OnPetitionForA WritOf Mandamus ToThe U.S.DistrictCourtForThe … · 2020. 6. 1. · Approximatelya...

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USCA Case #20-5143 Document #1845183 Filed:06/01/2020 Page 1 of 42

NOEL J. FRANCISCOSolicitor General

BRIANA. BENCZKOWSKIAssistant Attorney General

JEFFREY B.WALLERIC J. FEIGIN

Deputy Solicitors General

FREDERICKLIUVIVEK SURI

Assistants to the Solicitor GeneralU.S.Departmentof JusticeWashington,D.C.20530

On PetitionFor A Writ Of Mandamus

To The U.S.DistrictCourt For The DistrictOf Columbia

INTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOF APPEALS

FORTHE DISTRICTOF COLUMBIACIRCUIT

I N RE

BRIEFFORTHE UNITEDSTATES

: M ICHAEL

No.20-5143

T. F LYNN

MICHAEL R. SHERWINActing United States Attorney

KENNETH C.KOHLActing Principal Assistant United

States Attorney

JOCELYN BALLANTINEAssistant United States Attorney555 Fourth Street,NW,Room 11-858Washington, D.C. 20530(202) 252-7252

, PETITIONER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT ............................................................................................. 2

A. Factual background ................................................................... 2

B. Procedural background .............................................................. 8

ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 11

I. The District Court Should Have Granted The Government’sMotion To Dismiss ........................................................................... 12

A. The Constitution commits the power to prosecute to theExecutive rather than the Judiciary ........................................... 12

B. Rule 48, read against the backdrop of the Constitution,required the district court to grant the government’s motionto dismiss because the motion was unopposed .......................... 14

C. At a minimum, Rule 48 required the district court to grantthe motion to dismiss under the circumstances of this case ......... 20

D. The timing of the government’s motion cannot justifydenying the motion .................................................................. 24

II. The District Court Erred When, Instead Of Granting The MotionTo Dismiss, It Entered An Order Appointing An Amicus CuriaeAnd Contemplating Its Own Prosecution ........................................... 26

A. False statements in a plea colloquy or motion to withdraware not contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401.................................... 27

B. Even if petitioner committed criminal contempt, theauthority to prosecute him would lie with the U.S. Attorney,not the district court ................................................................. 30

III. A Writ Of Mandamus Is Appropriate And Necessary Relief InLight Of The District Court’s Unprecedented Order ........................... 31

CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 34

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Cases:

Aetna Life Ins.Co. v. Haworth,300 U.S.227 (1937)........................................14

Aiken County,Inre,725 F.3d255 (D.C.Cir.2013).............................12,13,19

Associationof Am. Physicians& Surgeonsv. Clinton,997 F.2d898(D.C.Cir. 1993)....................................................................................18

Bermanv. UnitedStates,302 U.S.211(1937).................................................25

Brewer, Inre,863 F.3d861(D.C.Cir.2017).................................................14

Bronsozianv. UnitedStates,No.19-6220,2020 WL 1906543(U.S.Apr. 20, 2020) ..............................................................................25

Brown,Inre, 454 F.2d 999 (D.C.Cir.1971)......................................27, 28, 29

CCNVv. Pierce,786 F.2d1199 (D.C.Cir.1986)...........................................13

Cheney v. U.S.DistrictCourt,542 U.S.367 (2004)...............................11, 31, 32

Clark v. United States, 289 U.S.1 (1933) ....................................................... 29

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.821 (1985)....................................................13,19

Hudgings, Ex parte, 249 U.S. 378 (1919) ..................................................27, 29

ICCv.Brotherhoodof Locomotive Eng’rs,482 U.S.270 (1987).....................13,19

Judicial Watch, Inc.v. U.S.Secret Serv., 726 F.3d208 (D.C.Cir. 2013)............15

KelloggBrown& Root,Inc.,Inre, 756 F.3d 754 (D.C.Cir. 2014).....................11

McConnell,Inre, 370 U.S. 230 (1962)......................................................27, 28

*Michael,Inre,326 U.S.224 (1945)........................................................27,29

* Authoritiesuponwhich we chieflyrely are markedwithasterisks.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941)........................................................ 28

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,514 U.S. 211 (1995)........................................25

Richards, Inre, 213 F.3d 773 (3d Cir. 2000) .................................................. 20

*Rinaldiv. UnitedStates, 434 U.S.22 (1977).................................15,17, 23, 25

Sacher v. UnitedStates,343 U.S.1 (1952)......................................................31

Sealed Case, Inre, 627 F.3d1235 (D.C.Cir. 2010)....................................28, 30

Steffelv. Thompson, 415 U.S.452 (1974).......................................................14

UnitedStates, In re, 345 F.3d450 (7thCir.2003)................16,17,18, 21, 26, 33

UnitedStatesv. Ammidown,497 F.2d615 (D.C.Cir.1973).............7, 18,19,24

UnitedStatesv. Armstrong,517 U.S.456 (1996).............................13,18,19,20

*UnitedStates v. Dunnigan,507 U.S. 87 (1993)...................................28, 29, 30

*UnitedStates v.Fokker Servs.B.V.,818 F.3d733(D.C.Cir.2016)...............1,10,11,12,13,15,16,19,20,22,24,26, 32, 33

UnitedStatesv. Gonzalez,58 F.3d459 (9th Cir. 1995)....................................25

United States v. Hector, 577 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2009) ....................................24

United States v. HSBC Bank USA,N.A., 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017)..........20, 21

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.683 (1974)........................................ 13, 18,19

UnitedStatesv. Scantlebury, 921F.3d241(D.C.Cir. 2019) ............................16

UnitedStatesv. Sineneng-Smith,140 S. Ct.1575(2020)..................................26

Wayte v. UnitedStates,470 U.S.598 (1985)..................................................23

Young v. UnitedStates ex rel.Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481U.S.787 (1987).........30, 31

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Page

Constitution, Statutes, and Rules:

*U.S. Const. art. II............................................................................ 1, 12,15

U.S. Const. art. II,§ 1, cl. 1........................................................................ 12

U.S. Const. art. II,§ 2, cl. 1........................................................................ 12

U.S. Const. art II,§ 3 ................................................................................. 12

*U.S. Const. art. III .......................................................................... 1, 12, 15

U.S. Const. art. III,§ 1............................................................................... 31

U.S. Const. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1....................................................................... 14

Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487 ..................................................... 27

All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).............................................................. 11

Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1799)................................................................ 3

18 U.S.C. § 401.......................................................................................... 27

*18 U.S.C. § 401(1) .............................................................. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) .................................................................................. 8

18 U.S.C. § 1621........................................................................................ 29

Fed. R. Crim. P.11.................................................................................... 17

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)................................................................................ 30

Fed. R. Crim. P.11(d)................................................................................ 30

Fed. R. Crim. P. 42 .................................................................................... 31

Fed. R. Crim. P. 48 .................................................................... 12, 14, 20, 21

*Fed. R.Crim. P. 48(a) .............. 1, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 33, 34

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Page

Other Authorities:

John Gleeson et al., The Flynn Case Isn’t Over Until the Judge Says It’s Over,Wash. Post (May 11, 2020), www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/11/flynn-case-isnt-over-until-judge-says-its-over ....................... 10

Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,A Report of Investigation of Certain Allegations Relating to FormerFBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe (Feb. 2018) ......................................... 8

U.S.Dep’tof Justice, Justice Manual(2020).................................................22

U.S.S.G.§ 3C1.1.......................................................................................29

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The Constitution vests in the Executive Branch the power to decide

when—andwhennot—toprosecutepotentialcrimes. Exercisingthat Article II

power here, the Executive filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, and

petitionerconsented. Despite that exerciseof prosecutorialdiscretion,and the

lack of any remainingArticle IIIcontroversybetweenthe parties, the district

court failed to grant the motion and bring the case to a close. It instead

appointedanamicuscuriae toargueagainstdismissalandtoconsideradditional

criminalcharges.

