O'Hearn_Innovation and the World-System Hierarchy_British Subjugation of the Irish Cotton Industry

8/7/2019 O'Hearn_Innovation and the World-System Hierarchy_British Subjugation of the Irish Cotton Industry

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Innovation and the World-System Hierarchy: British Subjugation of the Irish CottonIndustry, 1780-1830Author(s): Denis O'HearnSource: The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 100, No. 3 (Nov., 1994), pp. 587-621Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2782399 .Accessed: 12/02/2011 09:01

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Innovation and the World-SystemHierarchy: British Subjugation of the IrishCotton Industry, 1780-1830'Denis O'HearnQueen'sUniversityofBelfast

Analysesofinnovationgenerallyassumethatitis a localornationalprocess.This articleusesworld-systemconceptsand thecase oftheIrish and English cottonindustriesto arguethat innovationsarenotintrinsicallylocal but mustbe localized.Irishand Englishcus-tomsdata and historicalanalysisare used to demonstratehow thelocalizationof innovationaroundManchesterinvolvedthe periph-eralizationof theIrishindustrybyBritain.This peripheralizationinvolved,first,thedestructionofIrishspinningand thesubjugationofIrishweavingand, eventually,thetransformationofIrishtextileactivityinto linen. It is furtherarguedthat innovation(Schum-peter's innovativeresponse)is the definingcharacteristicof coreactivities,whileadaptiveresponsecharacterizessemiperipheralin-dustry.

The theoryof innovationand world-systemanalysis are relatedfieldsthatcould be strengthenedby dialogue.World-systemanalysisfillsa gapin the theoryofinnovationwhere,withfewexceptions,authorsassumethatinnovationis a localizedprocess-the resultofentrepreneuriallead-ership(Schumpeter1939, pp. 102-4) or nationalsystemsof innovation1 I would like to thankAndrewSchrank,membersof the trainingseminarin theSociologyofEconomicChangeintheUniversityofWisconsin,and theAJSreviewersfortheirvaluablecommentson earlierdrafts.Myargumentswerealso strengthenedbyconversationswithVincentTuckeraboutIrishrevisionism,RobertoFranzosiabouthistoricalandquantitativemethods,and StephenBunkeraboutaccessto rawmateri-als andindustrialascent.Accessto datawas graciouslyand helpfullyprovidedbythestaffofthearchivessectionoftheNationalLibraryofIrelandinDublin.Supportforthisresearchwas providedby the DepartmentofSociologyat UniversityCollegeDublin,theGraduateSchooloftheUniversityofWisconsin,and theFulbrightFoun-dation. Correspondencemay be sentto DenisO'Hearn, DepartmentofSociology,Queen'sUniversityofBelfast,BelfastBT7, NorthernIreland.? 1994by TheUniversityofChicago.Allrightsreserved.0002-9602/95/10003-0001$01.50

AJS Volume 100Number3 (November1994):587-621 587


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AmericanJournalof Sociology(Freeman1987).2 From a world-systemstandpoint,however,innovationis notinherentlylocal, but is localizedthrougha seriesofglobal strategiesto captureinnovationsand suppressthemelsewhere.No doubt,the na-tional environmentforinnovation-infrastructures,human knowledge,and capital resources,to quote a recentlist (Porter1990)-is important,but global power to achieve cheap and stable access to raw materials,markets,and humanlabor is necessaryforsuchnationalsystemsofinno-vation to succeed. Suppressinginnovationin the semiperipherystiflespotentialcompetitionjust as itfreessemiperipherallaborforsubordinateactivitiesthatare usefulto thecore. Thus, world-systemconceptsand atheoryof the localizationof innovationcan be mutuallysupportive.On theotherhand, world-systemconceptssuchas core,periphery,andsemiperiphery-thebasis of the world-systemhierarchy-are seriouslyundertheorized.The distinctionbetweencore and semiperipheryis espe-ciallyunclear.Moreover,withouta betterconceptualizationofwhatcon-stitutes"coreness,"it is difficultto analyzehow coreregionsmaintaintheirpositioninthe hierarchy.In thisarticleI use theconceptofinnova-tion not simplyas the characteristicthat distinguishescorefromsemi-peripheraleconomicactivities,butas a processthatmustbe localizedincoreregionsifthose regionsare to maintaintheirdominantpositioninthe world-systemhierarchy.3In exploringrelationsbetweenthecoreand semiperiphery,I am notconcernedwiththeobvious world-systemdistinctions-microprocessorsand bananas-but withthe murkierboundarybetweencore and semi-peripheralindustry.I willanalyzetheconnectionsbetweensemiperipher-ality, coreness,and innovationby usingan importantcase study:theIrish and Englishcottonindustriesof the late 18thand early 19thcentu-ries. The case ofBritishand Irish textilesis apt becausebothcountries,a colonizingeconomicascendantand its colonizedperiphery,engagedinthe same broad industrialsectorsfora timeafter1780. From 1780to1825 agentsin bothcountriesattemptedto industrializearoundcotton,which was the mostdynamicindustryof theperiodand eventuallythelargest.The case is also an importantonebecausetheEnglish-centered2AlthoughI referto the "theoryof innovation,"I am not particularlyconcernedhere withexplainingwhycertaininnovationsor inventionsarise whereand whentheydo. Rather,myconcernis who capturesand appliesinnovationsand how theydo this.Schumpeterhimselfmakesthedistinctionbetweeninventions,innovations,and theapplicationofinnovations,andheconsidersthefinalstepof applicationnotonlyto be distinctfromthe firsttwo but also to be the mostimportant(1939,pp.72-129).3 The importanceofinnovationas a characteristicofcorenesshas beenpursuedbrieflyby Arrighiand Drangel(1986)in theirattempttoexplainthe semiperipheralzone.The presentanalysisbuildson theirwork.588


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Irish CottonIndustryindustrialrevolutionis regularlycited as evidence fornation-centeredstudiesof innovationdespitetheimportanceofempireto Britishsuccess.

The economichistoryliteraturegenerallytreatsIrishand British"cot-ton" as equivalents, explainingthe eventual Irish failureby internalshortcomingsthat have recentlycome to be associated with"national"systemsofinnovation-lack ofentrepreneurialspirit,failuretomodern-ize, and lack of capital (Cullen 1972). I pursue a differentargument.Irish cottonwas peripheralizedby Britain,while Britishcottonbecamethe leading sector at the centerof its 19th-centurydominationof theworld-system.Two industrialsectorsthatseem at firstto be equivalentsare,on closerexamination,distinct.The industryof the colonizeris coreand thatofthecolonized,semiperipheral.Furthermore,whileinnovationdistinguishessemiperipheralfromcoreindustries,itis also a process.Anexplorationofhowcoreregionscaptureinnovations,and evenextinguishinnovativeimpulsesin semiperipheralregions,is crucial to our under-standingof how theworld-systemhierarchyis reproduced.4CORE INDUSTRY, SEMIPERIPHERALINDUSTRY,AND INNOVATIONThe structureofthecapitalistworld-systemis a well-definedhierarchyofrich,not so poor, and poor regionsratherthana continuumfrompoorto rich(Arrighiand Drangel 1986). It is generallyassumedthatthe levelof materialwell-beingin a countryor zone is a resultof that area'seconomicactivities-how the inhabitantsproduce, appropriate,or areexploitedof"want-satisfyingmaterialmeans"(Polanyi)or "use values"(Marx). Yet we have no precise definitionofwhat distinguishessemi-peripheralfromcoreeconomicactivitiesand, therefore,preciselywhyone set ofactivitiesis more conduciveto increasinga region'saveragelevel of materialwell-being.World-systemanalystsagreethatthecore-peripheryhierarchyis based4 The distinctionsI am drawingbetweencoreand semiperipheralindustryare notdependenton thespecificformofcolonialismthatwas pursuedin Ireland,or evenon formalcolonialismas opposedto moreinformalmeansofmarketcontrol.ThestrategyBritainpursuedin Irelandduringtheperiodanalyzedhere was a fairlyclassical"liberal"strategyofdominationthroughmarketmanipulationratherthanthedirecteliminationof a competingindustrythroughcoloniallaw, as intheearlierEnglishbanon Irishwoollenexportsin 1699.Thus,Irelandis nota "specialcase."The central concept that distinguishescore fromsemiperipheralindustry-innovation-isrelativelyindependentofthemeansused bycoreregionstosubjugatesemiperipheralindustries.Moreover,themechanismswhichBritainusedtosubjugateandperipheralizeIreland'scottonindustrywere"market"mechanismsratherthandirectpoliticalcontroland generalize,withsomespecificities,to a seriesofotherworld-systemiccases.I willdiscussthislastpointinthefinalsectionofthearticle.

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AmericanJournalof Sociologyon divergentregionalmaterialintereststhatresultfromdirectexploita-tion and unequal exchange(Chase-Dunn 1989, p. 203). They also agreethat exploitationis achieved throughthe manipulationof regionaleco-nomicactivities,so thatthe mostprofitableand expansiveactivitiestakeplace in the corewhilesemiperipheriesand peripheriesdo thingsthatarenot only less profitablebut may also increasethe profitabilityof coreactivitiesor the materialwell-beingof core regions.Thus, at the mostgenerallevel,theperipheryand semiperipheryprovidecorecapitalwiththingsit needs, and throughdominationof theworld-systemthatcorehopes to cheapen and stabilizesuch provisionas much as possible.Wallerstein(1979) definestheworld-systemas multiplenation-statesand societiesincorporatedwithina singledivisionoflabor. Withinthis(now-global)divisionof labor, core zones performpredominantlycoreactivities,peripheralzonesperformperipheralones,and semiperipheralzonesperforma balanceofbothkinds. Chase-Dunn(1989, p. 211) addsthe possibilitythat semiperipheriesmay performdistinctintermediateactivitiesbetween core and peripheralzones-for example, labor-intensiveindustrialactivitiessuch as assemblyor some internationalser-vices such as bankingand shipping.Yet thereis disagreementboth about how to definethis divisionoflabor and about how it getsreproduced.One set of explanationsconcen-trateson the relativepositionof core and peripheralactivitieswithinacontinuumofeconomicactivitiesbetweenthe rawmaterialand thefinalproduct.Some structuralistshypothesizea correlationbetweenlevel ofprocessingand profitability,national economic power, or economicgrowth.Galtung(1971, p. 159)assumesthatcoreregionsproducemainlymanufacturedgoods and peripheralregionsproduceraw materials;herefersto a "gap inprocessinglevel" betweenthe twozones.This impliesthattheproductionofprocessedcommoditiesis corewhilelessprocessedproductionor extractionis peripheral.Yet definingcorenessbylevel ofprocessingis problematic.Final assemblyregularlytakes place in thesemiperiphery.Textileweavingwas once a semiperipheralactivityandspinninga coreactivity,eventhoughclothis moreprocessedthanyarn.Level ofprocessingmay distinguishperipheral(agrarian,extractive)ac-tivitiesfromnonperipheral(semiperipheralandcoreindustrial)activities.But it cannotdistinguishthe industrialdivisionof labor betweencoreand semiperiphery.

