Ombusdment

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Introduction : The genesis of the Ombudsman may be traced as far back as 1809 when the institution was first established by the Swedish which was basically of Scandinavian tradition with a view to raising the standards of modern democratic forms of parliamentary administration. A tribune of the people: According to Wade (1988) the institution of Ombudsman is “a tribune of the people”. The word is of a Scandinavian, meaning thereby ‘Officer’ or ‘Commissioner’. Wade contended that : “An Ombudsman requires no legal powers except powers of inquiry. In particular, he is in no sense a court of appeal and he cannot alter or reverse any government decision. His effectiveness derives entirely from his power to focus public and parliamentary attention upon citizen’s grievances. But publicity based on impartial inquiry is a powerful lever”. Similarly, Jain and Jain (1986) observed, ‘Ombudsman acts as an external agency, outside the administrative hierarchy to probe into administrative faults. In theory Ombudsman is the projection of legislative function of supervising the administration.” Peter Cane (1987) propounded that ‘Ombudsman’ “is an official, independent of the administration with power to investigate the citizen’s complaints of maladministration.” The terminology ‘maladministration’ being the formal point of the institution, needs to be understood in its right perspective. DCM Yardly (1986) defined ‘maladministration’ as complaints tainted with : (a) nepotism, corruption or bias; (b) failure to observe a sound administrative basis; (c) negligence in carrying out a duty; (d) misuse of discretion; (e) incompetence;

Transcript of Ombusdment

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Introduction :The genesis of the Ombudsman may be traced as far back as 1809 when the institution was first established by the Swedish which was basically of Scandinavian tradition with a view to raising the standards of modern democratic forms of parliamentary administration.A tribune of the people:According to Wade (1988) the institution of Ombudsman is “a tribune of the people”. The word is of a Scandinavian, meaning thereby ‘Officer’ or ‘Commissioner’. Wade contended that :“An Ombudsman requires no legal powers except powers of inquiry. In particular, he is in no sense a court of appeal and he cannot alter or reverse any government decision. His effectiveness derives entirely from his power to focus public and parliamentary attention upon citizen’s grievances. But publicity based on impartial inquiry is a powerful lever”.Similarly, Jain and Jain (1986) observed, ‘Ombudsman acts as an external agency, outside the administrative hierarchy to probe into administrative faults. In theory Ombudsman is the projection of legislative function of supervising the administration.”Peter Cane (1987) propounded that ‘Ombudsman’ “is an official, independent of the administration with power to investigate the citizen’s complaints of maladministration.” The terminology ‘maladministration’ being the formal point of the institution, needs to be understood in its right perspective. DCM Yardly (1986) defined ‘maladministration’ as complaints tainted with :(a) nepotism, corruption or bias;(b) failure to observe a sound administrative basis;(c) negligence in carrying out a duty;(d) misuse of discretion;(e) incompetence;(f) loss of documents or papers;(g) tardiness and delay;(h) unjust segregation or discrimination;or (i) any similar matters.In fine, the main objects to the appointment of Ombudsman are to institute, according to Balbir Singh(1986),“… new standards and evolve new and more congenial pattern of administrative behaviour”, including doing away with corruption of all sorts.Chronological perspective:

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Interest generated in the idea of Ombudsman was of relatively recent phenomenon which gained momentum by the persuasive publicity given by Stefan Hurlvitz, the Danish Ombudsman under the statute of 1954.In England, Justice (1961) came out openly in support of the concept of Ombudsman in his report on the subject matter known as ‘Whytt Report’. This was soon followed with the institution of various kinds of Ombudsman on experimental basis to deal with the central and local Government, Northern Iceland and health service in England. New Zealand closely followed the heels of England among the Commonwealth countries and created Ombudsman in 1962 enacting the Parliamentary Commissioner (Ombudsman) Act, 1962. Other Commonwealth countries took up the institution of Ombudsman in quick succession, each country adopting in the manner to suit its own political, legal and constitutional usage.Thus, as to whether the Ombudsman, as the instrument of parliamentary process, press and public debates, redressal of public grievances, etc, is being effectively used or not, has come to stay in each country wherever the same has been instituted.Ombudsman has grown and developed in its legal perspective and public estimation or acceptability as aneffective institution for redressal of public grievances and minimization; if not total elimination of maladministration over the years could be evidenced from various Law journals.The Commonwealth Law Bulletin, January, 1994 reported that in Hong Kong, the Commissioner for Administration complaints (Amendment) Bill, 1993 sought to amend its ordinances so as to –(a) allow public direct access to the Commissioner for Administrative complaints;(b) include major statutory bodies within the purview of the Commissioner;(c) allow the Commissioner to publicize its investigation reports;(d) the Commissioner may investigate action taken by or on behalf of any organisation in exercise of administrative functions upon a complain by a person who claims to have sustained injustice in consequence upon maladministration in connection with that action;(e) thereafter if he deems proper and is in the interest of public; may-i) publish the report; andii) that the Commissioner shall not be restrained from disclosing

