One Laws, Mandatory Minimums and ‘Alcohol Fuelled’ as...

www.crimejusticejournal.comIJCJ&SD20143(1):81‐106 ISSN2202–8005

©TheAuthor(s)2014

One‐punchLaws,MandatoryMinimumsand‘Alcohol‐Fuelled’asanAggravatingFactor:ImplicationsforNSWCriminalLaw

JuliaQuilter1UniversityofWollongong,Australia

Abstract

This article critically examines the New South Wales State Government’s latest policyresponse to theproblemofalcohol‐relatedviolenceandanxietyabout ‘onepunch’killings:therecentlyenactedCrimesandOtherLegislationAmendment(AssaultandIntoxication)Act2014(NSW).Basedonananalysisofboththecircumstancesoutofwhichitemerged,andtheterms inwhich the newoffences of assault causing death and assault causing deathwhileintoxicatedhavebeendefined, Iargue that theActrepresentsanotherexampleof criminallaw‘reform’thatisdevoidofprinciple,producesalackofcoherenceinthecriminallawand,initsoperation,isunlikelytodeliveronthepromiseofeffectivecrimepreventioninrelationtoalcohol‐fuelledviolence.Keywords

Alcohol,violence,criminallawreform,penalpopulism,one‐punchlaws.Introduction

On 30 January 2014 theNew SouthWales (NSW)Parliament added two new offences to theCrimesAct1900(NSW):assaultcausingdeath,andanaggravatedversionofthatoffencewheretheoffender is intoxicated at the timeof committing theoffence. Foronly the second time inrecenthistory,theNSWParliamentincludedamandatoryminimumsentence(inrelationtotheaggravated offence).2 This article critically analyses both the content of theCrimesandOtherLegislationAmendment (Assaultand Intoxication)Act2014 (NSW) and the circumstanceof itsemergence and enactment. I argue that the Act represents another example of criminal law‘reform’thatisdevoidofprinciple,producesalackofcoherenceinthecriminallawand,initsoperation, is unlikely to deliver on the promise of effective crime prevention in relation toalcohol‐fuelledviolence.Theanalysispresentedinthisarticleisorganisedaroundfiveinter‐relatedcriticismsoftheAct:

1. The speed with which the offence was announced and passed, in the context of anintense media and public campaign, reflected a classic knee‐jerk ‘law and order’

JuliaQuilter:One‐punchLaws…ImplicationsforNSWCriminalLaw

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responsewithalltherelatedpitfallsofpoordrafting,lackofcoherenceandoperationaldifficulty;

2. The adoption of an ‘assault causing death’ offence represents an example of ‘policytransfer’ from the Code jurisdictions in Australia to the common law States withoutproper‘translation’;

3. The failure to give principled consideration to how the new offences relate to thehierarchy of existing fatality crimes in NSW contributes to a lack of coherence in thecriminallawandunderminestheprinciplesof‘fairlabelling’;

4. Theoffencedefinitioniscomplex,confusingandexemplifiestheviceof‘particularism’incriminallawdrafting;and

5. Theframingoftheoffenceislikelytoleadtooperationaldifficultieswhichwill,inturn,lead to community disappointment as the high expectations for real action on ‘onepunch’deathswillnotbemet.

Beforeturningtoeachofthesecriticismsinturn, Iwillprovideanoverviewofthe legislation,andthebackgroundtoitsenactment.Overviewofthelegislation

On21 January2014,NSWPremierBarryO’Farrell (2014a;seealsoMiller2014)announceda16‐pointplantotackledrugandalcoholviolencewhichincluded:

Anewone‐punch lawwith an aggravated version having a 25 yearmaximum and aneight year mandatory minimum sentence where the offender is intoxicated by drugsand/oralcohol;

Newmandatoryminimumsentences forcertainviolentoffenceswhere theoffender isintoxicatedbydrugsand/oralcohol;3

Amaximum sentence increase from two years to 25 years for the illegal supply andpossessionofsteroids;

Increasedon‐the‐spotfinesforanti‐socialbehaviour; Empoweringpolicetoconductdrugandalcoholtestingonsuspectedoffenders; Introduction of 1.30am lockouts and 3:00am last drinks across an expanded CBD

precinct; Newstate‐wide10:00pmclosingtimesforallbottleshops; Introductionofarisk‐basedlicensingschemewithhigherfeesimposedforvenuesand

outlets that have later trading hours, poor compliance histories or are in high risklocations;

FreebusesrunningeverytenminutesfromSydney’sKingsCrosstothecity’sCBD;and Afreezeongrantingnewliquorlicenses.

Just over aweek later, on 30 January 2014,without any knownpublic consultation from theNSWLawReformCommission(NSWLRC)orotherexpertgroups,PremierO’FarrellreadforasecondtimetheCrimesandOtherLegislationAmendment(AssaultandIntoxication)Bill2014and the Liquor Amendment Bill 2014.4 With alarming speed, the Bills were passed by bothhouseswithoutsubstantialamendmentandonthesamedaytheywereintroduced.TheCrimesandOtherLegislationAmendment(AssaultandIntoxication)Act2014(‘theAct’)receivedassentandcommencedoperation thenextday,31 January2014.PremierO’Farrell therebyachievedhis wish, announced to the media and to Parliament in introducing the Bill, to have theprovisionsupandrunningfortheweekend(O’Farrell2014b).TheLiquorAmendmentAct2014substantiallycameintoforceon5February2014.The two Acts introduce into law all elements of the 16‐point Plan announced on 21 January2014 – aside from the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences for a range of other


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existingviolentoffenceswheretheoffenderisintoxicatedbydrugsand/oralcohol.5Whilethefocusofthisarticleisonthenewoffenceofassaultcausingdeath, it isnotedthattheActalsosignificantly increases thepenalties for certainpublicorderoffences in theSummaryOffencesAct1988(NSW)(notablyraisingthemaximumpenaltyforthecontinuationofintoxicationanddisorderly behaviour following amove on direction in s 9 from6 penalty units ($660) to 15penaltyunits($1650)andthepenaltynoticeoffencesforoffensiveconduct(from$200to$500),offensive language (from $200 to $500) and s 9 (from $200 to $1,100)). While these lastamendmentswillnotbeaddressedfurtherinthispaper,theyareofgreatsignificancegiventhefrequency with which they are charged, the lack of clarity over the legal elements of suchoffences(QuilterandMcNamara2013),andthepossibleimpactonlicensedisqualifications(forunpaidfines)and,ultimately,imprisonmentfordrivingwhilstdisqualified.Assaultcausingdeath:TheoffencesTheAct introduces thebasicoffenceof ‘Assault causingdeath’ in s25A(1)andanaggravatedversionofthatoffenceins25A(2)intotheCrimesAct1900(NSW)Pt3,Div1 ‘Homicide’.Thisamendmentconstitutesthe firstsubstantivechange to theoffencestructureofhomicidesince1951 when infanticide (s 22A) was inserted by the Crimes (Amendment) Act 1951 (NSW).Section25Aisinthefollowingterms:

25AAssaultcausingdeath(1) Apersonisguiltyofanoffenceunderthissubsectionif:

(a)thepersonassaultsanotherpersonbyintentionallyhittingtheotherpersonwithanypartoftheperson’sbodyorwithanobjectheldbytheperson,and(b)theassaultisnotauthorisedorexcusedbylaw,and(c)theassaultcausesthedeathoftheotherperson.Maximumpenalty:Imprisonmentfor20years.

(2) Apersonwhoisoforabovetheageof18yearsisguiltyofanoffenceunderthissubsection if the person commits an offence under subsection (1) when thepersonisintoxicated.

Maximumpenalty:Imprisonmentfor25years.

(3) Forthepurposesofthissection,anassaultcausesthedeathofapersonwhether

thepersoniskilledasaresultoftheinjuriesreceiveddirectlyfromtheassaultorfromhittingthegroundoranobjectasaconsequenceoftheassault.

(4) Inproceedingsforanoffenceundersubsection(1)or(2),it isnotnecessaryto

provethatthedeathwasreasonablyforeseeable.(5) Itisadefenceinproceedingsforanoffenceundersubsection(2):

(a)iftheintoxicationoftheaccusedwasnotself‐induced(withinthemeaningofPart11A),or(b)iftheaccusedhadasignificantcognitiveimpairmentatthetimetheoffencewas alleged to have been committed (not being a temporary self‐inducedimpairment).


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(6) Inproceedingsforanoffenceundersubsection(2):

(a)evidencemaybegivenofthepresenceandconcentrationofanyalcohol,drugor other substance in the accused’s breath, blood or urine at the time of thealleged offence as determined by an analysis carried out in accordance withDivision 4 of Part 10 of theLawEnforcement (PowersandResponsibilities)Act2002,and(b) the accused is conclusively presumed to be intoxicated by alcohol if theprosecution proves in accordance with an analysis carried out in accordancewith that Division that there was present in the accused’s breath or blood aconcentration of 0.15 grams ormore of alcohol in 210 litres of breath or 100millilitresofblood….

Background:Respondingtoapenalpopulistcampaign

Howwasitthatwithinthespaceofjustoveraweek,withoutapublicconsultationprocessandwithoutanyapparentinputfromtheNSWLawReformCommission(NSWLRC)orotherexpertgroups, the Governmentmoved from the announcement of a 16‐point plan to tackle alcohol‐relatedviolencetofullyoperationallegislationwhichhadexceptionalfeatures:invokingforonlythesecondtimeinrecentNSWhistorythepolicyofmandatorysentencingandconstitutingthefirstadditionaloffencetothelawof‘homicide’since1951?Iarguethatthehastewithwhichthelegislation was drafted, passed and commenced is directly related to the intense media andpubliccampaignthatwastriggeredbythesentencinginNovember2013ofKieranLoveridgeforthemanslaughterofThomasKelly,acampaignthatdramaticallyintensifiedoverthesummerofDecember/January 2014. It was within this context that a ‘penal populist’ (Bottoms 1995;Garland2001;Lacey2008;Robertsetal.2003;Pratt2007;PrattandEriksson2013), ‘lawandorder’response(HoggandBrown1998)wasofferedbytheNSWGovernmentinanattempttoquell community concern – a trend in crime policy development that has been discussedelsewhere(Brown2013;Loughnan2009,2010).ThesentencingofKieranLoveridgeforthedeathofThomasKellyOn8November2013, JusticeCampbellsentencedKieranLoveridgetoa totalof7yearsand2months for the combined manslaughter of Thomas Kelly and four other unrelated assaults,being6years formanslaughter (4yearsnon‐paroleperiod) and1yearand2months for theassaults(RvLoveridge[2013]NSWSC1638at[14]‐[18]).Overayearearlier,inJuly2012,inanunprovoked attack, Mr Kelly had died from a single punch by Mr Loveridge, when he waswalking on Victoria Street, Kings Cross. Mr Kelly fell to the ground, hitting his head on thepavementsufferingmassiveheadinjuriesandneverregainingconsciousness.ThetragicdeathofMrKellytriggeredanimmediateand,untilthesentencingofLoveridgeinNovember2013,aprogressivepopulist campaignaround the issueof alcohol‐fuelled violence towhich theNSWGovernment respondedwith anuncharacteristicmulti‐faceted andnuanced response (Quilter2013; Quilter 2014a). The sentencing of Mr Loveridge, however, sparked immediate outragefromthefamily,thepublic,andtheNSWGovernment,andamorepunitiverhetoricenteredthedebate(forexample,seeBibby2013).On thesamedayasMrLoveridge’ssentencing, theNSWAttorneyGeneral,GregSmithSCMP,releasedamediastatementaskingtheDPPtoconsideranappealagainstthesentencehandeddown (Smith 2013a) and, by 12 November 2013, the Attorney General had announced aproposedso‐called‘onepunch’lawforNSW:


