ofpictorialcontent Towardsanon-propositionalistanalysistezimmer/Zimmermann/postercrete.pdf ·...
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Towards a non-propositionalist analysis of pictorial content Thomas Ede Zimmermann [email protected] 1. Outline Basic Question Q What, if anything, is pictorial content? [NOTE: As in language, one ought to dis- tinguish content from meaning: roughly, content = meaning + context] Two answers Propositionalist: the content of a picture is the set of depicted (possible) scenes (or indices, worlds, situations, . . . ) [cf. Cresswell (1983), also for refinements, covering contradictory pictures à la Escher] Dynamic: the (static) content of a picture is a structured proposition (relation-in-intension) holding between the depicted (possible) objects (its inventory) [cf. Abusch (2012) on discourse anaphora-like effects in pic- ture sequences] Goal cf. Zimmerman (2016) Use evidence from the semantic analysis of sen- tences like (1) to answer Q like: (1) Penny painted a penguin. On their unspecific readings, such picture pro- duction reports (PPRs) provide partial descrip- tions of pictorial contents – and thus indirect evidence of the nature of the latter. As it turns out, the evidence points in the direction of D. 2. Propositionalist Analyses and Their Problems ANALYSIS 0 (1.0) paint 1 pP enny 1 , ^ pDxqrpenguin 1 pxq^ P pxqsq PROBLEM 1 Since (1.0) is false whatever P is, it should not be determined by context – so: What is P? Penny Winn [?]: Baby Penguin ANALYSIS 1 (1.1) pDP q paint 1 pP enny 1 , ^ pDxqrpenguin 1 pxq^ P pxqsq ” paint 1 pP enny 1 , ^ pDxq penguin 1 pxqq « P enny painted a penguin to be Hamlet ellipsis [Parsons (1997)] PROBLEM 2 Depicted objects need not be depicted as existing. Forbes (2006: 63) (2) Ferdinand painted an angel. ANALYSIS 2 . . . in the spirit of Parsons (1980) (2.2) paint 1 pF erdinand 1 , ^ pDxq angel 1 pxqq vs. paint 1 pF erdinand 1 , ^ pDxqrangel 1 pxq^ exist 1 pxqsq Ferdinand Bol [1616–80]: Jacob’s Dream PROBLEM 3 What exists according to a picture need not be in it. (3) Penny painted a live penguin. (4) Penny painted a penguin heart. ANALYSIS 3 essentially Larson (2002: 233f.) (3.3) paint 1 pPenny 1 , ^ pDxqr penguin 1 pxq^ in-field-of-vision 1 px, Penny 1 qsq (4.3) paint 1 pPenny 1 , ^ pDxqr penguin-heart 1 pxq^ in-field-of-vision 1 px, Penny 1 qsq PROBLEM 4 The actual creator is not the implicit spectator. Forbes (2006: 62) (5) Vincent painted himself. (5.3) paint 1 pVincent 1 , ^ in-field-of-vision 1 pVincent 1 , Vincent 1 qq ANALYSIS 4 (5.4) paint 1 pVincent 1 , b s. in-field-of-vision 1 ps, Vincent 1 qq PROBLEM 5 Objects in the picture must be visible. (6) Chardin painted [a glass of] water. (6.4) paint 1 pChardin 1 , b s. pDxqrwater 1 pxq^ in-field-of-vision 1 ps, xqsq ” paint 1 pChardin 1 , b s. pDxqrH 2 O -molecules 1 pxq^ in-field-of-vision 1 ps, xqsq (7) Chardin painted [a glass of] H 2 O molecules. Jean-Baptiste Siméon Chardin (1699–1779): Water Glass and Jug ANALYSIS 5 (6.5) paint 1 pChardin 1 , b s. pDxqrwater 1 pxq^ in-field-of-vision 1 ps, xq^ visible 1 px, sqsq (7.5) paint 1 pChardin 1 , b s. pDxqrH 2 O -molecules 1 pxq^ in-field-of-vision 1 ps, xq^ visible 1 px, sqsq PROBLEM 6 Pictorial content does not imply the presence of a spectator. 