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the identity of the organisation involved on the matter in his report.In brief, the exercise was to enhance the powers of the Commission for Administrative Complaints.Secondly, in the United Kingdom, the report of the Commissioner for Administration on the investigation of a complain was found not to the satisfaction of the complainant who filed a complaint in the Court of Law against the Ombudsman on the grounds that the method of investigation was not satisfactory, that the Commissioner refused to reinvestigate the Complaint and that the Commissioner had exceeded his authority. The issue raised certain legal basic questions as to whether the complainant was entitled to receive draft report, etc, in pursuance of the parliamentary Commissioner’s Act, 1967.The main issue in the matter was about the conduct of the Department of Social Security in connection with the claims for certain benefits by the complainant. While investigating the case, the Commissioner upheld action of the Department of Social Security, refusing to re-open the case when requested to do so.If petition for a judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner was filed with the Queen’s Division Bench for which the Court held that :(1) although there was nothing in the Commissioner’s role or statutory frame-work within which he operated so singular as to take him outside the purview of judicial service the Court could not readily be persuaded to interfere with the exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion under the Act of 1967;(2) that, since the exercise of that discretion involved a high degree of subjective judgement, it would be difficult to mount an effective challenge to his decision on the grounds of unreasonableness;(3) that, the Commissioner was entitled to the exercise of his discretion to limit the scope of his investigation by selecting which complain he is addressed and by identifying and investigating broad categories of complaints;(4) that, the reasons for sending the draft report to the department to allow it to point out any inaccuracy to give notice of document or information disclosure of which could be contrary to the public interest and to indicate any proposed remedy did not apply to the applicant and although the decision of the Commissioner affected the rights to fairness of the applicant did not demand the applicant should be shown the draft report; and (5) that, once the Commissioner’s report had been submitted to the

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relevant member of Parliament and the department, he was functus officio and was unable to re-open his investigation without a further referral under section 5 of the Act.Thirdly, in Mauritius, the Ombudsman, Mr. S.M. Hatteea, in his 18th Annual Report covering the period January – December, 1991, stated that in view of the increasing number of cases that had been received during the year under report than that of the previous year was indeed an encouraging sign of the growing faith of the public in the institution of Ombudsman to assist the public who claim to have sustained injustice as a consequence of maladministration.to be continuedThe report of Ombudsman highlighted two sensitive areas for improvement of the performance of the Government in that :(a) the Ministers and departments should make the required information of Ombudsman with promptness without requiring them to be reminded; and(b) though he could not find evidence of proof that officials were communal in their dealings with the public, such impression should not be created in the discharge of their duty as public servants.The Ombudsman further observed that for the sake of good administration it was expedient that the public servants should at all cost be well perceived in the mind of the public and that in their dealings with the latter they should always be impartial and just.Fourthly, the Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman, Mr. David Marvell, in his Second Annual Report, 1992 recommended a public-oriented five point innovation for better administration and redressal of public grievances to the Law Society.Fifthly, in Zimbabwe, the Ombudsman, Mrs. S.G. Chanetasa, in her Eighth Annual Report covering the period January-December, 1992 gave the emphasis on radical improvement of their attitude and treatment of the officials towards the interest and redressal of citizen’s grievances by being more easily accessible.Indian Panorama:The origin, growth and function of the concept of Ombudsman cannot be studied in isolation. As one of the Commonwealth Countries, the Ombudsmania certainly had the impact in India, where the root had crept into the social milieu and administrative mechanism. Nevertheless, in view of its peculiar social structure based preponderantly on Hindu Caste System with multi-faceted ethnic diversity and religious pluralism as enshrined in its broad