This Court should issue a writ of mandamus compelling dismissal.

FederalRuleof CriminalProcedure48(a)providesthat “[t]hegovernmentmay,

with leave of court,dismissan indictment.” That languagedoes not authorize

a court to stand in the way of a dismissalthe defendant does not oppose,and

any other reading of the Rule would violate both Article II and Article III.

Nor,underthe circumstancesof this case, may the districtcourt assumethe role

of prosecutorandinitiatecriminalchargesof its own. Insteadof invitingfurther

proceedings,the courtshouldhavegrantedthe government’smotionto dismiss.

And given the court’s infringement on the Executive’s performance of its

constitutionalduties,a writ of mandamusis appropriate,as this Court held in

similar circumstances in United States v. Fokker Services B.V., 818 F.3d 733

(D.C.Cir.2016).

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STATEMENT

A. Factualbackground

Petitioner Michael Flynn served as a surrogate and advisor for then-

candidate DonaldJ. Trump during the 2016 presidentialcampaign. In 2016,

the FederalBureauof Investigationbeganinvestigatingpetitioneras part of a

largerinvestigationintowhether individualsassociatedwithPresidentTrump’s

campaignwere coordinatingwiththe Russiangovernmentto interferewith the

election. Doc.198-3,at 2-3.

After several months, the FBI identified no “derogatory information”

about petitioneranddeterminedthat he “was nolonger a viable candidate”for

investigation. Doc.198-2,at 3-4. Inearly January 2017, the FBI stated in a

draft internalmemorandumthat itwas “closing[its]investigation”of petitioner.

Id.at 5.

Aroundthe same time,the FBIlearnedthat petitionerandSergeyKislyak,

then Russia’sambassadorto the UnitedStates,hadspokenby telephonein late

December,aroundthe time that PresidentObamaannouncedsanctionsagainst

Russiafor election interference. Doc.198-4,at 3; Doc.198-6,at 4. The FBI

later preparedtranscriptsof the relevantcalls. Doc.198-6,at 8,13. When they

spoke, petitioner asked Kislyak not to escalate tensions in response to the

sanctions, and Kislyak later confirmed that Russia had taken the incoming

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administration’spositionintoaccountindeterminingits response. Doc.4, at 3.

FBI personnel considered whether petitioner had violated the Logan Act,

18 U.S.C.§ 953,whichprohibitsU.S.citizens from trying to influenceforeign

governmentsindisputes with the UnitedStates. See Doc.198-9,at 2. But that

idea got little tractionwithinthe Departmentof Justice becausethere has never

been a convictionunder the LoganAct in its 200-year history and, regardless,

communicationsby an incomingadministrationwith foreign officials are not

necessarilyout of the ordinary. Doc.198-4,at 4; Doc.198-5,at 3,10;Doc.198-

6, at 10-11.

On January 4, 2017, Peter Strzok, then FBIDeputy Assistant Director,

learnedthat petitioner’sfile “serendipitously”hadbeen left open. Doc.198-8,

at 2. Strzok instructedagents to “keep[theinvestigation]openfor now.” Id. In

electronicmessages,StrzokandLisaPage,thenanFBIattorney,expressedrelief

and commentedthat the FBI’s “utter incompetence”in failing to timely close

the file was actually “help[ing]”them. Id.

Approximatelya week later, a news report indicatedthat petitioner and

Kislyak hadspokenon the day Russiansanctions were announced. See Doc.

198-5,at 3. A spokespersonfor the President-Electrespondedthat petitioner’s

calls focusedon logistics. Id. Twodays later,the Vice President-Electstatedin

a public news interviewthat he hadspoken to petitioner and that petitioner’s

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conversationwith Kislyak did not relate to sanctions. Id. FBIDirectorJames

Comeytook the view that the FBIshouldnotnotifythe incomingadministration

about the content of the conversationsbetweenpetitionerandKislyak. Id.at 5.

The Acting Attorney General, the Director of NationalIntelligence,and the

director of the Central Intelligence Agency disagreed, but the latter two

ultimatelybackedoff. Id.;Doc.198-4,at 6.

On January 22, 2017, following the President’sinauguration,petitioner

was sworn in as NationalSecurity Advisor. Doc.133-1,at 1. The next day,

Comey directed two “experienced”FBI agents to interviewpetitioner. Doc.

198-6,at 7. Comey resolvedthat neither White House counselnor anyone at

the Justice Departmentwouldbe notifiedin advanceof the interview.Id.;Doc.

198-5,at 5-6. Onthe day of the interview,the ActingAttorneyGeneraldecided

“enoughwas enough” and calledComey to tell him that it was time to notify

the White House about the substance of petitioner’s calls. Doc. 198-5, at 5.

WhenComey returnedthe call, he toldher that two agents were already on the

way to interviewpetitioner. Id. The ActingAttorneyGeneralandothers at the

Departmentwere “flabbergasted”that the FBIhaddecidedto proceedwithout

coordinatingwiththe Department.Doc.198-4,at 7.

Before the interview,FBI officials discussedwhether to show petitioner

the text of the relevantcalls. Innotes made to prepare for the discussion,FBI

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Chief of CounterintelligenceE.W.Priestap took the view that the FBIshould

“rethink”its decisionnot to show petitionerthe text. Doc.198-11. Priestap’s

notes observedthat the FBI“regularlyshow[ed]subjectsevidencewiththe goal

of getting them to admit their wrongdoing.” Id. In his notes, Priestap

questioned whether the FBI’s goal was getting the “[t]ruth/[a]dmission”or

“get[ting][petitioner]to lie,so we can prosecutehimor get himfired?” Id. FBI

leadershipultimatelydecidednot to show petitionerthe text. Doc.198-6,at 8;

Doc.198-14,at 4. They alsodecidednot to warnpetitionerthat lyingto the FBI

is a crime. Doc.198-14,at 4.

FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe spoke by phone to petitioner,

askingto have two agents “sit down”with himto hear about his conversations

withKislyak. Doc.198-12. Petitionernotedthat the FBIlikelyknewwhat was

said in the calls because it “listen[s] to everything [the Russians] say.” Id.

McCabe indicated that he nevertheless wanted the interview to be done as

“quickly, quietly and discre[et]ly as possible.” Id. Petitioneragreed to meet

alone with the agents that same day without involving the White House

Counsel’sOffice. Id.

Less than two hours later,petitionermet with Strzok anda secondagent

at the White House. Petitionerwas “relaxed,”“unguarded,”and “talkative.”

Doc.198-14,at 4. He“clearlysaw the FBIagents as allies.” Id. The agents did

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not recordthe interview,but took handwrittennotes. Doc.198-13,at 2-8. After

returningto the FBI,the agents draftedan FD-302,the FBI’sInterviewReport

form, summarizingthe interview,and they continuedto revise it thereafter.

Doc.198-7,at 2-6; see Doc.198-8,at 4.

