offsite F auxiliary · offsite F auxiliary ... regulatop
Transcript of offsite F auxiliary · offsite F auxiliary ... regulatop
REGULATOP INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM (RIDS)I~
'ACCESSION NBR:8511050161 DOC ~ DATE: 85/11/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET'~ FACIL;STN-50-528 Pal o Verde Nuclear .Stationi Unit 1i Ar) zona Publ i 05000528
STN 50 529 Palo Verde- Nuclear Station~ Unit 2~ Arizona Publi 05000529STN 50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station~ Unit 3i Arizona Publi 05000530
AUTH,NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATIONVAN BRUNT'~E".E Ar izona Nuclear Power Project (formerly Arizona Public Serv
RECIP ~ NAME." RECIPIENT AFFILIATIONKNIGHTONiG~ N ~ Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulationr Dir ector
SUBJECT; Forwards results of steam generator tube rupture w/loss ofoffsite power F 851015'chedule for implementation of modsiper 851029 telcon re auxiliary pressurizer spray
sys;'ISTRIBUTION
CODE: A001D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR "ENCL - SIZE',TITLE: OR Submittal: General DistributionNOTES:Standardized plant.
OL o 12/31/80Standardized plant,Standardized plant.
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Arizona Nuclear Power ProjectP.o. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX. ARIZONA85072-2034
ANPP-33905-EEVB/KLM
November 4, 1985
Director of Nuclear Reactor RegulationAttention: Mr. George W. Knighton, Project Director
PWR Project Directorate 87Division of Pressurized Water Reactor Licensing — B
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, D.C. 20555
Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)Units 1, 2 and 3Docket Nos. STN-50-528 (License No. NPF-41)/529/530Information Concerning the PVNGS AuxiliaryPressurizer Spray SystemFile: 85-056-026; G.1.01.10
References: (1) Letter to G. W. Knighton, NRC, from E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.,ANPP, dated October 15, 1985 (ANPP-33713);Subject: Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray Design
(2) Letter to G. W. Knighton, NRC, from E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.,ANPP, dated October 22, 1985 (ANPP-33771);Subject: Additional Information Concerning the September 12;1985 Event at Palo Verde Unit 1
Dear Mr. Knighton:
As a result of a telephone conversation on October 29, 1985, with members ofthe NRC staff, ANPP is providing information in addition to that previouslyprovided in References 1 and 2. The requested information, provided inAttachments to this letter, is as follows:
Attachment 1: Results of Steam Generator Tube Rupture with a Lossof Offsite Power and a fully stuck open ADV using thePressurizer Gas Vent System (Auxiliary PressurizerSpray System inoperable).
Attachment 2: Schedule for Implementation of Modificationsdescribed in ANPP-33713, dated October 15, 1985(Reference 1).
I- 85iiosoihi 85 e)5281,PDR ADOCK 0
PDRP o~
1
I.
I
/
Mr. George W. KnightonInformation Concerning the PVNGS AuxiliaryPressurizer Spray SystemANPP-33905-EEVB-KLHPage Two
Attachment 3: Additional Considerations to ANPP-33713, datedOctober 15, 1985 (Reference 1).
If you should have any questions concerning this matter, contact Mr. W.F. Quinn,of my staff.
Very truly yours,
~+v~8E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.Executive Vice PresidentProject Director
EEVB/KLM/dimAttachments
cc: E. A. LicitraR. P. ZimmermanM. C. LeyA. C. Gehr
I" ll
ATTACHMENT 1
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE WITH A LOSS
OF OFFSITE POWER AND A FULLY STUCK OPEN
ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVE (ADV)
The Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) analysis currently contained in thePVNGS FSAR Appendix 15A, was performed in response to a NRC staff concern thatoperator actions may affect the assumption of a worst single failure. As a
result, the Appendix 15A analysis was submitted, (Appendix to Reference 1 and
subsequent information in References 2 and 3) considering the operator actionsthat are outlined in the plant procedures.
These procedures provide guidance to the operator in the event of a SGTR witha loss of offsite power to lower RCS pressure through the use of the AuxiliaryPressurizer Spray System (APSS). Thus, the current Appendix 15A analysisassumes an operator action at 1015 seconds to initiate the APSS.
In response to a staff concern that this action was required to achieve
acceptable consequences, the event was reanalyzed without operator action toinitiate the APSS until two hours after the event initiation. The results
of'his
analysis were transmitted in Reference 4.