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based secular constitution, the structure and function of the Ombudsman has to undergo necessarily modifications without loosing, of course, its original concept so that it may be fitted not only with its democratic and parliamentary institution but also conformed to their social and economic systems.The ARC initiative of Lokpal:Keeping this in view and convinced with the opinion that there is no effective mechanism to redress grievances of all kinds against the administrative evils, the Administrative Reforms Commission under the Chairmanship of Morarji Desai recommended to set up Lokpal similar to that of Ombudsman in India in its “Interim Report on the Problems of Redressal of Citizen’s Grievances (1966) most probably as a result of eminent lawyers none other than M.C. Setalrod, L.M. Singhi etc in the early sixties.First Indian Version of Ombudsman (1968) :The first Indian version of Ombudsman Bill 1968 was presented by in the fourth Lok Sabha. Unfortunately, it got lapsed before its being approved by the Rajya Sabha to become law due to dissolution of the Lok Sabha. The Bill was known as “The Lokpal and Lokyuktas, 1968”. It was modeled very closely on the draft Bill, proposed by the Administrative Reforms Commission in the Interim Report. It envisaged a Lokpal to monitor the actions of the Ministers and the Secretaries, and a Lokayukta to consider complaints against the actions of administrative cadres below the rank of Secretary.The Second Lokpal Bill (1971) :A Second Bill was introduced in 1971. It was also lapsed due to dissolution of the fifth Lok Sabha. The Lokpal and the Lokayuktas Bill 1971 did not make any substantial departure from the earlier Bill, 1968.The highlight the main features, the Bill envisaged to focus on two kinds of activity – ‘allegation’ and ‘grievances’. The term ‘allegation’ may be summed up as in relation to a public servant who is found to have –(a) abused his position to obtain any gain or favour to himself or to any other person or to cause undue hardship to any other person or to cause undue hardship to any other person;(b) biased by personal interest or improper or corrupt motives, etc, in the discharge of his official duty;(c) guilty of corruption, lack of integrity or improper conduct in his capacity.

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Likewise, while clause 2(d) of the Bill defined grievance as a claim by a person that he suffered injustice or undue hardship in consequence of ‘maladministration’ as action taken or purported to have taken in exercise of the administrative function wherein such action or administrative procedure or practice governing such action was alleged or found to have been unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory, negligent, unduly delayed, etc.Secondly, clause 9(1)(a) and (b) further explained that while ‘grievance’ can be brought by a person who was actually aggrieved, ‘allegation’ can be brought by any person other than a public servant.Thirdly, except the Prime Minister, complaint could be lodged against all shades of public servants. The Lokpal, on his part, is obliged to lay his investigations to the Prime Minister in case of Cabinet Minister and in other cases before the Officer or Minister who is superior to the public servant involved.The Lokpal proposed by the 1971 Bill could have yielded enormous powers and could have investigated various kinds of cases including maladministration and allegations of corruption of any sort. The institution was not a parliamentary creation, could receive complaints directly and also monitor the action taken by the authority concerned in pursuance of the report of Lokpal. In case the Lokpal was not satisfied, he might seek the help of the President and through him of Parliament.The Lokpal Bill, 1971 would also have been a very effective instrument of change for improvement and in the nature of administration, but for its being lapsed before it became a law.

Growth of Lokpal in States :Despite the fact that the Lokpal Bill could not be created as a national institution, interest generated in the concept of Ombudsman throughout the country made its manifestation felt in the enactment of various State Legislations. Orissa was the first State that enacted a legislation in 1970 on the institution, Lokpal.This was soon followed by Maharashtra in 1971, Rajasthan and Bihar in 1973, Madhya Pradesh in 1974 and Uttar Pradesh in 1975; Kerala adopted a policy to institute a Commissioner to expose corruption in 1976, the Jammu and Kashmir as Prevention of Corruption Statute in 1975, Tamil Nadu as Administrative Criminal Misconduct in 1974, Karnataka in 1973, and so on.

