On Writing It

8/3/2019 On Writing It

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Man and Worm 27:99-115, 1994. 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

On w riting it

S T E P H E N A . E R I C K S O NDep artm ent of Philosophy, Pomona College, 551 N. College Avenue, ClaremontCA 91711-6355, U.S.A.

Writin g is a central activity for most of us wh o are workin g in f ields such asphi losophy, and not jus t for us , of course . This ac t ivi ty i s usua l ly a t tendedby a cer tain complex experience which carr ies i t forward. I wish to exploresome impl ica t ions of th is exper ience , the exper ience of wr i t ing. Theexper ience has a ( seemingly) psychologica l dimension, open to what mightvery loosely be called "introspection." Regarding this dimension, as I shallhope to show, 1 some phi losophers , Heidegger and Der r ida mostprominent ly , have drawn some ext raordinary conc lus ions which wel ltranscend, at least in intent, anything easily labelled "psychological observa-t ion." I ment ion this ne i ther to pra ise nor to blame, but mere ly to begin to"map" them on what turns out to be a vas t and la rge ly obscure phi losophi-cal terrain, the on e ope ned th rough "writ ing i t . '2We are well acquainted with the Cartesian terrain, with the realm ofconsc iousn ess and representa t ion, doubt and cer ta inty , formal and objec t ivebe ing. We are less aware , perhaps , of the manner in which the s ixteenthcentury prepared the way for Descar tes ' par t icula r mode of thought (andstyle of wr i t ing) , how scholas t ic commentary gave way to the essays ofMonta igne , foundat ionless and diverse , and how what we now labe l"modern epis temology" came into focus through the medi ta t ive re f lec t ionsof Descartes. I believe we are in a similar transit ional per iod as we ap-proach the twent ie th century ' s end, tha t what mig ht be ca l led epis temologi-ca l commentary i s g iving way in content ious and diverse ways . Nie tzschean ear ly example , Der r ida a more recent one , to something ye t unborn and,thus, not yet descr ibable in terms of style or content. The new Descartes, inshort , is yet to arr ive. Nor is there guarantee there will be one. Throughfurther ref lection on the experience of writ ing I think i t nonetheless possibleto mo ve c loser to the cur rent t r ansi tion ' s end, however , for my sense i s tha twr i t ing provides an ext raordinar i ly perspicuous access to the unchar tedte r r i tory of the coming century ' s phi losophica l disquie tudes , i f not medi ta -t ions and subsequent assert ions.


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100Prolegomena a re notor iously problemat ic , not jus t problemat ica l ly

programmat ic . In the face of th is recogni t ion I provide in the second andremaining sec t ion of th is s tudy an account of how the "I " and the " i t " (ofwrit ing i t) came to separate and devolve so as to br ing us to the "problemsof consc iousness" so endemic to la te twent ie th century epis temologica linquiry . The problems, I should add, make the exper ience of wr i t ing a t onceboth tangled and ambivalent, yet exceedingly fruitful as mater ial forreflection. One might construe this mater ial , potentially clear but in i ts veryna ture compacted, as l ived da ta ava i lable for a phenomenology of post -Husserlian "egological genesis," a genesis based on analyses of the force ofcer ta in fundamenta l presposi t ions in our language . How did the problemsassoc ia ted wi th the exper ience of my writing i t c ome to be ? H ow d id ' T 'and " i t " fa ll apart? How might "I " and " i t " come back toge ther? By impl ica-t ion I t ry to found the problemat ic of consc iousness on an account of theemergence of writ ing or iginally as failure and subsequently as (perhapseven spir i tual) opportunity.As these ref lections unfold, some unusual questions and directions areunavoidably suggested. From the s ta r t , however , an espec ia l ly int r iguingexposi tory problem conf ronts us , one which can be expressed s imply andgrammatically. In what follows, as in what has already gone before, if onlyby means of this current investigation's t i t le , a central question emerges:what i s the re ferent of ' i t ? ' To answer this quest ion wi l l mean to have b eencaught up in something once and perhaps espec ia l ly now problemat ic to"phi losophy." Does i t a lso put us a t the boundary of something e lse ,something "other" to phi losophy? I f so , what might th is "something e lse"be called, or does i t , rather , call us? And what, then, are we to be called if ,that is , we respo nd to ( i ts/our) call ing?

As a par t ia l , though incomple te means of engender ing a se t t ing, or -chestrating a context in which responses to these latest , most bewilderingquest ions become poss ible , even unavoidable , I wi l l r esor t to a few, whatelsewh ere 3 I have called snipits. Th ese are clear ly m arke d (a, b, c . . .)interpolations in the text , serving contrapuntally, if not at t imes altogetherdiscordant ly , to undermine the under lying textua l melody, be i t tha t . Onlythrough programmed recourse to such des tabi l iz ing cacaphonies i s i tpossible, I believe, to engender the kinds of space and silence in whichother sounds can begin to resonate and, then, eventually, to be writ tendown. I t is these other sounds which f inally matter , however odd this i tselfmust "sound." Normal scores , for our purposes of ten bes t t roped as tex-tuali t ies t issued with numerous and diverse inter textual supplements, arebut antechambers, vestibules, i t str ikes me, which enter on to what has beena largely si lent con cert hall .


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101

Consider some wr i t ing you a re engaged in . You can ' t be sa id a l toge ther towr i te i t, for your exp er ience i s tha t i t com es m ore to you tha n f rom you . A sbe s t you c a n , you do t ry to wr i te i t down, and to improve on i t , however ,even though i t i t se l f , tha t which prompts your wr i t ing, i sn ' t exac t ly some-thing tha t y ou do. To a s igni f icant degree , in fact , th is s t range " i t " happ ensto you, and, then, through you ( it ) f inds i ts way on to paper . Only m etaphor i -ca l ly , in fac t , can tha t which yo u wo rk to con vey i t se l f be ca l led wr i t ing (orspeaking) .

Both the preceding i ta l ic ized preposi t ions , 'to' and 'through' call forcom men tary, as does the " i t " they varyingly media te . In each ins tance of i tsuse so fa r in these paragraphs the " i t , " in fac t , r e fe r s in roughly the sameway to the same, however di f fe r ing the manners of i t s media t ion. I t i s th is"same" which most ca l l s out for commentary. Al te rna t ive ly , th is "same" isthe " i t " which ca l l s out most for exposi t ion. Note , f ina l ly , tha t one doeswant to say: the same . . . what? I f one answers this quest ion di rec t ly ,however , making ' same ' c lear ly and univoca l ly adjec t iva l , one has c lear ly ,though not a l toge ther univoca l ly , become qui te venturesome, in fac t ,invent ive .

