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Epistemology, Ethics and Mind
Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert
SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES
Ethics Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert
Dr Debbie Roberts
Epistemology, Ethics and Mind
Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert
SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES
Course aims and objectives
This course examines to what extent we can find a place for ethics in a
naturalistic, scientific picture of the world. This is one of the central issues in
contemporary ethics and metaethics, and we will address it by examining some
of the following questions: • Do we have free will? What if determinism is true?
• Can we be held morally responsible for our actions?
• Do moral judgments express beliefs? Are they ever true?
• Are there moral facts?
• What implications does evolution have for morality?
• What implications does neuroscience have for morality?
Intended learning outcomes
By the end of this course, students should: � Have a grasp of fundamental issues and views in philosophy of free will and
moral responsibility, e.g. determinism, compatibilism, incompatibalism,
libertarianism.
� Have a grasp of fundamental issues and views in metaethics, e.g. moral realism,
error theory, expressivism and of some of the implications of evolutionary
theory and recent work in neuroscience for meaethics.
� Be able to critically analyse and engage with literature by key philosophers in
this field.
� Be able to present arguments clearly and concisely both within a classroom
context and in a 2,500 word essay.
� Gain transferable skills in research, analysis and argumentation
People Course lecturer: Dr. Debbie Roberts [email protected]
Course secretary: Ms. Lynsey Buchanan [email protected]
Course librarian: TBA
Teaching assistants: Di Yang [email protected]
Epistemology, Ethics and Mind
Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert
SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES
Syllabus
Free Will and
Responsibility
Week 1
(date)
Introduction to free will and
moral responsibility
Synchronous seminar
Week 2
(date)
Incompatibilism Synchronous seminar
Week 3
(date)
Compatibilism Asynchronous forum
seminar
Metaethics
Week 4
(date)
Introduction to metaethics,
moral realism
Synchronous seminar
Week 5
(date)
Error theory Asynchronous forum
seminar
Week 6
(date)
Expressivism Synchronous seminar
Week 7
(date)
The challenge from evolution Asynchronous forum
seminar
Week 8
(date)
The challenge from
neuroscience
Synchronous seminar
Week 9
(date)
The explanatory challenge Asynchronous forum
seminar
Week 10
(date)
Moral realism revisited Synchronous seminar
Week 11
(date)
Review Asynchronous forum
seminar
Week 1: Introduction to Free Will and Moral Responsibility
We might naturally think that in order to for us to be subject to moral
requirements at all, i.e. in order for there to be ways that we ought to act, that it
must be the case that we can choose how to act. Similarly, we might naturally
think that for us to be able to be held morally responsible for our actions, it must
be the case that we did them. This week, after an introduction to the issues in this
first section of the course, we’ll look at just what determinism is in more detail.
On the face of it, freedom and responsibility look to be in tension with
determinism. If determinism is true, and human behaviour is causally
determined, how can we ever be held responsible for anything we do? How can
we be subject to moral requirements?
Class readings
1. Kane, R. (2005) ‘The Free Will Problem’ in his A Contemporary Introduction to
Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Hoefer, Carl, "Causal Determinism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Spring 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/determinism-causal/>.
Epistemology, Ethics and Mind
Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert
SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES
Secondary readings
Butterfield, J. (1998) ‘Determinism and Indeterminism,’ in Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Craig (ed.), London: Routledge.
Earman, J. (1986) A Primer on Determinism, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Eshleman, A. (2009) ‘Moral Responsibility’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/moral-responsibility/
Kane, R. (ed.), (2002) Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell.
O'Connor, T. (2013) ‘Free Will’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward
N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/freewill/
Watson, G. (ed.), (2003) Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Week 2: Incompatibilism.
Incompatibilists think that free will and determinism are just that: incompatible
– we can’t have both. Peter Van Inwaagen provides an argument for
incompatibilism called the Consequence Argument. Hard determinists hold that it
is free will that is illusory. Libertarians claim that determinism is false. Others
prefer not to take a stand on whether determinism is true or false, but who argue
that nonetheless, free will is impossible. Galen Strawson holds such a view.
