JOHN STUART MILL (1806–1873)

Summary

On Liberty is one of Mill’s most famous works and remains the one most read today.

In this book, Mill expounds his concept of individual freedom within the context of his ideas

on history and the state. On Liberty depends on the idea that society progresses from lower

to higher stages and that this progress culminates in the emergence of a system of

representative democracy. It is within the context of this form of government that Mill

envisions the growth and development of liberty.

Chapter I defines civil liberty as the limit that must be set on society’s power over

each individual. Mill undertakes a historical review of the concept of liberty, beginning with

ancient Greece and Rome and proceeding to England. In the past, liberty meant primarily

protection from tyranny. Over time, the meaning of liberty changed along with the role of

rulers, who came to be seen as servants of the people rather than masters. This evolution

brought about a new problem: the tyranny of the majority, in which a democratic majority

forces its will on the minority. This state of affairs can exercise a tyrannical power even

outside the political realm, when forces such as public opinion stifle individuality and

rebellion. Here, society itself becomes the tyrant by seeking to inflict its will and values on

others. Next, Mill observes that liberty can be divided into three types, each of which must

be recognized and respected by any free society. First, there is the liberty of thought and

opinion. The second type is the liberty of tastes and pursuits, or the freedom to plan our own

lives. Third, there is the liberty to join other like-minded individuals for a common purpose

that does not hurt anyone. Each of these freedoms negates society’s propensity to compel

compliance.

Chapter II examines the question of whether one or more persons should be able to

curtail another person’s freedom to express a divergent point of view. Mill argues that any

such activity is illegitimate, no matter how beyond the pale that individual’s viewpoint may

be. We must not silence any opinion, because such censorship is simply morally wrong. Mill

points out that a viewpoint’s popularity does not necessarily make it correct—this fact is why

we must allow freedom of opinion. Dissent is vital because it helps to preserve truth, since

truth can easily become hidden in sources of prejudice and dead dogma. Mill defines dissent

as the freedom of the individual to hold and articulate unpopular views.

Chapter III discusses whether people who hold unpopular views should be allowed to

act on them without being made social outcasts or facing a legal penalty. Actions cannot be

as free as ideas or viewpoints, and the law must limit all actions whose implementation

would harm others or be an outright nuisance. He states that human beings are fallible, and

therefore they need to experiment with different ways of living. However, individual liberty

must always be expressed in order to achieve social and personal progress.

Chapter IV examines whether there are instances when society can legitimately limit

individual liberty. Mill rejects the concept of the social contract, in which people agree to be

a part of society and recognize that society can offer certain forms of protection while asking

for certain forms of obligations. However, he does suggest that because society offers

protection, people are obliged to behave in a certain way, and each member of society must

defend and protect society and all its members from harm. In brief, society must be given

power to curtail behavior that harms others, but no more.

Chapter V summarizes and elucidates Mill’s twofold argument. First, individuals are

not accountable to society for behavior and actions that affect only them. Second, a person

is answerable for any type of behavior or action that harms others, and in such cases it is

the responsibility of society to punish and curtail such behavior and action. However, Mill

does note that there are some types of actions that certainly harm others but bring a larger

benefit to society, as when one person succeeds in business more than his rival. In the rest

of the chapter, Mill examines particular examples of his doctrine.

Chapter 1, Introduction

Mill starts off by limiting the scope of his essay to Civil, or Social Liberty. He writes

that this essay will look at what kind of power society can legitimately exert over the

individual. Mill predicts that this question will become increasingly important because some

humans have entered a more civilized stage of development, which presents "new

conditions" under which issues of individual liberty must be addressed.

Mill then turns to an overview of the development of the concept of liberty. In ancient

Greece, Rome and England, liberty implied "protection against the tyranny of political

rulers," and rulers and subjects were often thought to have a necessarily antagonistic

relationship. The leader did not govern by the will of his people, and while his power was

seen as necessary, it was also considered dangerous. Patriots tried to limit the leader's

power in two ways: 1) They gained immunities called "political liberties or rights." The leader

was thought to have a duty to respect these immunities, and there was a right of rebellion if

these rights and liberties were infringed. 2) Constitutional checks developed, under which

the community or their representatives gained some power of consent over important acts

of governance.

Mill writes that eventually men progressed to a point where they wanted their leaders

to be their servants, and to reflect their interests and will. It was thought that it was not

necessary to limit this new kind of ruler's power, because he was accountable to the people,

and there was no fear of the people tyrannizing itself. However, when an actual democratic

republic developed (The United States), it was realized that the people don't rule

themselves. Rather, the people with power exercise it over those without power. In

particular, a majority may consciously try to oppress a minority. Mill writes that this concept

of a tyranny of the majority has come to be accepted by major thinkers. Mill, however,

argues that society can also tyrannize without using political means. Rather, the power of

public opinion can be more stifling to individuality and dissent than any law could be. Thus,

he writes that there must also be protection for people against the prevailing public

opinions, and the tendency of society to impose its values on others.