In saying tha t i t happens to you, - what you wr i te down, tha t i s - youmight be said to be i ts object , a "direct" object at which i t directs i tself , towhich (or whom) i t g ives di rec t ions (and di rec t ives) , th is to the extent , a tleast , that you are cooperative, solicitous. As a director i t resembles in atleas t one sense a dic tator : i t d ic ta tes . Wheth er you wr i te i t dow n or not , youdo rece ive dic ta t ion. But th is i s only ha l f the s tory, i f even tha t . Withoutyou, i t couldn ' t exis t , for in th is manner of speaking i t i s accusa t ive andneeds you as the "objec t" of i ts accusa t ion, the "subjec t" o f it s order. Af te rall , directors do need actors who follow their direction(s) , as dictators needsubjec ts , ca l l them somet imes secre ta r ies , who a lso ac t on i t , " take i tdow n," ev en t ranscr ibe it . Note h ow s t range " i t" i s .

Note , a lso , how s t range i t i s to say tha t wr i t ing happens to you. I sn ' t i tmo re the case tha t wr i t ing is your response to what happens - to and then"within" you? Doesn ' t i t seem more perspicuous to const rue the re fe rent of' i t ' to be though t , which wr i t ing then captures?

The las t two word s of th is las t paragraph a re te rr ibly t roublesome: . . .' then ' . . . ' captures . ' I s ' then ' a tempora l not ion? Of ten i t wi l l seem tha twr i t ing fol lows after the thought , in some broad sense responding to i t. Butnot a lways . Do esn ' t wr i t ing - mo re obviously in the case of it s "ana logue ,"speaking - so met imes precede thought in the sense o f producing par t icula rthoughts , perhaps even "causa l ly?" Don' t thoughts somet imes come af te rwr i t ing as i t s (wr i t ing ' s ) r esul t? And we speak now of wr i t ing be ing w r i t ten,


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10 2rather than writ ing later read, though with regard to the lat ter , what we sayis perhaps m ore resonant . We speak more l imi tedly now, how ever , of one ' sown wr i t ing process , a subsidia ry but s igni f icant componant of which i sone ' s r eading o f one ' s wr i t ing, a r eading of one ' s wr i t ten , a r eading der ivedf rom, made poss ible by, and, thus , paras i t ica l on tha t wr i t ing which i s ourf i rs t con cern.

(a ) One model i s August ine . The Confessions, spir i tually if notbibliographically plural , are addressed and in response to a familiar"you," but not a human one . The "you" i s present , though came over t lyto be so o ver t ime , emerging recent ly in the se l f -compreh ended li fe ofAugust ine . In t imacy has been a t ta ined and sus ta ins what i s confessed,even makes i t poss ible . . . .The H eidegg er c i rcumstance i s s imi la r, though by no means the same.The "you" i s absent , and came to be so over t ime , having depar ted pr iorto Heid egger ' s a r r iva l on the scene. Not even contac t or encounte r , muchless familiar i ty and/or int imacy, has been at tained. There exists, rather , avoid , i t se l f perhaps ev entua l ly a space in which . . . it ( no t "you" ) ma ycom e to give i tse l f. But no mo re than wi th August ine ' s "you " i s th is " i t "const rued as ( s imply) wi thin and par t of one .T he ' t he n ' o f "w r i ti ng then captures" is not al together "logical" ei ther .Wh ere the " then" a ra tiona l consequent of tha t to which i t r esponds , wr i t ingwould be fa r less f rus t ra t ing, fa r more predic table , more managable , butprobably fa r less r ewarding than w e in fac t exper ience it to be . And on su chan account we would ourse lves emerge fa r more machine- l ike , more"ar t i fic ia l" in in te l ligence ( Is th is in fac t the word w e w ant? But who, then,this "we?") than the var ious s l ippages in ou r expressings (and exp ress ions)be t ray us as . Le t us leave such exper ient ia l "da ta" as ide , however , subjec tas they a lways a re to theore t ica l d isputes . For wr i t ing to be a rational, le talone a str ict ly logical consequent of tha t which i t " then captures ," thenwr i tes down, the " i t " to which wr i t ing so responds must i t se l f be a ra t iona l ,perhaps even logica l antecedent. I t must i tself , in short , be rat ional, logical ,a s ta tus wi th respec t to which i t i ssues ne i ther guarantee nor discernableevidence . Consider some of the many evas ions of r ecogni t ion of th isunder lying c i rcumstance , however . I t i s somet imes sa id tha t the " i t " to becaptured must i t se l f be logica l, tha t i t could n ' t be otherwise . 4 Thus , tho ughone m ay s t il l miss i t s content a l toge ther , by be ing logica l one none the less ,and necessar i ly , mir ror s and the reby captures it s form. But w hat guaranteesthe appl icabi l i ty of the form/content d is t inc t ion as (a l legedly) inherent totha t " i t " which one seeks to wr i te down? In what sense , for example , does ar iver have a form ? 5 And, sure ly , th is i s a d i f fe rent ques tion than w hethe r i tf l ows in a par t icular direction. Wouldn' t a treatise on the rat ionali ty andlogic of r iver s be a most m isguided under taking?

Is wr i t ing a se r ies o f conc lus ions , infe rences drawn f ro m the " i t " i t seeks


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103to capture , now const rued as premise(s)? There i s no independent means ofde te rmining and revea l ing such (a l leged) "premises ," for a l l inquiryregarding them , a l l searching, researching and shar ing, takes place throughwr i t ing or through speaking, through language in the broadest sense . Howdoes one then know tha t these sought a f te r "premises ," purpor tedly the"t rue" beginnings of a l l inquiry , a re t ruly premises , possess ing " logica lf o r m? " M igh t one ma ke in f e re nc e s f rom varying wr i t ten or spoken, tha t i s ,l inguis t ic "conc lus ions" to such "prem ises ," revers ing ( logica l ) d i rec t ion soto speak? No, for in a most tangled way this would be "af f i rming theconsequent ," i t se l f a logica l fa l lacy. No, nothing fol lows f rom af f i rmedconclus ions regarding the i r under lyin g premises . Nor can w e ca l l such " i t s"as "wr i t ing then captures" p remises a t a ll . Once aga in, there is no indepen d-ent access to them, nor way to know tha t wr i t ing i s the i r ( logica l ) conse-quent or conc lus ion. Wr i t ing, r a ther , i s an outcome, a bodi ly i ssue , whichissues f rom such " i t s" as "wr i t ing then captures ." I ts so i ssuing, how ever , -and " i t s" so i ssuing, those " i t s" which "wr i t ing then captures" - r emainthem selves an i ssue.