A two-hour time delay was chosen for two reasons. First, this delay willmaximize the two-hour Exclusion Area Boundary dose for this event. Second,
the two-hour delay provides adequate time to manually establish auxiliarypressurizer spray, even in the event failures in the system occur, per BTP RSB
5-1.
In response to a staff concern that the APSS may remain inoperable longer than
two hours, the event was reanalyzed with the APSS assumed inoperable
throughout the entire event and with the pressurizer gas vent system (withflow restricted by a 7/32" orifice) assumed activiated by the operator at 2
hours.
'
l:,""'.ll 3'1 iGii (>3..'-. z 'Bloc.~ .' l
~ ~ il t e ~ } ~g ) If)
JL ~~~1 f>l C'*, ( Jd=-" a f%~ 1 l yV ~ l~ 4 a ) 5= <'V4 > <II J lrl ail
I 'I f ~ ~ ~ lil 4 '' I + I tl" Y ~ i'
IDENTIFICATION OF EVENT AND CAUSES
This transient analysis is similar to that described in the PVNGS FSAR
Appendix 15A except that auxiliary pressurizer spray is never initiated and
the pressurizer gas vent is opened at two hours. It assumes that the plant ischallenged by a steam generator tube rupture including the conservative
assumptions of the Standard Review Plan Section 15.6.3 (loss of offsite power,
accident meterology, iodine spiking, etc.). In addition, the analysis
postulates that 1) the operators open an ADV on the affected steam generator
and 2) it runs to the full open position and 3) it sticks open for the
duration of the transient.
SE UENCES OF EVENTS AND SYSTEMS OPERATION
Refer to the PVNGS FSAR Appendix 15A for a description of the event
assumptions. In addition, Table 1 of this Attachment 1 provides the sequence
of events and setpoint values used for the revised steam generator tube
rupture analysis. The sequence of events and setpoint values are identical to
those described in the PVNGS FSAR Appendix 15A, through 1015 seconds, at which
time it was assumed the operator initiated auxiliary pressurizer spray. This
reanalysis conservatively assumes no initiation of auxiliary pressurizer spray
and opening of the pressurizer gas vent two hours into the event. By delaying
opening of the pressurizer gas vent to this time, the primary to secondary
tube leak is maximized and therefore, the 0-2 hour exclusion area boundary
(EAB) radiological consequences are maximized. Most of the radioactive
releases contributing to the dose at the low population zone (LPZ) occur inthe first two hours. At 8 hours, plant conditions are such that the operator
initiates shutdown cooling system operation and the radioactive releases from
the plant are terminated. The opening of the pressurizer gas vent at 2 hours
permits gradual venting of the pressurizer steam bubble causing slow recovery
of the pressurizer level.'hen the level is sufficiently high, the operator
is permitted to throttle the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps which
results in a RCS depressurization.
0
t
b
s ', c,1
C
Due to the delay in operator intervention from 1015 seconds to 7200 seconds,
resulting in an increased primary to secondary leak rate, the steam generator
tubes are covered at 1347 seconds which is slightly earlier than the PVNGS
FSAR Appendix 15A analysis. Approximately 25 minutes after the pressurizer
gas vent is opened, pressurizer level is regained. The operator then controls
the HPSI flow to allow RCS depressurization and reduce the primary to
secondary leak flow rate. At 22,106 seconds, the operator closes the
pressurizer gas vent and uses the backup pressurizer heaters to maintain the
20'F subcooling criteria. 't 28,800 seconds, the operator activates the
shutdown cooling system. The dynamic behavior'f important NSSS parameters
following this revised steam generator tube rupture analysis are provided inFigure 1-14 of this Attachment l.
ANALYSIS OF EVENTS AND CONSE UENCES
The mathematical model used for this analysis is described in CESSAR Section
15D.3.1.A.
RADIOLOGICAL CONSE UENCES
The physical model is the same as that discussed in CESSAR Section 15D.3.2
except that the ADV of the affected steam generator opens fully. In order to
reduce the radiological releases, the operator takes appropriate actions to
cover the U-tubes of the affected steam generator. Actions assumed in thisanalysis included overriding the automatic isolation of Auxiliary Feed Water
(AFW) flow to the affected steam generator and diverting the flow of both AFW
pumps to the affected steam generator.