Accordingto the final FD-302,whenthe agents askedpetitionerwhether

he recalledany conversationwith Kislyakinwhich he encouragedKislyaknot

to “escalate the situation” in response to the sanctions,petitioner responded,

“Not really. I don’t remember. Itwasn’t,‘Don’tdo anything.’” Doc.198-7,at

6. Accordingto the FD-302,the agents askedpetitioner whether he recalleda

conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had taken the incoming

administration’s position into account when responding to the sanctions;

petitioner stated that he did not recall such a conversation. Id. The agents’

handwritten notes do not reflect that question being asked or petitioner’s

response. See Doc.198-13,at 2-8.

The final FD-302also reports that petitioner incorrectly stated that, in

earliercalls with Kislyak,petitionerhad not madeany requestabout voting on

a UNResolutionina certainmanneror slowingdownthe vote. Doc.198-7,at

5. Petitionerindicatedthat the conversation,which took place on a day when

he was calling many other countries, was “along the lines of where do you

stand[] and what’s your position.” Id. The final FD-302 also states that

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petitioner was asked whether Kislyak describedany Russian response to his

requestandsaidthat Kislyakhadnot,id.,althoughthe agents’handwrittennotes

do not reflect petitionerbeingaskedthat questionor givingthat response. See

Doc.198-13,at 2-8.

After the interview,the agents agreedthat petitioner “did not give any

indicatorsof deception.” Doc.198-14,at 4. Both agents had the impression

that petitioner“was not lyingor did not think he was lying.” Id.at 5. Intheir

view,it was possiblethat petitionerreally didnot rememberthe substanceof his

calls with Kislyak. See Doc. 198-5, at 6. Comey later described the “two

experiencedagents”reportingthat they “sawnothingthat indicatedto themthat

[petitioner]knewhe was lyingto them.” Doc.198-6,at 7-8. WhenComeywas

askedonMarch2,2017,whetherhe believedthat petitionerlied,he responded

“Idon’t know. I think there is an argumentto be made that he lied. It is a close

one.” Id.at 10.

Soonafter the interview,Priestap,Strzok,and other senior FBIofficials

briefedindividualsat the Department.Doc.198-4,at 7. Whenthe Department

raisedthe issue of re-interviewingpetitioner,the FBIwas “prettyemphatic”that

a re-interview was unnecessary. Doc. 198-5, at 6; see Doc. 198-4, at 7.

Departmentofficialsbriefedthe White House,andthe Departmentarrangedto

provide transcriptsof petitioner’scalls. Doc.198-5,at 7-11; Doc.198-6,at 9.

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AninternalDepartmentmemorandumindicatesthat,by late January 2017, the

FBIadvisedthe Departmentthat it didnot believethat petitionerwas actingas

a Russian agent. See Doc. 123, at 2. The President asked for petitioner’s

resignationonFebruary13. See Doc.198-6,at 9.

Thereafter,new informationemergedabout essentialparticipantsin the

investigation. Strzok was removed from the investigationdue to apparent

politicalbias and was later terminatedfrom the FBI. The secondinterviewing

agent was criticizedby the InspectorGeneralfor his tactics inconnectionwith

the largerinvestigation.See Doc.169,at 6-7. AndMcCabewas terminatedafter

the Departmentof Justice determinedthat he liedunder oath,includingto FBI

agents. Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, A Report of

Investigationof Certain AllegationsRelating to Former FBI Deputy Director Andrew

McCabe2 (Feb.2018).

B. Proceduralbackground

On November 30, 2017, the Special Counsel’s Office filed a criminal

informationchargingpetitionerwith a single count of makingfalse statements

inviolationof 18U.S.C.§ 1001(a)(2). Doc.1. The nextday,petitionerpleaded

guilty to that offense before the HonorableRudolphContreras. See Docs.3, 4.

The statement of the offense provided that petitioner “made materially false

statementsand omissions”that “impededandotherwisehada materialimpact

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on the FBI’s ongoing investigation into the existence of any links or

coordinationbetween individualsassociatedwith the [Trump]Campaignand

Russia’sefforts to interferewith the 2016 presidentialelection.” Doc.4, at 1-2.

The case was subsequentlyreassignedto the HonorableEmmet G. Sullivan.

Doc.9.

The district court set a sentencinghearingfor December18,2018. Inpre-

sentencing filings, the government agreed that petitioner had substantially

cooperated,andthat a probation-onlysentencecould be appropriate. Doc.46,

at 1. At the outset of the hearing,the court informedpetitionerthat it would

conduct an “extension … of the plea colloquy.” App. 6. The court asked

petitionerto reaffirmhis pleaunderoath. App.8-11. Onthe adviceof counsel,

petitionermaintainedhisguilty pleaandindicatedthat he was “readytoproceed

to sentencing.” App.11,14,17.

The district court then addressed petitioner, stating that his offense

“arguably… undermineseverythingthis flagover herestandsfor … . Arguably,

yousold your country out.” App.34. The court statedthat it was “not hiding

[its]disgust,[its]disdainfor this criminaloffense.” Id. The court suggestedthat

petitioner consider delaying the sentencing until after his cooperation was

complete. App. 48. After conferring with counsel, petitioner requested a

continuance. App.47.

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Petitionersubsequentlyretainednewcounsel.Doc.88,at 2. Hethenfiled

a Brady motion,which the district court denied. Doc.144, at 2-3. InJanuary

2020, petitioner moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting ineffective

assistanceof priorcounsel. Docs.151,154,160. Petitioneralso filed a motion

to dismiss the case for governmentmisconduct.Doc.162.

OnMay7, 2020,while those motionsremainedpending,the government

movedtodismiss the caseunderFederalRuleof CriminalProcedure48(a). The

government first explaineda court’s “narrow” role inaddressinga Rule 48(a)

motion. Doc.198, at 10 (quotingUnited States v. Fokker Servs.B.V., 818 F.3d

733, 742 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). The government then set out its reasons for the

dismissal,explainingwhy it had concludedthat continuedprosecutionwould

not serve the interests of justice. Id.at 12-20; see pp. 21-23, infra. Petitioner

consentedto the motion. Doc.202.

A few days later,retiredfederaljudge JohnGleesonco-authoredanarticle

urging the district court to scrutinize the government’smotion, includingby

appointing“anindependentattorneyto act as a ‘friendof the court’” andprovide

for anadversarialinquiry. JohnGleesonet al.,The FlynnCase Isn’t Over Untilthe

Judge Says It’s Over, Wash. Post (May 11, 2020), www.washingtonpost.com/

opinions/2020/05/11/flynn-case-isnt-over-until-judge-says-its-over.On May 13,

2020,the courtappointedJudgeGleesonas amicuscuriae“topresentarguments

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inoppositionto the government’sMotionto Dismiss”;it also directedamicus

to “address whether the Court should issue an Order to Show Cause why

[petitioner]should not be held in criminal contempt for perjury.” App. 77.

Court-appointedamicusthenindicatedthat he intendsto informthe court about

“any additionalfactualdevelopment”amicusmay need“beforefinalizing[his]

argumentinoppositionto the government’smotion.” Doc.209,at 1.

