattheuniversal,whichtheagentintellectcauses,isonethinginallthebeingsfromwhichitisabstracted;andhencetheagentintellectisnotdiversifiedonthebasisoftheirdiversification.However,itisdiversifiedonthebasisofadiversityofintellects:becauseeventheuniversaldoesnotderiveitsonenessfromthestandpointofitsbeingunderstoodbymeandbyyou;foritisaccidentaltotheuniversalthatitisunderstoodbymeandbyyou.Andhencethediversityofintellectsdoesnotaffecttheonenessoftheuniversal.

Astothefifteenth,itmustbesaidthatitisincorrecttosaythattheagentintellectisnakedorclothed,fullofspeciesoremptyofthem.20Fortobefilledwithspeciesischaracteristicofthepossibleintellect,buttocausethemischaracteristicoftheagentintellect.Nowitmustnotbesaidthattheagentintellectunderstandsinisolationfromthe

19YetSt.Augustinecarefullydistinguishesbetweentheknowledgeofpurelyintelligiblethings(numbers),andofempiricalthings(stones),adistinctionwhichlosesitsimportanceinthePeripateticteaching.20Heisperhapsthinkingofprop.9oftheLiberdeCausis,"everyintelligenceisfullofforms"andthestatementmadebyAristotlethattheintellectisthe"placeofspecies".

possibleintellect,butthatthemanunderstandsbymeansofboth;itishewhohasknowledgeinparticular,throughthesensepowers,ofthosethingswhichareabstractedbymeansoftheagentintellect.

Astothesixteenth,itmustbesaidthatitisnotbecauseofGod'sinsufficiencythatHeattributespowersofactiontocreatedthings,butbecauseofHismostperfectfullness,whichissufficientforsharingwithallbeings.

Astotheseventeenth,itmustbesaidthataspecieswhichisintheimaginationisofthesamegenusasaspecieswhichisinasense,becausebothareindividualandmaterial.Butaspecieswhichisinanintellectbelongstoanothergenus,becauseitisuniversal.Andconsequentlyanimaginedspeciescannotimprintanintelligiblespeciesasasensitivespeciesimprintsanimaginedspecies;andforthisreasonanactiveintellectualpowerisnecessary,whereasanactivesensepowerisnot.

ArticleXIThelastquestionis:Arethepowersofthesoulthesameastheessenceofthesoul?1

Anditwouldseemthattheyare.1ForAugustinesaysinIXDeTrinitate[IV,5]:"Wearereminded...thatthesethings(namely,mind,knowledge,andlove)existinthesoul...substantiallyoressentially,notasinasubject,likecolororshapeinabodyorlikeanyotherquantityorquality."

2Furthermore,inthebookDeSpirituetAnima[XIII,PLXL,789]itissaidthat"GodisallthethingsthatHehas,butthesoulissomeofthethingsthatithas",2namely,powers;andisnotsomeofthethingsthatithas,namely,virtues.

3Futhermore,substantialdifferencesarenotderivedfromanyaccidents.But"sensible"and"rational"aresubstantialdifferences,andtheyarederivedfromsenseandreason.Thereforesenseandreasonarenotaccidents,andbyaparallelargument,neitheraretheotherpowersofthesoul;andsotheyseemtobelongtotheessenceofthesoul.

Buttheobjectorsaidthatthepowersofthesoularenotaccidentsanddonotbelongtotheessenceofthesoul,butthattheyarenaturalorsubstantialproperties;3andsotheyaresomethingintermediatebetweenasubjectandanaccident.Butontheotherhand,4betweenanaffirmationandadenialthereisnothingintermediate.Butasubstanceandanaccidentaredifferentiatedbywayofaffirmationanddenial:becauseanaccidentisthatwhichisinasubject,butasubstanceisthatwhichisnotinasubject.Thereforebetweentheessenceofathingandanaccidentthereisnothingintermediate.

5Furthermore,ifthepowersofthesoularecallednaturaloressentialproperties,thisiseitherbecausetheyareessentialparts,orbecausetheyarecausedbytheprinciplesoftheessence.Ifinthefirstsense,thentheypertaintotheessenceofthesoul,becauseessentialpartsareoftheessenceofathing.Ifinthesecondsense,thenevenaccidentscanbecalledessential,becausetheyarecausedbytheprin-