3. Dynamic Content ANALYSIS D . . . turning Ds into λs (D) paint 1 “ λw.λP.λx.pDy q in w, y is a paint- ing & x creates y & Contentpy q P where, e.g.: Contentpy q“ λw.λx 1 ...λx n rx 1 is a live penguin & x 2 is x 1 ’s front & x 3 is x 1 ’s left eye . . . ] (3.D) paint 1 pP enny 1 , b x.rpenguin 1 pxq^ alive 1 pxqsq (4.D) paint 1 pP enny 1 , b x. penguin-heart 1 pxqq rto be continueds References Abusch, Dorit: ‘Applying Discourse Semantics and Pragmat- ics to Co-reference in Picture Sequences’. In: E. Chemla et al. (eds.), Sinn und Bedeutung 17 Proceedings. ENS Paris 2012. 9– 25. http://semanticsarchive.net/sub2012/Abusch.pdf. – Cress- well, Maxwell J.: ‘A highly impossible scene. The semantics of vi- sual contradictions’. In: R. Bäuerle et al. (eds.), Meaning, Use, and Interpretation of Language. Berlin/New York 1983. 62–78. – Forbes, Graeme: Attitude Problems. An Essay on Linguistic Intensionality. Ox- ford 2006. – Larson, Richard: ‘The Grammar of Intensionality’. In: G. Preyer & G. Peter (eds.), Logical Form and Natural Language. Ox- ford 2002. 228–262. – Parsons, Terence: Non-existing Objects. New Haven 1980. – Parsons, Terence: ‘Meaning Sensitivity and Gram- matical Structure’. In: M. L. D. Chiara et al. (eds.), Structures and Norms in Science. Dordrecht 1997. 369–383. – Zimmermann, Thomas Ede: ‘Painting and Opacity’. In: W. Freitag et al. (eds.), Von Rang und Namen. Münster 2016. 425–451.
Transcript of ofpictorialcontent Towardsanon-propositionalistanalysistezimmer/Zimmermann/postercrete.pdf ·...
Towards a non-propositionalist analysisof pictorial content
Thomas Ede [email protected]
1. OutlineBasic Question
Q What, if anything, is pictorial content?
[NOTE: As in language, one ought to dis-tinguish content from meaning: roughly,content = meaning + context]
Two answers
Propositionalist: the content of a picture is theset of depicted (possible) scenes (or indices,worlds, situations, . . . )[cf. Cresswell (1983), also for refinements, coveringcontradictory pictures à la Escher]
Dynamic: the (static) content of a picture isa structured proposition (relation-in-intension)holding between the depicted (possible) objects(its inventory)[cf. Abusch (2012) on discourse anaphora-like effects in pic-ture sequences]
Goal cf. Zimmerman (2016)
Use evidence from the semantic analysis of sen-tences like (1) to answer Q like:
(1) Penny painted a penguin.
On their unspecific readings, such picture pro-duction reports (PPRs) provide partial descrip-tions of pictorial contents – and thus indirectevidence of the nature of the latter. As it turnsout, the evidence points in the direction of D.
2. Propositionalist Analyses and Their ProblemsANALYSIS 0
(1.0) paint1pPenny1,^ pDxqrpenguin1pxq ^ P pxqsq
PROBLEM 1Since (1.0) is false whatever P is, it should not be determined by context –so:What is P?
Penny Winn [?]: Baby Penguin
ANALYSIS 1
(1.1) pDP q paint1pPenny1,^ pDxqrpenguin1pxq ^ P pxqsq
” paint1pPenny1,^ pDxq penguin1pxqq
« Penny painted a penguin to be Hamlet ellipsis [Parsons (1997)]
PROBLEM 2Depicted objects need not be depicted as existing. Forbes (2006: 63)
(2) Ferdinand painted an angel.