Hopkins and Wallerstein(1986)defineglobal productionas a seriesofcommoditychains that "link raw materials,labor, the sustenanceoflabor, intermediateprocessing,finalprocessing,transport,and finalcon-sumption"(Chase-Dunn 1989, p. 205). Certain corenodes along thesechainsreceiveespeciallyhigh profits,while othersreceivelow returns.Coreregionscontainrelativelyhighproportionsofcorenodes,peripheral590


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Irish CottonIndustryregionscontainlow proportions,and semiperipheralregionsare in be-tween.

Otherdescriptionsofcorenessare indicative.Three commonindicatorsare wage rates,profitrates,and capitalintensity.Emmanuel(1972) de-finescorenessbywage rates,inwhichrelativelylowwagesin theperiph-erycause unequalexchange.5Wallerstein(1979) expectscoreprofitratesto exceedperipheralonesandexplainsthedifferencebythehighercapitalintensityof core activities.Chase-Dunn(1989, p. 207) assumesthatcoreactivitiescombineall three characteristics:skilled labor receivesrela-tivelyhighwagesinrelativelycapital-intensiveproduction,whichinturnfacilitateshigherlaborproductivityand higherratesofprofit.Wage rates,profitrates,and capitalintensity,however,indicatecore-ness butdo notdefineit. Each indicatoris imperfectlycorrelatedwithapriordefiningcharacteristic.Arrighiand Drangel (1986) claim that thispriorcharacteristicis the relationshipofan economicactivityto clustersof otherinnovativeactivities.Activitiesin leadingsectorsthatdefineanera of capitalistexpansionare clearlycore activities.The corenessofactivitiesthatare linkedtoleadingsectorsdependson whetherthe link-ages induceexpansionof the activityand innovationin its productivetechniques.Thus, simpleeconomicgrowthis not equivalentto core-ness-growth mayresultfromthecaptureof innovationand resultantproductivityenhancement,but it can also occur in the semiperipherywithoutinnovativechangesintechniqueortechnology.Growthis a nec-essaryconditionof corenessbut not a sufficientone in the absence ofinnovation.6But what is innovation?Schumpeter(1939) suggeststhat economicchangetakesplace througheconomicevolution-a nonequilibrium,dis-continuousprocesswherebyeconomicactivitymovesto quantitativelyandqualitativelydifferentlevels.Atthecenterofmajoreconomicchangeare innovationsthatsubstantiallyincreaselaborproductivity,makingitpossibleto producemoreoutputwitha givenlevel ofinputs(ora givenoutputwithfewerinputs).Theyclusterinspace and time.They concen-tratein certainsectorsand surroundings.They requiresignificantnew5Mandel (1975)and Amin(1975)contendthat a core-peripherywage differentialemergedin the1880s,whileChase-Dunn(1989,p. 53)identifiesa growingwage gapsincethe 16thcentury.6 Thisdistinctionbetweengrowthandinnovationis foreshadowedinseveralresponsestoBillWarren's(1973)thesisthatimperialismisconducivetocapitalistindustrializa-tion.BothEmmanuel(1974)andMcMichael,Petras,andRhodes(1974)havepointedoutthatthegrowththatoccurredin thesemiperipheryduringthe 1950sand 1960swas notrootedin an independenttechnologicalbase. Semiperipheralgrowthwas,therefore,unsustainable,and it failedto closetheincomegap betweencore andsemiperiphery.

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AmericanJournalof Sociologyconstructionof plantand equipmentand the creationof new firmsor thereorganizationof old ones. Innovationis notequivalentto invention-how an inventionis utilized is more importantthan inventionitself.Indeed, the reorganizationof productionmaybe more importantthantechnologicalchange. Chandler(1962, 1990),forexample,proposesthatlargerfirmscan organizeproductionin newways to captureeconomiesofscale (whichtransformhigherfixedcostsintolowerunitcosts),techno-logical complexity(allowingfirmsto combineresourcesin new ways),and verticalintegration(reliancemore on theirown resourcesthanonmarketsfor criticalinputs). New formsof corporateorganizationalsoinvolve new methodsof skill formation,motivation,retentionof keyworkers,and gainingcontrolofa satisfactoryportionof the productivitygainsthatarisefrominnovation.Mass and Lazonick (1990) and Lazonick (1991) put organizationalchangeatthecenterofinnovation.TheytraceBritishcompetitiveadvan-tages in the cottonindustryto five main sourcesof innovation:laborcosts,fixedcapital costs,materialscosts,marketingcosts,and adminis-trativecosts. Unlike entrepreneur-centeredaccounts,theiranalysiscen-ters on the importanceofdevelopingan experienced,specialized, andcooperativelabor forceoutofpreexistingdomesticand craftlabor. Thisis a welcomechangein emphasisfrommodernizationistaccountsof coreentrepreneurialsuperiority.Yet, withouta theorythatelaboratesthestructuralsourcesof and impedimentsto developingdisciplinedfactorylabor froma pool of domesticand craftlabor,we runthe riskofblamingperipherallabor for not "developingcapitalism"just as some analystsblame peripheralcapitalistsfornot "developingcapitalism." Thus, itis valuable to combinestructuralapproachessuch as theworld-systemperspectivewithhistoricalapproachestoinnovationand competitivead-vantage.Mass and Lazonick's (1990) othersources of innovationare equallyimportant.The developmentof a closelylinked engineeringindustrycheapenedthecostofproducingcottongoodsand increasedthe indus-try'sflexibilitytorespondtochangesinmarketdemandsand thequalityof cottonsupplies.Manchester'sclose proximityto themajor pointofentryofthe raw materialcheapenedproductionand increasedthestabil-ityofmaterialsupply.The advantagesofempireinaccessto raw materi-alswerematchedbythewayitstransportandinformationinfrastructuresopened up new marketsforyarnand cloth.And the Lancashire cottonindustry'scentralizationaround well-developedinput and outputmar-kets reducedthe amountsoffinancialresourcesand managementskillsthatwerenecessaryto compete.Finally, corenessand innovationare relatedto generalizedeconomicgrowth throughexternaleconomies (Schumpeter1939) and linkages592


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Irish CottonIndustry(Hirschman1958). Schumpeterlinks innovationto the expansionaryphase of the economic long wave (see Van Djuin 1983). A "primarywave"lcenterson a limitedgroupof leadingsectorswhereinnovationisconcentrated.The primarywave persistsuntilinnovationis generalized(or those who fail to adapt are destroyed)and surplus profitsin theleading sectorsfall. Meanwhile, the prosperitycreatedby the primarywave inducesa "secondarywave." Many firmsspeculateon the primaryexpansion,somein a recklessand overlyoptimisticway. Because itcov-ers a muchwiderpartofa regionaleconomy,theeffectsofthesecondarywave on economicgrowthcan be muchgreaterthan theprimarywave.Simpleeconomicgrowth,however,is notequivalentto innovationeventhoughinnovationmaybe the mostimportantcause ofgrowth.Rather,corenessis indicatedbythegrowthofinnovativesectorsrelativeto totaleconomicgrowth.The "secondarywave" resemblesHirschman's(1958) conceptoflink-ages, in which firmsare inducedto (1) beginproducingthingsthat areneeded by theprimaryinnovatorsor (2) use theiroutputtoproduceothercommodities.Schumpeter'sconceptof externaleconomy,however,isbothbroaderand moreprecise.It is broaderbecausethesecondarywaveincludesbothactivitiesthatare directlylinkedto innovationand thosethat are inducedby the general "prosperity"that follows clustersofinnovation.It ismoreconcisebecause Schumpeter(1939) beginshisanal-ysis of economicchangewith innovation(independentvariable) andworksthroughlinkagesand secondarymultipliers(interveningmecha-nisms)toeconomicgrowth(dependentvariable),whileHirschmanbeginswithlinkageswithoutadequatelyexploringtheinnovativeprerequisitesfortheirsuccessfulinducement.The distinctionbetweencore and semiperipheralindustryis clarifiedbytheconceptsofcreativeand adaptiveresponse.Schumpeter(1947, p.150) proposesthat economies,sectors,or firmsrespond differentlytochange.Those that do somethingnewmake a creativeresponse-theyutilizenewtechnologiesorformsoforganizationinwaysthatallowthemto outcompeteothers.Those thatrespond by extendingtheirexistingpracticemake an adaptiveresponse,whichenablesthemto competewithinnovatorsfora timeby intensifyingworkers'efforts,reducingwages,and acceptinglowerratesofprofit.Core activities(orfirmsorsectors)arecentersof creativeresponse.Semiperipheralactivitiesrelyon adaptiveresponsesand are,therefore,proneto lowerratesof profit,lowerwages,lower capitalintensity,and greaterratesofstagnationand failure.Creative and adaptive responsesresembletheMarxian conceptsofabsoluteand relativesurplusvalue. Like creativeresponse,relativesur-plusvalue referstoa firm'sabilityto increaseitsrateofprofitby utilizingproductiontechniques,so that it uses less than thesocial average labor

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AmericanJournalof Sociologytime to produce a given level of output. Surplus profitsmay accrue toinnovatingfirmswithina sectoror to whole sectors.Absolute surplusvalue, on theotherhand, refersto a firm'sabilityto increaseor maintainits rate of profitby increasingthe rate of exploitation-extendingthework day, increasingthe intensityof work, or reducingthe wage rate.This is clearlyan adaptive response.Laclau (1971) and Brenner(1977)arguethattechnologicalchangesin advanced capitalismhave made itimpossibleforthe core to exploitthe peripherythroughcapturingabso-lute surplusvalue. They implythat peripheralregionsfail to innovatenot becauseof coreinterests,butbecauseofa lack of dynamismof localelites. Yet restrictionson thetransferofleading edge technologyor onparticipationin leadingsectorsmay consignperipheralfirmstouse out-moded technologiesor previousinnovations.This formof adaptive re-sponseenablesperipheralfirmsto maintaina presencein certainindus-trialsectorsoverlong periodsoftime,althoughwithlowerprofitratesand lowerwage rates.Finally, innovation occurs in distributionas well as production.Schumpeter'slist ofimportantinnovationsincludesaccess to new mar-kets and sourcesof supply. Mass and Lazonick (1990) emphasize theimportanceofconditionsof materialsupplyand marketingstructurestocompetitiveadvantage. Schumpeter(1939, pp. 93, 99), by distinguishingbetween factor-usingperiods of innovative"gestation"and output-increasingperiods of innovative"operation,"underscoresthe impor-tanceof marketstabilityand potentialmarketexpansionforextendingafirm'sor agent'shorizon.7Recent approachesfromwithinthe Schumpeteriantraditionpursuetheimportanceof institutionsthatencouragethe stableyet challengingenvironmentthatisnecessaryforinnovation.The mostinfluentialrecentworksinthisregarddevelopconceptssuchas nationalsystemsofinnova-tion (Freeman 1987; Bengt-Ake1992)and nationalcompetitiveadvan-tage(Porter1990).These approachessuggestthatinnovationis capturednotby entrepreneurs,butbyinstitutionswithinfirmsand inthenationaleconomy.Schumpeter'sinsistencethatinnovationscomeinclustersleadssome to emphasizethe importanceof nationallybounded, interactiveprocessesoftechnologicalchange,learning,and productivereorganiza-tion.Porter(1990),forinstance,emphasizesthecreationofnationalcom-petitiveadvantagesthroughhighlylocalizedprocessesthatimprovefac-tor conditions(skilled labor and infrastructure),demand conditions7Lange (1943,p. 21), on theotherhand,excludesmarketchangesfromhis definitionof innovations,whichmustbe ouput increasingor factorsaving. Yet his formaleconomicapproachavoids the relationshipbetweenuncertainty,"horizon,"andagents'willingnesstointroduceinnovations.594