1InISent.,d.3,q.4,a.2;Quodl.VII,a.5;Quodl.X,a.5;SummaTheol.I,q.77,a.1*,q.79,a.1(andontheangels,q.54,a.3);Q.DeAn.12*.St.Augustine,DeTrin.IX,iv;X,xi,18,etc.Avicenna,DeAn.V,c.7.PeterLombard,Sent.I,d.3.IsaacdeStella,Epist.DeAn.,PL194,1883.AlcherusdeClaravalle,DeSpirituetAnima13.Phil.Cancellarius,q.3andq.4DeAn.Guil.Alvernus,DeAn.III,c.6.loan.deRupella,DeAn.II,c.1.Alex.Halensis,SummaII,1,p.424.AlbertusM.,SummadeCreat.II,q.7,vol.35,p.89;InIDeAn.,tr.3,cc.1516.St.Bonaventure,InISent.,d.3,p.84;InIISent.,d.24,p.558(andcomparethescholiaatthatplaceintheQuaracchiedition).SummaPhilos.VI,c.6.RogerBacon,Com.Nat.IV,3,

c.5.2InthatpassageAlcheremphaticallyassertsthatthepowersareidenticalwiththeessence.3ThusLombard(Sent.I,d.3);theyare"naturalpropertiesorpowers."

ciplesofasubject.Thereforeitmustbethecasethatthepowersofthesouleitherpertaintotheessenceofthesoul,orelseareaccidents.

Buttheobjectorsaidthat,althoughaccidentsarecausedbytheprinciplesofasubstance,yetnoteverythingwhichiscausedbytheprinciplesofasubstanceisanaccident.Butontheotherhand,6everythingthatisintermediatemustbedistinguishedfrombothextremes.If,then,thepowersofthesoulareintermediatebetweenanessenceandanaccident,itmustbethecasethattheyaredifferentiatedfromanessenceaswellasfromanaccident.Butnothingcanbedifferentiatedfromathingbysomethingthatiscommontoboth.Since,then,toflowfromtheprinciplesofasubstance,whichisthereasonwhythepowersaresaidtobeessential,isanattributeevenofaccidents,itwouldseemthatthepowersofthesoularenotdifferentiatedfromaccidents;andsoitwouldseemthatthereisnointermediatebetweensubstanceandaccident.

Buttheobjectorsaidthattheyaredifferentiatedfromaccidentsbythefactthatasoulcanbeconceivedapartfromaccidents,butcannotbeconceivedapartfromitsownpowers.Butontheotherhand,7eachindividualthingisunderstoodthroughitsownessence,becausetheproperobjectoftheintellectiswhatathingis,asissaidinIIIDeAnima[4,429b19].Whateverthereis,then,apartfromwhichathingcannotbeunderstood,belongstotheessenceofthatthing.

If,then,thesoulcannotbeunderstoodapartfromitspowers,itfollowsthatthepowersbelongtotheessenceofthesoulandthattheyarenotsomethingintermediatebetweenessenceandaccidents.

8Furthermore,AugustinesaysinXDeTrinitate[XI,18]thatmemory,understanding,andwillare"onelife,onemind,onesubstance."Andsoitwouldseemthatthepowersofthesoulareitsveryessence.

9Furthermore,asthewholesoulistothewholebody,soapartofthesoulistoapartofthebody.Butthewholesoulisthesubstantialformofthebody.Thereforeapartofthesoul,e.g.,sight,isthesubstantialformofapartofthebody,namely,oftheeye.Butthesoulbyitsownessenceisthesubstantialformofthewholebodyandofeveryoneofitsparts.Thereforethepowerofsightisidenticalwiththeessenceofthesoul;andforthesamereasonsoarealltheotherpowers.

10Furthermore,thesoulisnoblerthananaccidentalform.Butanactiveaccidentalformisitsownpowerofaction.Therefore,somuchthemoreisthesoulitsownpowers.

11Furthermore,AnselmsaysinhisMonologium[LXVII,PLCLVIII,213]thatnothinggreatercouldbegiventothesoulthanremembering,understanding,andwilling.But

amongallthethingsthat

belongtothesoul,thechiefthingisitsownessence,whichhasbeengiventoitbyGod.Thereforethepowersofthesoulareidenticalwithitsessence.

12Furthermore,ifthepowersofthesoularesomethingotherthanitsessence,itmustbethecasethattheyflowfromtheessenceofthesoulasfromaprinciple.Butthisisimpossible,becauseitwouldfollowthataprincipiatewouldbemoreimmaterialthanitsownprinciple:fortheintellect,whichisoneofthepowers,isnotanactofanybody;whereasthesoulbyitsownessenceistheactofthebody.Therefore,too,thefirststatementisincongruous,namely,thatthepowersofthesoularenotitsessence.

13Furthermore,itisespeciallypropertoasubstancetobesomethingthatisabletotakeoncontraries.Butthepowersofthesoulareabletotakeoncontraries:thusthewill,forinstance,isabletotakeonvirtueandvice,andtheintellect,knowledgeanderror.Therefore,thepowersofthesoulareasubstance.Buttheyarenotadifferentsubstancefromthesubstanceofthesoul.Thereforetheyareidenticalwiththeverysubstanceofthesoul.