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TheproposedbillwillbebasedonaWesternAustralianso‐called‘onepunchlaw’whichcarriesamaximumpenaltyof10years–thelawsIamproposingforNSWwillcarryamaximumpenaltyof20yearsimprisonment…Thenewoffenceandproposedpenaltywillsendthestrongestmessagetoviolentanddrunkenthugsthatassaultingpeopleisnotariteofpassageonaboozynightout–yourbehaviourcanhavethemostseriousconsequencesandthecommunityexpectsyoutopayaheavypriceforyouractions.(Smith2013b)

Soon after the sentence was handed down, the Kelly family started a petition to the NSWPremier6 calling forminimum sentencing laws in cases ofmanslaughter. Broader support forthesemeasureswas foundinthe ‘EnoughisEnough’campaign7andapublicrallywasheld inSydney’sMartinPlaceon19November2013calling for tougherandmandatorysentencesforviolentoffenders(Wood2013).On 14 November 2013, the NSW Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Lloyd Babb SC,announcedanappealofMrLoveridge’ssentenceformanifestinadequacy.Healsoindicatedthathe would ask the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal (NSWCCA) to issue a guideline judgment(Coulton2013).TheAttorney‐General’sannouncementofanapparently‘toughlawandorder’responsewiththenew one‐punch law together with the DPP’s announcement of an appeal of Mr Loveridge’ssentence for ‘manifest inadequacy’ and the application for a guideline judgment may havecalmedpublicsentimentandslowedmediaagitation.However,followinganotherseriousone‐punchassault(of23‐year‐oldMichaelMcEwen,atBondiBeach,Sydney,on14December2013,whichputhiminacomaforaweek)andaone‐punchassaultonNewYear’sEvethatultimatelyledtothedeathof18‐year‐oldDanielChristie(eerilyinKing’sCross,verynearthespotwhereMr Kelly was killed in 2012), Sydney’s two newspapers ran major campaigns in relation toalcohol‐fuelledviolence.TheSydneyMorningHeraldrevivedthe‘SaferSydney’campaignithadinitiatedafterMrKelly’sdeath,andTheTelegraphranthe‘Enough’campaign.Inmany critiques of penal populism, the allegation is oftenmade that themedia distorts the‘facts’ and fails to provide information to the public in a balanced way so fostering punitiveopinion(forexample,seeRoberts2008).Whileitisnotthesubjectofthisarticle,itisimportanttonotethatboththeSaferSydneyandEnoughcampaignswerenotexclusivelypunitiveintheirtreatmentoftheissue.Whiletherewasamoreclassic‘demonising’ofrecentoffendersinawaythatdidnothappenwithMrLoveridge–inparticular,ofShaunMcNeilwhohadbeenchargedwithassaultingMrChristie(Fife‐YeomansandWood2014)–andcallsformandatoryminimumsentencing, the campaigns also called for additional actions: the introduction of ‘Newcastle‐style’1.00amlockoutmeasuresacrosstheSydneyCBD;morepublictransport;publiceducationondrinking(includingTheSydneyMorningHeraldrunningacompetitionforthepublictocomeup with a new creative advertising campaign similar to the ‘Pinkie campaign’ that targetedviolentalcohol‐relatedoffending8);andrisk‐basedlicensingmeasures.Victims’familieswerealsoprominentinthepublicdiscourse.Forinstance,aftertheassaultonMrChristie,theKellyfamilyexpandedtheoriginalNovember2013petitiontoincludecallsforthefollowingtobeaddedasaggravatingfactorsinsentencing:theoffenderbeingdrunkatthetimeofcommittingtheoffence;theyouthandinabilityofvictimstodefendthemselves;andtheoffenderbeingona‘goodbehaviourbond’atthetimeoftheoffence.RobertMcEwen,fatherofMichaelMcEwen,spokeoutafterhissonwasassaulted,callingforanumberofmeasureswhichtargetedalcohol‐fuelledviolencetobeimmediatelyadoptedbytheNSWGovernmentincludingthe ‘Newcastlesolution’andanationalbanonpoliticaldonationsbythealcoholandgambling


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industries.9At the funeralofDanielChristieon17 January2014,his father,Michael,madeanimpassionedpleaforyoungpeopletostoptheviolence(Dingle2014).Australia’s twomost senior political figures, Prime Minister Tony Abbott and the Governor‐General, also weighed into the debate. Mr Abbott stated he was ‘appalled’ by the attacks inSydneyandsaidthattherewereessentiallytwoproblems:

… The first problem is the binge‐drinking culture that seems to have becomequiteprevalentamongstyoungstersinthelastcoupleofdecades.

Thesecondproblem,andthisisatrulyinsidiousthing–thisriseofthedisturbedindividualwhogoesoutnotlookingforafight,butlookingforavictim.…

Ithinkreally,thepolice,thecourts,thejudgesoughttoabsolutelythrowthebookatpeoplewhoperpetratethiskindofgratuitousunprovokedviolence.(ABCNews2014)

TheGovernor‐General,QuentinBryce,madetheextraordinarydecisiontoattendthefuneralofMrChristie,indicatingthatherpresencewas‘asanexpressionofthecommunity’srevulsion’ofviolenceonSydney’sstreets(Robertson2014).Afterthefuneral,shestated:

As Governor‐General and if I may say, as a parent for all parents, allgrandmothers,all fathersandgrandfatherstherecanbenoplace,noexcuse,notolerance forgratuitousviolence inoursociety.… It’sunacceptable,and it’sun‐Australian.(Ralston2014)

Withthemediarunninghardontheissue–andclearlybackedbypublicopinion(exemplifiedby themultiplicity of letters to the Editor during the December/January 2014 period on theissue in both the Sydney Morning Herald and The Telegraph) – it is clear that there wasenormous pressure for the NSW Government and particularly the Premier to act. Just oneexample indicativeof the intensityof this campaign isTheSydneyMorningHerald runninganeditorialcomparingPremierO’Farrell’sabsenceinthedebateonalcohol‐fuelledviolencetothecartoon figureWhere’sWally? (TheSydneyMorningHerald Editorial2014). Itwaswithin thispressuredenvironmentthatthePremierannouncedhis16‐pointplanandfollowedonlyaweeklater with hastily and poorly drafted legislation (as will be discussed below), reflecting yetanother example of a government beingdrawn to a ‘law andorder’, simplistic penal populistresponse – but one that will ultimately fail to deliver what the public expect, includingpreventingcrime.It is noteworthy that the history of initiating and introducing one‐punch laws in Australia(Quilter2014b)demonstratessimilarpatternsofintensemediacoverageof,andpublicconcernover,one‐punchdeathsandtheintroductionofhastilydraftedassaultcausingdeathprovisions.Againstthis‘toughonlawandorder’styleofcriminallawreform,itisnotablethatwheremoreconsideredassessmentsoftheneedforsuchoffenceshasbeenundertaken,inparticularbylawreformcommissionsinAustralia,theyhaveexpresslyrecommendedagainsttheirintroduction(seeQueenslandLawReformCommission2008;WesternAustralianLawReformCommission2007;alsoQuilter2014b).Policytransferredbutnottranslated

ThesecondcriticismisthattheadoptionbytheNSWGovernmentofan‘assaultcausingdeath’provision represents an ill‐considered policy transfer from the Code jurisdictions to thecommonlawStatesbutwithout ‘translation’. In theareaofcrimecontrol,Newburnand Jones


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have discussed the problems of ‘policy transfer’ to different contexts (Jones and Newburn2002a,2002b,2005,2006;Newburn2002).Followingthistrend,hereweseeaspecificpolicyaddressingaperceived‘gap’inthelawintheCode‐basedjurisdictionsbeing‘transplanted’ontotheverydifferentcontextofthecommonlawinNSW.However,therewasneitheragaponthestatute books in NSW nor an operational gap: manslaughter convictions were consistentlyachievedinNSWunderexistinglaws.Assault causingdeathprovisionswere introduced in theCode jurisdictions to fill a perceived‘gap’inthelaw’soperationinthecontextofone‐punchmanslaughters(forexample,seeElferink2012).Thisislargelybecauseoftheoperationofthe‘accident’defencewhichappliesineachofthe Code jurisdictions for manslaughter (Quilter 2014b; Fairall 2012). The accident defenceprecludescriminalresponsibilityforaneventwhereitcanbesaidtohaveoccurredby‘accident’–whereanaccidentisdeterminedbyanobjectivetestbeingaresultthatwasnotintendedbythe perpetrator and not reasonably foreseeable by an ordinary person (Kaporonowski v TheQueen(1973)133CLR209,231(GibbsJ)).Thus,wherethereisaone‐punchmanslaughterandtheaccidentdefenceisraised,thejurymustbesatisfiedbeyondreasonabledoubtthatthedeath(thatis,‘theevent’)fromtheonepunchwasreasonablyforeseeablebytheordinaryperson.Thisisaveryhighthresholdandoftenmaynotbesatisfiedinsuchsituations.Inotherwords, ‘onepunch’ lawsmaybe viewedas necessary in jurisdictions such asWesternAustralia (WA)notbecausemanslaughterisviewedastoolightbutbecausemanslaughtermaynotbeavailableinsuchsituations(Quilter2014b).By contrast, involuntary manslaughter and, relevantly, unlawful and dangerous actmanslaughter,isdefineddifferentlyinthecommonlawStates(includingNSW)andwithalowerthreshold.ForunlawfulanddangerousactmanslaughterinNSW,theCrownmustprovebeyondreasonabledoubtthat:thedeathofapersonwascausedbyapositive(ordeliberate)actoftheoffender that was unlawful (for example, an assault); the offender must intend to commit abreachofthecriminallawasalleged;andtheactmustbedangerous.Themostrelevantaspectoftheseelementsisthefinalone:thattheactbedangerous.ThetestfordangerousnesswassetoutintheHighCourtdecisionofWilson,withthisbeinganobjectivetest:wouldthereasonableperson, in the position of the defendant, have appreciated that the unlawful act exposed thevictimtoanappreciableriskofserious injury?(WilsonvR(1992)174CLR313,333). Inotherwords, the difference between the Code jurisdictions and the law in NSW (and the othercommonlawStates)isthattheobjectivetestof‘dangerousness’requires‘anappreciableriskofseriousinjury’(forinstance,fromthepunch)butdoesnotrequire,asintheCodejurisdictions,that the death be reasonably foreseeable as a result of the punch (Quilter 2014b; see alsoTomsenandCrofts2012).Toputitsimply,inNSW,therewasnolegalgapthatneededtobefilledwithaone‐punchlaw.Furthermore, in NSW (and the other common law States), there is no defence of accident asthere is in theCode jurisdiction, something that appears tohave confused the drafters of thenewoffence.Thus,s25A(4)oftheActexpresslyprovidesthatitisnotnecessarytoprove‘thatthedeathwasreasonablyforeseeable’foranoffenceunders25A(1)or(2).Presumablythenewlegislationwasmodelledonsub‐s(2)oftheequivalentWesternAustralianlegislation,s281ofthe Criminal Code Act 1913 which purports to exclude accident as a defence. However, thatdefencedoesnotexistinNSWandthustheprovisionisredundantinthisState.Notonlyisthereno‘gap’inthestatutebooksfora‘onepunch’lawtofillinNSW,thereisalsonooperationalgap.Manslaughterconvictionsforone‐punchmanslaughtersarebeingachieved.Ina previous study, Quilter isolated 18 cases ofwhatmay be called ‘one punch’manslaughtersfrom1998to2013(Quilter2014b).Significantly,inallbutonecasethematterdidnotproceedtotrialwiththeoffenderpleadingguiltytomanslaughter.