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Irish CottonIndustry(homedemandforan industry'sproductorservice),supportingindustries(linkagesto suppliers),and firmstructure(includingconstructivedomes-tic rivalry).Competitiveadvantagesare thus created ratherthan en-dowed as in neoclassicaleconomictheory.Yet such approachesto innovationremainwedded to the nation-stateor thefirmas thecriticalunitofanalysisandignoreorseriouslyunderesti-mate theimportanceofglobal institutionsto thecaptureand localizationof innovations.State activitiestoprotectmarketsand open up new onesare importantin thisregard,especiallyifinnovationis associatedwitheconomiesofscale. From withina world-systemframework,Bornschier(1992, p. 4) views the stateas produceror protectorof innovation,refer-ring to the "world marketforprotection"or social order, which is aterritoriallyboundedpublicutilityandan elementofthenationalproduc-tionfunction.Statessupportinnovationand investment,he argues, byplacing theirfirmswithinnational and internationalnetworksof eco-nomic transactionsthatare effectivelyprotected.Hegemony,zones ofinfluence,and nationalprotectionare all means by which states trytoimprovethe structuralenvironmentforinnovation.Conceptsfromtheworld-systemapproach,then,enhanceour under-standingof how innovationis captured,localized,and protected.Thereis no such thingas a national systemof innovationbecause clusteredinnovationsrequire global strategiesto secure raw materials,capturemarketsfor the exportof core products,and stiflecompetitionfromwithinand outsidethe core. What appearsas a highlylocalized processis embeddedwithinglobal strategiesto securethe necessarycommercialand materialenvironmentforinnovationsto clusteror interactwithinthe boundariesof a core state or region.These global strategiesmayfollowcharacteristictemporalpatterns,movingfromprotectionto freetrade,fromdirectmanipulationtoliberalhegemony,fromwarringwithrivals to the enforcementof peacefultrade(Chase-Dunn 1990, pp. 54-69). The globalizationof studiesofinnovationallows one to recognizethatthecaptureofinnovativecore activitiesis notjust a matterof intra-corecompetition,but also partofthe simultaneousprocessbywhichtheworld-systemhierarchyis reproduced.The associationbetweencore activitiesand innovationis, I believe,robust.Innovationdefinesthecuttingedge betweencorenessand semi-peripheralitywithintheglobal structure.It allows moreprocessedeco-nomic activitiesto be semiperipheralifinnovationis concentratedup-stream.It allows sectorsorcommoditiesto movein and outofcorenessas theirrelationshiptocentersofinnovationand theirsitesofproductionchangeovertime.It enablesus todistinguishwhichregionalcompetitorsina singleindustry-suchas cotton-are coreand whichare semiperiph-eral. Unlike approachesthatuse commoditychainsand defineas core

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AmericanJournalof Sociologythosenodes thatreceivehigherratesof profit,it examinesthe causes ofsurplus profitsand even allows us to analyze indirectlinkagesamongnodes of differentcommoditychainsin a givenregion.Furthermore,an examinationof how classes and statesinduceor con-strainactorsorregionsfromparticipatingin innovativewaves may helpus understandhow the structuralhierarchyis producedand reproduced.Innovationputs activitiesor sectorsin theirregionaland temporalcon-text.Core activitiesare definedin relationto each other-since theycluster,coreactivitiesand regionalcorenessare related.Even ifa sectoror firminnovates,it is core onlyif it is connectedto a series of othercore activitiesin theregion.The absenceofsuch linkagesthreatensthelong-termstabilityof the activityand its abilityto remaininnovative.Itwillbecomedependenton outsidesourcesof supplyand onoutsidemar-kets and, in the long run, will eitherbe peripheralizedor decline.Acompletetheoryofinnovation,therefore,musttie structuralcharacteris-ticsof theglobal hierarchy(whichworld-systemanalystsassumeto bestable)to theever-changinglocationsofclustersofinnovation.WHAT WAS "LEADING" ABOUT COTTON?A "leading"sectoris one at thecenterof innovation.It expands,gener-ates surplusprofits,and linkswith othercore sectors.Cottonby itselfdid not constitutethe whole of England'sindustrialrise;it was at thecenterof a series of linkedinnovationsthatmade up the "industrialrevolution."Deane (1968, pp. 104-7) belittlescotton'simpact becausethe industrynever exceeded5%-6% of BritishGNP, althoughotherestimatesputthefigureat 11%-12% (Farnie 1979, p. 24). Yet herfocuson the size of the cottonindustrymissesthesector'simpacton overallEnglishindustrialization.8Once we recognizethat cottonwas the centerof a wide clusterofinnovationsand a widernetworkofexpansionaryimpulses,Deane's revi-sionismloses muchof its force.Cottoninduced technicalspin-offsinmechanical engineering,chemicals,and steam power (Musson andRobinson 1969)..It was a bulwarkof the English exporttrade,withimportantlinkagesto shipping(Davis 1962).9And theriseofManchester8 A morerecentrevisionin thelate 1980squestionedtheconceptof the "industrialrevolution"duringtheyears1780-1830on thegroundsthatratesofgrowthofBritishnationaloutput,totalfactorproductivity,and industrialoutputwereall slow before1830and did notdisplaythesharpupwardturnaround1780thatpreviouseconomichistoriansclaimed.For a reviewofthisrevisionistliteratureand an excellentcritique,see Berg (1994, pp. 13-33).9 Cottonmanufacturesmadeup52.8% oftheincreaseofvalueofBritishexportsfrom1785 to 1815, and35% from1820 to 1850 (Farnie1979, p. 10).596


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Irish CottonIndustryand Liverpoolinducedthedevelopmentofshipping,canal,and railtech-nologies-the centerof the"second industrialrevolution"-and the im-provementofpost and communications(Redford1934,pp. 188-204).Farnie(1979, pp. 27-36) uses a linkageapproachto assess theimpactofthe cottonindustryonBritisheconomicchangebeforeand after1830.Before 1830,the greatestgrowtheffectsof cottonwere in thespinningsector,wherea discontinuousbreakfromearlierlevelsofproductionwasenabled bychangesintechnique,productiveorganization,and supplyofthe raw material. There were importantbackwardlinkagesin engi-neeringand transport,butforwardlinkageswerelimitedto weavingandfinishing.Weavingwas stillperformedprimarilyonhand loomsinhomesor small workshops.The finishingtrades, especiallybleaching,weremore capital intensivebutwere not yetlinkedto the chemicaland dyeindustriesthatwouldbecomeprominentlaterin the 19thcentury.After1830thenewdemandsof thespinningsectorinduceda transfor-mationofthe wholeeconomy.The introductionofpowerloomsaddedimpetustomechanicalengineering.Transportationrequirementsstimu-lated theintroductionand expansionoftheLancashirerailsystem.Fair-burnand othersrevolutionizedthetechnologyofmillbuildinginLanca-shire.Cottonmay have consumedhalfof the incrementin steelproduc-tionand fabricationthroughitsdemandforpowerlooms,printing,cylin-ders, steamengines,and boilers(notto mentionthesteelconsumptionof transportand miningmachinery).Otherlinkagesincludedmachineoils,woodenbobbins,chemicalsand dyes,and rubberand leatherma-chinebelts.Murray(1870)estimatesthat154ancillaryindustriessuppliedthecottonsectorby 1870. To thiswe may add the consumerdemandgeneratedbytheindustry'sworkers.Butratesofchangeoftechnology,productiveorganization,wagerates,skilllevels,and profitabilitywereunevenamongsubsectorsof thecottonindustry.Innovationswereconcentratedin certainsectors,while othersremainedrelativelyunchangedforlongperiods. Before1830, themostinnovativeprocesseswereupstreamfromless advancedones. The majortechnicalinnovations-thewaterframe,themule,and thejenny-werein spinning.Moreover,spinningfirstcombinedthesenew technologieswithfactory-basedproduction.Most authorsagree thatthe impetusforchangein spinningwas thebottleneckit createdtoweaving. Yet, evenaftertheremarkableseriesof technicalinnovationsofthe late 18thcen-turyand thecentralizationof spinningin the factory,weaving was nota bottleneckon spinning.Traditionalsocial relationsin weavingwereactuallyencouragedby the use of the exportmarketas a "vent"forsurplusyarn.Thus, spinningbefore1830was the centerof"innovativeresponse"and weaving a centerof"adaptive response."As mechanizedmillspinningincreasedyarnoutput,ruralhandweavingwas extended.

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AmericanJournalof SociologyThe putting-outsystemcontinuedto dominateweaving untilthe 1840s(Landes 1969,pp. 42-44).

