ON TIME - NEW CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE...

ON TIME - NEW CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HUSSERLIANPHENOMENOLOGY OF TIME

PHAENOMENOLOGICASERIES FOUNDED BY H.L. VAN BREDA AND PUBLISHED

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE HUSSERL-ARCHIVES

197

ON TIME - NEW CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEHUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY OF TIME

Editorial Board:

Director: U. Melle (Husserl-Archief, Leuven) Members: R. Bernet (Husserl-Archief,Leuven) R. Breeur (Husserl-Archief, Leuven) S. IJsseling (Husserl-Archief, Leuven)H. Leonardy (Centre d’études phénoménologiques, Louvain-la-Neuve) D. Lories(CEP/ISP/Collège Désiré Mercier, Louvain-la-Neuve) J. Taminiaux (Centre d’étudesphénoménologiques, Louvain-la-Neuve) R. Visker (Catholic University Leuven,Leuven)

Advisory Board:

R. Bernasconi (The Pennsylvania State University), D. Carr (Emory University,Atlanta), E.S. Casey (State University of New York at Stony Brook), R. Cobb-Stevens(Boston College), J.F. Courtine (Archives-Husserl, Paris), F. Dastur (Université de ParisXX), K. Düsing (Husserl-Archiv, Köln), J. Hart (Indiana University, Bloomington),K. Held (Bergische Universität Wuppertal), K.E. Kaehler (Husserl-Archiv, Köln),D. Lohmar (Husserl-Archiv, Köln), W.R. McKenna (Miami University, Oxford, USA),J.N. Mohanty (Temple University, Philadelphia), E.W. Orth (Universität Trier), C. Sini(Università degli Studi di Milano), R. Sokolowski (Catholic University of America,Washington D.C.), B. Waldenfels (Ruhr-Universität, Bochum)

For further volumes:http://www.springer.com/series/6409

ON TIME -new contributions to the

husserlian phenomenology of time

Edited by

Dieter Lohmar and Ichiro Yamaguchi

123

EditorsDieter LohmarUniversität KolnHusserl-ArchivAlbertus-Magnus Platz50923 Kö[email protected]

Ichiro YamaguchiGraduate School of LiteratureToyo University5-28-20 HakusanTokyoBunkyo-ku112-8606 [email protected]

ISSN 0079-1350ISBN 978-90-481-8765-2 e-ISBN 978-90-481-8766-9DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8766-9Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York

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CONTENTS

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Rudolf Bernet: Husserl’s New Phenomenology of TimeConsciousness in the Bernau Manuscripts . . . . . . . . . 1

John B. Brough: Notes on the Absolute Time-ConstitutingFlow of Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

James Dodd: Death and Time in Husserl’s C-Manuscripts . . . . 51

Saulius Geniusas: On Birth, Death, and Sleep in Husserl’sLate Manuscripts on Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Klaus Held: Phenomenology of “Authentic Time” in Husserland Heidegger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Dieter Lohmar: On the Constitution of the Time of theWorld: The Emergence of Objective Time on theGround of Subjective Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Yves Mayzaud: The Metaphor of the Stream:Critical Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

James Mensch: Retention and the Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Stefano Micali: The Temporalizations of the Absolute Flow ofTime-Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Liangkang Ni: Horizontal-Intention: Time, Genesis,History – Husserl’s Understanding of their ImmanentRelationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Luis Niel: Temporality, Stream of Consciousness and the I inthe Bernau Manuscripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

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vi contents

Lanei M. Rodemeyer: A Return to Retention and Recollection:An Analysis of the Possible Mutual Influence ofConsciousness and its Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

Tetsuya Sakakibara: Reflection Upon the Living Present andthe Primal Consciousness in Husserl’s Phenomenology . . 251

Nicolas de Warren: The Inner Night: Towards aPhenomenology of (Dreamless) Sleep . . . . . . . . . . . 273

Ichiro Yamaguchi: Intermonadic Temporalization inSimultaneous Reciprocal Awakening . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

Dan Zahavi: Inner (Time-)Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319

Name Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341

CONTRIBUTORS

Rudolf Bernet Husserl-Archives, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 3000Leuven, Belgique

John B. Brough Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA

James Dodd New School for Social Research, New York, USA

Saulius Geniusas James Madison University, Harrisonburg,Virginia, USA

Klaus Held Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany

Dieter Lohmar Universität zu Köln, Cologne, Germany

Yves Mayzaud Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany

James Mensch Department of Philosophy, Saint Francis XavierUniversity, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Canada

Stefano Micali Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany

Liangkang Ni Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-Sen University,510275 Guangzhou, PR China

Luis Niel Husserl Archiv, Universität zu Köln, Cologne, Germany

Lanei M. Rodemeyer Department of Philosophy, DuquesneUniversity, Pittsburgh, PA 15282, USA

Tetsuya Sakakibara Department of Philosophy, The University ofTokyo, Bunkyo, Tokyo, Japan

Nicolas de Warren Wellesley College, Wellesley, MA, USA

Ichiro Yamaguchi Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

Dan Zahavi Center for Subjectivity Research, University ofCopenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

vii

INTRODUCTION

Husserl’s analyses of the constitution of time belong to the most difficultpart of his phenomenology. They entail the attempt to gain insight intothe deepest level of constitution as well as the different steps involved inthe process that lead up to the full objective time. As one should expect,such an attempt faces exceptional difficulties. These difficulties often ledHusserl in his research manuscripts to competing aporetic solutions, tounsolvable dilemmas and sometimes also to serious regresses. Yet also, thehigher levels of constitution imply temporal aspects that offer challengingquestions that sometimes led to the ultimate frontiers of phenomenologi-cal understanding. It thus turns out that Husserl’s analyses seem to offer atleast some promising ways of accessing the problems of time-constitution.And yet, the problems often call for a renewed or even a reformed phe-nomenological treatment, informed by and systematically oriented to thephenomenological method.