Class reading
1. Strawson, G. (1994) ‘The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility’ Philosophical
Studies, 75: 5-24.
2. van Inwagen, P. (1975) ‘The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism’,
Philosophical Studies, 25: 185–99.
3. Clarke, R. (2002). ‘Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-
Causal Accounts of Free Agency.’ In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Robert
Kane (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 356–85.
Secondary readings
Baker, L. R. (2008) ‘The Irrelevance of the Consequence Argument,’ Analysis, 68
(1): 13–22.
Balaguer, M. (2004) ‘A Coherent, Naturalistic, and Plausible Formulation of
Libertarian Free Will’, Noûs, 38: 379–406.
Epistemology, Ethics and Mind
Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert
SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES
Clarke, R. (2003) Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, New York: Oxford University
Press
Kane, R. (2005) ‘Incompatibilism’ in his A Contemporary Introduction to Free
Will’ Oxford: Oxford University Press
Pereboom, D. (2001) Living without Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Smilansky, S. (2000) Free Will and Illusion, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Vihvelin, K. (2011) ‘Arguments for Incompatibilism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/incompatibilism-
arguments/>.
Week 3: Compatibilism
Compatibilism is the view that there really is no conflict between free will and
determinism. If compatibilists are right, then we can have both free will and
determinism and we needn’t worry that future science will undermine our
ordinary conviction that we are free and morally responsible agents. Classical
compatibilists, like David Hume, argue that our natural belief in the
incompatibility of freedom and determinism rests on confusions about the
nature of freedom and the nature of determinism. New compatibilists, like Harry
Frankfurt, argue that free will and moral responsibility doesn’t require that you
could have acted otherwise. New compatibilists, like Peter Strawson, on the
other hand, argue that to understand free will we must focus on the practices of
everyday life and the attitudes we take to each other.
Class readings
1. Hume, D. (1748) ‘Of Liberty and Necessity (in two parts)’ in his An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding, Tom L. Beauchamp (ed), Oxford/New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999
2. Frankfurt, H. (1969) ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Journal
of Philosophy, 66: 820–39
3. Strawson, P.F. (1962) ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Proceedings of the British
Academy, 68: 187–211.
Secondary readings
Hobbes, T. (1654) ‘Of Liberty and Necessity’ in Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty
and Necessity, Vere Chappell (ed.), 1999, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Epistemology, Ethics and Mind
Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert
SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES
Kane, R. (2005) ‘Compatibilism’ in his A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will,
Oxford: Oxford University Press
Dennet, D. (1984) Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting,
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Fischer, J. ( 2008) ‘Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Vihvelin,’
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 38 (3): 327–42.
McKenna, M. (2009) ‘Compatibilism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/compatibilism/
_____ (1998) ‘The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A Defense of
Strawsonian Compatibilism,’ Journal of Ethics, 2: 123–42.
Nielsen, K. (1971) ‘The Compatibility of Freedom and Determinism’ in Free Will.
Robert Kane (ed. )Oxford: Blackwell, 2002, 34-46.
Scanlon, T.M., 2008. Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame,
Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Harvard Press.
Smart, J.J.C., 1963. “Free Will, Praise, and Blame,” Mind, 70: 291–306.
Week 4: Introduction to Metaethics, Moral Realism
The task of metaethics is to understand the nature of ethics. More specifically, it is
to understand the nature of moral reality, thought, talk and action. Metaethics is
not ethics in the same way that athletics commentators are not athletes, and
philosophers of science are not scientists. This week, after a more detailed look
at what metaethics is, we turn to G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument, an
argument that is sometimes held to support the autonomy of ethics, the view
that ethics is its own self-contained field, and not continuous with science for
example. We then turn to moral realism, of which Moore was a proponent.
