On the Alleged Transparency of Conscious Experience

Pete MandikAssistant Professor of PhilosophyCoordinator, Cognitive Science LaboratoryWilliam Paterson University, New Jersey USA

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Primary Goal

Present a novel argument against the so-called transparency of conscious experience

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Secondary Goal

Derive, from the failure of transparency, conclusions regarding the nature of conscious experience and its phenomenal character

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The Transparency ThesisIf you have a conscious experience, all that you are

conscious of are the objects and features of the objects that the experience is an experience of.

Elaborations of Transparency Introspective access to

experience simply looks through experience to the external world

We are never introspectively aware of features of experiences themselves

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The Transparency ThesisIf you have a conscious experience, all that you are

conscious of are the objects and features of the objects that the experience is an experience of.

Entailments1. If true, then first-order

representationalism is true and higher-order representationalism is false

2. If false, then first-order representationalism is false (however, higher-order representationalism may be either true or false)

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Spelling out entailment #1If consciousness experience is transparent, then first-order

representationalism is true and higher-order representationalism is false

First-order representationalism: phenomenal character is one and the same as the content of (certain) first-order representations and a state may be conscious independently of being represented by any other state (i.e., independently of being the target of higher-order representations).

Higher-order representationalism: phenomenal character is one and the same as the content of (certain) higher-order representations and a state is conscious only if it is represented by some other state

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Spelling out entailment #1If consciousness experience is transparent, then first-order

representationalism is true and higher-order representationalism is false

First-order representationalism: phenomenal character is one and the same as the content of (certain) first-order representations and a state may be conscious independently of being represented by any other state (i.e., independently of being the target of higher-order representations).

The Transparency Thesis: If you have a conscious experience, all that you are conscious of are features of the objects the experience is an experience of.

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Spelling out entailment #1If consciousness experience is transparent, then first-order

representationalism is true and higher-order representationalism is false

Higher-order representationalism: phenomenal character is one and the same as the content of (certain) higher-order representations and a state is conscious only if it is represented by some other state

The Transitivity Thesis: If you have a conscious experience, you must be conscious of the experience

The Transparency Thesis: If you have a conscious experience, all that you are conscious of are features of the objects the experience is an experience of.

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Spelling out entailment #1If consciousness experience is transparent, then first-order

representationalism is true and higher-order representationalism is false

Higher-order representationalism: phenomenal character is one and the same as the content of (certain) higher-order representations and a state is conscious only if it is represented by some other state

The Transitivity Thesis: If you have a conscious experience, you must be conscious of the experience

Higher-order contents must include vehicular properties of their lower order targets

If they didn’t, then they would have the same contents as their targets and thus not be higher-order.

HO content: I am in a state with the content the grass is greenFO content: the grass is green

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Spelling out entailment #2If conscious experience is not transparent, then first-order

representationalism is false (however, higher-order representationalism may be either true or false)

If we can be conscious of features of the experiences themselves then phenomenal character is something other than the content of first-order representations

Phenomenal character sometimes includes either vehicular properties of experiences or the contents of higher-order representations (note the non-equivalence of these disjuncts)

(Higher-order representationalism is true only if phenomenal character always includes the contents of higher-order representations)

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Argument Against Transparency #1

Attitude discrimination without content divergence:

My memory that I am at a movie on a Tuesday

My intention that I am at a movie on a Tuesday

My perception that I am at a movie on a Tuesday

If (first-order) content is all I have introspective access to, then memory, intention, and perception would be indistinguishable.

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Argument Against Transparency #1

Objection: Perhaps this only shows that memory and intention aren’t transparent, but perception still is

Reply #1: If memory and intention aren’t transparent, this casts doubt on the transparency of perception

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Argument Against Transparency #1

Objection: Perhaps this only shows that memory and intention aren’t transparent, but perception still is

Reply #2: A natural reading of the opacity of memory and intention is the mismatch between the time of occurrence of the mental state and its truth conditions, similarly what one has access to in introspecting perception is the time of occurrence of both percept and target

time of occurrence is vehicular

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Argument Against Transparency #2Introspecting brain states as such

(Churchlandish Introspection)1. Perception is the automatic conceptual exploitation of the natural

information carried by sensations about things other than themselves

2. Sensations also carry natural information about themselves3. The introspection of sensory experience is the automatic

conceptual exploitation of the natural information sensations carry about themselves