To summarize,the corenessof a leading economicsectoris definedpartlyby itsrelationto othersectors.It inducesa seriesof profitableandexpandingoutside activities.But not all parts of a leading sectorareequally core. Some processesare centersof innovativeclusters,whileothersremainrelativelyuntouchedby innovation.Core and semiperiph-eralactivitiesmayresidenexttoeach otherin a commoditychain.Thiswas the case with cottonspinningand weaving between 1780 and1830.GROWTH,INNOVATION,AND PERIPHERALIZATIONIN BRITISHAND IRISH COTTONIreland'stextileindustrybegan in wool, which grew rapidlyuntiltheBritishWoollenActprohibitedthe exportof woolen clothfromIrelandin 1699. The suppressionof Irish wool, like Indiantextiles,was a stateresponseto pressuresby English wooleninterests(Kearney 1959;Kelly1980). But theEnglish state'swider intentwas to subjugateand trans-formIrishindustryto producelinenand provisionsforthe Britishfleet(Ellison 1886, p. 19). Irish textileexpansionafter 1700 was in linen,which was stimulatedby a 1696 act that allowed plain Irish linen toenterEnglandduty-freeand bythe activitiesof theIrishLinenBoard,establishedin 1711(Crawford1969, p. 26).The linen act gave Ireland advantages over continentalproducers,but Irish linenwas a dependentindustryfromthebeginning.BritainencouragedIrish linento relieveitsdependenceon Balticsources.Mar-kets forlinen expandedmore slowlythan other textilesand BritainstrictlylimitedIrishexportsofcertainlinensin orderto keepthe mostprofitablemanufacturesin England. In 1773,on the eve of thebirthofIreland's cottonindustry,England tookmore than90% of Irish linenexports.As a result,theindustrywas highlyunstable.Duringthedepres-sion of 1773, up to three-quartersof the linen looms in the northofIreland wereidle (Monaghan 1942, p. 1). Linen'sdependentnaturewasincreasedby a limitedworldsupplyof flax so that,unlikecotton,itspricerose withdemand(Durie 1976,p. 90); byitsabsenceoflinkagestoassociatedactivities;andbyitsdecentralizedorganizationamongfarmerswithtinyplots,whomovedinand out ofweavingorspinningas a hedgeagainstfluctuationsofthecostofsubsistence(Crawford1969,pp. 27-28;Durie 1976, p. 91). Untiltechnologyand factoryorganizationbecameroutineenoughthattheycouldbe introducedwidelyinto a textilewithsuchlimitationsofraw materialsupplyandfinaldemand,therewas little598


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Irish CottonIndustryimpetusto innovate.Nearly all increasesof linen output in the 18thcenturyrequiredproportionalincreasesoflabor."?

The Irish cottonindustry,on the otherhand,was establishedduringa periodof relativeautonomyfromBritain.In responseto mobilizationby the Irish Volunteers,Britainrepealedsomeof its moreegregiousre-strictionson Irish tradeand industry(althougha centuryof the naviga-tionand woolen actsleftIrishcommerceand industrywoefullyunderde-veloped). As linenstagnatedduring1770-80,thesemi-independentIrishparliamentrespondedwith incentivesforcottonmanufacturesin theformof bountiesand protectionagainstimportsof Englishcalico andmuslin. New spinningtechnologywas introduced,including water-drivenmills,and cottonprogressivelyreplacedlinen.'Althoughsmall by English standards,Irish cotton productionex-panded rapidlybefore1800. Because all theraw materialfortheindustrywas imported,ratesof growthofIrishand Britishcottonproductioncanbe estimatedfromtheirretainedimportsofcottonwool.2 Figure1showsthe logged outputofthe Britishand Irish industriesbetween 1782 (thefirstyear of normalactivityfollowingtheAmericanWar of Indepen-dence) and 1822 (thelast yearforwhich separateIrishdata are avail-able).13 The overallratesofgrowthintheIrishand Britishindustriesare'o Althoughmachinerywas availablefromthe1730s,Irishflaxwas scutchedbyhand.Mechanizationof spinningand weavingfollowedcottonbydecades.Theonlymajorgainsinproductivitybefore1800werefromsubstitutingthespinningwheelforthedistaffor rockand themodificationofhandlooms.Eventhespinningwheeldidnotreachsomeremoteareas untilthe 1790s(Durie 1976).1"In Belfastin 1760therewere400 linenloomsand no cottonlooms;an 1810censusreported860cottonloomsand 6 linenlooms(Monaghan1942,p. 3).12 Data on Irishimportsand exportsof cottonwool, yarn,andclothbetween1764and1822areintheannualledgersoftheIrishCustoms,foundintheNationalLibraryofIreland.Britishdata beginningin1881arefromBaines(1835, p. 347).Blaug(1961,p. 377),followingBaines andothers,assumesthatwastageinspinningwas constantat about11% untilthe1860s.Bythe1780stheuseofcottoninotherlinesofproduction(candlewicks,mixedfabrics)wasminimal.Thus,cottonyarnoutputcan be estimatedwithreasonableaccuracyas 89% of retainedcottonwool imports(importsnetofreexports).Clothmanufactures(byweight)aregenerallyconsideredto be equivalentto retainedyarnoutput.This methodcannotdistinguishbetweenvalue added inspinning,weaving,and finishing.Regionalindustriesthatconcentratein differentstagesare notstrictlycomparable,nor are specializingregionsstrictlycomparablewiththosethatare integratedfromspinningthroughfinishing.Initially,however,Iwilluse a globalestimateofcottonoutput,whichiscottonyarnavailableforweaving(whethertheyarnis subsequentlywoven or exported).Thus, "cottonoutput"(inpounds)is estimatedas thesumofyarnproducedandyarnimported.13Irishcottonwoolimportsfor1809-11areexpectedvaluesestimatedbythemodifiedCochrane-Orcuttiterativeprocess.Thiswasnecessarybecausecottonwoolimportsdoubledduringthoseyears,from2.5 to 6 millionpounds,onlyto dropback to 2.6

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AmericanJournalof Sociologyoutput20 -

19 _18 - _vXf Britain17 _- ~ g t-A16 _*-15 -reland141312 1782 1787 1792 1797 1802 1807 1812 1817 1822year

FIG. 1.-LoggedoutputoftheIrishandBritishcottonindustries(inpounds),1782-1822, calculatedfromIrish Customs(variousyears).

estimatedbyautocorrelationmodelswhichregressloggedoutputon time,where 1782 = 1 and 1822 = 41.14The ratesofgrowthof cottonoutputare thecoefficientsoftime. The resultsare the following(t-statisticsinparentheses):

Britain: ln(OUTPUT) = 16.218+ .060TIME R2 = .902.(11.641)(1)Ireland: ln(OUTPUT) = 13.489+ .050TIME R2 = .808.(9.342)

millionpoundsin 1812and neverachievethe 1809-11levelsagain. These weretheyearsofU.S. embargoeson exportsto England,and the differencebetweenactualvaluesand expectedvaluesconsistedof cottonwoolthatwas importedbyAmericanshipsintoIrelandandreexportedto Britainas a wayofcircumventingtheembargo"throughthebackdoor." Dubourdieu(1812),inhis statisticalsurveyofcountyAn-trim,estimatesthat21% of cottonwool importsinBelfastwerereexportedin 1811.This is probablya seriousunderestimate.Most Irisheconomichistorianswho quoteDubourdieu(e.g., Monaghan1942;Gill 1925)failtorecognizetheextraordinaryperiodduringwhichhis observationsweremade.In otheryears,reexportsofcottonwoolwerepracticallyniland werenoteven recordedin thecustomsbooks.Data on reex-portsis availablefor1835,Irishexportsofcottonwoolare less than 1% of imports(IrishRailwayCommissioners1837).14All of the regressionsin thisarticleare estimatedusingthe modifiedCochrane-Orcuttmethod,withmaximum-likelihoodestimationof p. In all cases, Durbin-Watsontestsindicatedfirst-orderautocorrelation.

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IrishCottonIndustryBoth rates of growthare similar.The Britishindustrygrew by 6% peryear,and theIrishindustryby 5%. 15 At thislevel ofgenerality,thetwocottonindustriesappearto be nearlyequivalent.A closerlookat figure1, however,indicatesthattheIrishcottonindus-trywentthroughtwophases. Cottonoutputgrewrapidlyand relativelysmoothlyuntilthe mid-1790sand thereafterbecame slowerand moreerratic.16 Once we divideIrishcottonintoitsearlyand late phases, usingthe union ofIreland withBritainin 1801as the dividingyear, we findtwo distinctgrowthpatterns:Period 1, 1782-1801:

Britain: ln(OUTPUT) = 16.106+ .071TIME R2 = .744.(5.069) (2)Ireland: ln(OUTPUT) = 13.107+ .070TIME R2= .594.(4.541)Period 2, 1802-22:

Britain: ln(OUTPUT) = 16.513+ .051TIME R2 = .641.(3.952)(3)Ireland: ln(OUTPUT) = 14.253+ .026TIME R2= .472.(2.867)

Before1801,the twoTIME coefficientsindicatethateach industrygrewat an equivalentrate of 7%. After1801,whileBritishoutput growthremainedhigh(5.1%), the Irish growthrate felldramaticallyto 2.6%."Moreover,the simpletime modelforIreland failsto account fora lotmore of the observed variance after1802, whichindicatesthat Irishcottonoutputwas moreunstableduringthesecond period.Therewere15 It shouldbe rememberedthatthelinearityof theseestimatedmodelsis producedbyloggingcottonoutputtoobtainratesofgrowth.Thismasksa discontinuouschangein actualoutput,and also obscuresa pathofexpansionthatexperiencedsevereperiodsof stagnationas well as periodsof rampantgrowth.16The exploratorytechniqueof a runningmedianidentifiesmorepreciselywhengrowthratesshifted.Therewereclearbreaksin themedianratesof growthof Irishoutputin 1795-97 (whenthe mediangrowthrate declinedfrom17.5%-19.9% to9.6%-17.5%), in 1805-9 (whenit declinedto 9.4%-9.6%) and in 1816 (when itdeclinedto 9.4%). Unfortunately,Irishtradedata are notavailableafter1822,butone wouldexpectrathersteadydeclinessoonthereafter.17The distinctionbetweenthetwoindustriesin differenttimeperiodsis evenstarkerwhenwe considertheirearliestyears.During1782-95,outputintheIrishindustrygrewat an estimatedrateof morethan 11% per annum,whiletheEnglishindustrygrewby 7%. Thus,whiletheBritishindustrymaintaineda ratherevenrateofgrowththroughthe1790s,theIrishindustrywas alreadyindecline.

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AmericanJournalof Sociologyperiods of high output and equally distinctiveslumps. Instabilityandrecessionin the Britishindustrywere less severe.