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Thehierarchyofcriminaloffences

The third criticism to bemade of the Act is the failure of the Government to give principledconsideration to where assault causing death offences sit in the hierarchy of fatality crimes.Indeed, while the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has created a National Index Offence(NOI)10 and a separate seriousness ranking was produced by the NSW Judicial Commission(MacKinnell,PolettiandHolmes2010),therehasbeenlittlescholarlyanalysisofthehierarchyofoffenceseriousness(ClarksonandCunningham2008;DavisandKemp1994;Walker1978).Thisomissionissignificantashierarchyanalysiscouldbeusedasanormative,principledbasisfor assessing the need or otherwise for offence creation and drafting. That is, it could be animportantadditionaldimensiontothescholarshipthathasproliferatedinthelastdecadeonthelegitimate limits of the criminal law (see, for example, Brown 2013; Duff et al. 2010; Husak2008;Lacey2009).Thefailuretoconsiderthehierarchyofoffenceseriousnesscontributestoalackofcoherenceinthecriminallawandunderminestheprinciplesof‘fairlabelling’whichplayan important communicative function of the criminal law (Ashworth 2009; Chalmers andLeverick2008;Duff1999,2000).Asmentionedabove,nolawreformcommissioninAustraliahasrecommendedtheintroductionofa‘onepunch’law.Oneoftheconsequencesofthisisthatthequestionofwhereoffenceslikes281oftheWesternAustralianCriminalCodeand,now,s25AoftheCrimesAct1900(NSW),sitinthehierarchyoffatalitycrimes,hasreceivedlittleattention.Suchproblemsareexacerbatedwherenewcriminaloffencesarebrought intobeingunderconditionsofhasteandurgencyasoccurredinNSWinJanuary2014.Thequestionofhierarchyisanimportantonetoconsiderinordertoassesswhetherthereisa‘match’betweentheperceivedneedforanewoffenceandthenatureoftheoffenceitself,andsotakeaccountofthewiderandlonger‐termimplicationsofacontemplatedchangetothecriminallaw.TheLawReformCommissionofIreland(LRCI)didrecommendtheintroductionofa‘onepunch’law aspart of its reviewofhomicide andmanslaughter in 2008, and explicitly addressed thequestionofhierarchy.Considerationof theLRCI’sanalysis is illuminating (seeQuilter2014b).TheLRCIrecommendedtheintroductionofa‘onepunch’lawonthebasisthatdeathscausedinthis way often involved insufficient culpability to warrant a manslaughter conviction (LRCI2008).Thatis,acrimeofassaultcausingdeathdoesnotrepresentamorepunitiveresponsetoone‐punchdeathsthanmanslaughter,butcreatesalessseriousoffencethatreflectsthereducedculpability. Therefore, in terms of the hierarchy or ladder of fatality crimes, assault causingdeathlogicallysitsonthethirdtier,belowmanslaughter,withmurderatthetop.Althoughthisapproach tohierarchywasnot articulated in the legislativedebates surrounding s281of theCriminalCode1913(WA)ithasbeenconfirmedbytheWesternAustraliancourts’applicationofthe assault causing death offence: in the seriousness hierarchy of crimes causing death, thecrimeofunlawfulassaultcausingdeathsitsbeneathmanslaughter(seeQuilter2014b).Thiscomparativeanalysisindicatesthattheintroductionofanassaultcausingdeathprovisionis not, by definition, inconsistent with the hierarchy of offences, but what is necessary is toappropriatelyencapsulate– intermsof ‘label’,penaltyandconductcovered–whereitsitsontheseriousnesshierarchyor ladder. Its logical location ison the third tier,belowmurderandmanslaughter–becauseithasneitherthesubjectivefaultelementsofmurdernortheobjectivefault elements ofmanslaughter – and should be confined to the least culpable forms of fatalconduct. As amatter of principle, the offence should be defined accordingly.While the NSWoffencearguablyencapsulatesanappropriatelevelofculpabilityintermsofthelabel(‘Assaultcausing death’), as discussed in the following section of the article, it does not appropriatelyconfinetherelevantconduct tothe leastseriousmatters. Its location inPt3 ‘OffencesAgainstthePerson’,Div1‘Homicide’afters24(thepunishmentformanslaughter)isfittingbut,aswill


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bediscussed,themaximumpenaltiesparticularlyinthecaseoftheaggravatedoffencedefinedbys25A(2),areoutofsyncwiththishierarchy.Althoughitisatoddswiththe‘gettough’‘lawandorder’rhetoricoftheNSWGovernment,themaximum penalty assigned to the basic offence of assault causing death does adhere to thishierarchy:aone‐punchfatalityisalessseriouscrimethanmanslaughterandsitsabovethatofanassault.Thus,thebasicoffenceofassaultcausingdeath(s25A(1))hasamaximumpenaltyof20yearsbeinglessthanthemaximumof25yearsformanslaughter:sees24.Furthermore,thes25A(1)offenceisastatutoryalternativeverdicttomurderandmanslaughter(s25A(7))andalsotothes25A(2)offence(sees25A(8)).Theaggravatedoffenceins25A(2)fitsmuchlesscomfortablywithinthehierarchy.Ontheonehand, the offence remains a statutory alternative verdict to murder and manslaughter,suggestingitislowerintheseriousnesshierarchythanbothoffences(s25A(7)).Ontheotherhand, the offence has the same maximum penalty as manslaughter but with the mandatoryminimum sentence of 8 years (s 25B(1)),11whichmakes the offencepotentiallymore seriousthanmanslaughter,particularlywhenaccountistakenofsentencingstatisticsformanslaughter.Forinstance,theaveragesentenceforthe18one‐punchmanslaughtercasesinQuilter’sstudy(2014b)was5yearsand2monthswithanaveragenon‐paroleperiodof3yearsand3months.Themediansentencewas5yearsand11monthsandthemediannon‐paroleperiodwas3yearsand 6months. The range of sentenceswas 3 years to 7 years (and the range of non‐paroleperiodswas1year5monthsto5years8months).SentencingstatisticsprovidedtomebytheJudicial Commission of New SouthWales for the seven year period between April 2006 andMarch 2013 indicate that the median sentence for manslaughter is 7 years with sentencesrangingfrom36monthstomorethan20years.Whileitisdifficulttodrawanyconclusionsfromthe Judicial Information Research System (JIRS) sentencing statistics without knowing moreabouttheindividualcases,itisnoteworthythatboththemedianone‐punchsentencesandthemediansentencesformanslaughtercasesasawholearebelowthe8‐yearmandatoryminimumfors25A(2)offences.Furthermore,whileamandatoryminimumistypicallyunderstoodtobetheminimumpenaltyin relation to a particular offence (see Roth 2014; alsoHoel andGelb 2008), in the case of s25A(2)offences,s25B(1)furtherindicatesthatthemandatoryminimumperiodisthesameastheminimumnon‐paroleperiod(NPP)periodofeightyearsforthatoffence:

(1)Acourtisrequiredtoimposeasentenceofimprisonmentofnotlessthan8yearsona person guilty of an offence under section 25A(2). Any non‐parole period for thesentenceisalsorequiredtobenotlessthan8years[emphasisadded].

ThisreferencetotheminimumNPPwasrecommendedbytheAttorney‐GeneralinParliamenttomakeitclearthatacourtisrequiredtosetaNPPofeightyearsandnotlowerinrespectofthes 25A(2) offence, presumably to ensure that the 8‐year mandatory minimum could not beinterpretedasaheadsentence(Smith2014).However,whenthisNPPperiodisreadalongsides44(1)and (2)of theCrimes (SentencingProcedure)Act1999 (NSW), theheadsentence for anoffender for a s 25A(2) offence will need to be one‐third more than the 8‐year mandatoryminimum. This is because, unless the court is imposing an ‘aggregate sentence’,12 s 44(1)requiresthecourtto‘firstsetanon‐paroleperiodforthesentence(thatis,theminimumperiodforwhichtheoffendermustbekeptindetentioninrelationtotheoffence)’ands44(2)requiresthat‘thebalanceofthetermofthesentencemustnotexceedone‐thirdofthenon‐paroleperiodforthesentence,unlessthecourtdecidesthattherearespecialcircumstancesforitbeingmore(inwhichcasethecourtmustmakearecordof itsreasons for thatdecision).’ Inotherwords,whereacourtisnotimposinganaggregatesentence(anddoesnotfind‘specialcircumstances’),aheadsentencefortheleastseriouss25A(2)offencewouldbejustover10.5years.Ineffect,the


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newlegislationmandatesthatfatalassaultswheretheoffenderisintoxicatedarenecessarilyatthe above‐average end of the spectrum formanslaughter sentences. This is both inconsistentwiths25A’s locationonthethirdtier inthehierarchyof fatalitycrimes(beneathmurderandmanslaughter) and out of line with previous sentencing practice, particularly for one‐punchfatality cases. It does, however, accord with the Government’s stated objective of punishingseverely violent offences committed in circumstances where the offender is intoxicated. AsPremierO’Farrellmadeclearinthesecondreadingspeech:

It is unacceptable to think it is okay togo out, get intoxicated, start a fight andthrowapunch.Thislegislationmeansthatpeoplewillfaceseriousconsequences….(O’Farrell2014b:6)