The question, then, as Mill sees it, is where and how to limit public opinion's sway

over individual independence. There has been very little consensus among nations about

the answer to this question, and people tend to be very complacent about their own

customs in dealing with dissent. People tend to believe that having strong feelings on a

subject makes having reasons for that belief unnecessary, failing to realize that without

reasons their beliefs are mere preferences, often reflecting self-interest. Furthermore, on the

occasions when individuals do question the imposition of public opinion on social standards,

they are usually questioning what things society should like or dislike, not the more general

question of whether society's preferences should be imposed on others. Mill also notes that

in England there is no recognized principle by which to judge legislative interference in

private conduct.

After laying out the major issues, Mill then turns to what he calls "the object of his

essay." He writes that he will argue that the only time individuals or society as a whole can

interfere with individual liberty is for self-protection. Mill states that the argument that a

certain law or public opinion might be for an individual's own good or welfare does not

suffice to justify that law or public opinion as a coercive force; coercion by the many toward

the individual is only acceptable when an individual poses a threat to others. It is fine to

argue with a person about his actions, but not to compel him. Mill writes, "Over himself, over

his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."

Mill notes that the right of liberty does not apply to children, or to "backward"

societies. It is only when people are capable of learning from discussion that liberty holds;

otherwise the people must be taken care of. Mill also notes that he is not justifying the claim

of liberty as an abstract right. Rather, he is grounding it in utility, on the permanent interests

of mankind.

Mill writes that if a person causes harm to others actively or inactively, it is

appropriate for society to condemn him legally or through general disapprobation.

Individuals can even be compelled to do good for other people, such as to save someone's

life, because to do otherwise would be to cause evil to another person. In contrast, society

only has an indirect interest in what a person does to himself or to other freely consenting

people.

Mill divides the appropriate sphere of human liberty falls into three categories,

claiming that any free society must respect all three. First, there is the domain of the

conscience, and liberty of individual thought and opinion. Second, there is planning one's

own life, and the liberty of tastes and pursuits. Third, there is the liberty to unite with other

consenting individuals for any purpose that does not harm others. These liberties reflect the

idea that true freedom means pursuing one's own good in one's own way, as long as it does

not prevent others from doing the same. These ideas directly contradict society's increasing

tendency to demand conformity, and unless moral conviction turns against this tendency,

the demand for conformity will only increase.

Commentary

Mill's introduction is one of the most important parts of his essay, as it contains the

basic structure of his argument, as well as some of his major presuppositions. Mill describes

civilization as a struggle between society and the individual about which should have control

over the individual's actions. Mill sees the world as tipping toward a balance in which

society, through laws and public opinion, has far more power over the actions and thoughts

of an individual than an individual has over himself. Mill rejects this status, arguing that

society should have control over only those actions that directly affect it, or those actions

that harm some of its members. Mill argues that an individual harming himself or acting

against his own good provides insufficient reason for others to interfere. His essay will be a

description of why this is the case.

It is important to note that in rejecting social interference with individual thought and

activity, Mill is not just writing about laws, but also about "moral reprobation." An individual

or group cannot rightly punish a person's behavior by, for example, treating him as an

enemy, if his actions only affect himself. In rejecting the legitimacy of coercive opinion, Mill

drastically broadens the scope of his claims. It is worth paying attention in later chapters to

why Mill is so critical of public disapproval of behavior, and to the avenues that Mill does

leave open for people to express disapproval of actions they dislike.

The idea of progress is integral to Mill's essay, and this chapter reflects a few of his

ideas on the subject. Mill believes that individuals and society as a whole can improve

themselves. Fitting with this idea, he considers different societies to exist on a clear

hierarchy of value: barbaric societies are childlike, without the necessary tools of self-

government. They must be governed like children, so that they can eventually become

capable of exercising their liberty. Yet while Mill considers progress and civilization to be

definite goods, he also expresses concern that with progress comes conformity. In later

chapters he will try to show that such conformity could undermine further individual and

social improvement.

In this introduction, Mill explicitly calls his justification of liberty utilitarian. In doing

so, he says outright that his defense of liberty will not be based on natural rights, such as

those proposed by Locke, or on metaphysical claims, such as those proposed by Kant.

Rather, Mill bases his argument on what is best for mankind, and in doing so suggests that

his arguments will show the individual and social benefits of human liberty. In later chapters,

it is worthwhile to examine when and how Mill makes broad utilitarian arguments for liberty,

and to similarly look for instances when Mill resorts to non-utilitarian arguments.

