Oliver_Hidalgo_-_Conceptual_History_and_Politics_Is_the_Concept_of_Democracy_Essentially_Contested[1]...

copy Koninklijke Brill NV Leiden 2008 DOI 101163187465608X363463

Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 wwwbrillnlchco

contributions to the history

of concepts

Conceptual History and Politics Is the Concept of Democracy Essentially Contested

Oliver HidalgoInstitut fuumlr Politikwissenschaft der Universitaumlt Regensburg

AbstractTh is article surveys the history of the concept of democracy from Ancient times to the present According to the author the conceptual history of democracy shows that the overwhelming success of the concept is most of all due to its ability to subsume very diff erent historical ideas and realities under its semantic fi eld Moreover the historical evolution of the concept reveals that no unequivocal defi nition is possible because of the signifi cant paradoxes aporias and contradictions it contains Th ese are popular sovereignty vs representation quality vs quantity liberty vs equality individual vs collective and fi nally the synchronicity between similarities and dis-similarities Th e ubiquitous usage of democracy in present-day political language makes it impossible to speak of it from an external perspective Th us both demo-cratic theory and practice are suff used with empirical and normative elements

Keywordsdemocracy conceptual history conceptual politics normative theory

Th e concept of democracy has been associated at diff erent points in history with some very opposing ideas while the ancients used the term δημοκρατια to identify the eff ective rule of the many or even of the whole people (despite the fact only a minority were considered citizens and the popula-tion was constricted to a small area) modern thinkers employ it in order to refer to a society in which people are able to elect and control their rulers as a means to guarantee freedom equality and the pursuit of self-interest for all individuals1 Th ere are also countless other forms of govern-

1) For a comprehensive analysis of ancient and modern democracies see Moses I Finley (1980) Fritz Gschnitzer (1995) and Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick (1996)

O Hidalgo Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 177

ment which adopt patterns (sub-)types and varieties of decision-making processes that have also been labelled democratic making it hard to keep orientation Th is myriad usage of the concept leads to a spate of distinc-tions and qualifi cations Most traditionally one can speak of democracies that are liberal or republican direct or representative consensual or majori-tarian market or socially oriented More recently other variants acquired prominence such as participatory deliberative and grassroots democracies or even alternatives like demarchy skewed democracy and non-partisan democracy Finally considering how democracies have evolved worldwide even the possibility of a specifi c Islamic transformation of democracy or of a socialist and anarchist brand of democratization might expand the scope of the concept in the future

If a typology is plausible (a diffi cult task as it is since nowadays the basic traits of a direct democracy -initiatives referenda and recalls ndash take place within the representative system and the people sometimes not only han-dle legislative but certain executive and judicial powers as well) we cannot avoid the suspicion that the ldquogovernment of the people by the people and for the peoplerdquo (Abraham Lincoln) might just as well mean ldquoeveryone and everythingrdquo2

Rather than succumbing to a mood of dismay we must take into con-sideration W B Galliersquos classical statement that democracy ndash like justice or arts ndash is yet another one among those ldquoessentially contested conceptsrdquo which lack unique standards of defi nition3 Furthermore (and fortunately) the contest seems to concern fi rst and foremost the interpretation of the concept not the concept of democracy itself4 Obviously then the question that must be made is whether it is possible to fi nd arguments and criteria to assess what is the best interpretation of the concept of democracy or whether all there is to be done is to accept a juxtaposition of competing versions Th is approach implies a second deeper problem namely the extent to which conceptual history might help in acquiring a normative perception of democracy At fi rst glance there can only be an answer in the negative conceptual history (here understood as the description and anal-ysis of concrete historical semantics origins derivations and alterations of

2) Giovanni Sartori (1992) 113) See Walter B Gallie (1956)4) See some considerations concerning normative concepts presented by Stephen Lukes (1974) and Rainer Forst (2003) 50-52

178 O Hidalgo Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201

concepts) apparently belongs to the empirical paradigm in social sciences5 therefore a normative notion of democracy (and not only a refl ection of the social and moral impact of democratic ideas and values) can only be informed by political philosophy However simply considering what the entire range of the history of political ideas is able to off er would be much too simple Instead we must acknowledge the importance and thus pro-ceed to analyze the historical and conceptual contexts that provide the framework for the development of a normative theory of democracy after the linguistic turn6 It is therefore possible to separate conceptual history from an abstract history of ideas even if it remains closely bound to norma-tive theories Th is presents the political philosophers with an additional task Th ey must also make an eff ort to clarify the extent to which the con-ceptual history of democracy might function as a basis for any kind of conceptual politics7 depending on whether they are able to extrapolate the ldquobest interpretationrdquo of the concept of democracy However fi rst I would like to discuss briefl y democracy as a historical concept before showing that conceptual history also leads to the necessity of a normative concep-tion that refl ects the aporias and contradictions of democracy

1 Th e Concept of Democracy

As it is well-known ancient Greece is the birthplace of democracy8 Th e word ldquoδημοκρατιαrdquo (which means the ldquorule by the peoplerdquo) was invented by the Athenians in order to defi ne their political system after 462461 BC particularly after Ephialtes put in place the proposals of Cleisthenes in 508507 BC disempowering the aristocratic Areopag and turning most

5) Th rough his writings on Quentin Skinner and Reinhart Koselleck Kari Palonen (2002) intends to turn the history of concepts into a subversive critique of normative political theory6) Arno Waschkuhn (1998) part 3 7) ldquoConceptual politicsrdquo is my translation of Reinhard Mehringrsquos concept of Begriff spolitik by which he wants to characterize both the method of Carl Schmitt and Reinhart Koselleck in contrast to their own conceptions of sociologist or historian of concepts See Reinhard Mehring (2006) 31 as well as the analogy to Hermann Luumlbbersquos concept of Ideenpolitik For the conceptual politics of Max Weber see also Kari Palonen (2005) 8) Some authors argue that the historical origins of democracy can be found already in the Sumerian City and the fi rst republics of ancient India but these examples are at best democ-racies avant la lettre which makes them irrelevant for this article


of the important political decisions to the assembly constituted exclusively by male citizens9 At the time the fi rst principles of democracy were free-dom and equality ndash all citizens being free by birth each one would accept the other as an equal10 and henceforth by ruling they accepted to be ruled in return After the second half of the fi fth century democracy also meant that offi cials were to be controlled by fi xed laws and by the peoplersquos vote and ndash as stated in Periclesrsquo funeral oration which survived thanks to Th ucy-dides ndash that citizens would be ensured the right to live on their own behalf without being educated and guarded by the state and its public norms11

Th e fi rst historian to mention the concept of δημοκρατια was obviously Herodotus Nevertheless we must retrace its origins at least back to the tyranny of the Peisistratides12 and the Athenian Sea Union13 when the noblesrsquo position was weakened while that of the citizens ndash the δημος ndash was strengthened Moreover the etymological derivation of the word δημοκρατια also shows the replacement of law (nomos) as constitutional concept (εύνομία ίσονομία) by an emphasis on power that is arche (μοναρχία όλιγαρχία) and kratia (δημοκρατια) respectively14

Th ese shifts show evidence that the concept of democracy was above all an attempt to identify political reality in ancient Athens Today one can hardly call democratic the political system in Attica which included slav-ery and excluded all women and foreigners from citizenship Th is con-versely makes it much easier to adopt the concept of δημοκρατια in order to describe present-day political conditions However the very singular and complex circumstances that led to the development of the rule by the people in Athens hardly compare with other political contexts and eras Rather than applying contemporary standards of democracy one should be able to contextualize the claims of the ancient Greeks In this light it is no surprise that many thinkers in ancient Greece ndash among them Plato (who associated democracy with chaos and anarchy) but also Socrates Xenophon and others ndash hoped for an aristocratic wind of change in the city of Athens leading them to lament the loss of moral order and authority