Class reading
1. Moore, G. E. (1903) ‘The Subject Matter of Ethics’ in his Principia Ethica,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Cuneo, T. (2007) ‘Moral Realism of a Paradigmatic Sort’ in his The Normative
Web, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Secondary readings
Baldwin, T. (2010) ‘The Open Question Argument’ in The Routledge Companion
to Ethics, John Skorupski (ed.), Oxford: Routledge
Epistemology, Ethics and Mind
Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert
SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES
Frankena, W. (1939) ‘The Naturalistic Fallacy,’ Mind, 48: 464–477
McNaughton, D. (1988) Moral Vision Oxford: Blackwell Chapters 1 & 3.
Railton, P. (2010) ‘Moral Realism and Its Alternatives’ in The Routledge
Companion to Ethics, John Skorupski (ed.), Oxford: Routledge
Sayre-McCord, G. (2012) ‘Metaethics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/metaethics/
_____ (2011) ‘Moral Realism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Edward
N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/moral-realism/
Smith, M. (2013) ‘Moral Realism’ in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory 2nd ed.
Hugh LaFollette and Ingmar Persson (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell
Week 5: Error Theory
Moral error theorists hold that although moral judgments express beliefs, none
of those beliefs are ever true. Moral judgments, say error theorists, are like
judgments about witches. People may have and express beliefs about witches,
but they are never true because witches don’t exist. And it’s the same for
morality because there are no moral facts for our moral judgments to be about.
The canonical statement of error theory comes from J. L. Mackie. This week we
examine his arguments for the error theory.
Class reading
1. Mackie, J.L. (1977) ‘The Subjectivity of Values’ in his Ethics: Inventing Right
and Wrong London: Penguin.
2. Joyce, R. ‘Moral Anti-Realism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/moral-anti-realism/
sections 1,2 & 4.
Secondary readings
Brink, D. 1984. “Moral realism and the skeptical arguments from disagreement and
queerness.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 111-125.
Garner, R.T. 1990. “On the genuine queerness of moral properties and facts.”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68: 137-146.
Joyce, R. 2001. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Epistemology, Ethics and Mind
Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert
SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES
Lillehammer, H. 2004. “Moral error theory.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
104: 93-109.
Mackie, J.L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
McNaughton, D. 1988. Moral Vision. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Miller, A. 2003. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge: Polity.
Shafer-Landau, R. 1994. “Ethical disagreement, ethical objectivism and moral
indeterminacy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 331-344.
Week 6: Expressivism
Like error theorists, expressivists are anti-realists about morality. But unlike
error theorists, expressivists think that moral judgements do not even attempt to
describe some moral reality; rather they express attitudes, emotions,
preferences or desires. This week we examine what expressivism is, and the
main arguments for it.
Class readings
1. Blackburn, S. (1988) ‘How to be an ethical anti-realist’ Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 12(1):361-75
2. Chrisman, M. (2011) ‘Ethical expressivism’ in The Continuum Companion to
Ethics London: Bloomsbury
Secondary readings
Ayer, A.J. [1936] 1971. Language, Truth and Logic. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the Word. Oxford: Clarendon.
Blackburn, S. 1993a. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blackburn, S. 1993b. “Circles, finks, smells and biconditionals.” Philosophical
Perspectives 7: 259-279.
Blackburn, S. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dreier, J. 2004. “Meta-ethics and the problem of creeping minimalism.”
Philosophical Perspectives 18: 23-44.
Epistemology, Ethics and Mind
Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert
SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES
Hare, R.M. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hare, R.M. 1963. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Joyce, R. 2002. “Expressivism and motivation internalism,” Analysis 62: 336-344.
McNaughton, D. 1988. Moral Vision. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Miller, A. 2003. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge: Polity.