Some difficulties also arise from Husserl’s attempt to treat a multitudeof constitutional questions simultaneously but without a clear insightinto this variety. In his Lectures Husserl tries to treat several projects atthe same time and this leads to a complex mixture of tasks and methods:(1) the analysis of immanent time itself, i.e., the flow of consciousness,and this means the character of time in the inner experience of conscious-ness itself (the time of the act itself ); (2) the analysis of the subjectivetime in its function as a medium of representation for objective time inevents and lasting objects; (3) the search for the ultimate level of consti-tution in which, on the basis of the pure hyletic streaming (in all fieldsof sensibility), sensible data together with their duration are constituted;(4) the investigation of specific time-objects like melodies or events (insubjective and objective time); (5) the constitution of the unity of con-sciousness itself; (6) furthermore, Husserl also works on the conceptualand methodological tools of his analysis of time.

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x introduction

Besides the deep and challenging difficulty of the topic itself, alreadythe central text of Husserl’s investigations of time, the Lectures on thephenomenology of internal time-consciousness edited by Martin Heideggerin 1928, offers numerous textual difficulties that mirror Husserl’s lifelongstruggle with time-consciousness. This text does not entirely coincidewith the original Lectures Husserl delivered in the winter semester of1904/1905, but is the result of far-reaching revisions undertaken in 1917.More than half of the text Heidegger edited is composed of Husserl’s latersketches, mainly from 1917 and partly of his manuscripts from 1908 to1911. Moreover, in Husserl’s own view, these revisions were far from satis-factory. Husserl wrote the Bernau Manuscripts directly after the revisionsof the Lectures in two working-holidays that he spent in the small vil-lage of Bernau in the Black Forest. They reveal a number of undevelopedlines of thought in the Lectures that urgently called for renewed treat-ment. Several problems concerning the constitution of time turned outto be unsolved and some basic methods and patterns of understandinghad to undergo serious revisions. In the Bernau Manuscripts it becomesobvious that many problems of the Lectures cannot find an easy solution.Therefore, even the conceptual framework of problems in the Lecturesis affected by the discussion of the Bernau Manuscripts, all the more asthese research manuscripts often generate only contradictory and aporeticsolutions.

Concerning themes and methods, the late C-Manuscripts offer some-thing quite different from the analyses of the Lectures and the BernauManuscripts that were dedicated to the structures of extended presencein the dimensions of primal-impression, retention and protention. Thestarting point now is the living present, and a return to this realm of expe-rience is understood as a reductive method, similar to the transcendentaland primordial reduction. In the C-Manuscripts, the egological analysisof constitution is pursued starting on a full intentional level, i.e. startingwith concrete individual objects and a perspective on a world of objects,which the ego experiences and uses in concrete circumstances - but in theultimate living present of the now. This relation to the things in the worldis not only investigated on an intentional level as a striving for fulfillment,but also on a practical level and even on the level of drives and instincts.Nevertheless, some of the central themes of the Bernau Manuscripts

introduction xi

are taken up again: for example, the problem of an intersubjective,common constitution of the objective time of the world and full indi-viduation of things in this time of the world. The C-Manuscripts alsoaddress the self-constitution of the transcendental ego in time in terms ofembodiment and becoming part of the world. This field of researchincludes special features of the ego and leads to the analysis of instincts,pleasure and displeasure, loss of strength in falling asleep, illness and oldage. Moreover, these manuscripts also address phenomena like sleep, birthand death as problematic endings, beginnings and limits of subjectiveexperience in their significance for time-constitution.

Usually Husserl’s analysis of time-constitution is thought of in termsof three phases that are roughly bound up with the central publications,the Lectures, the Bernau Manuscripts and the C-Manuscripts. Today, afterthe publication of the central texts incorporating the last two phases, thediscussion of Husserl’s analysis of time-constitution has entered a newphase. This is true for the interpretation of the latter two texts but it alsoaffects our reading of the Lectures. Today, in the aftermath of the recentpublication of the C-Manuscripts, it seems more likely that the seeminglyseparated first two phases are more close to each other than expected. Thenew and broader context allows for a more thorough interpretation of thewhole enterprise of time-constitution.

Our intention in publishing a collection of contributions of recognizedinternational experts in this field, entailing some refreshing approaches ofnew-coming researchers, is to give an overview of the most outstandingcontemporary interpretations of this fundamental phenomenologicaltheme.

The last years have seen a number of conferences on the topic of time-constitution and a great number of excellent discussions can be found inmonographs and articles. It thus seems to be the right time to concentratethese insights in a thematic collection of articles. This is the backgroundof our enterprise of a book concentrating on analyses of time-constitutionin which the leading researchers in this difficult field can present theirviews.

Nevertheless, we are quite conscious of the fact that the theme oftime-constitution is not only considered to be complicated but it alsodoes not belong to the core themes that are investigated by many

xii introduction

phenomenologists. No one, however, would reject the central importanceof this research. Therefore we decided to publish all articles in English togive the discussion the most effective dissemination.

Let us shortly characterize the contributions to this volume.The contribution of Rudolf Bernet provides a short historical and sys-

tematic overview of the analysis of time-consciousness developed in theBernau Manuscripts. It investigates where these manuscripts make signifi-cant progress when dealing with problems that had remained unsolvedin the texts of Husserliana X, and where they prepare themes of theC-Manuscripts. Four fields of new or renewed theory-formations in con-stitution are discussed: The constitution of immanent time objects; agenetic analysis of the emergence of all acts of intentional conscious-ness; a new understanding of the present now in terms of a process offulfillment in the tension between retentions and protentions; and newanalyses of specifically noematic temporal characteristics including thetheme of individuation. These new insights have decisive consequencesfor some well-known technical issues in Husserl’s phenomenology oftime: Concerning the use of the schema “apprehension - apprehension-content” in analyses of (different kinds of ) temporal objects; the infiniteregress argument arising from the search for an absolute foundationof time-consciousness; the distinction between a passively lived-throughtemporal stream and the modification it undergoes when it becomes anobject of reflection. Besides emphasizing where and how progress hasbeen made, this contribution also points out remaining difficulties.