ANALYSIS 2 . . . in the spirit of Parsons (1980)
(2.2) paint1pFerdinand1,^ pDxq angel1pxqq
vs. paint1pFerdinand1,^ pDxqrangel1pxq ^ exist1pxqsq
Ferdinand Bol [1616–80]: Jacob’s Dream
PROBLEM 3What exists according to a picture need not be in it.
(3) Penny painted a live penguin.
(4) Penny painted a penguin heart.
ANALYSIS 3 essentially Larson (2002: 233f.)
(3.3) paint1pPenny1,^ pDxqr penguin1
pxq ^ in-field-of-vision1px,Penny1
qsq
(4.3) paint1pPenny1,^ pDxqr penguin-heart1
pxq ^ in-field-of-vision1px,Penny1
qsq
PROBLEM 4The actual creator is not the implicit spectator. Forbes (2006: 62)
(5) Vincent painted himself.
(5.3) paint1pVincent1,^ in-field-of-vision1
pVincent1,Vincent1qq
ANALYSIS 4
(5.4) paint1pVincent1, s. in-field-of-vision1
ps,Vincent1qq
PROBLEM 5Objects in the picture must be visible.
(6) Chardin painted [a glass of] water.
(6.4) paint1pChardin1, s. pDxqrwater1pxq ^ in-field-of-vision1
ps, xqsq
” paint1pChardin1, s. pDxqrH2O-molecules1
pxq ^ in-field-of-vision1ps, xqsq
(7) Chardin painted [a glass of] H2O molecules.Jean-Baptiste Siméon Chardin
(1699–1779): Water Glass and Jug
ANALYSIS 5
(6.5) paint1pChardin1, s. pDxqrwater1pxq ^ in-field-of-vision1
ps, xq ^ visible1px, sqsq
(7.5) paint1pChardin1, s. pDxqrH2O-molecules1
pxq ^ in-field-of-vision1ps, xq ^ visible1
px, sqsq
PROBLEM 6Pictorial content does not imply the presence of a spectator.
3. Dynamic ContentANALYSIS D . . . turning Ds into λs
(D) paint1“ λw.λP.λx.pDyq in w, y is a paint-
ing & x creates y & Contentpyq � P
where, e.g.: Contentpyq “λw.λx1 . . . λxn rx1 is a live penguin & x2 is x1’sfront & x3 is x1’s left eye . . . ]
(3.D) paint1pPenny1, x.rpenguin1pxq ^ alive1
pxqsq
(4.D) paint1pPenny1, x. penguin-heart1pxqq
rto be continueds
ReferencesAbusch, Dorit: ‘Applying Discourse Semantics and Pragmat-
ics to Co-reference in Picture Sequences’. In: E. Chemla et al.
(eds.), Sinn und Bedeutung 17 Proceedings. ENS Paris 2012. 9–
25. http://semanticsarchive.net/sub2012/Abusch.pdf. – Cress-
well, Maxwell J.: ‘A highly impossible scene. The semantics of vi-
sual contradictions’. In: R. Bäuerle et al. (eds.), Meaning, Use, and
Interpretation of Language. Berlin/New York 1983. 62–78. – Forbes,
Graeme: Attitude Problems. An Essay on Linguistic Intensionality. Ox-
ford 2006. – Larson, Richard: ‘The Grammar of Intensionality’. In:
G. Preyer & G. Peter (eds.), Logical Form and Natural Language. Ox-
ford 2002. 228–262. – Parsons, Terence: Non-existing Objects. New
Haven 1980. – Parsons, Terence: ‘Meaning Sensitivity and Gram-
matical Structure’. In: M. L. D. Chiara et al. (eds.), Structures and
Norms in Science. Dordrecht 1997. 369–383. – Zimmermann, Thomas
Ede: ‘Painting and Opacity’. In: W. Freitag et al. (eds.), Von Rang und
Namen. Münster 2016. 425–451.