And the ' then ' of "wr i t ing then captures ," could hardly be causa l e i ther ,as i f wr i t ing were somehow automat ic , i t s prac t i t ioners automatons . Oneneed not "wr i te i t down." There i s se ldom, i f ever , compuls ion. Of ten, infac t usua l ly , one dec ides not to do so. Somet imes, even, having dec ided towri te " i t " down, one discovers tha t one ( seemingly) can ' t , however hardone t r ies , - An d w ho is th is "one ?" An d how s tands such a one in re la t ion to'T '? To "we"? What s ta tus , dynamics and inte rac t ions , in te r re la t ions , such' ,voices?"6On the other hand, there a re such momen ts as those in which, though no tcompel led, one acquiesces and " then" fol lows, wr i t ing " i t " down as i t"comes," la rge ly succeeding in capturing "it" as i t "comes," " i t " givesi t se l f . These a re of ten exper ienced as for tuna te t imes , when " things jus tf lowed." - And w hat i s mean t by " things ," by " i t "? Ideas? Thoughts?Subsys t e ms o r sys t e ms o f c onne c t ions be tw e e n . . . ? A n d w h y shou ld ' f l ow 'seem an appropr ia te and apt verb? From where might the f low be sa id toc ome ? Whe r e i t s sour c ? A nd w he r e doe s i t go? Whe r e w he n unr e c or de d?And where does i t f i r s t "a r r ive" such tha t i t " then" can be di rec ted toward,"expressed" (pressed out ) on( to) paper , or a l lowed to pass on " through"? 7Again, on through to . . . where? To . . . what? Do such quest ions put us inthe ves t ibule , the ant ichamber of neuro-psych ology ? Or do neuroph ysiologi -ca l invest iga t ions themselves place the i r prac t i t ioners jus t as much in ave s t ibu le ? Wh ose ?

Acquiesc ing, fol lowing, wr i t ing " i t " down as i t come s a re fa r f rom causeend e f fec t , c lose to what Wit tgenste in and others rumina ted on as beingguided by. Perhaps the " then" of wr i t ing, when "wr i t ing then captures ," i s


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10 4an accept ing of guidance , not logica l , nor i l logica l e i ther , not causa l , norrandom e i ther . But a lso something more than mere ly tempora l ly con-t iguous .

" . . . w h i c h writing then captures." " . . . being guided by . . . " Ca p tu r ingand be ing guided b y sug gest s l ightly di f fe rent processes , even through the i rgrammar . What i s captured i s an "objec t" pursued and, thus , an "objec t" ofpursui t . This "objec t ," of course , can be fa r more than "mere ly" objec t ive ,as when an animal or person is pursued. And the " i t " pursued in wr i t ing isof ten exp er ienced as e lus ive , wi ly .

A reflexive relation is even possible, as when one tr ies to br ing to thesur face and de te rmine one ' s t rue fee l ings or t rue na ture . Whatever thepar t icula r case ma y be , the pursue r - sha ll this be ca l led the "wr i te r"? - i snone the less the pr imary subjec t engaged in the ac t ivi ty and is , thus , theac tor or agent of record. The (most problemat ic ) " i t , " of wr i t ing " i t " i s ,then, the pursued.

By a s l ight twis t of emphasis , how ever , one sees tha t the agent of recordin fact seeks to record, to be a recorder . To do so is to be guided by . . . thatwhich i s to be recorded. In be ing so guided agent turns to pa t ient , becom espa t ient , as suggested by the pass ive const ruc t ion ' am . . . by. ' Not o nly this .There i s indi rec tion, though this i s so mew hat di f f icul t to c la r i fy . You can behi t wi thout your coopera t ion, in spi te of a t tempts to the cont ra ry in fac t ,a t tempts , tha t i s, to avoid, even thwar t be ing hi t . But you cannot be guidedwithout considerable coop era t ion on you r par t. Y ou have , in e f fec t, to w antto be guided, and somet im es want ing i s s imply not enough. More i s needed,some of which requires considerable prepara t ion. Medica l s tudents , forexample , s tudy long and hard to reach the point where they can be guidedby diagnost ic da ta . And ma ny people have grea t di ff icul ty know ing wh atthe i r fee l ings ac tua l ly a re regarding var ious mat te r s and even grea te rdi f f icul ty le t t ing those sam e fee l ings guide them. - I s i t somet imes the casetha t want ing i t se l f needs to be cul t iva ted? For so me a t leas t, to know one ' sfee l ings requires tha t one want to do so, somet imes in the face of notwant ing to know them, not want ing to have to dea l wi th them. And ho w issuch wan t ing cul t iva ted, espec ia lly in the face of a conf l ic t ing want w hichstands in seemin g opposi t ion? 8

The las t r emarks a re problemat ic because so eas i ly mis leading. Note theseeming changes in di rec t ion tha t have been opened up. We have beencentered in our medi ta t ions through focuss ing on the som et imes di f f icul ttask of wr i t ing " i t " down. I t is th is phen omen on wh ich i s meant to guide ourunder taking. The " i t " of "wr i t ing i t down," however , i s l i t t le resemblant ofmedical data, for , unlike medical data, i ts availabil i ty is pr ivileged andinvar iant ly individua l . Access to " i t " i s only " int rospec t ive ." What othera nsw e r migh t M oz a r t o r a nyone o f us g ive w he n a ske d the sour c e o f a nd


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10 5route to the no tes now being comp osed , the l ines being wri t t en?

Another sor t o f p rob lem (and se t o f p rob lems) ar i se when "determin ingones fee l ings" o r " le t t ing them guide one" i s a l lowed to be parad igmat icwith respect to "wri t ing i t ." Feel ing is often contrasted with thought , andhuman beings are primari ly ident ified with the lat ter , feel ings then andthereby get t ing t roped as a l esser par t o f "me" - no t as d is tan t f rom my"center" as , say , my pancreas , bu t concent r ica l ly fu r ther remov ed than , say ,my overt phantasies . (In this respect the Cartesian t radi t ion and i ts closein ter twin ing of iden ti ty and t ransparency has l ingered w el l beyond i t sexaggera ted "conceptual" death . )

Note how the no t ion of a cen ter , the sphere of " thought , " o f"consciousness ," has begun to emerge in th i s par t i cu lar t rop ing . Heed nex thow seemingly ea sy i t becom es , f rom that center , to comprehe nd fee l ings assubsidiary, as virtual , though seldom actual "objects ," accessibi le to (andmade access ib le by) tha t cen ter . These "ob ject s" get cons t rued as engagablewi th in the cen ter ' s f i e ld of in f luence and as usually very much engaged .They a l so get cons t rued as somewhat per iphera l to , yet cons t i tu tive o f thatcente r - for a center after al l is a center o f " s ome t h i n g " - and get construed ,also, as under that center 's control , not al together, but at least to somedegree , as i t might equal ly be sa id , wi th some combinat ion of in te l l igenceand care, but also luck, one, as a center, can control one's ( less central , butno t so per iphera l as no t to be impor tan t) complex ion . To speak of luck , o fcourse, is to admit that wh at const i tutes that of which a center is a center,and a (part ial ly) contro l l ing cen ter at that, in this case a com plex of feel ings,also effect s tha t o f which the cen ter i s a cen ter , inc lud ing the "ve ry" ce n teritself.