The districtcourt subsequentlyset a briefingscheduleon the government’s

Rule 48(a) motion, providing for multiple briefs submitted by the court-

appointedamicus,the government,and petitioner,as well as additionalbriefs

from non-court-appointedamici, with oral argument scheduled for July 16,

2020. May 20, 2020 Order.

ARGUMENT

The All Writs Act empowers courts of appeals to issue writs of

mandamus. 28 U.S.C.§ 1651(a);see Cheney v. U.S.DistrictCourt,542 U.S.367,

380 (2004). In reviewinga mandamuspetition,“[t]he thresholdquestion” is

whether the district court’s ruling “constituted legal error”; if it did, “the

remainingquestionis whetherthe error is the kindthat justifies mandamus.” In

re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 756-757 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The

answers to those questions are plainunder UnitedStates v. Fokker Services B.V.,

818 F.3d733(D.C.Cir.2016). InFokker,this Courtissueda writ of mandamus

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to compel a district court to grant an unopposed motion to terminate a

prosecution,in order to avoid“an unwarrantedimpairmentof another branch

in the performanceof its constitutionalduties.” Id.at 750 (citationomitted).

The Court shoulddo the same here,for the same reason.

I. The District Court Should Have Granted The Government’s

MotionTo DismissThe Indictment

Under Articles II and III of the Constitution,the power to prosecute

belongsto the Executive,not the Judiciary. FederalRuleof CriminalProcedure

48, read against the backdrop of that constitutional principle, required the

district court to grant the government’smotionto dismiss the indictmentwith

prejudicebecause that motionwas unopposed. At a minimum,it requiredthe

court to grant the motionunderthe circumstancesof this case, notwithstanding

petitioner’sguilty plea.

A. The Constitution commits the power to prosecute to the

Executive rather than the Judiciary

1. Article IIprovides that “[t]he executive Powershall be vested in a

President,”U.S.Const.art.II,§ 1,cl.1; that the President“shallhave Powerto

grant ReprievesandPardonsfor Offencesagainst the UnitedStates,” § 2, cl. 1;

and that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”

§ 3. Taken together,those provisionsvest the power to prosecutecrimes in the

Executive.Inre AikenCounty,725F.3d255,263 (D.C.Cir.2013). The Supreme

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Court thus has recognizedthat, as a generalmatter,“the ExecutiveBranchhas

exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a

case.” UnitedStatesv. Nixon,418 U.S.683, 693 (1974). This Court has likewise

recognized that “[t]he power to decide when to investigate, and when to

prosecute,lies at the core of the Executive’sduty to see to the faithfulexecution

of the laws.” CCNV v. Pierce,786 F.2d1199,1201(D.C.Cir. 1986). Notably,

“[t]he Executive’scharging authority embraces decisions about … whether to

dismiss charges once brought.” Fokker,818F.3dat 737.

A “corollary”of “[t]he Executive’sexclusive authority” is that “neither

the Judicial nor Legislative Branches may directly interfere with the

prosecutorialdiscretionof the Executiveby directing the ExecutiveBranchto

prosecuteparticularindividuals.”Aiken,725F.3dat 263 (citationomitted). For

example, in light of the executive power over prosecutions,the remedy for a

selective prosecutionbased on impermissibleconsiderations“is to dismiss the

prosecution,not to compelthe Executiveto bring another prosecution,”id.at

264 n.7;see UnitedStatesv.Armstrong,517 U.S.456,466-467 (1996);an agency’s

exercise of enforcement discretion is immune from judicial review under the

AdministrativeProcedureAct, Hecklerv. Chaney,470 U.S.821, 831(1985);and

“the refusal to prosecute cannot be the subject of judicial review,” ICC v.

Brotherhoodof LocomotiveEng’rs,482 U.S.270, 283 (1987).

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2. ArticleIII,meanwhile,providesthat the federalcourtsmayexercise

only “judicialPower”over “Cases”and “Controversies.” U.S.Const.art. III,

§ 2, cl. 1. A case or controversy is a “dispute betweenparties who face each

other inan adversaryproceeding.” Aetna Life Ins.Co.v. Haworth,300 U.S.227,

242 (1937). And“an actualcontroversymustbe extant at all stages of review.”

Steffelv. Thompson,415 U.S.452, 459 n.10 (1974). Itfollows that, if the dispute

betweenthe partiescomes to anend,the court’s exerciseof judicial powermust

end as well. For instance,if all parties to a civil case agree that the case should

be dismissed,the stipulateddismissal“resolvesall claims before the court” and

“leav[es][the court]without a live Article IIIcase or controversy.” Inre Brewer,

863 F.3d861, 869 (D.C.Cir.2017). Likewisein a criminalcase: if the United

States and the defendant agree that the indictmentshouldbe dismissed,there

remainsno disputebetween the parties,there is no needfor a court to impose

judgmentagainstthe defendant,andthere is thus nobasisfor the furtherexercise

of judicial power.

B. Rule 48, read against the backdrop of the Constitution,

required the district court to grant the government’s motion

to dismiss because the motion was unopposed

1. Rule 48(a) provides: “The governmentmay,with leave of court,

dismiss an indictment,information,or complaint.” “The principal object of

[Rule 48(a)’s] ‘leave of court’ requirement”is “to protect a defendant against

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prosecutorialharassment.” Rinaldiv. UnitedStates,434 U.S.22, 29 n.15 (1977)

(per curiam); see Fokker,818 F.3dat 742. If a prosecutorcoulddismiss cases

unilaterally, he could harass a defendant by “charging, dismissing, and

recharging… over the defendant’sobjection.” Rinaldi,434 U.S.at 29 n.15. But

that concern provides no basis for judicial interventionwhere a defendant

consents to the dismissal,let alone wherethe governmentagrees to dismisswith

prejudicetorefiling.Indeed,readingRule48(a)tograntdistrictcourts a broader

and more open-ended authority to override the Executive’s prosecutorial

decisions and to keep alive an otherwise moot controversy would violate

Articles IIand III—floutingthe principle that courts should avoid adopting

interpretationsthat raise serious constitutionalproblems. JudicialWatch,Inc.v.

U.S.SecretServ.,726F.3d208,226 (D.C.Cir.2013).

Fokker confirms that Rule 48(a) does not grant courts such power. In

Fokker, this Court consideredwhether a district court could reject a proposed

deferredprosecutionagreement“basedonthe court’s view that the prosecution

had been too lenient.” 818 F.3d at 741. The Court observed that “[t]he

Constitutionallocatesprimacyincriminal chargingdecisions to the Executive

Branch”andthat “the Judiciarygenerally lacks authorityto second-guessthose

Executivedeterminations,muchless to impose its own chargingpreferences.”

Id.at 737. “Those settledprinciples,”the Court emphasized,“counselagainst

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interpreting statutes and rules in a manner that would impinge on the

Executive’sconstitutionallyrootedprimacy over criminalchargingdecisions.”

Id.at 742.

The Court then interpretedRule48(a)inlight of those principles. Fokker,

818 F.3dat 742. It explainedthat Rule 48(a) allows a court to deny leave in

order “ ‘toprotect a defendantagainst prosecutorialharassment,’” but that “the

‘leave of court’ authority gives no power to deny [dismissal] based on a

disagreement with the prosecution’s exercise of charging authority” or “to

scrutinizeandcountermandthe prosecution’sexerciseof its traditionalauthority

over chargingand enforcementdecisions.” Id. at 742-743 (citationomitted).

“For instance,a court cannot deny leave of court because of a view that the

defendantshouldstandtrialnotwithstandingthe prosecution’sdesire to dismiss

the charges.” Id. at 742. Nor may a court deny leave on the groundthat the

prosecution has “fail[ed] to redress the gravity of the defendant’s alleged

conduct.” Id. “The authority to make such determinationsremains with the

Executive.” Id.; see UnitedStates v. Scantlebury,921F.3d 241, 250 (D.C.Cir.