14Furthermore,thesoulisunitedtothebodyasitsformimmediately,andnotthroughthemediumofsomepower.Nowinasmuchasitistheformofthebody,itgivessomeacttothebody.Butnottheactofexistence,becausethisactisfoundeveninthingsthathavenosoul;andagain,itdoesnotgivetheactofbeingalive,becausethisactisfoundinthingswhereinthereisnorationalsoul.Therefore,theonlyremainingalternativeisthatitgivestheactofunderstanding.Butthisactisgivenbytheintellectualpower.Thereforetheintellectualpowerisidenticalwiththeessenceofthesoul.

15Furthermore,thesoulisnoblerandmoreperfectthanprimematter.Butprimematterisidenticalwithitsownpotency.Foritcannotbesaidthatthepotencyofmatterisanaccidentofit,becauseinthatcaseanaccidentwouldexistpriortoasubstantialform,sincepotencyinoneandthesamethingistemporallypriortoact,asissaidinIXMetaphysica[8,1049b19];andinthesecondplace,neitherisitthesubstantialform,becauseaformisanact,whichistheoppositeofapotency;andsimilarlyneitherisitacompositesubstance,becauseinthatcaseacompositesubstancewouldprecedeaform,whichisimpossible.Andthustheonlyremainingalternativeisthatthepotencyofmatteristheveryessenceofmatter.Muchmore,then,arethepowersofthesoulitsessence.

16Furthermore,anaccidentdoesnotextendbeyonditsownsubject.4Butthepowersofthesoulextendbeyondthesoulitself,be-

4HeistalkingaboutthefamouspassageofSt.Augustine(DeTrin.IX,iv,5):"Forwhateverthereisofthiskind(quantityorquality)doesnotexceedthesubjectinwhichitis.Forthatparticularcolorortheshapeofthisparticular

causethesoulnotonlyunderstandsandwillsitself,butalsootherthings.Thereforethepowersofthesoularenotitsaccidents.Theonlyremainingalternative,therefore,isthattheyaretheveryessenceofthesoul.

17Furthermore,everysubstanceisintellectualbytheveryfactthatitisfreefrommatter,asAvicennasays[VIIIMet.,6].Butimmaterialactualbeingispropertothesoulbyitsownessence:therefore,intellectualactualbeingisalsopropertoit.Thereforetheintellectisitsownessence,andbyaparallelargumentsoareitsotherpowers.

18Furthermore,"inthosethingswhicharewithoutmatter,theintellectandthethingthatisunderstoodarethesamething,"accordingtothePhilosopher[IIIDeAn.,4,430a2].Buttheveryessenceofthesouliswhatisunderstood.Thereforetheveryessenceofthesoulistheunderstandingintellect;andbyaparallelargumentthesoulisitsotherpowers.

19Furthermore,thepartsofathingbelongtoitssubstance.Butthepowersofthesoularesaidtobeitsparts.Thereforetheypertaintothesubstanceofthesoul.

20Furthermore,thesoulisasimplesubstance,aswassaidabove;butthepowersofthesoulareseveral.If,then,thepowersofthesoularenotitsessence,butarekindsofaccidents,itfollowsthatinonesimplethingthereareseveralanddifferentaccidents,whichseemsincongruous.Thereforethepowersofthesoularenotitsaccidentsbutitsveryessence.

ButontheotherhandthereisiwhatDionysiussaysintheeleventhchapterofDeCaelestiHierarchia[§2,PGI,283D],thatthehigheressencesaredividedintosubstance,power,andactivity.Muchmore,then,insouls,theiressenceisonethingandthevirtueorpowerisanother.

iiFurthermore,AugustinesaysinXVDeTrinitate[XXIII,43]thatthesouliscalledtheimageofGod,asaboardis,"becauseofthepicturewhichisonit."Butapictureisnottheveryessenceoftheboard.Thereforeneitherarethepowersofthesoul,bywhichtheimageofGodisstampeduponthesoul,thesoul'sverysubstance.5


bodycannotbelongtoanotherbodyalso.Butthemindthroughthelovewithwhichitlovesitselfcanalsolovesomethingotherthanitself.Likewisethemindnotonlyknowsitself,butmanyotherthingsalso.Wherefore,loveandknowledgearenotinthemindasinasubject,butalsoexistsubstantially,astheminditselfdoesbecause,althoughtheyareusedinrelationtoeachother,yeteachisindividuallyinitsownsubstance."5BothinAugustineandintheLombardthequestionisraisednotonitsownaccount,butinrelationtodeterminingtheimageoftheHolyTrinityinthesoul;andtheydidnotwanttoadmitthatthatimageis

merelyintheaccidentsofthesoul.ThisSt.ThomasclearlyintimatesinQ.DeAn.10,obj.6.St.BonaventureInIISent.,d.24,p.559)beginshisanswerthus:"Itmustbesaidthat,althoughtheaforesaidquestionhasmoreofcuriositythanofusefulnessinitonaccount


iiiFurthermore,allthingsthatarecountedlikeessencesarenotoneessence.Butthethreethingsinviewofwhichtheimageisconsideredtobeinthesoularecountedlikeessencesorsubstances.Thereforetheyarenottheveryessenceofthesoul,whichisone.