These mat ters are by no means easy to comprehend , much less toart iculate. What begins as a meditat ion on wri t ing gets caught up in issuest rad i tional ly the prov ince of ph i losophical psy chology and ph i losop hy o fmind. Curiously, the not ion of a center has not i tself typical ly been centralto these l a t t er ref lec t ions . How long does a cen ter remain a cen ter? Howmuch can i t be separated from and st i l l remain i tself , remain, that is , acen ter? As a cen ter o f someth ing , i t cannot be to ta l ly d ives ted of a l l e lse bu ti tself and rema in central , remain i tself as center (of). And, again, without i ts"ofness," after al l , a center could not be (a center). Or could i t? In the Westwe have tended to think at t imes of total separabi l i ty in principle, as i f ashumans we were pure thought (Descar tes ) o r ex t rac tab le sou ld impr i sonedin a bodies (Plato). Even then some "central i ty" remains and, thus, our-se lves as cen ters remain as wel l, fo r the "ob ject s" o f our thought (o r o f oursoul ' s devot ion) might be sa id to surround us, be around us. Our thinkingradia tes out toward and to them. Their total i ty const i tutes the sphere of ourawareness , though no t a lways of our in f luence . - And no te the oddity , even


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106mystery of th is . Can you a lways inf luence the "objec ts" of your thought?Try. And what does ' inf luence ' mean ? Al te r? Persuade? Flow into?

Minimal ly , i t is of ten thought , fee l ings be long inseparably wi th thought ,tha t cente r wi thout which they could not be , but which would not exis twithout them either . This center , i t is said, is that from which feelingsproceed, but which of ten subsequent ly (and a t t imes content iously) thesesame feelings engage, disrupt, supplement, confuse, guide, calm, agitate ,and so on.

"Wri t ing it down," "be ing guided by it and trying (at the same t ime) tocapture it," suggest a subt ly di f fe rent model than the on e which re fe rence tofeelings tends to generate. On the "feeling" model feelings tend to besecondary, the i r possessor pr imary. "Wri t ing i t down ," i f taken paradigmat i -cally, tends to make the "it" pr imary, ourselves as i ts recorders (scr ibes,conveyers, reporters) secondary. We might be said (at least to try) to circlearound "it ," rather than to construe i t as somehow circling around us. Butthere is more. Feelings tend to be viewed as precariously cognit ive, ifcognit ive at al l , as largely lacking in any sequential dynamic, if having oneat all , as pr imitive, if not altogether deficient with respect to the adjectivalrelevance and applicabil i ty of such terms as the following: halt ing, insight-ful , slow, br il l iant , English, ponderous, uninformed, f lowing, proposit ional,rapid, multi-directioned, disorganized, persuasive, cunning. Feelings, also,we are inclined to believe, are "objects," pr imarily of psychological interest ,beyond, that is , their obvious personal importance, their signif icance to (andfor ) those who possess them (and to and for those who must or choose todeal with those who do) . But is i t the case that the "i t" which gets writ tendown is a lso pr imar i l y of psychologica l in teres t? What sense can be made ,for ins tance , what va lue found in and f rom a psychologica l s tudy of the " i t "which Kant wrote down, or E ins te in , Bee thoven, Frege , Ar is tot le , Newton,Hume, Darwin or Stravinsky? And they did all write "i t" down, offer ing i tin varying forms for our reading.

No, "feeling" belongs to the psychological in a way in which the "it"which writ ing attempts to capture does not. A denial of this circumstancecannot but ca tapul t i t s adherent in to the most bla tant of psychologisms.Note fur ther . One can, in fact usually does have various feelings, sometimesintense ones regarding the "it" which writ ing captures, and often evenst ronger ones regarding a t tempts a t capturing and/or impro ving " i t . " But the"it" i tself is not in this sense a feeling, however many and diverse those i tmay produce or pro voke in us . And this ra ises t roublesome, even paradoxi-cal questions. Do all the (relevant) feelings provoked, produced, belong tous? Or s ome to i t? Do they invar iably com e to us , or somet imes f rom i t? I ft he y c ome to us, f rom where (or whom) do they come? Do we providethem, or are they given to us, provided for us? More generally, does "i t"


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107belong to us or do we be long to i t? And what in e i ther case can 'be lo nging 'mea n? In the te rra in adumbra ted through such questions the task of concep-tua l car tography appears bewi lder ing.

(b) Note how c lose ly the " i t " of wr i ting it (down) para l le ls in man y of i t svar ious and co mple x fea tures Heidegge r ' s Being. Consider , f i r st , the " i t . "Without us " i t " would not , could not be wr i t ten (or spoken) . I f i t turnedout to be o f the essence of "i t" to f ind expression of i tself - for i tself? -then wi thout us (or c rea tures much l ike us) i t would not be , and thiswou ld in i t se l f be an essent ia l t ruth regarding " i t , " on e ne i ther acc identa lnor a rbi t ra ry , a t ruth bui l t in to " i t s" def ini t ion. An d could one im agine an"i t" such tha t i t never got wr i t ten dow n nor , perhaps , could be so w r i t ten?A n " i t " w hic h w a s ( some ho w ) inde pe nde n t o f us? Wha t, t he n " i t "? A ndw ho "w e "? Y e t t he w r i t i ng o f " i t " w ou ld no t be i t , nor would suchwr i t ing l ike ly exhaust i t , however much i t depended upon us for i t s"be ing."H e ide gge r ' s ma nne r o f spe e c h a nd unde r ly ing ph ilosophic a l c omm i t -ment , of course , involve c la iming tha t i t i s of the essence of Being togive i t se l f , to manifes t i t se l f , tha t Being ( therefore) needs "man."Humans a re const rued as Being ' s poem, presumably as i t s express ion, i t ssaying, i t s wr i t ing (down) . This poem (Being) would (and could) nototherwise exis t.Now turning the mat te r a round, as cogni t ive be ings whose essent ia lcharac te r i s somehow inext r icably caught up in awareness , both ofsignif icance and at the same t ime, potentially at least , of i tself , that is , asre f lexive , we need tha t to which wr i t ing is a response : tha t which gu idesand thereby makes wr i t ing (and speech) poss ible . And sure ly throughthese and s imi la r observa tions w e ge t caugh t up in a te r r ible tangle , onewhich has a l te rna t ive ly haunted and tyrannized over the pass ingtwent ie th century. Though thought - presumably tha t which (howeverimper fec t ly) ge ts wr i t ten down - has been sa id to have no exis tence apar tf rom langu age , language , const rued e i ther as wr i t ing or as speech, i s veryf requent ly , perhaps a lmost a lways , a response to something fa r lessobviously language , i f language a t a l l , something which languages t r iesto capture, to express, to "get r ight," to write (down).Heid egger te l l s us tha t i t is o f our essence to l ive wi thin an unders tand-ing of Being, wi thout which - the unders tanding and (howe ver fa intly orprecar iously) the unders too d - we would not , could not be . AnotherHeidegger ian way to put th is i s to say tha t we a re our openness , tha topenness i s in tent iona l , and tha t in tent iona l i ty places (what " then"becomes) us in the order of s igni f icance . Yet another way is to say we"are" only so long as Being "is," that is , so long as Being gives i tself , solong as "i t" gives.