9) Kurt A Raafl aub (1995) Jochen Martin (1995) and Jochen Bleicken (1995) 10) See Aristotle (1280a) 5-7 and 24 (1291b) 32-38 and (1301a) 28-32 11) Werner Conze et al (1972) 828 12) Michael Stahl (1987) and Konrad Kinzl (1995) 13) Kurt A Raafl aub (1995) 36ff 14) Christian Meier (1983)


and to call for the rule of the best (αριστοι) or of the ones distinguished by their bravery (τιμήι) instead of the rule of the many the mob (όχλος)15 Nevertheless they were also capable of developing a readiness to accept an arrangement compatible with democratic reality in Athens Socrates famously preferred to die rather than to break the democratic laws of the city Xenophon returned to Athens after the reconciliation between Ath-ens and Sparta Plato made an interesting distinction between a ldquogoodrdquo and a ldquobadrdquo form of democracy which is supposed to have infl uenced Aristotlersquos conception of πολιτεία as an amalgam between oligarchy and democracy and therefore as a compromise between the quality of govern-ment and the peoplersquos participation16 Th e mixed constitution subsequently became the only conceivable form of Greek democracy outside Athens and its Sea Union17 Later the Romans put a new emphasis on law as a system including democracy only as a supplement Th eir concept of res publica ndash connecting monarchic aristocratic and democratic elements18 ndash was a model of constitution deemed to be the best insurance against instability from Polybius to Machiavelli

After the fall of the republic and the rise of the Roman Empire the con-cept of democracy was submitted to new assessment as a result of political circumstances While Aelius Aristides called the Imperium romanum a ldquocommon democracy of the world under one man the best ruler and directorrdquo19 Cassius Dio stressed that real democracy could only exist under a monarchy whereby the Platonic formula of justice (ldquoDoing onersquos ownrdquo) was supposed to be no longer aristocratic but democratic20 Ultimately

15) Early supporters of democracy like Herodotus and Pericles who linked justice and iso-nomia to the rule of the δημος still did not envisage a confl ict between citizens and nobles but merely did emphasize the unity of the city against the menace of oligarchy and tyranny At fi rst nobles like Pindar and Plato innovated the political and moral concept of aristocracy in order to pit the rule of the best against democracy or ndash as Th ucidides and Aristotle did later ndash to distinguish good from bad oligarchies For the conceptual history of aristocracy see Werner Conze and Christian Meier (1972) 16) In Aristotle a pure democracy is described as degenerated rule of the poor (1279b 5-10) His concept of politeia understood as the good form of democracy or also as free constitu-tion was shared by Isocrates (IV 125 ep VI 11) and Demosthenes (I 5 VI 21 XV 20)17) Wolfgang Schuller (1995) 316-23 and Alexander Demandt (1995) viii and ix 18) For the strong elements of popular participation in Rome see John North (1994) 19) Aelius Aristides (1981) XXVI 60 See also Richard Klein (1981) 131f20) Cassius Dio (1961) LVI 434 and VI 235 See also Alexander Demandt (1995) 213


neither Aristides nor Dio wanted to renounce the legitimizing value the concept of democracy still carried in the fi rst centuries of the Christian era Th e situation only changed during the European Middle Ages when the predominance of religion over all aspects of life made the reference to democracy evidently useless It was not until the thirteenth century that a few thinkers revived the concept ndash notably St Th omas of Aquinas Engel-bert of Admont Marsilius of Padua and Nicole Oresme ndash who encoun-tered it through their reception of Aristotle21 and started using it to describe the contemporary politics of the Italian cities22 But even the rise of Prot-estantism and the diminishing authority of the Catholic Church (accom-panied by the rise of contract theory which epitomized the new forms of rationalism in politics) could not immediately change the association of the concept of democracy with antiquity Th e concept of representation especially was for a long time considered to be incompatible with the idea of the ruling people Hence Th omas Hobbes argues in favour of represen-tation and against democracy ndash even though his argument that every man is born free and equal can be said to be democratic Meanwhile Rousseau insisted vice-versa on the sovereignty of the people against representation Obviously they shared the unchanged idea that democracy means nothing else than the reign of the people over themselves ndash for Hobbes a terrible image and for Rousseau something too nice to be actualized23 Further-more since the Reformation and the Enlightenment the concept of democ-racy was sporadically used to identify some specifi c elements of the mixed constitution in England (Blackstone De Lolme John Adams) of the republican constitutions of Switzerland and its cantons of the Netherlands

21) Th e philosophical work of Aristotle was unknown in the West from the fi fth century all the way to the late twelfth century 22) See Claire R Sherman (1995) 240-52 Karl Ubl (2000) 134ff RW Dyson (2003) 203-05 and 246-50 23) ldquoAgrave prendre le terme dans la rigueur de lrsquoacception il nrsquoa jamais existeacute de veacuteritable deacutemo-cratie et il nrsquoen existera jamais [ ] Srsquoil y avait un peuple de dieux il se gouvernerait deacutemo-cratiquement Un gouvernement si parfait ne convient pas agrave des hommesrdquo Translation ldquoIn its most rigorous sense there has never been a true democracy such a thing will never exist [ ] If a people of god existed it would govern itself democratically Such a perfect govern-ment is not appropriate for mankindrdquo Jean-Jacques Rousseau Du contrat social (1959-1969) III 4


and also of some German cities24 Nevertheless the (Aristotelian) scepti-cism concerning the realization of a ldquopurerdquo democracy still predominated until the end of the eighteenth century Indeed also very Aristotelian was the fact that many thinkers restricted the conceptrsquos use to the description of the state and government system as for example in the works of Johan-nes Althusius John Henry Alsted Th omas Hobbes William Temple John Locke Samuel von Pufendorf Christian Wolff Charles de Montesquieu the Encyclopaedie (De Jaucourt) Jean-Jacques Rousseau Christoph Martin Wieland and August von Schloumlzer

Th is historical context explains why the concept of democracy would not strike a chord during the French Revolution During its fi rst stage republic was still the most widely used concept25 In this sense the works of the Abbeacute Sieyegraves are instrumental in proving that only the republic was assumed to be able to include a modern market economy as well as a rep-resentative government26 whereas democracy was still associated with the direct rule of the people and the virtugrave of citizens A few years later how-ever there was a signifi cant increase in the number of positive statements concerning democracy uttered by the revolutionaries27 but eventually the reign of the Jacobins only served to confi rm scepticism towards democracy discrediting the concept for another few decades especially in England and in Germany Th is is how in Kantrsquos Zum Ewigen Frieden (1795) ndash a complement of Rousseaursquos Contrat social in which an important distinc-tion between the forma regiminis (republicanism and despotism) and the forma imperii (monarchy aristocracy and democracy) can be found ndash democracy remains associated with the absence of checks and balances as well as of representation and the rule of law28

24) See for example Martin Lutherrsquos address on February 7th 1539 (WA IV 4324) and Reneacute Louis drsquoArgensonrsquos Consideacuterations (1764) 8ff 61f 70ff and 103 25) Th erefore the concept of deacutemocratie did not play any role during the French debate concerning the suff rage universel in 1790 See Robert R Palmer (1953) 214 26) Jean Roels (1969)27) See for instance Robespierrersquos address on February 5th 1794 when he made no substan-tial distinction between democracy and republic Charles Vellay (1908) 324ff 28) Before Sieyegraves and Kant the Federalists argued in favour of the republic and against the ldquoancientrdquo idea of a democratic executive that might lead to despotism In the United States the concept of democracy had a rather pejorative image at least until the Jacksonian Democracy after 1828 ndash despite the sympathies sporadically voiced by Th omas Jeff erson See Gustav H Blanke (1956) 43ff Supposedly the reason for this is that democracy