Chapter 2, Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion (Part 1)

In Chapter 2, Mill turns to the issue of whether people, either through their

government or on their own, should be allowed to coerce or limit anyone else's expression of

opinion. Mill emphatically says that such actions are illegitimate. Even if only one person

held a particular opinion, mankind would not be justified in silencing him. Silencing these

opinions, Mill says, is wrong because it robs "the human race, posterity as well as the

existing generation." In particular, it robs those who disagree with these silenced opinions.

Mill then turns to the reasons why humanity is hurt by silencing opinions. His first

argument is that the suppressed opinion may be true. He writes that since human beings

are not infallible, they have no authority to decide an issue for all people, and to keep others

from coming up with their own judgments. Mill asserts that the reason why liberty of opinion

is so often in danger is that in practice people tend to be confident in their own rightness,

and excluding that, in the infallibility of the world they come in contact with. Mill contends

that such confidence is not justified, and that all people are hurt by silencing potentially true

ideas.

After presenting his first argument, Mill looks at possible criticisms of his reasoning

and responds to them.

First, there is the criticism that even though people may be wrong, they still have a

duty to act on their "conscientious conviction." When people are sure that they are right,

they would be cowardly not to act on that belief and to allow doctrines to be expressed that

they believe will hurt mankind. To this, Mill replies that the only way that a person can be

confident that he is right is if there is complete liberty to contradict and disprove his beliefs.

Humans have the capacity to correct their mistakes, but only through experience and

discussion. Human judgment is valuable only in so far as people remain open to criticism.

Thus, the only time a person can be sure he is right is if he is constantly open to differing

opinions; there must be a standing invitation to try to disprove his beliefs.

Second, there is the criticism that governments have a duty to uphold certain beliefs

that are important to the well being of society. Only "bad" men would try to undermine

these beliefs. Mill replies that this argument still relies on an assumption of infallibility--the

usefulness of an opinion is still something up for debate, and it still requires discussion.

Furthermore, the truth of a belief is integral to whether it is desirable for it to be believed.

Mill observes that the assumption of infallibility about a certain question implies that

one not only feels very sure about a belief, but also includes the attempt to try to decide

that question for other people. It is in stifling dissenting opinions in the name of social good

that some of the most horrible mistakes in human history have been made. Mill writes about

Socrates and Jesus Christ, two illustrious figures in history, who were put to death for

blasphemy because their beliefs were radical for their times. Mill then considers whether

society should be able to censor an opinion that rejects a common moral belief or the

existence of God and a future state. He gives the example of Emperor Marcus Aurelius, a

just and kind man who still persecuted Christianity, failing to see its value to society. Mill

argues that if one is to accept the legitimacy of punishing irreligious opinions, one must also

accept that if one felt, like Marcus Aurelius did, that Christianity was dangerous, one would

also be justified in punishing Christianity.

Third, Mill considers the criticism that truth may be justifiably persecuted, because

persecution is something that truth should have to face, and it will always survive. Mill

replies that such a sentiment is harshly unfair to those who actually are persecuted for

holding true ideas. By discovering something true, these people have performed a great

service to humanity. Supporting the persecution of such people suggests that their

contributions are not truly being valued. Mill also contends that it is wrong to assume that

"truth always triumphs over persecution." It may take centuries for truth to reemerge after it

is suppressed. For example, Mill writes that the Reformation of the Catholic Church was put

down twenty times before Martin Luther was successful. It is mere sentimentality to think

that truth is stronger than error, although truth will tend to be rediscovered over time if it is

extinguished.

Fourth, Mill responds to the possible argument against him that since we do not

actually put dissenters to death any more, no true opinion will ever be extinguished. Mill

replies that legal persecution for opinions is still significant in society, for example in the

case of blasphemy or atheism. There is also no guarantee, given general public opinion, that

more extreme forms of legal persecution will not reemerge. In addition, there continues to

be social intolerance of dissent. Mill argues that societal intolerance causes people to hide

their views, and stifles intellectualism and independent thought. Stifling free thinking hurts

truth, no matter whether a particular instance of free thinking leads to false conclusions.

Commentary

In Chapter 2, Mill looks exclusively at issues of freedom of thought and of opinion. It

is significant that he attempts to justify the importance of this freedom by showing its social

benefits--for Mill, diversity of opinion is a positive societal good.

Mill's argument that the dissenting opinion may be true brings up some important

points. First, it highlights that Mill believes that moral truths do exist. Thus, in defending

liberty, Mill does not say that all opinions are equally valid. Mill is not a relativist; he is not

saying that all things can be true according to their circumstances. Rather, he is simply

saying that any single idea might be true, and that for this reason no idea can be dismissed,

since truth is a boon to progress.