The early success of the Irish cottonindustry,as indicated by itsgrowthrate in model (2), is reflectedin theEnglish responseto PrimeMinisterPitt's 1785 proposalsforlimitedfreetradebetweenIreland andEngland. Lancashire cottonmanufacturersrejectedthe proposals out-right.They regardedIrelandas a commercialthreatbecause of its abun-dantlow-wagelabor, plentifulwaterpower, and stateincentivesto in-dustry(Edwards 1967, p. 11). RobertPeel even threatenedtomovehiscottonmanufacturesto Irelandifthepropositionswereenacted. Englishindustrialcapital organizedsolidlyagainst Pittand defeatedthe pro-posals.18Fifteenyears later the English manufacturers'attitudehad changed.They pressedPittto withdrawIrishcottondutiesimmediatelyunderthe1801 Act of Union of Ireland with Britain,in orderto gain freeaccessto Irish markets.The ManchesterChamber ofCommercearguedthat"the removal of all restrictionswould tend to directthe capital andindustryof bothcountriesto prosecutingthosevariousmanufacturesforwhicheach possessedthegreatestnaturalqualifications"(Redford1934,p. 142). Afterdelays caused by politicalconsiderations,Irishdutiesoncottonyarnwere eliminatedin 1816 and on cottonclothin 1824.In 1785 Britishindustrialcapital rejectedfreetrade with Irelandbe-cause it had toomanyofthe "greatestnaturalqualifications"in cottonmanufactures.By 1801,theydemandedfreetradebecause Englandnowpossessedthese"natural"qualifications.Whathappenedin between?Ibelieve the distinctgrowthpatternsof Irish and Britishcottonoutputand the timingoftheirdivergence-reflectedinmodels(2) and (3)-canbe explained by the localizationof innovationin the cottonindustryaroundLancashire and by the peripheralizationof the Irish industry.The English industrybecame a centerof creativeresponse,introducingnew technologiesbut, what is moreimportant,exploitingnew formsofproductiveand commercialorganization.The Irishindustry,on theotherhand, extendeditscottonactivitiesthroughadaptiveresponses,primarilyby extendingthelabor-intensivesystemofputting-outinweaving,whichbecamea subsidiarysectorto English spinning.Ireland's peripheralityis indicated by its concentrationin weavingratherthan spinning,itsunfavorableaccessto therawmaterial,itslackoflinkagesto otherinno-vatingsectors,and itsunfavorableaccess toexternaland even domesticmarkets.18 Ironically,theEnglishindustrialistsdemandedfreetradewithFrancebecausetheydesiredaccesstoitsmarketsandperceivedno threatfromthelocalindustry(Redford1934,p. 127).602


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IrishCottonIndustryFor a time,Ireland's relativeadvantagesin cheap labor costs andwaterpowerenabled it to remaincompetitivewithBritain,despiteits

continuedrelianceon adaptiveresponses.But inthe adversecommercialconditionsof the early 19thcentury-a period of war and global eco-nomicinstability-thestrengthof theEnglishinnovativesectorsenabledthemto surviveand expandat a higherrate thantheIrish sectors.ButEngland'sinnovationswerenot a nationalevent.They also requiredthesubordinationoftheIrishtextileindustry,whichgavethelargerEnglishspinnerstheflexibilityto movein and out of theIrishmarket,dumpingtheirsurplusyarnthereinperiodsofslumpingdemandwhileusingcheapIrish weavinglabor to cheapenthe cloth Englandsold throughouttheworld.This explainstherisinginstabilityoftheIrishindustryafter1801,as observedin model(3) above. Englandachieved the stablesupplyofraw materialsthat was necessaryforits firms'increasedthroughputbyincreasingtheinstabilityofsupplyin subordinatemarketsthattheyser-viced throughreexports.England's innovationsand creativeresponsesand, ultimately,itsrapidrates ofgrowthand relativemarketstability,came at the cost of Irish adaptive response,instability,and periodicstagnation.SPINNINGAND WEAVING:INNOVATIVEANDADAPTIVERESPONSESThe keyinnovationsduring1780-1820 werecenteredin cottonspinning,whichwas clearlytheleadingsectoroftheworldeconomy.New spinningtechnologieswerecombinedwiththenewfactoryorganizationto radi-cally increase throughputand labor productivity.Linked capital-intensivesectorssuchas finishing,machinebuilding,shipping,and dis-tributionwereincreasinglymechanized.Butweavingwas stillprimarilydoneinhomesand smallweavingsheds.Expansion ofyarnoutputwasachievedprimarilyby increasinglaborproductivitydue to innovationsin technique, organization,productivescale, and material supply.Expansion ofweaving (and ofnoninnovatingspinningoperations)wasachievedprimarilybyaddingmorelaborandequipment.Thefirstexpan-sionwas a creativeresponse,whilethesecondextensionwas an adaptiveresponse.Somespinnerscompetedfora timebyintensifyinglabor exploi-tationand acceptinglower profitrates;weaversin generaladapted totheincreasedsupplyofyarnbyextendingtheirexistingpracticethroughtheputting-outsystem.In world-systemterms,cottonspinningwas atthecenterofcoreindustrywhileweavingwas a semiperipheralindustrialactivity.How did thisdistinctionaffectthetrajectoriesofthe Britishand Irishcottonindustries?Figure2 showsIrishoutputof cottonmanufactures

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AmericanJournalofSociologymillionpounds7

6cottonmanufactures

4-,yamoutput3

2 yamimports

1782 1787 1792 1797 1802 1807 1812 1817 1822yearFIG.2.-Irish cottonindustryoutputand itscomponents,1782-1822,calcu-latedfromIrishCustoms(variousyears).

and its components,yarn outputand yarn importsfromBritain. Irishyarnoutputincreasedrapidlyfrom1782to 1788,was stagnantbetween1788 and 1806, and rose slowly thereafter.On the other hand, Brit-ish yarnexportsto Ireland increasedrapidlyafter1790 and rose irregu-larly but steadilyuntil the 1820s. Britishyarn was eitherwoven intofabricsforthe Irish marketor woven forBritishdealers who reim-portedthefabricforfinishingandmarketingaroundtheworld.The ratesof growthof homespunversusimportedyarnas inputsinto the Irishclothindustry,estimatedby autocorrelationmodels,are the followingfor1790-1822:Irishspinning: ln(OUTPUT) = 13.562+ .0348TIME R2 = .6552.

(9.0123) (4)Britishyarn: ln(IMPORTS) = 12.173 + .0531TIME R2 = .5364.(5. 1158)Yarn importsrosebyan estimated5.3% perannumbetween1790 and1822,whileIrishspinningexpandedby less than 3.5%. Irish cottonbe-came concentratedin weaving,whereBritishspinnersand dealers putoutyarn,and Irishentrepreneurs,in a classic adaptiveresponse,tookcheapBritishyarnand extendedtheirexploitationofIrishweavers. TheresultingIrish "cottonindustry"was capable ofperiodsofrapid expan-sionbut was highlydependenton Britishmachinesandmaterials.It hadfew of the innovativecharacteristicsthatmade Britishcottona leadingsector.Increasingly,corespinningbecame delinkedfromsemiperipheralweavingand was concentratedin Britain.604


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Irish CottonIndustryThe importedshare of Irishyarnconsumptionroserapidly,fromlessthan 1% in 1782 to more than30% in 1795. After1795, it fluctuated

between20% and 50%. The fluctuationofyarnimportsaddedsubstantialinstabilityto the Irish cottontrade. Irish capital's"failure"to innovatemorewidelyin cottonspinningwas a rationalreactionto a marketthatwas periodicallygluttedbyimports.These dislocationsbecameparticu-larlyproblematicunder freetrade afterthe union. Irish weaving wasalso in a precariouspositionbecauseitssupplyofyarnwas unstable(fig.2). Because it did not innovate,it became vulnerableonce technicalchangesand factoryorganizationswepttheBritishweavingsectorinthe1830s.Adaptiveresponsemaybe successfulfora time,but its effective-ness is temporallylimitedwhen faced with a continuallyhighrate ofinnovationin competingsectors.How did the distinctionbetweenspinningandweavingarise?Duringthe early cottonperiod, thecapital needed to begin eitherspinningorweavingwas quite small.Yet the organizationofproductionintofacto-ries was concentratedin spinning,culminatingin the predominanceoflargespinningmillsin theearly 19thcentury(Edwards 1967, p. 9). Asmallspinnercouldproducewithrelativelylittlecapital outlay,but thelargemill,whichcombinedpower mulesand multiplespindleswiththeadvantages of buying large lots of cottonwool, massivelyincreasedthroughput.Factoryinnovationsturnedspinningfrombeinga bottleneckon weaving to being an inducerof rapid expansionin weaving.'9Butweavingdid not expand by increasingits laborproductivity-throughinnovation-but by extendinga systemofmiddlemenwho intermediatedbetween the relativelyconcentratedspinnersand multiple weaversspreadoutover large areas.Low wages gave Irishweaversa greatadvantageovertheBritish.ButIrishspinningcould surviveonlyiflow wagescompensatedfortechnicaldisadvantagesand highermaterialcosts.20Lowerwages weremaintainedby continuingthe Irish agrarian-basedrelationsof production,whichreducedthe subsistencecosts of farmer-spinnersand farmer-weavers.But the persistanceof this agrarian-basedorganizationof productionprecludedthewidescaleintroductionoffactory-basedspinningthatwasrevolutionizingthe Englishindustry.21Thus, Irishentrepreneursused19 In 1770spinningwas a bottleneck:six-eightpeoplewererequiredto spinenoughyarnforone weaver.By 1785theproductivityofspinninglaborincreasedso muchthatweavinghad toexpandfortheyarntobe sold(Ellison1886,p. 48).20 Geary(1981, p. 41) estimatesthatcoalwas 2% oftotalcostsintheIrish"cottonindustry"whilewageswere33%. Belfastspinningwageswereabout72% ofLanca-shirewagesin 1833,andweavers'wagesweresubstantiallylower.21 In addition,a higherproportionofIrishurbanlabor was femalethaninLanca-shire-a maletofemaleratioinBelfastofabout1:2 andinLancashireof 1:1-while

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AmericanJournalof Sociologyrelativelylabor-intensiveprocesses,includingputting-out,to competefora timewithLancashirespinners.As a result,Irishspinningeventuallydeclinedand weavingpredominated.But weaving was clearlya semiperipheralindustry.Weavers' wageswere extremelylow;22theirmarketwas unstable and it was the firsttextilesectorto feel the effectsofa recession(Ellison 1886, pp. 78-79);weavingshedsrequiredfarlesscapitalthanspinningmillsof correspond-ingdimensions,so therewerefeweconomiesof scale orspeed; and weav-erswereoftentied to buyers,whilethelargerspinnersmoved back andforthbetweenhome marketsand export(Ellison 1886,p. 79; Edwards1967, pp. 27, 50).Yet the spinningfirmsdid not automaticallyachieve the diversifiedmarketaccess thatwas necessarytorealizeeconomiesofscale. This hadto be created.Throughouttheworld-system,Englishmarketaccess wasestablishedthroughitsuse ofsea powertodominateinternationalcom-merceand to regulateitsimperialtradelaws and practices.WithinIre-land, the Britishstate'sdesiretoreassertdirectpoliticalcontrolafterthe1798 Irishrebellioncorrespondedto cottoncapital'sdemands for freeaccess to the Irishmarket.Both interestswere enhancedbytheforcedunionofIrelandwithBritainin 1801. Free trade(inIreland as through-out theworld-system)enabledspinnerstodumptheiryarnabroadduringdifficultperiodssuch as thewartimeperiodafter1803,when"theexporteffortsometimesresembleda giganticdumpingoperation;theoutcomeofdesperateattemptsbymanufacturerstofightoffidlecapacityillustrat-ing theirdependenceon theforeignmarketfortheirsuccessfulexpan-sion"(Edwards 1967, p. 74). Englishdumpingwas especiallyimportantin the fineryarns where yarnstocks tied up huge amountsof capital(Edwards 1967, pp. 128-30).As theEnglish industrybecamemoreconcentrated,smallerspinnersbecamedependenton largespinnersand dealerswithmarketcontactstosell theiryarn.In time,thesmallerspinnersbecame"controlledbytheiryarndealers"(Edwards 1967, p. 34). Theyhad limitedcapital, spunona commission,and sent all of theiryarnto a dealer who kept themsuppliedwithcottonand made cash advances. Small spinnerswere at adisadvantageon foreignmarketsbecauseofhightransactionscosts and

womenspinnersearnedless thanone-thirdthewagesof malespinners(Geary1981,p. 44).22 In 1811,Irishhomeweaversand theirspousesreportedlyworkedfromfourin themorningto midnightsix daysa weekfora netwage ofabouttwoshillings,sixpence(2s. 6d.; Monaghan1942,p. 12). Mostfactoryweaversmade 9s.-15s. per week. In1832-33Irishhomeweaversreceived7s.perweekwhileManchesterspinnersmade20s.-25s., mechanics24s.-26s., machinemakers26s.-30s., and iron founders28s.-30s. (Redford1934,p. 80).606


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Irish CottonIndustryunfavorablecreditterms,so that theywere oftenforcedto sell on theless profitablehome market.