The essay of John Brough intends to serve as a partial primer forthe central theme of the “absolute time-constituting flow of conscious-ness” and to discuss some of the difficult and perplexing questionsthat surround it. It starts characterizing three levels involved in time-consciousness: first, the primal level of the absolute flow; second, the levelof immanent temporal unities or experiences, such as acts, which the flowconstitutes; and third, the level of transcendent objects in world time con-stituted by the acts. The connections among these levels are examined, aswell as the structure of the absolute flow that enables it to constituteboth itself and immanent temporal experiences. This is followed by aconsideration of a series of issues concerning the flow, many of whicharise from Husserl’s sometimes paradoxical statements about it: Whetherand in what sense the flow can be said to have a temporal character;

introduction xiii

the difficulties in finding a vocabulary suitable for describing the flow;whether the consciousness belonging to the flow is intentional in charac-ter and how it differs from the objectivating consciousness of acts such asperception; the sense in which the flow and what it constitutes are distinctbut inseparable, and whether Husserl introduces needless complexity intoconsciousness by distinguishing between the absolute flow and the streamof experiences it constitutes in immanent time. The essay concludes withsome reflections on the absolute flow as the living present or nunc stans,formulations that capture the constant and centering role of the flow inour conscious lives.

Nicolas DeWarren frames his attempt with the question, whether andhow a phenomenology of sleep is possible. If sleep is the complete absenceof experience, including the self-experience of consciousness itself, howcan phenomenology have access to it? The article wants to respond toJean-Luc Nancy’s challenge that a phenomenology of sleep is impossiblein direct and indirect manner. To do this it first offers a sketch of anindirect phenomenology of sleep investigated in Husserl’s employmentof the distinction between sleep and wakefulness as a metaphor, startingwith the metaphorical characterization of retentional consciousness.The author argues that Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousnesswould remain incomplete without an account of “sleep-consciousness”,especially of dreamless sleep. Following Husserl’s genetic account of sleep,falling asleep and waking up, he proposes a suggestion how to under-stand the sense in which consciousness constitutes itself as sleep, namelyas the complete absence of itself. The contribution concludes drawingan analogy with Husserl’s investigations of imagination: In sleep and inimagination consciousness induces within itself its own suspension andloosens the connections to the world, practical interests and affects.

The paper of James Dodd outlines a reading of the C-Manuscriptsthat aims to fix how Husserl formulates the problem of death from aphenomenological perspective. The paper explores an approach to thequestion “What can death tell us about time?” by considering first whatlife has to tell us about time, with the working thesis being that the prob-lem of death bears precisely on how egoic life is conscious of itself as a“whole,” or how the whole of a personal “life” is a given unity of sensefor an ego. This approach illuminates why Husserl pursues the themesof death, birth, sleep and sedimentation, since all of these themes form

xiv introduction

the basic parameters of Husserl’s conception of egoic life. This paperis to be understood as a preliminary exploration of possible ways toapproach Husserl’s late writings on time. It concludes with the suggestionthat Husserl takes a very different course than other phenomenologicalphilosophers, like Sartre and Heidegger, who lay much more emphasison the “ecstatic” character of lived time.

Saulius Geniusas wants to provide a systematic account of theproblematic of birth, death, and sleep in Husserl’s C-Manuscripts. Heargues that for Husserl, the full constitution of human finitude restsupon a threefold disclosure of birth, death, and sleep as limit-phenomena,intersubjective phenomena, and paradoxical phenomena. Then he treatsthe central topic of the transcendental necessity of the phenomena inquestion. His resulting thesis is, that in the absence of birth, death, andsleep, subjectivity could not be conceived as a world-constituting sub-jectivity. Therefore to accentuate the distinguishing features of Husserl’sanalyses, he brings them into a polemic with Heidegger’s notion ofauthentic temporality.

Klaus Held situates Husserl’s analyses of time in a tension of alternativepoints of view we can find already in Greek philosophy. In his TimaeusPlato recognized two aspects of time, the past and the future, but notthe present. In contrast, Aristotle’s analysis of time in the Physics tookits orientation from the ‘now’. It is the latter path that Husserl first fol-lows with his conception of the ‘original impression’ (Urimpression). Butas we can learn from certain parts of the Bernau Manuscripts, here thepresent loses significance because of a novel interpretation of protention.This development, which revitalizes Plato’s understanding of time, is fur-thered in Heidegger’s late lecture Time and Being: the present can beunderstood on the basis of the ‘withdrawal’ which determines the mutualrelation between the arrival as authentic future and the having-been asauthentic past.

The paper of Dieter Lohmar addresses some of Husserl’s attempts toanswer the question how the objective time of the world is constituted onthe basis of the experienced subjective time. Although this task is intro-duced already in the Lectures from 1904/1905, we may find acceptableattempts to answer this question only in the Bernau Manuscripts. Thefirst step of this solution concerns my own past that does not only appearin the form of singular static pictorial memories but rather in short nar-rative stories raised by memories that already own an internal order of

introduction xv

time. But these internally ordered stories are not yet ordered externally,somehow they are still lying “side by side”. Thus they lack an objective,synthetic coordination in time. This synthetic unification of my narrativememories in an objective unity and order is the first step towards objec-tivation of time. Nevertheless, this first synthetic unification is done onlyby myself and thus we have not yet reached an intersubjective-objectiveorder in time. The objective order in the full sense we are searchingfor necessarily depends on communication, critique and agreement withother persons. The communicative ways, authorized subjects and rules ofthis common constitution of objective time in a community is discussedby Husserl only in the late C-Manuscripts. Therefore, based on sugges-tions and elements from these two sources - and exceeding both - whatfollows is a discussion of the contribution of common intersubjectiveconstitution to the formation of a full objective time of the world.

The contribution of Yves Mayzaud opens with a dichotomousconsideration of Husserl’s phenomenology of time. On the one hand,Husserl unveils contradictions and the opaqueness of the objective time,discovers retention, and interprets transcendental characteristics of time.On the other hand, he conceives of time as continuous and it seems thathe leaves no space for forgetting. This holistic conception of time leadsHusserl to the idea that consciousness forms a totality. It is thereforealways threatened by the shadow of solipsism. Against this threat, thisessay explores the possibilities of a description of the experience of timethrough a phenomenological monadology.

James Mensch’s article discusses Husserl’s controversial schemaof interpretative intention, contents-there-to-be-interpreted, and theresulting intentional object. One central problematic of time-constitutionis how we are to understand our retention of just past time. This short-term memory is the basis of our consciousness of extended time, butsuch time-consciousness is fundamental for our apprehension of everytemporally determinate object. Thus, the question of the schema con-cerns the very basis of Husserl’s theory of how we grasp our world.Although Husserl severely criticizes the schema, he never abandons it. Infact, we find him continuing to employ it in the C and B manuscripts ontime-consciousness from the 1930’s. Mensch shows in detail how Husserlapplies the schema to our apprehension of time. This includes a cruciallimitation he imposes on the schema with regard to the lowest level ofsuch apprehension. But this schema also determines what Husserl means

xvi introduction

by retention and temporal constitution. After making clear how his useof the schema overcomes the objections that have been brought againstit, the implications are discussed that thereby arise regarding the priorityof appearing as such.