I IThis a t temp t a t shared "re f lec t ion" - i s r e flec t ion, then, when successful , amirroring, a non-distor t ing capturing (of "i t") as in a mirror , a duplicating?


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10 8But let me star t again.

This at tempt to ref lect in a sharable way, this at tempted writ ing (of) "i tdo wn - is the writ ing, then, som ething that belong s to it , someth ing that isof i t? Or does "i t" belon g to the writer? But I must star t . . . again.

This writ ing "it" (down) gave r ise already in the f irst section, explicit lyas "i ts" (and, yet also, at that last section's) end, to the question ofb e l o n g i n g . Does the " i t " of (a t tempts a t ) wr it ing down be long to "us ," or do"we" be long to " i t?" And what in e i ther case can 'be longing ' mean? Again,what (or who) " i t "? And who (or what) "we" ?

It is now fashionable, of ten in fact helpful, to ask in the case of writ tenw o r k w h o is writ ing/signing, whose signature is aff ixed to the writ ing. Thiscan be esp ec ia l ly impor tant where "we " i s used in the body of the text , forin the usua l c i rcumstance where there i s jus t one s igna ture , a s ingularascr ipt ion o f authorship, a reader i s le ft some what perplexed, though moreof ten suspic ious regarding recourse to the f i r s t person plura l in the text ' sbody, subsequent ly (and wi th seeming inconsis tency) s igned s ingular ly .From these c i rcumstances a r ises the not ion of a f loa t ing "we." This "we"ge ts const i tu ted, perhaps , by one or more readers assent ing to i t a t eachpar t icula r point of i t s emergen ce - and not necessar i ly any of the samereaders f rom paragraph to paragraph, tha t i s , f rom we to we . At any pointwhere the reader disagrees , a f te r a l l , the "we" becomes for tha t r eader , athey: those , who a long wi th the author , be l ieve or ascr ibe to w hat the "w e"asser ts (or confesses) . Perhaps this "we" is at a cer tain point the writer( s igna tory, author ) and jus t one reader . Or no reader eve r acquisces and the"we " i s the wr i te r ' s i l lus ion of a group of l ike-minded people , perhaps ani l lus ion de l ibera te ly c rea ted by the w r i te r as a rhe tor ica l device to en gend eragreement , to persuade , an a t tempt to engender the so-ca l led bandwagonef fec t . Perhaps the "we" then func t ions of ten in what many would ca l l ani d e o l o g i c a l ma nne r .

To pursue t h i s fur ther is to mo ve u s - us? - fur ther into poli t ics. Insof aras i t proves possible, i t is just precisely this move I hope to minimize, tosome extent even t ranscend or overcome wi th respec t to re f lec t ion onwr i t ing " i t . " On wr i t ing " i t, " r emem ber , i s the ref lexive focus (and quan dry)of this study. In fact i t is this study, this study's t i t le , i ts ( thematic) signa-ture. ( Is a ti t le, as a signature, a nam e? Ofte n just a label? Are n' t labels alsoa lways pol i t ica l? )

With respec t to wr i t ing ( i t) , const rued now as " i tem " pursued w i t h i n thisstudy, under the guidance (and direction) of this study's t i t le , is i t possibleto c i rcum vent pol i t ica l ges tures? Or, i s such (a t tempted) c i rcumv ent ion noti t se l f a lso qui te pol i t ica l? The issue i s mo st di f f icul t . But wh y even a t temptto avoid b e ing pol i t ical? This br ings us to the c rux of the mat te r .

There i s an int r iguing aphor ism, a t t r ibuted to the French: th ings begin in


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109my stery and end in pol it ics. P icking up aga in f rom ear l ie r r e flec t ions ,9 whatmigh t be ca l led the "aboutnes s" of wr i t ing 10 - th is " aboutness" or"re fe ren ce" now con st rued as the " i t " wr i t ing would disc lose , wr i te (down)- i s bes t const rued as (pre-pol it ica l) myste ry, how ever man y pol i t ica lconsequences might ge t subsequent ly drawn. And, of course , such anasser t ion i s never provable through inference , any m ore than is the " i t , " andit ( the asser t ion) a n d "i t" a re a lways disputable . The " i t " to be wr i t ten(down) m ight be sa id to lie beyo nd space and t ime. Sources - and is not " i t"a source o f (and for) wr i t ing? - inaugura te spaces (and t imes). Equal ly ,beginning s - and is not " i t " a beginning o f (and for ) wr i t ing? - inaugura tet imes (and spaces) . As coordina te sys tems used not jus t for measurem ent ,but a lso of ten for placement , for cont rol , and, thus , as ins t ruments o f power ,space and t ime be long to the rea lm of pol i t ics . Perhaps they should beconst rued as the m inimal condi t ions for pol i tics ' occur rence . Consider . Weof ten seek to possess , thus br ing under our cont rol , tha t which we en-counter . And sure ly the " i t " of wr i t ing i s a supreme example , a pr ime causeand s t imula tn o f such a des i re - whate ver other responses ( to " i t ") a re a lsoposs ible , those , even , tha t mig ht dissolve , or render inef fec t ive , possess iveurgings. To control is to posit ion and, therefore, to be in a posit ion to put(som ething , "i t") into a posit ion. To be on eself in such a posit ion - aposi t ion to posi t ion - i s to have (or be) a context or f rame (work) . In abroad, though "manageably" metaphor ic sense i t i s to be spa t io- tempora land on (and as) tha t bas is to be what Heidegger would ca l l c a l c u l a t i v e . -And note the a t tendent oddi ty ye t famil ia r i ty , even resonance , of thebroadly phi losophico- re l igious s tory of human his tor ica l dec l ine whenref rac ted through such formula t ions . The "fa l l" in to space and t ime madeanything but dec l ine impossible , for to be in space and t ime is to be posi -t ioned, but , m ore im por tant ly , posi tioning, thus ca lcula t ive . Calcula t ion ge tsconst rued, and unavoidably, as on a cont inuum a t the other end of which i sdevot ion. Much l ike hot and cold, the degree of presence of the one i s tha tdegree less presence of the - tha t i s, i t s - other . Ca lcula t ion i s pos sess ion ' smo de o f thought , as devot ion i s absorpt ion ' s , and possess ive /absorpt ive -ana l /oral - l ike hot /cold a re mutua l ly exc lus ionary, but, as w i th hot /cold, inte rms of degree . Possess ive /absorpt ive , in fac t , might be sa id to be t h e m o s tbasic (and opposi t iona l) qua l i f ie rs of openness : possess ion "c losure ,"absorpt ion "disc losure ."