Week 7: The challenge from evolution
A number of philosophers have claimed that evolutionary theory can be used to
undermine moral realism. These philosophers point out that evolutionary
accounts of the origins of our capacity to be guided by morality don’t require that
our ancestors grasped moral truths nor even that there are any such truths. All
we need to explain our capacity to be guided by morality, they say, is that natural
selection favored the development of such a capacity and tendency because of
the positive effects such traits had on biological fitness. This week we examine
whether this should undermine our confidence in the notions of moral truth and
knowledge.
Class readings
1. Street, S. (2006) ‘A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,’
Philosophical Studies 127: 109-66.
2. Kahane, G. (2011) ‘Evolutionary Debunking Arguments’ Nous 45(1): 103–125
Secondary reading
Fitzpatrik, W. "Debunking Evolutionary Debunking of Ethical Realism," forthcoming
in Philosophical Studies.
_____ "Why There is No Darwinian Dilemma For Ethical Realism," forthcoming in M.
Bergmann and P. Kain eds., eds., Challenges to Religious and Moral Belief from
Evolution and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Joyce, Richard. (2000) “Darwinian Ethics and Error,” Biology and Philosophy, 15:
713–732.
_______ (2002) The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
_______ (2006a) The Evolution of Morality, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
_______ (2006b) “Metaethics and the empirical sciences,” Philosophical
Epistemology, Ethics and Mind
Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert
SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES
Explorations, 9:133-148.
Ruse, Michael and Wilson, E. O. (1986) “Moral Philosophy as Applied Science,”
Philosophy, 61: 173-192. Ruse, Michael. (1998) Taking Darwin Seriously, Prometheus
Books.
Singer, Peter. (1993) Practical Ethics, 2nd Ed., Cambridge University Press. ――
(2005) “Ethics and Intuitions,” The Journal of Ethics, 9: 331–352.
Week 8: The challenge from neuroscience
Can neuroscience help us to answer questions about the nature of ethics?
Metaethical theories make claims about the nature of moral judgments. Because
of this, some philosophers have thought that these theories can, in a sense, be
empirically tested. This week we examine whether neuroscience can tell us
anything about which ethical theories we ought to find more plausible.
Class Reading
1. Greene, J. and Haidt, J. (2002) ‘How (and where) does moral judgment
work?’ in Trends in Cognitive Sciences vol 6, 517-523.
2. Joyce, R. (2008) ‘What Neuroscience can (and Cannot) Contribute to
Metaethics’, in Moral Psychology vol. 3, ed. Sinnott-Armstrong
Secondary Reading
Greene, Joshua. (2008) “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong,
ed., Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality, vol. 3, 35-79.
Levy, Neil. (2006) “Cognitive scientific challenges to morality,” Philosophical
Psychology, 19: 567-587.
Appiah, Anthony Kwame: Experimental ethics (2008)
Greene, Joshua, et al: The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral
judgment in Neuron vol 44, 389-400, (2004)
Hauser et al: A dissociation between moral judgment and rational justifications in
Mind and Language vol 22, 1-21, (2007)
Haidt, Jonathan: The emotional dog and it!s rational tail, Psychological review vol
108, 814-834, (2001)
Racine, Eric: Which naturalism for neuroethics, Bioethics vol 22, 92-100, (2008)
Epistemology, Ethics and Mind
Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert
SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES
Railton, Peter: Naturalism and prescriptivity, Social Philosophy and Prescriptivity vol
95, 151-174, (1989)
Roskies, Adina: Neuroethics for the new millennium, in Defining Right and Wrong in
Brain Science ed. Glannon, Walter, (2007)
Week 9: The explanatory challenge
On one view, we cannot be justified in believing a claim unless the truth of that
claim is necessary for the best explanation of some independent fact. Some
philosophers, most famously Gilbert Harman, argue that moral truths are never
necessary for the best explanation of any non-moral fact. If this is correct, it
follows that we cannot be justified in believing any moral claim. In other words,
Harman issues an explanatory challenge to moral realists. This week we examine
this challenge and possible realist responses to it.
Class reading
1. Harman, G. (1977) The Nature of Morality, New York: Oxford University Press,
Chapter 1.