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Two kinds of Lokpal :The above mentioned State Legilsatyions may be categorized into two. The first category consists of statutes which are modeled on the Lokpal Bill 1972, with modifications to accommodate indigenous elements. The second category is of the kind that was enacted in Rajasthan and Gujarat which were primarily concerned with examining and looking into ‘allegation’ aspect only.Distorted Lokpal at National Level (1977) :Some state institutions of Lokpal had shown remarkable success in dealing with ‘grievance’ cases along with ‘allegation’. Despite this, the Janata Government at the centre preferred the Rajasthan and Gujarat models and decided that the Ombudsman shall investigate into ‘allegation’ only. Thus, the 1977 Bill is not concerned with the administration at all. It only concerns with the ‘corruption’ of any member of the Council of Ministers for the Union including the Prime Minister, the Chief Ministers, and members of Parliament and of Legislative Assemblies, leaving the Administrative cadres completely excluded.The fact that the 1977 Bill had laid emphasis on ‘corruption’ made the Lokpal a complete departure from the Ombudsman model as was originally understood.The Lokpal Bill, 1985 :The Rajiv Gandhi Government re-introduced the Bill in 1985 in the Lok Sabha on the 26th August, 1985. It was referred to a joint committee of each Houses of Parliament. In the Committee several members criticized the Bill to the effect that the scope of the same was too restrictive. Thus, the joint committee report on the Bill said,“It did not provide for the redressal of grievances of citizens but only provided for a pre-trial inquiry into the cases of corruption.”Under the situation the Government deemed it proper to re-examine the whole issue of establishment of a Lokpal, his powers, functions, jurisdiction etc, and, therefore, withdrew the Bill so as to introduce a more comprehensive legislation on the subject despite strong protest to do so from the opposition heavy-weight leaders, such as, L.K.Advani, P. Upendra, V. Arunachalam, K.P. Unikrishnan, S. Jaipal Reddy, etc. on the ground that the Bill could be adopted with suitable modification without being withdrawn.The Lokpal Bill, 1989 :Two years later, the National Front Government introduced the Bill in 1989. The Bill brought in the Prime Minister within the purview

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of the Lokpal. In fact, the Bill was almost a reproduction of 1985 Bill with minor modifications. The change worthy of mention that had been brought about is in respect of provision for a troika consisting of a Chairman and two members.Observations with Comments :As per the 1989 Bill, the Lokpal is merely to conduct pre-trial enquiry against persons holding ministerial posts who are alleged to be guilty under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.Sathe (1991) contended that this would place the Lokpal in embarrassing situation. The Government may put up cases before a competent court of Law against the evidence or finding of the Lokpal and may even get the person held to be prima facie culpable by the Lokpal acquitted by the trial Court under the Prevention of Corruption Act and questioned as to the worthwhile purpose of such an expensive institution of Lokpal, “If it is merely to hold pre-trial enquiries”. Sathe further commented that“We do not know how far the Lokpal will be able to unearth cases of corruption by ministers. This is going to be a very top heavy machinery for that purpose. But certainty the present Lokpal Bill totally buries the concept of Ombudsman which the Administrative Reforms Commission has spelt out in its reports. The Lokpal will not be of any use to the common man whose main grievances is against maladministration, red tape, callousness and negligence. We feel that it might turn out to be another cosmetic office to induct a sense of complacency. What we need is a system which will provide quick relief to people against administrative action as well as administrative inaction. Going to the Court is too expensive and many a time one cannot Marshall Evidence enough to obtain favourable judicial response. So far as corruption is concerned, the prevention of Corruption Act shall be suitably strengthened and even a special tribunal or court with appeal only to the Supreme Court on questions of law could be provided for dealing with those cases. Ombudsman is not the remedy for that purpose.All said and done as it stands now in the Indian context, it is a matter to watch and see how the Lokpal as the Indian version of Ombudsman is to take final shape to become a Law in the Country so as to raise the standard of administration which lessens, if not done away with, the grievances of citizens.Conclusion :So far, as Dhavan had rightly pointed out, the concept of Ombudsman in the form of Lokpal particularly that of the 1977 Bill:

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“… transparently concerns itself with politics. It does not, in fact, belong to the Ombudsman idea as we know it. It is a Bill which has been designed by politicians for political purpose to be used against politicians. It is a Bill which is a typical product of the aftermath of the emergency. Its object is to promote witch-hunts, not good administration. And indeed, this is exactly how the Bill was greeted when it was introduced in Parliament by Charan Singh, the Home Minister.”