It remains to be seen how the mandatory minimum for s 25A(2) offences may impact onsentencing practices for manslaughter. For example, will it produce the unintendedconsequenceofinflatingsentencesforfatalitiesthatdonotfallwithinthescopeofs25A(1)or(2)asjudgesfeelcompelledtomaintaintheintegrityoftheculpabilityhierarchywhichlocatesmanslaughteraboveassaultcausingdeath?While s25A(2)maybeoutof linewith theculpabilityhierarchyandsentencingpractices formanslaughter, it may not be out of line with Parliament’s provision of standard non‐paroleperiods(SNPP)(Crimes(SentencingProcedure)Act1999(NSW)s54A(2)).TheSNPPrepresentsthe non‐parole period for an offence ‘in the middle of the range of seriousness’ ‘taking intoaccount only the objective factors affecting the relative seriousness of that offence’ (Crimes(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 s 54A(2)). While Parliament has not provided a SNPP formanslaughter,ithasforotherrelevantcrimesintheculpabilityhierarchy.Forexample,murderhasaSNPPof25yearsforspecialclassesofvictims(includingemergencyserviceworkersandchildren under 18 years) and 20 years in all other cases; s 33 of theCrimesAct1900 (NSW)(woundingwith intent todobodilyharmor resistarrest)hasaSNPPof7years; ands35(2)(recklesscausingofGBH)hasaSNPPof4years(Crimes(SentencingProcedure)Act1999(NSW)s54A(2)).WhiletheSNPPdoesnottakeaccountoftheaggravatingandmitigatingfactorsandanyothermatterspermitted tobe taken intoaccount, arguably the SNPPassigned tooffencespositionsthemintheculpabilityhierarchy,withtheSNPPforeachoftheassaults(ss33and35)rangingfrom4to7years.While thetwoconcepts(SNPPandmandatoryminimum)arenot thesame,themandatoryminimumNPP for s 25A(2) offences places the aggravated offence above theSNPPfors35(2)offences(4years)and justabovethat fors33offences(7years)–which, intermsofoffencehierarchy,iswhereonewouldexpectthes25A(2)offencetobe.On26February2014PremierO’Farrellrevisedtheoriginalnineoffencestowhichmandatoryminimumswouldapplywhencommittedinthecircumstancesofintoxication,tosix13(thatis,inadditiontothenewcrimeofassaultcausingdeath):seeCrimesAmendment(Intoxication)Bill2014(theBill).Inaddition,theBillintroducesastaggeringfivenewoffencesifcommittedwhen‘intoxicated in public’ (discussed in the final section of the article), none of which havemandatoryminimums.ThesefivenewoffencesareindicatedinTable1.Table1alsosetsouttheGovernment’s planned likely increase in maximum penalties for the aggravated versions ofthoseoffencesrelative to themaximumpenalty for the ‘basicoffence’; themootedmandatoryminimumfortheaggravatedoffence;andthecurrentSNPPforeachofthe‘basicoffences’(thatis,thecurrentSNPPforthebasicoffence);andthenewoffences(seetheBill;O’Farrell2014c).What Table 1 suggests is that little consideration has been given in terms of the seriousnesshierarchy to the relationship between themandatoryminimums and the SNPPs for the basicoffence.AsTable1 indicates, inmost circumstances themootedmandatoryminimum for theaggravated offence is equivalent to the SNPP for the basic offence (where there is a SNPP).


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However,thereappearstobeconfusioninrespectoftheaggravatedversionsofss60(3A)and(3) offences.While the aggravated version of a s 60(3A) offence (to become s 60(3C)) has amaximumpenalty twoyearsmore than theaggravateds60(3)offence (tobecomes60(3B)),theyhavebeenallocatedthesamemandatoryminimumof5years:seetheBillSch1cl[25].Table1:Comparisonofbasicandaggravatedoffences

Offence

Currentmaximumfor‘basicoffence’

Predictednewmaximimforaggrevatedintoxicatedoffence

Newmandatoryminimumforaggravatedoffence

Standardnon‐paroleperiods

forbasicoffence

Murderpoliceofficerinexecutionofduties,ss18,19B

Life Life1425(special

classofvictim/victimunder18years)

Murder,ss18,19A Life ‐ ‐

20(allothercases)

Manslaughter,ss18,24 25 ‐ ‐ ‐Aggravatedassaultcausingdeath,s25A(2) 25 ‐ 8

‐

Assaultcausingdeath,s25A(1) 20 ‐ ‐ RecklessGBH–incompany,s35(1)andwhenintoxicateds35(1AA)

14 16 55

Assaultpoliceofficer– recklessGBHorwounding(publicdisorder),s60(3A)andwhenintoxicateds60(3C)

14 16 5‐

Assaultpoliceofficer– recklessGBHorwounding(notduringpublicdisorder),s60(3)andwhenintoxicateds60(3B)

12 14 55

RecklessGBH,35(2)andwhenintoxicateds35(1A) 10 12 4

4

Recklesswoundingincompany,s35(3)andwhenintoxicateds35(2A)

10 12 44

Affrays93C(1)andwhenintoxicateds93C(1A) 10 *12 ‐

Recklesswounding,s35(4)andwhenintoxicateds35(3A) 7 9 3

3

Assaultwhenincompany,s59(2)andwhenintoxicateds59(3) 7 *9 ‐

Assaultpoliceofficer– whenintoxicatedoccasionsABHs60(2B)

‐

*9 ‐

Assaultpoliceofficer– whenintoxicatedbutnoABHs60(1B) ‐ *7 ‐

AssaultoccasioningABH,s59(1)andnewoffencewhenintoxicateds35(1A)

5 *7 ‐

*Newoffences introduced in2014Billwhichmayapply if committedwhen ‘intoxicated inpublic’ andwhichdonothaveamandatoryminimum


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Confusingandcomplex:Theelementsofs25A

ThefourthcriticismoftheActisthats25Ahasbeendraftedinacomplexandconfusingway.Whileanoffenceentitled ‘Assaultcausingdeath’could carveouta legitimatespace fora thirdtier of fatality offences, it should in substance accord with what Ashworth described as fairlabelling.Ashworthexplainsthattheconcernoffairlabelling:

…istoseethatwidelyfeltdistinctionsbetweenkindsofoffencesanddegreesofwrongdoing are respected and signalled by the law, and that offences aresubdividedandlabelledsoastorepresentfairlythenatureandmagnitudeofthelaw‐breaking.(Ashworth2009:78;seealsoChalmersandLeverick2008)

The peculiar way in which s 25A has been drafted means that the offence created fails theprinciples of fair labelling and creates a further lack of coherence in the criminal law. Theseissues are exemplified in the basic offence which has defined the conduct in ways that arearbitraryandlackclarity.Aswillbediscussedinthefinalsectionofthearticle,theaggravatedversion has also been drafted without sufficient precision as to the aggravating factor ofintoxication. Both are problems that are likely to result in operational difficulty and will bediscussedinturn.ThebasicoffenceForthebasicoffenceunders25A(1),theprosecutionmustprovebeyondreasonabledoubtthefollowingelements:

1. anassault‘byintentionallyhitting’theotherpersonwithanypartoftheperson’sbodyorwithanobjectheldbytheperson;

2. thattheassaultwasnotauthorisedorexcusedbylaw;15and3. that the assault causes the death of the other person, where ‘causes’ is defined in s

25A(3).The focusofthisdiscussionwillbe inrelationtoelementone. It isnoted,however, thatwhileelement two does not present legal issues, element threemay have unintentionally confinedwhat ‘causes the death of the other person’, making the provision inapplicable in certaincircumstances.Thus,s25A(3)statesthat:

Forthepurposesofthissection[emphasisadded],anassaultcausesthedeathofapersonwhether theperson is killed as a result of the injuries receiveddirectlyfromtheassaultorfromhittingthegroundoranobjectasaconsequenceoftheassault.

Thisdefinitionof‘causes’isproblematicasitmaybethatneithertheinjuryresultingfromtheassault nor the hitting of the ground or object causes the death. This has been the case in anumberofmattersnotablywherethevictimsufferedadefectorwhere, followingtheassault,thevictimdiedfromanothercausesuchasdrowning.16Whileithasbeenthepolicyofthelawtotakeyourvictimasyoufindhim/her(Blaue[1975]3AllER446,450)(sometimesknownasthe‘eggshellskullrule’)andsothevictim’sdefectwouldnotaffectcausation,thefactthats25A(3)states ‘[f]or thepurposesof thissection’maysuggesta legislative intention todefinecausationfor this section and so oust the common law rule, effectively removing such deaths from theoperation of this offence. This problem does not arise in the Western Australian equivalentwhichstates‘diesasadirectorindirectresultoftheassault’(s281(1));itisnotclearwhythisdefinition of ‘causes’ in the NSW offence was proffered but I suggest it is tied up with theparticularitiesofMrKelly’sdeath.


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In the lead up to announcing the assault causing death offence (discussed above), the NSWGovernment indicated it would be modelled on the Western Australian equivalent (that is,CriminalCode1913 s 281). TheNSW offence, however, departs in significantways from thatmodel both in terms of how ‘cause the death’ is defined and, aswill be discussed below, thetypesofconductthatmayconstitutean‘assault’fortheoffence.Indeed,itwouldappearthatthecircumstancesofMrKelly’stragicdeathinalltheirparticularity–ablowtotheheadwhichledhim to fall to thegroundandhithisheadon the footpathand suffermassivebrain injuries–haveexertedagreater influenceon thewordingofs25A thantheWesternAustralian lawonwhichitwasostensiblymodelled.Perhapstherewasadesiretoaccuratelycaptureandembedin legislation theprecisewrongdone toMrKelly, asasymbolicgestureof recognitionof thatspecific tragedy.Whileexplicable in those terms, it isnota soundbasis foramajorchange toNSW homicide law. The chief problem is that the idiosyncratic definition of assault causingdeath (discussed below) which has been adopted in NSW risks excluding killings that areequallytragic,andwheretheoffenderisjustasculpable,butthedeathoccursincircumstanceswhichdonotfitwithintheframecreatedbys25A.Arbitrarilyconfiningtheconductto‘hitting’Under the Western Australian provision any form of unlawful assault that either directly orindirectly causes the person’s death satisfies the offence. The NSW provision confines the‘assault’elementto‘intentionallyhittingtheotherpersonwithanypartoftheperson’sbodyorwithanobjectheldbytheperson’. It isunclearwherethemodel forthisaspectoftheoffencecamefromalthoughIsuggestitisbasedontheparticularcircumstancesofMrKelly’sdeath(andpossiblyalsoMrChristie’s).Theoffenceiscloserto,butnotthesameas,theNorthernTerritory(NT)provisionwhichisbasedona‘violentact’causingdeath(ratherthansimplyanassault)ins 161A Criminal Code (NT). The Northern Territory provision defines ‘conduct involving aviolentact’ins161A(5);however,thereisnosimilardefinitionoftheword‘hitting’intheNSWprovision17orelsewhereintheCrimesAct1900.ItisalsonotawordusedinanyothersectionoftheCrimesAct190018andIhavenotlocatedanyjudicialconsiderationofthatphrase.Asamatterof statutoryconstruction, regardmaybehad toextrinsicmaterial toconfirmthattheordinarymeaningisthemeaningtobeconveyedbythetext(InterpretationAct1987(NSW)s34(1)(a)).TheordinaryorcommonmeaningofthewordintheOxfordEnglishDictionaryis:

Hitting,n.–Theactionofhitv.invarioussenses;striking,impact,collisionHitting,adj.–Thathitsorstrikes;strikingHit,v.–I.Togetatorreachwithablow,tostrike.19

The second reading speech may be used to confirm this meaning (Interpretation Act 1987 s34(2)(f))andthatspeechindicatesthattheActwasmodelledonthe‘onepunch’scenario:

The Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Bill2014introducesanewoffenceforone‐punchassaults[emphasisadded]whereapersonunlawfullyassaultsanotherwhodiesasaresultoftheassault,witha20‐year maximum sentence being introduced. Perpetrators of one‐punch killings[emphasis added] have previously been prosecuted in New South Wales formanslaughter.Thismeansthatwhenthecasegoestocourttheprosecutionhastoprovebeyondreasonabledoubt that theoffender shouldhave foreseen that,bydoingwhat he or she did, the victimwould be placed at risk of serious injury.(O’Farrell2014b:3)

Thiswould suggest a fairly narrow focus but confirms the ordinarymeaning of ‘hitting’ as astrikingorblow; the fact that thehit canbebyanypartof thebodyor anobjectheldby the


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person,focusesonhitsbutclearlyexpandstheambitbeyondthatofsimplyasinglepunch.Thequestiontheniswhattypesofbehaviourareincludedorexcludedbyit?It is likely tobesometimebefore there isany judicialconsiderationof theword ins25A(1);however,referencetoNSWunlawfulanddangerousactmanslaughtercases–typicallybasedonassaults–mayhighlightsomeoftheissues.Tothisend,theauthorhasreviewedthe229unlawfulanddangerousactmanslaughtercasesinNSWfrom1998‐2013byreferencetothePublicDefender’sOfficeofNSWSentencingTableforthat offence.20 Table 2 shows the most common ‘categories’ of unlawful and dangerous actmanslaughterwereassault (40.6percentor, togetherwithone‐punchassaults,48.5percent,includingbothgeneralanddomesticassaults),followedbystabbings(whichcomprise30.6percent) and shootings (12.7 per cent). One‐punchmanslaughtersmade up only 7.9 per cent, asmallshareofsuchmatters.Notethatdomesticunlawfulanddangerousactmanslaughters(acombinationofassaults,stabbingsandshootings)accountfor34.9percentofallcases.Table2:TypesofunlawfulanddangerousactmanslaughtercasesinNSW,1998‐2013

Type Number Percentage

Assault(Domestic)

93(41)

40.6(17.9)

Stabbing(Domestic)

70(31)

30.6(13.5)

Shooting(Domestic)

29(8)

12.7(3.5)

Onepunch 18 7.9

Motorvehicle 8 3.5

Arson 5 2.2

Other 4 1.8

Drowning 2 0.9

Total(Domestic)

22980

10034.9

At lawashooting(RyanvR (1967)121CLR205)andastabbingamount toassaults (intheiraggravated forms); however, typically they are categorised separately as (more serious)‘categories’ of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter. Such matters could be prosecutedundertheWesternAustralianunlawfulassaultcausingdeathoffenceasallthatisrequiredisanassaultcausingdeath.OnecriticismoftheWesternAustralianprovision(whichmaynotapplytotheNSWoffence)isthatthebreadthoftheconductthatcancomewithintheoffencehasledtoveryseriousdeathsinWesternAustraliabeingprosecutedunderit(seeQuilter2014b).Itisunlikelythatashootingorstabbingwouldsatisfya ‘hitting theotherperson…withanobjectheldbytheperson’unders25A(1).Itispossiblethatthelatter(astabbing)may,butacreativelegalargumentwouldneedtobeconstructedtoshowthata‘stab’constitutesa‘hitting’andthismay depend on theway the knife or other objectwas used. For instance,was it applied in astabbingactionmoreakintoahittingorwasit ‘pushed’or forced?Theformer(ashooting) isunlikelytoconstituteahittingbecausethehitthatcausesthedeathcomesfromthebullet,notby an object held by the person. This means that perhaps appropriately in terms of theseriousnesshierarchyandtheprinciplesof fair labelling,stabbingsandshootings(beingmorethan40percentof themoreseriouscasescurrentlyprosecutedasmanslaughterbyunlawfuland dangerous act) are ruled out of the ambit of s 25A offences, including the aggravatedoffence.


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Ifwelookfurtheratthecasesinrelationto‘assaults’,themostsignificantcategoryinTable2ofunlawfulanddangerousactmanslaughter(48.5percent,whenone‐punchmanslaughtercasesare included), the case law suggests a variety of behaviours constitute such assaults. Thefollowingwordsareappliedinthecasestodescribehowtheassaultoccurred:brawl(Annakin(1988)37ACrimR131);groupassault (Avakian [2003]NSWSC1042);assault (Kwon [2004]NSWCCA 456; Esposito [2006] NSWSC 1454); stomping (Willoughby [2001] NSWSC 1015);bashing (TJP [1999] NSWCCA 408); striking (Hyatt [2000] NSWSC 774; Grenenger [1999]NSWSC380);beating(Sotheren[2001]NSWSC214);ramming(Woodland[2001]NSWSC416);hitting (with anobject) (Benbow [2009]NSWSC1472;Leung [2013]NSWSC259);one‐punch(eg R v Risteski [1999] NSWSC 1248); kicking (Bellamy [2000] NSWSC 1217; CW [2011]NSWCCA45;DGP[2010]NSWSC1408);head‐butt(RvCK,TS[2007]NSWSC1424;RvCarroll(2008) 188 A Crim R 253); gouging (Tillman [2004] NSWSC 794); tackling (Dean‐Wilcocks[2012] NSWSC 107); strangling (Graham [2000] NSWSC 1033); suffocated (Masson [2001]NSWSC 1037); asphyxiation (Adamson (2002) 132 A CrimR 511); pushing (Wheatley [2007]NSWSC 1182;Zammit [2008]NSWSC 317); forcing (MD [2005]NSWCCA 342;Daniels [2004]NSWSC1201;Jeffrey [2009]NSWSC202); throwing(CK[2004]NSWCCA116);burning(Byrne[2001]NSWSC1164);bruising(Byrne[2001]NSWSC1164);shaking(GJL[2009]NSWDC167);anddrowning(Laing[2004]NSWSC510).While the case law indicates that these are different ways of carrying out an assault for thepurposesofunlawfulanddangerousactmanslaughter,arguablyonlysomewillmeetthecriteriains25A.Ontheonehand,brawls,stomping,bashing,striking,kicking,beatingandhead‐buttsarelikelytomeetthecriteriaofan‘intentionalhitting’ofthepersonbyanypartoftheperson’sbody.Ontheotherhand,anassaultthatoccursbywayofgouging,pushing, forcing, throwing,tackling,21strangling,asphyxiation,burning,shakinganddrowning,areunlikelyto.Theredoesnotappeartobeanyprincipledbasisforthesedistinctions–andcertainlynotintermsofwheretheysitonthescaleofobjectiveseriousness.Theassaultisalsoconfinedunders25A(1)tohittingbyobjectsheldbytheperson.Thismust,thereby,excludeanassaultby‘throwing’anobject(suchasarock,barstool,brick,beerbottleoranotherobject)atthepersonand,ifashootingwerenotexcludedbythewordhitting,itislikelytobeexcludedbythefactthatthevictimishitbyabulletratherthanthegunwhichisheldbytheperson.Thiscriterionmaynot,however,excludestabbingsastheobjectwouldbeheldbytheperson.The introduction of the elements of ‘hitting’ and ‘held by the person’may have beendone todemarcatecertainformsofconduct(suchasshootingsandstabbings)asmoreseriousthantheambit of s 25A offences – and hence to be dealt with by way of murder or manslaughter.However,itdoesnotexplainwhyveryseriousbrawls,bashingsandgroupassaultsmaywellbeprosecuted under s 25A(1) with the lesser maximum penalty for the basic offence, whereaspotentiallylessseriousassaultscausingdeathsuchaspushingortacklingcannot.Furthermore,removingassaultsthatoccurbywayof‘throwing’fromtheoperationofs25Aseemsarbitraryratherthanbasedonanyprincipleinrelationtooffenceseriousnessorotherwise.Conversely,whatthismeansisthatassaultsleadingtodeaththatdonotconstitute‘intentionallyhittingtheotherpersonwithanypartoftheperson’sbodyorwithanobjectheldbytheperson’willneedtobeprosecutedas eithermanslaughterormurder,nomatter the scaleof seriousnessof theconduct.These aspects of the definition of s 25A exemplify the vice of what Horder (1994) called‘particularism’: the inclusionofdefinitionaldetail thatmerelyexemplifiesratherthandelimitswrongdoing.Theproblemwiththisapproachisthat: ‘[v]eryprecisespecificationofthemodesof responsibility opens up the possibility of unmeritorious technical argument’ over whichconduct falls within the offence and creates ‘arbitrary distinctions between [that conduct]