2019)(“The ‘leave of court’authoritygives nopower to a district court to deny

[dismissal]basedon a disagreementwiththe prosecution’sexerciseof charging

authority.”)(bracketsandcitationomitted);Inre UnitedStates,345 F.3d450,453

(7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that, under Rule 48(a), a court may “protect a

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defendantfrom the government’sharass[ment],”but may not properly deny a

motionto dismisswhen“the defendantha[s]agreedto it”).

2. Dicta in some cases have suggested a broader conception of a

district court’s power under Rule 48(a). This Court rejected those views in

Fokker,andthose views are inany event incorrect.

In United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973)—which

involveda plea under Federal Rule of CriminalProcedure 11rather than a

motionto dismiss under Rule 48(a)—this Court stated that, even “when the

defendantconcurs in the dismissal,”a district court “willnot be contentwitha

mere conclusory statement by the prosecutor that dismissal is in the public

interest,but will require a statement of reasons and underlyingfactual basis.”

497 F.2dat 620. The Courtfurtherstatedthat the district courthas “the role of

guarding against abuse of prosecutorialdiscretion” and, to that end, should

grant a motionto dismissonly if it is “satisfiedthat the reasonsadvancedfor the

proposed dismissal are substantial.” Id. Some other courts have similarly

assertedthat a district court may deny an unopposedmotion to dismiss if it is

“inbadfaithor contrary to the public interest.” In re UnitedStates,345 F.3dat

453 (collectingcases);see Rinaldi,434 U.S.at 29 n.15(findingit “unnecessaryto

decide” whether some lower courts have acted impermissiblyin asserting the

power to deny unopposedmotions to dismiss when “clearly contrary to the

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public interest”). Those statements are all dicta; “[w]e are unaware … of any

appellatedecisionthat actuallyupholdsa denialof a motionto dismiss a charge

onsuch a basis.” Inre UnitedStates,345 F.3dat 453.

This Court shouldnot follow those dicta here. “The Constitutiondoes

place judicially enforceablelimits on the powers of the nonjudicialbranches of

the government—forexample,the governmentmay not make its prosecutorial

decisions on racially discriminatorygrounds—butthey are the limits found in

the Constitutionand thus do not include ‘bad faith’ and ‘against the public

interest.’” In re United States, 345 F.3d at 453. Nor do those judicially

enforceablelimits includea requirementto providea “statementof reasons”that

is not “conclusory.” Ammidown,497 F.2dat 620. Quitethe opposite,any such

requirement would—at least absent “clear evidence” of an unconstitutional

motive,Armstrong,517 U.S.at 465 (citationomitted)—contradictthe principle

that the Executive is entitled to “confidentiality” in its “decisionmaking

process.” Associationof Am. Physicians& Surgeonsv. Clinton,997 F.2d898, 909

(D.C.Cir.1993)(quotingNixon,418 U.S.at 705-706).

In addition, the dicta rest on an unsound premise: that when the

Executive decides no longer to prosecute a case, district courts have

freewheelingandstandardlessauthorityto preventwhat they regardas “abuse”

of that prosecutorialdiscretion. Ammidown,497 F.2dat 620. “The remedyfor

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… abuses of the power … to decline to prosecutecomes in the form of public

disapproval, congressional ‘retaliation’ on other matters, or ultimately

impeachmentin cases of extreme abuse”—notin the form of judicial override.

Aiken,725 F.3dat 266. Indeed,the dicta make no sense as a practicalmatter,

because even if a district court were to deny an unopposedmotionto dismiss

with prejudice,it wouldhave noeffectivemechanismto force the Executiveto

put on a case at trial against its will.

The dicta also contradict more recent decisions of the Supreme Court.

Since this Court decidedAmmidownin1973,the SupremeCourt has explained

that “the Executive Branchhas exclusive authority and absolute discretionto

decide whether to prosecute a case,” Nixon,418 U.S.at 693; that “the decision

of a prosecutorinthe ExecutiveBranchnot to indict”is “thespecialprovinceof

the ExecutiveBranch,”Chaney,470 U.S. at 832; that “the refusal to prosecute

cannot be the subjectof judicial review,”LocomotiveEng’rs,482 U.S.at 283;and

that the exercise of “a prosecutor’sdiscretion” involves “the performanceof a

coreexecutiveconstitutionalfunction,”Armstrong,517U.S.at 464-465. Inlight

of those interveningdecisions,this CourtinFokkerreadAmmidownto meanthat

“courts generally lack authority to second-guess the prosecution’s

constitutionallyrootedexercise of chargingdiscretion.” 818 F.3dat 750 (citing

Ammidown,497 F.2dat 621-622)(emphasisadded).

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C. At a minimum, Rule 48 required the district court to grant

the motion to dismiss under the circumstances of this case

1. Even assuming that a district court may ever deny an unopposed

motion to dismiss, it may do so only in extraordinary circumstances. The

SupremeCourthasexplainedthat,eveninthose few areas wherea federalcourt

may review a decision whether to prosecute, the court must apply a

“presumption of regularity,” presuming that prosecutors “have properly

discharged their official duties” unless “clear evidence” shows otherwise.

Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (citation omitted). This Court likewise has

emphasizedthat “ ‘judicialauthority is … at its most limited’ when reviewing

the Executive’sexercise of discretionover charging determinations.” Fokker,

818 F.3dat 741.

Othercourts of appealsagree that any authoritya districtcourt may have

to deny an unopposedmotion to dismiss is limited. Some have treatedRule

48(a) as a purely procedural requirement—“a ‘[s]unshine’ provision” that

requires the prosecutionto providereasons for its decision,but that grants the

court no “substantive”authorityto reviewthe adequacyof those reasons. Inre

Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 789 (3d Cir. 2000). Others have stated that “any

authority a court might have to deny a Rule 48(a) motionwouldbe limitedto

cases inwhichdismissalis ‘clearlycontrarytomanifestpublic interest.’” United

States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 141(2d Cir. 2017) (citation

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omitted). Courts “that have elucidatedthis ‘public interest’ test have stressed

how‘severelycabined’it is,‘equat[ing]a dismissalthat is clearly contrary to the

public interestwith one inwhich the prosecutorappearsmotivatedby bribery,

animus towards the victim,or a desireto attenda socialevent ratherthantrial.’”

Id. (citation omitted). If a prosecutor “accepts a bribe” or prefers “to go on

vacationratherthanconducta trial,”hisactionswouldsuggestthat he“isacting

alone rather than at the direction or with the approval of the Justice

Department.” Inre UnitedStates,345F.3dat 454.

2. Even if they applied, those standards would not allow a Rule 48

denial in these circumstances. The Rule 48(a) motion here represents the

authoritative position of the Executive Branch, and moreover it provides a

faciallyadequateexplanationfor the Executive’sdecisiononseveralalternative

grounds. The district court and court-appointedamicus therefore may not

conduct evidentiaryproceedingsbased on speculationabout the government’s

motives.

In its motion, the government first explainedthat, after “an extensive

reviewandcarefulconsideration,”it haddeterminedthat continuedprosecution

of the case would“notservethe interestsof justice.” Doc.198,at 1. Itexplained

that record materials could be taken to suggest that the FBI “was eager to

interview[petitioner]irrespectiveof any underlyinginvestigation”and that the

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interviewwas undertakenpredominantly“to elicit those very false statements

and thereby criminalize[petitioner].” Id. at 16-17. The ExecutiveBranch is

entitled to determine that, based on the circumstances surrounding the

interview, it can no longer make the “policy judgment” that continued

prosecutionserves a substantialfederal interest. Id.at 2 (quotingU.S.Dep’tof

Justice,JusticeManual§ 9-27.001(2020));see Fokker,818 F.3dat 743.