2. Sturgeon, N. (1985) ‘Moral Explanations’, in Morality, Reason, and Truth, D.
Copp and D. Zimmerman, (eds.), Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld.
Secondary reading
Blackburn, S. “Just Causes.” Philosophical Studies 61 (1991): 3–17.
Copp, D. “Explanation and Justification in Ethics.” Ethics 100 (1990): 237–58.
Harman, G. The Nature of Morality. New York: Oxford UP, 1977
——. “Moral Explanations of Natural Facts – Can Moral Claims be Tested against
Reality?” Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (suppl.) (1986): 57–68.
——. “Responses to Critics.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998):
207–14.
—— and J.Thomson. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Oxford: Blackwell,
1996.
Jackson, F. and P. Pettit. “Program Explanation: A General Perspective.” Analysis 50
(1990): 107–17.
Kleiman, L. “Morality as the Best Explanation.” American Philosophical Quarterly 26
(1989): 161–7.
Epistemology, Ethics and Mind
Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert
SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES
Leiter, B. “Moral Facts and Best Explanations.” Social Philosophy and Policy 18
(2001): 79–101.
Loeb, D. “Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs.” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 70 (2005):
193–208.
Majors, B. “Moral Explanation and the Special Sciences.” Philosophical Studies 113
(2003): 121–52.
Quinn,W. “Truth and Explanation in Ethics.” Ethics 96 (1986): 524–44.
Railton, P. “Moral Explanation and Moral Objectivity.” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research
58 (1998): 175–82.
Sayre-McCord, G. “Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence.” Essays in Moral
Realism. Ed. G. Sayre-McCord. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1988.
Sturgeon,N.“Contents and Causes: A Reply to Blackburn.” Philosophical Studies 61
(1991):19–37
——. “Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts.” Southern Journal of
Philosophy 24 (suppl.)
(1986): 69–78.
——. “Moral Explanations.” Morality, Reason and Truth. Eds. D. Copp and D.
Zimmerman.
Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985.
——. “Moral Explanations Defended.” Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Ed. J.
Drier. Oxford:
Blackwell, 2006.
Week 10: Moral realism revisited
Some metaethicists, like J. L. Mackie for example, think that whether moral
realism is true or not makes to difference to our ordinary moral practices. Others
think that whether moral realism is true or not makes a great difference, that is
they think that there are moral implications at stake here. This week we try to
answer the question of what difference it makes whether moral realism is true.
Class reading
1. Sturgeon, N. (1986) ‘What Difference Does It Make Whether Moral Realism is
True?’ Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):115-141.
Epistemology, Ethics and Mind
Online MSc/PGDipl/PGCert
SCHOOL of PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY and LANGUAGE SCIENCES
2. Enoch, D. (2011) Taking Morality Seriously Oxford: Oxford University Press,
Chapter 2.
Secondary reading
Drier, J. (2002) “Meta-Ethics and Normative Commitment,” Philosophical Issues 12:
Realism and Relativism, 241–63.
Dworkin, Ronald. (1996) “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it,” Philosophy
& Public Affairs, 25: 87-139.
Fantl, J. (2006) “Is Metaethics Morally Neutral?,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87,
24–44.
Gewirth, A. (1960) “Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics,” Mind 69, 187–205.
Kramer, M. H. (2009) Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine (Chichester and Malden,
Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell).
Week 11: Review
This week we will bring together the themes of the course, discuss essay
strategies, and anything else you’d like to go over.
Resources
Please ensure you have completed the library induction tutorial. Should you
have any problems accessing any of the materials for the course please contact
the course librarian *NAME* in the first instance.
Office Hours
My office hours will be ***. Office hours are a good time for you to come and
discuss ideas for your essays. Please don’t think you need a ‘problem’ to come to
office hours; I am always willing to use this time to chat through any thoughts
you may be having about topics covered in the course, or topics for your essays.
If you are unable to meet with me during office hours, please send me an email
and we can arrange an alternative time.