The mathematical dose model is as described in CESSAR Section 15D.3.2.C.
The assumptions and conditions employed for the evaluation of radiologicalreleases are the same as those discussed in CESSAR Section 15D.3.2.B with the
exceptions of assumptions 7, 9, and 10. The assumptions used in this analysis
are:
0
tl iK 1 ci h
t,
7. During the period when the water level in the affected steam generator isabove the top of the U-tubes, the portion of the leaking primary fluidwhich flashes to steam upon entering the steam generator is assumed to be
released to the atmosphere with a decontamination factor (DF) of 1.0.The portion'f the leaked fluid that does not flash, mixes with the
liquid in the steam generator and is released to the atmosphere with a DF
of 100. During that period when the water level is below the top of the
U-tubes, it is assumed that all the activity associated with the leakingprimary fluid escapes to the atmosphere with a DF of 1.0, which is more
conservative than the CESSAR assumptions. No credit is taken for the
presence of steam separators and dryers which would retain a part of the
escaping primary liquid in the steam generator.
9. The 0-2 hour and 2-8 hour primary-to-secondary leakage through the
rupture are 447,600 ibm and 814,100 ibm, respectively.
10. The PVNGS site specific atmospheric dispersion factors employed in the-4 3
analyses are: 3.1 x 10 sec/m for the exclusion area boundary and-5 35.1 x 10 sec/m for the low population zone.
The two-hour exclusion area boundary (EAB) and the eight-hour low population
zone (LPZ) boundary inhalation doses for both the Generated Iodine Spike (GIS)
and the Preaccident Iodine Spike (PIS) are presented in Table 2 of thisAttachment 1. The calculated EAB and LPZ doses are well within the acceptance
criteria of 10CFR Part 100. The dose results from the PVNGS FSAR Appendix 15A
are also provided in Table 2 for reference.
CONCLUSIONS
Assuming the APSS is not actuated throughout the entire event, and that the
pressurizer gas vent is opened at two hours after the event, the radiologicalreleases calculated for the SGTR event with a loss of offsite power and a
fully stuck open ADV are well within the acceptance criteria of 10CFR100. The
secondary system pressures are well below 110X of the design pressure limitsensuring the integrity of these systems.
IJ
REFERENCES
(1) Letter from E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., ANPP, to G. W. Knighton, NRC, dated
September 19, 1984, ANPP-30572. Subject: Steam Generator Tube Rupture
Analysis.
(2) Letter from E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., ANPP, to G.'. Knighton, NRC, dated
October 5, 1984, ANPP-30746. Subject: , Steam Generator Tube Rupture
Analysis.
(3) Letter from E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., ANPP, to, G. W. Knighton, NRC, dated!
October 24, 1984, ANPP-30938. Subject: Steam Generator, Tube Rupture
Analysis.
(4) Letter from E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., ANPP, to G. W. Knighton, NRC, dated
October 15, 1985, ANPP-33713. Subject: Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray
Design.
C
TABLE 1
SE UENCE OF EVENTS FOR A STEAM GENERATOR TUBE
RUPTURE WITH A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
AND FULLY STUCK OPEN ADV
(Auxiliary Spray System Inoperable)(Sheet 1 of 3)
(8ec) EventSetpoint*or Value Success'Path or Comment
0.0
40
40
47
47.15
48
51
Tube Rupture Occurs ~
Third Charging Pump Started,feet below program level
-0.75
CPC Hot Leg Saturation TripSignal Generated
Trip Breakers Open
Turbine/Generator Trip
Loss of Offsite Power
Letdown Control Valve ', -0.75Throttled Back to Minimum Flow,feet below program level
Primary System IntegrityI
t\
Primary System"Integrity
Reactivity Control
Reactivity Control
Secondary System Integrity
52
52
LH Main Steam Safety ValvesOpen, psia
RH Main Steam Safety ValvesOpen, psia
1265
1265
Secondary System Integrity
Secondary System Integrity
56
121
Maximum SteamGenerator PressuresBoth Steam Generators, psia
Steam Generator Water LevelReaches Auxiliary FeedwaterActuation Signal (AFAS)Analysis Setpoint in UnaffectedGenerator, percent wide rangelevel
1330
25 Secondary System Integrity