The governmentalsoexplainedthat,“mindfulof the highburdento prove

every elementof [the]offensebeyonda reasonabledoubt,”it nolonger believes

it could secure a conviction at trial. Doc. 198, at 2. Although petitioner

previously pleaded guilty, it is Justice Department policy that prosecutions

shouldnotbe initiated—andthus shouldnotbe continued—“unlessthe attorney

for the governmentbelieves that the admissibleevidence is sufficient to obtain

and sustain a guilty verdict by an unbiased trier of fact.” Justice Manual

§ 9-27.200cmt. The governmentexpressedconcernspecificallyabout its ability

to prove materiality. The governmentobtainedpetitioner’splea on the theory

that his “false statementsand omissionsimpededand otherwise had a material

impact on the FBI’s ongoing investigationinto the existence of any links or

coordinationbetween individualsassociatedwith the [Trump]Campaignand

Russia’sefforts to interferewiththe 2016 presidentialelection.” Doc.4, at 1-2.

But the government identified substantial evidence that neither the truthful

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information nor the fact of any false statement was significant to that

investigation,Doc.198,at 13-18& n.6,andthe FBIconcludedshortly after the

interview that petitioner was not an agent of Russia, see p. 8, supra. The

governmentexplainedthat it doubtedwhether it should attempt to prove to a

jury that the informationwas neverthelessobjectively significant. Doc.198,at

17.

After comprehensivereview,the governmentwas also concernedthat it

wouldbe unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitionerwillfully

made false statements. Doc.198,at 18-20. The governmentdeterminedthat

the foundationalevidenceof willfulfalsity wouldhavehadmajorweaknessesat

trial inlight of the interviewingagents’owndoubtsaboutwhetherpetitionerwas

lying,the equivocalnature of some of the criticalstatements inhis interview,

and substantialimpeachingmaterialfor the key witnesses. See pp. 2-8, supra.

The government’sjudgment about the underlyingstrengthof the case, and its

decisionnot to rely on the plea,are “particularly ill-suitedto judicial review.”

Waytev. UnitedStates,470 U.S.598, 607 (1985). And just as inRinaldi,where

the district court was requiredto grant a postconvictionRule 48(a)motion,see

434 U.S.at 32, the government’smotionhere applied an establishedcharging

policy.

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Simply put, the district court has no authority to reject the Executive’s

conclusion that those reasons justify a dismissal of the charges. The

government’s detailed explanation is far more than “a mere conclusory

statement,” Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 620, amply satisfying any procedural

requirement that the government provide reasons for its decision to end a

prosecution. There also is no evidence at all—much less the kind of clear

evidence needed to overcome the presumption of regularity—that the

prosecutorswere motivatedby bribery or similar considerations. Because this

case involves “the prosecution’s constitutionally rooted exercise of charging

discretion,”it is a “usurpationof judicialpower”to second-guessit. Fokker,818

F.3dat 750 (citationomitted).

D. The timing of the government’s motion cannot justify

denying the motion

Amici here and proposedamici below have principallyargued that the

district court may deny the motion to dismiss because the government filed it

after petitionerhad pleadedguilty. E.g., Watergate ProsecutorsBr. 7; D.Ct.

Separationof PowersScholarsBr.17-18(ScholarsBr.). But nothingin the text

of Rule48(a)suggests that the Executive’sauthorityto obtaindismissalexpires

or shrinks upon the entry of a guilty plea. Quite the contrary, it is “well

establishedthat the governmentmaymove to dismissevenafter a complainthas

turnedinto a conviction.” UnitedStatesv. Hector,577 F.3d1099,1101(9thCir.

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USCA Case #20-5143 Document #1845183 Filed: 06/01/2020 Page 31of 42

2009); see, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 58 F.3d 459, 460 (9th Cir. 1995)

(dismissalafter conviction);Rinaldi,434 U.S.at 25 (dismissalafter conviction

andsentencing);Bronsozianv. UnitedStates,No.19-6220,2020 WL 1906543,at

*1(U.S.Apr.20, 2020)(dismissalafter conviction,sentencing,and affirmance

by the court of appeals).

Amiciarguethat,underPlautv.SpendthriftFarm,Inc.,514U.S.211(1995),

the Executive has no power to “commandthe federal courts to reopen final

judgments.” ScholarsBr.23 (bracketsandcitationomitted). But “judgmentin

a criminal case means sentence.” Berman v. UnitedStates, 302 U.S.211, 212

(1937). And a judgment becomes “final” for purposes of the separation of

powersonly after “allappealshavebeenforgoneor completed.” Plaut,514 U.S.

at 227. Here,the district court has notyet pronouncedsentence,so there is not

even a judgment,much less one that has become final after the exhaustionof

appeals. Far from authorizingfurther proceedingsat the district court’s behest,

the Constitutionrequiresthe court to honor the Executive’sunopposeddecision

to drop the pending charges, and precludes the case from proceeding to

sentencingin the absenceof a live controversy.

Amici also argue that dismissal at this stage would interfere with the

district court’s authorityto “decide what sentenceto impose.” ScholarsBr.13.

But a district court lacks the authority to impose a criminalsentence after an

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unopposedmotionto dismiss with prejudice,just as it lacks the authority in a

civilcase to awarddamagesafter the plaintiffmovestodismiss. Thus,inFokker,

this Court explainedthat “the Judiciary’s traditionalauthorityover sentencing

decisions” could not justify judicial interference with “the Executive’s

traditionalpowerover chargingdecisions.” 818F.3dat 746. AndinInre United

States,the SeventhCircuit directeda district court to grant a motionto dismiss,

notwithstanding the court’s belief that “the government was trying to

circumvent[its]sentencingauthority”throughdismissal. 345 F.3dat 452.

II. The District Court ErredWhen, InsteadOf Granting The Motion

To Dismiss, It Entered An Order Appointing An Amicus Curiae

And Contemplating ItsOwn Prosecution

Rather than dismiss the indictment,the district court entered an order

appointing an amicus (1) to present arguments against dismissal and (2) to

address whether the court “should issue an Order to Show Cause why

[petitioner]shouldnotbe heldincriminalcontemptfor perjury.” App.77. The

failure to dismiss the indictmentwas error. And the court’s efforts to pursue

additional charges of contempt compounded its error. See United States v.

Sineneng-Smith,140S.Ct.1575,1579(2020)(reaffirming“the principleof party

presentation”).When,likemany otherdefendants,petitionerpleadedguiltybut

later asserted his innocence, he did not expose himself to prosecution for

criminal contempt of court. The court lacks authority to bring its own

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prosecution of petitioner, for two independent reasons. First, any false

statementsinthis contextare notcontemptunder18U.S.C.§ 401. Second,even

if petitioner’sconductwere punishableas contempt,the authority to prosecute

himwouldlie withthe Executive,not the court.

A. Falsestatementsin a plea colloquy or motionto withdraw

are not contemptunder 18 U.S.C.§ 401

1. Congress enactedthe Act of March2, 1831,ch. 99, 4 Stat.487, to

“drastically” “curtail the range of conduct which courts could punish as

contempt.” In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945). The current contempt

statute,18 U.S.C.§ 401,“is basedon [the]Act passedin1831.” InreMcConnell,

370 U.S.230, 233 (1962). Section401providesinpertinentpart that “[a]court

of the UnitedStates shallhave powerto punishby fine or imprisonment… such

contemptof its authority”as “[m]isbehaviorof any personin its presenceor so

near theretoas to obstruct the administrationof justice.” 18 U.S.C.§ 401(1).