Free tradeextendedthisproductivehierarchytoIrelandand theworld-systembeyond.The largeEnglishspinnersincreasinglysubjugatedIrishweaving throughtheirdealersin Ireland, who regularlyreduced theirIrish pricesto undercutlocal competition(Edwards 1967, p. 140). Thepressureto sell yarnto Irishweaversincreasedduringthe 1790swiththesize and throughputof Englishspinningmills. Eventually,the largestEnglish spinnerscolluded to share out the Irish marketat agreedmini-mum prices(Edwards 1967, p. 141).23WhentheUnitedStatesimposedtradebarriersagainstBritainin 1809,Britishmanufacturersbegandumpingclothas well as yarnin Ireland.Irish manufacturerscould notrespondby exportingtheirown clothbe-cause theylackeda solidexportinfrastructure-theby-productofmorethana centuryof Britishdomesticprotectionand restrictionson its colo-nies' trade with countriesotherthan England. SingularIrishattemptsto exportclothto Americaendedin disaster,and Irish customsrecordsshow onlya handfulof small cottontextileshipmentsfromIrelandtoAmericaafter1805.The Irish cottonindustryfinallycollapsedafterEnglandremoveditstariffson yarnin 1816 and clothin 1824. Between 1825 and 1835 Irishyarnoutputfellfrom3.6 to 2.3 millionpoundsand clothoutputfellfrom6.3 to 2.9 millionpounds(IrishRailwayCommissioners1837).As Englishweavingwas mechanized,theManchestermanufacturersbegantoexportfinishedclothto Ireland ratherthanputting-outthere.Englishclothex-portsto Irelandaveragedless than80,000yardsbefore1815, butreached850,000 yardsin 1822. Britishcloth exportsroseto 5 millionyardsin1825 and 14 millionin 1835,while yarn exportsfell from3 millionto500,000 pounds.24Belfastspinnersmoved intospinningflaxwhen theybecame unableto competein cotton.Both the numberof cottonspinningmills andimportsof cottonwool intoBelfastfelldramaticallybetweenthe early1820sand 1835 (Dickson 1976,p. 110; IrishCustoms1823;IrishRailwayCommissioners1837, p. 73). Dublin and Cork found no adaptive re-23 EvenaroundBelfast,wherethereweresomemodernmills,thefineryarnscontin-ued to be importedfromEngland.Ironically,theskilledUlsterweaverswereespe-ciallydependenton theBritishindustrybecauseUlster'smillscouldnotspinthefineyarnstheyneededto weavehigh-qualitycloth(Geary1981,p. 38). The dependentUlsterweaversweretypicallycontrolledbyBritishspinnersundertheputting-outsystem.24 The remainingyarnexportscame mainlyfromScottishspinnerswhowere at-temptingto competein an ever moredifficultenvironmentbytheirownadaptiveresponseofputting-outin Ireland(Dickson1976,p. 111).

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Irish CottonIndustryofimportpenetration,associatedwithIrishprotectionin the1780s,fol-lowed by rapidincreasesin the 1790s.Importpenetrationremainedrela-tivelystablein the rangeof 35%-45%, withnotableshort-termdropsin1807 and 1810 (duringrestrictiveU.S. trade policies). There weretwoperiodsofrapidincrease:1790-1805 and 1815-35.The firstphase of rapidimportpenetrationwas drivenby Englishyarnexports,a resultof theregionalconcentrationofspinningin Lancashireand theperipheralizationof Irishweaving. FollowingIrish success inreducingEnglishclothimports,the share ofyarnin importpenetrationrose rapidly,from1%-3% in the early1780s,to 45% in 1790, and morethan67% in 1800.This helpsexplainthedivergenceofIrishgrowthratesin cotton,whichwas uncoveredin theautocorrelationmodels(2) and (3)above.The secondphase,after1816,accompaniedtheend ofIrishprotectionand the mechanizationof Britishweaving.Importpenetrationincreasedfromone-thirdin 1815 to more than 80% in 1835. Between 1825 and1835, therewas a massiveshiftof Britishexportsfromyarntoclothandclothing.While Britishyarnaccountedfor72% of importpenetrationin 1825, clothaccountedformore than80% by 1835. This remarkablechangerepresentsthe consolidationof "cottonindustry"as an integratedcore activity,fromtransportthroughspinning,weaving, and finish-ing.Ireland'smodestexporttradein cottonclothafter1816 didnotreflectthe industry'shealth.Cloth exportsrose after1816 because the Britishmarketwas protectedbeforethen.But theseexportswere the end prod-uct ofputting-out,by Manchesterduringthe1820sand laterby Scottishmanufacturerstryingto competewithmechanizedEnglishweaving. Intime,Belfast weavers produced clothratherthanyarn,forGlasgowratherthanManchester(Geary1989,p. 27). This was a Scottishadaptiveresponseto theconcentrationof theEnglishindustry.Glasgow was pe-ripheralizedwithinthe Britishindustry,and Belfast subordinatedtoGlasgow until,finally,thesubordinatedIrishcottonclothindustrydisap-peared altogether.

distorttheresults.Thedistortionislimitedbythepriceboundsofthemajorproducts(between2s. 6d. forvelvets,etc., and ls. 3d. formixedfabrics)and by thefallingshareofmiscellaneousmanufacturesintotalBritishcottonexports.Ifthereis a bias,it is probablyto overestimatethe weightsofmiscellaneousmanufacturesin trade,becausevelvetsand fustiansmade up a greatershare oftrade relativeto mixedfabricsin 1833 thanin earlieryears.The bias is notverylarge,however,becausemixedfabricsalreadywere a small shareof cottonmanufactureand tradebythe1790s.

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TABLE 1BRITISH IMPORT PENETRATION OF IRISH COTTON MARKETS AND SHARES OFDIFFERENT COMMODITIES IN IMPORT PENETRATION, 1780-1835

MiscellaneousImport Total Yarn Calico Muslin Manufacturers'Year Penetration Imports Share Share Share Share1780 ....... .2988 176,894 .0383 .0018 .0630 .89701781 ....... .6914 221,898 .0132 .0021 .0365 .94821782 ....... . 3644 259,996 .0250 .0011 .0215 .95231783 ....... . 3539 231,345 .0144 .0013 .0110 .97321784 ....... .2217 147,492 .0319 .0022 .0146 .95121785 ....... . 2608 255,242 .0857 .0074 .0230 .88391786 ....... .2290 265,589 .1419 .0163 .0845 .75741787 ....... .2036 272,961 .1528 .0209 .0619 .76431788 ....... . 1776 291,964 .2871 .0112 .0468 .65501789 ....... .2052 306,721 .2519 .0171 .0702 .66081790 ....... . 2389 458,297 .4484 .0144 .0535 .48371791 ....... . 3537 558,275 .5344 .0223 .0248 .41851792 ....... . 2736 769,381 .4219 .0219 .0181 .53811793 ....... . 3109 338,658 .5130 .0178 .0178 .45151794 ....... . 2984 602,161 .5214 .0101 .0116 .45701795 ....... . 4210 954,225 .6155 .0040 .0065 .37391796 ....... . 4217 1,027,483 .6631 .0022 .0037 .33101797 ....... . 3549 364,756 .5228 .0027 .0066 .46791798 ....... .4347 929,197 .5467 .0014 .0110 .44081799 ....... . 5111 1,545,652 .6318 .0015 .0071 .35961800 ....... . 3746 942,621 .6761 .0019 .0060 .31591801 ....... .4029 720,661 .5212 .0033 .0061 .46951802 ....... .4739 1,650,039 .6702 .0012 .0045 .32401803 ....... . 4571 1,166,588 .6943 .0010 .0030 .30181804 ....... . 4632 1,561,536 .7357 .0007 .0024 .26121805 ....... .5248 1,840,864 .7930 .0008 .0041 .20211806 ....... . 4337 1,403,534 .7555 .0016 .0092 .23371807 ....... .2185 915,111 .6233 .0016 .0136 .36151808 ....... .4795 2,050,607 .7251 .0007 .0048 .26931809 ....... . 4335 1,613,373 .6910 .0053 .0143 .28931810 ....... .2375 664,101 .4733 .0052 .0172 .50431811 ....... .3773 1,353,505 .6578 .0038 .0111 .32731812 ....... .4586 2,186,115 .7343 .0040 .0101 .25151813 ....... . 4255 2,215,993 .7603 .0097 .0059 .22411814 ....... . 3566 1,311,257 .7252 .0045 .0099 .26041815 ....... .3263 984,587 .6357 .0116 .0127 .34011816 ....... . 3455 811,384 .6698 .0046 .0490 .27661817 ....... .3920 1,253,158 .6542 .0070 .0603 .27851818 ....... . 4007 1,952,599 .6636 .0226 .0487 .26521819 ....... .4775 2,381,738 .7297 .0411 .0323 .19711820 ....... .3802 1,600,824 .7471 .0292 .0367 .18691821 ....... .4624 2,885,583 .8055 .0432 .0193 .13211822 ....... .4256 2,296,327 .7835 .0424 .0255 .14861835 ....... .8256 3,544,151 .2787 . . .* . . .* . . *

* Importpenetrationof all typesofcloth(calicoshare,muslinshare,miscellaneousmanufacturers'share) = .8355. Data for 1835 werenotadequatetoallow calculationof each typeseparately.