Two complementary things had to happen before the concept of democ-racy could start its triumphant advance First of them was the historical overcoming of the antagonism between democracy and representation and second the extension of the concept beyond the classifi cation of state and government to the description of a particular form of society as well Th e Marquis drsquoArgenson was possibly the author who prepared and antic-ipated both innovations in the middle of the eighteenth century In his Consideacuterations sur le gouvernement (1764) he distinguished between a fausse and a leacutegitime democracy the fi rst one being anarchic and revolutionary the second its ldquotruerdquo version being represented by elected deputies29 Th e amalgam between the concept of democracy and political representation became possible because drsquoArgenson neglected the state and constitutional order and focussed on the social system About one hundred years before Tocqueville30 he already was concerned with the historical progregraves de la deacutemocratie in France and also stressed the decisive role of the French mon-archy in repressing European feudalism and the privileges of the nobles and in allowing the rise of civil society and social equality31

DrsquoArgensonrsquos royalist view on democracy became politically effi cient soon after the French Revolution when Th omas Painersquos answer to Edmund Burkersquos Refl ections on the Revolution in France (1790) in Th e Rights of Man (1791) began to dissolve the idea that democracy and representative government must remain a contradictio in adjecto32 In this same vein the distinction between the forma regiminis and the forma imperii as it was expressed by Kant shifted towards the interpretation that rather than the republic democracy might be the forthcoming aim of history whether in France (Constant Guizot) or in Germany (Schlegel Goumlrres)

became identifi ed with the terreur of the Jacobins See William Corbettrsquos History of the American Jacobins Commonly Denominated Democrates (1796) 29) Reneacute Louis drsquoArgenson (1764) 7f A similar yet not so strict distinction can be found in the Deutsche Encyclopaumldie from 1783 30) Th e Consideacuterations started circulating in France after the 1730rsquos See RR Palmer 1953 205 31) Reneacute Louis drsquoArgenson (1764) 135ff 32) Cf Dolf Sternberger (1980) Th erefore Fichtersquos and Schlegelrsquos receptions of Kantrsquos Zum Ewigen Frieden ndash following Campersquos Zweitem Versuch deutscher Sprachbereicherung (1792) ndash insist on the compatibility between a representative democracy and a republic See Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1965a) 160 (1965b) 431ff and Friedrich Schlegel (1966) 12-17 Kant himself confi rmed this view in his Metaphysik der Sitten (1797)


As this development occurred Aristotlersquos quantitative criterion ndash the rule of one a few or many ndash and most notably the opposition between monar-chy and democracy receded into the background Later in the nineteenth century (and particularly after the 1848 Revolution) the question was not longer if democracy was within the historic horizon but simply what kind of democracy lied ahead in the future free or despotic liberal or socialist monarchic or republican elitist grass-rooted or anarchic or perhaps even a ldquodemocraticrdquo dictatorship All these options became available due to the fact that the concept of democracy had increasingly become a synonym for modern society and culture33 and that democratic theories (Jeff erson Toc-queville von Stein Lincoln Mill Proudhon34 Marx Mosca Dewey) changed into normative (or normative-empirical) concepts tailored to organize the social reality of democracy or to overcome it as for Nietzsche Sorel and Pareto Starting in the nineteenth century one is also able to observe how democratic systems develop distinctively in each country region and continent While the Anglo-American brand stood out for its liberal aspects France and other countries in Continental Europe remained more strongly connected to the republican tradition If presidential democ-racy is dominant today in North and South America (and in Eastern Europe more recently) in Western Europe parliamentary governments have been prevalent (despite some ill-fated hesitations and interruptions in Germany Italy Portugal and Spain) Th e epoch-defi ning success of democracy as a constitutional and social order and additionally as a polit-ical practice gave rise to a host of empirical and formal theories during the twentieth century (Weber Schumpeter Popper Downs Carl J Friedrich Dahl Lipset) A trait these theories have in common is the attempt to describe analyze and forecast democratic processes and politics Th e dom-inance of the formal-empirical paradigm in the social sciences succeeded in promoting the opinion that concepts of democracy resting upon norms and ideals lacking systematic reference to political reality were generally

33) In this respect the fundamental break between the concept of democracy and its ancient heritage occurred during the nineteenth century (Constant Bluntschli) Since then the identifi cation of democracy with Protestant equality and Contract Th eory (von Rotteck) have been refl ected in the use of the concept 34) In Tocqueville and Proudhon it is also possible to fi nd the Kantian insight that modern democracy means most of all a peaceful handling of political and social confl icts beyond the former Kriegergesellschaft


undermined by empirical defi nitions35 Nevertheless there are still eff ec-tive normative concepts of democracy emphasizing for example justice (Rawls) or its bond to human rights (Habermas) Neither should other lesser known conceptions of democracy be ignored such as those that criticize the lack of peoplersquos participation in contemporary liberal democ-racies (Barber Bellah Putnam) or that underscore its inevitable decline due to the belief that democratic levelling is the conditio sine qua non of totalitarianism (Lefort Arendt) Furthermore it is possible to fi nd theories that combine aspects of normative and empirical conceptions36 as well as other rather empirical concepts that are used to formulate quasi-normative concepts that inform the construction of a new social and political world order such as modernity for example It seems inevitable today that the empirical reality and variety of democratic institutions and societies is accompanied by renewed critical normative refl ections on the concept given that not only the best form of democracy is an object of dispute but also its chances and risks in the context of globalization

2 Paradoxes Aporias and Contradictions of Democracy

If we are to judge according to the large amount of diff erent social and political systems named ldquodemocraciesrdquo (among them the democratic peo-plersquos republics of Korea Laos and Algeria the democratic republics of Congo and East Timor the peoplersquos republics of China and Bangladesh the democratic socialist republic of Sri Lanka and the Islamic republics of Pakistan Iran and Afghanistan) there is no doubt no country in the world would call itself ldquoanti-democraticrdquo today Since the twentieth century the legitimizing value of democracy is such that any country will be quick to call itself ldquodemocraticrdquo in the sense that the ruler allegedly draws his legiti-macy from the people regardless of the existence of individual rights free elections and the political power is not under peoplersquos control Interest-ingly the countries with the longest democratic traditions ndash the Swiss Confederation the United Kingdom and the United States of America ndash do not draw attention to their democratic institutions and society by means of their offi cial name whereas socialist countries in particular

35) Mostafa Rejai (1967) 31 36) Giovanni Sartori (1992) Arno Waschkuhn (1998)


seldom renounce or have renounced such a reference While the use of the concepts of republic and monarchy in order to defi ne a state and a political system demand the visibility of political institutions that have traditionally been associated with them the employment of the term democracy appar-ently is not bound to such strictures Whereas the fi rst two concepts must be supported by hard evidence the concept of democracy remains amor-phous whereas it is not so hard to identify a constitution as a republic or monarchy a fi erce and protracted struggle has evolved around the question of which countries are entitled to call themselves democracies Prior to 1990 this issue was disputed between liberal and socialist regimes nowa-days the same seems to be happening between the so-called Western democracies (with their off shoots in Latin America India Japan and Eastern Europe) and political systems from other parts of the world espe-cially in the Middle East and Asia

In view of the above this brief analysis might raise the suspicion that the abuse of the concept by dictators parties and ideologists is a danger How-ever the conceptual history of democracy shows that diff erent interpreta-tions are inherent to the concept itself Th is goes beyond the general thesis that all political concepts are liable to continuous change in terms of mean-ing since they refl ect the mutating values and norms of a society Not only does democracy fi t the general insight that (political) concepts are always collections of a plurality of meanings37 that is formed by historical reality which makes it impossible to demarcate the boundaries between syn-chronic and diachronic time but it also contains many and contradictory meanings dimensions and associations all of which invite us to adapt its semantics to diff erent historical entities Below one fi nds a list of fi ve of the most important paradoxes and aporias38 of democracy which are not dis-cussed at length in this article

(1) Democracy is obviously against the natural idea that the few above should rule over the many below39 In this respect the sovereignty of the people remains simply a metaphor for democracy as a special form of order