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includedandthoseleftout’(Horder1994:340;seealsoLoughnan2010:20‐1).Inturn,thishasthepotentialtounderminethecommunicativefunctionofthecriminallaw(Duff2000,1999).Itislikelythatinanyprosecutionunders25A,technicalargumentswillbemadeaboutwhattypesofconductdo(not)fitwithintheoffencewithpotentiallyunintendedconsequences.There are three otherways that the drafting of this element potentially excludes less seriousformsofassaultsfromtheparametersofs25A,whichwillbediscussedinturn.Onceagaintheseraisequestionsabouthierarchy,fairlabellingandhowthesereformscreatealackofcohesioninthecriminallaw.First, by confining assaults to ‘hittings’ the NSW offence excludes the common law form of‘assault’ from the ambit of the actus reus. In NSW the common law contained two separateoffencesbeingassault(thethreatofunlawfulphysicalcontact)andbattery(theactualinflictionof unlawful physical contact). These are now combined in the CrimesAct1900 (NSW) in theoffenceof‘commonassault’ins61.Theoffenceins25Aisrestrictedto‘assaults’basedontheoldformof‘battery’becausetheremustbeanassaultbyhittingtheotherpersoneitherwithapart of the body or an object held by the person. This means that ‘assaults’ which involvecreatingtheapprehensionofimminentunlawfulphysicalcontactwhichleadtoaperson’sdeathareexcludedfromtheoperationofs25A.Forexample,theconductinRvKerr[2004]NSWSC75(Kirby J,24February2004)couldnotbeprosecutedunders25A. In thatmatter theoffenderalighted from a train and, in an aggressivemanner and swearing, approached a male sittingaloneonaplatform.Theassaultledthevictimtojumpontothetrackswherehewasstruckbyatrain.Theoffenderwasconvictedofmanslaughterbyunlawfulanddangerousact(seealsoRIK[2004]NSWCCA282).Indeed,most‘escape’casesmaynotcomewithintheparametersofs25A.ConsiderthefactsinoneversionoftheCrowncaseinRoyall,whereHealeyhadawell‐foundedandreasonableapprehensionthat,ifsheremainedinthebathroom,shewouldbesubjectedtolife threatening violence from Royall, and so she jumped out of the window to escape andthereby died (Royall (1991) 172 CLR 378). Such ‘psychic’ assaults are excluded from theoperation of s 25A(1); yet arguably theymay represent a less serious form of assault to theactualinflictionofunlawfulphysicalcontactandtothatextentmaybebettersuited–intermsofhierarchyofoffenceseriousnessasdiscussedabove– toanoffencewitha lowermaximumtothatofmanslaughter.Secondly,assaultsunders25Aarealsoconfinedtoassaultsthat involve ‘intentionallyhitting’,presumablywiththeaimofremovingassaultsthatoccur‘byaccident’(forexample,jostlinginaqueuetoget intoanightcluboratacrowdedbar) fromtheambitof theoffence.Thishas theimplicationofrulingoutassaultsthatoccurrecklessly.Thus,themensreaforanassaultiseitherintent or recklessness: an intent to effect unlawful contact or create the apprehension ofimminentunlawfulcontact;orbeingrecklessastowhetherhis/heractionswouldeffectunlawfulcontactorcreatetheapprehensionof imminentunlawfulcontact–whererecklessnessmeansforesightofthepossibility(MacPhersonvBrown(1975)12SASR184).Itisunclearastowhythelegislaturehasprecluded ‘hitting’ thatoccursrecklesslyfromthescopeofs25A(forexample,whereapersonswingsafauxpunchthatlandsbecausetheaccusedtripsorstaggersass/heisswinging). Such assaults are, in theory, not precluded from the more serious offence ofmanslaughterbyunlawfulanddangerousact.Thirdly, the requirement that the assault occurs by intentionally hitting theotherpersonmayalsoruleoutsituationswheretheoffenderintendstohitonepersonbutinfacthitsanother.Forexample,thisiswhatoccurredinthecaseofTaiseni,Motuapuaka,Leota,Tuifua[2007]NSWSC1090.Inthatcase,Leotawasinvolvedinanargumentwiththesecondvictimovertheuseofapooltableandwasejected fromthehotelbutreturnedwithhisco‐offendersandattackedthesecondvictim.Motuapuakaswungabarstoolatthesecondvictimbutitfatallystruckthefirstvictim(ahotelemployee)inthehead(whenthesecondvictimducked).Theoffenderspleaded


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guilty to unlawful and dangerous actmanslaughter.While such a situation is covered by theWestern Australian provision (and in the Northern Territory, s 161A(1)(b)(ii) ‘or any otherperson’),suchconductislikelytobeexcludedfromtheparametersofs25Aoffences.Again,ononeview,suchconduct is lessseriousthanthatconcernedwith intentionallyhittingtheotherperson and may be more appropriately dealt with under the basic offence with a lowermaximumpenaltyof20yearsratherthanundermanslaughter.Furthermore,thedraftingoftheoffenceas‘intentionallyhittingtheotherperson’appearstohaveexcludedthegeneralcommonlawdoctrineof transferredmalicebyexpressly requiring that the intent tohitbeattached to‘theotherperson’(notanyperson).22Theroleofintoxication:Legallyandoperationallyproblematic

The fifth criticism of the legislation is the lack of clarity and operational constraints thatsurroundthedefinitionof ‘intoxication’.Beforeturningtothisissue,thereisa largerquestionthat is thrown into reliefby the additionof s25A(2) intoNSWcriminal law: isapersonwhocommits the offence of assault causing deathwhile intoxicatedmoremorally culpable than apersonwhodoessowhilestonecoldsober?TheNSWGovernment’sposition isunequivocally‘yes’.Thisnormativepositioniscontroversialbutso,Iwouldargue,isthe‘commonsense’view(which routinely features in defence sentencing submissions) that violence can be renderedexplicablebecausetheoffenderwasdrunk,orthatintoxicatedviolenceislessmorallyculpable(seealsoLoughnan2012).Indeed,thereisanimportantdebatetobehadaboutwhetherornot‘intoxication’ isanappropriatebasis fordistinguishingbetweenmoreseriousand lessseriousformsofcriminalconductinthecontextofoffencesofviolence.It is worth recognising that intoxication already renders conduct more culpable in somecontexts, includingdriving offences.Moreover, this is an approach that has strong support intohewidercommunity.Forinstance,adistinctionappliesinthedrivingcontextwiththeoffenceofdangerousdrivingoccasioningdeath(s52A)and itsaggravated form(s52A(2))oneof theaggravating circumstances being driving with the ‘prescribed concentration of alcohol’ (s52A(7)),definedins52A(9):

prescribedconcentrationofalcoholmeansaconcentrationof0.15grammesormoreofalcoholin210litresofbreathor100millilitresofblood.

The principled basis for introducing random breath‐testing and other drink‐driving relatedoffences such as aggravated dangerous driving is found in studies that demonstrate therelationshipbetweendrinkingandimpaired(risky)driving.23Yetstudieshavealsorepeatedlydemonstratedthelinkbetweenalcohol,violenceandamyriadofsocietalharms(includingthatalcohol increases risks).24 The analogymay be imperfect, but if we see one‐punch deaths assomewhat analogous to drink‐driving fatalities, perhaps there is a question as to whetherintoxicationshouldbeseenasanaggravatingfactorforcertainotherformsofviolentconduct.25Putting to one side the legitimacy or otherwise of distinguishing the basic and aggravatedoffences on the basis of intoxication, there are clear legal problems with the drafting of theaggravated offence in s 25A(2), particularly around the lack of clarity in what the term‘intoxicated’means.Theaggravatedoffencerequiresthe‘basicoffence’tobecommittedbyapersonovertheageof18yearswho,atthetimeofcommittingtheoffence,wasintoxicated.However,theActprovideslimitedguidanceonwhat‘intoxicated’meansasidefrom:

IntoxicationhasthesamemeaningasinPt11AoftheCrimesAct1900being‘intoxicationbecauseoftheinfluenceofalcohol,adrugoranyothersubstance’(s428A);


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thatinproceedingsforanoffenceunders25A(2),evidenceregardingtheconcentrationof alcohol, drug or other substance at the timeof the alleged offencemaybe given asdeterminedbyananalysiscarriedoutunderthenewDiv4,Pt10,LEPRA(s25A(6)(a));and

‘the accused is conclusively presumed to be intoxicatedby alcohol’ if the prosecutionprovesunderananalysiscarriedout inaccordancewithDiv4,Pt10, that theaccusedhasa0.15gramsormoreofalcoholin220litresofbreathor100millilitresofblood(s25A(6)(b))(beingequivalenttotheHRPCAamount).

Inaddition,thePremier’ssecondreadingspeechtotheAct,stated:

The bill sets out ways in which the prosecution can prove intoxication. Anaccused person is presumed intoxicated if they havemore than 0.15 grams ormoreofalcoholin220litresofbreathor100millilitresofblood.Wherethisisnotavailable, or where drugs are suspected, other evidence may be considered,includingtheconcentrationofalcoholordruginaperson’sbreathorbloodatthetimeof theoffenceandevidence fromclosed‐circuit television [CCTV] footage,eyewitnesses and police observations, all of which are consistent with the currentprovisionsoftheCrimesAct[emphasisadded].(O’Farrell2014b:3)

Thefailuretodefine‘intoxicated’meansthatoneofthesignificantdifficultieswithprosecutionsunders25A(2) is likelytobeprovingthat,at thetimetheoffencewascommitted, thepersonwasinfactintoxicated.Asidefromsituationswhereapersonis‘deemed’tobeintoxicatedbytheprosecution proving, via an analysis carried out underDiv 4, Pt 10 of LEPRA, that therewaspresentintheaccused’sbreathorbloodaconcentrationof0.15gramsormoreofalcoholin220litresofbreathor100millilitresofblood(suchcasesare likelytoberare, for theoperationalreasonsdiscussedbelow),thelegislationleavesasignificant‘greyarea’astowhatismeantbyintoxication either by alcohol or drugs. In otherwords,where theprosecution doesnot have‘conclusive’evidenceofintoxicationunders25A(6)(b),itwillbeamatterofcobblingtogetherevidenceofeyewitnesses,policeandexperts.Furthermore,withamandatory8‐yearminimumsentence(s25B(1))theconsequenceofconvictiontogetherwiththefactthatthereisunlikelytobeanyincentivetopleadtosuchoffences,thedefencewillhotlycontestthisissue,puttingtheCrowntostrictproof.Wherepleastounlawfulanddangerousactmanslaughtertypicallyleadtoan ‘agreed statement of facts’ for the purposes of sentencing including acknowledgment ofagreedlevelsofalcoholordrugconsumption,thereareunlikelytobeanyadmissionsmadebyoffendersinrelationtointoxicationfors25A(2)charges.This problem does not arise in other situations where intoxication is an aggravating factor.Thus, for the aggravated offence of dangerous driving occasioning death in s 52A,where theaggravating factor isdrivingwiththe ‘prescribedconcentrationofalcohol’ (s52A(7)),ascitedabove,thishasbeenclearlydefinedins52A(9).Theproblemisalsonotsolvedbythemootedamendeddefinitionof‘intoxicated’intheCrimesAmendment (Intoxication) Bill 2014 (the Bill) which, if passed, would insert a definition of‘intoxicatedinpublic’26intos8A(3)oftheCrimesAct1900inthefollowingterms:

Forthepurposesofanaggravatedintoxicationoffence,apersonisintoxicatedif:(a) theperson’sspeech,balance,co‐ordinationorbehaviourisnoticeablyaffectedasthe

result of the consumption or taking of alcohol or a narcotic drug (or any otherintoxicatingsubstanceinconjunctionwithalcoholoranarcoticdrug),or


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(b) therewaspresentintheperson’sbreathorbloodtheprescribedconcentrationofalcohol(thatis,0.15orabove).