The contribution of Stefano Micali discusses the temporalization of theabsolute flow of consciousness. He starts with the relationship betweenthe time of the intentional acts and the absolute pre-phenomenal flowof time constituting consciousness. In this regard, John Brough draws adistinction between the intentional acts and the specific dimension of theabsolute flow of time-consciousness. Dan Zahavi questions the validityof this distinction: the inner time-consciousness should not be regardedas an additional flow aware of the intentional act, but it is nothingbut the pre-reflective self-awareness of the act. Despite these differences,a common presupposition characterizes both of the above-mentionedinterpretations of the absolute time-constituting flow: the absolute flowis indifferent to the acts; it always flows in the same way, the same form.Micali shows that the validity of this thesis may be challenged from twodifferent angles: Considering an essential ambiguity of Husserl’s configu-ration of the absolute flow to be found not only in the Lectures but alsoin the Bernau Manuscripts. And by taking into consideration Husserl’sanalyses of specific temporal experiences, as they are lived during the timeof unclear phantasia and the experience of the radically new.

Liangkang Ni discusses the relation of “time” and “genesis” startingwith the Logical Investigations where Husserl did not put both in any,not even an opposite, relationship. Only through some fragmental state-ments can we realize Husserl’s concentration on “analyses of time” andhis exclusion of “analyses of genesis”. But his attitude toward the analysisof “time” and “genesis” changed in the Lectures. Here Husserl tried tograsp their immanent relationship. Later, in the period of the CartesianMeditations, the connection of “time” and “genesis” found its expressionin a discussion of the relationship between static phenomenology, whichtakes “crosswise-intentionality” as its theme, and genetic phenomenology,which takes “longitudinal-intentionality” as its theme. It is likely thatthis thought led Husserl to consider “time” as “the universal form ofall geneses of egology” in the Cartesian Meditations. Starting from here,particularly in the Crisis, the historical dimension of the relation of timeand genesis came into Husserl’s horizon. Now the problematic relation

introduction xvii

concerns the way in which history is studied, i.e. the immanent relation-ship between history, time and genesis, and the possible connection anddifference between the “form” and “content” of his phenomenology ofhistory.

Luis Niel analyses the way Husserl presents the problem of the I insome of the Bernau Manuscripts in its relationship to temporality andto the stream of consciousness. By giving an account of the commonlymisunderstood meaning of the methodical suspension of the I he charac-terizes it as the necessary center and pole of the stream of consciousness.We can neither identify it with a moment of the stream nor with thestream itself and we can understand its special temporal character as‘supra-temporal’. From the point of view of its givenness the I appearsas an ‘object-I’, objectified through reflection. But we also recognize thatthis ‘object-I’ is not the original I-pole of my consciousness, namely the‘primal-I’. This ‘primal-I’ (Ur-Ich), which as an ‘operating I’ should notbe confused with other egological levels, appears as the necessary original‘mine-ness’ of all my experiences. Finally it turns out that the primal-I isalways given together with the stream of consciousness as the innermostoriginal intentional primal-tension.

The contribution of Lanei Rodemeyer discusses the reliability of thecontents of retention and recollection. While most analyses of Husserl’sphenomenology of inner time-consciousness focus on the structures ofthe layers of constitution, we should not forget that they are the utmostfoundation for all phenomenological research and for the relation of con-sciousness to its objects. But the fact that I can make mistakes, that I canthink I am recollecting when I actually am not, forces us to considernot just the structure of inner time-consciousness, but its content as well.How could any noetic act be incorrect? Then the paper takes up the inter-section of Husserl’s analyses of recollection and belief in order to identifyhow apodictic acts of consciousness can be mistaken. For this purposethree items are discussed: The relation of the content of consciousnesswith its activity; the importance of the context of an experience to howI take it up as actual or not; the relation of retention and recollectionwith regard to their content. The resulting thesis is that at this level noexperience can be taken in isolation, but every meaning and temporal-ity of each experience must be taken up in light of the horizons of itscontext.

xviii introduction

Tetsuya Sakakibara thematizes the difficulties of the phenomenologicalreflection on the living present in the C-Manuscripts. Following Husserl’smanuscripts chronologically, Sakakibara tries to exhibit the special modeof these reflections on the living present in those manuscripts, and howhe understands these reflections. It turns out that the reflections uponthe living present are based on the self-touching or inner primal con-sciousness of the functioning Ego. Wavering between epistemologicaland ontological perspectives in those manuscripts, Husserl finally reacheswhat is best named an epistemological-ontological method of reflec-tive exhibition grounded on the self-touching consciousness. The specialcharacteristics of this unique method are clarified in the last section ofthis contribution.

The essay of Ichiro Yamaguchi treats the topic of intermonadic tem-poralization in simultaneous reciprocal awakening. Husserl persistentlystrives to deepen his analysis of the problem of the infinite regress, notonly in his Lectures from 1904/1905 but also in the Bernau Manuscripts.His central concern in this regard seems to be the proper interpretation ofthe character of retentional intentionality as passive egoless intentionality.Such an interpretation must continue to maintain the distinctionbetween egoic and egoless intentionality. This distinction leads to thelatter distinction between egoic and intermonadic temporalization ofthe temporal stream of the living present given in the C-Manuscripts.The final solution of the problem of infinite regress is found in theconcept of the reciprocal awakening between the empty shapes ofthe drive intentionality as primal affection and the primal impres-sion (primal hyle) in the process of intermonadic temporalization. Thisunconscious temporalization in genetic phenomenology can establish acooperative, but limited relation between phenomenology and neuralscience.