ivFurthermore,apowerissomethingintermediatebetweenasubstanceandanactivity.Butanactivitydiffersfromthesubstanceofthesoul.Thereforeapowerdiffersfromboth;otherwiseitwouldnotbesomethingintermediateifitwereidenticalwithanextreme.

vFurthermore,aprincipalandaninstrumentalagentarenotonething.Butapowerofthesoulisrelatedtoitsessenceasaninstrumentalagentistoaprincipalagent;forAnselmsaysinhisbookDeConcordiaPraescientiaeetLiberiArbitrii[XI,PL158,534]thatthewill,whichisapowerofthesoul,islikeaninstrument.Thereforethesoulisnotitsownpowers.

viFurthermore,thePhilosophersaysinthefirstchapterofDeMemoriaetReminiscentia[infin.]thatmemoryisapassionorahabitofthesensefacultyoroftheimaginativefaculty.Nowapassionandahabitisanaccident.Thereforememoryisanaccident;andforthesamereasonsoaretheotherpowersofthesoul.

ANSWER.Itmustbesaidthatsomehaveassertedthatthepowersofthesoularenothingelsethanitsveryessence:insuchawaythatoneandthesameessenceofthesoul,accordingasitistheprincipleofsenseactivity,iscalledthesense;butaccordingasitistheprincipleoftheintellectualactivity,itiscalledintellect;andsooftheotherfaculties.6Andtheyseemtohavebeenespeciallymovedtowardthisposition,asAvicennasays[DeAn.V,7];becauseofthesimplicityofthesoul,asthoughthissimplicitywouldnotpermitsuchgreatdiversityasisapparentinthepowersofthesoul.Butthispositionisutterlyimpossible.

Firstofall,becauseitisimpossibleinthecaseofanycreatedsubstancethatitsownessenceshouldbeitsownactivepower.Foritisobviousthatdifferentactsbelongtodifferentthings;foranactisalwaysproportionedtothethingwhereofitisanact.Nowjustasactualbeingitselfisakindofactualityofanessence,soactingisanactualityofanactivepowerorvirtue.Foronthisbasisbothoftheseareinact:theessenceinregardtoactualbeing,andthepowerinregardtoacting.Andhence,sinceinnocreatureisitsownactivityitsownactualbeing,butthisispropertoGodalone,itfollowsthattheactivepowerofnocreatureisitsessence;buttoGodaloneisitproperthatHisessenceisHispower.


ofthefactthatwhetheronesideortheotheristaken,noprejudiceeithertofaithormoralsarises"etc.6SosaysWilliamofAuvergne(DeAn.III,6),whovehementlyattacksarealdistinction.Avicennateachesthatthepowersarereallydistinctfromtheessence.

Secondly,thisappearsimpossibleforaspecialreasoninthecaseofthesoul,onthreecounts.Firstofall,becauseanessenceisone;whereasinregardtopowerswemustassertmanynessbecauseofthediversityofactsandobjects.Forpowersmustbediversifiedonthebasisoftheiracts,sinceapotencyissocalledinrelationtoanact.Secondly,thesamethingisapparentasaresultofthediversityofpowers,whereofcertainonesareactsofcertainpartsofthebody,7asareallpowersofthesensitiveandthenutritivepart;butcertainpowersarenotactsofanypartofthebody,as,forinstance,theintellectandthewill.Thiscouldnotbethecaseifthepowersofthesoulwerenothinglessthanitsessence;foritcannotbesaidthatoneandthesamethingmaybeanactofthebodyandyetsomethingseparate,exceptindifferentrespects.

Thirdly,thesameisapparentasaresultoftheorderofthepowersofthesoulandtheirrelationtooneanother.Foritisfoundthatonepowermovesanother:thus,forinstance,reasonmovestheirascibleandtheconcupisciblepower,andtheintellectmovesthewill;andthiscouldnotbethecaseifallthepowersweretheveryessenceofthesoul,becausethesamethingdoesnotmoveitselfinthesamerespect,asthePhilosopherproves[VIIIPhys.,5].Thereforetheonlyremainingalternativeisthatthepowersofthesoularenotitsveryessence.