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AmericanJournalof Sociologyporterssuppliedspinnersthroughdealers,whoboughttheirrawcottonandresolditto spinnersbyauctionorprivatesale. Mostcottonbefore1800wasboughtin smalllotsof one or two bags. But as spinnersgot biggertheyboughtin biggerlots and demandedprice discounts(Edwards 1967, p.113).As the influenceof the largerspinnersincreasedafter1800, brokersreplaceddealers.Dealers wereimportantforsmall spinnersbecause theyextendedcredit,but the largerspinnerscould affordto buy large lots ofcottonat a discountwith shortercredits.Such a system,however,re-quiredtheimprovedorganizationofproductionand marketingthatwaspossible onlyin largefirms.Large spinnerseconomizedand increasedtheirflexibilitybykeepingexpensivecottonstocksinthehandsofimport-ersand brokers(an earlyexampleofjust-in-timedelivery)and by sellingofftheirsuppliesto dependentsmallerspinners(Edwards 1967, p. 104).Increasingly,brokerssold cottonby sendingsamples to spinnersonapproval (Edwards 1967, p. 103). This systemconsiderablydecreasedthe turnovertimeof cottondistribution;a decisionwas usuallyexpectedbeforetheday was out. And it increasedthesupplyadvantagesof thebiggestspinnersclose to Liverpoolbecause a brokercould get samplesto hisfavoredcustomersearlyin thedayand keepthecottonfromcom-petitorsuntil a purchasingdecision was made (Ellison 1886, p. 177).Time economies-days or even hours-were already importantin the1790s.26A consistentlydiversesupplyof cottonwas crucialforthecompetitiveadvantageof thelargerLancashirespinners.Theirabilitytospina vari-etyofweightsofyarn gave themmarketflexibilitywhencoarseyarnswereinoversupply.Biggerscale,bettertechnology,and skilledmachineoperativesenabled them to switchproductionmoreeasilyto differentweightsofyarn.Theymaintainedaccessto cottonofvariouslengthsandqualitiesby employingseveralbrokers(Edwards 1967,p. 121). By 1800,therewas a hierarchyof supplyof raw cottonby thebuyer'ssize andproximitytoLiverpool-the mostconsistentandcheapestsupplyinLan-cashire,higherpricesinGlasgow,and thehighestpricesandmostunevenqualityin Ireland and beyond(Edwards 1967, pp. 107, 110).Canal andrail transportsystemsinLancashirefurtherincreaseddifferencesinsup-plyconditions.Fromthe1780s,Irelandbecamedependenton theBritishreexporttrade,whichwas dominatedbylowerqualitiesofcotton,whileEnglishspinnersretainedthe best cottonfortheirown use (Mann 1860,p. 88).26 Manchestermanufacturersconsistentlycomplainedaboutthepossibilityofforeignmails missingthe Saturdaycoach fromLondon,whichwould put themtwo daysbehindtheirLondoncompetitorsindealingwithforeigninquiries(Redford1934,p.189).612


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IrishCottonIndustryNot only did Britishsupplies of raw cottongrowmorerapidly,buttheywere morestable than suppliesto Ireland.This pointis borne out

if we comparethe varianceof suppliesto each country.Autocorrelationmodels,usingthelog ofcottonimportsas thedependentvariableand timeas theindependentvariable,yieldthefollowingresultsfor1782-1822:Britain: ln(COTTON IMPORTS) = 16.197+ .066TIME(12.121)

R2= .899. (5)Ireland: ln(COTTON IMPORTS) = 13.387+ .044TIME(6.575) R2= .740.

The TIME coefficientindicatesthatthe rate ofgrowthofBritishcottonimportswas higherthanthatofIreland,whilethet-statisticoftheTIMEcoefficientsshows that the supplyof cottonwool in Ireland was lessstable than in Britain.Irishsupplybecameparticularlyunstable after1800. This increasingdisadvantagein access tothekeyrawmaterialforthespinningsector,whichwas a cumulativeeffectofEnglishmercantilistpoliciesthatthrivedunderfreetrade,souredtheIrishenvironmentforinnovation,regardlessof considerableeffortsto enhance it by theIrishstate and its prospectiveindustrialclass.Like theraw material,the IrishcottonindustrybecamedependentonEngland for its linked inputs. This furtherisolatedweaving fromthemoreinnovativepartsof theindustry.The othermajor sectorsthatcom-prisedthe clusterof innovationsinearlycotton-engineeringand textilefinishing-werealso dominatedby English core capital. Not only wastheIrishindustrylessmechanizedthantheBritish,itreliedon Britainforwhatmachineryithad.27There was a particularlybigtrafficto Irelandin secondhandEnglish steam enginesand cottonmachinery.Everydaysupplies such as card brushes,rollersand spindles,full sets of mules,dressingmachines,andmillgearingwerealso suppliedfromManchester.Irishweavers,even in Ulster,workedin homes and smallweavingsheds even afterpower looms had displacedhand looms in England(Green 1944; Mokyr 1983, pp. 176-77).28 The persistenceof the handloomwas a rationalresponseto thelow priceofIrish labor, whichin-ducedentrepreneursto use a differentfactormixthanin England (Geary27 The ratioof steamto waterhorsepowerwas about7.5:1 inLancashireand2:1 inBelfast(Geary1989,p. 262).28 Therewere 2,000 powerloomsinManchesterby 1818 and 10,000by 1823,butIrishweavingwas donealmostentirelyby handas late as 1831(Monaghan1942,p.10).

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AmericanJournalof Sociology1989, p. 262). But while it was rationalto use cheap labor, givenIre-land's exclusionfromcoreinnovations,thesubstitutionof labor forma-chineswas a semiperipheraladaptive responsethatfurtherconstrainedtheregion'slong-termparticipationin capitalistindustrialization.Like the controlof trade,however,the controlofmachineryand con-centrationofengineeringin Lancashirewas explicitBritishpolicy.Cot-ton merchantsand manufacturers,includingthe otherwisevehementManchesterfreetraders,opposedmachineryexportsand theemigrationof skilled machiniststo forestallforeigncompetition.The Britishstatecompliedwithcomprehensiveand rigorouslyenforcedlegislation(Mus-sonand Robinson1969; Redford1934, pp. 131, 133). WhileIrelandhadfreeraccess to Britishmachineryafterthe unionof1801,ithad becomedependentonBritishengineeringand even the mostadvancedIrishpro-ducersremaineda steportwo behindtheEnglishindustrialcore.29Most new Irishcapital in theearlycottonindustrywas concentratedinfinishing.Worstedyarnmerchantsand merchantsexperiencedin im-portingand marketingEnglish goodsmade largeinvestmentsin Corkand Dublin (Dickson1976, pp. 105-6). These merchantsmade theshortbackward link intofinishingcottoncloththattheycould sell in theirexistingmarkets.Buttheydependedonnonintegratedsupplybyunstableregionalweavingindustries.WhenBritishputting-outreplaceditsdump-ing ofyarn, and especiallywhenweavingwas transferredoutrighttoEngland, thefinisherswere vulnerable.The collapseof Irishspinningand especiallyweavingprecipitatedtheendoffinishing,regardlessofitsefficiencyofoperation.It is possibleto concludethat Ireland's limitedsuccessin the cottonindustrywas enabledby its proximityto a supplyof cottonwool andtechnologythatwouldnothave been available hadIrelandnothadaccessto Englishimports.On the otherhand,Ireland becamedependenton amarketfor cottonwool that was organizedto supplyfirstthe largest29 It is worthdistinguishingthepresentanalysisfromproductlife-cyclemodels(e.g.,Vernon1966). These modelsimplya ratherunilineardevelopmentpatternas semi-peripheralcountriesadoptthetechnologiesthatarediscardedbythecore.The processI am describingin Irelandis not one in whichthe semiperipheralindustrylaggedbehindthecorebutcontinuedtomoveforwarda coupleofstepsbehindintheproductcycle,thusachievingsomeformof "dependentdevelopment"or evenlimited"mod-ernization."Rather,BritishimperialpowerperipheralizedIrishcottonas it enabledthelocalizationofinnovationsin theEnglishcore,ultimatelyleadingtothedestructionof an Irishindustrywhichwas previouslygrowingapace withtheEnglishindustry.Irishproducersweremovedout of themostprofitablepartsof cottonproductionfora time,untiltheyweremovedout of thesectoraltogetherand intosemiperipheraland peripheraleconomicactivities.Thisdescribesa processthatismoreakin to thedevelopmentofunderdevelopmentorperipheralizationthantodependentdevelopmentor modernization.614


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IrishCottonIndustryEnglishspinners,and onlyafterthatthe smallerand moredistantspin-ners. It became a consumerof secondhandEnglishmachineryratherthan a producerand user of thelatesttechnologies.Withoutguaranteedaccess tohigh-qualitycotton,rationalinvestorscould hardlybe expectedto innovateby supplyingthecapital and technologythatwould allowIrishspinningtocompetewithits mainBritishrivals. Erraticsupplyleftspinningcapacityunderutilizedandcontributedtothefailureof spinningmills,causing theregionalsectoras a whole to be moreinefficientthanbetter-suppliedregions.Ratherthan a commonsourceofsupplycreatingequal conditionsforEngland and Ireland,the factthat Irishspinnershad to importtheirmachineryand rawmaterialsfromBritainshows thattheywere depen-dent and helps explaintheircompetitivedisadvantagesrelativeto theEnglishcore. If we substitute"dependedon" for"had access to" in thefollowingquote,which is meantto describea fullyintegratedregionoftheBritishcore,we see Belfastas a fullyincorporatedsemiperipheralzoneintheBritish-centeredworld-system:"Belfastproducershad accessto the channelsofraw materialsupplyand to themarketingtechniquesand marketsbeingdeveloped byBritishproducers.Theyhad access tothenew technologyand the skilledlabour forceto erect and maintainthemachinesembodyingit. Finally theywere well integratedinto thedevelopingBritishcommercialand financialsystem.Events in Belfastwere,then,influencedby eventsin Lancashire"(Geary1989, p. 267).Ireland'sunstabledependenceon Englishchannelsof supply,however,was notsimplya matterofgeographicalproximity.It was theresultofthecountry'slogicalsubordinationto Englandthroughitsincorporationin theworld-system.This disabledIreland,likeothercoloniesand evennoncolonieswho weresubjectto Britishnaval power,fromestablishingthe commercialconnectionsand naval capabilitiesthatwould enableaccess to rawmaterialsfromaroundthe world.Taken togetherwiththedisruptiveeffectsofBritishyarnpenetrationon the Irishmarket,whichincreasedas regionaland globaltrade rela-tionswere liberalized,unstablecottonsupplyindicatesIreland'ssemi-peripheralordependentrelationshipwithEngland.Ireland'ssemiperiph-eral incorporation,then,is a powerfulexplanationof whyrationalIrishcottonentrepreneurs-particularlyinspinning-did not introduceinno-vationsat nearlythesame rate as Britishindustrialists.CONCLUSIONS: AGAIN ON CORE, SEMIPERIPHERY,AND INNOVATIONThe Britishcottonindustryis the classic case of a leading sectorinwhichgeneralizedeconomicgrowthis inducedthroughinnovationsin a