“[O]bstruction”is an“element[that]must clearly be showninevery case

wherethe powerto punishfor contempt is exerted.” Ex parteHudgings,249U.S.

378, 383 (1919);see Inre Brown,454 F.2d999,1005 (D.C.Cir. 1971)(“Absent

any evidenceto warranta findingof an actualobstructionof the administration

of justice,there canbe noviolationof the first subdivisionof Section401.”). In

the context of Section 401(1), the Supreme Court has construed the term

“obstruction”narrowly,“against the backgroundrule that the contemptpower

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was to be confined to the least possible power adequate to protect the

administrationof justice againstimmediateinterruptionof its business.” United

States v. Dunnigan,507 U.S. 87, 93-94 (1993) (internal quotation marks and

citationsomitted). The Court has therefore heldthat Section401(1)requiresa

showing of “actual obstruction,” McConnell, 370 U.S. at 236—for instance,

disruptioninthe courtroomor interferencewithcourtproceedings,Nyev.United

States,313 U.S.33, 48, 52 (1941). “[O]bstruction”thus has a muchnarrower

meaninginthis contextthan in others. Dunnigan,507 U.S.at 93-94.

Inaddition,Section401(1) requiresa showingof “contumaciousintent,”

Brown,454 F.2dat 1007—namely,an“inten[t]toobstructthe administrationof

justice,” In re Sealed Case, 627 F.3d 1235, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2010). “The

foundationfor the criminalcontemptpower is the need to protect the judicial

process from wilful impositions.” Brown,454 F.2dat 1006. Accordingly,this

Court has recognizedthat “a degree of intentionalwrongdoingis an ingredient

of the offense of criminalcontempt.” Id.

2. Petitionerpleadedguilty to makingfalse statements to the FBIbut

later movedto withdrawhis plea,assertinghis innocence. The suggestionof

“perjury”is apparentlybasedon statementspetitionermade,either inpleading

guilty or in moving to withdraw his plea. App. 77. Even assuming that

petitioner committedperjury,however,he cannot be prosecutedfor contempt

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under Section401(1). That is because perjury,in itself, does not satisfy either

the “obstruction”or the “intent”elementsof contemptunder Section401(1).

a. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that “perjury alone

does not constitute an ‘obstruction’which justifies exertionof the contempt

power.” Michael,326 U.S.at 228; see Dunnigan,507 U.S.at 93; Clark v. United

States, 289 U.S.1, 11(1933); Hudgings,249 U.S.at 383-384. The Court has

acknowledgedthat perjury“may produce a judgment not restingon truth,” but

has explainedthat perjuryalone does not“obstructor halt the judicial process”

withinthe meaningof Section401(1). Michael,326 U.S.at 227. That is because

“the ordinarytask of trialcourts is to sift true fromfalse testimony.” Dunnigan,

507 U.S.at 93. Thus, “the problemcausedby simple perjury [i]s not so much

anobstructionof justice as anexpectedpart of its administration.” Id.

That is not to say that perjury must go unpunished. There is a separate

federal criminal statute—enforced by the Executive—prohibitingperjury.

18 U.S.C.§ 1621. Perjuryalsocanwarrantan increasedsentence. See U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1. But perjury, without more, simply is not criminal contempt under

Section401(1). Hudgings,249U.S.at 384.

b. Petitioneralsocannot be prosecutedfor contemptbecause there is

noevidenceof “contumaciousintent.” Brown,454 F.2dat 1007.Evenassuming

that petitionerhadthe intentto commitperjury,that wouldnot establishthat he

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hadthe “inten[t]toobstruct the administrationof justice.” SealedCase,627 F.3d

at 1238. Thereis noindicationthat petitionerpleadedguiltyandthenmovedto

withdraw his plea as “part of some greater design to interfere with judicial

proceedings.” Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 93. Rather, the record shows that

petitioner—likeotherdefendantswhoenter pleas they laterseek to withdraw—

pleadedguilty withthe intent to resolvethe allegationsagainsthimon the best

terms he thought possible at the time. Doc.160-23,at 8-9. Our adversarial

systemtreats pleacolloquiesand latermotionsto withdrawas anacceptedpart

of normal judicial proceedings. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b), (d). An intent to

acquiesce in the prosecution’scharges,even falsely, is not an intent to interfere

with judicial proceedings themselves for purposes of contempt under Section

401(1).

B. Even if petitioner committed criminal contempt, the

authority to prosecute him would lie with the U.S.

Attorney, not the district court

As explainedabove,the Constitutionvests the power to prosecutecrimes

in the Executive. To the extent that courts may exercisesuch power at all, it is

only as “partof the judicial function.” Youngv. UnitedStatesex rel.Vuittonet Fils

S. A., 481U.S.787, 795 (1987). Thus, even if petitioner committedcriminal

contempt,the district court could initiate its own prosecutionof him only if

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doingso were a valid exercise of “[t]he judicialPower.” U.S.Const.art. III,

§ 1;see Young,481U.S.at 800 n.10.

Such a prosecutionwould not be a valid exercise of the judicial power

here. The judicial power authorizes a court to initiate criminal-contempt

proceedings—andtoappointa privateattorneytoprosecutethe contempt—only

when necessary to “vindicate its own authority without complete dependence

onotherBranches.” Young,481U.S.at 796. This case doesnot fallwithinthat

narrowexception. Evenif petitioner’sconductconstitutedcontempt,prosecuting

that conductwouldnot be necessaryto allow the districtcourt to function. The

court thus has no authority to initiate its own prosecution of petitioner or

appoint a private attorney to prosecutehim. It erred in doinganythingother

thandismissingthe indictment.*

III. A Writ Of MandamusIs AppropriateAnd Necessary Relief In

LightOf TheDistrictCourt’sUnprecedentedOrder

A writ of mandamusis a “drasticandextraordinaryremedy.”Cheney,542

U.S. at 380. “Before a court may issue the writ, three conditions must be

satisfied: (i) the petitioner must have ‘no other adequate means to attain the

* The district court’s order also refers to Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 42. App. 77. Rule 42, however, addresses only “the manner of

exercising” the power conferred by Section 401(1). Sacher v. United States, 343

U.S. 1, 6 (1952). It neither expands the definition of contempt nor provides

authorizationfor initiatingcriminal-contemptproceedings. See Young,481U.S.

at 793-794.

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relief he desires’;(ii) the petitionermust show that his right to the writ is ‘clear

and indisputable’;and (iii) the court ‘in the exercise of its discretion,must be

satisfiedthat the writ is appropriateunderthe circumstances.’” Fokker,818 F.3d

at 747 (citationomitted).

InFokker,this Court issueda writ of mandamuscompellinga districtcourt

to grant an unopposedmotionto dismiss charges inaccordancewitha deferred

prosecutionagreement. 818 F.3d at 747-750. The Court explainedthat the

mandamus petitioner—there,the government—lackedadequate alternative

means to obtain relief, because “interlocutoryappeal [wa]s unavailable,and

appeal after final judgment” wouldhave been “inadequate.” Id.at 747. The

Court furtherexplainedthat the rightto the writ was “ ‘clearandindisputable,’”

because “numerousdecisions of the Supreme Court and this court made clear

that courts generally lack authority to second-guess the prosecution’s

constitutionallyrootedexerciseof chargingdiscretion.” Id.at 747,750 (citation

omitted). Finally,the Courtfoundthat mandamuswas appropriatebecausethe

district court’s disagreement with dismissal constituted “an unwarranted

impairmentof another branch in the performanceof its constitutionalduties.”