Some,grantingthis,saythattheyarenotanaccidentofthesouleither,butareitsessentialornaturalproperties.8Thisopinion,infact,ifunderstoodinonesense,canbemaintained,butinanothersenseitisimpossible.Asevidenceofthiswemustbearinmindthat"accident"istakenintwosensesbyphilosophers.Inonesense,asthatwhichistheoppositeof"substance"andincludesunderitselfninecategoriesofthings.Nowtaking''accident"inthissensethepositionisimpossible.Forbetweenasubstanceandanaccidenttherecannotbeanythingintermediate,sincesubstanceandaccidentaredivisionsofbeingbywayofaffirmationanddenial:sinceitispropertoasubstancenottobeinasubject,buttoanaccidenttobeinasubject.Andhence,ifthepowersofthesoularenottheveryessenceofthesoul(anditisobviousthattheyarenotothersubstances),itfollowsthattheyareaccidentsincludedunderoneoftheninecategories.9Fortheyareinthesecondspeciesofquality,whichiscallednaturalpowerornaturalimpotence."Accident"istakeninanothersenseasbeingoneofthefourpredicatesputdownbyAristotleinITopica[4,101b17],andasbeingoneofthefive

7Cf.Aristotle(IIDeAn.,c.1,413a57):"Forsomepartshaveanactoftheirown.Butasregardssomeparts,thereisnothingtoprevent(thesoulfrombeingseparated),becauseofthefactthattheyarenotactsofanypartofthebody."8Cf.PeterLombard(ISent.,d.3).9ThisiscalledbyRogerBacon(Comm.Nat.IV,3,c.5):"thedamnableviewthatispopularly

acceptedatParis."

universalsputdownbyPorphyry[Isagoge,IV].Forinthissenseanaccidentdoesnotsignifythatwhichiscommontotheninecategories,buttheaccidentalrelationshipofapredicatetoasubject,ortherelationshipofauniversaltothosethingswhichareincludedundertheuniversal.Forifthismeaningofaccidentwerethesameasthefirst,sinceaccidentinthissenseisopposedtogenusandspecies,itwouldfollowthatnothingwhichisintheninecategoriescouldbecalledeitheragenusoraspecies;anditisclearthatthisisfalse,sincecoloristhegenusofwhiteness,andnumberthegenusof"couple".Takingaccidentinthissense,then,thereissomethingintermediatebetweensubstanceandaccident,thatis,betweenasubstantialpredicateandanaccidentalpredicate;andthisisaproperty.Apropertyislikeasubstantialpredicate,inasmuchasitiscausedbytheessentialprinciplesofaspecies;andconsequentlyapropertyisdemonstratedasbelongingtoasubjectthroughadefinitionthatsignifiestheessence.Butitislikeanaccidentalpredicateinthissense,thatitisneithertheessenceofathing,norapartoftheessence,butsomethingoutsideoftheessenceitself.Whereasitdiffersfromanaccidentalpredicate,becauseanaccidentalpredicateisnotcausedbytheessentialprinciplesofaspecies,butitaccruestoanindividualthingasapropertyaccruestoaspecies,yetsometimesseparably,andsometimesinseparably.So,then,thepowersofthesoulareintermediatebetweentheessenceofthesoulandanaccident,asnaturaloressentialproperties,thatis,aspropertiesthatareanaturalconsequenceoftheessenceofthesoul.

Astothefirstargument,therefore,itmustbesaidthatnomatterwhatbesaidofthepowersofthesoul,stillnooneeverthinks(unlessheiscrazy)thatahabitandanactofthesoulareitsveryessence.NowitisobviousthattheknowledgeandloveofwhichAugustinespeaksinthatpassagedonotdesignatepowers,butactsorhabits.AndhenceAugustinedoesnotmeantosaythatknowledgeandlovearetheveryessenceofthesoul,butthattheyareinit,andsubstantiallyoressentially.Tounderstandthis,wemustnoticethatAugustineinthatpassageisspeakingofthemindaccordingasitknowsandlovesitself.Fromthisviewpoint,then,knowledgeandlovecanberelatedtothemind,eitherastothemindthatlovesandknows;orastothemindthatislovedandknown.AndAugustineisspeakinghereinthissecondsense;forthereasonwhyhesaysthatknowledgeandloveexistsubstantiallyoressentiallyinthemindorinthesoulisthatthemindlovesitsessence,orknowsitssubstance.10Andhencehelateradds[DeTrin.