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AmericanJournalof Sociologyclusterof linkedactivities.Linkedinnovationsinengineering,transport,and distributionincreasedthe level ofthroughputin mill-basedcottonspinning,enabling economiesof scale and speed. This version of theinnovationstoryis a familiarexplanationof why industryconcentratedin certaincoreregionsand not in others.It is the storyof how a corenationachieves competitiveadvantageby introducinga nationalsystemofinnovationthatis betterthan thoseofothercore nations.The actorsare classes, entrepreneurs,developmentalstates,cultures,money,andmarketsof thecore.But anotherstoryis absent fromthisliterature-the subjugationofsemiperipheraland peripheralregionsto supportinnovationin thecore.In Ireland,thismeantperipheralizingan industrialcompetitorso thatitprofitablycomplementedthe innovativecore sector,and its expansionrequiredtheextensionof existingtechnologiesand formsoforganization.Even Belfast'smillsused technologiesandorganizationsthathadbecomeroutinein England and Scotland. Irish semiperipheralweaving sup-portedtheintensificationofEnglishspinningby assuringthedemandforyarn.The localizedfocus of conceptssuch as "nationalsystemsofinnova-tion"or "nationalcompetitiveadvantage"impliesthat statesor firmsthat attain competitiveadvantage "do somethingright"while others"fail" to innovate.This is highlymisleading.There was no suchthingas a "national"systemof innovationincotton-manyof the institutionsthatwerenecessaryforthecaptureof innovationand itsloss elsewherewereglobal.The infrastructuralsupportforinnovationwas global.The concentra-tionof advantageous suppliesof raw cottonaroundLiverpool,whichenabledlargespinnersto attaincompetitiveadvantage,requiredthecu-mulativeeffectsofthenavigationlaws and otherrestrictive(oftenmili-tarilyviolent)effortsthatincreasedBritishnaval and commercialpowerwhiletheyweakenedthoseofcompetitors.Increasedand stableflowsofmaterialsof diversequalitywerenecessaryforthe largermillsto runefficientlyand to respondflexiblyto changingmarkets,and theseflowsrequiredinnovativeglobal transportand communicationsnetworksthatwere controlledbytheEnglishcore and policed by Englishsea power.Competingindustrialcentersthatmightdivertcottonsuppliesweresup-pressed.

The demandconditionsnecessaryforinnovationwereglobal.The cap-ture of the local Englishmarketand themarketsof empirerequiredrestrictionson productioninregionssuch as Irelandand India untilEn-glishproducersattainedcompetitiveadvantages.Then,the enforcementof freetradethroughouttheworld-systemgave theEnglishindustryits616


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Irish CottonIndustryfreedomto sell and evendump goodsin othermarkets.This followedaglobal cycle of protectionand liberalization,as the economicascendant(England) moved fromcontrollingitszones of influenceto global hege-mony.The cyclewas reproducedat thelocal level,firstby directcontrolsoverIrish productiveand commercialactivitiesand laterby liberalizingtrade so that English goods (now competitivelyadvantageous) couldfreelyenter.Liberalizationinall oftheEnglishcolonieswas enforcedbydirectpoliticalmechanisms,althoughthe specificmechanismin Irelandwas itsintegrationintoa Britishfreetradezone.30In LatinAmericaandelsewhere,Britainenforceditsmarketentrybymoreindirectmeans.In conclusion,world-systemanalysis freesthe theoryof innovationfromthe restrictiveassumptionthatinnovationis nationaland, instead,relatescore strategiesto build zones of interestand global hegemonytotheirsuccessat localizinginnovationsandsuppressingthemincompetingregions(includingsemiperipheries)."National" systemsof innovationhave differentresultsin thesemiperiphery,wherethe"innovative"de-velopmentof humanandknowledgeresourcesmaysimplyresultinemi-grationand braindrain;and thedevelopmentof infrastructuremaysim-ply enable core firmsand regionsto extractnew materialsand theproductsof semiperipherallabormoreefficiently,while marketingtheirownproductsmorecheaply.On theotherhand, thetheoryofinnovationadds clarityto world-systemanalysisinsofaras itdistinguishescorefromsemiperipheralindustry.The strategiesemployedto captureinnovationand maintaincompetitiveadvantage additionallyhelp explain how thehierarchyis reproduced.But can lessonsfromthepresentcase be generalizedor is it simplyinterestingbut special? The case distinguishesclearlybetweencore andsemiperipherybecause bothregionsdirectlycompetedfora time in anascendingleadingsector.In thisrespectit is special, but its peculiaritiesinformus about the strategiesof core economieswhen semiperipheralcompetitionbecomes a threat.Japanesestrategiesto channelthe SouthKoreanelectronicsindustryintosubordinateand complementaryactivi-ties(buyinginnovativeJapanesetechnologiesand microchipsforassem-bly into electronicproducts)may parallel Ireland's subordinationinweaving and linen. Theremay also be parallelsto the methodsused by

30The parallelstoEuropeaneconomicintegrationaftertheSecondWorldWarand,morerecentlyinthelate 1980sand 1990s,havegonelargelyunnoticed.Perhapsthisis becausemostanalysesofEuropeanintegrationfocusalmostentirelyontheEuro-peancore (theequivalentofEnglandandperhapsScotlandin thepresentanalysis)and ignoretheeffectsofintegrationon theEuropeanperiphery(the equivalentofIrelandinthe18thand 19thcenturies).

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AmericanJournalof SociologyNew England capitalto localize theNorthAmericanspinningsectorinthe 19thcentury,even thoughcompetingmills in South Carolina hadlower wages, plentifulwaterpower, and closer proximityto the rawmaterial(see Wright1979).Anotherpeculiarityof the presentcase is Ireland's spatial proximityto England,whichallowedthelatterto use directintegrationto subjugatetheIrisheconomy.The use ofan act ofpoliticalunion to allow directrule over a territorymay sound more like world-empirethan world-system,3'but I believethisis mistaken.True, Ireland was integratedpoliticallyby the Britishstate in 1801 as a means of assertingmoreeffectivecontrolover theterritory.But Britainemployeddirectcontrolsthroughoutitsempirebefore1800 and liberalizationand freetradeafter1800 to realizeits competitiveadvantages.Ireland was no differentinthisrespect.Unionwas simplya meansofsubduingtheIrishparliamentand socialmovements,whichhad attaineda degreeofautonomyineco-nomic policy-makingthat was notpresentin otherpartsof the empire.Throughoutthe historyof its industrialsubjugation,Irelandwas periph-eralized bythesame means as otherpartsof theworld-system-directrestrictionson commerceand industryand, once English competitiveadvantagewas clearlyestablishedin theinnovativesectors,the indirectmechanismsof freetrade.Moreover,world-systemanalystsexplicitlychooseregions,ratherthannation-states,as theirprimaryunitofanalysis.Undercertainconditionsinternalcolonialismmaybe nearlyequivalenttoglobal imperialismas ameans of localizinginnovation.Again,the cases ofNew England andSouthCarolina,as well as those of otherperipheralregionsofBritain,have closeparallelsto the Britishsubjugationof Irish cotton.A moreimportantresultof Irishproximitymaybe thatthe ascendantsettlerclass, manyof whom retainedtheirties to and even domicilesinEngland,had unique opportunitiesas Irishentrepreneursto competeinsuccessiveperiodsofcoreEnglishexpansion(cattle,wool, and cotton).In mostperipheralor semiperipheralcases, competitiveinnovationsoc-curlessfrequently-coreregionsmustprimarilydefendagainstcompet-ing core regionsratherthan semiperipheralones. Yet the Irish caseclearlyrevealsthenecessityoflocalizinginnovationsand, becauseofthetenacityof Irishcompetition,it reveals a world-systemprocessthat isusuallymuch simplerand shorterand, therefore,less observable.Allperipheralregionsarecontinuallyperipheralizedand reincorporatedintothecapitalistworld-systemas theprecisenatureof theirrelationswith31Worldempireis "a typeofworld-systeminwhichtheterritorialeconomicnetworkis largelycontainedwithina singlestateapparatus"(Chase-Dunn1990, pp. 348-49).618


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Irish CottonIndustrycoreregionsand theworld-systemchangesacrosstime.Irish"reperipher-alizations"were starkerbecause theyinvolved thedestructionof Irishcompetitorsin leadingindustrialsectorsand theirtransformationintocomplementarysemiperipheralactivitiessuchas linen.There maybe no singlespecificcorestrategyforachievingcompetitiveadvantage and, in the process,excludingotherregionsor statesfromparticipating.Indeed, I would expect that competitiveadvantage isachieved"by anymeansnecessary."Yet economicascendantsand even-tual hegemonscharacteristicallyachieve and maintaintheirpositionsthroughthecaptureofmarkets,rawmaterials,and laborresources.Inno-vationscreatecompetitiveadvantagesforregionalcore economiesonthe basis ofeconomiesoflabor,fixedcapital,materials,marketing,andadministration.In contrast,peripheralor semiperipheralactivitiesex-pand mainly by extendingthe use of labor and materials. The core-peripherydivisionof labor in theearlyBritishand Irishcottonindustriesfollowsthispattern.Englandwas not endowedwith,but captured,itscompetitiveadvantagesinaccessto materialsandmarkets,skilledtechni-cians, and experiencedtradesmenand merchants.Ireland'sadvantageslay in cheap labor and plentifulwaterpower (bothof which may haveworked againstthe introductionof labor- and energy-savinginnova-tions).Withtheestablishmentof a semi-independentparliament,Irelandhad a developmentalstatethatwas willingtoprotectitsinfantindustriesand provideinducementstonewinvestments,essentiallyby introducinga "nationalsystemof innovation."Many Irishparliamentariansweremen of propertywho hoped to become rich throughcotton. Yet En-gland's developmentalstate could notonly protectits infantindustriesand theirmanylinkedsuppliersand buyers,it could also providea rela-tivelystableglobalenvironmentwheretheseindustriescould obtaintheirraw materialsand sell theirproduct.The Irish developmentaliststatecouldprovidemonetaryincentivesand localprotection,whiletheBritishstateprovidedthe wholeworld-system.REFERENCESAmin,Samir. 1975. UnequalDevelopment.New York:MonthlyReviewPress.Arrighi,Giovanni,and JessicaDrangel.1986."StratificationoftheWorld-Ecomony:AnExplanationof theSemiperipheralZone." Review 10 (1): 9-74.Baines,Edward. 1835.HistoryoftheCottonManufacturein GreatBritain.London:

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