Second, Mill tries to show the contingency of popular beliefs about truth while going

to great lengths to not actually state that any popular views about things like religion are

wrong. To accomplish this, he observes that in the past people have been persecuted for

what is now believed to be true. Thus, Mill creates a logical situation in which anyone

reading must accept that if they support persecuting "false" views, then they are required to

accept their own persecution if in the minority on a specific issue. Mill is thereby able to

dismiss the persecution of "false" views, without condemning modern views as being false.

Third, Mill's examples of persecuted truths reflect some of his rhetorical strategies in

this essay. Mill is very conscious of his audience in 19th century England, and he uses

examples, like the crucifixion of Christ, which would certainly have resonance with his

readers. This reflects a more general strategy in this essay of choosing familiar and often

uncontroversial examples in order to make much broader moral claims. In reading this essay

it is important to remember that England did not have the same legal protection of liberty

that it has today; Mill uses examples to make his points that would not get him into trouble

with the law or English society.

Finally, it is worth thinking about the importance of Mill's assumption in the existence

of truth to his justification for freedom of opinion. If no one could be wrong or right, would

this require tolerance and respect of difference, or could the strongest opinion simply try to

defeat all others? Mill does not try to answer this question, because the existence of truth is

assumed throughout. However, thinking about such issues is important in seeing how

persuasive Mill can be to people who do not share all of his assumptions.

Chapter 2, Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion (Part 2)

After explaining how popular opinions might be false, Mill makes three further

arguments in favor of freedom of opinion.

His second argument (after the argument discussed last section that the popular

opinion could be false), is that even if the popular opinion is true, if it is not debated it will

become "dead dogma." If truth is simply held as a prejudice, then people will not fully

understand it, and will not understand how to refute objections to it. Dissent, even if it is

false, keeps alive the truth against which it dissents.

Mill then turns to two potential criticisms of his argument.

First, one could say that people should be taught the grounds for their opinions, and

that having been taught these grounds, they do not then merely hold prejudices but really

understand the basis of their opinions. Mill replies that in cases where differing opinions are

possible, understanding the truth requires dispelling arguments to the contrary. If a person

cannot refute objections, then he cannot properly be said to understand his own opinion.

Furthermore, he must hear these objections from people who actually believe them,

because it is only these people who can show the full force of the arguments. Responding to

objections is so important that if no dissenters exist, it is necessary to imagine them, and to

come up with the most persuasive arguments that they could make.

A second criticism might be that it is not necessary for mankind in general to be

familiar with potential objections to their beliefs, but only for philosophers or theologians to

be thus aware. Mill replies that this objection does not weaken his argument for free

discussion, because dissenters still must be given a voice with which to object to opinions.

Furthermore, while in the Catholic Church there is a clear distinction between common

people and intellectuals, in Protestant countries like England, every person is considered

responsible for his choices. Also, in modern times it is practically impossible to keep writings

that are accessible to the intellectuals from the common people.

Mill then presents a third argument for the value of liberty of thought and discussion.

He writes that if a true opinion is not debated, the meaning of the opinion itself may be lost.

This can be seen in the history of ethical and religious beliefs--when they stop being

challenged, they lose their "living power." Mill says that Christianity faces such a situation,

where people's beliefs are not reflected in their conduct. As a result, people do not truly

understand the doctrines they hold dear, and their misunderstanding leads to serious

mistakes.

Mill presents one possible criticism of this view. He writes that it could be asked

whether it is essential for "true knowledge" for some people to hold erroneous opinions. Mill

replies that having an increasing number of uncontested opinions is both "inevitable and

indispensable" in the process of human improvement. However, this does not mean that the

loss of debate is not a drawback, and he encourages teachers to try to compensate for the

loss of dissent.

Mill then turns to a fourth argument for freedom of opinion. He writes that in the case

of conflicting doctrines, perhaps the most common case is that instead of one being true

and one false, the truth is somewhere between them. Progress usually only substitutes one

partial truth for another, the newer truth more suited to the needs of the times. Dissenting

or heretical opinions often reflect the partial truths not recognized in popular opinion, and

are valuable for bringing attention to a "fragment of wisdom." This fact can be seen in

politics, where differing opinions keep both sides reasonable. In any open question, the side

that is least popular at the time is the side that should be most encouraged. This side

reflects interests that are being neglected.

Mill then looks at a criticism of this fourth argument. He says that it could be argued

that some principles, such as those of Christianity, are the whole truth, and if somebody

disagrees, he is completely wrong. Mill replies by saying that in many ways Christian

morality is "incomplete and one-sided," and that some of the most important ethical ideas

have been derived from Greek and Roman sources. He argues that Christ himself intended

his message to be incomplete, and that it is a mistake to reject secular supplements to

Christian morality. Most basically, human imperfection implies that a diversity of opinion

would be required to understand truth.