Dan Zahavi’s contribution wants to examine the relation betweenHusserl’s notion of inner consciousness (self-consciousness) and histheory of inner time-consciousness. He argues that the distinctionbetween reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness is crucial if we areto understand Husserl’s analysis of time. Moreover, the article claims thatthe latter analysis contains Husserl’s most profound contribution to ourunderstanding of the pre-reflective self-manifestation of subjective life.

introduction xix

We would also like to express our gratitude to Klaus Sellge from theHusserl Archive in Cologne who spent a lot of time and effort on the textsof the present collection, as well as to Dr. Saulius Geniusas and JasminDücker who carefully corrected the English text of this introduction.

CHAPTER I

HUSSERL’S NEW PHENOMENOLOGY OF TIME

CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BERNAU MANUSCRIPTS

Rudolf Bernet

Abstract. This paper has no other ambition than to provide a short historicaland systematic overview of the analysis of time-consciousness developed in theBernau manuscripts. More specifically, it investigates where these manuscriptsmake a significant progress when dealing with problems which had remainedunsolved in the earlier texts of Hua X, and where they pave the way for to the laterC-manuscripts. Four main areas of renewal are signaled out: (1) a better accountof transcendental constitution and how it applies to the meaning of immanenttemporal objects, but not to the self-awareness of the temporal flux of conscious-ness; (2) the renewal of the meaning of transcendental constitution through a“genetic” analysis of the emergence of all acts of intentional consciousness; (3)a better account of the consciousness of a present now in terms of a processof fulfillment in which retentions and protentions are interwoven; (4) a freshinterest in specifically noematic temporal characteristics and their contributionto a phenomenological ontology, especially with regard to individuation. Thesenew insights have decisive consequences for the treatment of all the well-knowntechnical issues in Husserl’s phenomenology of time: the use of the schema “appre-hension – apprehension-content” for the intentional consciousness of (differentsorts of ) temporal objects; the infinite regress arising from the search for an abso-lute foundation of time-consciousness; the distinction between a passively (andunconsciously?) lived-through temporal stream and the modification it undergoeswhen it becomes an object of reflection. Emphasizing where progress has beenmade, the paper, however, also points to the remaining, and possibly structural,“Aporien” that Husserl himself admits of in his Bernau manuscripts.

I.

Despite their considerable size, Husserl’s so-called “Bernau Manuscripts”were written over a relatively brief span of time. Husserl stayed in Bernau

∗An earlier version of his text was first published as Rudolf Bernet: Die neuePhänomenologie des Zeitbewusstseins in Husserls Bernauer Manuskripten. In: Dieerscheinende Welt. Festschrift für Klaus Held. Ed. by H. Hüni and P. Trawny, Berlin 2002,539–555. English translation by Mark Green and the author.

1

D. Lohmar, I. Yamaguchi (eds.), On Time - New Contributions to the HusserlianPhenomenology of Time, Phaenomenologica 197, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8766-9_1,C© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

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in both August and September 1917 as well as February and March 1918.The general theme of the texts, which were written in those less than fivemonths or so, was consistently paraphrased by Husserl with the heading“Time and Individuation.” The motivation for this renewed preoccupa-tion with the problem of time shortly after his relocation to Freiburg wasinfluenced by Edith Stein’s project of editing the earlier time analyses.A first edit of these earlier manuscripts, which consisted of, above all,the lectures of 1904/1905, but also included some texts from the follow-ing years until 1911, was jointly revised by Husserl and Stein during herpresence in Bernau in the summer of 1917. But, as usual with Husserl,this revision soon led to new investigations, which in turn demandedall of Husserl’s attention. Much to the dismay of Stein, Husserl now hadvery little time and interest remaining for the engagement with the earliertime manuscripts, and a couple of months later and after several similarexperiences, she gave notice to quit her assistantship with Husserl.

For exactly how long Husserl regarded the manuscripts developed inBernau as merely a complement and continuation of his earlier texts onthe consciousness of internal time cannot be reconstructed with certainty.It is certain, however, that Husserl was conscious of the new direction thathis engagement with the problem of time had taken in Bernau. No laterthan his second stay in Bernau at the beginning of 1918, Husserl spokequite frequently of a new “great work,” the contents of which he char-acterized in a letter to Martin Heidegger on March 28, 1918, as follows:“Time and individuation, a renewal of a rational metaphysics based onprinciples”.1 A few days later, he described his project even more clearly ina letter to Roman Ingarden on April 5: “For I am working not on a merephenomenology of time – which cannot be treated separately and purelyfor itself – but on the colossal problem of individuation, of the constitu-tion of individual (thus “factual”) being in general, and that according toits essentially basic formations.”2

Then, eight solid years later, in 1926, Husserl contacted Heideggerwith a request to prepare his time manuscripts for publication in theJahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. In doing so heprobably hoped at first that Heidegger would consider not only the earliertexts, but also the Bernau Manuscripts. However, because Heidegger didnot want to get involved in editing stenographic research manuscripts,Husserl only handed over Stein’s edited version of the earlier texts. With

I. husserl’s new phenomenology of time 3

that, the separation of the Bernau Manuscripts from the corpus of theearlier analyses of time was also physically accomplished. When, oneyear later, in September 1927, Husserl tried to get Ingarden involvedin the publication of his time analyses, the project concerned exclu-sively the texts from Bernau. After this attempt also failed, Husserl finallydelivered, probably a full year later near the end of 1928, the materialof the Bernau Manuscripts to his assistant Eugen Fink. Meanwhile, inApril of the same year, Heidegger had published Stein’s edition of theearlier texts making only small changes and adding an “IntroductoryRemark,” in which he refers to a “later publication” of the “continuingstudies of time-consciousness in connection with the problem of indi-viduation, especially those undertaken since 1917.”3 In the manuscriptsfrom Bernau, compiled by Husserl and handed over to Fink, the problemof individuation, however, is not the major topic. It cannot be said withany great certainty for which reasons and with respect to which publi-cation plan Husserl left out in large part those texts on the problem ofindividuation, which he had written during his second stay in Bernau.However, these more ontologically oriented time-analyses from Bernau,which centered on the problem of the individuation of different kindsof objectivities, were in fact discovered in Husserl’s Nachlass, and someof them were incorporated, together with the manuscripts entrusted toFink, into the Husserliana volume of the Bernau texts which was editedby Rudolf Bernet and Dieter Lohmar.4