4. Learning can increase both a person’s number of concepts and the ability to apply them automatically

5. This is no less true of neuroscientific concepts.: Brain states may be introspected as such.: We can be conscious of (neurophysiological) vehicular properties

of conscious experiences

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1. Perception is the automatic conceptual exploitation of the natural information carried by sensations about things other than themselves

The natural information carried by our sensations determines what we can perceive

Conceptual exploitation of natural information determines what we do perceive

(compare a person who doesn’t see a fly because of poor eyesight to a person with excellent eyesight who hasn’t noticed the fly)

The automatic conceptual exploitation of natural information determines what we do perceive without (conscious) inference

The non-automatic conceptual exploitation of natural information determines what we consciously infer without perceiving it

(compare special-effects experts and novices observing realistic special effects)

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2. Sensations also carry natural information about themselves

A sufficient condition for natural information:

If (X if and only if Y) then X carries natural info that Y.

This is neutral with respect to whether or not X=Y

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3. The introspection of sensory experience is the automatic conceptual exploitation of the natural information sensations carry about themselves

Exteroceptive Thermometer Introspective Thermometer(no weirder than clocks!)

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4. Learning can increase both a person’s number of concepts and the ability to apply them automatically

The western sky reddening as the Sun sets

The wavelength distribution of incoming solar radiation shifting towards the longer wavelengths (about 0.7 X 10-6m) as the shorter wavelengths are increasingly scattered away from the lengthening atmospheric path they must take as terrestrial rotation turns us slowly away from their source

(no weirder than wine-tasting!)

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5. This is no less true of neuroscientific concepts

Suppose that I know that the visual perception of motion always involves the neural activity in area V5/MT, then with a little practice…

Just as I can automatically apply the concept of motion to the things I see…

…I can automatically apply the concept of activity in area V5/MT to the experience of motion

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5. This is no less true of neuroscientific concepts

.: Brain states may be introspected as such

.: We can be conscious of (neurophysiological) vehicular properties of conscious experiences

Thus, contra the transparency thesis, introspecting our experiences only as representing features of the external world is optional

One may instead augment one’s conceptual repertoire with neuroscience and introspect vehicular properties of experiences

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Objections/Replies

Objection #1: Presupposes identity theory (as opposed to functionalism or anomalous monism)

Reply: The multiple realizability of mousetraps doesn’t rule out the perception of a mousetrap realization, so the multiple realizability of experiences wouldn’t rule out the introspection of one of their neural realizations

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Objections/Replies

Objection #2: Presupposes physicalism (as opposed to Cartesian soul mechanics or a completed Chalmersian kinematics of qualia)

Reply: The essential features of the argument can be restated by replacing a neuroscientific theory with a dualistic theory (if there were such a thing) and vehicular properties of experience will still be introspectible.

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Spelling out entailment #2If conscious experience is not transparent, then first-order

representationalism is false (however, higher-order representationalism may be either true or false)

If we can be conscious of features of the experiences themselves then phenomenal character is something other than the content of first-order representations

Phenomenal character sometimes includes either vehicular properties of experiences or the contents of higher-order representations

(Higher-order representationalism is true only if phenomenal character always includes the contents of higher-order representations)

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Does phenomenal character ever include vehicular properties of experiences?If so, then representationalism is false, since something other than

representational content is included in phenomenal character.If so, this isn’t shown by the argument for Churchlandish

introspection (quite the contrary…)Consider an analogy to the direct and accurate perception of

external objects: Even when an object is directly and accurately perceived, neither

an unrepresented aspect of the object nor the object itself enters into the perception

Thus, even when an experience is directly and accurately introspected, neither an unrepresented aspect of the experience nor the experience itself enters into the introspection

(this would be true on even the strongest versions of externalism about content, since they are all about content)

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Phenomenal character never includes vehicular properties of experiences.Representationalism: Phenomenal character is always

some first-order or higher-order representational content and a conscious state is always some first-order or higher-order representation

Neutral with respect to higher-order representationalism(Higher-order representationalism HO-reps are always

involved in conscious states and phenomenal character)

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CONCLUSIONS/SUMMARY

Churchlandish introspection Failure of transparency

Failure of transparency Failure of first-order representationalism

Churchlandish introspection

Representationalism still stands

Representationalism is neutral with respect to higher-order representationalism

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THE END