After looking at these four arguments for liberty, Mill briefly addresses the argument

that free expression should be allowed, but only if it sticks to "fair discussion." He says that

such a standard would be very hard to enforce from a practical perspective. Mill posits that

it would likely only be dissenters who would be held to such a high standard of conduct.

Ultimately, it is not law's place to restrict discussion in this way; public opinion must look at

individual cases, and hold both sides to the same standard.

Commentary

Mill makes the case that if people hold a true opinion they will benefit from hearing

dissenters argue against that opinion. He also observes that he thinks most people only

know partial truths, and that they might benefit from hearing other fragments of truth. This

discussion reflects a particular conception of how people learn. Mill contends that people

learn through debate, and through having their opinions challenged. Thus, dissenting

opinions are socially useful because they help people to understand the real strength (and

limitations) of their own beliefs. Mill believes that the usefulness of dissenting opinions

cannot be substituted for, neither when the unpopular view is partially true, nor when it is

completely false.

One idea to consider when thinking about Mill's argument is whether he has an

overly idealized view of this learning process. For example, what happens when the

conflicting opinions rest on fundamentally different presuppositions--are the conversations

that Mill describes really possible? If people do not share the same vocabulary for discussing

moral and political issues, then will they really be challenging each other, or simply talking

past each other? Think about what answer Mill might give to this problem. If his answer is

unconvincing, then can he still say that a diversity of opinions is socially useful?

Finally, it is also worth looking at Mill's refutation of someone who thinks that

Christianity is the whole truth. Mill seems to argue that such a person misinterprets

Christianity. Would this response be convincing to a person with views on Christianity that

are different from Mill's? Does Mill have other arguments that might provide a better

response to this claim? More generally, Mill's discussion of religious toleration in Chapter 2

brings up the issue of whether Mill can be convincing to people whose beliefs demand

intolerance of those who disagree with them. Since Mill is using social benefit as the basis of

his justification for liberty, it would seem that a person who believes in intolerance could

simply say that any benefits of free opinion are outweighed by allowing something evil to be

expressed. Think about how persuasive such a critique is, given Mill's claims about the need

for dissent in order to truly understand one's own opinions.

Chapter 3, Of Individuality, as one of the Elements of Well-being

Having already examined whether people should be allowed to hold and express

unpopular beliefs, Mill looks at the question of whether people should be allowed to act on

their opinions without facing legal punishment or social stigma. Mill observes that actions

should not be as free as opinions, and reasserts that both must be limited when they would

cause harm to others and be "a nuisance to other people." However, many of the reasons for

respecting different opinions also apply to respecting actions. Since humans are fallible,

different "experiments of living" are valuable. The expression of individuality is essential for

individual and social progress.

Individuality is essential to the cultivation of the self. A basic problem that Mill sees

with society is that individual spontaneity is not respected as having any good in itself, and

is not seen as essential to well-being. Rather, the majority thinks that its ways should be

good enough for everybody. Mill argues that while people should be trained as children in

the accumulated knowledge of human experience, they should also have the freedom as

adults to interpret that experience as they see fit. He places great moral emphasis on the

process of making choices, and not simply accepting customs without questions: only people

who make choices are using all of their human faculties. Mill then links the desires and

impulses reflected in individuality with the development of character: "One whose desires

and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam engine has

character."

Mill writes that in early stages of society, it is possible that there could be too much

individuality. However, the danger now is rather the stifling of desires and impulses. He says

that people become more valuable to themselves and also more able to be valuable to

others when they develop their individuality. Mill then turns to the second part of his

discussion, the ways in which people who exercise their liberty as individuals are valuable to

others.

Individuality is valuable because people might learn something from the

nonconformists. Dissenters may discover new goods, and keep alive existing goods. While

genius is rare, it is also true that "Genius can only breathe free in an atmosphere of

freedom." Unoriginal people tend to not see the value of originality, and tend to shun genius

for mediocrity. Mill argues against this tendency, saying that all people should value what

originality brings to the world. Furthermore, Mill argues that the modern age (the 19th

century), in contrast to the Middle Ages, tends to diminish the individual and encourage

mediocrity, linking this tendency with the democratization of culture and government. A

conscious effort needs to be made to counteract this trend.

There is no one pattern for how to best live life. If a person is sufficiently developed,

then his choices for how to live life are best precisely because they are his own. People

require different atmospheres in order to develop and reach their potentials, and a healthy

society must make it possible for people to follow more than one pattern.

Liberty and individuality are essential to individual and social progress. Seeing

people's dissimilarities is key in learning about one's own weaknesses. Diversity also lets us

see the potential of combining the positive traits of different people. Forced conformity, in

contrast, keeps people from learning from each other. Mill writes that it is "despotism of

custom" that prevents the improvement of England, and that it is Europe's relative diversity

of lifestyles and paths that makes it more progressive than conformist China. However, Mill

worries that Europe is progressing towards the Chinese ideal of "making all people alike,"

and will thus face stagnation.