Eugen Fink occupied himself with the Bernau time-manuscripts againand again in the years from 1929 to 1937. Husserl tried to assist thefaltering advance of the editing work by granting more and more libe-rty to his assistant concerning the use of his texts. There was soon talkof a publication that would be supplemented by Fink’s own texts andappear under both names. In fact, both Husserl and Fink were intenselypreoccupied with the problem of time in the beginning of the thirties,in conversation with each other and in independently producing newtexts. Though it was never abandoned, the effort to publish the BernauManuscripts receded into the background. Husserl composed numerousmanuscripts dealing with the relationship of time-consciousness to hyleticpre-givenness and egoic performances, to sleep, death, and waking, tointersubjectivity and trans-generative historicity, etc. His preoccupationwith time thus took a decisive turn in these texts, best known as “The

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C-Manuscripts.”5 Despite the fact that Husserl himself considered theselast time-manuscripts as a continuation of the Bernau investigations,it did not lead him to think that both groups of manuscripts shouldbe blended into a single publication. Not only the considerable sizeof each group, but also their systematically differing points of depar-ture suggested that Husserl’s middle and late texts on the problem oftime should be published separately. Therefore, the publication of theBernau Manuscripts and the C-Manuscripts as two different volumes inHusserliana edition complies with Husserl’s own wishes.

Additionally Fink’s own work on the time-problem did not remainfruitless. “Time and Temporalization,” the treatise which was based onthe Bernau Manuscripts and to be jointly published by Husserl andFink, was transformed with Husserl’s consent (though he could not hidehis disappointment) into a new book on time with Fink as the soleauthor. However, Fink never published any such text. According to hisown account, he willfully destroyed the manuscript of his own book. In1969, he handed over Husserl’s original Bernau Manuscripts, which wereentrusted to him at the end of 1928, to the Husserl Archives in Leuven,where they were filed in the Nachlass as the “L-Group.” They presentlyform the core of the Volume XXXIII of the Husserliana edition whichincludes a large selection from all the manuscripts written in Bernau andpresents them in a systematic order.

II.

If, following this short sketch of the history of the genesis of theBernau time-manuscripts, we now turn to their systematic content, itseems appropriate that we situate it in the context of both the earliermanuscripts edited in Volume X of Husserliana and the later time-analysesof the C-Manuscripts edited in Volume VIII of Husserliana-Materialien.

Husserl’s earlier texts on the phenomenology of time-consciousnesstake their point of departure from the description of the perception oftemporal objects (a constant tone) or time-objects (the duration of thetone). In his engagement (which is completely missing in the BernauManuscripts) with the writings of Brentano and Meinong, and also withJames, Stumpf, Stern, etc., Husserl’s conviction that the perception of an


enduring object does indeed normally occur in an enduring act of percep-tion, but that the duration of perception alone does not yet explain howthe perception of an objective duration is possible, ripened. As with hispredecessors, Husserl’s analysis of the perception of a temporal durationcame to a head with the question of whether and how a present act isable to perceive a temporal extension which exceeds the actual present. Inaddition Husserl’s insight that a duration can be presently grasped onlywhen the present time-object is simultaneously grasped with its prece-ding and now past givenness, still owed much to his discussions of viewsdefended by his contemporaries.

For this present grasping of a past which is intimately connected withthe present grasping of a present, Husserl first used the name “PrimaryMemory,” but soon after he coined the term “Retention.” With regardto content, he differed in some significant ways from Brentano andMeinong, in that he understood this retention neither as an act (in themode of phantasy) of representation (Brentano), nor as a categorial actof a subsequent synthesis (Meinong), but instead as a modality of theperception itself. Thus Husserl wanted, on one hand, to cling to thedistinction between the present (primary-impressional) grasping of thepresent tone and the present (retentional) grasping of the past tone, buton the other hand, he wanted both graspings to still be understood asnon-independent moments of the same act of present perception. Thiswas and remained Husserl’s fundamental intuition, the analytically elabo-rated determination of which admittedly still occupied him for severalyears after a first failed attempt in the Time Lectures of 1904/1905. Theinvestigation into the essence of the present grasping of a futural tone,which Husserl called “Protention,” remained a minor point. The topic ofprotention, and especially its interlacing with retention, first received theattention it deserves in the Bernau Manuscripts.

Husserl’s preoccupation with the essence of intuitive phantasy andits distinction from the acts of recollection, which spanned years andeven extended into his time at Bernau, also played an essential rolein the advance of his determination of the essence of retention. Fromit resulted the insight that the retentional consciousness, in contrastto phantasy and recollection, is indeed not an act of representation[Vergegenwärtigung], but nevertheless is a modified consciousness of a(former) original present. The retentional consciousness of the past is

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therefore neither a reproductive representation of the past like recollec-tion, nor a simple making-present [Gegenwärtigung] of the present likethe original perception, but is the modified perception of a past. It wasnot easy for Husserl to precisely determine the essence of this perceptionof the past in the framework of his doctrine of intentional consciousness,and the related difficulties also worried him in the Bernau Manuscriptsagain and again. Problems resulted especially from the application of theschema of the intentional apprehension of a sense-datum, which wasborrowed from the phenomenological determination of the external per-ception of spatial objects, to time-consciousness and therefore also to theretentional perception-consciousness. In reference to the latter, one of thequestions that arises concerns how a present apprehension of a similarlypresent sensation should succeed in retentionally perceiving a present thatbelongs to the past.

Husserl’s various attempts to solve this puzzle ultimately led him againand again to the same point, namely to the givenness of the sense-datumsupposedly implicated in retentional consciousness. It soon became obvi-ous that the modification, which characterizes the present retentionalconsciousness of a past present, must concern not only the apprehen-sion but necessarily also the apprehended sense-datum. Otherwise, itis impossible to understand why a sensation can allow for a perceptualapprehension of something present in one case and, in the other case,allow for a retentional apprehension of something past. The “phantasma,”that is, the modified sense-datum of an apprehension in the mode ofa phantasy, volunteered itself as a model for the modified content thatunderlies retentional apprehension. However, a more thorough investiga-tion of phantasy-consciousness proved that this model contains its ownpeculiar puzzle, one which precisely concerns the essence, that is, themode of givenness, of this phantasma.