37) Reinhart Koselleck (1978) 2938) A good overview concerning the huge list of relevant aporias and paradoxes pertaining the concept of democracy can be found in Paul B Clarke and Joe Foweraker (2001) or also in Robert Dahl et al (2003) 39) Jean-Antoine Laponce (1991)


although complete identity between rulers and subjects is impossible to achieve With representative government elections and the dismissal of rulers the concept of democracy is supposedly converted into political practice but the contradiction between democracy and representation ulti-mately remains unsolved40 Th us modern democratic theories try to distin-guish between the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of democracy41 While every government system guarantees the necessary hierarchy and verticality in order to avoid anarchy only democracy provides horizontal elements of control such as checks and balances opposition institutional-ized confl icts and pluralism Th e diff erence however between power coming from above and legitimacy coming from below as underlined by thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville Guglielmo Ferrero42 and Max Weberrsquos is not specifi cally democratic

(2) With respect to the democratic decision-making processes there is a general competition between the principles of quality and quantity Although some new models of radical democracy (Barber Lummis) deny this antagonism and strive to widen the scope of democracy as well as the intensity of participatory moments the problem seems to be determining how to achieve good or at least acceptable political choices Th e vote of the majority might be seen as an indicator of the quality of a decision (or of a politician) but what will happen however if the majority is wrong about decisive or fundamental questions43 Hence one of the most important tasks of democratic theory will always be locating the boundaries for dem-ocratic decision-making Should it be bound by the constitution or by human rights or religion Radical theorists like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Hans Kelsen stressed that any kind of border will necessarily violate democ-racy itself Th is also led into a new paradox While Rousseau claimed that a divine legislator was necessary to educate the people in order to conciliate quantity and quality (or the volonteacute geacuteneacuterale and the volonteacute de tous) in democratic decisions Kelsen declared that voting for anti-democratic par-ties and demagogues in order to prevent the majority from destroying democracies is actually an act of betrayal44 Th erefore if democracy is to be

40) Danielo Zolo (1998) and Guiseppe Duso (2006) 41) Giovanni Sartori (1992) 137f42) See Alexis de Toqueville (1954) 333 and Guglielmo Ferrero (1944) 481 43) Bernd Guggenberger and Claus Off e (1984) 44) Hans Kelsen (2006) 237 Th e paradox is also known as the Toleranzproblem of democ-racy Manfred Haumlttich (1965)


protected against its own dangers we must eventually accept some bound-aries and values located beyond democracy even if we agree that democ-racy and human rights might come from the same source (Habermas)45 As long as a contradiction in practice is possible the appeal to anti-democratic measures always remains a plausible option for democracy46

(3) Democracy rests upon two fundamental principles that are often following colliding trajectories liberty and equality47 When Goethe said ldquoLegislators and revolutionaries who promise equality and liberty at the same time are either psychopaths or mountebanksrdquo he was indicating that absolute equality could only be achieved by repression since a free society will necessarily display diff erences and inequalities On the other hand the classical controversy between Left and Right can persuasively be described as a debate concerning the possible extent of equality although neither camp needs to challenge democracy itself given that they show respect for the principle of freedom48 Hence the struggle between democratic parties all over the world is usually a quest for the right balance between liberty and equality In this respect the liberal ideal combining social hierarchy and political equality (Rawls) is one possible orientation among many Moreover in addition to the problem that some will become more equal than others there is the question of what kind of freedom is preferred an undefi ned negative one giving us the opportunity to start our own pursuit of happiness or a defi ned positive one securing our participation in mak-ing the laws we have to obey Th e former type is supported by liberals like Benjamin Constant and Isaiah Berlin the latter by democrats such as Ben-jamin Barber and Jean-Jacques Rousseau And there are other thinkers like Kant and Habermas that attempted to combine both aspects In sum refl ection upon liberty and equality and the tension between them is one of the perennial subjects of democratic theory

45) Th is aporia persists in one of Habermasrsquo earlier contributions (1973) 316 in which he affi rms that the ldquoVerfassungswirklichkeit des buumlrgerlichen Rechtsstaatesrdquo was ldquoseit je her in Widerspruch zur Idee der Demokratierdquo An advanced discussion about the possible anton-ymy between democracy and the constitutional state can be found in Werner Kaumlgi (1973) 46) For this see also Derridarsquos fi gure of ldquola deacutemocratie agrave venirrdquo Jacques Derrida (2002) 112-157 47) See the famous fi rst chapter of Tocquevillersquos Democracy in America Vol 2 book 2 Why Democratic Nations Show a More Ardent and Enduring Love of Equality than of Liberty A meditation on the topic is off ered in Ralf Dahrendorf (1963) 48) Norberto Bobbio (1994)


(4) Modern democracy also marks a new epoch in terms of the com-plex relationship between individuals and the collective While in the ancient world private concerns were strictly subordinated to the public interest49 capable even of turning slavery into a moral imperative50 the modern age has set itself apart by the protection of individual rights and of the pluralism of opinions aims and ambitions Nevertheless even mod-ern democracies require some degree of public spiritedness and social homogeneity in order to conserve political unity and represent something more than just a crowd of people Th e question of how to bind democratic individuals together is another problem for which several tentative solu-tions have been off ered Th eory as well as history have witnessed several such attempts under several (partially antagonistic) concepts such as the state and the nation race and ethnicity religious and cultural traditions rationality ethical categories like justice tolerance or solidarity the civil society communication and last but not least economical success and consumer needs Furthermore some degree of social homogeneity also seems to be a necessary precondition for the functionality of democratic techniques and for the peaceful coexistence of majorities and minorities51 However there is always a danger that in striving to forge political unity and to solve essential social and political confl icts the exact opposite might be achieved through the elimination of a sense of indefi niteness and divi-sion that is inherent to democracy52 Th erefore striking a balance between private and public interests individual and collective claims represents a constant challenge for democratic theory

49) Although some ancient authors also made important ethical innovations strengthening the individualrsquos position (sophists like Antiphon and Alcidamas for example emphasized equality Socrates and Aristotle considered the prospect of an apolitical way of life and the philosophical schools of Cynicism Stoicism and Epicureanism called for a kind of world citizenship) one should not forget that the concept of the individual only becomes identifi -able with a singular human life after the fi rst civil revolutions Hence in Antiquity there is neither a theoretical nor a practical separation between the individual and his community comparable with modern individualism (Vittorio Houmlsle (1997) 36ff ) For the ancients it was diffi cult to believe that the aims and purposes of one single man could be deemed higher than the public need 50) Alexander Demandt (1993) 51 51) Herrmann Heller (1971) 52) Claude Lefort (1990)


(5) Th e dislocation of the concept of democracy from a form of govern-ment to a form of society also leads to understanding of the heterogeneity of democratic institutions as a result of moral social and cultural dissimi-larities As indicated by Montesquieu and Tocqueville the particular men-talities habits and intellectual manners of nations endow all social and political systems with a character of their own Th us there are two reasons why democracy has become such a ubiquitous concept it is able to explain what democratic societies have in common as well as what distinguish them from each other Th is leaves democratic theory with the task of pro-viding cogent criteria to determine what is still not yet or no longer a democracy But even in this respect there can be only provisional answers once again as a result of the special dynamics of democracy In particular the history of democracy can also be interpreted as a permanent movement of inclusion that progressively incorporated once marginal individuals and groups slaves the poor people women and so forth Yet there have always been those willing to criticize the alleged overreach of democratic equality Th is continues in the present as discussions on the extension of democracy to other social groups (children foreigners and next generations)53 prog-ress Th us when evaluating other societies one must keep in mind that democracy is a process that might evolve diff erently or that might incorpo-rate key aspects that are not necessarily familiar to certain societies Ulti-mately however we must eventually be able to say whether or not the application of the concept is justifi ed