Commentary

In this chapter, Mill tries to show that individuality and nonconformity are valuable

both on the level of the individual and on the level of society. Mill believes that society

naturally prefers conformity, and that this preference is exacerbated by democratization and

the control of society by the masses.

Mill's concern with the stifling of individuality extends to both legal and social realms.

He believes that in the face of public pressure to conform and the institutionalized power of

over-reaching laws, the individual is obstructed from an ability to make meaningful choices,

and thus from personal development. More broadly, and extremely important to any

argument resting on the concept of utility, conformity hurts society as well as the individual

in the minority, since in conformity people lose out on potentially desirable ways of

approaching life and stop learning from each other. Mill believes that social progress

requires a dynamic give and take between conflicting ways of life.

Mill's views of social progress are intimately tied up with his views on individuality

and conformity. Mill subscribes to the belief that there are better and worse ways to live life:

barbarians and savages, Mill believes live more poorly than civilized man. But, with

civilization comes a tendency toward conformity. And since Mille believes that it is through a

free and dynamic development of one's self and the interaction with people with different

ways of life that an individual perfects himself, and similarly, that it is through discussion

and dissent that "truth" is kept alive in society, conformity leads to social stagnation. There

may be such a thing as too much individuality, as a barbarian nation is structured (or

unstructured). Conformity, however, the opposite of too much individuality, is similarly

problematic, and leads only to a lack of vitality. Mill here outlines a relationship between the

liberty of man and society that is dynamic, a constantly negotiated terrain; there is a

delicate balance, the individual must always be free, but the specter of too much freedom,

as embodied by the uncivilized world, does exist.

Mill does not give many examples in this chapter, and his discussion of liberty of

action is quite general. Thus, it is important to think about what individual "liberty" Mill truly

considers to be necessary for human and social development. If by liberty he merely means

permitting eccentricity, then it is not clear that his position is very radical all. However, if Mill

wishes to encourage people to act out against deeply engrained social norms, then one

might wonder if society might simply lose cohesion and become polarized under his system.

One might also wonder if there aren't some actions that are simply worthless for human

development. The next two chapters provide some real examples of Mill's principles in

action. When reflecting on these examples, think about whether they are consistent with

Mill's arguments and predictions in this chapter.

Chapter 4, Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual

In this chapter, Mill attempts to delineate when the authority of society can rightly

limit individuality and the "sovereignty of the individual over himself." Mill's answer is that

society and the individual should each receive control over that part of human life that it is

particularly interested in.

While rejecting the idea of a social contract, Mill writes that since people receive the

protection of society, they owe certain conduct in return. Individuals must not injure those

interests of other people that should be considered rights. Individuals must fairly share the

burden of defending society and its members from injury. Finally, individuals may be

censured by opinion, though not by law, for harming others while not violating their rights.

Thus, society has jurisdiction over any aspect of human behavior that "affects prejudicially

the interests of others."

However, society does not have an interest in those aspects of life that affect no one

but the person acting, or only affects people by their consent. Mill writes that such behavior

should be both legally permitted and socially accepted. People should encourage others to

make full use of their faculties. They should not, however, try to keep a person from doing

with his life what he wishes. Mill justifies this position by observing that anybody else's

interests in or knowledge about a particular person's well being is "trifling" compared to the

individual's own interest and knowledge.

Mill says that he does not mean that people should not be allowed to point out what

they see as faults in other people's behavior. In addition, he is not proscribing avoiding a

person or warning others about that person. These "penalties" are acceptable because they

are natural reactions to some behavior--they are not intended to punish a person. However,

People do not have the right to express moral reprobation, and they should not try to make

the person uncomfortable. He should not be treated with anger or resentment, or seen as an

enemy if he engages in unpopular activities that only affect himself.

Mill then addresses potential criticism of his argument. How "can any part of the

conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to the other members?" No

human is fully isolated, and actions can create bad examples, hurt those who depend on the

person and diminish community resources. Furthermore, why can't society interfere on

behalf of mature people incapable of "self- government?

Mill replies that he agrees that some behavior may affect the "sympathies" and

interests of others, and hurt the well-being of society at large. When an action violates a

person's obligations then it does not only affect himself, and he can be properly face moral

reprobation for breaking those obligations. Mill forwards the example of a person who is

unable to pay debts because of extravagant living. He says that such behavior is subject to

punishment because the person fails to fulfill a duty to his creditors. However, the person

should not be punished for the extravagance itself--that is a personal decision that must be

respected.