The parallel investigations of retention and phantasy, which conti-nued through the Bernau Manuscripts, soon led to the insight that thedifficulties connected with the phenomenological determination of thephantasma are fundamentally the same as those which concern the deter-mination of the modified sense-datum in retentional consciousness. Thusidentifying the sense-datum motivating a retentional apprehension witha phantasma helped no further, and it simultaneously threatened to blurthe distinction between the presenting retention and the representing


phantasy. Only when one can cling, on the one hand, to the dif-ferentiation between the phantasmal and retentional modifications ofthe contents of apprehension, and also, on the other hand, accountfor the circumstance that both sense-data concern a modified, senso-rial consciousness, of which the general essence must still be clarified,can the phenomenological analyses of retention and phantasy stimulateeach other. On closer inspection, the task concerns not only retentionand phantasy, but also the consciousness of an unmodified sense-datumthat underlies a perceptual apprehension. Husserl called the givennessof one such unmodified, i.e. originarily present sensation, “primaryimpression [Urimpression]” in the early texts and “primary presentation[Urpräsentation]” in the later Bernau manuscripts.

The first decisive step towards to a clarification of the essence of modi-fied or unmodified givenness of the sensorial content which underliesan intentional apprehension is already to be found in Husserl’s earliertexts on time-consciousness, and the insights acquired in them are nevercalled into question in the Bernau Manuscripts. Of whatever kind theintentional apprehension of the sense-datum implicit in retention andphantasy (and also already in perception) may be, that is, if it is a questionof a perceptual, retentional, or phantasmal apprehension, it is certain, inany case, that the apprehended sense-datum is itself given; and thereforethere must be a modified or unmodified consciousness of it. Thus in theend, the difference between a present sensation and a retentionally givensensation depends on the different consciousness of these sensations.

Husserl named this inner consciousness of the sensation “absolute con-sciousness” in the earlier texts and then in the Bernau Manuscripts the“originary process [Urprozess]” or “originary stream [Urstrom].” The sen-sations were called “immanent time-objects” in the early texts and assuch they were distinguished from the transcendent objects belongingto objective time, like, for instance, the tone of a violin. The BernauManuscripts more simply called these immanent time-objects tempo-ral “events [Ereignisse]” and the inner consciousness of them “lived-experience [Erlebnis].” This alteration in terminology is already a firstindication that it was no longer self-evident for Husserl in Bernau that(modified and unmodified) sensations are given in the originary pro-cess as objects and that the originary process itself had the form of anobjectifying intentional consciousness.

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The introduction of the “absolute” consciousness in the earlier textsinvolved many problems, which still bothered Husserl in Bernau. A firstdifficulty arose with the exact determination of the nature of this “abso-lute” consciousness in its relationship to the “immanent time-objects.”In the manuscripts from the Nachlass published in Hua X one cantrace how Husserl finally arrived at a two-fold insight on this matter.First, it soon became clear to him that the so-called “absolute” con-sciousness of the sense-data was a kind of intentional consciousness; thatis, the sense-data could not belong to the “absolute” consciousness as“reelle” constituents. Otherwise the difference between a modified andan unmodified, i.e., between a retentional and a primary-impressionalconsciousness of a sensation, would have become unintelligible. Husserl’ssecond new insight, resulting from the introduction of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, consisted in the new characterization of therelationship between “absolute” consciousness and sense-data as a rela-tion of constitution. Similarly as a transcendent object is constituted inthe apprehension of a sense-datum, the sensation is also constituted inthe “absolute” consciousness as a (present, past, or futural) immanenttime-object.

Then, in the Bernau Manuscripts, both these insights were againsubjected to thorough examination, and admittedly, it seems withoutconclusive results. In many of these Bernau texts Husserl began to doubtagain whether the relationship between the “originary process” and tem-poral “events” is really a matter of transcendental constitution, andwhether this “originary process” and these “events” really belong to twodifferent levels of consciousness. This doubt had its source above all in thequestion of whether the “events” in the “originary process” really come toprominence and grasping as immanent objects. With this, the first insightwas also called into question again, namely the designation of the orig-inary process as a kind of intentional consciousness. Incidentally, thesedoubts and questions still bothered Husserl in the late texts on time ofthe C-Group. On the one hand, this seems to confirm the impressionthat no final characterization of the connection between the “originaryprocess” and temporal “events” is advanced in the Bernau Manuscripts.On the other hand, however, it is unmistakable that those later texts ofthe C-Group develop a doctrine that, along with other doctrines, canalready be found in the Bernau Manuscripts.


Put succinctly, this doctrine consists in the attempt of a radical sepa-ration between egoic and pre-egoic, i.e. hyletic, time-processes. Theindepth investigation of the difference between an egoic and activelyperformed temporalization, on the one hand, and an anonymous and pas-sively occurring, material or hyletic temporalization, on the other, leadsHusserl in the C-Manuscripts to deny that this pre-egoic flowing streamcan be ascribed any original constitutive performance. According to thisview, one can only speak of a constitution of temporal objects when thereis an active involvement of the transcendental ego. In order to acquirea constitutive signification, the pre-intentional hyletic originary streamthus needs to undergo a thorough modification which consists in a sub-sequent performance of an egoic act of reflection on it. This new modelof the originary process admittedly has its ground not only in the sepa-ration between active and passive forms of consciousness, but also in theproblem of the infinite regress, which lurks behind Husserl’s phenomeno-logy of time-consciousness, both in the early texts as well as in the BernauManuscripts and in the later time-manuscripts of the C-Group.