TheBill introducing thisdefinitionwasread forasecond timeon26February2014andwaspassed by the Legislative Assembly on 6 March 2014 without amendment. If passed by theLegislativeCouncil itwill apply to the newassault causing death offencebecause s 25A(2) isdefined tobean ‘aggravated intoxicationoffence’ in s8A(1)of theBill. Sub‐section (a) of thedefinitionabovetransplants thedefinitionof ‘intoxicated’ fromprovisions found inotherActswhichtypicallyrelatetoasituationwhereapoliceofficerisrequiredtoexerciseadiscretionasto whether a person is intoxicated before exercising other powers or charging an offence.Section 9(6) of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) (the definition of intoxication for theoffence of a continuation of intoxicated and disorderly behaviour following a move ondirection),isindicative:

(6)Forthepurposesofthissection,apersonisintoxicatedif:

(a) theperson’sspeech,balance,co‐ordinationorbehaviourisnoticeablyaffected,and(b) itisreasonableinthecircumstancestobelievethat[emphasisadded]theaffected

speech,balance,co‐ordinationorbehaviouristheresultoftheconsumptionofalcoholoranydrug.

SimilardefinitionsarecontainedintheIntoxicatedPersons(SoberingUpCentresTrial)Act2013(NSW)s4(2);LEPRAs198(5);andLiquorAct2007s5(1).Thewords‘itisreasonableinthecircumstancestobelievethat…’havebeenremovedfromthemooteddefinition tobeapplied to thes25A(2)offenceandreplacedwith ‘as theresultof theconsumptionortakingofalcoholoranarcoticdrug…’.Suchadefinitionof intoxicationwillbelegally and operationally unworkable given it will be near impossible to prove that thebehaviour (that is, the ‘person’s speech, balance, co‐ordination or behaviour’) is ‘noticeablyaffectedas the result of the consumption or taking of’ alcohol or drugs. In otherwords, howcouldtheCrownprovebeyondreasonabledoubtthatthe‘behaviour’identifiedwas ‘theresultof’ the alcohol or drugs and not, for instance, some other reason (for example, tiredness,excitement,anger,fearandsoon)?Giventhatover‐consumptionofalcohol(and,toalesserextent,otherdrugs)hasbeenthefocusoftheconstructionofa‘problem’thatneedstobe‘fixed’,itissurprisingthatthenewlegislation–andthesemooted‘refinements’–createconsiderableuncertaintyastowherethelinewillbedrawnbetweenconsumptionofalcohol/drugsthattriggerss25A(2)andconsumptionthatdoesnot.Thenewtestingpowersarealso likely tobeoperationallydifficultbecauseof thetime inwhichpolicehavetoundertakedrugandalcoholtestingunderthenewDiv4,Pt10ofLEPRA.Inthecaseofalcoholtestingitmustbeundertakenwithintwohours‘afterthecommissionoftheallegedoffences’(s138F(3))‘atornearthesceneoftheallegedoffenceoratapolicestationorother place at which the person is detained in connectionwith the offence’ (s 138F(1)). Forbloodandurinesamplesforalcoholordrugsitmustbewithinfourhoursafterthecommissionof the offence (s 138G(3)) and a personmay be taken to and detained at a hospital for thepurposeof the takingofabloodorurinesample’ (s138G(4)).27Notonlywill itbedifficult insome situations to define exactly when the offence was committed28 and hence when timebegins to run but, from an operational point of view, the time limits for obtaining samplesdramaticallyconfinethetypesofprosecutionsthatwillbepossibleunders25A(2).29Indeed,itislikelythatonlyoffenderscaughtatthesceneofthecrimewillbeabletobetestedwithin the relevant time frames. For instance, Mr Loveridge was arrested 11 days after the


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offencewascommitted(arelativelyshortperiodoftimeininvestigationtermsforahomicide)whenclearlyitwouldnotbepossibletotesthimforalcoholordrugs.Ifs25A(2)hadbeeninexistence,theCrown,ifitsoughttomakeoutacaseforthisoffence,wouldnothavehadaccessto the ‘presumptiveconclusion’ofa0.15 test,andsowouldhavehad tobuildevidenceofMrLoveridge’s intoxication.Evidencethathehadconsumedalcoholwouldnotbeenough. Inthatcase, it appears that the evidence of Mr Loveridge’s intoxication that was available at hissentencinghearingwasonlyavailablebecauseithadbeenvolunteeredbyhimandformedpartof an agreed statement of facts.30 Such practices are unlikely to continue with a mandatoryminimum of eight years being the outcome of a conviction. By contrast, it may have beenpossible to testMrMcNeil, in relation to his assault ofMr Christie, because hewas arrestedshortlyaftertheassaultandatthesceneoftheoffence.Notonlydoesthisindicatethedifficultypolicewillhaveofcarryingoutdrugandalcoholtestingwithintherelevanttimeframesofthecommissionoftheoffence,butitisalsolikelytoleadtoanadhocsystemforprosecutionwhereitmaybepurelychancethatpoliceareabletoarrestthesuspectandtestforalcoholordrugsatthesceneoftheoffence.Thiswillintroduceasignificantelementofrandomness.Inoneinstance,anoffendermaybechargedwiths25A(2)becausetheoffender is caught at the scene. In another, the offender is not caught until aweek later, andwhiles/hemaystillbechargedwiths25A(2),becauseofdifficulties inproving ‘intoxication’,theCrownmayacceptapleatos25A(1)(witha20yearmaximum)–withtheresultthattheoffenderisentitledtotherelevantdiscountforanearlyguiltyplea.Giventhedifficultiesinprovingintoxicationconclusively,itislikelythatwewillseechargestos25A(2) (giving the appearance of a ‘tough’ response that satisfies what are said to be thecommunity’s expectations) but pleas to the lesser offence of s 25A(1). Studies of mandatorysentencingindicatethat‘discretion’isnotremovedfromthesystem;ratheritisdisplacedoftenontopoliceandprosecutors,andsignificantlysointheareaofchargingandchargenegotiation(HoelandGelb2008).FurtherevidencethattheacceptanceofpleasislikelycanbefoundinthestudybyQuilter(2014b)ofone‐punchmanslaughters,whichindicatedthat,inallcasesbutone,thematterdidnotproceedtotrial,withtheoffenderpleadingguiltytomanslaughter.Ineachofthe17othercases,theoffenderreceivedadiscountof20‐25percentinrecognitionoftheearlyplea (inaccordancewithCrimes (SentencingProcedure)Act1999 (NSW)ss21A(3)(k),22andThomsonandHoulton(2000)49NSWLR389).Furthermore, in10ofthematters,theoffenderwas originally charged with murder but pleaded guilty to the less serious offence ofmanslaughter. An unintended consequence of the creation of a new basic offence and anaggravatedversion(similartothehierarchybetweenmurderandmanslaughter)maymeanthatwe could see charges to s 25A(2) offences but pleas to the basic offence which has a lessermaximumthanmanslaughterandtowhichnomandatoryminimumapplies.Theultimateeffectmaybeafurtherdeflationofsentencesforthesetypesofmatters.Conclusion

Thisarticlehasmadefiveinter‐relatedcriticismsoftheCrimesandotherLegislationAmendment(Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW). Although the NSW Government claims to have‘listened’ to community concerns and acted decisively, the unfortunate irony is that theoperationaldifficulties towhichthe legislationwillgiveriseare likelytoresult inwidespreaddisappointment.The appearance of a tough and effective response to alcohol‐fuelled violencemay turn out to be illusory. It has been more than 60 years since the NSW Parliamentsubstantially amended homicide offences in the CrimesAct1900 (NSW). The addition of twonew forms of homicide in NSW – assault causing death, and assault causing death whileintoxicated–shouldnothaveoccurredinthecontextofavolatileknee‐jerkreactiontogenuinecommunity anxiety about alcohol‐fuelled violence, and with such haste that there was noopportunity for expert input, careful consideration or broader discussion. The legal and


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operationalproblemsthathavebeenexaminedinthisarticlecouldhavebeenaddressedpriortoenactmentifadequatetimehadbeenallowedforproperconsultation,includingwiththeNSWLaw Reform Commission, and the NSW Parliament’s Legislation Review Committee.Unfortunately,theseproblemswillnowfalltoberesolvedinthecontextofoperationalpolicing,prosecutorial discretion and the conduct of trials. These environments are not necessarilyconducivetoyieldingsoundinterpretationsofgeneralapplicationandleavenoopportunityfortheemergenceofaconsideredopinionthatfurthercriminalisationordraconianpenaltiesmaynot in fact be thebest regulatory tool for addressing theproblemof alcohol‐relatedviolence.Theotherproblemisthatthegovernmenthassethighexpectationsforhowone‐punchdeathswill be handled in the future and yet the legislation offers no guarantee that the harshpunishmentpromisedbythegovernmentwillbedeliveredinanygivencase.Correspondence:DrJuliaQuilter,SchoolofLaw,UniversityofWollongong,NSW2522,Australia.Email:[email protected] The author thanks the participants of the Criminal LawWorkshop (held at SydneyUniversity, 14‐15February2014)fortheirhelpfulcommentsonanearlierpaper.TheauthoralsothanksLukeMcNamaraforhisthoughtfulcommentsonadraftofthispaper.

2 The firstwas added in 2011 formurdering a police officer in execution of his or her duties and themandatorypenaltyislife:CrimesAct1900s19B.

3Originallynineoffencesweremooted:assaultoccasioningactualbodilyharm;assaultoccasioningactualbodilyharmincompany;assaultofpoliceofficerintheexecutionofduty(notduringapublicdisorder);recklesswounding; recklesswounding in company; reckless grievous bodily harm; reckless grievousbodilyharmincompany;affray;andsexualassault(seeRoth2014:6).

4 The Liquor Amendment Act 2014 introduced: lockouts from 1.30am; cessation of liquor service at3:00pm; imposition of similar licensing conditions as those already applied in Kings Cross to theexpandedSydneyCBDEntertainmentPrecinct; anexpanded freeze to theSydneyCBDEntertainmentPrecinct;anextensionof temporaryandlong‐termbanningorderstothenewPrecinct;prohibitionoftakeawayliquorsalesafter10:00pm;andarisk‐basedliquorlicensingscheme(basedonfactorssuchastradinghoursandrecordsonpreviousassaults).

5 The Crimes Amendment (Intoxication) Bill 2014 was read by the Premier for a second time on 26February 2014 and passed by the Legislative Assembly on 6March 2014. The Billwas substantiallyamendedbytheLegislativeCouncilandreturnedtotheLegislativeAssemblyon19March2014whichrejectedtheamendedBillandreturnedittotheLegislativeCouncil.TheLegislativeCouncilonceagainrejectedtheBillon26March2014.WhatbecomesofthisBillremainstobeseenbutitisexpectedtobeconsideredagaininMay2014.

6Seethepetitionat:change.org/thomaskelly.Atthetimeofwritingthepetitionhas144,331signaturesandthewebsiteclaims‘Victory’.

7‘EnoughisEnough’isanantiviolencemovementestablishedbyKenMarslewfollowingthe1995murderofhis18‐year‐oldson,MichaelMarslew,duringapizzarestaurantrobbery(seehttp://enoughisenough.org.au/site/11/anti‐violence).