Th e tensions between liberty and equality individualism and collectiv-ism participation and leadership will persist as problems each democratic theory and system will have to deal with even if they cannot ultimately be solved54 Given the diversity of societies and cultures this also means that solutions can hardly be universal Th is approach also suggests that the empirical variety of democratic political formations demands the acknowl-edgement that defi ning ldquowhat a democracy isrdquo is a normative decision refl ecting diff erent tentative solutions to the paradoxes of democracy Th e types of policies that are eventually pursued are inevitably a consequence of this previous normative decision

53) See for instance Bobbio (1988) and Dryzek (2000) 54) J Roland Pennock (1979)


3 Conceptual History and Conceptual Politics

Th e numerous contradictions paradoxes and aporias proper to democ-racy mean that the concept is rarely used in isolation it is often qualifi ed by special adjectives that attribute a descriptive or normative meaning by increasing diff erentiation and restricting conceptual stretching55 Examples of such adjectives used to qualify the concept of democracy are ldquoauthori-tarianrdquo ldquoneopatrimonialrdquo ldquomilitary-dominatedrdquo ldquoparliamentaryrdquo ldquopresi-dentialrdquo ldquofederalrdquo ldquoguardedrdquo ldquoelectoralrdquo ldquoprotectedrdquo ldquoilliberalrdquo ldquorestrictiverdquo ldquotutelaryrdquo ldquoone-partyrdquo and ldquoelitistrdquo or also ldquoWesternrdquo ldquomodernrdquo ldquoplebi-scitarianrdquo ldquorepresentativerdquo ldquopluralisticrdquo ldquosocialisticrdquo ldquoliberalrdquo and ldquodelib-erativerdquo56 In this respect it is important to understand that the usage of the noun reveals the intention to ensure that the referred state society or system is in fact a democracy since it displays at least one of its many prox-ies ndash elections referenda a constitution parties civil rights a market economy or also the pluralism of opinions and lifestyles Meanwhile the adjective serves the purpose of emphasizing either the rejection or the adoption of certain democratic practices Th is is also why descriptive and normative perspectives interfere in this conceptual construction For example a ldquomilitary-dominatedrdquo ldquoauthoritarianrdquo or ldquoparliamentaryrdquo democracy just means that in fact diff erent actors play powerful roles ndash the military the (elected) political leader or the parliament Most importantly the adoption of these adjectives normatively indicates whether the described subject is more democratic or less so For example the adjectives ldquoauthori-tarianrdquo ldquoneopatrimonialrdquo ldquomilitary-dominatedrdquo ldquoguardedrdquo ldquoprotectedrdquo ldquoilliberalrdquo ldquorestrictiverdquo ldquotutelaryrdquo ldquoone-partyrdquo or ldquodefectrdquo are always detri-mental to the quality of democracy whereas the concept of a ldquoparliamentaryrdquo ldquopresidentialrdquo ldquofederalrdquo or ldquoelectoralrdquo democracy rather confi rms the fact we are dealing with true democracies albeit admitting diff erent subtypes57 Hence in all of these cases the concept of democracy itself remains a positive norm whose devaluation demands an adjective Consequently it is hardly

55) David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997) 56) David Collier amp Steven Levitsky (1997) and Hubertus Buchstein (2006) 48 See also Giovanni Sartori (1970) David Collier and James E Mahon (1993) David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997)57) While the studies of Juan Linz (1978) and (1994) suggest that a presidential democracy can more easily deteriorate into an authoritarian regime than a parliamentary one this does not mean that the adjective ldquopresidentialrdquo has an anti-democratic connotation


surprising that the semantic use the adjective democratic serves to legiti-mize states societies institutions national and international organizations or to support techniques actions value propositions or even human traits

But what about the other adjectives mentioned above Are they also the product of a confl ict between a descriptive and a normative perspective Indeed they are Th is becomes evident if the fi ve aporias or contradictions of the concept of democracy are considered popular sovereignty vs repre-sentation quality vs quantity liberty vs equality individual vs collective and fi nally the synchronicity between similarities and dissimilarities In order to demonstrate this argument I shall point out that all those adjec-tives that cannot be immediately or unequivocally associated with the decrease or increase in the quality of democracy can be rearranged as antagonistic subtypes of democracy that stress only one side of a paradox (or perhaps of several paradoxes) According to this criterion the following pairs of concepts dealing with the issues of government decision-making ideology economy time and space seem to be relevant

bull direct (or radical) vs representative democracybull elitist vs deliberative58 (or participatory) democracybull liberal vs republican democracybull pluralistic (or market) vs social democracybull ancient vs modern democracybull Western vs non-Western democracy59

All of these conceptual constructions might include an empirical descrip-tion of existing democracies However they always include a normative perspective as well Th is occurs both at a theoretical level (in that a particu-lar dimension of democracy is valued positively or negatively in each case) and at a practical level (through the observation of democratic institutions and habits that refl ect a normatively constituted political culture) Th ere-fore direct or republican democracy emphasize the ancient heritage against modern forms of representative or liberal democracy whereas deliberative republican social or also the known forms of non-Western democracy

58) For the concept of deliberative democracy see Joshua Cohen (1989) Jon Elster (1998) and Robert Talisse (2005) 59) Of course this list is incomplete and could be enhanced with oppositions like consensus vs majoritarian democracy or also consociational vs competitive democracy


stress the collective against the more individualistic concepts of elitist lib-eral pluralistic and Western democracy Liberal and elitist democracy underline freedom against equality the republican and deliberative sub-type vice versa and while ancient and modern democracy are associated with opposing notions of freedom pluralistic and social democracy sug-gest a diff erent concept of equality Finally elitist representative and lib-eral democracy stand for the quality of democratic decision-making whereas deliberative direct and republican democracy emphasize the quantity of people participating

In this respect the evident cross relations between the diff erent opposi-tions of conceptual constructions show at least two things fi rst that one adjective is hardly enough in order to produce an in-depth characterization of a democratic system and second that diff erent democratic systems have both similarities and dissimilarities (aporia no 5) whereby the crucial question is whether these dissimilarities include not only diff erent norma-tive decisions concerning the aporias inherent to democracy but also choices pertaining to aspects that diminish democracy For example ancient democracy which included slavery and did not take individual rights into account today would hardly be deemed as a sound democracy Likewise this can apply to the adjectives used to describe the decline of radical forms of democracy into a tyranny of the majority of social democ-racy into socialism or the serious lack of democratic legitimacy in liberal elitist or representative systems However the most diffi cult problem is of course how to treat concepts of democracy in view of the existence of dif-ferent societies and cultures From a Western point of view the proximity between existing Asian or Islamic democracies and authoritarian or totali-tarian regimes60 might seem quite obvious Yet we must not forget that the fact that Western civilization has dominated our view of global democracy means nothing else but the long-term result of normative decisions values habits and practices So although the appreciation of non-Western democ-racies might be almost impossible for Westerners we must keep in mind that we are never simply describing but always evaluating in accordance with our norms Th ese evaluations prove that the interaction between the empirical and the normative perspective relative to the concept of democ-racy becomes even more accentuated in spatial comparisons

60) For this diff erence see Juan Linz (2000)


But what does all of this mean for the conceptual history of democracy Hitherto we have been discussing how diff erent conceptual constructions are not only descriptions or attempts to grasp the normative decisions made by democratic societies but are also normative decisions themselves that serve to strengthen the functionality effi cacy or simply the legitimacy of a democratic system or to stress either homogeneity or plurality the position of individuals or of the collective the role of cultural identity and so on Th us the role conceptual history plays in this whole game is fi rst and foremost to reveal the conceptual politics of democracy Th is brings us back to the initial question of whether conceptual history might help us to arrive at a normative perception of democracy It is now possible to answer that this is indeed the only possible perception since the contradictions and aporias inherent to the concept of democracy require choosing one kind of democracy over other61 Conceptual history also shows that it is not the concept of democracy itself that is essentially contested Rather contention is an essential feature of the democratic moment and is what allows the use of the concept to subsume quite diff erent historical realities under its semantic fi eld