It can already be gathered from the early texts published in Hua X thatthere are, in fact, different forms of such an infinite regress. A first formarises from the fact that each newly emerging “primary impression,” oreach new “primary presentation,” modifies the mode in which the formerprimary impression is given, transforming it into a retention of a pastprimary impression. A third new primary impression then modifies notonly the previous (second) primary impression, but equally the retentionof the first primary impression which is connected with it. This first pri-mary impression is therefore now given under the form of a modificationof a modification. With the fourth new primary impression, the given-ness of every single past primary impression is modified once more, andthe givenness of the first primary impression now has the mode of themodification of a modification of a modification. As long as the originaryprocess remains lively, i.e. as long as new primary impressions surfacein consciousness, this complicated process of a continuous and multidi-mensional modification of the modification of the givenness of each pastprimary impression carries on, potentially ad infinitum. Thus, in the lat-ter case, the retentional grasping of the initial primary impression wouldbe tied to a running-through of an infinite series of modifications nestedinto one another.6

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This first regressus ad infinitum is comparatively harmless because itdoes not call into question the possibility of grasping a first primaryimpression. However, the Bernau Manuscripts reveal that it became moreand more doubtful for Husserl whether such a process of an infinite modi-fication of a retentional past really represents a phenomenologically veri-fied finding. In the course of his new description of time-consciousnessin the framework of a genetic phenomenology, Husserl increasinglyconcerned himself with the consequences the constantly (with each rei-teration of retentional modification) growing distancing from the presenthas for the retentional givenness of the past. He described how theprimary presentations belonging to a far-distant past fuse together andthereby not only lose their clear distinction from one another, but alsotheir affective allure on the present ego. The Bernau Manuscripts from1918 dedicate detailed investigations to this phenomenon, which is dis-tinguished from retention and named “fading-away [Abklang].” In theabsence of an active turning-towards and grasping on the part of the ego,the retentions directed at a distant past soon die off, and with that theprocess of their continual modification also potentially comes to a stand-still. Dead retentions can become newly awakened and rise up again, butthis does not immediately do away with their character of indistinctnessor haziness.

The second form of an infinite regress concerns the awareness of the“absolute consciousness” or of the “originary process.” We have seenthat Husserl characterizes the intentional consciousness of a transcendenttime-object as an intentional apprehension of a pre-intentional sense-datum. This sense-datum is then, in its turn, experienced by a deeperconsciousness, namely by the “absolute consciousness” or “originary pro-cess.” The exact determination of this originary process still botheredHusserl very much in the Bernau Manuscripts. Time and again thequestion surfaced as to whether the so-called “absolute” consciousnessshould, indeed, be understood as an independent level of consciousness,whether it really concerns an intentional and transcendentally constitu-tive consciousness, and whether the intentionality of this consciousnessstill has the form of an intentional apprehension of a pre-intentionalapprehension-content. The further question then also arises, both in theearlier texts and in the Bernau Manuscripts, as to the nature of the con-sciousness that makes us aware of the flow of this “absolute consciousness”


or of this “originary process.” If the latter consciousness still requires afurther consciousness for which it is given, then it loses not only its “abso-lute” character as an “originary process,” but one also falls prey to a formof infinite regress, which would precipitate the whole edifice of the levelsof consciousness resting on each other into an abyss.

The risk of such an infinite regress, which is connected with the con-sciousness of an “absolute” consciousness, was not only formulated withsufficient clarity already in Husserl’s early texts, but Husserl also suc-ceeded in finding an attractive solution to the difficulty. The core of thissolution lies in the supposition that the “absolute” consciousness mustnecessarily and simultaneously be a consciousness of the givenness ofimmanent time-objects and a consciousness of its own flow. This solu-tion did not remain a mere hypothesis but on the contrary, Husserl triedto demonstrate in a painstaking analysis of retentional consciousness twopoints: first, due to the continuous change of the time-perspective (or“time-adumbration”), the unity of an immanent time-object, with itsrespective time-position, comes to prominence in the continuum of theretentional modifications, and second, a consciousness of the flow of thecontinuously self-modifying retentional consciousness itself also arises bymeans of the “nesting [Verschachtelung]” of each retention with all theother retentions. Therefore, the flow of the “absolute” retentional con-sciousness entails a double intentionality, of which one is directed toimmanent time-objects and the other has the form of a self-reference, i.e.of a self-awareness of the flow. Husserl termed the former direction of theretentional intentionality “transverse-intentionality [Querintentionalität]”and the latter “longitudinal intentionality [Längsintentionalität].” Finally,Husserl also specifically stressed that both these intentional directions inthe course of the flow of the continuous retentional modifications belongto one selfsame process and therefore are “inseparably” connected withone another.7

This attempt at overcoming the danger of the infinite regress related tothe consciousness of the “originary process” was taken up again and morewidely developed in the Bernau Manuscripts. In accordance with the ear-lier texts, a clear distinction between the retention of an immanent objectand the retention of the originary process is made. However, Husserl doesmake a significant advance by now paying more attention to protentionalconsciousness. This newly awakened and long overdue interest in the

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contribution of protention not only to a consciousness of the “originaryprocess,” but also to the consciousness of novelty (which is preoccupyingHusserl with increasing intensity), is reflected in the new time diagramsone finds in the Bernau Manuscripts. Specifically the precise investigationof the intertwining of retentional and protentional continua of modifica-tions resulted in significant new insights. Husserl was no longer satisfiedwith the suggestion that each primary presentation is embedded in a bilat-eral horizon of retentional and protentional phenomena, but instead heanalyzed, often in microscopic detail, the role of protentions within thecontinuum of the retentional modification and the influence of retentionson the determination of the contents of the protentions.

This new discovery of the function of both protention within retentionand retention within protention resulted from a more dynamic analysisof time-consciousness that was linked with the development of a geneticphenomenology. This new perspective is made apparent by the fact that,for example, “primary presentation” (or the former “primary impression”)is now no longer understood as the original core or “source-point” oftime-consciousness, but instead as a mere limit point in which the con-tinua of retentional and protentional modifications intersect. In such agenetic analysis, the originary process shows itself to be more than amere mechanical process of continuous modification resulting from thepushing-back of the present into the past. On the contrary, this originaryprocess, as the life-process of consciousness, is governed by passive ten-dencies and anticipations, by forms of the increasing and weakening ofthe intuitive fullness of different phenomena, by the lived-experiences ofan incessant “fulfillment [Erfüllung]” and “emptying [Entfüllung].”

For the understanding of the phenomenon of an inner awareness of theoriginary process these new investigations led Husserl to no longer con-sider the emergence of such a self-consciousness to be exclusively a matterof retention, i.e. of a retentional “longitudinal intentionality.” Accordingto the Bernau Manuscripts, this self-consciousness of the originary pro-cess rather arises from the experience of a present intuitive fulfillment,i.e. by virtue of the consciousness of the continuous transition of reten-tional protentions to their intuitive realization. In this dynamic, flowingprocess of fulfillment, the flow of consciousness itself comes to a presentappearance through the awareness of the fact that what is presently givenis the same as what one had already anticipated in the past as something

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