122 AFAS Generated
TABLE 1
SE UENCE OF EVENTS FOR A STEAM GENERATOR TUBERUPTURE WITH A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
AND FULLY STUCK OPEN ADV(Auxiliary Spray System Inoperable)
(Sheet 2 of 3)
(Sec) EventSetpoint*or Value Success Path or Comment
131
132
Steam Generator Water LevelReaches AFAS Analysis Setpointin the Affected Generator,percent wide range level
AFAS Generated
25 Secondary System Integrity
167.0 Auxiliary Feedwater Initiatedto Unaffected Steam Generator
Secondary System Integrity
177.0 Auxiliary Feedwater Initiatedto Affected Steam Generator
Secondary System Integrity
460 Operator Initiates PlantCooldown by Opening One ADVon Each SG —ADV of theAffected SG InstantaneouslyOpens Fully
Reactor Heat Removal
484 Pressurizer Empties
513 MSIS Actuation, SecondaryPressure, psia
919 Secondary System Integrity
535 Automated Isolation of AFW toAffected SG, hP SGs, psi
581 Pressurizer Pressure ReachesSafety Injection ActuationSignal (SIAS) AnalysisSetpoint, psia
581 Safety Injection ActuationSignal Generated
185
1578(1837)
Secondary System Integrity
Reactivity Control
581 Safety Injection FlowInitiated
Reactivity Control
655 Operators Overrides the AFW
Isolation Signal and StartsFeeding the Affected SG withAFW
-7-
TABLE 1
SE UENCE OF EVENTS FOR A STEAM GENERATOR TUBERUPTURE WITH A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
AND FULLY STUCK OPEN ADV(Auxiliary Spray System Inoperable)
(Sheet 3 of 3)
(Sec) EventSetpoint*or Value Success Path or Comment
775
895
Operator Takes Manual Controlof the AFW System, FeedsAffected SG with Both AFW
Pumps
Operators Shuts the ADV ofthe Unaffected Steam Generator
1347
7200
Level in the Affected SG Abovethe Top of U-tubes, percentwide range
Operator Opens PressurizerSteam Vent
71.5
8666
8906
Pressurizer Level, percent
Operator Throttles HPSI PumpFlow to Allow RCS Depressuriza-tion and Reduce the LeakFlow Rate
33
221106
28,800
Pressurizer Heaters Actuated,Pressurizer Gas Vent Closedto Maintain SubcoolingCriteria, 'F
Shutdown Cooling EntryConditions are Reached RCS
psia/'F
20
400/350
28,800 Operator Activates ShutdownCooling System
Where the Technical Specification (TS) Setpoint is different from whatwas used, the TS value is listed in parenthesis for reference.
1J
4
TABLE 2
RADIOLOGICAL CONSE UENCES OF THE STEAM GENERATOR
TUBE RUPTURE WITH A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
AND FULLY STUCK OPEN ADV(Auxiliary Spray System Inoperable)
Offsite Doses Rems
Location
l. Exclusion Area Boundary0-2 hr. Thyroid
2. Low Population Zone OuterBoundary 0-8 hr. Thyroid
GIS
, 22
PIS
208
44
RADIOLOGICAL CONSE UENCES'OF THE STEAM GENERATOR
TUBE RUPTURE WITH A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
AND FULLY STUCK OPEN ADVAPSS OPERATION AT 1015 SECONDS
(PVNGS FSAR APPENDIX 15A)
Offsite Doses Rems
Location GIS PIS
l. Exclusion Area Boundary0-2 hr. Thyroid
2. Low Population Zone OuterBoundary 0-8 hr. Thyroid
40
20
200
41
W
I
FI6IJRE 1
CORE POWER VS. Tlj'1E
(SHEET 1 OF 2)
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
100
80
60
00
20
.0 1200 2400 5600 4800
TINE,'ECONDS
6000 720I
0
I'
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
Figure 1
CORE POWER VS. TIME
(Sheet 2 of 2)
120
- 100
I—„
I
800
CLI
GG
CL
40
Qi
5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000TIME SECONGS
FIGURE 2
RCS PRESSVRE VS. TINE
.(SHEET 1 OF 2)
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH IOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
2500
2000
li00
oooo
500
03.200 2000 5600
TINE,'ECGNDS
~800 6000 72Ca
J
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
. Figure 2
RCS PRESSURE VS. TIME
(Sheet 2 of 2)
2SGQOperator'takes control of plant -'pens one ADV in each Sfl
2000 Operator opens pressurizer steam vent
1500Operator throttles HPSI flow toreduce RCS'ressure whils maintainingpressurizer level and 20 F subcoolinq
1000
SGO RCS reaches shutdowncooling entry conditions
0,,
5000 10000 15000 20000 25GOQ 30000,TIME SECONOS
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
FIGURE 3
{:QRP COOLANT TENPERATURES VS, TII'IE
(SHEET 1'OF 2)
650
S75
~HOT LEG
cn 50Q
I'25 AVERAGE
35Q
COLO L
2?5
1200 2400 '600 4800 6000 7"CQ
TtSE, SECONDS
I
I
II'!