10Inthisfamouspassagetherewaseitheralacunaorsomecorruptedwordinthefirstcopy.ThesameinterpretationisputonAugustineinSum.Theol.I.q.77,a.1,ad1:"ItmustbesaidthatAugustineisspeakingofthemindaccordingasitknowsitselfandlovesitself.Thusthereforeknowledgeandlove,inasmuchastheyarereferredtotheminditselfasthatwhichisknownandloved,aresub-


IX,4,7]:"HowthosethreethingsarenotofthesameessenceIdonotsee,sincethemindlovesitself,anditselfknowsitself."

Astothesecond,itmustbesaidthatthebookDeSpirituetAnimaisapocryphal,11sinceitsauthorisunknown;andthereareinitmanythingsfalselyorinaccuratelystated,becausehewhowrotethebookdidnotunderstandthesayingsofthesaintsfromwhomhetriedtoquote.Yetiftheobjectionhastobemet,wemustnotethattherearethreekindsofwholes.Oneisauniversalwhole,whichispresenttoeverypartinitswholeessenceandpower;henceitisproperlypredicatedofitsparts,aswhenonesays:Manisananimal.Butanotherwholeisanintegralwhole,whichisnotpresenttoanypartofitself,eitherinitswholeessenceoritswholepower;andconsequentlythereisnowayinwhichitispredicatedofapart.asifoneweretosay:Awallisahouse.Thethirdwholeisapotentialwhole,whichisintermediatebetweenthesetwo:foritispresenttoapartofitselfinitswholeessence,butnotinitswholepower.Andhenceitstandsinanintermediatepositionasapredicate:foritissometimespredicatedofitsparts,butnotproperly,andinthissenseitissometimessaidthatthesoulisitsownpowers,orviceversa.

Astothethird,itmustbesaidthatbecausesubstantialformsinthemselvesareunknownbutbecomeknowntousbytheirproperaccidents,substantialdifferencesarefrequentlytakenfromaccidentsinsteadoffromthesubstantialformswhichbecomeknownthroughsuchaccidents;as,forexample,"biped"and"abletowalk"andthelike;andsoalso''sensible"and"rational"areputdownassubstantialdifferences.Oritmaybesaidthat"sensible"and"rational",insofarastheyaredifferences,arenotderivedfromreasonandsenseaccordingasthesearenamesofpowers,butfromtherationalsoulandfromthesentientsoul.

Astothefourth,itmustbesaidthatthatargumentisbasedon"accident"inthesenseofwhatiscommontotheninecategories;andinthissensethereisnothingintermediatebetweensubstanceandaccident;butinanothersense,ashasbeensaid,thereis.

Astothefifth,itmustbesaidthatthepowersofthesoulcanbecalledessentialproperties,notbecausetheyareessentialparts,butbecausetheyarecausedbytheessence;andinthisrespecttheyarenotdifferentiatedfrom"accident"thatiscommontotheninecategories;buttheyaredifferentiatedfrom"accident"thatisanaccidentalpredicatewhichisnotcausedbythespecificnature.


stantiallyoressentiallyinthesoul;becausetheverysubstanceoressenceofthesoulisknownandloved."Andvetinthatpassageanotherinterpretationisadded.AndinQ.DeAn.(12.ad5)the

aboveexpositionisprefacedbythisformula:"Andhenceperhapsitisinthissensethathesaid..."11Cf.above,Art.3,ad6.

Andhencethesolutiontothesixthisclear.

Astotheseventh,itmustbesaidthattherearetwoactivitiesoftheintellect,12asissaidinIIIDeAnima[6,430a26].Onewherebyitunderstandswhatathingis:andbythissortofactivityoftheintellecttheessenceofathingcanbeknown,bothapartfromapropertyandapartfromanaccident,sinceneitheroftheseentersintotheessenceofathing;andthisisthesenseonwhichtheargumentisbased.Theotherisanactivityoftheintellectthatcombinesandseparates;andinthiswayasubstancecanbeunderstoodapartfromanaccidentalpredicate,evenifitisreallyinseparable:thus,"acrowiswhite"isintelligible;forthereisnorepugnanceofconceptsthere,sincetheoppositeofthepredicatedoesnotdependontheprinciplesofthespecieswhichisdesignatedbythewordputdownasthesubject.Butbythisactivityoftheintellectasubstancecannotbeunderstoodwithoutitsproperty;foritcannotbeunderstoodthat"manhasnotthepoweroflaughing",orthat"atriangledoesnothavethreeanglesequaltotworightangles";forherethereisrepugnanceofconcepts,becausetheoppositeofthepredicatedependsuponthenatureofthesubject.So,then,bythefirstsortofactivityoftheintellecttheessenceofthesoulcanbeunderstood,insuchaway,thatis,thatitsessenceisunderstoodapartfromitspowers;butnotbythesecondkindofactivity,i.e.,sothatitisunderstoodnottohavepowers.