An additional question that arises is whether conceptual history simply unveils the issues and categories that inform normative perspectives of democracy or whether it is also a form of conceptual politics As Reinhard Mehring argued noting some surprising methodological analogies between Reinhart Koselleck and Carl Schmitt in the writing of a history of (politi-cal) ideas there seems to be a kind of blending of Begriff ssoziologie Begriff s-geschichte and Begriff spolitik into each other62 Although conceptual history should try to reveal the strategies of conceptual politics the potential of concepts to exert political power and also the polemic purposes of seman-tic uses it almost goes without saying that conceptual history may also

61) Here I have in mind Max Weberrsquos statement that there is no ldquotruly objective scientifi c analysis of cultural life or [ ] social phenomenardquo but only knowledge depending on ldquoindi-vidual realitiesrdquo or precisely on ldquonormative ideasrdquo See Max Weber (1991) 49 and 61f So an ldquoobjectiverdquo point of view turns out to be possibly by separating facts and norms (like Weber assumed) it matters little if social phenomena which might be called or even treated as facts are merely a result of our interpretation (Peirce) of our ldquorealization-leading interestrdquo (Habermas) or of social communication (Niklas Luhmann) ndash in any case we must decide fi rst what democracy ldquoshouldrdquo mean And by all means this sort of defi nition is part of a normative process which I call conceptual politics 62) Reinhard Mehring (2006)


include a claim for the normative prevalence of particular conceptions ndash perhaps already by deciding which concept might be worth analyzing Most importantly however it must not be forgotten that the analysis con-ducted according to the methods of conceptual history require the use of concepts per se almost all of which might be ldquopoliticalrdquo63 which means that these concepts might become charged in a normative-political way which means that they contain the potential for polemics64 After all con-cepts not only have a history but they also make history as ldquoleading con-cepts of the historical movementrdquo and by formulating ldquoprerequisites of possible futuresrdquo65 In other words it may be possible to make a clear dis-tinction between the analytic and the normative application of concepts yet it is impossible to act only as an observer of history and of changing semantic uses66 Even the fundamental critique of normative concepts includes an absolute normative approach As discussed above this dynam-ics is more than evident when it comes to democracy In this sense the concept captures much more than one of the four fundamental criteria of the Lexikon der Geschichtlichen Grundbegriff e67 which describes the seman-tics of modernity in toto ndash democratization It also signifi es that the con-ceptual history of democracy which requires the consideration of the most diverse spatial and temporal perspectives in order to become intelligible cannot release itself from modern democracyrsquos claim to be the exclusive form and method capable of generating legitimacy Th erefore the concep-tual history of democracy is also part of democratic history

4 Conclusion

In his posthumously published book Begriff sgeschichte Studien zur Seman-tik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache (2006) Koselleck emphasized that ldquothe historian does research on concepts in which social

63) Horst Guumlnther (1978) 102 64) See Reinhart Koselleck (1967) 87ff (1972) XXf (1979) 65) Reinhart Koselleck (1972) XVII (2000) 327ff 66) See Reinhard Mehring (2006) 41 Hence the authorrsquos aim is also to extract a practical proposition from Koselleckrsquos studies focussing on a subversive critique of modernity whose semantics and concepts are analyzed only with superfi cial objectivity (2006) 46 67) According to Koselleck the other three criteria are ldquotemporalizationrdquo (Verzeitigung) ldquopolit-icizationrdquo and ldquoideologizationrdquo of all modern concepts See Reinhart Koselleck (1972) 46


and political processes are recorded persisting over the course of genera-tions and even centuries rdquo68 Hence conceptual historians research the his-torical transformations of perceptions and receptions of semantics in order to understand the veritable meaning of concepts and to make sure their usage remains critical and historically informed

In the specifi c case of democracy it is even more important to analyze semantic change because the conceptrsquos inherent contradictions and aporias require a special type of conceptual history Paradoxically the fact that democracy is necessarily an ldquounfi nished journeyrdquo (John Dunn) is what might be the best guarantee that the concept maintains its hegemonic status within political semantics Th e fact that the concept of democracy is still in use in scientifi c discourse as well as in everyday language is far from being ldquoan exception in the history of languagerdquo69 Rather the under-determination of the concept seems to be the most important reason for its success Th e eternal question concerning the best political constitution seems to have been translated into the question about the best kind of democracy Th erefore the symbiosis between ldquosocial historyrdquo and ldquohistory of linguistic meaningrdquo70 obviously suggests that the current debate con-cerning a possible ldquopost-democracyrdquo (Gueacutehenno Ranciegravere Crouch Joumlrke) will be futile

However conceptual history also proves that democracy is not simply a label that could be used in order to legitimize any political or social system Although we cannot escape conceptual politics because it is embedded into the structure of concepts democracy is much more than a strategy of persuasion used to advance political agendas What conceptual history shows is the framework of the concept democracy in which diff erent nor-mative decisions are available and also become necessary reference points in the search for the best interpretation of democracy Nevertheless it is impossible to escape the problem that the contest over the best interpreta-tion of the concept must always establish the boundaries that cannot be crossed Th is search for the best interpretation of democracy is ultimately a form of conceptual politics It is less the lack of standards than the con-tradictions and aporias inherent to the concept that prevent us from for-mulating a valid single idea of democracy Instead we must always keep in

68) Reinhart Koselleck (2006) 365 69) Hubertus Buchstein (2006) 48 70) Karlheinz Stierle (1978) 184


mind that the many sides of democracy render each defi nition of ldquowhat should democracy mean todayrdquo71 merely a preliminary political decision

5 Bibliographical References

Argenson Reneacute Louis de 1764 Consideacuterations sur le gouvernement de la France AmsterdamAristides P Aelius 1981 Th e Complete Works 2 Vol Leiden BrillAristotle 1994 Politik Reinbek RohwoltBarber Benjamin 1994 Starke Demokratie Uumlber die Teilhabe am Politischen Hamburg

RotbuchBerlin Isaiah 2006 Freiheit Vier Versuche Frankfurt FischerBlanke Gustav H 1956 ldquoDer amerikanische Demokratiebegriff in wortgeschichtlicher

Beleuchtungrdquo In Jahrbuch fuumlr Amerikastudien 1 41-52Bleicken Jochen 1995 Die athenische Demokratie Paderborn SchoumlninghBobbio Norberto 1988 Die Zukunft der Demokratie Berlin Rotbuchmdashmdash 1994 Rechts und Links Gruumlnde und Bedeutungen einer politischen Unterscheidung

Berlin WagenbachBrunner Otto Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck ed 1972 Geschichtliche Grundbe-

griff e Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland Vol 1 Stuttgart Klett-Cotta

Buchstein Hubertus 2006 ldquoDemokratierdquo In Politische Th eorie 22 umkaumlmpfte Begriff e zur Einfuumlhrung edited by G Goumlhler M Iser and I Kerner Wiesbaden VS

Campe Joachim Heinrich 1792 Zweiter Versuch deutscher Sprachbereicherung BraunschweigClarke Paul B and Joe Foweraker ed 2001 Encyclopedia of Democratic Th ought London

New York RoutledgeCohen Joshua 1989 ldquoDeliberative Democracy and Democratic Legitimacyrdquo In Th e

Good Polity Normative Analysis of the State edited by A Hamlin and P Pettit Oxford Blackwell

Collier David and Steven Levitsky 1997 ldquoDemocracy with Adjectives Conceptual Inno-vation in Comparative Researchrdquo World Politics 49 430-451

Collier David and James E Mahon 1993 ldquoConceptual Stretching Revisited Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysisrdquo American Political Science Review 87 845-855