8ThePinkieadcampaignsuccessfullytargetedandreducedspeedingparticularlyofyoungmen.Theadwassaidtoslowthemdownbyholdingupalittlepinkiefingerandconvincingthemthatiftheysped,that’swhatpeoplesuspectedabouttheirgenitals(Naggy2014).

9MrMcEwencalledforsixmatters:atargetedmediacampaigntotacklealcohol‐fuelledviolencelikethe‘pinkiead’; theNewcastlesolution;adatabaselinkingpubsandclubs toensurerepeatoffenderswhoare thrown out of one venue are not admitted to another; change of bail and good behaviour bondsrevoking the rights of a person who commits an alcohol‐related crime to drink outside their home;introduce mandatory drug and alcohol‐testing of violent offenders; and a national ban on politicaldonationsbythealcoholandgamblingindustries(McEwen2014).

10TheABSreleasedaNationalOffenceIndex(NOI)in2003andasecondeditioninJuly2009.TheNOIisAustralia’smostrecognisedoffenceseriousnessindex.SeeABS(1997)AustralianOffenceClassification(ASOC), 1997 Cat.No.1234.0. Canberra: ABS; ABS (2003) Criminal Courts, Australia 2001‐02 Cat.No.4513.0Canberra:ABS;ABS(AustralianStandardOffenceClassification(ASOC),2008(2nded).Cat.NO.


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1234.0.Canberra:ABS;ABS(2009)NationalOffenceIndex2009Cat.No.1234.0.55.001.Canberra:ABS;ABS(2010)CriminalCourts,Australia2008‐09Cat.No.4513.0Canberra:ABS.

11Thismeans that,unlikeotherprovisions, suchas inVictoria, there isnopossibilityofa judge finding‘specialreasons’ toreducethemandatoryminimum:seeCrimesAmendment(GrossViolence)Act2012(Vic).ThisActamendedtheCrimesAct1958(Vic)tointroduceoffencesof‘grossviolence’(ss15AandB),andtheSentencingAct1991(Vic)toprovideamandatoryminimumof4yearsforsuchcrimes,butwithprovisionforalessersentencewherethejudgefinds‘specialreasons’(ss10and10A).

12An aggregate sentence is where a court is ‘sentencing an offender for more than one offence’ andimposesanaggregatesentenceofimprisonmentwithrespecttoallorany2ormoreofthoseoffencesinsteadof imposinga separate sentenceof imprisonment foreach:Crimes (SentencingProcedure)Act1999(NSW)s53A.

13ThesixoffencesarerecklessGBHincompany(s35(1));recklessGBH(s35(2));recklesswoundingincompany (s 35(3)); reckless wounding (s 35(4)); assault police officer – reckless GBH or wounding(public disorder) (s 60(3A)); assault police officer – reckless GBH or wounding (not during publicdisorder)(s60(3))(O’Farrell2014c).

14Thismandatoryminimumisnotnewbutwasintroducedin2011.15An assault is not authorised or excused by law if there is no consent to the assault or other lawfulexcuse.

16ForinstanceinRvMunter[2009]NSWC158,the66‐year‐oldvictimofaone‐punchmanslaughterhadahistoryofhypertensionandpotentiallyfatalheartdisease.Aftertheonepunchhehadaheartattackanddied.SeealsoRvIrvine[2008]NSWCCA273,wherethevictimofaone‐punchmanslaughtersufferedacongenitalabnormalitythatcontributedtohisdeath;andLAL,PN[2007]NSWSC445inwhichthetwooffenders assaulted a taxi driverwithmoderate forcebut the victim suffered fromheart disease anddied from a heart attack. A manslaughter trial in NSW that recently returned a not guilty verdictinvolvedasituationthatwouldpotentiallybeexcluded. InthismatterChabTaleb(a formerbouncer)wasinvolvedinabrawlwithJasonDaepatthePontoonnightclubinCockleBayandpushedDaepintothewaterwherehedrowned. In thiscase,Daepdiednotbecauseof the injuries fromtheassaultnorfromhittingahardsurface,butfromdrowning.

17Adefinitionoftheword‘hitting’containedintheCrimesAmendment(Intoxication)Bill2014.IftheBillispasseditwillamends25Atoinsertthefollowingdefinitionof‘hitsanotherperson’:(2A)Forthepurposesofthissection,apersonhitsanotherpersoniftheperson:

(a)hitstheotherpersonwithanypartoftheperson’sbody,or(b)hitstheotherpersonwithathingwornorheldbytheperson,or(c)forcesanypartoftheotherperson’sbodytohittheground,astructureorotherthing.

This new definition is likely to extend the types of behaviours that comewithin the ambit of s 25Aincluding‘forcing’,‘pushing’,‘tackling’asdiscussedbelow.

18Theword‘hit’isusedonceinthedefinitionof‘violence’ins93AoftheCrimesActinrelationtoriotoraffray,violencemeansanyviolentconduct,sothat:

(a)except for thepurposesofsection93C, it includesviolentconduct towardspropertyaswellasviolentconducttowardspersons,and

(b) it is not restricted to conduct causingor intended to cause injuryordamagebut includesanyotherviolentconduct(forexample,throwingatortowardsapersonamissileofakindcapableofcausinginjurywhichdoesnothitorfallsshort).

19TheMacquarieDictionarydefines‘Hit–verb(t)1.todealabloworstroke;bringforciblyintocollision.’20ThePublicDefender’sOfficeofNSWSentencingTablesforunlawfulanddangerousactmanslaughterfrom1998‐2013;availableathttp://www.publicdefenders.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/pdo/public_defenders_manslaught_unlawful_dang_act.html?s=1001(accessed18March2014).

21Alegalargumentcouldperhapsbemadethatatacklingconstitutesa‘collision’intheordinarymeaningof‘hitting’asnotedabove.

22Underthedoctrineoftransferredmalicemensreacanbetransferredtothedefendant.Thus,wherethedefendantattackssomeonewithmensreaforaparticularoffence,misses,butnevertheless‘accidentally’bringsabouttheactusreusforthesameoffenceinrelationtoadifferentperson,themensreaandactusreuscan,essentiallybeaddedtogether,andtheoffendercanbeconvictedoftheoffence(Brownetal.2011:347).Thedoctrine,however,hasbeenstronglycriticisedintheUK(seeBrown2011:347).Fors25Aoffences,however, theoffenceconfinestheintentionalhittingtotheotherpersonwhichseemstoexcludethedoctrine.


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23For example,Homel1997;RoadTrafficAccidents inNSW2001, Statistical Statement: Year ended31December2001(RTARoadSafetyStrategyBranch,January2003)revealsthehighcostsofdrink‐drivingnotonlyintermsofdeathorinjurytodriversandotherusersoftheroads,butalsointermsofeconomiccost involving loss of earnings, decreased enjoyment of life, medical and hospital expenses, costsassociatedwithdamageor lossofpersonalproperty, and thepublicexpenditureon the investigationand prosecution of offenders. See also RTA, Drink Driving: Problem Definition and CountermeasureSummary(August2000)at2.

24See, for example, above endnote 23; see also Quilter 2014b, where only four of the one‐punchmanslaughtersdidnotinvolvesignificantalcoholand/ordrugconsumption.

25Perhapsoneansweristhatthereisagenerallyapplicableandscientificallyprovencorrelationbetweendrinkinganddriverimpairmentwhereastherelationshipbetweendrinkingandpropensitytoviolenceislessconsistent.Forinstance,theNSWCCAindicatedintheHighRangePCAguidelinejudgment:‘itisaxiomaticthatthehighertheconcentrationofalcoholinthebloodthemorelikelyitisthattheperson’sabilitytocontrolandmanageamotorvehiclewillbeadverselyaffectedandthegreateristheriskofthevehicle being involved in an accident. A blood alcohol readingwithin the “high range” increases theprobability of the vehicle crashing by 25 times, that is 2,500 per cent: RTA, Drink Driving: ProblemDefinitionandCountermeasureSummary (August2000)at2. In2001of1,055motorvehicledriversandmotorcycleriderskilledorinjuredandwhohadabloodalcoholconcentrationoverthelegallimit,50percentareinthehighrange;RTAStatisticalStatement,above,atpiii.’:ApplicationbytheAttorneyGeneral Concerning theOffence ofHigh Range Prescribed Content of Alcohol Section 9(4) of the RoadTransport (Safety and TrafficManagement) Act 1999 (No 3 of 2002) (2004) 61 NSWLR 305 at [10].Anotheraspectisthats52Aoffencesareonesofstrictliabilitywhereass25Aoffences(togetherwiththenineotheroffencesthataretobeintroducedinlateFebruary2014)aremensreaoffences.

26Whilenotthesubjectof thisarticle, it is troublingthatthe focusof thedefinitionintheBill is ‘public’intoxication. This clearly leaves unregulated any ‘aggravated intoxicated offence’ committed in a‘domestic’setting,beitdomesticviolenceorneighbourorotherprivateviolence.

27Itisnotedthatitisanoffencetorefusetoprovideabloodorurinesamplepursuanttos138G,withamaximumpenaltyof50penaltyunitsorimprisonmentfor2years,orboth:LEPRAs138H(1).

28Although it is noted that, under the Crimes Amendment (Intoxication) Bill 2014, the time of thecommissionoftheoffencewillbeamendedto ‘thepoliceofficerhasreasontobelievethattheallegedoffencewascommitted’:Sch2cl[3]and[6].

29ItisnotedthatthetimeperiodswillbeextendedundertheCrimesAmendment(Intoxication)Bill2014.Thus,forbreathtestingandanalysisunderLEPRAs138F(3),insteadof2hoursafterthecommissionoftheoffenceitwillbe‘assoonaspossibleandwithin2hoursafterthepoliceofficerhasreasontobelievethattheallegedoffencewascommitted’andforbloodandurinesamplesunderLEPRAs138Gtheymaybeconductedupto12hoursafterthe‘policeofficerhasreasontobelievethattheallegedoffencewascommitted’(ratherthantheoriginalfourhours):seeSch2cl[6].Furthermore,Sch1[2]willintroduceaseriesof‘deeming’provisionsintotheCrimesActs8A(5)suchthatanyconcentrationofalcoholordrug6hoursaftertheallegedoffenceisdeemedtobetheconcentrationofalcoholatthetimeoftheallegedoffence.

30This is a commonpractice in one‐punchmanslaughter caseswith 17 of the 18 suchmatters inNSWfrom 1998‐2013 involving guilty pleas and, on sentence, an agreed statement of facts including inrelationtotheoffender’s levelof intoxication. Indeed,of theone‐punchmanslaughtercases,only fourdidnotinvolveeitheralcoholordrugsandinallcasesevidenceofintoxicationordrugscamefromtheagreedstatementoffacts:seeQuilter2014b.

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