Astotheeighth,itmustbesaidthatthosethreethingsaresaidtobeonelife,oneessence,eitheronthegroundthattheyarerelatedtotheessenceastoanobject,orinthewayinwhichapotentialwholeispredicatedofitsparts.

Astotheninth,itmustbesaidthatthewholesoulisthesubstantialformofthewholebody,notbyreasonofthetotalityofitspowers,butbytheveryessenceofthesoul,aswassaidabove[Art.IV].Andhenceitdoesnotfollowthatthepowerofsightitselfisthesubstantialformoftheeye,butthattheveryessenceofthesoulis,accordingasitisthesubjectorprincipleofthispower.

Astothetenth,itmustbesaidthatanaccidentalform,whichisaprincipleofaction,isitselfapoweroravirtueofanactivesubstance;butthereisnogoingontoinfinity,asthoughforeveryvirtuetherewereanothervirtue.13

Astotheeleventh,itmustbesaidthatanessenceisinasenseagreatergiftthanapower,justasacauseismoreimportantthanan

12Cf.above,Art.9,resp.13Herehetouchesonadifficultythatafterwardsbecameclassical:ifthesamesoulcannotactonmanydifferentthingssavethroughthemediumofdifferentpowers,forthesamereasonitwillnotbeabletoputforthmanypowersfromitselfsavethroughthemediumofotherpowers,andsoontoinfinity.

effect.Butpowersaremoreimportant,inasense,inasmuchastheyarenearertotheactswherebythesoulholdsfasttoitsend.

Astothetwelfth,itmustbesaidthatthereasonwhyithappensthatapowerwhichisnotanactofthebodyflowsfromtheessenceofthesoulisthattheessenceofthesoultranscendsthelimitationsofthebody,aswassaidabove[Art.II;Art.IX,ad15].Andhenceitdoesnotfollowthatapowerismoreimmaterialthantheessence;butfromtheimmaterialnatureoftheessencetherefollowstheimmaterialnatureofthepower.

Astothethirteenth,itmustbesaidthatamongaccidentsoneisnearerthananothertoasubject;thusquantityisnearertoasubstancethanquality;andsoasubstancereceivesoneaccidentbymeansofanother;thus,forinstance,itreceivescolorbymeansofasurface,andknowledgebymeansoftheintellectualpower.Inthisway,then,apowerofthesoulisabletotakeoncontraries,asasurfaceisabletotakeonwhiteandblack,inasmuch,namely,asthesubstancereceivescontrariesinthewayspokenofabove.

Astothefourteenth,itmustbesaidthatthesoul,insofarasitistheformofthebodybyitsownessence,givesactualbeingtothebody,inasmuchasitisasubstantialform;14anditgivestoitbeingofacertainsort,i.e.,life,inasmuchasitisthiskindofform,namely,asoul;anditgivesitlifeofacertainsort,namely,inanintellectualnature,inasmuchasitisthiskindofasoul,namely,intellectual.Now"understanding"sometimesmeansanactivity,andinthissenseitsprincipleisapowerorahabit;butsometimesitmeanspreciselytheactualbeingofanintellectualnature,andinthiscasetheprincipleofunderstandingistheveryessenceoftheintellectualsoul.

Astothefifteenth,itmustbesaidthatthepotencyofmatterisnotapotencyforacting,butforsubstantialbeing.Andconsequentlythepotencyofmattercanbeinthegenus"substance",butnotthepotencyofthesoul,whichisapotencyforacting.

Astothesixteenth,itmustbesaidthat,aswassaidabove[ad1],Augustinerelatesknowledgeandlovetothemindinasmuchasthemindisknownandisloved;andif,becauseofthisrelationship,knowledgeandlovewereinthemindorinthesoulasinasubject,itwouldfollowthatbyaparallelargumenttheywouldbeinallthingsthatareknownandlovedasinasubject:andinthatcaseanaccidentwouldtranscenditsownsubject,whichisimpossible.Otherwise,ifAugustinewereintendingtoprovethattheseweretheveryessenceofthesoul,hiswouldbenoproof.Foritisnolesstrueoftheessenceofathingthat

14Thesewords"inasmuchasitisasubstantialform"appeartobeaglossthatwasintroducedintothetext.

itdoesnotexistoutsidethethingthanitistrueofanaccidentthatitdoesnotexistoutsideitssubject.

Astotheseventeenth,itmustbesaidthatfromtheveryfastthatthesoulisfreefrommatterbyitsownsubstance,itfollowsthatithasanintellectualpower,butnotinsuchawaythatitspowerisitsownsubstance.

Astotheeighteenth,itmustbesaidthattheintellectisnotonlyanintellectualpower,butmuchratherasubstancebecauseofitspower;henceitisunderstoodnotonlyasapowerbutalsoasasubstance.