In contrast, if an action only indirectly affects society without violating any fixed

obligation, then "the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of

the greater good of human freedom." Society has a person's entire childhood to nurture

values; if the person fails to accept those values, or remains immature, it is society's own

fault. No further influence is necessary. Also, if an action is harmful then people will see its

negative effects, and this should be enough of an example to them of why they should not

act in such a way.

Mill says the strongest argument against interference, though, is that when society

does interfere, it will likely do so wrongly. He writes, "there is no parity between the feeling

of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it."

Mill argues that there is a universal tendency of people to extend the bounds of "moral

police" unjustly. He writes about how a Muslim majority might insist that pork not be eaten

in their country, or that married clergy be punished in Spain. He writes, "we must beware of

admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to

ourselves." If people want to be able to impose their morality, they must be willing to accept

the imposition by others. Mill complains about unjust violations of freedom such as the

banning of alcohol, the banning of recreation on the Sabbath, and the persecution of

Mormons for polygamy. People can preach against such activities, and try to change

people's minds, but they should not be coercive.

Commentary

Mill spends significant time in this chapter defending and delineating his "harm

principle": that actions can only be punished when they harm others. Perhaps the most basic

issue in this chapter, then, is whether Mill's harm principle actually makes sense. Mill

acknowledges that people are not fully isolated from society, and that their actions can

affect others. In principle then, one could make a case that any particular activity causes

such harm to other people that the need to respect individuality is outweighed. Is it unfairly

arbitrary that Mill therefore limits social intervention to those actions that directly violate

obligations? Perhaps more importantly, does Mill leave too much room for someone to say

that it would be acceptable to limit liberty any time it could harm society in any way?

In response to these questions, Mill would likely remind the reader that his approach

is operating under a broadly construed conception of social good. In Chapter 3, he tried to

show many of the beneficial effects of nonconformity. Any social interest in restricting

actions would therefore have to overcome the broad social value of individuality. While Mill's

utilitarian approach does leave open the possibility that social interest could require major

limitations on freedom, his discussions in previous chapters about the social value of liberty

makes such a possibility unlikely. The reason his standard for "harm" is so high is that the

good that comes from individuality is so socially beneficial.

In many ways, Mill uses the same arguing technique in this chapter that he did in

defending freedom of opinion in Chapter 2. Mill points out that societies frequently declare

perfectly legitimate activities to be immoral. Therefore, if a person wants to say that it is

acceptable to punish bad activities, he must also accept that others have the right to do the

same to him. Mill starts with examples that would seem obvious to his audience, like the

unfairness of banning pork in Muslim countries, to make much more radical claims, such as

the unfairness of banning polygamy. Thus, the fallibility of society is an important aspect of

Mill's defense of liberty of action.

Mill's discussion is also interesting in the ways in which he leaves some openings for

social criticism of actions. Such criticism is appropriate when it cannot be helped; it is simply

natural that people will find some activities to be distasteful and will therefore judge the

action inappropriate. However, Mill sets boundaries on any punitive action emerging from

this criticism. Just as Mill believes opinions must be free while actions are subject to at least

some regulation, he gives free rein to criticism while limiting punishment, an action.

One idea worth considering is whether a certain degree of punishment of distasteful

activity might also be a natural human reaction. Mill may leave doors open for critique by

basing his argument on what it is "natural" for humans to do.

Chapter 5, Applications

In the final chapter of On Liberty, Mills tries to clarify his general argument. He writes

that his essay can be broken down into two basic principles. First, people are not

accountable to society for actions that only concern themselves. The only means society has

to express disapproval of such actions is through "advice, instruction, persuasion, and

avoidance by other people if thought necessary by them for their own good." Secondly, the

individual is accountable for actions that hurt others, and society can punish a person

socially or legally as is deemed necessary for such actions. Mill observes, though, that

sometimes when an action causes harm to others, such as when a person succeeds in a

competitive job market, the general social good is positive, and there is no right to punish

people for the harm caused. Similarly, free trade is allowed because of its socially beneficial

effects.

In the rest of the chapter Mill looks at particular examples, and explains how his

argument should be properly applied to each one.

Mill first looks at how liberty relates to society's right to guard against crimes and

accidents. Mill says that the police must be careful not to restrict things that might only

potentially be done for evil, and must respect people's right to potentially harm themselves.

For example, a person should be warned about the danger of crossing an unstable bridge,

but should not be forcibly prevented from crossing if he understands the risks. In the case of

a poison that could be potentially used for a crime, there should be regulations such as

taking down the name and address of the purchaser, but the poison should not be banned.

Mill also observes that the right to prevent crimes makes it legitimate to limit conduct in the

interest of prevention. For example, a person who becomes violent when drunk could be

compelled not to drink. He also mentions that public violations of "decency" are an affront to

others, and can therefore be restricted.