No w posi t ioning i t se l f a r ises out of the urge to possess , thus cont rol - oris to control , thus possess? Is the urge to control/possess, to be center ing(and thus onese l f the cente r ) , i t sel f the cause o f the "fa l l" in to space an dt ime, which a re , in fac t , the condi t ions making possess ion and cont rol , andunder lying them as the i r condi t ion, cente redness , t h u s s e l f i t s e l f , possible?But , then w h o has this urge? A re fe rent to such a "wh o," perhaps , in fac t , an


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11 0"I" is said only to ar ise, to become possible, af ter and as a ( l ikely) conse-quence of what the urge e f fec ts : space and t ime, and a not necessar i lya l toge ther uni f ied and integra ted cente r ing which ac ts ca lcula t ive ly so as tocont rol and possess , possess and cont rol . The answer to the "who"? ques-t ion, if this be true, is given, if at al l , only much later through those ac-t ivit ies most appropriate to the urge, activit ies now appropriately troped,properly and with propriety, as incorporation, ingestion, eating, assimila-t ion, identif ication, introjection, appropriation and so on.

Who , then, i s the we? At w hat i s seemingly the deepest leve l we canreach, the "we" i s subjec t to a problemat ic emergence , fa r moreperspicuously t roped in psychologica l / re l igious language than in thediscourses of pol it ics - though obv iously ga thered up into and conve rsantwi th (and through) those languages as wel l .In the l ight of this last paragraph, an obsc ure l ight at best, giv en theinherent di f f icul t ies of ex-posi t ion, of re -moval to a pre-spa t io- tempora loriginal (and originating) posit ion, a pre-posit ion, the "i t" to be writ tenmight be ca l led the "food" for thought . But i t might equa l ly , therefore , beca l led the source (and substance) of the "who," the di f fe rent ( f rom "me ") i t ,ident i f ica t ion wi th which provides the (problemat ic ) "me" wi th whateverident i ty i t can have , whatever ident i ty " i t " can give me, whatever ident i ty ,thus , I can com e to have , an ident i ty I r ece ive through " i t s" comin g to m e ini ts d i f fe rence and as di f fe rent , a com ing I r ece ive , wr i te down as " i t " com esto me, and become. I become, tha t i s , come to be because i t comes. I am"i t" to the degree I absorb i t . To whatever degree I do not , I am not . Asingest ing and ident i fying my se l f wi th (and as) th is com ing, I am. Insofar asI ident i fy myse l f with th is coming, I am agent . Ident i f ied not with, bu t asth is coming, I am vehic le of it s coming, for i t com es through me as vehic leof i t s emergence . Or i s i t , in fac t the other way a round: as th is coming Ibeco me agent , wi th the com ing I am vehic le?

Let us consider now f rom s t i l l another perspec t ive . Do I be long to i t?Withou t i t I am not . I f i t is what th inking is, the rea l i ty and m anifes ta t ion ofthought , and I am the ra t iona l animal , the thinking thing, then wi thou t i t (orbefo re i t and after i t - and is the af ter, then, death?) I am no t. The thin kingcomes, however . "I t" comes. From where and how, then, comes the 'T '? I si t the thinking or a par t of the thinking? How could this be? Af te r a l l , I t ryto capture " i t , " t ry to wr i te " i t " down. Of ten " i t " escapes m e, f rus t ra tes me,baf f les me. What am I t rying to say? And what am I? I seem separa te f romthe thinking. But a m I (and 'T ' ) , how ever disguisedly, par t of " i t "? I f so, Ibe long to i t. I am i ts (a lmost cunning ?) manifes ta t ion. I f not , i f 'T ' not par tof it , how, where , w hen I?

Now f rom the "other" s ide . - On who se s ide a re you? On w hose s ide am1? Wh ich s ide am I? It s s ide?


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111From the other s ide . Does i t be long to me? Wel l , the i t I t ry to wr i te

down , w hen I am t rying to wr i te it down, i s no one e lse ' s i s it? No one e lsehas access to i t, unless I choose to give them access through te l l ing them. Iseem of ten able to shut i t of f , eas ie r done than turning " i t " on. (Of ten, infac t , " i t " turns me on) . Somet imes I can ' t cont rol i t . On the other hand,ne i ther can I mu ch cont rol m y hear tbea t.

Perhaps i t is bes t to take a s tep back, th is in order to ask what ' be longing 'means . B ut in the absence of be longing ' s preposi tion, what i s ava i lable forre f lec t ion i s meager and inconclus ive . X might be sa id to be long to Y, orequa l ly with y.11 Minim al ly , wi th the i ssue of preposi t iona l qua l i f ie r le f t inabeyance , "be longing" suggests tha t the X which be longs could be e lse -where , o r under di f fe rent cont rols, and tha t i s somet imes perhaps i s. An dnow we come to the c rux. The " to" suggests Y ' s ownership, i t s possess ionof X, wherea s "wi th" suggests a toge therness in which ne i ther X nor Y needbe sa id to "own" or possess the other . Nei ther need be const rued as prece-dent . But note how our quest ion of the " i t " and the "r ' who t r ies to wr i te itdown has been cas t , viz., as " to" quest ion. On such a bas is o de of the two,the 'T ' or the " i t " (of wr i ting i t down ) must have asc enden cy over the other .Preposi t iona l grammar , seemingly dic ta tes tha t such be the case , and i t i sprec ise ly a t th is point tha t our more modest labors regarding "wr i t ing i t "begin to m erge wi th major i ssues in contemporary phi losophy.

