Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra...

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Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets

Transcript of Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra...

Page 1: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

Office of Information Technologies

CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management

Christopher Misra14 February 2008

Tempe, AZ

Protecting Network Assets

Page 2: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

Agenda- DRAFT, needs to be updates

Automated Security and Policy Enforcement• History• New Challenges

Background/Roles of:• NAC• IdM• Network Segmentation

What might we do?• Firewall traversal

Grid case Standards

Page 3: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

Session Abstract

Can IAM be helpful in managing network intrusions and access policies?

Can IAM correctly correlate identity to an endpoint device by combining network registration and personal identification?

Can coupling network capabilities and IAM replace the use of IP addresses as the criterion for access with identity, roles, and related attributes?

This session will explore these questions and how one can identify the person behind the device or address.

Page 4: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

Managing Network Intrusions?

Initial NAC deployments were not driven by architectural decisions• Large numbers of unmanaged systems connected to

campus network• Primarily in residence halls

• Battle scars from Code Red, Nimda, and Blaster

However, we did leverage campus IAM successfully• And we effectively created a device registry

• Even if we didn’t integrate this data with our IAM

Page 5: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

How we got here…or, before NAC was cool… Why “Automate Security and Policy

Enforcement”?From the SALSA-Netauth document Strategies for Automating Network Policy Enforcement:

“(A) major security challenge facing university residential networks and other large-scale end-user networks is the thousands of privately owned and unmanaged computers directly connected to an institution's relatively open, high-speed Internet connections. Security policy enforcement is often lax due to a lack of central control over end-user computers and an inability to tie the actions of these computers to particular individuals. A few times a year there are surge events, including the predictable start of each semester and the unpredictable and increasingly frequent reactions to large-scale security incidents, that require massive support intervention.

Page 6: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

Even though it wasn’t cool, we implemented NAC

Detection

Take Enforcement Action and return to Policy Decision

Remediation

Notification

Isolation

PolicyEnforcement

Applied

Network Transitions

to New State

Network Transitions to a fully compliant or

non-compliant final state .

Policy Action :None Required

Policy Action : Move to new state

Policy Action :EnforcementAction Required

External Event Occurs – Policy Decision Check

Required

Workflow Diagram

Policy Decision

Lookup to Policy

Repository

Detection

Page 7: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

And here we are…I guess NAC is cool now..

Network Access Control: Vendor Definitions

“Using the network infrastructure to enforce security policy compliance on all devices seeking to access network computing resources” – Cisco

“…combines user identity and device security state information with network location information, to create a unique access control policy…“ - Juniper

Page 8: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

Why did we implement NAC systems?

Only automated approaches can scale and respond rapidly to large-scale incidents.

Preventative policy enforcement reduces risk:• overall number of security vulnerabilities• the success of any particular attack technique.

Automated remediation systems have a positive impact on a large number of hosts with a relatively small time investment from computing staff.

Page 9: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

Network Access Control

Higher education created many early systems of what is now termed NAC (Network Access Control)• Southwestern Netreg, CMU Netreg,

Packetfence, others

Currently there are many commercial offerings in the space• 30+ vendors at last count• Major deployments by Cisco, Microsoft, Juniper

and others

Page 10: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

Network Access Control in Higher Ed

Characteristics of higher ed networks lead to unique challenges• Large numbers of unmanaged systems

connected to campus network• Residence halls• Heterogeneous computing base• Frequently no ubiquitous administration

structure• Complex network Use Cases

Page 11: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

Network Access Control in Higher Ed

Associating a device with an identity• Is the user a member of the campus community?• Leveraging campus IdM

Determining a host’s posture• Is the host compliant with local policy?• Measuring device state against campus IT security

standards

Role-based network assignment• What network perimeter is appropriate for this host?• vLAN, subnet, firewalls, ids

Page 12: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

NAC Basics

Registration options include:• Open DHCP (“free love”)• DHCP with MAC registration (“netreg”)• Web middlebox (“portal”)• 802.1x (“supplicant”)

Enforcement types include:• vLAN isolation/DHCP scope isolation• Network-based firewall/Host-based filters• Class of Service (rate limit)

Page 13: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

NAC: Posture assessment

Original implementations used active network-based scanning• Windows XP SP2 rained on this parade• But security staff didn’t compliance

Many sites migrated to client-based posture assessment• Running code on endpoints to validate

compliance• Could be implemented in the 802.1x supplicant

Page 14: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

NAC is Complicated

Administrative Domain (AD)

Access Requestor (AR)

Network Node Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)

Network Element

Network Detection Point (NDP )

Network Element

Policy Decision Point (PDP)

Policy Server

Identity / Integrity

Request

Request

AAA/Policy Query

AAA/PolicyQueryTerminology

PDP – Policy Decision Point (RFC 2753 )PEP – Policy Enforcement Point (RFC 2753 )AR – Access Requestor (TCG TNC & RFC 2906 )AD – Administrative Domain (RFC 2753 )

Data Repository (DR)

Policy,Authentication ,

Authorization DB

Identity / Integrity

Decision

Decision

Page 15: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

Federations have a role here also

Enable members of one institution to authenticate to the wireless network at another institution using their home credentials • E,g, eduroam which stands for Education Roaming, is a

RADIUS-based infrastructure that uses 802.1X security technology to allow for inter-institutional roaming.

• “Being part of eduroam allows users visiting another institution connected to eduroam to log on to the WLAN using the same credentials(username and password) the user would use if he were at his home institution. “

Effectively need to achieve identity discovery Also applicable to Grid environments

Page 16: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

Correlating identity to device to privilege

We’ve done a pretty effective job so far• But the drivers were not traditional IAM drivers

Can we assign a meaningful Level of Assurance to this correlation?• Not so sure.

Are we willing to use this correlation to grant privileges?• Dynamic vLAN assignments?• Firewall traversal capabiltiies?

Page 17: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

Correlating identity to device to privilege

We need to understand the relationship between user identity, device identity, and host integrity (posture)• This is complicated further in a federated environment

Does (user + device) == privilege?• What about users with multiple roles?

Is this a network, security, or idm problem?• D) All of the above

Perhaps we need to step back and take an architectural view of this…

Page 18: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

Drivers for NAC standards

Community desire for interoperable components• Heterogeneous campus environment

Modular network architecture• Ability to use commercial and open source components

• Vendor-made switches• Open-source registration and remediation

Page 19: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.

NAC Standards space

Trusted Computing Group• Trusted Network Connect

Vendor ‘standards’• Cisco NAC• Microsoft NAP

IETF NEA• Chartered only for client-server protocols

Page 20: Office of Information Technologies CAMP: Bridging Security and Identity Management Christopher Misra 14 February 2008 Tempe, AZ Protecting Network Assets.