Astothenineteenth,itmustbesaidthatthepowersofthesoularecalledparts,notoftheessenceofthesoul,butofitstotalpower;justasifoneweretosaythatthepowerofabailiffisapartoftheroyalpowerasawhole.

Astothetwentieth,itmustbesaidthatmanyofthepowersofthesoularenotinthesoulasinasubject,butinthecomposite;andthemultiformityofthepartsofthebodyfitsinwiththismultiplicityofpowers.Butthepowers,whichareinthesubstanceofthesoulaloneasinasubject,aretheagentintellectandthepossibleintellect,andthewill.Andforthismultiplicityofpowersitissufficientthatinthesubstanceofthesoulthereissomecompositionofactandofpotency,aswassaidabove[Art.I].

MediaevalPhilosophicalTextsinTranslation

Translation#1:"Grosseteste:OnLight"byClareRiedl-Trans.

ThistreatiseissignificantasanintroductiontoaninfluentialthinkerandmanofscienceoftheMiddleAges.

Translation#2:"St.Augustine:AgainsttheAcademicians"bySisterMaryPatricia,R.S.M.-Trans.

Augustineaimstoprovethatmanneednotbecontentwithmereprobabilityintherealmofknowledge.

Translation#3:"PicoDellaMirandola:OfBeingandUnity"

byVictorM.Hamm-Trans.InthisworkPicotriedtodiscoverthegenuinethoughtofPlatoandAristotleonbeing

andunity.

Translation#4:"FrancisSuarez:OntheVariousKindsofDistinction"

byCyrilVollert,S.J.-Trans.Suarezpropoundshistheoryondistinctions,apointofcapitalimportanceforagraspof

Suarezianmetaphysics.

Translation#5:"St.ThomasAquinas:OnSpiritualCreatures"

byMaryC.Fitzpatrick-Trans.Thisbookfallsintotwogeneraldivisions:anintroductionandthetranslationfromthe

Latin.

Translation#6:"MeditationsofGuigo"

byJohnJ.Jolin,S.J.-Trans.AseriesofreflectionsbyGuigo,12thcenturyPriorofthehermitageCharterhouse.

Translation#7:"GilesofRome:TheoremsonExistenceandEssence"

byMichaelV.Murray,S.J.-Trans.Anessaydealingwiththeapriorideductionsofbeinganditsconditions.

Translation#8:"JohnofSt.Thomas:OutlinesofFormalLogic"

byFrancisC.Wade,S.J.-Trans.AstandardEnglishtranslationoftheLogicofJohnofSt.Thomas.

Translation#9:"HughofSt.Victor:SoliloquyintheEarnestMoneyoftheSoul"

KevinHerbert-Trans.Thepurposeoftheworkistodirectthesoultowardatrueloveofself,anattitudewhich

isidenticalwithaloveofGod.

Translation#10:"St.ThomasAquinas:OnCharity"

byLottieKendzierski-Trans.ThistreatiseissignificantasanexpressionofSt.Thomas'discussiononthevirtueof

charityinitself,itsobject,subject,order,precepts,andprincipalact.

Translation#11:"Aristotle:OnInterpretation-CommentarybySt.ThomasandCajetan"

JeanT.Oesterle-Trans.Thistranslationwillbeofparticularvaluetoteachersandstudentsoflogic.

Translation#12:"DesideriusErasmusofRotterdam:OnCopiaofWordsandIdeas"

byDonaldB.KingandH.DavidRix-Trans.Oneofthemostpopularandinfluentialbooksofthe16thcenturyismadeavailablehere

forthefirsttimeinEnglish.

Translation#13:"PeterofSpain:TractatusSyncategorematumandSelectedAnonymousTreatises"

byJosephP.MullallyandRolandHoude-Trans.ThefirstEnglishtranslationofthesetractsnowmakesitpossibleforscholarsoflogicto

betterappreciatethecontinuityofFormalLogic.

Translation#14:"Cajetan:CommentaryonSt.ThomasAquinas'OnBeingandEssence"

byLottieKendzierskiandFrancisC.Wade,S.J.-Trans.AbasicunderstandingoftherelationbetweenCajetanandSt.Thomas.

Translation#15:"Suarez:DisputationVI,OnFormalandUniversalUnity"

byJamesF.Ross-Trans.Thestudyoflatemediaevalphilosophyandthedeclineofscholasticism.

Translation#16:"St.Thomas,SiegerdeBrabant,St.Bonaventure:OntheEternityoftheWorld"

byCyrilVollert,S.J.,LottieKendzierski,PaulByrne-Trans.Acombinedworkbringingtogetherthewritingsofthreegreatscholarsonthe

philosophicalproblemoftheeternityoftheworld.

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