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
Figure 3
CORE COOLANT TEMPERATUREVS. TIME
(Sheet 2 of 2)
575
500 HOT LEG
425 AVERAGE
275
COLD LEG
2000 5000 10000 15000 20000 '5000. 30000
TINE. SECONDS
1'
4
FIGURE '4
UppER Hgg T@pERATURE YS, TINE
(SHEET 1 OF 2>
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
.' '00
550
500
450
400
5001200 2400 5600
TIi'IE, SECONDS
4800 6000
,II
t
l
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE
WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANE
A FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERIC
DUMP VALVE,(ASSUMING AUXILIARYPZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
Figure 4
UPPER HEAD TEMPERATURE VS. TIME
(Sheet 2 of 2)
650
600
55G
I— ~
5GO
450
400
5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000TINE, SECONDS
!
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE {ASSUMINQ AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)FIr.USE 5
PRESSURI2ER MATER VOLUNE VS, TINE
(SHEET' OF 2)
20QQ
1500
1000
SOO
-5001200 2000 3600
TlNE, SECONDS
~SCO 66'4 J 7200
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
Figure 5
PRESSURIZER WATER
VOLUME VS. TIME
(Sheet 2 of 2)
2000
1500
OPERATOR THROTTLES HPSI FLOW TO REDUCE RCS
PRESSURE WHILE MAINTAININGPRESSURIZER
LEVEL AND 20 F SUBCOOLING
1000
SQO
0 OPERATOR OPENS''PRESSURIZERSTEAM VENT
-5000 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
TINE SECONGS
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)FIGURE 6
LAID L~yEL ggyP 7)p OF HOT LEGS
(SHEET 1 OF 2>
ZOOO
TOP OF Rv
- 1600
1200
800
a 000
TOP OF HOT LEG
00 1200 2000 560Q 4800 6000
TIiNE, SECONDS
7)PIO
,0 0,
If
li
III
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND
A FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERIC
DUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARYPZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
Figure 6
LI(UID LEVEL ABOVE TOPOF HOT LEGS
(Sheet 2 of 2)
2000
1600
Top of Reactor Vessel
I—CD
1200CD
I—UJ 4)
e
C C~
800UJ)CD
400
00 5000 10000 15000
Top of HotLegs
0 0
TIME, SECONDS
ll
FIGURE 7
RC$ LIQUID NASS VS, TINE
(SHEET 1 0F 2)I
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
@no
550
5On
1200 2400 5600 4809
TI~E, SECONDS
6000 7200
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
Figure 7
RCS LIgUID MASS VS. TIME
(Sheet 2 of 2)
700000
650000
600000
A
55GOOO
5GOOOO
450000
4ooaao0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 3000
TINE, SECONDS
P
i
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMINQ AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
FIGURE 8
STEN GENERATOR PRESSURE VS, TINE
(SHEET 1 OF 2)
1000
1200
IOOO
800
600 IJNFFECTED SS
200
1200 2400 3600 4800TtrlE, SECONDS
7200
L
1400
e
Figure 8
'TEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE
VS. TIME(Sheet 2 of 2)
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE
WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND
A FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERIC
DUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARYPZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
1200
1000
MSIVS CLOSE
800
600
400UNAFFECTED SG
200 ~AFFECTED SG
05000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
TIME SECONDS
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)FIGURE 9
I,INTEGRATED ARI Ff OIP| TO AFFECTED SG VS, TIt'IE
.(SHEET 1,0F 2>
800
CD
600
I~<00
200
1200 2~OO 3i00 4800 6000 7,| g
TI~E, SECONDS
I
0 0
I
!1
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREPITH LOSS OP OPESITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
Figure 9
INTEGRATED AFM FLOW TOAFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR VS. TIME
(Sheet 2 of 2)