Mill then turns to the issue of whether people should be free to "counsel or instigate"

others to act in a particular way. He says that they should, because of the importance of

exchanging opinions. A more complicated situation is when someone profits from acting

against the public good, such as in owning a gambling house. On the one hand, society does

not have the right to keep a person from trying to persuade people to do something bad. On

the other hand, Mill does not think it unreasonable for society to say that people should not

be allowed to benefit from prompting others to make bad decisions. Rather, a bad decision

should reflect only the individual's will. Mill acknowledges that persuading people to act

badly for profit is an evil, and accepts that society could impose restrictions on such people.

Another issue is whether the state should discourage vices through powers like taxation. Mill

rejects this, saying that it represents a punishment. Since it is not acceptable to ban vices it

is not acceptable to punish people for them either.

Mill addresses the question of whether people should be held to agreements that

cause themselves harm, such as selling oneself into slavery. Mill says that a person should

not be held to this agreement, because he is thereby permanently giving up his freedom,

and thereby undermining the very significance of freedom. However, Mill does recognize

that since agreements often create expectations and obligations, these factors must be

taken into account in determining whether it is acceptable to nullify a particular agreement.

Mill also complains that certain actions affecting other people are currently seen as

being protected by a right to liberty. In particular, Mill writes about the case of "family

relations." In these cases actions can harm other people, and it is in the State's authority to

make sure such harms do not occur. For example, the State should be allowed to legislate

compulsory education for children (while allowing for different modes of education),

regardless of the desires of the parent. To leave children uneducated is a crime against

society and the child, and the state should be able to test that children have general

knowledge of facts. Mill also contends that the State should be allowed to restrict marriage

to those people capable of supporting a family, given the dangers of over-population and the

duty to give children a chance at a normal existence.

Finally, Mill examines the issue of whether the government should intervene to help

people, instead of letting them do things for themselves. This is related to his discussion of

government action, but does not directly deal with the issue of liberty. Mill gives three

objections to such interference. First, the person most qualified to perform an action is

usually the person with a direct interest in it. Second, it is useful that people do things

themselves for their personal development. Third, it is bad to add to the government's

power. A powerful bureaucracy will stifle reform as a means to preserve its own interests,

and thus goes against the interests of free people. Drawing the line where big government

becomes dangerous is one of the most important political questions. Mill's answer is to

decentralize power as much as possible, but to centralize the dissemination of information.

He warns about the evils of giving the state so much power that it stifles human

development, because ultimately this lack of development will stifle the state itself.

Commentary

This chapter is significant because it provides a much clearer sense of what kinds of

actions Mill believes should be respected by society. Most of his examples deal with legal

requirements and the role of the state. Why might he have chosen to focus on government

action in this chapter? In particular, think about how this approach might work as a

rhetorical strategy. It is important to remember, however, that in general Mill does not limit

compulsion to state activities. It is likely that in most of his examples he would also say

public judgment would be inappropriate.

In general, Mill's applications seem to reinforce the view of liberty of action

previously developed. Some examples, however, may be surprising. For example, Mill's

statement that gambling houses can be limited reflects an imposition of social values on the

business activities of others. Given his argument about the fallibility of social values, Mill's

willingness to restrict "bad" businesses might appear inconsistent. In thinking about the

significance of such examples, it may be useful to think about two ways of interpreting

them. First, such examples might show a depth of Mill's theory that was not previously

apparent. Indeed, this is why Mill provides a chapter on applications of his theory. In fact,

this example does reinforce the point that while society must not punish behavior, it does

not have to actively promote vices. A second interpretation of difficult examples is that Mill

himself failed to appreciate the full significance of his theory. It is possible that Mill simply

did not see the full logical implications of his previous discussion. When looking at his

examples, think about which category Mill falls in to.

Another interesting point is Mill's insistence that parents do not have full ownership

over the lives of their children. The good of society requires certain behavior on the part of

parents and potential parents, and society is fully justified in compelling that behavior. In

thinking about Mill's argument, consider whether he gives an adequate account of the rights

that parents have to raise their children as they see fit.

Finally, Mill ends with a discussion about the importance of people having the

freedom to develop their capability to make choices. Mill uses the example of a government

that is trying to help people make the right decision through institutionalized means. But

this help, according to Mill, is no beneficial to either the individual or to society. Mill adheres

to his principal that it is only through dissent, only through disagreement and conflict of

ideas, that society can be bettered and an individual can gain the perspective to help

himself. The freedom that Mill wants for the individual is a freedom to make mistakes, to

assert falsehood. Mill is committed to the idea of progress, his theory of the hierarchy of

civilization demonstrates his belief that man can improve himself. But Mill sees this progress

as only able to emerge from an open culture, one free from conformity; the utility Mill

promotes is not one of comfort in the present, it is one designed to create the ultimate good

in the future, human progress.