Som e rec ent phi losophers , m ost notably Der r ida , 12 as we know , h avebeen inc l ined to ca l l such a c i rcumstance as (my) wr i t ing " i t " engenders abinary opposi t ion. In such an opposi t iona l c i rcumstance , the "opposi tes" -not opposi tes necessar i ly a t a l l , jus t s imply in "opposi t ion" and thus"antagonis ts" - contend for supremacy. To forward the not ion tha t thec on te nde r s c a nno t be without each other , tha t in an impor tant sensedominance i s a misguided not ion wi thin the binar i ty , the not ion of"privileging" is introduced. I t is then said that "we" pr ivilege, that is ,choose to give prefe rence to one or the other of the binary e lements , i t sother , then, be ing in e f fec t "margina l ized."

Note how the s tory, a s igni f icant dimension of phi losophica l (hi ) s tory,can no w be told . The "I ," and the " i t " th is 'T ' seeks to wr i te (down) , be longwith each other . However , and even a t an ear ly point , the i ssue of ascen-denc y or super ior i ty a rises . Wh ether the preposi t iona l t r ansit ion f rom 'wi th 'or ' to ' i s cause or e f fec t in th is regard does not concern us for the mom ent .Once the i ssue of ascendency does a r ise , however , i t i s judged tha t thesuperio r of the two, as par t ial pr oof of i ts superior ity, as, in fact, a sign i tbears as well as one of i ts inherent features, must control i ts lesser par tner ,dom ina te i t , which, then, m akes i t s lesser par tner suporbina te.

What might demonst ra te such cont rol? Power over the ( then) cont rol led,though not assured, i s made more , secure more suscept ible of proof , i f i t


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112can be shown tha t ownership (possess ion) i s involved. One way, howeverpr imi t ive , through which this i s accompl ished is to exper ience (or s implyclaim) that the controlled issued from its (purported) contro ller - forexample, these "its" ( thoughts, feelings) issue from me and, thus, are mine;as the i r owner , in whose p ossess ion they a re , I am the dom inant one , thesevar ious " i t s" subordina te to me, however unruly they somet imes a re .Another way bypasses the quest ion of i ssuance , of or igin , and seeks todemonstrate control by taking i t ("i t ," of course, in a double sense) over -for example , I com e to disc ipl ine , to harmonize my var ious " i t s" ( thoughts ,fee l ings) ; thereby, they become more and more wi thin my power to guide ,a t t imes even command, for they have become progress ive ly more andmor e mine through my maste ry of them.

But there are always doubts, doubts based, often, on occurrences(irruptions?) which shake belief in any easy answer to the superior ityquest ion. The doubts can perhaps be se t t led more " theore t ica l ly ." I sn ' t thereal (or more real) the superior of the two? What is "real ," then, what(appropriate cr i ter ia of) reali ty? The real is lasting - Isn' t th at I? I 'm always"here"; my fee l ings and thoughts , those " i t s" of mine , they come and go.An d surely the real is rat ional - now con sider my thou ghts and feelings intheir frequ ent ir raitonali ty.

We could cont inue a long these l ines , but th is would be unnecessary, forthe under lying points have a l ready emerged. Ascendency becomes an i ssue- somethin g which could only have happened because "I" and " i t " fel l outof under lying harmony, or because "I" emerged and the "harmony" i ssue ,for whatever reason, became one of dominance . Dominance then gotdemonst ra ted e i ther through ac t ivi t ies (of domina t ion) or through theor ies(of superior ity) .

The "theories of superior ity" avenue is terr ibly suggestive. I ts f irstsuggest ion i s tha t domina t ion could not be convinc ingly es tabl ished norcould a t tempts a t it be a l toge ther convinc ingly f rus tra ted. So me measure ofdomina t ion, a lways capable of be ing los t , made poss ible the concern overfur ther domina t ion, and proof of dominance was one form the concern forfur ther domina t ion took. I f such a suggest ion i s va lid , then theory em ergesas pr imar i ly an ins t rument of domina t ion, one "I" employ to cont rol( further) and thereby dom ina te more o ver my varying " i ts ."

Must there be a dominant one in a due t? By c la iming one par tnerdominant that par tner is thereby chosen, is pr ivileged, is given cer tainpr ivi leges . But "who" does the ini t ia l c la iming tha t dominance exis ts andthat "this par t icular par tner ," rather than that , is in fact dominant? Who isthe ini t ia l pr ivi leger? Who does the choosing, establ ishing thereby achosen? The way o ur s tory unfolds, some com bina t ion of Freud and Darwinon the one hand, Plato and Western Rationalism on the other , the (at f irst


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11 3precar iously emergent ) "I ," seeking fur ther powers , i s the chooser . Thesought a f te r powers this 'T ' exper iences as having to come a t the expense ofthose ( som et imes bewilder ing, even threa tening) " i t s ," out of whose mutua lentang lemen t and confusion the 'T ' has ( recent ly) emerged. The "I ," thus , is"self-ch oosin g." I t chooses i tself. Given i ts sense of "at the expens e of" - i tspr imi t ive , and therefore a l l the more power ful adherence to exc lus ivealternation, to e i t he r 'T ' o r "i t" and never both - i ts choice unavoidablyimpover ishes i t s par tner . Theor ies of the emerging 'T"s own super ior i tyare, thus , tools, empl oyed by this 'T ' toward i t s var ious ends , r anging f romsepara t ion and independence , through cont rol and domina t ion to renuncia-t ion and ext i rpa t ion (of those " i t s" f rom which the 'T ' seeks re lie f - andrelease) .

How is the choosing accompl ished? Here there i s a deep cur ios ity . Giventhe undulying sense of e i ther /or , but never both, any ac t of a f f i rmat ion bythe 'T ' is i tself a choosing. And by this relentless (and relentlessly opposi-t ional) "logic," such aff irmation is in i ts very emergence a negation of thepar tner , the " i t " member of the dua l i ty . Duet becomes due l . May the be t te rwin. Thus opposi t ion, antagon ism is bui lt in to the very process o f the "I " ' semergence . Aff i rmat ion i s nega t ion.

But negation is, then, aff irmation as well . To negate the "it" is , byexc lus iona l " logic ," to have a f f i rmed the "I " in the very nega t ing ac t ion.Par t of the nega t ing ac t ivi ty , the dis tanc ing involved in separa t ing andbecoming independent as an "I ," takes the form, however "unintended," oft ransmut ing the pa r t n e r into (not altogether simply, but in another senses imply) other .Conside r careful ly . A due t i s be ing "sung." Harmony , mutua l i ty , perhapsnearly fused intimacy are in play. One partner aff irms, however , and, by thelogic of exclusion, thereby denies ( the other par tner , now, simply, theother) . What I do wi th you becomes, w hen I do i t as and for me, som ethingI do to you. The "wi thness" of be longing takes on a " to-ness ." I f and whenthis "to-ness" is applied to the "belonging" i tself , the non-opposit ionalduali ty, the duet, becomes opposit ional, potentially antagonistic , an issue ofascendency and control . In fact , the f irst issue that i s sues f rom the separa teasser t ion of I , and thus the t ransforming of be longing wi t h in to be longingto , i s the i ssue of dominance /sub ordinance , super ior i ty /infe rior i ty .