Conze Werner Reinhart Koselleck Hans Maier Christian Meier and Hans-Leo Reimann 1972 ldquoDemokratierdquo In Geschichtliche Grundbegriff e Vol 1 edited by O Brunner W Conze and R Koselleck Stuttgart Klett-Cotta

Conze Werner and Meier Christian 1972 ldquoAdel Aristokratierdquo In Geschichtliche Grund-begriff e Vol 1 edited by O Brunner W Conze and R Kosellek Stuttgart Klett-Cotta

Crouch Colin 2004 Post-Democracy Th emes for the 21st Century Cambridge Polity

71) David Held (1987) 283-288


Cunningham Frank 2002 Th eories of Democracy A Critical Introduction London Routledge

Dahl Robert A 1971 Polyarchy Participation and Opposition New Haven Yale University Press

Dahl Robert A Ian Shapiro and Joseacute A Cheibub ed 2003 Th e Democracy Sourcebook New York MIT Press

Dahrendorf Ralf 1963 Gesellschaft und Freiheit Zur soziologischen Analyse der Gegenwart Muumlnchen Piper

Demandt Alexander 1993 Der Idealstaat Die politischen Th eorien der Antike Koumlln Boumlhlaumdashmdash 1995 Antike Staatsformen Berlin AkademieDemosthenes 2002 Politische Reden Stuttgart ReclamDerrida Jacques 2002 Politik der Freundschaft Frankfurt SuhrkampDio Cassius 1961 Diorsquos Roman History in Nine Volumes CambridgeLondon MacmillanDryzek John 2000 Deliberative Democracy and Beyond Liberals Critics Contestations

Oxford Oxford University PressDunn John ed 1992 Democracy Th e Unfi nished Journey Oxford Oxford University

PressDuso Guiseppe 2006 Die moderne politische Repraumlsentation Entstehung und Krise des

Begriff s Berlin Duncker amp HumblotDyson R W 2003 Normative Th eories of Society and Government in Five Medieval Th ink-

ers St Augustine John of Salisbury Giles of Rome St Th omas Aquinas Marsilius of Padua Lewiston Edwin Mellen

Elster Jon ed 1998 Deliberative Democracy Cambridge Cambridge University PressFerrero Guglielmo 1944 Macht Bern FranckeFichte Johann Gottlieb 1965a ldquoGrundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissen-

schaftslehre (1796)rdquo In Saumlmtliche Werke Vol 3 Berlin de Gruyter 1-385mdashmdash 1965b ldquoRezension von Kant Zum ewigen Frieden (1796)rdquo In Saumlmtliche Werke Vol 8

Berlin de GruyterFinlay Moses I 1980 Antike und moderne Demokratie Stuttgart ReclamForst Rainer 2003 Toleranz im Konfl ikt Frankfurt SuhrkampGallie Walter B 1955 ldquoEssentially Contested Conceptsrdquo Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society 56 167-198Goumlrres Joseph von 1928 ldquoDas rothe Blattrdquo In Gesammelte Schriften Vol 1 Koumllnmdashmdash 1928 ldquoDer allgemeine Frieden ein Idealrdquo In Gesammelte Schriften Vol 1 KoumllnGschnitzer Fritz 1995 ldquoVon der Fremdartigkeit griechischer Demokratierdquo In Greece and

the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory edited by K Kinzl BerlinNew York de Gruyter

Guggenberger Bernd and Claus Off e 1984 An den Grenzen der Mehrheitsdemokratie Poli-tik und Soziologie der Mehrheitsregel Opladen Westdeutscher Verlag

Gueacutehenno Jean-Marie 1994 Das Ende der Demokratie Muumlnchen Artemis amp WinklerGuumlnther Horst 1978 ldquoAuf der Suche nach der Th eorie der Begriff sgeschichterdquo In Histori-

sche Semantik und Begriff sgeschichte edited by R Koselleck Stuttgart Klett-CottaHabermas Juumlrgen 1968 Erkenntnis und Interesse Frankfurt Suhrkamp


mdashmdash 1973 ldquoPolitische Beteiligung ndash Ein Wert an sichrdquo In Grundprobleme der Demokra-tie edited by U Matz Darmstadt Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft

Haumlttich Manfred 1965 ldquoDas Toleranzproblem in der Demokratierdquo Civitas 4 15-40Held David 1987 Models of Democracy Stanford Stanford University PressHeller Hermann 1971 ldquoPolitische Demokratie und soziale Homogenitaumlt (1928)rdquo In

Gesammelte Schriften Vol 2 Leiden Sijthoff Houmlsle Vittorio 1997 Moral und Politik Grundlagen einer politischen Ethik fuumlr das 21

Jahrhundert Muumlnchen BeckIsocrates 2003 Opera omnia 3 Vol MuumlnchenLeipzig SaurJoumlrke Dirk 2005 ldquoAuf dem Weg in die Postdemokratierdquo Leviathan 33(4) 482-491Kaumlgi Werner 1973 ldquoRechtsstaat und Demokratie Antinomie und Syntheserdquo In Grundpro-

bleme der Demokratie edited by U Matz Darmstadt Wissenschaftliche BuchgesellschaftKant Immanuel 2002 Werkausgabe 12 Vol Frankfurt SuhrkampKelsen Hans 2006 ldquoVerteidigung der Demokratie (1932)rdquo In Verteidigung der Demokratie

Abhandlungen zur Demokratietheorie edited by H Kelsen Tuumlbingen Mohr SiebeckKinzl Konrad H 1995 ldquoAthens Between Tyranny and Democracyrdquo In Greece and the

Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory edited by K Kinzl BerlinNew York de Gruyter

Kinzl Konrad H ed 1995 Demokratia Der Weg der Demokratie bei den Griechen Darm-stadt Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft

Klein Richard 1981 Die Romrede des Aelius Aristides Darmstadt Wissenschaftliche Buch-gesellschaft

Koselleck Reinhart 1967 ldquoRichtlinien fuumlr das Lexikon politisch-sozialer Begriff e der Neuzeitrdquo Archiv fuumlr Begriff sgeschichte 11 81-99

mdashmdash 1972 ldquoEinleitungrdquo In Geschichtliche Grundbegriff e edited by O Brunner W Conze and R Kosellek Stuttgart Klett-Cotta

mdashmdash 1978 ldquoBegriff sgeschichte und Sozialgeschichterdquo In Historische Semantik und Begriff sgeschichte edited by R Koselleck Stuttgart Klett-Cotta 19-36

mdashmdash 1979 ldquoZur historisch-politischen Semantik asymmetrischer Gegenbegriff erdquo In Ver-gangene Zukunft Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten edited by R Koselleck Frankfurt Suhrkamp

mdashmdash 2000 ldquoModerne Sozialgeschichte und historische Zeitenrdquo In Zeitgeschichten Studien zur Historik edited by R Koselleck Frankfurt Suhrkamp

mdashmdash 2006 Begriff sgeschichten Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache Frankfurt Suhrkamp

Laponce Jean-Antoine 1991 ldquoDemocracy and Verticality Are Th ere Biophysical Obsta-cles to Democratic Th oughtrdquo In Hierarchy and Democracy edited by A Somit and R Wildenmann Baden Baden Nomos

Lefort Claude 1990 ldquoDie Frage der Demokratierdquo In Autonome Gesellschaft und libertaumlre Demokratie edited by U Roumldel Frankfurt Suhrkamp

Linz Juan 1994 ldquoPresidential or Parliamentary Democracy Does It Make a Diff erencerdquo In Th e Failure of Presidential Democracy edited by J Linz and A Valenzuela BaltimoreLondon John Hopkins University Press


mdashmdash 2000 Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes Boulder RiennerLinz Juan and Alfred Stepan 1978 Th e Breakdown of Democratic Regimes BaltimoreLon-

don John Hopkins University PressLipset Seymour Martin 1959 ldquoSome Social Prerequisites of Democracy Economic Devel-

opment and Political Legitimacyrdquo American Political Science Review 53(1) 69-105Luumlbbe Hermann 1965 Saumlkularisierung Geschichte eines ideenpolitischen Begriff s Freiburg