Id.at 750 (quotingCheney,542 U.S.at 390).

In In re United States, the Seventh Circuit similarly issued a writ of

mandamus where a district court denied an unopposed motion to dismiss

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chargesandinsteadappointeda specialprosecutorto continuethe prosecution.

345 F.3d at 454. The court explainedthat “[t]he historic and still the central

function of mandamus is to confine officials within the boundaries of their

authorizedpowers.” Id.at 452. “[I]nour systemof criminaljustice,” the court

continued,“the authorizedpowersof federaljudges do not includethe powerto

prosecutecrimes.” Id. The court accordingly“d[id]not think that there can be

muchdoubt that” mandamuswas appropriate. Id.

For the same reasons that the mandamusfactors were met inFokkerand

Inre UnitedStates, those factors are met here. The only distinctionbetweenthe

cases is that, inFokkerand Inre UnitedStates, the district court had enteredan

order denying the motion,while here the district court has entered an order

providingfor further proceedingsandcontemplatingadditional,court-initiated

criminalcharges. That distinctionmakes no legaldifference. This Court has

emphasizedthe “settled constitutionalunderstandingsunder which authority

over criminal charging decisions resides fundamentally with the Executive,

without the involvementof—andwithout oversight power in—theJudiciary.” Fokker,

818 F.3dat 741(emphasisadded). Courts have “no power”under Rule 48(a)

“to scrutinize and countermand the prosecution’s exercise of its traditional

authority over charging and enforcementdecisions.” Id.at 742-743 (emphasis

added). Indeed, the threat of intrusive judicial proceedings and criminal

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charges—andpotentially even evidentiary proceedings if the court-appointed

amicushas his way—onlymakes the separation-of-powersproblemworse. The

district court plans to subject the Executive’senforcementdecisionto extensive

judicial inquiry, scrutiny, oversight, and involvement. Under the Supreme

Court’sandthis Court’sprecedents,it is clear andindisputablethat the district

courthas noauthorityto embark onthat course.

grant the government’smotionunderRule48(a) to dismiss the indictment.

J UNE

NOEL J. FRANCISCOSolicitor General

BRIANA. BENCZKOWSKIAssistant Attorney General

JEFFREY B.WALLERIC J. FEIGIN

Deputy Solicitors General

FREDERICKLIUVIVEK SURI

Assistants to the Solicitor GeneralU.S.Departmentof JusticeWashington,D.C.20530

2020

This Court shouldissue a writ of mandamusdirectingthe district court to

CONCLUSION

34

Respectfullysubmitted,

MICHAEL R. SHERWINActing United States Attorney

KENNETH C.KOHLActing PrincipalAssistant United

States Attorney

/s/Jocelyn BallantineJOCELYN BALLANTINE

Assistant United States Attorney555 Fourth Street, NW,Room 11-858Washington, D.C.20530(202) 252-7252

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USCA Case #20-5143 Document #1845183 Filed: 06/01/2020 Page 41of 42

Appellate Procedure21(d)(1) because it contains 7,790 words. This brief also

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AppellateProcedure32(a)(5)-(6)becauseit was preparedusingMicrosoftWord

inCalistoMT 14-pointfont,a proportionallyspacedtypeface.

This brief complies with the type-volume limit of Federal Rule of

CERTIFICATEOF COMPLIANCE

/s/JocelynBallantine

JOCELYNBALLANTINE

( of Total)


brief with the Clerk of the Court by using the appellate CM/ECFsystem. I

further certify that the participantsinthe case are registeredCM/ECFusers and

that servicewillbe accomplishedby the appellateCM/ECFsystem.

I hereby certify that on June 1, 2020, I electronicallyfiled the foregoing

CERTIFICATEOFSERVICE

/s/Jocelyn Ballantine

JOCELYN BALLANTINE

( of Total)

district court are petitionerMichael T. Flynn;respondent the UnitedStates,

appearingby and through the UnitedStates Attorney’s Office in and for the

Districtof Columbia;and amicus John Gleeson. Covington& BurlingLLPis

an interestedpartyindistrict court. The partiesappearingbefore this Court are

petitionerMichaelT. Flynn;respondent the UnitedStates;andrespondentthe

Hon.EmmetG.Sullivan.

Georgia; Indiana; Louisiana; Mississippi; Missouri; Montana; Oklahoma;

South Carolina; Texas; Utah; West Virginia; Lawyers DefendingAmerican

Democracy,Inc.;Nick Akerman;RichardBen-Veniste;RichardJ. Davis;Carl

B. Feldbaum;George T. Frampton,Jr.; KennethS. Geller;GeraldGoldman;

StephenE.Haberfeld;HenryL.Hecht;PaulHoeber;PhilipA. Lacovara;Paul

R. Michel;RobertL.Palmer;Frank Tuerkheimer;Jill Wine-Banks;Roger M.

Witten;Hon.MarkW. Bennett(Ret.);Hon.BruceD.Black (Ret.);Hon.Gary

A. Feess (Ret.);Hon.Jeremy D. Fogel(Ret.);Hon.William RoyalFurgeson,

Jr. (Ret.);Hon.NancyGertner(Ret.);Hon.JamesT.Giles(Ret.);Hon.Thelton


CERTIFICATEAS TOPARTIES,RULINGS,ANDRELATEDCASES

Pursuantto CircuitRule 28(a)(1),respondenthereby states as follows:

(A) Parties,Intervenors,andAmici. The partiesappearingbefore the

Amicibefore this Court are: Ohio;Alabama;Alaska;Arkansas;Florida;

E. Henderson(Ret.);Hon.FaithS. Hochberg(Ret.);Hon.RichardJ. Holwell

i

( of Total)

(Ret.); Hon. Carol E. Jackson (Ret.); Hon. D. Lowell Jensen (Ret.); Hon.

George H.King (Ret.);Hon.Timothy K.Lewis (Ret.);Hon.John S. Martin

(Ret.);Hon. A. Howard Matz (Ret.);Hon. Carlos R. Moreno(Fmr.); Hon.

Stephen M. Orlofsky (Ret.); Hon. Marilyn Hall Patel (Ret.); Hon. Layn R.

Phillips (Fmr.);Hon.Shira A. Scheindlin(Ret.);Hon.FernM.Smith(Ret.);

Hon.Thomas I.Vanaskie (Ret.);Hon.T. John Ward (Ret.);John M. Reeves;

the New York City Bar Association;EdwinMeese III;and the Conservative

LegalDefenseandEducationFund.

proceedingare:

dismiss,filed on May 7,2020,Doc.198.

participation.That rulingis not reported,but is includedinthe appendixat App.

75.

Doc.205. That rulingis not reported,but is includedin the appendixat App.

77-78.


(B) RulingsUnder Review. The rulings at issue in this mandamus

(1) The district court’s failure to grant the government’s motion to

(2) The district court’s May 12, 2020 order regarding amicus

(3) The district court’sMay 13,2020 order appointingamicus curiae,

(4) The districtcourt’sMay18,2020ordergrantingamicusprohacvice

status. That rulingis not reported.

ii

( of Total)

or any other court for appellate review. Respondentis unawareof any related

case involvingsubstantiallythe same partiesandthe same or similarissues.


(C) RelatedCases. This case hasnotpreviouslybeenbefore this Court

iii

/s/JocelynBallantine

JOCELYNBALLANTINE

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