I t is at least conceivable that the "i t" of writ ing i t down was once, andprimordially, not an "it" at al l , but more akin to an "I ." I t would in fact notat this ear lier point be an "I ," for "I" ar ises from asser t ion and involves, byexc lus ionary impl ica t ion, a denia l of "I -ness" to what would then becomeits other and, thus, an "it ." Were the "it ," thus, of writ ing "it" down, to beconstrued as or iginally "I ," the "I ," who now struggles to write "i t" down,become "itself . ' an "i t" in "ear ly t imes."


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11 4How to construe an "i t" as , original ly, more akin to an "I," but not one?

One reason this is so hard a quest ion to answer is that i t is addressed,however un themat ical ly , to an "I," and, for an affirming "I," the answergiven builds on the basis of an "i t ," that is , assumes the referent of thean s wer t o be an "i t" - this because for an affirming 'T' the non-"I" is , byexclusionary logic, invariably "i t ," as "personal" I , the non-I is , by the samerelent less , obviously in fact destruct ive logic, impersonal . In short , to ask"us" to answer this quest ion, to address the quest ion to us, is already tohave undercut the possibi l i ty of an appropriate, that is , resonant response.For "us" to an swer i s for "our" answer to make fundam ental reference to an"i t ," just precisely and explici t ly what the quest ion seeks to t ranscend.

I have jus t ma de m ent ion of resonance, o f resonance (as preferab le toappropr ia teness) in response . One of the consequences o f the emergence ofbelonging to , and thus oppos i t ion , f rom the po ten t ia l ly more harmonicre la t ion of belonging with, is a s t i l l further, but s l ight ly different preposi-t ional t ransi t ion, viz., from the "with," this t ime of resona t ing with, throughthe " to" of responding " to ," to the "a tness" of looking at in the sense of"object ive" examinat ion . I f what I have sugges ted i t se l f resonates , engen-ders an acknowledging response , then there a l so comes a recogni t ion that"wri t ing it (down)" i s bes t served by resonance and that appropr ia t ional ready assumes a d i s tance, which a subsequent se t o f appropr ia t ive act swould al leviate. Properly understood, but fi rs t necessari ly l ived (andresonantly) the I-i t (of wri t ing "i t" down) is towards, i f not in the cen ter o fthat which motiva tes the unfolding and spiritual disclosure of our humanexistence. M ight this indicate the direct ion of post-twe ntieth ce nturyphilosophical thought? I think so, but to think so with that persuasive forcewhich engenders acquiescence i s l ess a mat ter o f " th ink ing" than of f ind ingaccess to and within the tangled terrain of wri t ing and, then, yes, finding away of wri t ing " i t ."

Notes

1. However important Heidegger and Derrida are to the development of latetwentieth century thought, they are not the thematic focus of what follows.Reference to their work, thus, in the main body of the text, is decidedly moreallusive than argumentative or demonstrative. I will reme dy this to some exten tthrough some strategically placed footnotes. One of the things which late stagephiloso phica l thought is doing, I believe, is gradually extricating itself from theincreasingly confining parameters of comm entary . In this resp ect Mon taigne isperhaps un fortunately apt for our time in his reflections on the pervasiveness o fcommentary.2. Heid egge r's account of Being 's "giving itself," in fact, may we ll have beengenerated from something closely akin to the experience of writing. See in this


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115connect ion, Mart in Heidegger, Being and Time, t rans . John Macquarrie &Edward Robinson (N ew York: Harper & Row, 1962). See especial ly pp. 55-6 3and 203-214.

3. See in this connect ion "The Presence of the Present as Absence: SomeReflect ions ," Man and WorM, Vol. 24, Fall 1991, pp. 355-72.4. This is surely Wittge nstein's view, for exam ple, in the Tractatus, as well asHusserl 's in his Logical Investigations.5. When T .S. El iot wri tes "The Dry Salvages" sect ion of Four Quartets, referr ingto the r iver as "a s t rong brown god," he is very close to a precarious and, inDerrida 's sense, " t rembling" boundary between what the older t radi t ion wasmost comfortable cal l ing "God and man." As I indicated in snipi t (a) , thoughdid not expl ici t ly s tate , August ine and Heidegger work very close to thisboun dary's edges , a t t imes vir tual ly eras ing them.6. And o bviously plural i ty is involved here. The decenteredness so much upo n usthrough Foucaul t and others need not imply some exis tent ial variant of a nooccupanc y theory o f "consciousness ." Mult iple vo ices are not only l ikely, butperhaps unavoidable. See in this connect ion, Jacques Derrida, "Eat ing Well ,"or the Calculation of the Subject," trans. Peter Connor and Avital Ronell, inWho Comes after the Subject? ed. Eduardo Cadava et a l . (New York: Rout-ledge, Chapman and Hall , 1991). Pp. 96-119.7. Note the Heideggerian reference to ausdruecken (expression) in Being andTime. See especial ly pp. 190-191.8. The Heideg gerian s t ruggle to connect the "cal l" of conscience and "wanting tohave a co nscience" is obviously a variant of this problem. In another context i tmight be argued that Heidegger is t rying to f ind a way to give himself over tothe " i t ," from Being and Time to his belated interview, published pos-thumously, in w hich he says that "only a god can save us ."9. See in this connect ion "The Presence of the Present as Absence: SomeReflect ions ," Man and World, Vol. 24, Fall 1991, pp. 355-372.10. The des ignat ion which I prefer regarding the "aboutness" of wri t ing is TowardDisclosure. It names at once a series of articles, some of which are published,and some still in progress, and also a longer study which will appear under thistitle, viz., Toward Disclosure.11. I t might be helpful to keep a few examples in mind.(1) Jane belongs to Jack (or Jack belongs to Jane).(2) Red belong to colour ( is one).(3) Jane belongs with Jack (or Jack belongs with Jane).(4) Extension belongs to (with) space.(5) The chair belongs over there.(6) They belong together.(7) Language belongs to humans.(8) Humans belong to language.

12. See in this conne ction, for examp le, Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference,trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Th e University of Chicago Press, 1978). Seepart icularly pp. 196 -231.

On Writing It

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