1 2E+06
1 OE+06
800000
C5
600000
400000
200000
ip5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 3000(
TINE. SECONDS
j
t
FIGURE 10
TUBE LEAK RATE VS TIL'lE
(SHEET 1 OF 2)
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND
A FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
70
w 50
00
3'0
10
1200 2'0 5600
TAHE, SECONDS
~800 6000 72QG
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
Figure 10
TUBE LEAK RATE VS. 'TIME
(Sheet 2 of 2)
70
60
PressurizerSteam Vent Opened
40
30OperatorOpens AOV
20
10,5000 10000 15000 200QO 25000 30000
TINE, SECONOS
II
II
FIGURE 11
INTEGRATED LEAK FLQH VS. TIPIE
(SHEET 1 OF 2)
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
1200
IQOO
n 800
Q
600
000
200
1200 2400 3600 'SCOTIME, SECONDS
6000 7<".0
f
~ Y
1.2E+06
Figure 11
INTEGRATEO LEAK FLOW
VS. TIME
(Sheet 2 of 2)
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE
WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND
A FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
1.0E+06
800000
A
C)
~ ~ 600000Cl
400000
200000
05000 10000 15000 20QOO 25000 3000(
TINE SECONDS
I
l
0STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE
WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
FIGURE 12
FRACTION OF LEAKED ACTIVITY
RELEASED IMMEDIATELYVS. TIME
(SHEET 1 of 2)
1200 2400 3600
Ttr~f, SKCG'rOS
~HQQ
1
~ I
0
Figure 12
FRACTION OF LEAKED ACTIVITY
RELEASED IMMEDIATELYVS. TIME
(Sheer 2 of 2)
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
F 16
F 12
~ 08
~ 04Affected Steam t)eneratorLevel Above Top of
U-Tubes
~ 005000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
TINE. SECONOS
l
FIGURE 13
STEN GENERATOR NASS YS,. TII1E
,(SHEET 1,0F 2)
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
AFFECTED SG
UVi AFFECTED SG
1200 2400 5600 6000 7200
TINE, SECONDS
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND
A FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
Figure 13
STEAM GENERATOR MASS
VS. TIME
(Sheet 2 of 2)
S40000
450000
360000
270000AFFECTEDSTEAM GENERATOR
18GQOO UNAFFECTEDSTEAM GENERATOR
90000 ~ OPERATOR FEEDS AFFECTED STEAN
GENERATOR WITH BOTH AFW PUMPS
00 SGOQ 10000 1SGOO 20000 2SGOQ 3000C
TIME . SECONDS
II
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER ANDA FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)FI6URE 10
IATE(yTg) g)V FLOW VS.. TINE
(SHEET 1 OF 2)
15CO
1200
900
600
500
0
0 1200 2400 5600 4800
TtHE; SECONDS
6000 7200
I(
f"
4
t
t
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTUREWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND
A FULLY STUCK OPEN ATMOSPHERICDUMP VALVE (ASSUMING AUXILIARY
PZR SPRAY IS INOPERABLE)
1 8E+06
Figure 14
INTEGRATED ADV fLOW
VS. TINE
(Sheet 2 of 2)
1.5E+06
o 1..ZE+06)C5
ClI-
900000
600000
'00000
5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 3000TIME SECON'OS
II
yl
h
t
ATTACHMENT 2
SCHEDULE FOR IMPLEMENTATION
OF MODIFICATIONS DESCRIBED IN
ANPP 33713 J DATED OCTOBER 15 ~ 1985
Three modifications were discussed in detail in Attachment 3 of Reference l.These modifications can be briefly described as: 1) provide power to Valves
CH-501 and CH-536 from a lE Motor Control Center (MCC), 2) enhanced automatic
realignment to the refueling water tank (RWP) and, -3) enhanced volume control
tank (VCT) level instrumentation.
The schedule for implementation for all of the modifications for each PVNGS
Unit is as follows:
PVNGS Unit 1: Following completion of engineering and procurement,
currently in process, implementation will be during the
first outage of sufficient duration but not later than the
completion of the first refueling outage.
PVNGS Unit 2: Prior to exceeding 5% power.
PVNGS Unit 3: Prior to fuel load.