Muumlnchen AlberLuhmann Niklas 2002 Die Religion der Gesellschaft Frankfurt SuhrkampLukes Steven 1974 ldquoRelativism Cognitive and Moralrdquo Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soci-

ety Suppl 48 165-189Lummis Douglas 1996 Radical Democracy Ithaca Cornell University PressLuther Martin 1916 Tischreden D Martin Luthers Werke (WA) Vol 4 Weimar BoumlhlauMartin Jochen 1995 ldquoVon Kleisthenes zu Ephialtes Zur Entstehung der athenischen

Demokratierdquo In Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory edited by K Kinzl BerlinNew York de Gruyter

Mehring Reinhard 2006 ldquoBegriff ssoziologie Begriff sgeschichte Begriff spolitik Zur Form der Ideengeschichtsschreibung nach Carl Schmitt und Reinhart Koselleckrdquo In Politische Ideengeschichte im 20 Jahrhundert Konzepte und Kritik edited by H Bluhm and J Gebhardt Baden-Baden Nomos

Meier Christian 1983 Die Entstehung des Politischen bei den Griechen Frankfurt Suhrkamp

North John 1994 ldquoDemocracy in Romerdquo History Today 44(3) 38-43Ober Josiah and Charles Hendrick ed 1996 Demokratia A Conversation on Democracies

Ancient and Modern Princeton Princeton University PressOliver James H 1953 Th e Ruling Power A Study of the Roman Empire in the Second Cen-

tury Th rough the Roman Oration of Aelius Aristides Philadelphia American Philosophical Society

Palmer Robert R 1953 ldquoNotes on the Use of the Word Democracy 1789-1799rdquo Political Science Quarterly 68 203-226

Palonen Kari 2002 ldquoTh e History of Concepts as a Style of Political Th eorizing Quentin Skinnerrsquos and Reinhart Koselleckrsquos Subversion of Normative Political Th eoryrdquo European Journal of Political Th eory 1(1) 91-106

mdashmdash 2005 ldquoMax Weber als Begriff spolitikerrdquo Etica amp PoliticaEthics amp Politics 2 (httpwwwunitsitetica 2005_2PALONENhtm)

Pennock J Roland 1979 Democratic Political Th eory Princeton Princeton University Press

Popper Karl 1992 Die off ene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde 2 Vol Tuumlbingen Mohr SiebeckProudhon Pierre-Joseph 1861 La guerre et la paix Recherches sur le principe et la constitu-

tion du droit des gens Brussels LacroixRaafl aub Kurt A 1995 ldquoEinleitung und Bilanz Kleisthenes Ephialtes und die Begruumln-

dung der Demokratierdquo In Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory edited by K Kinzl BerlinNew York de Gruyter

Ranciegravere Jacques 1997 ldquoDemokratie und Postdemokratierdquo In Politik der Wahrheit edited by R Riha Wien Turia + Kant


Rejai Mostafa 1967 Democracy Th e Contemporary Th eories New York AthertonRoels Jean 1969 Le concept de repreacutesentation politique au dix-huitiegraveme siegravecle franccedilais Paris

LouvainRousseau Jean-Jacques 1959-1969 Œuvres complegravetes 4 Vol Paris GallimardSartori Giovanni 1970 ldquoConcept Misformation in Comparative Politicsrdquo American Poli-

tical Science Review 64 1033-1055mdashmdash 1992 Demokratietheorie Darmstadt Wissenschaftliche BuchgesellschaftSchlegel Friedrich 1966 ldquoVersuch uumlber den Begriff des Republikanismus veranlasst durch

die Kantische Schrift zum ewigen Frieden (1796)rdquo In Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe Vol 7 Muumlnchen Schoumlningh

Schmidt Manfred 1995 Demokratietheorien Opladen Leske amp BudrichSchuller Wolfgang 1995 ldquoZur Entstehung der griechischen Demokratie auszligerhalb

Athensrdquo In Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory edited by K Kinzl BerlinNew York de Gruyter

Sherman Claire R 1995 Imaging Aristotle Verbal and Visual Representation in 14th Cen-tury France Berkeley University of California Press

Stahl Michael 1987 Aristokraten und Tyrannen im archaischen Athen Stuttgart SteinerSternberger Dolf 1980 ldquoHerrschaft und Vereinbarungrdquo In Schriften III Frankfurt InselStierle Karlheinz 1978 ldquoHistorische Semantik und die Geschichtlichkeit der Bedeutungrdquo

In Historische Semantik und Begriff sgeschichte edited by R Koselleck Stuttgart Klett-Cotta

Talisse Robert B 2005 Democracy after Liberalism Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics New York Routledge

Tocqueville Alexis de 1954 Erinnerungen Stuttgart Kochlermdashmdash 1987 Uumlber die Demokratie in Amerika 2 Vol Zuumlrich ManesseUbl Karl 2000 Engelbert von Admont Ein Gelehrter im Spannungsfeld von Aristotelismus

und christlicher Uumlberlieferung WienMuumlnchen OldenbourgVellay Charles 1908 Discours et rapports de Robespierre Paris Charpentier et FasquelleWaschkuhn Arno 1998 Demokratietheorien Politiktheoretische und ideengeschichtliche

Grundzuumlge MuumlnchenWien OldenbourgWeber Max 1991 ldquoDie Objektivitaumlt sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkennt-

nisrdquo In Schriften zur Wissenschaftslehre Stuttgart ReclamZolo Danielo 1998 Die demokratische Fuumlrstenherrschaft Fuumlr eine realistische Th eorie der

Politik Goumlttingen Steidl


ment which adopt patterns (sub-)types and varieties of decision-making processes that have also been labelled democratic making it hard to keep orientation Th is myriad usage of the concept leads to a spate of distinc-tions and qualifi cations Most traditionally one can speak of democracies that are liberal or republican direct or representative consensual or majori-tarian market or socially oriented More recently other variants acquired prominence such as participatory deliberative and grassroots democracies or even alternatives like demarchy skewed democracy and non-partisan democracy Finally considering how democracies have evolved worldwide even the possibility of a specifi c Islamic transformation of democracy or of a socialist and anarchist brand of democratization might expand the scope of the concept in the future

If a typology is plausible (a diffi cult task as it is since nowadays the basic traits of a direct democracy -initiatives referenda and recalls ndash take place within the representative system and the people sometimes not only han-dle legislative but certain executive and judicial powers as well) we cannot avoid the suspicion that the ldquogovernment of the people by the people and for the peoplerdquo (Abraham Lincoln) might just as well mean ldquoeveryone and everythingrdquo2

Rather than succumbing to a mood of dismay we must take into con-sideration W B Galliersquos classical statement that democracy ndash like justice or arts ndash is yet another one among those ldquoessentially contested conceptsrdquo which lack unique standards of defi nition3 Furthermore (and fortunately) the contest seems to concern fi rst and foremost the interpretation of the concept not the concept of democracy itself4 Obviously then the question that must be made is whether it is possible to fi nd arguments and criteria to assess what is the best interpretation of the concept of democracy or whether all there is to be done is to accept a juxtaposition of competing versions Th is approach implies a second deeper problem namely the extent to which conceptual history might help in acquiring a normative perception of democracy At fi rst glance there can only be an answer in the negative conceptual history (here understood as the description and anal-ysis of concrete historical semantics origins derivations and alterations of

2) Giovanni Sartori (1992) 113) See Walter B Gallie (1956)4) See some considerations concerning normative concepts presented by Stephen Lukes (1974) and Rainer Forst (2003) 50-52










































































4 Conclusion

























71) David Held (1987) 283-288



















































































































































4 Conclusion

























71) David Held (1987) 283-288
































































































71) David Held (1987) 283-288










































































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