0
I
REFERENCES
(1) Letter to G. V. Knighton, NRC, from E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., ANPP, dated
October 15, 1985 (ANPP-33713); Subject: Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray
Design
ATTACHMENT 3
ADDITIONALCONSIDERATIONS TO
ANPP 33713@ DATED OCTOBER 15'985
In addition to the items already considered in Reference 1, the NRC staffrequested that ANPP review four additional areas of concern. The descriptionand results of ANPPs evaluation for each of the items are described below.
Item 1: RWZ Level Evaluation
&e NRC concern was with respect to the availability of the auxiliarypressurizer spray system (APSS) for the Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)
event as described in Reference 1 (APSS actuation at 7200 seconds into theevent). The concern is based on the fact that the charging pumps (which
provide flow for the APSS) draw their suction from the high suction nozzle on
the refueling water tank (RWl').
Assuming that the RWT level is at its low level alarm setpoint, there would
still be 25,000 gallons of water above the high suction nozzle in the RUT when
the operator actuates the shutdown cooling system and the auxiliarypressurizer spray system is no longer needed. Even if the RVZ levelcorresponds to the Technical Specification minimum required volume, the RNT
level would not drop below the high suction nozzle until after approximately5-1/2 hours following event initiation. The referenced analysis indicatesthat the RCS pressure and temperature at this time would be approximately 260
psia and 390- F, respectively. A more aggressive cooldown would allow normal
shutdown cooling entrance conditions to be reached within 5-1/2 hours insteadof the currently assumed value of 8 hours. In addition; 5-1/2 hours is ample
time for the operator to realign the charging pump suction to the lower nozzle
on the RNT. Therefore, the RNT has sufficient inventory to satisfy the amount
of water required for APSS availability.
$
Item 2: Verification of ui ent Qualification
The NRC requested that ANPP verify that Valve CH-239 and the heat exchanger
CHE-E01 are qualified.
CH-239 — Fisher pneumatically operated valve has been verified to meet therequirements of the mechanical equipment and seismic qualification
programs'he
ASCO solenoid has been verified to meet the requirements of theenvironmental and seismic qualification programs.
The NAMCO position switches have been verified to meet the
requirements of the environmental and seismic qualification. programs.
CHE-EOl — Regenerative heat exchanger has been verified to meet the'equirementsof the mechanical equipment and seismic qualification
programs.
Item 3: Descri tion of Preventative Maintenance (PM) Pr ram and ASME Section
~XI Testin
lhe NRC has requested that ANPP provide a description of the PM program
performed on the volume control tank (VCT) level instrumentation and the ASME
Section XI testing that is performed on Valves CH-239, CH-240 and CH-501.
These descriptions are provided below.
PM on The VCT Level Instrumentation
'lhe water level in the reference leg is checked daily. This check consists of
connecting a pressurized water source to the reference leg and monitoring the
VCT level transmitter output (via a trace from the plant computer) for any
change in the VCT indicated level. If the data obtained justifies a less
frequent monitoring interval, ANPP will propose a different interval to the
NRC staff.
t
r
I
p
]
ASME Section XI Testin Pro ram on Valves CH-239 CH-240 and CH-501
These valves will be tested as part of the Section XI valve testing program.
These valves will be full stroke tested during cold shutdowns per ASNE SectionXI Article IWV-3412.
Item 4: Valves CH-532 and CH-524
To ensure a flow path to the APSS, ANPP will lock open Valves CH-524 and
CH-532. In addition to locking open CH-524, MPP will also remove power fromthe valve. Implementation of these modifications, for each PVNGS Unit, willbe performed consistent with the schedule provided in Attachment 2 of thisletter.
0 I4
I
II
REFERENCES
(1) Letter to G. W. Knighton, NRC, from E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., ANPP, dated
October 15, 1985 (ANPP-33713); Subject: Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray
Design
~
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P
4
1
~ AR s I)$' 'ISTRIBUTION
0~et-Fi.l e~LPDRPRC SystemPBD7 ReadingJLee
DOCKET NO(S). STN 50-528Hr. E. E. Van Brunt, JreExecutive Vice PresidentArizona Nuclear Power ProjectPost Office Box 52034Phoanic,, Arizona„ 85072-2034
SUBJECT: ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COIIPANYPALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1
The following documents concerning our review of.the subject facility are transmitted for your information.
D Notice of Receipt of Application, dated
D Draft/Final Environmental Statment, dated
CI Notice of Availabilityof Draft/Final Environmental Statement, dated
CI Safety Evaluation Report, or Supplement No. , dated
CI Notice of Hearing on Application for Construction Permit, dated
D Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Facility Operating License, datedB4-Meekly
Ijg)ggggp Notice; Applications and Amendments to Operating Licenses Involving:no Significant HazardsConsiderations, dated 2).
O Application and Safety Analysis Report, Volume
D Amendment N'o. to Application/SA R dated
D Construction Permit No. CPPR-
O Facility Operating License No.
, Amendment No.
, Amendment No.
dated
, dated
O Order Extending Construction Completion Date, dated
D Other (Specifyf
Enclosures:As stated
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
'ee next page
OPSICK~
SURNAME&
OAVe> 86~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
NRC FORM 3'18 (1/84) NRCM 0240
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t~ j+UNtTED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
kNR 3 lauu
DOCKET NO(S). STN 50-528Nr. E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.Executive Vice PresidentArizona Nuclear Power ProjectPost Office Box 52034Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034
~ SUBJECT: ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANYPALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1
The following documents concerning our review of the subject facility are transmitted for your information.
D Notice of Receipt of Application, dated
D Draft/Final Environmental Statment, dated
D Notice of Availabilityof Draft/Final Environmental Statement, dated
D Safety Evaluation Report, or Supplement No. , dated
D Notice of Hearing on Application for Construction Permit, dated
D Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Facility Operating License, datedBi-Meekly
GB NCN8$ Notice; Applications and Amendments to Operating Licenses Involving no Significant HazardsConsiderations, dated 2 12 86 See a e 5282) .
D Application and Safety Analysis Report, Volume
D Amendment No. to Application/SAR dated
D Construction Permit No. CPPR-, Amendment No. dated
D Facility Operating License No. , Amendment No. , dated
D Order Extending Construction Completion Date, dated
D Other (Specify)
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:As stated
cc'ee next page
-- rv ~
Hr. E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.Arizona Nuc>ear Power Proiect Pal o Verde
CC:Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.Snell 5 Wilmer3100 Valley CenterPhoenix, Arizona 85073
- Nr. James N. Flenner, Chief CounselArizona Corporation Commission1200 West WashinqtonPhoenix, Arizona 85007
Charles R. Kocher, Esq. AssistantCouncil
James A. Boeletto, Esq.Southern California Edison CompanyP. 0. Box 800Rosemead, California 91770
Nr. Nark GinsbergEnerqy DirectnrOffice of Economic Planninq
and Development1700 West Washinaton - 5th floorPhoenix, Arizona 85007
Mr. Wayne ShirleyAssistant Attorney GeneralBataan Memorial BuildinqSanta Fe, New Mexico 87503
Nr. Roy ZimmermanU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionP. 0. Box 239Arlington, Arizona 85322
Ns. Patricia Lee Hourihan6413 S. 26th StreetPhoenix, Arizona 85040
Regional Administrator, Reqinn VU. S. Nuclear Requlatory Commission1450 Maria LaneSuite 210Walnut Creek, California 94596
Kenneth Berlin, Esq.Winston & StrawnSuite 5002550 M Street, NW
Washinaton, DC 20037
Ns. Lynne BernabeiGovernment Accountability Proiect
of the Institute fnr Policy Studies1901 Que Street, NW
Washinqton, DC 20009
Ns. Jill Morrison522 E. ColgateTemoi, Arizona 85238
Mr. Charles B. Brinkman, ManagerWashinaton Nuclear Opera tinnsCombustion Engineering, Inc.7910 Woodmont Avenue Suite 1310Bethesda, Maryland 20814
Nr. Ron RavnerP. 0. Box 1509Goodyear, AZ 85338
ChairmanArizona Corporation Commission2222 West WashingtonPhoenix, Arizona 85007
Arizona Radiation Regulatory AgencyATTN: Ms. Clara Palovic, Librarian925 South 52nd StreetTempe, Arizona 85238
Hr. Charles Tedford, DirectorArizona Radiation Regulatory Agency924 South 52nd Street, Suite 2Tempe, Arizona 85281
ChairmanMaricopa County Board of SupervisorsillSouth Third AvenuePhoenix, Arizona 85003